In following changes we will need to override ftrace direct attachment
behaviour. In order to do that we are adding struct bpf_trampoline_ops
object that defines callbacks for ftrace direct attachment:
register_fentry
unregister_fentry
modify_fentry
The new struct bpf_trampoline_ops object is passed as an argument to
__bpf_trampoline_link/unlink_prog functions.
At the moment the default trampoline_ops is set to the current ftrace
direct attachment functions, so there's no functional change for the
current code.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260606123955.345967-6-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Adding mutex lock pool that replaces bpf trampolines mutex.
For tracing_multi link coming in following changes we need to lock all
the involved trampolines during the attachment. This could mean thousands
of mutex locks, which is not convenient.
As suggested by Andrii we can replace bpf trampolines mutex with mutex
pool, where each trampoline is hash-ed to one of the locks from the pool.
It's better to lock all the pool mutexes (32 at the moment) than
thousands of them.
There is 48 (MAX_LOCK_DEPTH) lock limit allowed to be simultaneously
held by task, so we need to keep 32 mutexes (5 bits) in the pool, so
when we lock them all in following changes the lockdep won't scream.
Removing the mutex_is_locked in bpf_trampoline_put, because we removed
the mutex from bpf_trampoline.
Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260606123955.345967-5-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The cgroup shim runs under rcu_read_lock_dont_migrate(), so we should
not attach any sleepable BPF programs there. Add support to the verifier
to explicitly reject attempts to load sleepable BPF programs destined
for LSM cgroup attachment.
Without this, we get the following splat from a BPF_LSM_CGROUP
program marked BPF_F_SLEEPABLE attached to file_open when it calls
bpf_get_dentry_xattr():
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1567
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 34317, name: load
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 2, expected: 0
Call Trace:
down_read+0x76/0x480
ext4_xattr_get+0x11f/0x700
__vfs_getxattr+0xf0/0x150
bpf_get_dentry_xattr+0xbb/0xf0
bpf_prog_e76a298dac9218c6_test_open+0x6a/0x85
__cgroup_bpf_run_lsm_current+0x326/0x840
bpf_trampoline_6442534646+0x62/0x14d
security_file_open+0x34/0x60
do_dentry_open+0x340/0x1260
vfs_open+0x7a/0x440
path_openat+0x1bac/0x30a0
libbpf provides a .s named section variant for every sleepable
program type except lsm_cgroup, reflecting that per-cgroup LSM programs
are intended to only run in a non-sleepable context.
The above splat was obtained by bypassing libbpf by using bpf(2)
directly.
Fixes: 69fd337a97 ("bpf: per-cgroup lsm flavor")
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260605145707.608579-1-dwindsor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Constant pointer arithmetic on a PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS register lands the
constant in reg->var_off (e.g. flow_keys(imm=4096)), but the
PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS path in check_mem_access() passes only insn->off to
check_flow_keys_access() and never folds reg->var_off.value. The
verifier therefore accepts an access that, at runtime, dereferences past
struct bpf_flow_keys -- a verifier/runtime divergence that yields an
out-of-bounds read and write of kernel stack memory.
Commit 022ac07508 ("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for
pointers") removed the generic "off += reg->off" that check_mem_access()
applied before the per-type dispatch and replaced it with per-path
folding of reg->var_off.value (for example the ctx path now folds the
register offset via check_ctx_access()). The PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS path was
not given the equivalent fold, so a constant offset that used to be
folded and rejected is now silently accepted:
before 022ac0750883: the offset stays in reg->off and is folded
generically, so the access is checked with off=4096 and rejected.
after 022ac0750883: the offset lands in reg->var_off, the flow_keys
path checks off=0 and accepts; at runtime the access dereferences
base + 0x1000.
For a BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR program the following is accepted:
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 144) ; R2=flow_keys (PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS)
r2 += 0x1000 ; R2=flow_keys(imm=4096), accepted
r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0) ; accepted, var_off.value=0x1000 ignored
while the equivalent insn->off form
r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0x1000)
has the same effective offset but is correctly rejected with
"invalid access to flow keys off=4096 size=8", which isolates the defect
to the missing var_off fold. Once attached as a flow dissector, the
accepted program reads kernel stack past struct bpf_flow_keys (a
kernel-stack / KASLR information leak) and can likewise write past it,
corrupting kernel memory.
Fix it by folding reg->var_off.value into the offset before the bounds
check and rejecting non-constant offsets, mirroring the other pointer
types (e.g. check_ctx_access()).
Fixes: 022ac07508 ("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for pointers")
Signed-off-by: Nuoqi Gui <gnq25@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260606-c3-01-v3-v3-1-97c51f592f15@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add support for extended attributes on bpffs inodes so that user space
and BPF LSM programs can attach metadata, for example, a content hash
or a security label - to a pinned object or directory. BPF LSM or user
space tooling can then uniformly look at this (e.g. security.bpf.*) in
similar way to other fs'es. The store is in-memory and non-persistent:
it lives only for the lifetime of the mount, like everything else in
bpffs. The modelling is similar to tmpfs.
bpffs serves the trusted.* and security.* namespaces; user.* is left
unsupported. As bpffs is FS_USERNS_MOUNT, security.* is reachable by
the unprivileged mounter in a user namespace, and thus we are using
the simple_xattr_set_limited infra there (trusted.* needs global
CAP_SYS_ADMIN).
bpf_fill_super() is open-coded instead of using simple_fill_super(),
because the root inode must now be allocated through bpf_fs_alloc_inode()
i.e. carry the bpf_fs_inode wrapper and come from the right cache -
which requires s_op (and s_xattr) to be installed before the first
inode is created. While at it, also harden s_iflags with SB_I_NOEXEC
and SB_I_NODEV.
bpf_fs_listxattr() is only reachable through the filesystem via
i_op->listxattr, so the BPF token inode is left untouched. Name-based
fsetxattr()/fgetxattr() on a token fd still work since the get/set
handlers are installed at the superblock.
For security.* namespace, we use simple_xattr_set_limited() but
there was no simple_xattr_add_limited() API yet which was needed
in bpf_fs_initxattrs() to avoid underflows in the accounting. The
symlink target is freed in bpf_free_inode() rather than in
bpf_destroy_inode() so that it is released only after an RCU grace
period, as an RCU path walk following the symlink may still
dereference inode->i_link in security_inode_follow_link(). Lastly,
the bpf_symlink() allocated the symlink target is switched to
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, so the string is charged to the caller's memcg.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602074012.416289-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
BPF_PROG_LOAD verifies the loader signature but does not record the
outcome on the BPF program. [BPF] LSMs and audit can read attr->signature
and attr->keyring_id to infer "was this signed, and if so, against which
keyring".
Add prog->aux->sig (verdict + keyring_{type,serial}), populated by
bpf_prog_load before the LSM hook. keyring_type classifies the keyring
the load referenced (builtin, secondary, platform or user), while
keyring_serial records the serial of the keyring the signature was
actually validated against. System keyrings carry a pseudo key pointer
with no user-visible serial and are reported as 0, as are unsigned loads.
Failed verifications reject the load before the hook runs, so it observes
only either UNSIGNED or VERIFIED.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260605213518.544262-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The bpf_set_retval() helper is used by cgroup BPF programs to set the
return value of the target hook. The argument type for this helper is
ARG_ANYTHING. This allows setting a positive value, which no cgroup
hook expects and can cause issues, such as:
- BPF_LSM_CGROUP: a positive value from bpf_lsm_socket_create bypasses
the err < 0 check in __sock_create(), leaving the socket object
unallocated. The positive return value is then propagated to the
syscall entry __sys_socket(), which also bypasses the IS_ERR() guard
and ultimately causes a NULL pointer dereference.
- BPF_CGROUP_DEVICE: a positive value can be returned through cgroup
device bpf prog -> devcgroup_check_permission() -> bdev_permission()
-> bdev_file_open_by_dev(), where ERR_PTR(positive) produces a pointer
that IS_ERR() does not catch, leading to a wild pointer dereference.
- BPF_CGROUP_SOCK: a positive value can be returned through cgroup sock
bpf prog -> __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sk() -> inet_create() ->
__sock_create(), where inet_create() frees the newly allocated sk
via sk_common_release() and sets sock->sk = NULL on the non-zero
return, but __sock_create() only checks err < 0 for cleanup, so a
positive retval bypasses cleanup and returns a socket with NULL sk
to userspace, triggering a NULL pointer dereference on subsequent
socket operations.
- BPF_CGROUP_SYSCTL: a positive value can be returned through the cgroup
bpf prog -> __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl() -> proc_sys_call_handler(),
where a non-zero return bypasses the normal sysctl proc_handler and is
returned directly to userspace as return value of read() or write()
syscall.
So add validation for the argument of the bpf_set_retval() helper.
For BPF_LSM_CGROUP, enforce the LSM hook specific range returned by
bpf_lsm_get_retval_range().
For all other cgroup program types, restrict the argument to
[-MAX_ERRNO, 0], which matches the kernel convention of 0 for success
and negative errno for error.
BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT is an exception, since valid getsockopt
implementations may return positive values, as allowed by commit
c4dcfdd406 ("bpf: Move getsockopt retval to struct bpf_cg_run_ctx").
Also refine the return value range of bpf_get_retval() so that
values returned by bpf_get_retval() can be passed directly to
bpf_set_retval() without extra manual bounds checking.
Fixes: b44123b4a3 ("bpf: Add cgroup helpers bpf_{get,set}_retval to get/set syscall return value")
Fixes: 69fd337a97 ("bpf: per-cgroup lsm flavor")
Reported-by: Quan Sun <2022090917019@std.uestc.edu.cn>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/567d3206-74a5-44e5-99c6-779c425f399e@std.uestc.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260605140243.664590-3-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Commit 4e63acdff8 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_sysctl_{get,set}_new_value
helpers") changed the success return value to 0, but failed to update the
corresponding check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since
bpf_prog_run_array_cg() now returns 0 on success, the legacy ret == 1
condition is never satisfied. As a result, the modified value is ignored,
and bpf_sysctl_set_new_value() fails to replace the write buffer.
Fix this by checking for a return value of 0 instead, so cgroup/sysctl
programs can correctly replace the pending sysctl buffer.
This bug was discovered during a manual code review. Tested via a
cgroup/sysctl BPF reproducer overriding writes to a target sysctl.
Pre-fix, bpf_sysctl_set_new_value("foo") was silently ignored: the write
returned 8192 and the value remained "600". Post-fix, the BPF replacement
buffer properly propagates: the write returns 3 and the value updates to
"foo".
Fixes: f10d059661 ("bpf: Make BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY return -err instead of allow boolean")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-4-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
proc_sys_call_handler() allocates its temporary sysctl buffer with
kvzalloc() and passes it to __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since
kvzalloc() may fall back to vmalloc() for large allocations, freeing
that buffer with kfree() is wrong and can corrupt memory.
Use kvfree() to safely handle both kmalloc and kvzalloc()/vmalloc
allocations.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
present in v7.1-rc5.
Reproduced the bug based on v7.1-rc4 in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with
KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. To exercise the replacement path, the
test tree also included the accompanying fix for the stale ret == 1
check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). The reproducer confines
failslab injections to the proc_sys_call_handler() range, uses
stacktrace-depth=32, and injects fail-nth=1 while writing 8191 bytes to
/proc/sys/kernel/domainname from a task in the target cgroup. Under
that setup, fail-nth=1 triggered the fault:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb0200024d48
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 209 Comm: repro_proc_sys_ Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-00686-g97625979a5d4 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:kfree+0x6e/0x510
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x626/0xc30
__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x74d/0xc30
? __pfx___cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x10/0x10
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x345/0x870
? proc_sys_call_handler+0x250/0x480
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
proc_sys_call_handler+0x3a2/0x480
? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500
? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120
vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000
...
</TASK>
With this fix applied on top of the same test setup, rerunning the
reproducer with fail-nth=1 yields no corresponding Oops reports.
Fixes: 4508943794 ("proc: use kvzalloc for our kernel buffer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-3-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
When writing to sysctls, proc_sys_call_handler() guarantees that the
buffer passed to proc handlers is NUL-terminated. If
bpf_sysctl_set_new_value() replaces the pending sysctl value, it can
hand a replacement buffer directly to proc handlers. However, the
helper currently copies only buf_len bytes into that buffer without
appending a NUL terminator, leaving downstream parsers vulnerable to
out-of-bounds access.
Fix this by appending a '\0' after the replaced value to restore the
expected sysctl semantics. Since the helper already rejects buf_len
greater than PAGE_SIZE - 1, there is always room for the extra byte.
Reproduced in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with KASAN while exercising
the sysctl replacement path with a cgroup/sysctl BPF program. The
reproducer targets `/proc/sys/net/core/flow_limit_cpu_bitmap`, fills
the original user write buffer with non-zero bytes, and overrides the
sysctl value so the replacement buffer lacks a terminating NUL. Under
that setup, the pre-fix kernel reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strnchrnul+0x72/0x90
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800de57000 by task repro_patch3/66
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 66 Comm: repro_patch3 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc3-00269-g8370ca1f87cc #6 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
print_report+0xcb/0x5e0
? __virt_addr_valid+0x21d/0x3f0
? strnchrnul+0x72/0x90
? strnchrnul+0x72/0x90
kasan_report+0xca/0x100
? strnchrnul+0x72/0x90
strnchrnul+0x72/0x90
bitmap_parse+0x37/0x2e0
flow_limit_cpu_sysctl+0xc6/0x840
? __pfx_flow_limit_cpu_sysctl+0x10/0x10
? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x5ba/0x870
proc_sys_call_handler+0x31d/0x480
? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10
? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500
? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120
vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000
...
</TASK>
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 4096-byte region [ffff88800de56000, ffff88800de57000)
With this fix applied, rerunning the same sysctl-targeted path yields
no corresponding KASAN reports.
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-2-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Since there're 4 bytes padding at the end of struct bpf_prog_info, they
won't be checked by bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero().
pahole -C bpf_prog_info ./vmlinux
struct bpf_prog_info {
...
__u32 attach_btf_obj_id; /* 220 4 */
__u32 attach_btf_id; /* 224 4 */
/* size: 232, cachelines: 4, members: 38 */
/* sum members: 224 */
/* sum bitfield members: 1 bits, bit holes: 1, sum bit holes: 31 bits */
/* padding: 4 */
/* forced alignments: 9 */
/* last cacheline: 40 bytes */
} __attribute__((__aligned__(8)));
If a future kernel extension adds a new 4-byte field, older userspace
programs allocating this structure on the stack might inadvertently pass
uninitialized stack garbage into the new field, permanently breaking
backward compatibility. -- sashiko [1]
Fix it by changing sizeof(info) to
offsetofend(struct bpf_prog_info, attach_btf_id).
And, add "__u32 :32" to the tail of struct bpf_prog_info.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260513224823.6494FC19425@smtp.kernel.org/
Fixes: aba64c7da9 ("bpf: Add verified_insns to bpf_prog_info and fdinfo")
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260605155249.20772-3-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
bpf_rb_root_free() detaches the root by copying the current rb_root_cached
and then replacing the live root with RB_ROOT_CACHED. It then walks the
copied root and drops each object contained in the tree.
This leaves the rb node state intact while dropping the object. If the
object is refcounted and survives the drop, its bpf_rb_node_kern still
contains an owner pointer to the freed root and stale rb tree linkage. If
a later bpf_rb_root allocation reuses the same address, bpf_rbtree_remove()
can incorrectly pass the owner check and call rb_erase_cached() on a node
whose rb pointers belong to the old tree.
Mirror the list draining behavior by marking nodes as busy while the root
is being detached, then clear the rb node and release the owner before
dropping the containing object. This makes surviving nodes unowned and
safe to reject from remove or accept for a later add.
Fixes: 9c395c1b99 ("bpf: Add basic bpf_rb_{root,node} support")
Signed-off-by: Kaitao Cheng <chengkaitao@kylinos.cn>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260605094143.5509-1-kaitao.cheng@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
check_ids() warned when it ran out of idmap slots, assuming this was
impossible because the slots are bounded by the number of registers and
stack slots. That assumption no longer holds: referenced dynptrs acquire
an intermediate reference that lives in refs[] but is not backed by any
register or stack slot [0], so a program can accumulate more reference
ids than the idmap can hold and exhaust it.
Exhaustion is fine for verification correctness. check_ids() already
returns false, which makes the states compare as not equivalent and
prevents unsound pruning. The only effect of the WARN_ON_ONCE() is log
noise, or a panic under panic_on_warn. Drop the warning and keep
returning false.
[0] 308c7a0ae8 ("bpf: Refactor object relationship tracking and fix dynptr UAF bug")
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260605202056.1780352-5-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
refsafe() compared each reference's id and type but not its parent_id,
so two states whose PTR references differ only in the parent object they
were derived from could be wrongly treated as equivalent and pruned. Fix
it by checking parent_id too.
Fixes: 308c7a0ae8 ("bpf: Refactor object relationship tracking and fix dynptr UAF bug")
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260605202056.1780352-4-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
When acquiring references for struct_ops program arguments tagged with
"__ref", the return value of acquire_reference() was stored directly
into u32 ctx_arg_info[i].ref_id without checking for failure.
acquire_reference() returns -ENOMEM when acquire_reference_state() fails
to allocate, so the error was silently stored as a ref_id instead of
aborting verification. Fix it by checking the return.
Fixes: a687df2008 ("bpf: Support getting referenced kptr from struct_ops argument")
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260605202056.1780352-3-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
acquire_reference() returns a signed int that may be a negative errno
but was converted to unsigned, which makes the subsequent error check
deadcode. Fix it by declaring 'id' as int so the error path is taken
correctly.
Fixes: 308c7a0ae8 ("bpf: Refactor object relationship tracking and fix dynptr UAF bug")
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260605202056.1780352-2-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
apply_range_set_cb() maps the pages for a new arena allocation and returned
-EBUSY when the target PTE was already populated. Kernel-fault recovery
leaves the per-arena scratch page in unallocated arena PTEs, so a later
bpf_arena_alloc_pages() over such a page hits that -EBUSY, and every
subsequent allocation of it fails the same way. Allocation must install the
real page over scratch instead.
Overwriting the scratch PTE in place is a valid->valid change, which arm64
forbids without break-before-make. Route through an invalid entry instead:
ptep_try_set() fills only a none slot, so the PTE goes scratch->none->page.
On finding scratch, clear it and flush_tlb_before_set() before retrying. The
new flush_tlb_before_set() is a no-op except on arches like arm64 that need
the break-before-make TLB invalidate. The loop also copes with a concurrent
fault re-scratching the slot.
Arches without ptep_try_set() never install the scratch page, so keep the
must-be-empty check and set_pte_at() for them.
Fixes: dc11a4dba2 ("bpf: Recover arena kernel faults with scratch page")
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601183728.1800490-1-tj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Devmap broadcast redirects clone the packet for all but the last
destination.
For native XDP, that clone path copies only the linear xdp_frame data,
while fragmented frames keep skb_shared_info in tailroom outside the
linear area. Cloning such a frame leaves XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set but
without valid frag metadata, and the later free path can interpret
uninitialized tail data as skb_shared_info, leading to an out-of-bounds
access during frame return.
Reject fragmented native XDP frames in dev_map_enqueue_clone().
Add the same restriction to the generic XDP clone path in
dev_map_redirect_clone(). Generic XDP represents fragmented packets as
nonlinear skbs, and rejecting them here keeps clone-based broadcast
support aligned between native and generic XDP.
Fixes: e624d4ed4a ("xdp: Extend xdp_redirect_map with broadcast support")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zhao Zhang <zzhan461@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/21c2d153dd25603d359069a02bf06779b51f6423.1780385378.git.zzhan461@ucr.edu
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Search for duplicated kfunc in btf_vmlinux and btf_modules
before a kernel module attempts to register a kfunc.
If kfunc would shadow existing kfunc then pr_err() and
reject module loading.
Reviewed-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Song Chen <chensong_2000@126.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603091910.7212-1-chensong_2000@126.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Specialize the lookup/update/delete paths for keys whose size matches
sizeof(long) (4 bytes on 32-bit, 8 bytes on 64-bit). A static-const
rhashtable_params lets the compiler inline a custom XOR-fold hashfn and
a single-word equality cmpfn, eliminating the indirect jhash dispatch.
The same hashfn and cmpfn are installed into rhashtable's stored params
at rhashtable_init time, so the rehash worker, slow-path inserts, and
rhashtable_next_key() all agree with the inlined fast paths.
The seq_file BPF iterator uses rhashtable_walk_* and is unaffected.
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260605-rhash-v7-7-5b8e05f8630d@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add support for timers, workqueues, task work, spin locks and kptrs.
Without this, users needing deferred callbacks, BPF_F_LOCK, or
refcounted kernel pointers in a dynamically-sized map have no option -
fixed-size htab is the only map supporting these field types.
Resizable hashtab should offer the same capability.
kptr semantics under in-place updates are identical to array map.
Properly clean up BTF record fields on element delete and map
teardown by wiring up bpf_obj_free_fields through a memory allocator
destructor, matching the pattern used by htab for non-prealloc maps.
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260605-rhash-v7-6-5b8e05f8630d@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Implement get_next_key, batch lookup/lookup-and-delete, for_each_map_elem
callback, and the seq_file BPF iterator for BPF_MAP_TYPE_RHASH.
get_next_key() and batch use rhashtable_next_key() — stateless,
matches the syscall UAPI shape (no kernel-side iterator state).
get_next_key falls back to the first key when prev_key was
concurrently deleted (matches htab semantics). Batch reports
cursor loss as -EAGAIN so userspace can distinguish it from
end-of-iteration (-ENOENT) and restart from NULL.
The seq_file BPF iterator uses rhashtable_walk_* instead. It runs
only from read() syscall context, so the walker's spin_lock is
safe, and seq_file's per-fd state lets the walker handle rehash
correctly (retry on -EAGAIN) for stronger coverage than the
stateless API can provide.
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260605-rhash-v7-5-5b8e05f8630d@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Use rhashtable_lookup_likely() for lookups, rhashtable_remove_fast()
for deletes, and rhashtable_lookup_get_insert_fast() for inserts.
Updates modify values in place under RCU rather than allocating a
new element and swapping the pointer (as regular htab does). This
trades read consistency for performance: concurrent readers may
see partial updates. BPF_F_LOCK support and special-field
handling (timers, kptrs, etc.) follow in a later commit.
Initialize rhashtable with bpf_mem_alloc element cache. Require
BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC. Limit max_entries to 2^31. Free elements via
rhashtable_free_and_destroy().
Signed-off-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260605-rhash-v7-4-5b8e05f8630d@meta.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
zap_vma_range() requires the owning mm's mmap_lock to be held.
Taking mmap_read_lock under arena->lock would AB-BA against
arena_vm_close() and arena_map_mmap(), both of which run with
mmap_write_lock held and then acquire arena->lock. Instead drop
arena->lock, mmget_not_zero() the vma's mm, take mmap_read_lock, and
re-resolve the vma via find_vma() since it may have been unmapped or
replaced while waiting.
Track processed vmls with a per-call generation in vml->zap_gen and
serialize zap_pages() callers with a new arena->zap_mutex so
concurrent callers on different uaddr ranges do not mark each other's
vmls processed before the zap is done.
Reported-by: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>
Fixes: 317460317a ("bpf: Introduce bpf_arena.")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260528222014.38980-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Refactor the newly introduced btf_scan_decl_tags() to improve
readability and maintainability. The current implementation uses a
manual if-else chain and a magic number offset to strip the "arg:"
prefix from declaration tags.
Replace the if-else logic with a table-driven approach using a static
const array. This separates the tag data from the scanning logic, making
the helper more extensible for future tags. Additionally, replace the
magic number '4' with a sizeof-based calculation on the prefix string to
ensure the offset remains synchronized with the search key.
Finally, optimize the loop by moving the is_global check to the top of
the block. This allows the verifier to fail-fast on static subprograms
without performing unnecessary BTF string and type lookups.
Signed-off-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603201822.770596-1-mattbobrowski@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Exclusive maps (aka excl_prog_hash) are meant to be reachable only
from the single program whose hash matches. This is enforced by
check_map_prog_compatibility() when the map is referenced from a
program such as signed BPF loaders.
A bpf_map_elem iterator, however, binds its target map at attach
time in bpf_iter_attach_map() instead of referencing it from the
program, so the exclusivity check is never reached. On top of that,
the iterator exposes the map value as a writable buffer.
Fixes: baefdbdf68 ("bpf: Implement exclusive map creation")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260602133052.423725-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
commit 4f375ade6a ("bpf: Avoid RCU context warning when unpinning
htab with internal structs") moved inode cleanup from ->free_inode()
into ->destroy_inode() to avoid sleeping in RCU context when calling
bpf_any_put(). However this removed the RCU delay on freeing the
inode itself and the cached symlink body (i_link), both of which
can be accessed by RCU pathwalk (pick_link, may_lookup etc.).
This causes a use-after-free when a concurrent unlinkat() drops the
last inode reference and destroy_inode() frees the inode immediately,
while another task is still walking the path in RCU mode and reads
inode->i_opflags (offset +2) inside current_time() -> is_mgtime().
KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in is_mgtime include/linux/fs.h:2313
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8880407e4282 (offset +2 = i_opflags)
The rules (per Al Viro):
->destroy_inode() called immediately, can sleep, use for blocking
cleanup e.g. bpf_any_put()
->free_inode() called after RCU grace period, use for freeing
inode and anything RCU-accessible e.g. i_link
Fix: split the two concerns properly:
- keep bpf_any_put() in bpf_destroy_inode() since it is blocking
and needs to run promptly
- introduce bpf_free_inode() to handle kfree(i_link) and
free_inode_nonrcu() with proper RCU delay, preventing the UAF
Fixes: 4f375ade6a ("bpf: Avoid RCU context warning when unpinning htab with internal structs")
Reported-by: syzbot+36e50496c8ac4bcde3f9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=36e50496c8ac4bcde3f9
Suggested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260423043906.GN3518998@ZenIV/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260602002607.110866-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/T/ [v1]
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260602025249.113828-1-kartikey406@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
BPF subprogs currently only return void or scalar values. However,
it is also safe to return arena pointers between subprogs in the same
BPF program: Arena pointers are guaranteed to be safe for both programs
at any point. Expand the verifier to permit returning an arena pointer
to the caller.
The main subprog is still not allowed to return an arena pointer because
arena pointers are internal to the BPF program, and the return values
permitted for each main subprog depend on the program type anyway.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260602004120.17087-4-emil@etsalapatis.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The BTF parsing logic for function arguments goes through
the arguments' decl tags, but does not go into their type
tags. Add type tag parsing for function arguments.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260602004120.17087-3-emil@etsalapatis.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The loader verifies map->sha against the metadata hash in its
instructions. map->sha is calculated when BPF_OBJ_GET_INFO_BY_FD is
called on the frozen map.
While the map is frozen, the /signed loader/ must also ensure the map
is exclusive, as, without exclusivity (which a hostile host could just
omit when loading the loader), another BPF program with map access can
mutate the contents afterwards, so the check passes on stale data.
With the extra check as part of the signed loader, it now refuses to
move on with map->sha validation if the host set it up wrongly.
Fixes: fb2b0e2901 ("libbpf: Update light skeleton for signing")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-4-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
bpf_map_get_info_by_fd() is the only caller of the ->map_get_hash
and always invokes it with hash_buf == map->sha and hash_buf_size
of SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE. array_map_get_hash() in turn lets sha256()
write the digest directly into that buffer (map->sha) and then
performs a trailing memcpy(), which evaluates to memcpy(map->sha,
map->sha, 32): a redundant self-copy. The hash_buf_size argument
was never used at all. Simplify this a bit, no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-3-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
An exclusive map (created with excl_prog_hash) is bound to a single
program by hash: check_map_prog_compatibility() refuses to load any
program whose digest does not match map->excl_prog_sha. That check
only runs for maps a program references directly, i.e. its used_maps.
A map reached at runtime through a map-of-maps is never in used_maps,
and bpf_map_meta_equal() does not consider excl_prog_sha, so an
exclusive map can be inserted into a non-exclusive outer map and
then looked up and mutated by an unrelated program, bypassing the
exclusivity guarantee.
For the signed loader this defeats the metadata map exclusivity check
added in the signed loader: the cached map->sha[] is validated against
the signed hash while another program on a hostile host rewrites the
frozen map's contents through the outer map.
Fixes: baefdbdf68 ("bpf: Implement exclusive map creation")
Reported-by: sashiko <sashiko@sashiko.dev>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
When checking whether a referenced dynptr can be overwritten,
destroy_if_dynptr_stack_slot only counted sibling dynptrs in the
current call frame. If a clone sharing the same virtual ref parent
existed in a different frame (e.g., passed to a subprog), it would
not be counted, causing the verifier to incorrectly reject the
overwrite with "cannot overwrite referenced dynptr".
Fix by extracting the counting into dynptr_ref_cnt() which uses
bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate_mask() to scan dynptr stack slots across
all call frames.
Fixes: 017f5c4ef7 ("bpf: Allow overwriting referenced dynptr when refcnt > 1")
Reported-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529014936.2811085-10-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Introduce release_reg() to consolidate the release logic shared by both
helpers and kfuncs: dynptr release, kptr_xchg percpu-to-RCU conversion,
regular reference release, and NULL pass-through. NULL pass-through is
only allowed if the prototype indicates the argument may be null.
Determine release_regno from the function prototype/metadata before
argument checking, rather than discovering it dynamically during
argument processing. For helpers, scan the arg_type array in
check_func_proto() via check_proto_release_reg(). For kfuncs, set
release_regno to BPF_REG_1 in bpf_fetch_kfunc_arg_meta() when
KF_RELEASE is set. In the future when we start adding decl_tag to
kfunc arguments, we can just look at the function prototype instead
of a release_regno.
Extract ref_convert_alloc_rcu_protected() and
invalidate_rcu_protected_refs() to make it more clear what the code is
doing. For ref_convert_alloc_rcu_protected(), it pre-converts
MEM_ALLOC | MEM_PERCPU registers to MEM_RCU (clearing id so they
survive), then calls release_reference() to invalidate the remaining
registers and release the reference state.
Add KF_RELEASE to bpf_dynptr_file_discard() so its release_regno is set
via fetch_kfunc_meta rather than being assigned manually in the dynptr
argument processing. Set arg_type to ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR for
KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR so that check_func_arg_reg_off() correctly allows
non-zero stack offsets for dynptr release arguments same as helper.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529014936.2811085-9-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Helpers and kfuncs independently tracked referenced object metadata
using standalone id fields in their respective arg_meta structs.
This led to duplicated logic and inconsistent error handling between the
two paths.
Introduce struct ref_obj_desc to consolidate id and parent_id along with
a count of how many arguments carry a reference. Add update_ref_obj() to
populate it from a bpf_reg_state, replacing open-coded assignments in
check_func_arg(), check_kfunc_args(), and process_iter_arg(). Add
validate_ref_obj() to check for ambiguous ref_obj before using it.
For ref_obj releasing helpers and kfuncs, keep checking it before
calling update_ref_obj() for now. A later patch will make these
functions not depending on ref_obj. For other users of ref_obj, move the
checks to the use locations. For helper, this means moving the checks
inside helper_multiple_ref_obj_use() to use locations.
is_acquire_function() is dropped as ref_obj is never used.
Pass ref_obj_desc into process_dynptr_func()/mark_stack_slots_dynptr()
instead of a bare parent_id to make it less confusing.
Drop the selftest introduced in 7ec899ac90 ("selftests/bpf: Negative
test case for ref_obj_id in args") since the verifier no longer
complains about ambiguous ref_obj if it is not used.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529014936.2811085-8-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
unmark_stack_slots_dynptr() already makes sure that CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR
cannot be released. process_dynptr_func() also prevents passing
uninitialized dynptr to helpers expecting initialized dynptr. Now that
unmark_stack_slots_dynptr() also reports error returned from
release_reference(), there should be no reason to keep these redundant
checks.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529014936.2811085-7-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Refactor object relationship tracking in the verifier and fix a dynptr
use-after-free bug where file/skb dynptrs are not invalidated when the
parent referenced object is freed.
Add parent_id to bpf_reg_state to precisely track child-parent
relationships. A child object's parent_id points to the parent object's
id. This replaces the PTR_TO_MEM-specific dynptr_id.
Remove ref_obj_id from bpf_reg_state by folding its role into the
existing id field. Previously, id tracked pointer identity for null
checking while ref_obj_id tracked the owning reference for lifetime
management. These are now unified: acquire helpers and kfuncs set id
to the acquired reference id, and release paths use id directly.
Add reg_is_referenced() which checks if a register is referenced by
looking up its id in the reference array. This replaces all former
ref_obj_id checks.
For release_reference(), invalidating an object now also invalidates
all descendants by traversing the object tree. This is done using
stack-based DFS to avoid recursive call chains of release_reference() ->
unmark_stack_slots_dynptr() -> release_reference(). Referenced objects
encountered during tree traversal are reported as leaked references.
Add parent_id to bpf_reference_state to enable hierarchical reference
tracking. When acquiring a reference, a parent_id can be specified to
link the new reference to an existing one (e.g., referenced dynptrs
acquire a reference with parent_id linking to the parent object's
reference).
Pointer casting:
For pointer casting helpers (bpf_sk_fullsock, bpf_tcp_sock), instead of
propagating ref_obj_id, the cast result reuses the same reference id as
the source pointer. Since the cast may return NULL for a non-NULL input,
the NULL case is explored as a separate verifier branch. This allows
releasing any of the original or cast pointers to invalidate all others.
Referenced dynptrs:
When constructing a referenced dynptr, acquire a intermediate reference
with parent_id linking to the parent referenced object. The dynptr and
all clones share the same parent_id (pointing to the intermediate ref)
but get unique ids for independent slice tracking. Releasing a
referenced dynptr releases the parent reference, which in turn
invalidates all clones and their derived slices.
Owning to non-owning reference conversion:
After converting owning to non-owning by clearing id (e.g.,
object(id=1) -> object(id=0)), the verifier releases the reference
state via release_reference_nomark().
Note that the error message "reference has not been acquired before" in
the helper and kfunc release paths is removed. This message was already
unreachable. The verifier only calls release_reference() after
confirming the reference is valid, so the condition could never trigger
in practice.
Fixes: 870c28588a ("bpf: net_sched: Add basic bpf qdisc kfuncs")
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529014936.2811085-6-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Assign reg->id when getting referenced kptr from read program context
to be consistent with R0 of KF_ACQUIRE kfunc. skb dynptr will track the
referenced skb in qdisc programs using a new field reg->parent_id in
a later patch.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529014936.2811085-4-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Simplify dynptr checking for helper and kfunc by unifying it. Remember
the initialized dynptr (i.e.,g !(arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT)) pass to a
dynptr kfunc during process_dynptr_func() so that we can easily
retrieve the information for verification later. By saving it in
meta->dynptr, there is no need to call dynptr helpers such as
dynptr_id(), dynptr_ref_obj_id() and dynptr_type() in check_func_arg().
Remove and open code the helpers in process_dynptr_func() when
saving id, ref_obj_id, and type.
Besides, since dynptr ref_obj_id information is now pass around in
meta->bpf_dynptr_desc, drop the check in helper_multiple_ref_obj_use.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529014936.2811085-3-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Rename mark_stack_slot_obj_read() as mark_stack_slots_scratched() and
directly call it from functions processing iter, dynptr and irq_flag.
Commit 6762e3a0bc ("bpf: simplify liveness to use (callsite, depth)
keyed func_instances") has removed the dynamic liveness component in
mark_stack_slot_obj_read(). The function effectively only marks stack
slots as scratched and always succeed. Therefore, return void, drop the
unused bpf_reg_state argument and rename it to
mark_stack_slots_scratched() to reflect what it does now.
In addition, to prepare for unifying dynptr handling, dynptr_get_spi()
will be moved out of mark_dynptr_read(). As mark_dynptr_read() would join
mark_iter_read() as a thin wrapper of mark_stack_slots_scratched(), just
open code these helpers.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529014936.2811085-2-ameryhung@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
If security_bpf_prog_load() fails there is no need to call into
security_bpf_prog_free() as the LSM will handle the cleanup of any partial
LSM state before returning to the caller with an error. Thankfully this
isn't an issue with any of the existing code as the LSMs which currently
provide BPF hook callback implementations don't allocate any internal
state, but this is something we want to fix for potential future users.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260523160025.16363-2-paul@paul-moore.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Global subprogram argument checking derives generic pointer sizes from BTF
and passes the resolved size to check_mem_reg() as a u32. The access-size
validation path then uses a signed int, and stack pointers negate the value
before calling check_helper_mem_access().
This creates a wrap when BTF describes a pointee size larger than S32_MAX.
For example, a global subprogram argument of type:
int (*p)[0x3fffffff]
has a BTF-resolved pointee size of 0xfffffffc bytes. At a call site the
caller can pass a pointer to a 4-byte stack slot at fp-4. The current
PTR_TO_STACK path computes:
size = -(int)mem_size
so 0xfffffffc becomes -4 as a signed int and the negation validates only
a 4-byte stack range. That range is covered by the caller's stack slot,
so the call is accepted.
The callee is then verified independently with R1 as PTR_TO_MEM and
mem_size 0xfffffffc. A small instruction such as:
r0 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 4)
is accepted as being inside that BTF-described memory region. At run time,
however, the actual argument value is still fp-4, so r1 + 4 addresses fp+0,
outside the 4-byte object that the caller provided.
Reject sizes that cannot be represented by the verifier's signed
access-size API before the stack-specific negation. Add a verifier
regression test for the oversized BTF argument.
Fixes: 2cb27158ad ("bpf: poison dead stack slots")
Signed-off-by: Taegu Ha <hataegu0826@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260528062155.3988156-1-hataegu0826@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
BPF_PROG_QUERY writes back the 'query.revision' field unconditionally to
userspace. If userspace passes a smaller 'bpf_attr' structure (e.g. 40
bytes, which was the layout before the addition of 'query.revision'),
the kernel performs an out-of-bounds write.
Fix this by propagating the user-provided attribute size 'uattr_size'
down to the cgroup query handlers, and conditionally skipping writing
the revision field to userspace when the provided buffer size is
insufficient.
query.revision in bpf_mprog_query is structurally identical to the
cgroup case: a late tail field, written unconditionally.
But the backward-compat hazard is not the same.
The min-historical-size test is per command, and bpf_mprog_query only
serves attach types that were born with revision in the struct:
- tcx_prog_query -> BPF_TCX_INGRESS/EGRESS
- netkit_prog_query -> BPF_NETKIT_PRIMARY/PEER
tcx, netkit, the revision field, and bpf_mprog_query itself all landed in
the same v6.6 merge window (053c8e1f23 added the mprog query API +
revision; tcx in e420bed025, netkit in 35dfaad718). There has never
been a tcx/netkit BPF_PROG_QUERY userspace that doesn't know about
revision. So for these commands the minimum legitimate struct already
covers offset 56-64 — no old binary can be broken here.
Contrast with cgroup: BPF_PROG_QUERY on cgroup attach types shipped in
2017; revision write-back was bolted on years later (1209339844). That
path has a real population of pre-revision callers.
Fixes: 1209339844 ("bpf: Implement mprog API on top of existing cgroup progs")
Cc: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuyang Huang <yuyanghuang@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260531075600.4058207-2-yuyanghuang@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Pages that BPF arena code maps are allocated through
bpf_map_alloc_pages(), which does not allocate folios but pages.
In the future, pages will not have a mapcount, only folios will.
Converting the code to use folios and rely on folio_mapped() sounds like
the wrong approach.
Should BPF arena code allocate folios and use folio_mapped() here? But
likely we would not want to use folios here longterm, as we don't really
need folio information.
Hard to tell. But in the meantime, we can simply use the page refcount
instead, as a heuristic whether the page might be mapped to user space and
we would want to try zapping it, so we can get rid of page_mapped().
Page allocation will give us a page with a refcount of 1. Any user space
mapping adds a page reference. While there can be references from other
subsystems (e.g., GUP), in the common case for this test here relying on
the page count is good enough.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260427-page_mapped-v1-2-e89c3592c74c@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Cc: Harry Yoo <harry@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Cc: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Cc: Liam R. Howlett <liam@infradead.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Because there is time gap between bpf_map_new_fd() and close_fd(), a
concurrent thread is able to close the new fd and opens a new, unrelated
file with the exact same fd number. Thereafter, this close_fd() might
inadvertently close the unrelated file.
To avoid such regression, do finalize log before security_bpf_map_create().
However, in order to achieve it, move bpf_get_file_flag(),
security_bpf_map_create(), bpf_map_alloc_id(), and bpf_map_new_fd() from
__map_create() to map_create(). And, rename __map_create() to
map_create_alloc() meanwhile.
Then, in order to reuse the map and token when all checks pass in
map_create_alloc(), pass "struct bpf_map **" and "struct bpf_token **" to
map_create_alloc().
Fixes: 49f9b2b2a1 ("bpf: Add syscall common attributes support for map_create")
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260521142909.95818-1-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Stack traces often contain adjacent IPs from the same VMA or from
different VMAs backed by the same ELF file. Cache the last successfully
parsed build id together with the resolved VMA range and backing file
so the sleepable build id path can avoid repeated VMA locking and file
parsing in common cases.
Suggested-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Ihor Solodrai <ihor.solodrai@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260525223948.1920986-4-ihor.solodrai@linux.dev
On configs with CONFIG_BPF=y but CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=n (e.g. arm
multi_v7_defconfig), kernel/bpf/core.c defines a __weak
bpf_arena_handle_page_fault() while bpf_defs.h already supplies a static
inline stub for it, causing a redefinition error. Build the __weak
definition only under CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL, matching the bpf_defs.h
declaration and the CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL-gated strong definition in arena.c.
Fixes: dc11a4dba2 ("bpf: Recover arena kernel faults with scratch page")
Reported-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260527192632.2109419-1-tj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Tejun Heo says:
====================
This makes BPF arena memory directly dereferenceable from kernel code
(struct_ops callbacks, kfuncs). Each arena gets a per-arena scratch page
that an arch fault hook installs into empty PTEs on kernel-side faults,
after KFENCE. The faulting instruction retries and the violation is reported
through the program's BPF stream.
v4:
- Patch 1: note that the strict-zero cmpxchg is narrower than pte_none() in
inline comments on both x86 and arm64. (Andrea)
- Patch 2: stub bpf_arena_handle_page_fault() for !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL via a
new include/linux/bpf_defs.h. (lkp)
- Patch 7: scx_arena_alloc() retries via a loop instead of a single retry on
pool growth. (Andrea)
- Picked up Reviewed-by tags from Emil and Andrea.
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260520235052.4180316-1-tj@kernel.org
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260517211232.1670594-1-tj@kernel.org
v1 (RFC): https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260427105109.2554518-1-tj@kernel.org
Motivation
----------
sched_ext's ops_cid.set_cmask() hands the BPF scheduler a struct scx_cmask
*. The kernel translates a kernel cpumask to a cmask, but it had no way to
write into the arena, so the cmask lived in kernel memory and was passed as
a trusted pointer. BPF cmask helpers all operate on arena cmasks though, so
the BPF side had to word-by-word probe-read the kernel cmask into an arena
cmask via cmask_copy_from_kernel() before any helper could touch it. It
works, but is clumsy.
The shape isn't unique to set_cmask. Sub-scheduler support is on the way and
more sched_ext callbacks will want to pass structured data to BPF. Anywhere
a kfunc or struct_ops callback wants to hand a struct to a BPF program,
arena residence is the natural answer.
Approach
--------
Each arena gets a per-arena scratch page. Arenas stay sparsely mapped as
today - PTEs are populated only for allocated pages. A new arch fault hook
(bpf_arena_handle_page_fault) is wired into x86 page_fault_oops() and arm64
__do_kernel_fault(), after KFENCE. When a kernel-side access faults inside
an arena's kern_vm range, the helper walks the stack to find the BPF program
responsible, range-checks the fault address against prog->aux->arena, and
atomically installs the scratch page into the empty PTE via the new
ptep_try_set() wrapper. The kernel instruction retries and reads/writes the
scratch page. Free paths and map destruction treat scratch as non-owned.
Real allocation refuses to overwrite scratch (apply_range_set_cb returns
-EBUSY). A scratched address stays dead until map destroy, since its
presence means the BPF program has already malfunctioned.
The mechanism is default behavior - no UAPI flag.
What this preserves
-------------------
All the debugging properties of today's sparse-PTE design are preserved:
* BPF programs still fault on unmapped arena accesses. The fault semantics
(instruction retry with rdst = 0) and the violation report through
bpf_streams are unchanged for prog-side accesses.
* The first kernel-side touch of an unmapped address is reported via
bpf_streams the same way as a prog-side fault, with the stack walk
attributing it to the originating prog.
* User-side fault on a never-scratched address still lazy-allocates a real
page (or returns SIGSEGV under BPF_F_SEGV_ON_FAULT). User-side fault on a
scratched address SIGSEGVs.
What changes for the kernel-side caller is just that an unmapped deref no
longer oopses - it retries through the scratch page and emits a violation
report. The same shape today's BPF instruction faults have.
Patches 1-2 (atomic PTE install + arena scratch-page recovery)
--------------------------------------------------------------
mm: Add ptep_try_set() for lockless empty-slot installs
bpf: Recover arena kernel faults with scratch page
Patches 3-5 (helpers used by struct_ops registration)
-----------------------------------------------------
bpf: Add sleepable variant of bpf_arena_alloc_pages for kernel callers
bpf: Add bpf_struct_ops_for_each_prog()
bpf/arena: Add bpf_arena_map_kern_vm_start() and bpf_prog_arena()
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260522172219.1423324-1-tj@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
struct bpf_arena is opaque to callers outside arena.c. Add two helpers
for struct_ops subsystems that need to reach into an arena:
bpf_arena_map_kern_vm_start(struct bpf_map *map)
returns @map's kern_vm_start. A sched_ext follow-up needs this
to translate kern_va <-> uaddr.
bpf_prog_arena(struct bpf_prog *prog)
returns the bpf_map of the arena referenced by @prog (NULL if
@prog references no arena). The verifier enforces at most one
arena per program. Used by struct_ops callers that auto-discover
an arena from a member prog and need to take a map reference.
Suggested-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260522172219.1423324-6-tj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add a helper that walks the member progs of the struct_ops map
containing a given @kdata vmtable. struct_ops ->reg() callbacks (and
similar) sometimes need to inspect the loaded BPF programs, e.g. to
discover maps they reference via prog->aux->used_maps.
The implementation mirrors bpf_struct_ops_id(): container_of @kdata
to recover the bpf_struct_ops_map, then iterate st_map->links[i]->prog
for i in [0, funcs_cnt). Same access pattern, no new locking - by the
time ->reg() fires st_map is fully populated and stable.
A sched_ext follow-up walks the member progs of a cid-form scheduler's
struct_ops map, reads prog->aux->arena directly, and requires all member
progs to reference exactly one arena, without requiring the BPF program
to call a registration kfunc.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260522172219.1423324-5-tj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The existing kernel-side export of bpf_arena_alloc_pages is _non_sleepable
only - it's used by the verifier to inline the kfunc when the call site is
non-sleepable. There is no sleepable equivalent for kernel callers. The
kfunc bpf_arena_alloc_pages itself is BPF-only.
sched_ext needs sleepable kernel-side allocs for its arena pool init/grow
paths. Add bpf_arena_alloc_pages_sleepable() mirroring the _non_sleepable
wrapper but passing sleepable=true to arena_alloc_pages().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260522172219.1423324-4-tj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
BPF arena usage is becoming more prevalent, but kernel <-> BPF communication
over arena memory is awkward today. Data has to be staged through a trusted
kernel pointer with extra code and copying on the BPF side. While reads
through arena pointers can use a fault-safe helper, writes don't have a good
solution. The in-line alternative would need instruction emulation or asm
fixup labels.
Enable direct kernel-side reads and writes within GUARD_SZ / 2 of any
handed-in arena pointer, without bounds checking. A per-arena scratch page
is installed by the arch fault path into empty arena kernel PTEs - x86 from
page_fault_oops() for not-present faults, arm64 from __do_kernel_fault() for
translation faults, both after the existing exception-table and KFENCE
handling. The faulting instruction retries and the access is also reported
through the program's BPF stream, preserving error reporting.
bpf_prog_find_from_stack() resolves the current BPF program (and its arena)
from the kernel stack - no new bpf_run_ctx state is added. Recovery covers
the 4 GiB arena plus the upper half-guard (GUARD_SZ / 2). The lower
half-guard is excluded because well-behaved kfuncs only access forward from
arena pointers. The kfunc-author contract - access at most GUARD_SZ / 2 past
a handed-in pointer - is documented in Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst.
The install is lock-free via ptep_try_set(). On race-loss the winning
installer's PTE is already valid, so the access retry succeeds. The arena
clear path uses ptep_get_and_clear() so installer and clearer race through
atomic accessors. No flush_tlb_kernel_range() afterwards. Stale "not mapped"
entries just cause one extra re-fault, cheaper than a global IPI on every
install.
Scratch exists only to keep the kernel from oopsing on an in-line arena
access. Its presence at a PTE means the BPF program has already
malfunctioned, and the violation is reported through the program's BPF
stream. The only requirement for behavior on a scratched PTE is that the
kernel doesn't crash. In particular, any user-side access through such a PTE
may segfault. The shared scratch page is freed once during map destruction.
BPF instruction faults continue to use the existing JIT exception-table
path. This patch changes only the kernel-text fault path. No UAPI flag is
added. The new behavior is the default.
v2: Use ptep_get_and_clear() in apply_range_clear_cb(). (David)
v3: Stub bpf_arena_handle_page_fault() for !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL. (lkp)
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260522172219.1423324-3-tj@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add three kfuncs for BPF linked list queries:
- bpf_list_is_first(head, node): true if node is the first in the list.
- bpf_list_is_last(head, node): true if node is the last in the list.
- bpf_list_empty(head): true if the list has no entries.
Currently, without these kfuncs, to implement the above functionality
it is necessary to first call bpf_list_pop_front/back to retrieve the
first or last node before checking whether the passed-in node was the
first or last one. After the check, the node had to be pushed back into
the list using bpf_list_push_front/back, which was very inefficient.
Now, with the bpf_list_is_first/last/empty kfuncs, we can directly
check whether a node is the first, last, or whether the list is empty,
without having to first retrieve the node.
Signed-off-by: Kaitao Cheng <chengkaitao@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260521032306.97118-8-kaitao.cheng@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add a new kfunc bpf_list_add(head, new, prev, meta, off) that
inserts 'new' after 'prev' in the BPF linked list. Both must be in
the same list; 'prev' must already be in the list. The new node must
be an owning reference (e.g. from bpf_obj_new); the kfunc consumes
that reference and the node becomes non-owning once inserted.
We have added an additional parameter bpf_list_head *head to
bpf_list_add, as the verifier requires the head parameter to
check whether the lock is being held.
Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if 'prev' is not in a list or 'new'
is already in a list (or duplicate insertion). On failure, the
kernel drops the passed-in node.
Signed-off-by: Kaitao Cheng <chengkaitao@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260521032306.97118-7-kaitao.cheng@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Refactor __bpf_list_add to accept (node, head, struct list_head **prev_ptr,
..) instead of (node, head, bool tail, ..). Load prev from *prev_ptr after
INIT_LIST_HEAD(h), so we never dereference an uninitialized h->prev when
head was 0-initialized (e.g. push_back passes &h->prev).
When prev is not the list head, validate that prev is in the list via
its owner.
Prepares for bpf_list_add(head, new, prev, ..) to insert after a given
list node.
Signed-off-by: Kaitao Cheng <chengkaitao@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260521032306.97118-6-kaitao.cheng@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Allow users to remove any node from a linked list.
We have added an additional parameter bpf_list_head *head to
bpf_list_del, as the verifier requires the head parameter to
check whether the lock is being held.
Signed-off-by: Kaitao Cheng <chengkaitao@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260521032306.97118-5-kaitao.cheng@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
KF_ARG_PTR_TO_LIST_NODE normally requires an owning reference
(PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC with ref_obj_id). Introduce the
__nonown_allowed annotation on selected list-node arguments so
non-owning references with ref_obj_id==0 are accepted as well.
This patch only adds the generic verifier support and documents the
annotation. Later patches in the series will apply it to bpf_list_add
/del(), and bpf_list_is_first/last(), allowing bpf_list_front/back()
results to be used as the insertion point, deletion target, or query
target for those kfuncs.
Verifier keeps existing owning-ref checks by default; only arguments
annotated with __nonown_allowed bypass MEM_ALLOC/ref_obj_id checks
and then follow the same list-node validation path.
Signed-off-by: Kaitao Cheng <chengkaitao@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260521032306.97118-4-kaitao.cheng@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The issue only becomes exposed once bpf_list_del() is available: callers
can pass an arbitrary bpf_list_head and bpf_list_node pair, including
nodes that are not actually linked to the supplied head, or nodes that
outlive their original head after refcount-based retention. This was
not practically reachable for callers restricted to pop-style helpers
alone; bpf_list_del() widens the API surface.
A failure mode appears when bpf_list_head_free() runs while a program
still holds an independent refcount on a node (for example via
bpf_refcount_acquire()). The list head value embedded in map memory can
go away while the node object survives. If node->owner is left pointing
at the old head address until drop completes, that pointer becomes stale.
If a new bpf_list_head is later allocated at the same address and the
stale node is passed to bpf_list_del(), the owner comparison can succeed
even though the node is not really linked to the new head, and
list_del_init() will follow bogus next/prev pointers with the risk of
memory corruption.
When draining a bpf_list_head, mark each node owner with BPF_PTR_POISON
under the map spinlock while moving it to a private drain list, then
list_del_init() the node and clear owner to NULL before calling
__bpf_obj_drop_impl(). Concurrent readers therefore never observe a
node that appears linked to a head while its list_head is inconsistent,
and surviving refcounted nodes never retain a stale non-NULL owner.
Signed-off-by: Kaitao Cheng <chengkaitao@kylinos.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260521032306.97118-3-kaitao.cheng@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Refactor __bpf_list_del to accept (head, struct list_head *n) instead of
(head, bool tail). The caller now passes the specific node to remove:
bpf_list_pop_front passes h->next, bpf_list_pop_back passes h->prev.
Prepares for introducing bpf_list_del(head, node) kfunc to remove an
arbitrary node when the user holds ownership.
Signed-off-by: Kaitao Cheng <chengkaitao@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260521032306.97118-2-kaitao.cheng@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
__bpf_dynptr_data() can return NULL (FILE dynptrs, any non-contiguous
backing). bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() forwards the pointer to
verify_pkcs7_signature() unchecked, causing a NULL deref in
asn1_ber_decoder() reachable from a sleepable BPF LSM at lsm.s/bpf.
NULL-check both pointers and reject with -EINVAL. Mirrors the guards
already in kernel/bpf/crypto.c.
Fixes: 865b0566d8 ("bpf: Add bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() kfunc")
Reported-by: Xianrui Dong <dongxianrui1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260520024059.313468-1-kpsingh@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Because of the 8-byte alignment, the compiler will pad struct
bpf_common_attr to 24 bytes. That said, sizeof(attr_common) is 24 instead
of 20.
When check tail zero using sizeof(attr_common) in
bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(), there will be 4 bytes that won't be checked.
To also check the padding 4 bytes, replace sizeof(attr_common) with
offsetofend(struct bpf_common_attr, log_true_size).
Fixes: f28771c069 ("bpf: Extend BPF syscall with common attributes support")
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260518145446.6794-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
When a main program with exception_boundary has outgoing stack
arguments (e.g. from calling subprogs with >5 args), bpf_throw() fails
to correctly restore callee-saved registers, causing a kernel crash.
The x86 JIT allocates the outgoing stack arg area below the
callee-saved registers via 'sub rsp, outgoing_rsp' in the prologue.
When bpf_throw() unwinds, it captures the main program's sp (which
includes this outgoing area) and passes it to the exception callback.
The callback gets rsp and rbp, followed by pop_callee_regs, but rsp
points into the outgoing arg area rather than the callee-saved
registers, so the pops restore garbage values. Returning to the
kernel with corrupted callee-saved registers causes a crash.
Fix this by adjusting the sp (adding stack_arg_sp_adjust) passed to
the exception callback, so it points to the bottom of the callee-saved
registers instead of the outgoing arg area. When stack_arg_sp_adjust
is 0 (the common case), this is a no-op.
Fixes: 324c3ca6ee ("bpf,x86: Implement JIT support for stack arguments")
Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260517150702.288031-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Global subprogs are verified independently and are not descended into
when their callers are symbolically executed. This means a caller can
hold references or locks across a global subprog call that may throw,
while the verifier only checks the non-exceptional return path at the
call site.
Record whether a subprog might throw in the CFG summary pass, alongside
the existing might_sleep and packet-data-changing summaries, and
propagate that effect through reachable callees.
When a global subprog is marked as possibly throwing, push the normal
continuation and validate the exceptional path immediately at the call
site, avoiding a synthetic exception state and associated special case
in the pruning checks.
Fixes: f18b03faba ("bpf: Implement BPF exceptions")
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260517075530.3461166-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Remove a redundant stack_arg_cnt check in __bpf_prog_select_runtime()
and start the stack arg loop from index 0 in bpf_fixup_call_args().
Both changes are no-ops that simplify the code:
In __bpf_prog_select_runtime(), the subprog_info[0].stack_arg_cnt
check is unreachable:
- when there is only a main program (no bpf-to-bpf calls),
subprog_info[0].stack_arg_cnt is always 0 because the main
program's arg_cnt is forced to 1
- when bpf-to-bpf calls use stack args and JIT succeeds,
fp->bpf_func is set and this code is skipped
- when JIT fails, bpf_fixup_call_args() rejects the program
before we get to __bpf_prog_select_runtime().
In bpf_fixup_call_args(), starting the loop at i=1 skipped subprog 0,
which is safe since the main program always has arg_cnt=1 and thus
bpf_in_stack_arg_cnt() returns 0. Starting at i=0 removes the need
to reason about this invariant.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260515225101.824054-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
arg_track_join() logs state transitions at CFG merge points. For
stack arg slots (r >= MAX_BPF_REG), it printed "r11:", "r12:", etc.,
which is misleading since r11 is a special register (BPF_REG_PARAMS)
not meaningful to the user.
Fix it to print "sa0:", "sa1:", etc., matching the per-instruction
transition log in arg_track_log() which already uses the "sa" prefix.
Update the existing stack_arg_pruning_type_mismatch selftest to expect
the corrected format.
Fixes: 2af4e79277 ("bpf: Extend liveness analysis to track stack argument slots")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260515225056.823086-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
btf_prepare_func_args() sets sub->arg_cnt before validating arg types.
If validation fails (e.g. unsupported pointer type in a static subprog),
check_outgoing_stack_args() is skipped because btf_check_func_arg_match()
returns early. For static subprogs, check_func_call() ignores non-EFAULT
errors and proceeds with the call.
This causes the callee to read stack arg slots that the caller never
stored or not initialized, potentially dereferencing NULL caller->stack_arg_regs
or getting no-initialized value.
To fix the issue, when btf_prepare_func_args() fails and the subprog expects
stack args, call check_outgoing_stack_args() to verify the caller initialized
the slots. Return -EFAULT on failure so the error is not ignored.
Fixes: 3ab5bd317e ("bpf: Set sub->arg_cnt earlier in btf_prepare_func_args()")
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260515225040.821515-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Building without CONFIG_BPF_EVENTS produces a build-time
warning:
WARN: resolve_btfids: unresolved symbol bpf_session_is_return
The function is actually defined in kernel/trace/bpf_trace.o,
which is built conditionally based on configuration.
Make the reference to this function conditional as well,
as is already done in the bpf verifier for other functions.
Fixes: 8fe4dc4f64 ("bpf: change prototype of bpf_session_{cookie,is_return}")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260515113242.2706303-1-arnd@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
percpu_array_map_ops.map_meta_equal points to the generic
bpf_map_meta_equal(), which does not compare max_entries. When a
percpu array serves as an inner map, replacing it with one that has
fewer max_entries bypasses the check. Since percpu_array_map_gen_lookup()
inlines the original template's index_mask as a JIT immediate, a lookup
on the replacement map can access pptrs[] out of bounds.
Point percpu_array_map_ops.map_meta_equal to array_map_meta_equal(),
which already enforces the max_entries equality check.
Add a selftest to verify that replacing a percpu array inner map with
a differently-sized one is rejected.
Fixes: db69718b8e ("bpf: inline bpf_map_lookup_elem() for PERCPU_ARRAY maps")
Signed-off-by: Guannan Wang <wgnbuaa@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mykyta Yatsenko <yatsenko@meta.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260514074454.77491-1-wgnbuaa@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
We've hit the 512 bytes limit on stack depth a few times in Cilium
recently. As a result, we started reporting in CI our current maximum
stack depth across all configurations for each BPF program.
Unfortunately, that is not trivial to compute in userspace. The
verifier reports the stack depths of individual subprogs at the end of
the logs. However the maximum combined stack depth also depends on the
callgraph of those subprogs (the max combined stack depth is the height
of the callgraph weighted by per-subprog stack depths). We can compute
a callgraph in userspace from the loaded instructions, but it often
doesn't match the verifier's own callgraph because of dead code
elimination. Our current approach relies on dumping the BPF_LOG_LEVEL2
logs, but this feels overkill considering the verifier already has the
information we need.
The patch lets the verifier dump the maximum combined stack depth in
the logs, on the same line as the per-subprog stack depths:
stack depth 16+256 max 272
The per-subprog stack depths and the new max stack depth are not
directly comparable. The former is sometimes updated during fixups,
while the latter is not. As a result, even with a single subprog, we
may end up with two slightly different values. The aim of the new max
value is to be closest to what is actually enforced by the verifier.
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d3d23a0410f87f116f3bbaa98a815dbae113bda2.1778700777.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add x86_64 JIT support for BPF functions and kfuncs with more than
5 arguments. The extra arguments are passed through a stack area
addressed by register r11 (BPF_REG_PARAMS) in BPF bytecode,
which the JIT translates to native code.
The JIT follows the x86-64 calling convention for both BPF-to-BPF
and kfunc calls:
- Arg 6 is passed in the R9 register
- Args 7+ are passed on the stack
Incoming arg 6 (BPF r11+8) is translated to a MOV from R9 rather
than a memory load. Incoming args 7+ (BPF r11+16, r11+24, ...) map
directly to [rbp + 16], [rbp + 24], ..., matching the x86-64 stack
layout after CALL + PUSH RBP, so no offset adjustment is needed.
tail_call_reachable is rejected by the verifier and priv_stack is
disabled by the JIT when stack args exist, so R9 is always
available. When BPF bytecode writes to the arg-6 stack slot
(offset -8), the JIT emits a MOV into R9 instead of a memory store.
Outgoing args 7+ are placed at [rsp] in a pre-allocated area below
callee-saved registers, using:
native_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - bpf_off - 16
The native x86_64 stack layout with stack arguments:
high address
+-------------------------+
| incoming stack arg N | [rbp + 16 + (N-7)*8] (from caller)
| ... |
| incoming stack arg 7 | [rbp + 16]
+-------------------------+
| return address | [rbp + 8]
| saved rbp | [rbp]
+-------------------------+
| BPF program stack | (round_up(stack_depth, 8) bytes)
+-------------------------+
| callee-saved regs | (r12, rbx, r13, r14, r15 as needed)
+-------------------------+
| outgoing arg M | [rsp + (M-7)*8]
| ... |
| outgoing arg 7 | [rsp]
+-------------------------+ rsp
low address
Acked-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045122.2393118-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Other architectures like arm64, riscv, etc. have enough register
and for them private stack can be used together with
stack arguments.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045114.2392291-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Tail calls are deprecated and will be replaced by indirect calls
in the future. Reject programs that combine tail calls with stack
arguments rather than adding complexity for a deprecated feature.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045109.2392108-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Extend the stack argument mechanism to kfunc calls, allowing kfuncs
with more than 5 parameters to receive additional arguments via the
r11-based stack arg area.
For kfuncs, the caller is a BPF program and the callee is a kernel
function. The BPF program writes outgoing args at negative r11
offsets, following the same convention as BPF-to-BPF calls:
Outgoing: r11 - 8 (arg6), ..., r11 - N*8 (last arg)
The following is an example:
int foo(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6, int a7) {
...
kfunc1(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8);
...
kfunc2(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9);
...
}
Caller (foo), generated by llvm
===============================
Incoming (positive offsets):
r11+8: [incoming arg 6]
r11+16: [incoming arg 7]
Outgoing for kfunc1 (negative offsets):
r11-8: [outgoing arg 6]
r11-16: [outgoing arg 7]
r11-24: [outgoing arg 8]
Outgoing for kfunc2 (negative offsets):
r11-8: [outgoing arg 6]
r11-16: [outgoing arg 7]
r11-24: [outgoing arg 8]
r11-32: [outgoing arg 9]
Later JIT will marshal outgoing arguments to the native calling
convention for kfunc1() and kfunc2().
For kfunc calls where stack args are used as constant or size
parameters, a mark_stack_arg_precision() helper is used to propagate
precision and do proper backtracking.
There are two places where meta->release_regno needs to keep
regno for later releasing the reference. Also, 'cur_aux(env)->arg_prog = regno'
is also keeping regno for later fixup. Since stack arguments don't have a valid
register number (regno is negative), these three cases are rejected for now
if the argument is on the stack.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045104.2391543-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
BPF_REG_PARAMS (r11) is used for stack argument accesses and
the following are only insns with r11 presence:
- load incoming stack arg
- store register to outgoing stack arg
- store immediate to outgoing stack arg
The detailed insn format can be found in is_stack_arg_ldx/st/stx()
helpers. After this patch, stack arg ldx/st/stx insns become valid
for kernel and these insns can be properly checked by verifier.
The LLVM compiler [1] implemented the above BPF_REG_PARAMS insns.
[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/189060
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045059.2391192-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add bpf_jit_supports_stack_args() as a weak function defaulting to
false. Architectures that implement JIT support for stack arguments
override it to return true.
Reject BPF functions with more than 5 parameters at verification
time if the architecture does not support stack arguments.
Acked-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045054.2390945-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The interpreter does not understand the bpf register r11
(BPF_REG_PARAMS) used for stack arguments. So reject interpreter
usage if stack arguments are used either in the main program or
any subprogram.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045049.2390444-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
BPF_REG_PARAMS (R11) is at index MAX_BPF_REG, which is beyond the
register tracking arrays in const_fold.c and liveness.c. Handle it
explicitly to avoid out-of-bounds accesses.
Extend the arg tracking dataflow to cover stack arg slots. Otherwise,
pointers passed through stack args are invisible to liveness, causing
the pointed-to stack slots to be incorrectly poisoned.
Extend the at_out tracking array to MAX_AT_TRACK_REGS (registers
plus stack arg slots) so that outgoing stack arg stores are tracked
alongside registers. Add a separate at_stack_arg_entry array in
compute_subprog_args(), passed to arg_track_xfer(), to restore
FP-derived values on incoming stack arg reads.
Extend record_call_access() to check stack arg slots for FP-derived
pointers at kfunc call sites, reusing the record_arg_access() helper
extracted in the previous patch. Pass stack arg state from caller to
callee in analyze_subprog() so that callees can track pointers received
through stack args, hence avoid poisoning.
Skip stack arg instructions in record_load_store_access(). Stack arg
STX uses dst_reg=BPF_REG_PARAMS (index 11), but at[11] is repurposed
to track the value stored in stack arg slot 0. Without the skip, if a
prior stack arg STX stored an FP-derived pointer (e.g., fp-64) into
slot 0, a subsequent stack arg STX would read that FP-derived value as
the base pointer and spuriously mark a regular stack slot (e.g., fp-72
from -64 + -8) as accessed in the liveness bitmap.
Extend arg_track_log() to log state transitions for outgoing stack arg
slots at indices MAX_BPF_REG through MAX_AT_TRACK_REGS-1. Without this,
changes to at_out[11..17] caused by stack arg store instructions are
silently omitted from BPF_LOG_LEVEL2 output. For example, when a
caller passes fp-64 through a stack argument:
subprog#0:
10: (bf) r6 = r10
11: (07) r6 += -64
12: (7b) *(u64 *)(r11 -8) = r6
sa0: none -> fp0-64
13: (85) call pc+5
Without the fix, the "sa0: none -> fp0-64" transition at insn 12
would not appear.
Extend print_subprog_arg_access() to include stack arg slots in the
per-instruction FP-derived state dump. For example:
subprog#0:
12: (7b) *(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r6 // r6=fp0-64
13: (85) call pc+5 // r6=fp0-64 sa0=fp0-64
Without the fix, the "sa0=fp0-64" annotation at insn 13 would not
appear, making it harder to debug liveness analysis for programs
that pass FP-derived pointers through stack arguments.
Extend has_fp_args() to also check stack arg slots for FP-derived
pointers, so that callees receiving pointers only through stack args
are still recursively analyzed.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045043.2389049-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Replace "frame != ARG_NONE" with arg_is_fp() in has_fp_args().
The function's purpose is to check whether any argument is derived
from a frame pointer, which is exactly what arg_is_fp() tests
(frame >= 0 || frame == ARG_IMPRECISE). Using the dedicated
predicate is clearer and more consistent with the rest of the file.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045035.2388671-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Extract the per-argument FP-derived pointer handling from
record_call_access() into a new record_arg_access() helper.
The existing loop body — checking arg_is_fp, querying stack access
bytes, and calling record_stack_access/record_imprecise — will be
reused for stack argument slots in the next patch. Factoring it out
now avoids duplicating the logic.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045030.2388067-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Extend the precision marking and backtracking infrastructure to
support stack argument slots (r11-based accesses). Without this,
precision demands for scalar values passed through stack arguments
are silently dropped, which could allow the verifier to incorrectly
prune states with different constant values in stack arg slots.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045025.2387526-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Move stack slot index (spi) and frame number out of the flags field
in bpf_jmp_history_entry into dedicated bitfields. This simplifies
the encoding and makes room for new flags.
Previously, spi and frame were packed into the lower 9 bits of the
12-bit flags field (3 bits frame + 6 bits spi), with INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS
at BIT(9) and INSN_F_DST/SRC_REG_STACK at BIT(10)/BIT(11).
But this has no room for an INSN_F_* flag for stack arguments.
To resolve this issue, bpf_jmp_history_entry field idx is narrowed to
20 bits (sufficient for insn indices up to 1M), and the freed bits hold
spi (6 bits) and frame (3 bits) as dedicated struct fields. The flags
enum is simplified accordingly:
INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS -> BIT(0)
INSN_F_DST_REG_STACK -> BIT(1)
INSN_F_SRC_REG_STACK -> BIT(2)
which allows more room for additional INSN_F_* flags.
bpf_push_jmp_history() now takes explicit spi and frame parameters
instead of encoding them into flags. The insn_stack_access_flags(),
insn_stack_access_spi(), and insn_stack_access_frameno() helpers are
removed.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045020.2385962-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Currently BPF functions (subprogs) are limited to 5 register arguments.
With [1], the compiler can emit code that passes additional arguments
via a dedicated stack area through bpf register BPF_REG_PARAMS (r11),
introduced in an earlier patch ([2]).
The compiler uses positive r11 offsets for incoming (callee-side) args
and negative r11 offsets for outgoing (caller-side) args, following the
x86_64/arm64 calling convention direction. There is an 8-byte gap at
offset 0 separating two regions:
Incoming (callee reads): r11+8 (arg6), r11+16 (arg7), ...
Outgoing (caller writes): r11-8 (arg6), r11-16 (arg7), ...
The following is an example to show how stack arguments are saved
and transferred between caller and callee:
int foo(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6, int a7) {
...
bar(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8);
...
}
Caller (foo) Callee (bar)
============ ============
Incoming (positive offsets): Incoming (positive offsets):
r11+8: [incoming arg 6] r11+8: [incoming arg 6] <-+
r11+16: [incoming arg 7] r11+16: [incoming arg 7] <-|+
r11+24: [incoming arg 8] <-||+
Outgoing (negative offsets): |||
r11-8: [outgoing arg 6 to bar] -------->-------------------------+||
r11-16: [outgoing arg 7 to bar] -------->--------------------------+|
r11-24: [outgoing arg 8 to bar] -------->---------------------------+
If the bpf function has more than one call:
int foo(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6, int a7) {
...
bar1(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8);
...
bar2(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9);
...
}
Caller (foo) Callee (bar2)
============ ==============
Incoming (positive offsets): Incoming (positive offsets):
r11+8: [incoming arg 6] r11+8: [incoming arg 6] <+
r11+16: [incoming arg 7] r11+16: [incoming arg 7] <|+
r11+24: [incoming arg 8] <||+
Outgoing for bar2 (negative offsets): r11+32: [incoming arg 9] <|||+
r11-8: [outgoing arg 6] ---->----------->-------------------------+|||
r11-16: [outgoing arg 7] ---->----------->--------------------------+||
r11-24: [outgoing arg 8] ---->----------->---------------------------+|
r11-32: [outgoing arg 9] ---->----------->----------------------------+
The verifier tracks outgoing stack arguments in stack_arg_regs[] and
out_stack_arg_cnt in bpf_func_state, separately from the regular
r10 stack. The callee does not copy incoming args — it reads them
directly from the caller's outgoing slots at positive r11 offsets.
Similar to stacksafe(), introduce stack_arg_safe() to do pruning
check.
Outgoing stack arg slots are invalidated when the callee returns
(e.g. in prepare_func_exit), not at call time. This allows the callee to
read incoming args from the caller's outgoing slots during
verification. The following are a few examples.
Example 1:
*(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r6;
*(u64 *)(r11 - 16) = r7;
call bar1; // arg6 = r6, arg7 = r7
call bar2; // expected with 2 stack arguments, failed
Example 2:
To fix the Example 1:
*(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r6;
*(u64 *)(r11 - 16) = r7;
call bar1; // arg6 = r6, arg7 = r7
*(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r8;
*(u64 *)(r11 - 16) = r9;
call bar2; // arg6 = r8, arg7 = r9
Example 3:
The compiler can hoist the shared stack arg stores above the branch:
*(u64 *)(r11 - 16) = r7;
if cond goto else;
*(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r8;
call bar1; // arg6 = r8, arg7 = r7
goto end;
else:
*(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r9;
call bar2; // arg6 = r9, arg7 = r7
end:
Example 4:
Within a loop:
loop:
*(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r6; // arg6, before loop
call bar; // reuses arg6 each iteration
if ... goto loop;
A separate max_out_stack_arg_cnt field in bpf_subprog_info tracks
the deepest outgoing slot actually written. This intends to
reject programs that write to slots beyond what any callee expects.
It is necessary for JIT.
Similar to typical compiler generated code, enforce the following
orderings:
- all stack arg reads must be ahead of any stack arg write
- all stack arg reads must be before any bpf func, kfunc and helpers
This is needed as JIT may emit 'mov' insns for read/write with
the same register and bpf function, kfunc and helper will invalidate
all arguments immediately after the call.
Callback functions with stack arguments need kernel setup parameter
types (including stack parameters) properly and then callback function
can retrieve such information for verification purpose.
Global subprogs and freplace with >5 args are not yet supported.
[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/189060
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260423033506.2542005-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev/
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045015.2385013-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Move the "sub->arg_cnt = nargs" assignment to immediately after
nargs is computed from btf_type_vlen(), instead of at the end of
btf_prepare_func_args().
btf_prepare_func_args() can return -EINVAL early in several cases,
e.g. when a static function has some non-int/enum arguments.
Since -EINVAL from btf_prepare_func_args() does not immediately
reject verification, arg_cnt remains zero after the early return.
This causes later stack argument based load/store insns to
incorrectly assume the function has no arguments.
Setting arg_cnt right after nargs ensures it is available regardless
of which path btf_prepare_func_args() takes.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045010.2384635-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Remove the copy_register_state() helper which was just a plain struct
assignment wrapper and replace all call sites with direct struct
assignment. This simplifies the code in preparation for upcoming stack
argument support.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260513045000.2382933-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Many BPF_MAP_CREATE validation failures currently return -EINVAL without
any explanation to userspace.
Plumb common syscall log attributes into map_create(), create a verifier
log from bpf_common_attr::log_buf/log_size/log_level, and report
map-creation failure reasons through that buffer.
This improves debuggability by allowing userspace to inspect why map
creation failed and read back log_true_size from common attributes.
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260512153157.28382-7-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
BPF_BTF_LOAD can now take log parameters from both union bpf_attr and
struct bpf_common_attr, with the same merge rules as BPF_PROG_LOAD:
- if both sides provide a complete log tuple (buf/size/level) and they
match, use it;
- if only one side provides log parameters, use that one;
- if both sides provide complete tuples but they differ, return -EINVAL.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260512153157.28382-6-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
BPF_PROG_LOAD can now take log parameters from both union bpf_attr and
struct bpf_common_attr. The merge rules are:
- if both sides provide a complete log tuple (buf/size/level) and they
match, use it;
- if only one side provides log parameters, use that one;
- if both sides provide complete tuples but they differ, return -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260512153157.28382-5-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The next commit will add support for reporting logs via extended common
attributes, including 'log_true_size'.
To prepare for that, refactor the 'log_true_size' reporting logic by
introducing a new struct bpf_log_attr to encapsulate log-related behavior:
* bpf_log_attr_init(): initialize log fields, which will support
extended common attributes in the next commit.
* bpf_log_attr_finalize(): handle log finalization and write back
'log_true_size' to userspace.
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260512153157.28382-4-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Add generic BPF syscall support for passing common attributes.
The initial set of common attributes includes:
1. 'log_buf': User-provided buffer for storing logs.
2. 'log_size': Size of the log buffer.
3. 'log_level': Log verbosity level.
4. 'log_true_size': Actual log size reported by kernel.
The common-attribute pointer and its size are passed as the 4th and 5th
syscall arguments. A new command bit, 'BPF_COMMON_ATTRS' ('1 << 16'),
indicates that common attributes are supplied.
This commit adds syscall and uapi plumbing. Command-specific handling is
added in follow-up patches.
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <leon.hwang@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260512153157.28382-2-leon.hwang@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Currently, the BPF instruction set allows bpf-to-bpf calls (or internal
calls, pseudo calls) to use a 32-bit imm field to represent the relative
jump offset.
However, when JIT is disabled or falls back to the interpreter, the
verifier invokes bpf_patch_call_args() to rewrite the call instruction.
In this function, the 32-bit imm is downcast to s16 and stored in the off
field.
void bpf_patch_call_args(struct bpf_insn *insn, u32 stack_depth)
{
stack_depth = max_t(u32, stack_depth, 1);
insn->off = (s16) insn->imm;
insn->imm = interpreters_args[(round_up(stack_depth, 32) / 32) - 1] -
__bpf_call_base_args;
insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS;
}
If the original imm exceeds the s16 range (i.e., a jump offset greater
than 32767 instructions), this downcast silently truncates the offset,
resulting in an incorrect call target.
Fix this by:
1. In bpf_patch_call_args(), keeping the imm field unchanged and using the
off field to store the index of the interpreter function.
2. In ___bpf_prog_run() for the JMP_CALL_ARGS case, retrieving the
interpreter function pointer from the interpreters_args array using the
off field as the index, and passing the original imm to calculate the
last argument of the interpreter function.
After these changes, the truncation issue is resolved, and __bpf_call_base_args
is also no longer needed and can be removed, which makes the code cleaner.
Performance: In ___bpf_prog_run() for the JMP_CALL_ARGS case, changing the
retrieval of the interpreter function pointer from pointer addition to
direct array indexing improves performance. The possible reason is that the
latter has better instruction-level parallelism. See the v5 discussion [1]
for more details.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f120c3c4-6999-414a-b514-518bb64b4758@zju.edu.cn/
To avoid requiring bpftool changes, keep the new imm/off encoding internal
and restore the legacy xlated dump layout in bpf_insn_prepare_dump().
For bpf-to-bpf call offsets that do not fit in s16, export off as 0 instead
of a truncated and misleading value.
Fixes: 1ea47e01ad ("bpf: add support for bpf_call to interpreter")
Fixes: 7105e828c0 ("bpf: allow for correlation of maps and helpers in dump")
Suggested-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huaweicloud.com>
Suggested-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn>
Co-developed-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Yazhou Tang <tangyazhou518@outlook.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260506094714.419842-3-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The interpreters_args array only accommodates stack depths up to
MAX_BPF_STACK (512 bytes). However, do_misc_fixups() may allow a larger
stack depth if JIT is requested.
If JIT compilation later fails and falls back to the interpreter, the
verifier invokes bpf_patch_call_args() with this oversized stack depth.
This causes a load-time out-of-bounds (OOB) read when calculating the
interpreter function pointer index.
Fix this by changing bpf_patch_call_args() to return an int and explicitly
rejecting the JIT fallback (returning -EINVAL) if the stack depth exceeds
MAX_BPF_STACK.
Fixes: 1ea47e01ad ("bpf: add support for bpf_call to interpreter")
Co-developed-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn>
Co-developed-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Yazhou Tang <tangyazhou518@outlook.com>
Acked-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260506094714.419842-2-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARENA accepts BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_VALUE offsets at exactly
the end of the arena mapping (off == arena_size). The boundary check
in arena_map_direct_value_addr() uses `>` instead of `>=`, which
incorrectly allows a one-past-end pointer to be accepted.
Change the condition to `>=` to correctly reject offsets that fall
outside the valid arena user_vm range.
Fixes: 317460317a ("bpf: Introduce bpf_arena.")
Signed-off-by: Junyoung Jang <graypanda.inzag@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260426172505.1947915-1-graypanda.inzag@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Because subprog 0, the main subprog, is considered a global function,
we end up running the arg-tracking dataflow analysis twice on it. That
results in slightly longer verification but mostly in more verbose
verifier logs. This patch fixes it by keeping only the iteration over
global subprogs.
When running over all of Cilium's programs with BPF_LOG_LEVEL2, this
reduces verbosity by ~20% on average.
Fixes: bf0c571f7f ("bpf: introduce forward arg-tracking dataflow analysis")
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e4d7b53d4963ef520541a782f5fc8108a168877c.1778176504.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
When using global functions (i.e. subprogs), the verifier performs
function-by-function verification. In that case, the sum of the
instructions processed in each global function and in the main program
counts towards the 1 million instructions limit. Only that sum is
reported in the verifier logs.
While starting to use global functions in Cilium (finally!), we found it
can be useful to have the breakdown per global function, to understand
exactly where the budget is currently spent. This patch implements this
breakdown, under BPF_LOG_STATS, as done for the stack depths.
When iterating over subprogs, we need to skip the hidden subprogs at the
end because they don't have a corresponding func_info_aux entry and
calling bpf_subprog_is_global() would result in an OOB access.
Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/5590f9c67e614ec9054d0c7e74e87cc690a52c56.1777538384.git.paul.chaignon@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
