Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf 7.1-rc5

Cross-merge BPF and other fixes after downstream PR.

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Alexei Starovoitov 2026-05-25 06:33:15 -07:00
commit eb19eead36
989 changed files with 14532 additions and 6017 deletions

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@ -584,6 +584,8 @@ Mayuresh Janorkar <mayur@ti.com>
Md Sadre Alam <quic_mdalam@quicinc.com> <mdalam@codeaurora.org>
Miaoqing Pan <quic_miaoqing@quicinc.com> <miaoqing@codeaurora.org>
Michael Buesch <m@bues.ch>
Michal Grzeschik <mgr@kernel.org> <m.grzeschik@pengutronix.de>
Michal Grzeschik <mgr@kernel.org> <mgr@pengutronix.de>
Michael Riesch <michael.riesch@collabora.com> <michael.riesch@wolfvision.net>
Michal Simek <michal.simek@amd.com> <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Michel Dänzer <michel@tungstengraphics.com>
@ -857,6 +859,7 @@ Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch> <klto@zhaw.ch>
Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch> <tklauser@nuerscht.ch>
Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch> <tklauser@xenon.tklauser.home>
Todor Tomov <todor.too@gmail.com> <todor.tomov@linaro.org>
Tomasz Jeznach <tomasz.jeznach@linux.dev> <tjeznach@rivosinc.com>
Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@quicinc.com> <tsoni@codeaurora.org>
TripleX Chung <xxx.phy@gmail.com> <triplex@zh-kernel.org>

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@ -786,6 +786,7 @@ networking/altera_tse networking/device_drivers/ethernet/altera/altera_tse
networking/bpf_flow_dissector bpf/prog_flow_dissector
networking/cxacru networking/device_drivers/atm/cxacru
networking/defza networking/device_drivers/fddi/defza
networking/device_drivers/3com/3c509 networking/device_drivers/ethernet/3com/3c509
networking/device_drivers/3com/vortex networking/device_drivers/ethernet/3com/vortex
networking/device_drivers/amazon/ena networking/device_drivers/ethernet/amazon/ena
networking/device_drivers/aquantia/atlantic networking/device_drivers/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic

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@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ Support for changing the platform performance mode is currently not implemented.
Battery Charging Control
------------------------
.. warning:: Some devices do not properly implement the charging threshold interface. Forcing
the driver to enable access to said interface on such devices might damage the
battery [1]_. Because of this the driver will not enable said feature even when
using the ``force`` module parameter.
The ``uniwill-laptop`` driver supports controlling the battery charge limit. This happens over
the standard ``charge_control_end_threshold`` power supply sysfs attribute. All values
between 1 and 100 percent are supported.
@ -70,3 +75,8 @@ The ``uniwill-laptop`` driver allows to set the configurable TGP for devices wit
allow it.
See Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-driver-uniwill-laptop for details.
References
==========
.. [1] https://www.reddit.com/r/XMG_gg/comments/ld9yyf/battery_limit_hidden_function_discovered_on/

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@ -358,9 +358,9 @@ Dynamic energy performance profile
The amd-pstate driver supports dynamically selecting the energy performance
profile based on whether the machine is running on AC or DC power.
Whether this behavior is enabled by default depends on the kernel
config option `CONFIG_X86_AMD_PSTATE_DYNAMIC_EPP`. This behavior can also be overridden
at runtime by the sysfs file ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpufreq/policyX/dynamic_epp``.
Whether this behavior is enabled by default depends on the kernel command line option
``amd_dynamic_epp`` is set. This behavior can also be overridden
at runtime by the sysfs file ``/sys/devices/system/cpu/amd_pstate/dynamic_epp``.
When set to enabled, the driver will select a different energy performance
profile when the machine is running on battery or AC power. The driver will
@ -485,9 +485,8 @@ kernel parameter ``amd_prefcore=disable``.
``amd_dynamic_epp``
When AMD pstate is in auto mode, dynamic EPP will control whether the kernel
autonomously changes the EPP mode. The default is configured by
``CONFIG_X86_AMD_PSTATE_DYNAMIC_EPP`` but can be explicitly enabled with
``amd_dynamic_epp=enable`` or disabled with ``amd_dynamic_epp=disable``.
autonomously changes the EPP mode. The default is disabled. It can be enabled
with the kernel parameter ``amd_dynamic_epp=enable``.
User Space Interface in ``sysfs`` - General
===========================================

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@ -355,11 +355,12 @@ HyperThreading (HT) in the context of Intel processors, is enabled on at least
one core, ``intel_pstate`` assigns performance-based priorities to CPUs. Namely,
the priority of a given CPU reflects its highest HWP performance level which
causes the CPU scheduler to generally prefer more performant CPUs, so the less
performant CPUs are used when the other ones are fully loaded. However, SMT
siblings (that is, logical CPUs sharing one physical core) are treated in a
special way such that if one of them is in use, the effective priority of the
other ones is lowered below the priorities of the CPUs located in the other
physical cores.
performant CPUs are used when the other ones are fully loaded. SMT siblings
(that is, logical CPUs sharing one physical core) are given the same priority.
The scheduler can pull tasks from lower-priority cores and place them on any
sibling. Since the scheduler spreads tasks among physical cores, tasks will be
placed on the SMT siblings of physical cores only after all physical cores are
busy.
This approach maximizes performance in the majority of cases, but unfortunately
it also leads to excessive energy usage in some important scenarios, like video

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@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ call at each patchable function entry, and patches it dynamically at runtime to
enable or disable the redirection. In the case of RISC-V, 2 instructions,
AUIPC + JALR, are required to compose a function call. However, it is impossible
to patch 2 instructions and expect that a concurrent read-side executes them
without a race condition. This series makes atmoic code patching possible in
without a race condition. This series makes atomic code patching possible in
RISC-V ftrace. Kernel preemption makes things even worse as it allows the old
state to persist across the patching process with stop_machine().
In order to get rid of stop_machine() and run dynamic ftrace with full kernel
preemption, we partially initialize each patchable function entry at boot-time,
setting the first instruction to AUIPC, and the second to NOP. Now, atmoic
setting the first instruction to AUIPC, and the second to NOP. Now, atomic
patching is possible because the kernel only has to update one instruction.
According to Ziccif, as long as an instruction is naturally aligned, the ISA
guarantee an atomic update.
@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ By fixing down the first instruction, AUIPC, the range of the ftrace trampoline
is limited to +-2K from the predetermined target, ftrace_caller, due to the lack
of immediate encoding space in RISC-V. To address the issue, we introduce
CALL_OPS, where an 8B naturally align metadata is added in front of each
pacthable function. The metadata is resolved at the first trampoline, then the
execution can be derect to another custom trampoline.
patchable function. The metadata is resolved at the first trampoline, then the
execution can be directed to another custom trampoline.
CMODX in the User Space
-----------------------

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@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ the program.
Per-task indirect branch tracking state can be monitored and
controlled via the :c:macro:`PR_GET_CFI` and :c:macro:`PR_SET_CFI`
``prctl()` arguments (respectively), by supplying
``prctl()`` arguments (respectively), by supplying
:c:macro:`PR_CFI_BRANCH_LANDING_PADS` as the second argument. These
are architecture-agnostic, and will return -EINVAL if the underlying
functionality is not supported.

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@ -158,13 +158,22 @@ returned.
When a message has been received, the location and size of the data with the
message can be determined by calling::
void crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
size_t *_offset, size_t *_len);
int crypto_krb5_where_is_the_data(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
size_t *_offset, size_t *_len);
The caller provides the offset and length of the message to the function, which
then alters those values to indicate the region containing the data (plus any
padding). It is up to the caller to determine how much padding there is.
padding). It is up to the caller to determine how much padding there is. The
function returns an error if the length is too small or if the mode is
unsupported. An additional function::
int crypto_krb5_check_data_len(const struct krb5_enctype *krb5,
enum krb5_crypto_mode mode,
size_t len, size_t min_content);
is provided to just do a basic check that the decrypted/verified message would
have a sufficient minimum payload.
Preparation Functions
---------------------

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@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ allOf:
- required:
- "#sound-dai-cells"
else:
$ref: /schemas/sound/dai-common.yaml#
properties:
aux-bus: false
required:
@ -243,7 +244,7 @@ allOf:
clocks:
minItems: 5
maxItems: 5
clocks-names:
clock-names:
minItems: 5
maxItems: 5
@ -264,7 +265,7 @@ allOf:
clocks:
minItems: 5
maxItems: 6
clocks-names:
clock-names:
minItems: 5
maxItems: 6
@ -277,7 +278,6 @@ allOf:
- qcom,sc8180x-dp
- qcom,sdm845-dp
- qcom,sm8350-dp
- qcom,sm8650-dp
then:
properties:
reg:
@ -286,6 +286,24 @@ allOf:
clocks:
minItems: 6
maxItems: 6
clock-names:
minItems: 6
maxItems: 6
- if:
properties:
compatible:
contains:
enum:
- qcom,sm8650-dp
then:
properties:
reg:
minItems: 5
maxItems: 9
clocks:
minItems: 6
maxItems: 6
clocks-names:
minItems: 6
maxItems: 6
@ -306,7 +324,7 @@ allOf:
clocks:
minItems: 6
maxItems: 8
clocks-names:
clock-names:
minItems: 6
maxItems: 8
@ -326,7 +344,7 @@ allOf:
clocks:
minItems: 5
maxItems: 6
clocks-names:
clock-names:
minItems: 5
maxItems: 6

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@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ examples:
mdss_mdp: display-controller@ae01000 {
compatible = "qcom,eliza-dpu";
reg = <0x0ae01000 0x93000>,
<0x0aeb0000 0x2008>;
<0x0aeb0000 0x3000>;
reg-names = "mdp",
"vbif";
@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ examples:
mdss_dsi0_phy: phy@ae95000 {
compatible = "qcom,eliza-dsi-phy-4nm", "qcom,sm8650-dsi-phy-4nm";
reg = <0x0ae95000 0x200>,
<0x0ae95200 0x280>,
<0x0ae95200 0x300>,
<0x0ae95500 0x400>;
reg-names = "dsi_phy",
"dsi_phy_lane",
@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ examples:
mdss_dsi1_phy: phy@ae97000 {
compatible = "qcom,eliza-dsi-phy-4nm", "qcom,sm8650-dsi-phy-4nm";
reg = <0x0ae97000 0x200>,
<0x0ae97200 0x280>,
<0x0ae97200 0x300>,
<0x0ae97500 0x400>;
reg-names = "dsi_phy",
"dsi_phy_lane",
@ -407,11 +407,15 @@ examples:
displayport-controller@af54000 {
compatible = "qcom,eliza-dp", "qcom,sm8650-dp";
reg = <0xaf54000 0x104>,
<0xaf54200 0xc0>,
<0xaf55000 0x770>,
<0xaf56000 0x9c>,
<0xaf57000 0x9c>;
reg = <0x0af54000 0x200>,
<0x0af54200 0x200>,
<0x0af55000 0xc00>,
<0x0af56000 0x400>,
<0x0af57000 0x400>,
<0x0af58000 0x400>,
<0x0af59000 0x400>,
<0x0af5a000 0x600>,
<0x0af5b000 0x600>;
interrupts-extended = <&mdss 12>;

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@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ examples:
display-controller@ae01000 {
compatible = "qcom,sm8650-dpu";
reg = <0x0ae01000 0x8f000>,
<0x0aeb0000 0x2008>;
<0x0aeb0000 0x3000>;
reg-names = "mdp", "vbif";
clocks = <&gcc_axi_clk>,

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@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ examples:
display-controller@ae01000 {
compatible = "qcom,sm8650-dpu";
reg = <0x0ae01000 0x8f000>,
<0x0aeb0000 0x2008>;
<0x0aeb0000 0x3000>;
reg-names = "mdp", "vbif";
clocks = <&gcc_axi_clk>,

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@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ examples:
display-controller@ae01000 {
compatible = "qcom,sm8750-dpu";
reg = <0x0ae01000 0x93000>,
<0x0aeb0000 0x2008>;
<0x0aeb0000 0x3000>;
reg-names = "mdp",
"vbif";
@ -389,11 +389,15 @@ examples:
displayport-controller@af54000 {
compatible = "qcom,sm8750-dp", "qcom,sm8650-dp";
reg = <0xaf54000 0x104>,
<0xaf54200 0xc0>,
<0xaf55000 0x770>,
<0xaf56000 0x9c>,
<0xaf57000 0x9c>;
reg = <0x0af54000 0x200>,
<0x0af54200 0x200>,
<0x0af55000 0xc00>,
<0x0af56000 0x400>,
<0x0af57000 0x400>,
<0x0af58000 0x400>,
<0x0af59000 0x400>,
<0x0af5a000 0x600>,
<0x0af5b000 0x600>;
interrupts-extended = <&mdss 12>;

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@ -73,6 +73,15 @@ properties:
HSP CSR is to control and get status of different high-speed peripherals
(such as Ethernet, USB, SATA, etc.) via register, which can tune
board-level's parameters of PHY, etc.
Additional background information about the High-Speed Subsystem
and the HSP CSR block is available in Chapter 10 ("High-Speed Interface")
of the EIC7700X SoC Technical Reference Manual, Part 4
(EIC7700X_SoC_Technical_Reference_Manual_Part4.pdf). The manual is
publicly available at
https://github.com/eswincomputing/EIC7700X-SoC-Technical-Reference-Manual/releases
This reference is provided for background information only.
$ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/phandle-array
items:
- items:
@ -82,6 +91,8 @@ properties:
- description: Offset of AXI clock controller Low-Power request
register
- description: Offset of register controlling TX/RX clock delay
- description: Optional offset of register controlling TXD delay
- description: Optional offset of register controlling RXD delay
required:
- compatible
@ -116,7 +127,7 @@ examples:
reset-names = "stmmaceth";
rx-internal-delay-ps = <200>;
tx-internal-delay-ps = <200>;
eswin,hsp-sp-csr = <&hsp_sp_csr 0x100 0x108 0x118>;
eswin,hsp-sp-csr = <&hsp_sp_csr 0x100 0x108 0x118 0x114 0x11c>;
snps,axi-config = <&stmmac_axi_setup>;
snps,aal;
snps,fixed-burst;

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@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ properties:
description: Phandles of rt5650 and rt5514 codecs
items:
- description: phandle of rt5650 codec
maxItems: 1
- description: phandle of rt5514 codec
maxItems: 1
mediatek,platform:
$ref: /schemas/types.yaml#/definitions/phandle

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@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ properties:
- fsl,ls1021a-qspi
- fsl,ls2080a-qspi
- spacemit,k1-qspi
- items:
- const: spacemit,k3-qspi
- const: spacemit,k1-qspi
- items:
- enum:
- fsl,ls1043a-qspi

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@ -22,5 +22,5 @@ The following sensors are supported
sysfs-Interface
---------------
temp0_input
temp1_input
- Temperature of external NTC (milli-degree C)

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@ -69,6 +69,15 @@ properties:
header:
description: For C-compatible languages, header which already defines this value.
type: string
scope:
description: |
Visibility of this definition. "uapi" (default) renders into
the uAPI header, "kernel" renders into the kernel-side
generated header, "user" renders into the user-side
generated header. When combined with `header:`, the
definition is not rendered, and the named header is
included only by code matching the scope.
enum: [ uapi, kernel, user ]
type:
enum: [ const, enum, flags ]
doc:

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@ -83,6 +83,15 @@ properties:
header:
description: For C-compatible languages, header which already defines this value.
type: string
scope:
description: |
Visibility of this definition. "uapi" (default) renders into
the uAPI header, "kernel" renders into the kernel-side
generated header, "user" renders into the user-side
generated header. When combined with `header:`, the
definition is not rendered, and the named header is
included only by code matching the scope.
enum: [ uapi, kernel, user ]
type:
enum: [ const, enum, flags, struct ] # Trim
doc:

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@ -55,6 +55,15 @@ properties:
header:
description: For C-compatible languages, header which already defines this value.
type: string
scope:
description: |
Visibility of this definition. "uapi" (default) renders into
the uAPI header, "kernel" renders into the kernel-side
generated header, "user" renders into the user-side
generated header. When combined with `header:`, the
definition is not rendered, and the named header is
included only by code matching the scope.
enum: [ uapi, kernel, user ]
type:
enum: [ const, enum, flags ]
doc:

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@ -87,6 +87,15 @@ properties:
header:
description: For C-compatible languages, header which already defines this value.
type: string
scope:
description: |
Visibility of this definition. "uapi" (default) renders into
the uAPI header, "kernel" renders into the kernel-side
generated header, "user" renders into the user-side
generated header. When combined with `header:`, the
definition is not rendered, and the named header is
included only by code matching the scope.
enum: [ uapi, kernel, user ]
type:
enum: [ const, enum, flags, struct ] # Trim
doc:

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@ -33,6 +33,11 @@ doc: |
@cap-get operation.
definitions:
-
type: const
name: max-handle-id
value: 0x3fffffe
scope: kernel
-
type: enum
name: scope
@ -140,6 +145,8 @@ attribute-sets:
-
name: id
type: u32
checks:
max: max-handle-id
doc: |
Numeric identifier of a shaper. The id semantic depends on
the scope. For @queue scope it's the queue id and for @node

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@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
=============================================================================
Linux and the 3Com EtherLink III Series Ethercards (driver v1.18c and higher)
=============================================================================
This file contains the instructions and caveats for v1.18c and higher versions
of the 3c509 driver. You should not use the driver without reading this file.
release 1.0
28 February 2002
Current maintainer (corrections to):
Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Introduction
============
The following are notes and information on using the 3Com EtherLink III series
ethercards in Linux. These cards are commonly known by the most widely-used
card's 3Com model number, 3c509. They are all 10mb/s ISA-bus cards and shouldn't
be (but sometimes are) confused with the similarly-numbered PCI-bus "3c905"
(aka "Vortex" or "Boomerang") series. Kernel support for the 3c509 family is
provided by the module 3c509.c, which has code to support all of the following
models:
- 3c509 (original ISA card)
- 3c509B (later revision of the ISA card; supports full-duplex)
- 3c589 (PCMCIA)
- 3c589B (later revision of the 3c589; supports full-duplex)
- 3c579 (EISA)
Large portions of this documentation were heavily borrowed from the guide
written the original author of the 3c509 driver, Donald Becker. The master
copy of that document, which contains notes on older versions of the driver,
currently resides on Scyld web server: http://www.scyld.com/.
Special Driver Features
=======================
Overriding card settings
The driver allows boot- or load-time overriding of the card's detected IOADDR,
IRQ, and transceiver settings, although this capability shouldn't generally be
needed except to enable full-duplex mode (see below). An example of the syntax
for LILO parameters for doing this::
ether=10,0x310,3,0x3c509,eth0
This configures the first found 3c509 card for IRQ 10, base I/O 0x310, and
transceiver type 3 (10base2). The flag "0x3c509" must be set to avoid conflicts
with other card types when overriding the I/O address. When the driver is
loaded as a module, only the IRQ may be overridden. For example,
setting two cards to IRQ10 and IRQ11 is done by using the irq module
option::
options 3c509 irq=10,11
Full-duplex mode
================
The v1.18c driver added support for the 3c509B's full-duplex capabilities.
In order to enable and successfully use full-duplex mode, three conditions
must be met:
(a) You must have a Etherlink III card model whose hardware supports full-
duplex operations. Currently, the only members of the 3c509 family that are
positively known to support full-duplex are the 3c509B (ISA bus) and 3c589B
(PCMCIA) cards. Cards without the "B" model designation do *not* support
full-duplex mode; these include the original 3c509 (no "B"), the original
3c589, the 3c529 (MCA bus), and the 3c579 (EISA bus).
(b) You must be using your card's 10baseT transceiver (i.e., the RJ-45
connector), not its AUI (thick-net) or 10base2 (thin-net/coax) interfaces.
AUI and 10base2 network cabling is physically incapable of full-duplex
operation.
(c) Most importantly, your 3c509B must be connected to a link partner that is
itself full-duplex capable. This is almost certainly one of two things: a full-
duplex-capable Ethernet switch (*not* a hub), or a full-duplex-capable NIC on
another system that's connected directly to the 3c509B via a crossover cable.
Full-duplex mode can be enabled using 'ethtool'.
.. warning::
Extremely important caution concerning full-duplex mode
Understand that the 3c509B's hardware's full-duplex support is much more
limited than that provide by more modern network interface cards. Although
at the physical layer of the network it fully supports full-duplex operation,
the card was designed before the current Ethernet auto-negotiation (N-way)
spec was written. This means that the 3c509B family ***cannot and will not
auto-negotiate a full-duplex connection with its link partner under any
circumstances, no matter how it is initialized***. If the full-duplex mode
of the 3c509B is enabled, its link partner will very likely need to be
independently _forced_ into full-duplex mode as well; otherwise various nasty
failures will occur - at the very least, you'll see massive numbers of packet
collisions. This is one of very rare circumstances where disabling auto-
negotiation and forcing the duplex mode of a network interface card or switch
would ever be necessary or desirable.
Available Transceiver Types
===========================
For versions of the driver v1.18c and above, the available transceiver types are:
== =========================================================================
0 transceiver type from EEPROM config (normally 10baseT); force half-duplex
1 AUI (thick-net / DB15 connector)
2 (undefined)
3 10base2 (thin-net == coax / BNC connector)
4 10baseT (RJ-45 connector); force half-duplex mode
8 transceiver type and duplex mode taken from card's EEPROM config settings
12 10baseT (RJ-45 connector); force full-duplex mode
== =========================================================================
Prior to driver version 1.18c, only transceiver codes 0-4 were supported. Note
that the new transceiver codes 8 and 12 are the *only* ones that will enable
full-duplex mode, no matter what the card's detected EEPROM settings might be.
This insured that merely upgrading the driver from an earlier version would
never automatically enable full-duplex mode in an existing installation;
it must always be explicitly enabled via one of these code in order to be
activated.
The transceiver type can be changed using 'ethtool'.
Interpretation of error messages and common problems
----------------------------------------------------
Error Messages
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
eth0: Infinite loop in interrupt, status 2011.
These are "mostly harmless" message indicating that the driver had too much
work during that interrupt cycle. With a status of 0x2011 you are receiving
packets faster than they can be removed from the card. This should be rare
or impossible in normal operation. Possible causes of this error report are:
- a "green" mode enabled that slows the processor down when there is no
keyboard activity.
- some other device or device driver hogging the bus or disabling interrupts.
Check /proc/interrupts for excessive interrupt counts. The timer tick
interrupt should always be incrementing faster than the others.
No received packets
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If a 3c509, 3c562 or 3c589 can successfully transmit packets, but never
receives packets (as reported by /proc/net/dev or 'ifconfig') you likely
have an interrupt line problem. Check /proc/interrupts to verify that the
card is actually generating interrupts. If the interrupt count is not
increasing you likely have a physical conflict with two devices trying to
use the same ISA IRQ line. The common conflict is with a sound card on IRQ10
or IRQ5, and the easiest solution is to move the 3c509 to a different
interrupt line. If the device is receiving packets but 'ping' doesn't work,
you have a routing problem.
Tx Carrier Errors Reported in /proc/net/dev
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
If an EtherLink III appears to transmit packets, but the "Tx carrier errors"
field in /proc/net/dev increments as quickly as the Tx packet count, you
likely have an unterminated network or the incorrect media transceiver selected.
3c509B card is not detected on machines with an ISA PnP BIOS.
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
While the updated driver works with most PnP BIOS programs, it does not work
with all. This can be fixed by disabling PnP support using the 3Com-supplied
setup program.
3c509 card is not detected on overclocked machines
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Increase the delay time in id_read_eeprom() from the current value, 500,
to an absurdly high value, such as 5000.
Decoding Status and Error Messages
----------------------------------
The bits in the main status register are:
===== ======================================
value description
===== ======================================
0x01 Interrupt latch
0x02 Tx overrun, or Rx underrun
0x04 Tx complete
0x08 Tx FIFO room available
0x10 A complete Rx packet has arrived
0x20 A Rx packet has started to arrive
0x40 The driver has requested an interrupt
0x80 Statistics counter nearly full
===== ======================================
The bits in the transmit (Tx) status word are:
===== ============================================
value description
===== ============================================
0x02 Out-of-window collision.
0x04 Status stack overflow (normally impossible).
0x08 16 collisions.
0x10 Tx underrun (not enough PCI bus bandwidth).
0x20 Tx jabber.
0x40 Tx interrupt requested.
0x80 Status is valid (this should always be set).
===== ============================================
When a transmit error occurs the driver produces a status message such as::
eth0: Transmit error, Tx status register 82
The two values typically seen here are:
0x82
^^^^
Out of window collision. This typically occurs when some other Ethernet
host is incorrectly set to full duplex on a half duplex network.
0x88
^^^^
16 collisions. This typically occurs when the network is exceptionally busy
or when another host doesn't correctly back off after a collision. If this
error is mixed with 0x82 errors it is the result of a host incorrectly set
to full duplex (see above).
Both of these errors are the result of network problems that should be
corrected. They do not represent driver malfunction.
Revision history (this file)
============================
28Feb02 v1.0 DR New; major portions based on Becker original 3c509 docs

View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ Contents:
.. toctree::
:maxdepth: 2
3com/3c509
3com/vortex
amazon/ena
altera/altera_tse

View File

@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ regressions and security problems.
debugging/index
handling-regressions
security-bugs
threat-model
cve
embargoed-hardware-issues

View File

@ -66,6 +66,42 @@ In addition, the following information are highly desirable:
the issue appear. It is useful to share them, as they can be helpful to
keep end users protected during the time it takes them to apply the fix.
What qualifies as a security bug
--------------------------------
It is important that most bugs are handled publicly so as to involve the widest
possible audience and find the best solution. By nature, bugs that are handled
in closed discussions between a small set of participants are less likely to
produce the best possible fix (e.g., risk of missing valid use cases, limited
testing abilities).
It turns out that the majority of the bugs reported via the security team are
just regular bugs that have been improperly qualified as security bugs due to
a lack of awareness of the Linux kernel's threat model, as described in
Documentation/process/threat-model.rst, and ought to have been sent through
the normal channels described in Documentation/admin-guide/reporting-issues.rst
instead.
The security list exists for urgent bugs that grant an attacker a capability
they are not supposed to have on a correctly configured production system, and
can be easily exploited, representing an imminent threat to many users. Before
reporting, consider whether the issue actually crosses a trust boundary on such
a system.
**If you resorted to AI assistance to identify a bug, you must treat it as
public**. While you may have valid reasons to believe it is not, the security
team's experience shows that bugs discovered this way systematically surface
simultaneously across multiple researchers, often on the same day. In this
case, do not publicly share a reproducer, as this could cause unintended harm;
just mention that one is available and maintainers might ask for it privately
if they need it.
If you are unsure whether an issue qualifies, err on the side of reporting
privately: the security team would rather triage a borderline report than miss
a real vulnerability. Reporting ordinary bugs to the security list, however,
does not make them move faster and consumes triage capacity that other reports
need.
Identifying contacts
--------------------
@ -74,7 +110,7 @@ affected subsystem's maintainers and Cc: the Linux kernel security team. Do
not send it to a public list at this stage, unless you have good reasons to
consider the issue as being public or trivial to discover (e.g. result of a
widely available automated vulnerability scanning tool that can be repeated by
anyone).
anyone, or use of AI-based tools).
If you're sending a report for issues affecting multiple parts in the kernel,
even if they're fairly similar issues, please send individual messages (think
@ -131,6 +167,64 @@ the Linux kernel security team only. Your message will be triaged, and you
will receive instructions about whom to contact, if needed. Your message may
equally be forwarded as-is to the relevant maintainers.
Responsible use of AI to find bugs
----------------------------------
A significant fraction of bug reports submitted to the security team are
actually the result of code reviews assisted by AI tools. While this can be an
efficient means to find bugs in rarely explored areas, it causes an overload on
maintainers, who are sometimes forced to ignore such reports due to their poor
quality or accuracy. As such, reporters must be particularly cautious about a
number of points which tend to make these reports needlessly difficult to
handle:
* **Length**: AI-generated reports tend to be excessively long, containing
multiple sections and excessive detail. This makes it difficult to spot
important information such as affected files, versions, and impact. Please
ensure that a clear summary of the problem and all critical details are
presented first. Do not require triage engineers to scan multiple pages of
text. Configure your tools to produce concise, human-style reports.
* **Formatting**: Most AI-generated reports are littered with Markdown tags.
These decorations complicate the search for important information and do
not survive the quoting processes involved in forwarding or replying.
Please **always convert your report to plain text** without any formatting
decorations before sending it.
* **Impact Evaluation**: Many AI-generated reports lack an understanding
of the kernel's threat model (see Documentation/process/threat-model.rst)
and go to great lengths inventing theoretical consequences. This adds
noise and complicates triage. Please stick to verifiable facts (e.g.,
"this bug permits any user to gain CAP_NET_ADMIN") without enumerating
speculative implications. Have your tool read this documentation as
part of the evaluation process.
* **Reproducer**: AI-based tools are often capable of generating reproducers.
Please always ensure your tool provides one and **test it thoroughly**. If
the reproducer does not work, or if the tool cannot produce one, the
validity of the report should be seriously questioned. Note that since the
report will be posted to a public list, the reproducer should only be
shared upon maintainers' request.
* **Propose a Fix**: Many AI tools are actually better at writing code than
evaluating it. Please ask your tool to propose a fix and **test it** before
reporting the problem. If the fix cannot be tested because it relies on
rare hardware or almost extinct network protocols, the issue is likely not
a security bug. In any case, if a fix is proposed, it must adhere to
Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst and include a 'Fixes:' tag
designating the commit that introduced the bug.
Failure to consider these points exposes your report to the risk of being
ignored.
Use common sense when evaluating the report. If the affected file has not been
touched for more than one year and is maintained by a single individual, it is
likely that usage has declined and exposed users are virtually non-existent
(e.g., drivers for very old hardware, obsolete filesystems). In such cases,
there is no need to consume a maintainer's time with an unimportant report. If
the issue is clearly trivial and publicly discoverable, you should report it
directly to the public mailing lists.
Sending the report
------------------
@ -148,7 +242,15 @@ run additional tests. Reports where the reporter does not respond promptly
or cannot effectively discuss their findings may be abandoned if the
communication does not quickly improve.
The report must be sent to maintainers, with the security team in ``Cc:``.
The report must be sent to maintainers. If there are two or fewer
recipients in your message, you must also always Cc: the Linux kernel
security team who will ensure the message is delivered to the proper
people, and will be able to assist small maintainer teams with processes
they may not be familiar with. For larger teams, Cc: the Linux kernel
security team for your first few reports or when seeking specific help,
such as when resending a message which got no response within a week.
Once you have become comfortable with the process for a few reports, it is
no longer necessary to Cc: the security list when sending to large teams.
The Linux kernel security team can be contacted by email at
<security@kernel.org>. This is a private list of security officers
who will help verify the bug report and assist developers working on a fix.

View File

@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
The Linux Kernel threat model
=============================
There are a lot of assumptions regarding what the kernel does and does not
protect against. These assumptions tend to cause confusion for bug reports
(:doc:`security-related ones <security-bugs>` vs :doc:`non-security ones
<../admin-guide/reporting-issues>`), and can complicate security enforcement
when the responsibilities for some boundaries is not clear between the kernel,
distros, administrators and users.
This document tries to clarify the responsibilities of the kernel in this
domain.
The kernel's responsibilities
-----------------------------
The kernel abstracts access to local hardware resources and to remote systems
in a way that allows multiple local users to get a fair share of the available
resources granted to them, and, when the underlying hardware permits, to assign
a level of confidentiality to their communications and to the data they are
processing or storing.
The kernel assumes that the underlying hardware behaves according to its
specifications. This includes the integrity of the CPU's instruction set, the
transparency of the branch prediction unit and the cache units, the consistency
of the Memory Management Unit (MMU), the isolation of DMA-capable peripherals
(e.g., via IOMMU), state transitions in controllers, ranges of values read from
registers, the respect of documented hardware limitations, etc.
When hardware fails to maintain its specified isolation (e.g., CPU bugs,
side-channels, hardware response to unexpected inputs), the kernel will usually
attempt to implement reasonable mitigations. These are best-effort measures
intended to reduce the attack surface or elevate the cost of an attack within
the limits of the hardware's facilities; they do not constitute a
kernel-provided safety guarantee.
Users always perform their activities under the authority of an administrator
who is able to grant or deny various types of permissions that may affect how
users benefit from available resources, or the level of confidentiality of
their activities. Administrators may also delegate all or part of their own
permissions to some users, particularly via capabilities but not only. All this
is performed via configuration (sysctl, file-system permissions etc).
The Linux Kernel applies a certain collection of default settings that match
its threat model. Distros have their own threat model and will come with their
own configuration presets, that the administrator may have to adjust to better
suit their expectations (relax or restrict).
By default, the Linux Kernel guarantees the following protections when running
on common processors featuring privilege levels and memory management units:
* **User-based isolation**: an unprivileged user may restrict access to their
own data from other unprivileged users running on the same system. This
includes:
* stored data, via file system permissions
* in-memory data (pages are not accessible by default to other users)
* process activity (ptrace is not permitted to other users)
* inter-process communication (other users may not observe data exchanged via
UNIX domain sockets or other IPC mechanisms).
* network communications within the same or with other systems
* **Capability-based protection**:
* users not having elevated capabilities (including but not limited to
CAP_SYS_ADMIN) may not alter the
kernel's configuration, memory nor state, change other users' view of the
file system layout, grant any user capabilities they do not have, nor
affect the system's availability (shutdown, reboot, panic, hang, or making
the system unresponsive via unbounded resource exhaustion).
* users not having the ``CAP_NET_ADMIN`` capability may not alter the network
configuration, intercept nor spoof network communications from other users
nor systems.
* users not having ``CAP_SYS_PTRACE`` may not observe other users' processes
activities.
When ``CONFIG_USER_NS`` is set, the kernel also permits unprivileged users to
create their own user namespace in which they have all capabilities, but with a
number of restrictions (they may not perform actions that have impacts on the
initial user namespace, such as changing time, loading modules or mounting
block devices). Please refer to ``user_namespaces(7)`` for more details, the
possibilities of user namespaces are not covered in this document.
The kernel also offers a lot of troubleshooting and debugging facilities, which
can constitute attack vectors when placed in wrong hands. While some of them
are designed to be accessible to regular local users with a low risk (e.g.
kernel logs via ``/proc/kmsg``), some would expose enough information to
represent a risk in most places and the decision to expose them is under the
administrator's responsibility (perf events, traces), and others are not
designed to be accessed by non-privileged users (e.g. debugfs). Access to these
facilities by a user who has been explicitly granted permission by an
administrator does not constitute a security breach.
Bugs that permit to violate the principles above constitute security breaches.
However, bugs that permit one violation only once another one was already
achieved are only weaknesses. The kernel applies a number of self-protection
measures whose purpose is to avoid crossing a security boundary when certain
classes of bugs are found, but a failure of these extra protections do not
constitute a vulnerability alone.
What does not constitute a security bug
---------------------------------------
In the Linux kernel's threat model, the following classes of problems are
**NOT** considered as Linux Kernel security bugs. However, when it is believed
that the kernel could do better, they should be reported, so that they can be
reviewed and fixed where reasonably possible, but they will be handled as any
regular bug:
* **Configuration**:
* outdated kernels and particularly end-of-life branches are out of the scope
of the kernel's threat model: administrators are responsible for keeping
their system up to date. For a bug to qualify as a security bug, it must be
demonstrated that it affects actively maintained versions.
* build-level: changes to the kernel configuration that are explicitly
documented as lowering the security level (e.g. ``CONFIG_NOMMU``), or
targeted at developers only.
* OS-level: changes to command line parameters, sysctls, filesystem
permissions, user capabilities, exposure of privileged interfaces, that
explicitly increase exposure by either offering non-default access to
unprivileged users, or reduce the kernel's ability to enforce some
protections or mitigations. Example: write access to procfs or debugfs.
* issues triggered only when using features intended for development or
debugging (e.g., LOCKDEP, KASAN, FAULT_INJECTION): these features are known
to introduce overhead and potential instability and are not intended for
production use.
* issues affecting drivers exposed under CONFIG_STAGING, as well as features
marked EXPERIMENTAL in the configuration.
* loading of explicitly insecure/broken/staging modules, and generally any
using any subsystem marked as experimental or not intended for production
use.
* running out-of-tree modules or unofficial kernel forks; these should be
reported to the relevant vendor.
* **Excess of initial privileges**:
* actions performed by a user already possessing the privileges required to
perform that action or modify that state (e.g. ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN``,
``CAP_NET_ADMIN``, ``CAP_SYS_RAWIO``, ``CAP_SYS_MODULE`` with no further
boundary being crossed).
* actions performed in user namespace that do not bypass the restrictions
imposed to the initial user (e.g. ptrace usage, signal delivery, resource
usage, access to FS/device/sysctl/memory, network binding, system/network
configuration etc).
* anything performed by the root user in the initial namespace (e.g. kernel
oops when writing to a privileged device).
* **Out of production use**:
This covers theoretical/probabilistic attacks that rely on laboratory
conditions with zero system noise, or those requiring an unrealistic number
of attempts (e.g., billions of trials) that would be detected by standard
system monitoring long before success, such as:
* prediction of random numbers that only works in a totally silent
environment (such as IP ID, TCP ports or sequence numbers that can only be
guessed in a lab).
* activity observation and information leaks based on probabilistic
approaches that are prone to measurement noise and not realistically
reproducible on a production system.
* issues that can only be triggered by heavy attacks (e.g. brute force) whose
impact on the system makes it unlikely or impossible to remain undetected
before they succeed (e.g. consuming all memory before succeeding).
* problems seen only under development simulators, emulators, or combinations
that do not exist on real systems at the time of reporting (issues
involving tens of millions of threads, tens of thousands of CPUs,
unrealistic CPU frequencies, RAM sizes or disk capacities, network speeds.
* issues whose reproduction requires hardware modification or emulation,
including fake USB devices that pretend to be another one.
* as well as issues that can be triggered at a cost that is orders of
magnitude higher than the expected benefits (e.g. fully functional keyboard
emulator only to retrieve 7 uninitialized bytes in a structure, or
brute-force method involving millions of connection attempts to guess a
port number).
* **Hardening failures**:
* ability to bypass some of the kernel's hardening measures with no
demonstrable exploit path (e.g. ASLR bypass, events timing or probing with
no demonstrable consequence). These are just weaknesses, not
vulnerabilities.
* missing argument checks and failure to report certain errors with no
immediate consequence.
* **Random information leaks**:
This concerns information leaks of small data parts that happen to be there
and that cannot be chosen by the attacker, or face access restrictions:
* structure padding reported by syscalls or other interfaces.
* identifiers, partial data, non-terminated strings reported in error
messages.
* Leaks of kernel memory addresses/pointers do not constitute an immediately
exploitable vector and are not security bugs, though they must be reported
and fixed.
* **Crafted file system images**:
* bugs triggered by mounting a corrupted or maliciously crafted file system
image are generally not security bugs, as the kernel assumes the underlying
storage media is under the administrator's control, unless the filesystem
driver is specifically documented as being hardened against untrusted media.
* issues that are resolved, mitigated, or detected by running a filesystem
consistency check (fsck) on the image prior to mounting.
* **Physical access**:
Issues that require physical access to the machine, hardware modification, or
the use of specialized hardware (e.g., logic analyzers, DMA-attack tools over
PCI-E/Thunderbolt) are out of scope unless the system is explicitly
configured with technologies meant to defend against such attacks
(e.g. IOMMU).
* **Functional and performance regressions**:
Any issue that can be mitigated by setting proper permissions and limits
doesn't qualify as a security bug.

View File

@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ There are two drivers in the kernel
*For systems using SoundWire*: sound/soc/codecs/cs35l56.c and associated files
*For systems using HDA*: sound/pci/hda/cs35l56_hda.c
*For systems using HDA*: sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/cs35l56_hda.c
Firmware
========

View File

@ -656,8 +656,8 @@ References
See [white-paper]_, [api-spec]_, [amd-apm]_, [kvm-forum]_, and [snp-fw-abi]_
for more info.
.. [white-paper] https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
.. [api-spec] https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM_API_Specification.pdf
.. [amd-apm] https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.34)
.. [white-paper] https://docs.amd.com/v/u/en-US/memory-encryption-white-paper
.. [api-spec] https://docs.amd.com/v/u/en-US/55766_PUB_3.24_SEV_API
.. [amd-apm] https://docs.amd.com/v/u/en-US/24593_3.44_APM_Vol2 (section 15.34)
.. [kvm-forum] https://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
.. [snp-fw-abi] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf
.. [snp-fw-abi] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/developer/56860.pdf

View File

@ -68,6 +68,12 @@ Maintainers List
first. When adding to this list, please keep the entries in
alphabetical order.
3C509 NETWORK DRIVER
M: "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@orcam.me.uk>
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: drivers/net/ethernet/3com/3c509.c
3C59X NETWORK DRIVER
M: Steffen Klassert <klassert@kernel.org>
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
@ -2015,7 +2021,7 @@ F: Documentation/hwmon/aquacomputer_d5next.rst
F: drivers/hwmon/aquacomputer_d5next.c
AQUANTIA ETHERNET DRIVER (atlantic)
M: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
M: Sukhdeep Singh <sukhdeeps@marvell.com>
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
W: https://www.marvell.com/
@ -2024,7 +2030,7 @@ F: Documentation/networking/device_drivers/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic.rst
F: drivers/net/ethernet/aquantia/atlantic/
AQUANTIA ETHERNET DRIVER PTP SUBSYSTEM
M: Egor Pomozov <epomozov@marvell.com>
M: Sukhdeep Singh <sukhdeeps@marvell.com>
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
W: http://www.aquantia.com
@ -2058,7 +2064,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/snps,arcpgu.txt
F: drivers/gpu/drm/tiny/arcpgu.c
ARCNET NETWORK LAYER
M: Michael Grzeschik <m.grzeschik@pengutronix.de>
M: Michael Grzeschik <mgr@kernel.org>
L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: drivers/net/arcnet/
@ -3361,7 +3367,9 @@ F: drivers/irqchip/irq-rda-intc.c
F: drivers/tty/serial/rda-uart.c
ARM/REALTEK ARCHITECTURE
M: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de>
M: James Tai <james.tai@realtek.com>
M: Yu-Chun Lin <eleanor.lin@realtek.com>
R: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.com>
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
L: linux-realtek-soc@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
S: Maintained
@ -3369,6 +3377,7 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/realtek.yaml
F: arch/arm/boot/dts/realtek/
F: arch/arm/mach-realtek/
F: arch/arm64/boot/dts/realtek/
F: drivers/pinctrl/realtek/
ARM/RISC-V/RENESAS ARCHITECTURE
M: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
@ -4181,8 +4190,8 @@ F: include/uapi/linux/sonet.h
F: net/atm/
ATMEL MACB ETHERNET DRIVER
M: Nicolas Ferre <nicolas.ferre@microchip.com>
M: Claudiu Beznea <claudiu.beznea@tuxon.dev>
M: Théo Lebrun <theo.lebrun@bootlin.com>
R: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
S: Maintained
F: drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/
@ -12783,7 +12792,6 @@ M: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com>
M: Liam Girdwood <liam.r.girdwood@linux.intel.com>
M: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
M: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
M: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
M: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
R: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.dev>
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
@ -13864,6 +13872,7 @@ M: Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org>
R: Dave Young <ruirui.yang@linux.dev>
L: kexec@lists.infradead.org
S: Maintained
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/liveupdate/linux.git
F: Documentation/admin-guide/kdump/
F: fs/proc/vmcore.c
F: include/linux/crash_core.h
@ -14056,6 +14065,7 @@ KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR ARM64 (KVM/arm64)
M: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
M: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
R: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
R: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
R: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
R: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
L: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
@ -14180,6 +14190,7 @@ M: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
M: Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org>
L: kexec@lists.infradead.org
W: http://kernel.org/pub/linux/utils/kernel/kexec/
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/liveupdate/linux.git
F: include/linux/kexec.h
F: include/uapi/linux/kexec.h
F: kernel/kexec*
@ -14896,6 +14907,7 @@ LIVE UPDATE
M: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
M: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
M: Pratyush Yadav <pratyush@kernel.org>
L: kexec@lists.infradead.org
L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/liveupdate/linux.git
@ -18626,6 +18638,7 @@ F: tools/testing/selftests/net/
X: Documentation/networking/mac80211-injection.rst
X: Documentation/networking/mac80211_hwsim/
X: Documentation/networking/regulatory.rst
X: include/net/bluetooth/
X: include/net/cfg80211.h
X: include/net/ieee80211_radiotap.h
X: include/net/iw_handler.h
@ -18935,7 +18948,8 @@ F: drivers/hid/hid-nintendo*
NIOS2 ARCHITECTURE
M: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
S: Maintained
M: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
S: Supported
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dinguyen/linux.git
F: arch/nios2/
@ -19449,7 +19463,6 @@ F: include/misc/ocxl*
F: include/uapi/misc/ocxl.h
OMAP AUDIO SUPPORT
M: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@gmail.com>
M: Jarkko Nikula <jarkko.nikula@bitmer.com>
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
L: linux-omap@vger.kernel.org
@ -20731,15 +20744,13 @@ F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/intel,keembay-pcie*
F: drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-keembay.c
PCIE DRIVER FOR INTEL LGM GW SOC
M: Chuanhua Lei <lchuanhua@maxlinear.com>
L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
S: Orphan
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/pci/intel-gw-pcie.yaml
F: drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-intel-gw.c
PCIE DRIVER FOR MEDIATEK
M: Ryder Lee <ryder.lee@mediatek.com>
M: Jianjun Wang <jianjun.wang@mediatek.com>
L: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
L: linux-mediatek@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
S: Supported
@ -22945,7 +22956,7 @@ N: riscv
K: riscv
RISC-V IOMMU
M: Tomasz Jeznach <tjeznach@rivosinc.com>
M: Tomasz Jeznach <tomasz.jeznach@linux.dev>
L: iommu@lists.linux.dev
L: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
S: Maintained
@ -25059,7 +25070,6 @@ SOUND - SOUND OPEN FIRMWARE (SOF) DRIVERS
M: Liam Girdwood <lgirdwood@gmail.com>
M: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@linux.intel.com>
M: Bard Liao <yung-chuan.liao@linux.intel.com>
M: Ranjani Sridharan <ranjani.sridharan@linux.intel.com>
M: Daniel Baluta <daniel.baluta@nxp.com>
R: Kai Vehmanen <kai.vehmanen@linux.intel.com>
R: Pierre-Louis Bossart <pierre-louis.bossart@linux.dev>
@ -26352,7 +26362,7 @@ F: arch/xtensa/
F: drivers/irqchip/irq-xtensa-*
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS ASoC DRIVERS
M: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@gmail.com>
M: Sen Wang <sen@ti.com>
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/sound/davinci-mcasp-audio.yaml
@ -26854,12 +26864,6 @@ S: Maintained
F: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/iio/adc/ti,tsc2046.yaml
F: drivers/iio/adc/ti-tsc2046.c
TI TWL4030 SERIES SOC CODEC DRIVER
M: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@gmail.com>
L: linux-sound@vger.kernel.org
S: Maintained
F: sound/soc/codecs/twl4030*
TI VPE/CAL DRIVERS
M: Yemike Abhilash Chandra <y-abhilashchandra@ti.com>
L: linux-media@vger.kernel.org

View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
VERSION = 7
PATCHLEVEL = 1
SUBLEVEL = 0
EXTRAVERSION = -rc2
EXTRAVERSION = -rc5
NAME = Baby Opossum Posse
# *DOCUMENTATION*

View File

@ -5,4 +5,5 @@ generic-y += agp.h
generic-y += asm-offsets.h
generic-y += kvm_para.h
generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += text-patching.h

View File

@ -5,5 +5,6 @@ generic-y += extable.h
generic-y += kvm_para.h
generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h
generic-y += parport.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += user.h
generic-y += text-patching.h

View File

@ -34,9 +34,6 @@ flash@18000000 {
clocks = <&mstp9_clks R7S72100_CLK_SPIBSC0>;
power-domains = <&cpg_clocks>;
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <1>;
partitions {
compatible = "fixed-partitions";
#address-cells = <1>;

View File

@ -36,8 +36,6 @@ flash@18000000 {
power-domains = <&cpg_clocks>;
bank-width = <4>;
device-width = <1>;
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <1>;
partitions {
compatible = "fixed-partitions";

View File

@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ b_clk: b {
clock-div = <3>;
};
bsc: bus {
bsc: bus@0 {
compatible = "simple-bus";
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <1>;

View File

@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ aliases {
spi2 = &hspi2;
};
lbsc: bus {
lbsc: bus@0 {
compatible = "simple-bus";
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <1>;

View File

@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ R8A7779_CLK_MMC1 R8A7779_CLK_MMC0
};
};
lbsc: bus {
lbsc: bus@0 {
compatible = "simple-bus";
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <1>;

View File

@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ extal_clk: extal {
bootph-all;
};
lbsc: bus {
lbsc: bus@0 {
compatible = "simple-bus";
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <1>;

View File

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ generic-y += early_ioremap.h
generic-y += extable.h
generic-y += flat.h
generic-y += parport.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generated-y += mach-types.h
generated-y += unistd-nr.h

View File

@ -86,14 +86,6 @@ static u64 notrace intcp_read_sched_clock(void)
return val;
}
static void __init intcp_init_early(void)
{
cm_map = syscon_regmap_lookup_by_compatible("arm,core-module-integrator");
if (IS_ERR(cm_map))
return;
sched_clock_register(intcp_read_sched_clock, 32, 24000000);
}
static void __init intcp_init_irq_of(void)
{
cm_init();
@ -119,6 +111,10 @@ static void __init intcp_init_of(void)
{
struct device_node *cpcon;
cm_map = syscon_regmap_lookup_by_compatible("arm,core-module-integrator");
if (!IS_ERR(cm_map))
sched_clock_register(intcp_read_sched_clock, 32, 24000000);
cpcon = of_find_matching_node(NULL, intcp_syscon_match);
if (!cpcon)
return;
@ -138,7 +134,6 @@ static const char * intcp_dt_board_compat[] = {
DT_MACHINE_START(INTEGRATOR_CP_DT, "ARM Integrator/CP (Device Tree)")
.reserve = integrator_reserve,
.map_io = intcp_map_io,
.init_early = intcp_init_early,
.init_irq = intcp_init_irq_of,
.init_machine = intcp_init_of,
.dt_compat = intcp_dt_board_compat,

View File

@ -27,7 +27,12 @@ &lvds1 {
status = "okay";
ports {
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
port@1 {
reg = <1>;
lvds1_out: endpoint {
remote-endpoint = <&panel_in>;
};

View File

@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ scif0: serial@c0700000 {
"renesas,rcar-gen5-scif", "renesas,scif";
reg = <0 0xc0700000 0 0x40>;
interrupts = <GIC_ESPI 10 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd16>, <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd16>, <&scif_clk>;
clocks = <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd16>, <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd4>, <&scif_clk>;
clock-names = "fck", "brg_int", "scif_clk";
status = "disabled";
};
@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ scif1: serial@c0704000 {
"renesas,rcar-gen5-scif", "renesas,scif";
reg = <0 0xc0704000 0 0x40>;
interrupts = <GIC_ESPI 11 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd16>, <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd16>, <&scif_clk>;
clocks = <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd16>, <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd4>, <&scif_clk>;
clock-names = "fck", "brg_int", "scif_clk";
status = "disabled";
};
@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ scif3: serial@c0708000 {
"renesas,rcar-gen5-scif", "renesas,scif";
reg = <0 0xc0708000 0 0x40>;
interrupts = <GIC_ESPI 12 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd16>, <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd16>, <&scif_clk>;
clocks = <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd16>, <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd4>, <&scif_clk>;
clock-names = "fck", "brg_int", "scif_clk";
status = "disabled";
};
@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ scif4: serial@c070c000 {
"renesas,rcar-gen5-scif", "renesas,scif";
reg = <0 0xc070c000 0 0x40>;
interrupts = <GIC_ESPI 13 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
clocks = <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd16>, <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd16>, <&scif_clk>;
clocks = <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd16>, <&dummy_clk_sgasyncd4>, <&scif_clk>;
clock-names = "fck", "brg_int", "scif_clk";
status = "disabled";
};

View File

@ -1327,6 +1327,7 @@ usb20phyrst: usb20phy-reset@15830000 {
resets = <&cpg 0xaf>;
power-domains = <&cpg>;
#reset-cells = <0>;
#mux-state-cells = <1>;
status = "disabled";
};

View File

@ -1345,6 +1345,7 @@ usb20phyrst: usb20phy-reset@15830000 {
resets = <&cpg 0xaf>;
power-domains = <&cpg>;
#reset-cells = <0>;
#mux-state-cells = <1>;
status = "disabled";
};
@ -1355,6 +1356,7 @@ usb21phyrst: usb21phy-reset@15840000 {
resets = <&cpg 0xaf>;
power-domains = <&cpg>;
#reset-cells = <0>;
#mux-state-cells = <1>;
status = "disabled";
};

View File

@ -46,7 +46,12 @@ &csi2 {
status = "okay";
ports {
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
port@0 {
reg = <0>;
csi2_in: endpoint {
clock-lanes = <0>;
data-lanes = <1 2>;

View File

@ -26,7 +26,12 @@ &du {
status = "okay";
ports {
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
port@0 {
reg = <0>;
du_out_rgb: endpoint {
remote-endpoint = <&adv7513_in>;
};

View File

@ -27,7 +27,12 @@ &lvds0 {
status = "okay";
ports {
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
port@1 {
reg = <1>;
lvds0_out: endpoint {
remote-endpoint = <&panel_in>;
};

View File

@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ __AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(cbz, 0x7F000000, 0x34000000)
__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(cbnz, 0x7F000000, 0x35000000)
__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(tbz, 0x7F000000, 0x36000000)
__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(tbnz, 0x7F000000, 0x37000000)
__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(bcond, 0xFF000010, 0x54000000)
__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(bcond, 0xFF000000, 0x54000000)
__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(svc, 0xFFE0001F, 0xD4000001)
__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(hvc, 0xFFE0001F, 0xD4000002)
__AARCH64_INSN_FUNCS(smc, 0xFFE0001F, 0xD4000003)

View File

@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static inline u64 tcr_el2_ps_to_tcr_el1_ips(u64 tcr_el2)
static inline u64 translate_tcr_el2_to_tcr_el1(u64 tcr)
{
return TCR_EPD1_MASK | /* disable TTBR1_EL1 */
((tcr & TCR_EL2_DS) ? TCR_DS : 0) |
((tcr & TCR_EL2_TBI) ? TCR_TBI0 : 0) |
tcr_el2_ps_to_tcr_el1_ips(tcr) |
(tcr & TCR_EL2_TG0_MASK) |

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct folio *vma_alloc_zeroed_movable_folio(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long vaddr);
#define vma_alloc_zeroed_movable_folio vma_alloc_zeroed_movable_folio
bool tag_clear_highpages(struct page *to, int numpages);
bool tag_clear_highpages(struct page *to, int numpages, bool clear_pages);
#define __HAVE_ARCH_TAG_CLEAR_HIGHPAGES
#define copy_user_page(to, from, vaddr, pg) copy_page(to, from)

View File

@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
#ifndef _ASM_ARM64_RING_BUFFER_H
#define _ASM_ARM64_RING_BUFFER_H
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
/* Flush D-cache on persistent ring buffer */
#define arch_ring_buffer_flush_range(start, end) dcache_clean_pop(start, end)
#endif /* _ASM_ARM64_RING_BUFFER_H */

View File

@ -844,7 +844,7 @@
#define INIT_SCTLR_EL2_MMU_ON \
(SCTLR_ELx_M | SCTLR_ELx_C | SCTLR_ELx_SA | SCTLR_ELx_I | \
SCTLR_ELx_IESB | SCTLR_ELx_WXN | ENDIAN_SET_EL2 | \
SCTLR_ELx_ITFSB | SCTLR_EL2_RES1)
SCTLR_ELx_ITFSB | SCTLR_ELx_EIS | SCTLR_ELx_EOS | SCTLR_EL2_RES1)
#define INIT_SCTLR_EL2_MMU_OFF \
(SCTLR_EL2_RES1 | ENDIAN_SET_EL2)

View File

@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ static inline int tlb_get_level(struct mmu_gather *tlb)
static inline void tlb_flush(struct mmu_gather *tlb)
{
struct vm_area_struct vma = TLB_FLUSH_VMA(tlb->mm, 0);
tlbf_t flags = tlb->freed_tables ? TLBF_NONE : TLBF_NOWALKCACHE;
tlbf_t flags = (tlb->freed_tables || tlb->unshared_tables) ?
TLBF_NONE : TLBF_NOWALKCACHE;
unsigned long stride = tlb_get_unmap_size(tlb);
int tlb_level = tlb_get_level(tlb);

View File

@ -62,6 +62,13 @@ static void noinstr arm64_exit_to_kernel_mode(struct pt_regs *regs,
irqentry_exit_to_kernel_mode_after_preempt(regs, state);
}
static __always_inline void arm64_syscall_enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
enter_from_user_mode(regs);
mte_disable_tco_entry(current);
sme_enter_from_user_mode();
}
/*
* Handle IRQ/context state management when entering from user mode.
* Before this function is called it is not safe to call regular kernel code,
@ -70,20 +77,30 @@ static void noinstr arm64_exit_to_kernel_mode(struct pt_regs *regs,
static __always_inline void arm64_enter_from_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
enter_from_user_mode(regs);
rseq_note_user_irq_entry();
mte_disable_tco_entry(current);
sme_enter_from_user_mode();
}
static __always_inline void arm64_syscall_exit_to_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
local_irq_disable();
syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(regs);
local_daif_mask();
sme_exit_to_user_mode();
mte_check_tfsr_exit();
exit_to_user_mode();
}
/*
* Handle IRQ/context state management when exiting to user mode.
* After this function returns it is not safe to call regular kernel code,
* instrumentable code, or any code which may trigger an exception.
*/
static __always_inline void arm64_exit_to_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
local_irq_disable();
exit_to_user_mode_prepare_legacy(regs);
irqentry_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(regs);
local_daif_mask();
sme_exit_to_user_mode();
mte_check_tfsr_exit();
@ -92,7 +109,7 @@ static __always_inline void arm64_exit_to_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
asmlinkage void noinstr asm_exit_to_user_mode(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
arm64_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
arm64_syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
}
/*
@ -716,12 +733,12 @@ static void noinstr el0_brk64(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
static void noinstr el0_svc(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
arm64_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
arm64_syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_svc_handler();
fpsimd_syscall_enter();
local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
do_el0_svc(regs);
arm64_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
arm64_syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
fpsimd_syscall_exit();
}
@ -868,11 +885,11 @@ static void noinstr el0_cp15(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
static void noinstr el0_svc_compat(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
arm64_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
arm64_syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_svc_handler();
local_daif_restore(DAIF_PROCCTX);
do_el0_svc_compat(regs);
arm64_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
arm64_syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
}
static void noinstr el0_bkpt32(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)

View File

@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
* Author: Christoffer Dall <c.dall@virtualopensystems.com>
*/
#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/cpu_pm.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
@ -554,8 +555,10 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_destroy_mpidr_data(vcpu->kvm);
err = kvm_vgic_vcpu_init(vcpu);
if (err)
if (err) {
kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(vcpu);
return err;
}
err = kvm_share_hyp(vcpu, vcpu + 1);
if (err)
@ -2638,6 +2641,22 @@ static int init_pkvm_host_sve_state(void)
return 0;
}
static int pkvm_check_sme_dvmsync_fw_call(void)
{
struct arm_smccc_res res;
if (!cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_4193714))
return 0;
arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_CPU_WORKAROUND_4193714, &res);
if (res.a0) {
kvm_err("pKVM requires firmware support for C1-Pro erratum 4193714\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Finalizes the initialization of hyp mode, once everything else is initialized
* and the initialziation process cannot fail.
@ -2838,6 +2857,10 @@ static int __init init_hyp_mode(void)
if (err)
goto out_err;
err = pkvm_check_sme_dvmsync_fw_call();
if (err)
goto out_err;
err = kvm_hyp_init_protection(hyp_va_bits);
if (err) {
kvm_err("Failed to init hyp memory protection\n");

View File

@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static inline void __activate_traps_ich_hfgxtr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
__activate_fgt(hctxt, vcpu, ICH_HFGITR_EL2);
}
#define __deactivate_fgt(htcxt, vcpu, reg) \
#define __deactivate_fgt(hctxt, vcpu, reg) \
do { \
write_sysreg_s(ctxt_sys_reg(hctxt, reg), \
SYS_ ## reg); \

View File

@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ void trace_clock_update(u32 mult, u32 shift, u64 epoch_ns, u64 epoch_cyc)
struct clock_data *clock = &trace_clock_data;
u64 bank = clock->cur ^ 1;
if (!mult || shift >= 64)
return;
clock->data[bank].mult = mult;
clock->data[bank].shift = shift;
clock->data[bank].epoch_ns = epoch_ns;

View File

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <asm/kvm_emulate.h>
#include <asm/kvm_hyp.h>
#include <asm/kvm_mmu.h>
@ -14,6 +15,7 @@
#include <hyp/fault.h>
#include <nvhe/arm-smccc.h>
#include <nvhe/gfp.h>
#include <nvhe/memory.h>
#include <nvhe/mem_protect.h>
@ -29,6 +31,19 @@ static struct hyp_pool host_s2_pool;
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pkvm_hyp_vm *, __current_vm);
#define current_vm (*this_cpu_ptr(&__current_vm))
static void pkvm_sme_dvmsync_fw_call(void)
{
if (alternative_has_cap_unlikely(ARM64_WORKAROUND_4193714)) {
struct arm_smccc_res res;
/*
* Ignore the return value. Probing for the workaround
* availability took place in init_hyp_mode().
*/
hyp_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_CPU_WORKAROUND_4193714, &res);
}
}
static void guest_lock_component(struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm)
{
hyp_spin_lock(&vm->lock);
@ -574,8 +589,14 @@ static int host_stage2_set_owner_metadata_locked(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size,
ret = host_stage2_try(kvm_pgtable_stage2_annotate, &host_mmu.pgt,
addr, size, &host_s2_pool,
KVM_HOST_INVALID_PTE_TYPE_DONATION, annotation);
if (!ret)
if (!ret) {
/*
* After stage2 maintenance has happened, but before the page
* owner has changed.
*/
pkvm_sme_dvmsync_fw_call();
__host_update_page_state(addr, size, PKVM_NOPAGE);
}
return ret;
}
@ -1369,6 +1390,22 @@ int __pkvm_host_reclaim_page_guest(u64 gfn, struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm)
return ret && ret != -EHWPOISON ? ret : 0;
}
/*
* share/donate install at most one stage-2 leaf (PAGE_SIZE, or one
* KVM_PGTABLE_LAST_LEVEL - 1 block for share). kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages()
* bounds the worst-case allocation: exact for the PAGE_SIZE leaf,
* conservative by one for the block.
*/
static int __guest_check_pgtable_memcache(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm = pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(vcpu);
if (vcpu->vcpu.arch.pkvm_memcache.nr_pages < kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(vm->pgt.mmu))
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
int __pkvm_host_donate_guest(u64 pfn, u64 gfn, struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm = pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(vcpu);
@ -1388,6 +1425,10 @@ int __pkvm_host_donate_guest(u64 pfn, u64 gfn, struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *vcpu)
if (ret)
goto unlock;
ret = __guest_check_pgtable_memcache(vcpu);
if (ret)
goto unlock;
meta = host_stage2_encode_gfn_meta(vm, gfn);
WARN_ON(host_stage2_set_owner_metadata_locked(phys, PAGE_SIZE,
PKVM_ID_GUEST, meta));
@ -1453,6 +1494,10 @@ int __pkvm_host_share_guest(u64 pfn, u64 gfn, u64 nr_pages, struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu
}
}
ret = __guest_check_pgtable_memcache(vcpu);
if (ret)
goto unlock;
for_each_hyp_page(page, phys, size) {
set_host_state(page, PKVM_PAGE_SHARED_OWNED);
page->host_share_guest_count++;

View File

@ -752,16 +752,30 @@ static struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu selftest_vcpu = {
struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *init_selftest_vm(void *virt)
{
struct hyp_page *p = hyp_virt_to_page(virt);
unsigned long min_pages, seeded = 0;
int i;
selftest_vm.kvm.arch.mmu.vtcr = host_mmu.arch.mmu.vtcr;
WARN_ON(kvm_guest_prepare_stage2(&selftest_vm, virt));
/*
* Mirror pkvm_refill_memcache() for the share/donate pre-checks;
* the selftest invokes those functions directly and would
* otherwise see an empty memcache.
*/
min_pages = kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(&selftest_vm.kvm.arch.mmu);
for (i = 0; i < pkvm_selftest_pages(); i++) {
if (p[i].refcount)
continue;
p[i].refcount = 1;
hyp_put_page(&selftest_vm.pool, hyp_page_to_virt(&p[i]));
if (seeded < min_pages) {
push_hyp_memcache(&selftest_vcpu.vcpu.arch.pkvm_memcache,
hyp_page_to_virt(&p[i]), hyp_virt_to_phys);
seeded++;
} else {
hyp_put_page(&selftest_vm.pool, hyp_page_to_virt(&p[i]));
}
}
selftest_vm.kvm.arch.pkvm.handle = __pkvm_reserve_vm();

View File

@ -164,13 +164,16 @@ static int hyp_trace_buffer_load(struct hyp_trace_buffer *trace_buffer,
return ret;
}
static bool hyp_trace_desc_validate(struct hyp_trace_desc *desc, size_t desc_size)
static bool hyp_trace_desc_is_valid(struct hyp_trace_desc *desc, size_t desc_size)
{
struct ring_buffer_desc *rb_desc;
unsigned int cpu;
size_t nr_bpages;
void *desc_end;
if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
return true;
/*
* Both desc_size and bpages_backing_size are untrusted host-provided
* values. We rely on __pkvm_host_donate_hyp() to enforce their validity.
@ -212,8 +215,10 @@ int __tracing_load(unsigned long desc_hva, size_t desc_size)
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!hyp_trace_desc_validate(desc, desc_size))
if (!hyp_trace_desc_is_valid(desc, desc_size)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_release_desc;
}
hyp_spin_lock(&trace_buffer.lock);

View File

@ -663,7 +663,8 @@ static void __noreturn __hyp_call_panic(u64 spsr, u64 elr, u64 par)
host_ctxt = host_data_ptr(host_ctxt);
vcpu = host_ctxt->__hyp_running_vcpu;
__deactivate_traps(vcpu);
if (vcpu)
__deactivate_traps(vcpu);
sysreg_restore_host_state_vhe(host_ctxt);
panic("HYP panic:\nPS:%08llx PC:%016llx ESR:%08llx\nFAR:%016llx HPFAR:%016llx PAR:%016llx\nVCPU:%p\n",

View File

@ -1576,21 +1576,24 @@ struct kvm_s2_fault_desc {
static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd)
{
bool write_fault, exec_fault;
bool perm_fault = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_permission_fault(s2fd->vcpu);
enum kvm_pgtable_walk_flags flags = KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_SHARED;
enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
struct kvm_pgtable *pgt = s2fd->vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->pgt;
unsigned long mmu_seq;
struct page *page;
struct kvm *kvm = s2fd->vcpu->kvm;
void *memcache;
void *memcache = NULL;
kvm_pfn_t pfn;
gfn_t gfn;
int ret;
memcache = get_mmu_memcache(s2fd->vcpu);
ret = topup_mmu_memcache(s2fd->vcpu, memcache);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!perm_fault) {
memcache = get_mmu_memcache(s2fd->vcpu);
ret = topup_mmu_memcache(s2fd->vcpu, memcache);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
if (s2fd->nested)
gfn = kvm_s2_trans_output(s2fd->nested) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@ -1631,9 +1634,19 @@ static int gmem_abort(const struct kvm_s2_fault_desc *s2fd)
goto out_unlock;
}
ret = KVM_PGT_FN(kvm_pgtable_stage2_map)(pgt, s2fd->fault_ipa, PAGE_SIZE,
__pfn_to_phys(pfn), prot,
memcache, flags);
if (perm_fault) {
/*
* Drop the SW bits in favour of those stored in the
* PTE, which will be preserved.
*/
prot &= ~KVM_NV_GUEST_MAP_SZ;
ret = KVM_PGT_FN(kvm_pgtable_stage2_relax_perms)(pgt, s2fd->fault_ipa,
prot, flags);
} else {
ret = KVM_PGT_FN(kvm_pgtable_stage2_map)(pgt, s2fd->fault_ipa, PAGE_SIZE,
__pfn_to_phys(pfn), prot,
memcache, flags);
}
out_unlock:
kvm_release_faultin_page(kvm, page, !!ret, prot & KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_W);

View File

@ -2307,6 +2307,10 @@ static int vgic_its_restore_dte(struct vgic_its *its, u32 id,
/* dte entry is valid */
offset = (entry & KVM_ITS_DTE_NEXT_MASK) >> KVM_ITS_DTE_NEXT_SHIFT;
/* Mimic the MAPD behaviour and reject invalid EID bits. */
if (num_eventid_bits > VITS_TYPER_IDBITS)
return -EINVAL;
if (!vgic_its_check_id(its, baser, id, NULL))
return -EINVAL;

View File

@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ struct folio *vma_alloc_zeroed_movable_folio(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
return vma_alloc_folio(flags, 0, vma, vaddr);
}
bool tag_clear_highpages(struct page *page, int numpages)
bool tag_clear_highpages(struct page *page, int numpages, bool clear_pages)
{
/*
* Check if MTE is supported and fall back to clear_highpage().
@ -1026,13 +1026,16 @@ bool tag_clear_highpages(struct page *page, int numpages)
* post_alloc_hook() will invoke tag_clear_highpages().
*/
if (!system_supports_mte())
return false;
return clear_pages;
/* Newly allocated pages, shouldn't have been tagged yet */
for (int i = 0; i < numpages; i++, page++) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(!try_page_mte_tagging(page));
mte_zero_clear_page_tags(page_address(page));
if (clear_pages)
mte_zero_clear_page_tags(page_address(page));
else
mte_clear_page_tags(page_address(page));
set_page_mte_tagged(page);
}
return true;
return false;
}

View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ generic-y += qrwlock.h
generic-y += qrwlock_types.h
generic-y += qspinlock.h
generic-y += parport.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += user.h
generic-y += vmlinux.lds.h
generic-y += text-patching.h

View File

@ -5,4 +5,5 @@ generic-y += extable.h
generic-y += iomap.h
generic-y += kvm_para.h
generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += text-patching.h

View File

@ -10,5 +10,6 @@ generic-y += qrwlock.h
generic-y += user.h
generic-y += ioctl.h
generic-y += mmzone.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += statfs.h
generic-y += text-patching.h

View File

@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ static inline unsigned long efi_get_kimg_min_align(void)
return SZ_2M;
}
#define EFI_KIMG_PREFERRED_ADDRESS PHYSADDR(VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS)
unsigned long efi_get_kimg_kaslr_address(void);
#define EFI_KIMG_PREFERRED_ADDRESS efi_get_kimg_kaslr_address()
#endif /* _ASM_LOONGARCH_EFI_H */

View File

@ -4,6 +4,12 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(virt_preempt_key);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(virt_spin_lock_key);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_steal_time, steal_time);
int __init pv_ipi_init(void);
int __init pv_time_init(void);
int __init pv_spinlock_init(void);

View File

@ -3,12 +3,9 @@
#define _ASM_LOONGARCH_QSPINLOCK_H
#include <asm/kvm_para.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <asm/paravirt.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(virt_preempt_key);
DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(virt_spin_lock_key);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_steal_time, steal_time);
#define virt_spin_lock virt_spin_lock

View File

@ -60,16 +60,18 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(arch_prepare_kprobe);
/* Install breakpoint in text */
void arch_arm_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
{
*p->addr = KPROBE_BP_INSN;
flush_insn_slot(p);
u32 insn = KPROBE_BP_INSN;
larch_insn_text_copy(p->addr, &insn, LOONGARCH_INSN_SIZE);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(arch_arm_kprobe);
/* Remove breakpoint from text */
void arch_disarm_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
{
*p->addr = p->opcode;
flush_insn_slot(p);
u32 insn = p->opcode;
larch_insn_text_copy(p->addr, &insn, LOONGARCH_INSN_SIZE);
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(arch_disarm_kprobe);
@ -184,16 +186,16 @@ static bool reenter_kprobe(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs,
struct kprobe_ctlblk *kcb)
{
switch (kcb->kprobe_status) {
case KPROBE_HIT_SS:
case KPROBE_HIT_SSDONE:
case KPROBE_HIT_ACTIVE:
kprobes_inc_nmissed_count(p);
setup_singlestep(p, regs, kcb, 1);
break;
case KPROBE_HIT_SS:
case KPROBE_REENTER:
pr_warn("Failed to recover from reentered kprobes.\n");
dump_kprobe(p);
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
BUG();
break;
default:
WARN_ON(1);

View File

@ -134,11 +134,23 @@ early_param("nokaslr", nokaslr);
#define KASLR_DISABLED_MESSAGE "KASLR is disabled by %s in %s cmdline.\n"
/*
* Note: strictly-defined KASLR means the kernel's final runtime address
* has a random offset from the kernel's load address, which is implemented
* in relocate.c; broadly-defined KALSR means the kernel's final runtime
* address has a random offset from the kernel's link address (a.k.a.
* VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS), which also include the efistlub implementation,
* kexec_file implementation and QEMU direct kernel boot. kaslr_disabled()
* return true only means strictly-defined KASLR is disabled.
*/
static inline __init bool kaslr_disabled(void)
{
char *str;
const char *builtin_cmdline = CONFIG_CMDLINE;
if (kaslr_offset())
return true; /* KASLR is performed during early boot. */
str = strstr(builtin_cmdline, "nokaslr");
if (str == builtin_cmdline || (str > builtin_cmdline && *(str - 1) == ' ')) {
pr_info(KASLR_DISABLED_MESSAGE, "\'nokaslr\'", "built-in");
@ -210,14 +222,52 @@ static inline void __init *determine_relocation_address(void)
return RELOCATED_KASLR(destination);
}
static unsigned long __init determine_initrd_address(unsigned long *size)
{
unsigned long start = 0;
unsigned long key_length;
char *p, *endp, *key = "initrd=";
key_length = strlen(key);
p = strstr(boot_command_line, key);
if (!p) {
key = "initrdmem=";
key_length = strlen(key);
p = strstr(boot_command_line, key);
}
if (p == boot_command_line || (p > boot_command_line && *(p - 1) == ' ')) {
p += key_length;
start = memparse(p, &endp);
if (*endp == ',')
*size = memparse(endp + 1, NULL);
}
return start;
}
static inline int __init relocation_addr_valid(void *location_new)
{
unsigned long kernel_start, kernel_size;
unsigned long initrd_start, initrd_size = 0;
if ((unsigned long)location_new & 0x00000ffff)
return 0; /* Inappropriately aligned new location */
if ((unsigned long)location_new < (unsigned long)_end)
return 0; /* New location overlaps original kernel */
initrd_start = determine_initrd_address(&initrd_size);
if (initrd_start && initrd_size) {
kernel_start = PHYSADDR(location_new);
kernel_size = (unsigned long)_end - (unsigned long)_text;
if (kernel_start < (initrd_start + initrd_size) &&
initrd_start < (kernel_start + kernel_size))
return 0; /* initrd/initramfs overlaps kernel */
}
return 1;
}
#endif

View File

@ -123,11 +123,7 @@ void arch_remove_memory(u64 start, u64 size, struct vmem_altmap *altmap)
{
unsigned long start_pfn = start >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
struct page *page = pfn_to_page(start_pfn);
/* With altmap the first mapped page is offset from @start */
if (altmap)
page += vmem_altmap_offset(altmap);
__remove_pages(start_pfn, nr_pages, altmap);
}
#endif

View File

@ -3,5 +3,6 @@ generated-y += syscall_table.h
generic-y += extable.h
generic-y += kvm_para.h
generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += spinlock.h
generic-y += text-patching.h

View File

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ generic-y += extable.h
generic-y += kvm_para.h
generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h
generic-y += parport.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += syscalls.h
generic-y += tlb.h
generic-y += user.h

View File

@ -12,5 +12,6 @@ generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h
generic-y += parport.h
generic-y += qrwlock.h
generic-y += qspinlock.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += user.h
generic-y += text-patching.h

View File

@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ generic-y += cmpxchg.h
generic-y += extable.h
generic-y += kvm_para.h
generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += spinlock.h
generic-y += user.h
generic-y += text-patching.h

View File

@ -12,4 +12,6 @@
#define __ALIGN .align 4
#define __ALIGN_STR ".align 4"
#define _THIS_IP_ ({ unsigned long __ip; asm volatile("nextpc %0" : "=r" (__ip)); __ip; })
#endif

View File

@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ generic-y += spinlock_types.h
generic-y += spinlock.h
generic-y += qrwlock_types.h
generic-y += qrwlock.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += user.h

View File

@ -4,4 +4,5 @@ generated-y += syscall_table_64.h
generic-y += agp.h
generic-y += kvm_para.h
generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += user.h

View File

@ -83,11 +83,10 @@ config MSI_BITMAP_SELFTEST
depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
config GUEST_STATE_BUFFER_TEST
def_tristate n
def_tristate KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
prompt "Enable Guest State Buffer unit tests"
depends on KUNIT
depends on KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE
default KUNIT_ALL_TESTS
help
The Guest State Buffer is a data format specified in the PAPR.
It is by hcalls to communicate the state of L2 guests between

View File

@ -85,6 +85,8 @@ CONFIG_PMAC_SMU=y
CONFIG_MAC_EMUMOUSEBTN=y
CONFIG_WINDFARM=y
CONFIG_WINDFARM_PM81=y
CONFIG_WINDFARM_PM72=y
CONFIG_WINDFARM_RM31=y
CONFIG_WINDFARM_PM91=y
CONFIG_WINDFARM_PM112=y
CONFIG_WINDFARM_PM121=y

View File

@ -393,6 +393,7 @@ CONFIG_NETCONSOLE=m
CONFIG_TUN=m
CONFIG_VETH=m
CONFIG_VIRTIO_NET=m
CONFIG_EL3=m
CONFIG_VORTEX=m
CONFIG_TYPHOON=m
CONFIG_ADAPTEC_STARFIRE=m

View File

@ -5,4 +5,5 @@ generated-y += syscall_table_spu.h
generic-y += agp.h
generic-y += mcs_spinlock.h
generic-y += qrwlock.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += early_ioremap.h

View File

@ -79,10 +79,6 @@ extern int pmac_i2c_match_adapter(struct device_node *dev,
struct i2c_adapter *adapter);
/* (legacy) Locking functions exposed to i2c-keywest */
extern int pmac_low_i2c_lock(struct device_node *np);
extern int pmac_low_i2c_unlock(struct device_node *np);
/* Access functions for platform code */
extern int pmac_i2c_open(struct pmac_i2c_bus *bus, int polled);
extern void pmac_i2c_close(struct pmac_i2c_bus *bus);

View File

@ -458,6 +458,10 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(u8, irq_work_pending);
#endif /* 32 vs 64 bit */
/*
* Must be called with preemption disabled since it updates
* per-CPU irq_work state and programs the local CPU decrementer.
*/
void arch_irq_work_raise(void)
{
/*
@ -471,10 +475,8 @@ void arch_irq_work_raise(void)
* which could get tangled up if we're messing with the same state
* here.
*/
preempt_disable();
set_irq_work_pending_flag();
set_dec(1);
preempt_enable();
}
static void set_dec_or_work(u64 val)

View File

@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static ssize_t processor_bus_topology_show(struct device *dev, struct device_att
0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
return n;
goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
@ -244,12 +244,14 @@ static ssize_t processor_bus_topology_show(struct device *dev, struct device_att
starting_index, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
return n;
goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
}
out_success:
put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
return n;
out:
@ -278,7 +280,7 @@ static ssize_t processor_config_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute
0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
return n;
goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
@ -312,12 +314,14 @@ static ssize_t processor_config_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute
starting_index, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
return n;
goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
}
out_success:
put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
return n;
out:
@ -346,7 +350,7 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor_show(struct device *dev,
0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
return n;
goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
@ -382,12 +386,14 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor_show(struct device *dev,
starting_index, secondary_index, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
return n;
goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
}
out_success:
put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
return n;
out:
@ -416,7 +422,7 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_domain_show(struct device *dev, struct device
0, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
return n;
goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
@ -448,12 +454,14 @@ static ssize_t affinity_domain_via_domain_show(struct device *dev, struct device
starting_index, 0, buf, &n, arg);
if (!ret)
return n;
goto out_success;
if (ret != H_PARAMETER)
goto out;
}
out_success:
put_cpu_var(hv_gpci_reqb);
return n;
out:

View File

@ -293,6 +293,8 @@ static int pika_dtm_thread(void __iomem *fpga)
schedule_timeout(HZ);
}
put_device(&client->dev);
return 0;
}

View File

@ -27,8 +27,8 @@
static void __init km82xx_pic_init(void)
{
struct device_node *np __free(device_node);
np = of_find_compatible_node(NULL, NULL, "fsl,pq2-pic");
struct device_node *np __free(device_node) = of_find_compatible_node(NULL,
NULL, "fsl,pq2-pic");
if (!np) {
pr_err("PIC init: can not find cpm-pic node\n");

View File

@ -1058,40 +1058,6 @@ int pmac_i2c_match_adapter(struct device_node *dev, struct i2c_adapter *adapter)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pmac_i2c_match_adapter);
int pmac_low_i2c_lock(struct device_node *np)
{
struct pmac_i2c_bus *bus, *found = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(bus, &pmac_i2c_busses, link) {
if (np == bus->controller) {
found = bus;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
return -ENODEV;
return pmac_i2c_open(bus, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pmac_low_i2c_lock);
int pmac_low_i2c_unlock(struct device_node *np)
{
struct pmac_i2c_bus *bus, *found = NULL;
list_for_each_entry(bus, &pmac_i2c_busses, link) {
if (np == bus->controller) {
found = bus;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
return -ENODEV;
pmac_i2c_close(bus);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pmac_low_i2c_unlock);
int pmac_i2c_open(struct pmac_i2c_bus *bus, int polled)
{
int rc;

View File

@ -937,6 +937,28 @@ config RISCV_VECTOR_MISALIGNED
help
Enable detecting support for vector misaligned loads and stores.
config RISCV_SBI_FWFT_DELEGATE_MISALIGNED
bool "Request firmware delegation of unaligned access exceptions"
depends on RISCV_SBI
depends on NONPORTABLE
help
Use SBI FWFT to request delegation of load address misaligned and
store address misaligned exceptions, if possible, and prefer Linux
kernel emulation of these accesses to firmware emulation.
Unfortunately, Linux's emulation is still incomplete. Namely, it
currently does not handle vector instructions and KVM guest accesses.
On platforms where these accesses would have been handled by firmware,
enabling this causes unexpected kernel oopses, userspaces crashes and
KVM guest crashes. If you are sure that these are not a problem for
your platform, you can say Y here, which may improve performance.
Saying N here will not worsen emulation support for unaligned accesses
even in the case where the firmware also has incomplete support. It
simply keeps the firmware's emulation enabled.
If you don't know what to do here, say N.
choice
prompt "Unaligned Accesses Support"
default RISCV_PROBE_UNALIGNED_ACCESS

View File

@ -101,16 +101,6 @@ &ccc_nw {
status = "okay";
};
&i2c0 {
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&i2c0_fabric>;
};
&i2c1 {
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&i2c1_mssio>;
};
&mmuart1 {
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&uart1_fabric>;

View File

@ -14,6 +14,16 @@ / {
"microchip,mpfs";
};
&i2c0 {
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&i2c0_fabric>;
};
&i2c1 {
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&i2c1_mssio>;
};
&syscontroller {
microchip,bitstream-flash = <&sys_ctrl_flash>;
};

View File

@ -11,3 +11,22 @@ / {
"microchip,mpfs-icicle-kit",
"microchip,mpfs";
};
&i2c0 {
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&i2c0_fabric>;
};
/*
* Due to silicon errata, routing via MSS IOs doesn't work on ES devices.
* Instead, i2c1, appearing on B1/C1, which are normally MSS IOs, is routed
* via the fabric and back to B1/C1 via "fabric-test" functionality.
* This is done silently by Libero, so the iomux0 setting for i2c1 has to
* be fabric IO, despite tooling etc saying that MSS IOs are used.
*
* See Section 3.3 of https://ww1.microchip.com/downloads/aemDocuments/documents/FPGA/ProductDocuments/Errata/polarfiresoc/microsemi_polarfire_soc_fpga_egineering_samples_errata_er0219_v1.pdf
*/
&i2c1 {
pinctrl-names = "default";
pinctrl-0 = <&i2c1_fabric>;
};

View File

@ -135,29 +135,6 @@ &tdm_ext {
clock-frequency = <49152000>;
};
&camss {
assigned-clocks = <&ispcrg JH7110_ISPCLK_DOM4_APB_FUNC>,
<&ispcrg JH7110_ISPCLK_MIPI_RX0_PXL>;
assigned-clock-rates = <49500000>, <198000000>;
ports {
#address-cells = <1>;
#size-cells = <0>;
port@0 {
reg = <0>;
};
port@1 {
reg = <1>;
camss_from_csi2rx: endpoint {
remote-endpoint = <&csi2rx_to_camss>;
};
};
};
};
&csi2rx {
assigned-clocks = <&ispcrg JH7110_ISPCLK_VIN_SYS>;
assigned-clock-rates = <297000000>;
@ -175,9 +152,7 @@ port@0 {
port@1 {
reg = <1>;
csi2rx_to_camss: endpoint {
remote-endpoint = <&camss_from_csi2rx>;
};
/* remote CAMSS endpoint */
};
};
};

View File

@ -1199,34 +1199,6 @@ csi_phy: phy@19820000 {
#phy-cells = <0>;
};
camss: isp@19840000 {
compatible = "starfive,jh7110-camss";
reg = <0x0 0x19840000 0x0 0x10000>,
<0x0 0x19870000 0x0 0x30000>;
reg-names = "syscon", "isp";
clocks = <&ispcrg JH7110_ISPCLK_DOM4_APB_FUNC>,
<&ispcrg JH7110_ISPCLK_ISPV2_TOP_WRAPPER_C>,
<&ispcrg JH7110_ISPCLK_DVP_INV>,
<&ispcrg JH7110_ISPCLK_VIN_P_AXI_WR>,
<&ispcrg JH7110_ISPCLK_MIPI_RX0_PXL>,
<&syscrg JH7110_SYSCLK_ISP_TOP_CORE>,
<&syscrg JH7110_SYSCLK_ISP_TOP_AXI>;
clock-names = "apb_func", "wrapper_clk_c", "dvp_inv",
"axiwr", "mipi_rx0_pxl", "ispcore_2x",
"isp_axi";
resets = <&ispcrg JH7110_ISPRST_ISPV2_TOP_WRAPPER_P>,
<&ispcrg JH7110_ISPRST_ISPV2_TOP_WRAPPER_C>,
<&ispcrg JH7110_ISPRST_VIN_P_AXI_RD>,
<&ispcrg JH7110_ISPRST_VIN_P_AXI_WR>,
<&syscrg JH7110_SYSRST_ISP_TOP>,
<&syscrg JH7110_SYSRST_ISP_TOP_AXI>;
reset-names = "wrapper_p", "wrapper_c", "axird",
"axiwr", "isp_top_n", "isp_top_axi";
power-domains = <&pwrc JH7110_PD_ISP>;
interrupts = <92>, <87>, <90>, <88>;
status = "disabled";
};
voutcrg: clock-controller@295c0000 {
compatible = "starfive,jh7110-voutcrg";
reg = <0x0 0x295c0000 0x0 0x10000>;

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@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void mips_errata_patch_func(struct alt_entry *begin, struct alt_entry *end,
}
tmp = (1U << alt->patch_id);
if (cpu_req_errata && tmp) {
if (cpu_req_errata & tmp) {
mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
patch_text_nosync(ALT_OLD_PTR(alt), ALT_ALT_PTR(alt),
alt->alt_len);

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@ -14,5 +14,6 @@ generic-y += ticket_spinlock.h
generic-y += qrwlock.h
generic-y += qrwlock_types.h
generic-y += qspinlock.h
generic-y += ring_buffer.h
generic-y += user.h
generic-y += vmlinux.lds.h

View File

@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ static long compat_restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
/* sc_regs is structured the same as the start of pt_regs */
err = __copy_from_user(&cregs, &sc->sc_regs, sizeof(sc->sc_regs));
if (unlikely(err))
return err;
cregs_to_regs(&cregs, regs);

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