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bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read in bpf_patch_call_args()
The interpreters_args array only accommodates stack depths up to
MAX_BPF_STACK (512 bytes). However, do_misc_fixups() may allow a larger
stack depth if JIT is requested.
If JIT compilation later fails and falls back to the interpreter, the
verifier invokes bpf_patch_call_args() with this oversized stack depth.
This causes a load-time out-of-bounds (OOB) read when calculating the
interpreter function pointer index.
Fix this by changing bpf_patch_call_args() to return an int and explicitly
rejecting the JIT fallback (returning -EINVAL) if the stack depth exceeds
MAX_BPF_STACK.
Fixes: 1ea47e01ad ("bpf: add support for bpf_call to interpreter")
Co-developed-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Tianci Cao <ziye@zju.edu.cn>
Co-developed-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Shenghao Yuan <shenghaoyuan0928@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Yazhou Tang <tangyazhou518@outlook.com>
Acked-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260506094714.419842-2-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
5d6919055d
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4314a44564
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@ -2917,7 +2917,7 @@ int bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(bpfptr_t uaddr, size_t expected_size,
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int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **fp, union bpf_attr *attr, bpfptr_t uattr, u32 uattr_size);
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#ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
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void bpf_patch_call_args(struct bpf_insn *insn, u32 stack_depth);
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int bpf_patch_call_args(struct bpf_insn *insn, u32 stack_depth);
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#endif
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struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void);
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@ -2394,13 +2394,17 @@ EVAL4(PROG_NAME_LIST, 416, 448, 480, 512)
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#undef PROG_NAME_LIST
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#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
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void bpf_patch_call_args(struct bpf_insn *insn, u32 stack_depth)
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int bpf_patch_call_args(struct bpf_insn *insn, u32 stack_depth)
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{
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stack_depth = max_t(u32, stack_depth, 1);
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/* Prevent out-of-bounds read to interpreters_args */
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if (stack_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK)
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return -EINVAL;
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insn->off = (s16) insn->imm;
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insn->imm = interpreters_args[(round_up(stack_depth, 32) / 32) - 1] -
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__bpf_call_base_args;
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insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS;
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return 0;
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}
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#endif
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#endif
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@ -1416,7 +1416,12 @@ int bpf_fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
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depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i);
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if (depth < 0)
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return depth;
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bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth);
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err = bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth);
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if (err) {
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verbose(env, "stack depth %d exceeds interpreter stack depth limit\n",
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depth);
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return err;
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}
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}
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err = 0;
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#endif
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