bpf: Fold reg->var_off into PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS bounds check

Constant pointer arithmetic on a PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS register lands the
constant in reg->var_off (e.g. flow_keys(imm=4096)), but the
PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS path in check_mem_access() passes only insn->off to
check_flow_keys_access() and never folds reg->var_off.value.  The
verifier therefore accepts an access that, at runtime, dereferences past
struct bpf_flow_keys -- a verifier/runtime divergence that yields an
out-of-bounds read and write of kernel stack memory.

Commit 022ac07508 ("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for
pointers") removed the generic "off += reg->off" that check_mem_access()
applied before the per-type dispatch and replaced it with per-path
folding of reg->var_off.value (for example the ctx path now folds the
register offset via check_ctx_access()).  The PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS path was
not given the equivalent fold, so a constant offset that used to be
folded and rejected is now silently accepted:

  before 022ac0750883: the offset stays in reg->off and is folded
    generically, so the access is checked with off=4096 and rejected.
  after  022ac0750883: the offset lands in reg->var_off, the flow_keys
    path checks off=0 and accepts; at runtime the access dereferences
    base + 0x1000.

For a BPF_PROG_TYPE_FLOW_DISSECTOR program the following is accepted:

  r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 144)   ; R2=flow_keys (PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS)
  r2 += 0x1000              ; R2=flow_keys(imm=4096), accepted
  r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0)     ; accepted, var_off.value=0x1000 ignored

while the equivalent insn->off form

  r0 = *(u64 *)(r2 + 0x1000)

has the same effective offset but is correctly rejected with
"invalid access to flow keys off=4096 size=8", which isolates the defect
to the missing var_off fold.  Once attached as a flow dissector, the
accepted program reads kernel stack past struct bpf_flow_keys (a
kernel-stack / KASLR information leak) and can likewise write past it,
corrupting kernel memory.

Fix it by folding reg->var_off.value into the offset before the bounds
check and rejecting non-constant offsets, mirroring the other pointer
types (e.g. check_ctx_access()).

Fixes: 022ac07508 ("bpf: use reg->var_off instead of reg->off for pointers")
Signed-off-by: Nuoqi Gui <gnq25@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260606-c3-01-v3-v3-1-97c51f592f15@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Nuoqi Gui 2026-06-06 18:50:37 +08:00 committed by Alexei Starovoitov
parent 8ddce41679
commit 37363191cb

View File

@ -4728,9 +4728,21 @@ static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct b
return err;
}
static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off,
int size)
static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno,
int off, int size)
{
/* Only a constant offset is allowed here; fold it into off. */
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
verbose(env, "%s invalid variable offset to flow keys: off=%d, var_off=%s\n",
reg_arg_name(env, argno), off, tn_buf);
return -EACCES;
}
off += reg->var_off.value;
if (size < 0 || off < 0 ||
(u64)off + size > sizeof(struct bpf_flow_keys)) {
verbose(env, "invalid access to flow keys off=%d size=%d\n",
@ -6239,7 +6251,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct b
return -EACCES;
}
err = check_flow_keys_access(env, off, size);
err = check_flow_keys_access(env, reg, argno, off, size);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
} else if (type_is_sk_pointer(reg->type)) {