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Merge tag 'ipsec-2026-04-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2026-04-08
1) Clear trailing padding in build_polexpire() to prevent
leaking unititialized memory. From Yasuaki Torimaru.
2) Fix aevent size calculation when XFRMA_IF_ID is used.
From Keenan Dong.
3) Wait for RCU readers during policy netns exit before
freeing the policy hash tables.
4) Fix dome too eaerly dropped references on the netdev
when uding transport mode. From Qi Tang.
5) Fix refcount leak in xfrm_migrate_policy_find().
From Kotlyarov Mihail.
6) Fix two fix info leaks in build_report() and
in build_mapping(). From Greg Kroah-Hartman.
7) Zero aligned sockaddr tail in PF_KEY exports.
From Zhengchuan Liang.
* tag 'ipsec-2026-04-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec:
net: af_key: zero aligned sockaddr tail in PF_KEY exports
xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_report()
xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_mapping()
xfrm: fix refcount leak in xfrm_migrate_policy_find
xfrm: hold dev ref until after transport_finish NF_HOOK
xfrm: Wait for RCU readers during policy netns exit
xfrm: account XFRMA_IF_ID in aevent size calculation
xfrm: clear trailing padding in build_polexpire()
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408095925.253681-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
- reject oversized global TT response buffers, by Ruide Cao
- hold claim backbone gateways by reference, by Haoze Xie
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Merge tag 'batadv-net-pullrequest-20260408' of https://git.open-mesh.org/linux-merge
Simon Wunderlich says:
====================
Here are two batman-adv bugfixes:
- reject oversized global TT response buffers, by Ruide Cao
- hold claim backbone gateways by reference, by Haoze Xie
* tag 'batadv-net-pullrequest-20260408' of https://git.open-mesh.org/linux-merge:
batman-adv: hold claim backbone gateways by reference
batman-adv: reject oversized global TT response buffers
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408110255.976389-1-sw@simonwunderlich.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'nf-26-04-08' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf
Florian Westphal says:
====================
netfilter updates for net
I only included crash fixes, as we're closer to a release, rest will
be handled via -next.
1) Fix a NULL pointer dereference in ip_vs_add_service error path, from
Weiming Shi, bug added in 6.2 development cycle.
2) Don't leak kernel data bytes from allocator to userspace: nfnetlink_log
needs to init the trailing NLMSG_DONE terminator. From Xiang Mei.
3) xt_multiport match lacks range validation, bogus userspace request will
cause out-of-bounds read. From Ren Wei.
4) ip6t_eui64 match must reject packets with invalid mac header before
calling eth_hdr. Make existing check unconditional. From Zhengchuan
Liang.
5) nft_ct timeout policies are free'd via kfree() while they may still
be reachable by other cpus that process a conntrack object that
uses such a timeout policy. Existing reaping of entries is not
sufficient because it doesn't wait for a grace period. Use kfree_rcu().
From Tuan Do.
6/7) Make nfnetlink_queue hash table per queue. As-is we can hit a page
fault in case underlying page of removed element was free'd. Per-queue
hash prevents parallel lookups. This comes with a test case that
demonstrates the bug, from Fernando Fernandez Mancera.
* tag 'nf-26-04-08' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
selftests: nft_queue.sh: add a parallel stress test
netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: make hash table per queue
netfilter: nft_ct: fix use-after-free in timeout object destroy
netfilter: ip6t_eui64: reject invalid MAC header for all packets
netfilter: xt_multiport: validate range encoding in checkentry
netfilter: nfnetlink_log: initialize nfgenmsg in NLMSG_DONE terminator
ipvs: fix NULL deref in ip_vs_add_service error path
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408163512.30537-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
David Howells says:
====================
rxrpc: Miscellaneous fixes
Here are some fixes for rxrpc:
(1) Fix key quota calculation.
(2) Fix a memory leak.
(3) Fix rxrpc_new_client_call_for_sendmsg() to substitute NULL for an
empty key.
Might want to remove this substitution entirely or handle it in
rxrpc_init_client_call_security() instead.
(4) Fix deletion of call->link to be RCU safe.
(5) Fix missing bounds checks when parsing RxGK tickets.
(6) Fix use of wrong skbuff to get challenge serial number. Also actually
substitute the newer response skbuff and release the older one.
(7) Fix unexpected RACK timer warning to report old mode.
(8) Fix call key refcount leak.
(9) Fix the interaction of jumbograms with Tx window space, setting the
request-ack flag when the window space is getting low, typically
because each jumbogram take a big bite out of the window and fewer UDP
packets get traded.
(10) Don't call rxrpc_put_call() with a NULL pointer.
(11) Reject undecryptable rxkad response tickets by checking result of
decryption.
(12) Fix buffer bounds calculation in the RESPONSE authenticator parser.
(13) Fix oversized response length check.
(14) Fix refcount leak on multiple setting of server keyring.
(15) Fix checks made by RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY and RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING (both
should be allowed).
(16) Fix lack of result checking on calls to crypto_skcipher_en/decrypt().
(17) Fix token_len limit check in rxgk_verify_response().
(18) Fix rxgk context leak in rxgk_verify_response().
(19) Fix read beyond end of buffer in rxgk_do_verify_authenticator().
(20) Fix parsing of RESPONSE packet on a connection that has already been set
from a prior response.
(21) Fix size of buffers used for rendering addresses into for procfiles.
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into
fixed 50-byte stack buffers with "%pISpc".
That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the
formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a
dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP
addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap().
As a result, a case such as
[ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535
is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so
51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing
char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c.
Size the buffers from the formatter's maximum textual form and switch the
call sites to scnprintf().
Changes since v1:
- correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case
explicitly
- frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier
mapped-v4 example
Fixes: 75b54cb57c ("rxrpc: Add IPv6 support")
Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-22-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in
RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before
running response verification and security initialization, then use a local
secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after
the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from
re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state
test.
Fixes: 17926a7932 ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jie Wang <jiewang2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-21-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
An AF_RXRPC socket can be both client and server at the same time. When
sending new calls (ie. it's acting as a client), it uses rx->key to set the
security, and when accepting incoming calls (ie. it's acting as a server),
it uses rx->securities.
setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) sets rx->key to point to an rxrpc-type key
and setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) sets rx->securities to point to a
keyring of rxrpc_s-type keys.
Now, it should be possible to use both rx->key and rx->securities on the
same socket - but for userspace AF_RXRPC sockets rxrpc_setsockopt()
prevents that.
Fix this by:
(1) Remove the incorrect check rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING)
makes on rx->key.
(2) Move the check that rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) makes on
rx->key down into rxrpc_request_key().
(3) Remove rxrpc_request_key()'s check on rx->securities.
This (in combination with a previous patch) pushes the checks down into the
functions that set those pointers and removes the cross-checks that prevent
both key and keyring being set.
Fixes: 17926a7932 ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260401105614.1696001-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
cc: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
cc: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-16-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
This patch fixes a reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring()
by checking if rx->securities is already set.
Fixes: 17926a7932 ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luxiao Xu <rakukuip@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-15-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
rxgk_verify_response() decodes auth_len from the packet and is supposed
to verify that it fits in the remaining bytes. The existing check is
inverted, so oversized RESPONSE authenticators are accepted and passed
to rxgk_decrypt_skb(), which can later reach skb_to_sgvec() with an
impossible length and hit BUG_ON(len).
Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:
RIP: __skb_to_sgvec()
[net/core/skbuff.c:5285 (discriminator 1)]
Call Trace:
skb_to_sgvec() [net/core/skbuff.c:5305]
rxgk_decrypt_skb() [net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h:81]
rxgk_verify_response() [net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1268]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
worker_thread()
[kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]
Reject authenticator lengths that exceed the remaining packet payload.
Fixes: 9d1d2b5934 ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Signed-off-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-14-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
rxgk_verify_authenticator() copies auth_len bytes into a temporary
buffer and then passes p + auth_len as the parser limit to
rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(). Since p is a __be32 *, that inflates the
parser end pointer by a factor of four and lets malformed RESPONSE
authenticators read past the kmalloc() buffer.
Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with
scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxgk_verify_response()
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl() [lib/dump_stack.c:123]
print_report() [mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482]
kasan_report() [mm/kasan/report.c:597]
rxgk_verify_response()
[net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1103 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1167
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1274]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
worker_thread()
[kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]
Allocated by task 54:
rxgk_verify_response()
[include/linux/slab.h:954 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1155
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1274]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
Convert the byte count to __be32 units before constructing the parser
limit.
Fixes: 9d1d2b5934 ("rxrpc: rxgk: Implement the yfs-rxgk security class (GSSAPI)")
Signed-off-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-13-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
rxkad_decrypt_ticket() decrypts the RXKAD response ticket and then
parses the buffer as plaintext without checking whether
crypto_skcipher_decrypt() succeeded.
A malformed RESPONSE can therefore use a non-block-aligned ticket
length, make the decrypt operation fail, and still drive the ticket
parser with attacker-controlled bytes.
Check the decrypt result and abort the connection with RXKADBADTICKET
when ticket decryption fails.
Fixes: 17926a7932 ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuqi Xu <xuyuqiabc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-12-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
rxrpc_input_packet_on_conn() can process a to-client packet after the
current client call on the channel has already been torn down. In that
case chan->call is NULL, rxrpc_try_get_call() returns NULL and there is
no reference to drop.
The client-side implicit-end error path does not account for that and
unconditionally calls rxrpc_put_call(). This turns a protocol error
path into a kernel crash instead of rejecting the packet.
Only drop the call reference if one was actually acquired. Keep the
existing protocol error handling unchanged.
Fixes: 5e6ef4f101 ("rxrpc: Make the I/O thread take over the call and local processor work")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Douya Le <ldy3087146292@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <tanyuan98@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <tanyuan98@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Ao Zhou <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-11-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Peers may only send immediate acks for every 2 UDP packets received.
When sending a jumbogram, it is important to check that there is
sufficient window space to send another same sized jumbogram following
the current one, and request an ack if there isn't. Failure to do so may
cause the call to stall waiting for an ack until the resend timer fires.
Where jumbograms are in use this causes a very significant drop in
performance.
Fixes: fe24a54943 ("rxrpc: Send jumbo DATA packets")
Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-10-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
When creating a client call in rxrpc_alloc_client_call(), the code obtains
a reference to the key. This is never cleaned up and gets leaked when the
call is destroyed.
Fix this by freeing call->key in rxrpc_destroy_call().
Before the patch, it shows the key reference counter elevated:
$ cat /proc/keys | grep afs@54321
1bffe9cd I--Q--i 8053480 4169w 3b010000 1000 1000 rxrpc afs@54321: ka
$
After the patch, the invalidated key is removed when the code exits:
$ cat /proc/keys | grep afs@54321
$
Fixes: f3441d4125 ("rxrpc: Copy client call parameters into rxrpc_call earlier")
Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
Co-developed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-9-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
rxrpc_rack_timer_expired() clears call->rack_timer_mode to OFF before
the switch. The default case warning therefore always prints OFF and
doesn't identify the unexpected timer mode.
Log the saved mode value instead so the warning reports the actual
unexpected rack timer mode.
Fixes: 7c48266593 ("rxrpc: Implement RACK/TLP to deal with transmission stalls [RFC8985]")
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-8-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
In rxrpc_post_response(), the code should be comparing the challenge serial
number from the cached response before deciding to switch to a newer
response, but looks at the newer packet private data instead, rendering the
comparison always false.
Fix this by switching to look at the older packet.
Fix further[1] to substitute the new packet in place of the old one if
newer and also to release whichever we don't use.
Fixes: 5800b1cf3f ("rxrpc: Allow CHALLENGEs to the passed to the app for a RESPONSE")
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com [1]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-7-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk() reads the raw key length and ticket length
from the XDR token as u32 values and passes each through round_up(x, 4)
before using the rounded value for validation and allocation. When the raw
length is >= 0xfffffffd, round_up() wraps to 0, so the bounds check and
kzalloc both use 0 while the subsequent memcpy still copies the original
~4 GiB value, producing a heap buffer overflow reachable from an
unprivileged add_key() call.
Fix this by:
(1) Rejecting raw key lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_KEY_MAX and raw ticket
lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_TOKEN_MAX before rounding, consistent with
the caps that the RxKAD path already enforces via AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX.
(2) Sizing the flexible-array allocation from the validated raw key
length via struct_size_t() instead of the rounded value.
(3) Caching the raw lengths so that the later field assignments and
memcpy calls do not re-read from the token, eliminating a class of
TOCTOU re-parse.
The control path (valid token with lengths within bounds) is unaffected.
Fixes: 0ca100ff4d ("rxrpc: Add YFS RxGK (GSSAPI) security class")
Signed-off-by: Oleh Konko <security@1seal.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-6-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Fix rxrpc call removal from the rxnet->calls list to use list_del_rcu()
rather than list_del_init() to prevent stuffing up reading
/proc/net/rxrpc/calls from potentially getting into an infinite loop.
This, however, means that list_empty() no longer works on an entry that's
been deleted from the list, making it harder to detect prior deletion. Fix
this by:
Firstly, make rxrpc_destroy_all_calls() only dump the first ten calls that
are unexpectedly still on the list. Limiting the number of steps means
there's no need to call cond_resched() or to remove calls from the list
here, thereby eliminating the need for rxrpc_put_call() to check for that.
rxrpc_put_call() can then be fixed to unconditionally delete the call from
the list as it is the only place that the deletion occurs.
Fixes: 2baec2c3f8 ("rxrpc: Support network namespacing")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-5-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
In rxrpc_new_client_call_for_sendmsg(), a key with no payload is meant to
be substituted for a NULL key pointer, but the variable this is done with
is subsequently not used.
Fix this by using "key" rather than "rx->key" when filling in the
connection parameters.
Note that this only affects direct use of AF_RXRPC; the kAFS filesystem
doesn't use sendmsg() directly and so bypasses the issue. Further,
AF_RXRPC passes a NULL key in if no key is set, so using an anonymous key
in that manner works. Since this hasn't been noticed to this point, it
might be better just to remove the "key" variable and the code that sets it
- and, arguably, rxrpc_init_client_call_security() would be a better place
to handle it.
Fixes: 19ffa01c9c ("rxrpc: Use structs to hold connection params and protocol info")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260319150150.4189381-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260408121252.2249051-4-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Switch to device_for_each_child_node_scoped() to auto-release fwnode
references on early exit.
Fixes: 24e31e4747 ("net: mdio: Add RTL9300 MDIO driver")
Signed-off-by: Felix Gu <ustc.gu@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260405-rtl9300-v1-1-08e4499cf944@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Introduce a new stress test to check for race conditions in the
nfnetlink_queue subsystem, where an entry is freed while another CPU is
concurrently walking the global rhashtable.
To trigger this, `nf_queue.c` is extended with two new flags:
* -O (out-of-order): Buffers packet IDs and flushes them in reverse.
* -b (bogus verdicts): Floods the kernel with non-existent packet IDs.
The bogus verdict loop forces the kernel's lookup function to perform
full rhashtable bucket traversals (-ENOENT). Combined with reverse-order
flushing and heavy parallel UDP/ping flooding across 8 queues, this puts
the nfnetlink_queue code under pressure.
Joint work with Florian Westphal.
Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Sharing a global hash table among all queues is tempting, but
it can cause crash:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x11ac/0x15e0 [nfnetlink_queue]
[..]
nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x11ac/0x15e0 [nfnetlink_queue]
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x46a/0x930
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x11e/0x450
struct nf_queue_entry is freed via kfree, but parallel cpu can still
encounter such an nf_queue_entry when walking the list.
Alternative fix is to free the nf_queue_entry via kfree_rcu() instead,
but as we have to alloc/free for each skb this will cause more mem
pressure.
Cc: Scott Mitchell <scott.k.mitch1@gmail.com>
Fixes: e19079adcd ("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: optimize verdict lookup with hash table")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy() frees the timeout object with kfree()
immediately after nf_ct_untimeout(), without waiting for an RCU grace
period. Concurrent packet processing on other CPUs may still hold
RCU-protected references to the timeout object obtained via
rcu_dereference() in nf_ct_timeout_data().
Add an rcu_head to struct nf_ct_timeout and use kfree_rcu() to defer
freeing until after an RCU grace period, matching the approach already
used in nfnetlink_cttimeout.c.
KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881035fe19c by task exploit/80
Call Trace:
nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0
nf_conntrack_in+0x612/0x8b0
nf_hook_slow+0x70/0x100
__ip_local_out+0x1b2/0x210
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x722/0x1580
__sys_sendto+0x2d8/0x320
Allocated by task 75:
nft_ct_timeout_obj_init+0xf6/0x290
nft_obj_init+0x107/0x1b0
nf_tables_newobj+0x680/0x9c0
nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xc29/0xe00
Freed by task 26:
nft_obj_destroy+0x3f/0xa0
nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x51c/0x5c0
process_one_work+0x2c4/0x5a0
Fixes: 7e0b2b57f0 ("netfilter: nft_ct: add ct timeout support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tuan Do <tuan@calif.io>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
`eui64_mt6()` derives a modified EUI-64 from the Ethernet source address
and compares it with the low 64 bits of the IPv6 source address.
The existing guard only rejects an invalid MAC header when
`par->fragoff != 0`. For packets with `par->fragoff == 0`, `eui64_mt6()`
can still reach `eth_hdr(skb)` even when the MAC header is not valid.
Fix this by removing the `par->fragoff != 0` condition so that packets
with an invalid MAC header are rejected before accessing `eth_hdr(skb)`.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
ports_match_v1() treats any non-zero pflags entry as the start of a
port range and unconditionally consumes the next ports[] element as
the range end.
The checkentry path currently validates protocol, flags and count, but
it does not validate the range encoding itself. As a result, malformed
rules can mark the last slot as a range start or place two range starts
back to back, leaving ports_match_v1() to step past the last valid
ports[] element while interpreting the rule.
Reject malformed multiport v1 rules in checkentry by validating that
each range start has a following element and that the following element
is not itself marked as another range start.
Fixes: a89ecb6a2e ("[NETFILTER]: x_tables: unify IPv4/IPv6 multiport match")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Yuhang Zheng <z1652074432@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
When batching multiple NFLOG messages (inst->qlen > 1), __nfulnl_send()
appends an NLMSG_DONE terminator with sizeof(struct nfgenmsg) payload via
nlmsg_put(), but never initializes the nfgenmsg bytes. The nlmsg_put()
helper only zeroes alignment padding after the payload, not the payload
itself, so four bytes of stale kernel heap data are leaked to userspace
in the NLMSG_DONE message body.
Use nfnl_msg_put() to build the NLMSG_DONE terminator, which initializes
the nfgenmsg payload via nfnl_fill_hdr(), consistent with how
__build_packet_message() already constructs NFULNL_MSG_PACKET headers.
Fixes: 29c5d4afba ("[NETFILTER]: nfnetlink_log: fix sending of multipart messages")
Reported-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
When ip_vs_bind_scheduler() succeeds in ip_vs_add_service(), the local
variable sched is set to NULL. If ip_vs_start_estimator() subsequently
fails, the out_err cleanup calls ip_vs_unbind_scheduler(svc, sched)
with sched == NULL. ip_vs_unbind_scheduler() passes the cur_sched NULL
check (because svc->scheduler was set by the successful bind) but then
dereferences the NULL sched parameter at sched->done_service, causing a
kernel panic at offset 0x30 from NULL.
Oops: general protection fault, [..] [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
RIP: 0010:ip_vs_unbind_scheduler (net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_sched.c:69)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ip_vs_add_service.isra.0 (net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:1500)
do_ip_vs_set_ctl (net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c:2809)
nf_setsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:102)
[..]
Fix by simply not clearing the local sched variable after a successful
bind. ip_vs_unbind_scheduler() already detects whether a scheduler is
installed via svc->scheduler, and keeping sched non-NULL ensures the
error path passes the correct pointer to both ip_vs_unbind_scheduler()
and ip_vs_scheduler_put().
While the bug is older, the problem popups in more recent kernels (6.2),
when the new error path is taken after the ip_vs_start_estimator() call.
Fixes: 705dd34440 ("ipvs: use kthreads for stats estimation")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Andrea Mayer says:
====================
seg6: fix dst_cache sharing in seg6 lwtunnel
The seg6 lwtunnel encap uses a single per-route dst_cache shared
between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths
can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts
(e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table
separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the
other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.
Patch 1 fixes this by splitting the cache into cache_input and
cache_output. Patch 2 adds a selftest that validates the isolation.
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260404004405.4057-1-andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Add a selftest that verifies the dst_cache in seg6 lwtunnel is not
shared between the input (forwarding) and output (locally generated)
paths.
The test creates three namespaces (ns_src, ns_router, ns_dst)
connected in a line. An SRv6 encap route on ns_router encapsulates
traffic destined to cafe::1 with SID fc00::100. The SID is
reachable only for forwarded traffic (from ns_src) via an ip rule
matching the ingress interface (iif veth-r0 lookup 100), and
blackholed in the main table.
The test verifies that:
1. A packet generated locally on ns_router does not reach
ns_dst with an empty cache, since the SID is blackholed;
2. A forwarded packet from ns_src populates the input cache
from table 100 and reaches ns_dst;
3. A packet generated locally on ns_router still does not
reach ns_dst after the input cache is populated,
confirming the output path does not reuse the input
cache entry.
Both the forwarded and local packets are pinned to the same CPU
with taskset, since dst_cache is per-cpu.
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260404004405.4057-3-andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared
between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths
can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts
(e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table
separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the
other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.
Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output,
so each path maintains its own cached dst independently.
Fixes: 6c8702c60b ("ipv6: sr: add support for SRH encapsulation and injection with lwtunnels")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Reviewed-by: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260404004405.4057-2-andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The querier-interval test adds h1 (currently a slave of the VRF created
by simple_if_init) to a temporary bridge br1 acting as an outside IGMP
querier. The kernel VRF driver (drivers/net/vrf.c) calls cycle_netdev()
on every slave add and remove, toggling the interface admin-down then up.
Phylink takes the PHY down during the admin-down half of that cycle.
Since h1 and swp1 are cable-connected, swp1 also loses its link may need
several seconds to re-negotiate.
Use setup_wait_dev $h1 0 which waits for h1 to return to UP state, so the
test can rely on the link being back up at this point.
Fixes: 4d8610ee8b ("selftests: net: bridge: add vlan mcast_querier_interval tests")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Golle <daniel@makrotopia.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/c830f130860fd2efae08bfb9e5b25fd028e58ce5.1775424423.git.daniel@makrotopia.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Sashiko points out that we use qops in __net_mp_open_rxq()
but never validate they are null. This was introduced when
check was moved from netdev_rx_queue_restart().
Look at ops directly instead of the locking config.
qops imply netdev_need_ops_lock(). We used netdev_need_ops_lock()
initially to signify that the real_num_rx_queues check below
is safe without rtnl_lock, but I'm not sure if this is actually
clear to most people, anyway.
Fixes: da7772a2b4 ("net: move mp->rx_page_size validation to __net_mp_open_rxq()")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260404001938.2425670-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
This patch fixes an issue where reading the MAC address from the eFUSE
fails due to a race condition.
The root cause was identified by comparing the driver's behavior with a
custom U-Boot port. In U-Boot, the MAC address was read successfully
every time because the driver was loaded later in the boot process, giving
the hardware ample time to initialize. In Linux, reading the eFUSE
immediately returns all zeros, resulting in a fallback to a random MAC address.
Hardware cold-boot testing revealed that the eFUSE controller requires a
short settling time to load its internal data. Adding a 2000-5000us
delay after the reset ensures the hardware is fully ready, allowing the
native MAC address to be read consistently.
Fixes: 02ff155ea2 ("net: stmmac: Add glue driver for Motorcomm YT6801 ethernet controller")
Reported-by: Georg Gottleuber <ggo@tuxedocomputers.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/24cfefff-1233-4745-8c47-812b502d5d19@tuxedocomputers.com
Signed-off-by: Johan Alvarado <contact@c127.dev>
Reviewed-by: Yao Zi <me@ziyao.cc>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/fc5992a4-9532-49c3-8ec1-c2f8c5b84ca1@smtp-relay.sendinblue.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Several GPON ONT SFP sticks based on Realtek RTL960x report
1000BASE-LX at 1300MBd in their EEPROM but can operate at 2500base-X.
On hosts capable of 2500base-X (e.g. Banana Pi R3 / MT7986), the
kernel negotiates only 1G because it trusts the incorrect EEPROM data.
Add quirks for:
- Hisense-Leox LXT-010S-H
- Hisense ZNID-GPON-2311NA
- HSGQ HSGQ-XPON-Stick
Each quirk advertises 2500base-X and ignores TX_FAULT during the
module's ~40s Linux boot time.
Tested on Banana Pi R3 (MT7986) with OpenWrt 25.12.1, confirmed
2.5Gbps link and full throughput with flow offloading.
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: Marcin Nita <marcin.nita@leolabs.pl>
Signed-off-by: John Pavlick <jspavlick@posteo.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260406132321.72563-1-jspavlick@posteo.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit
8590541473 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests"), has
a use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the
scatterlist entry.
When crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to
the cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be
invoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the
scatterlist entry (sge->offset, sge->length) and decrements
ctx->encrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an
error, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the
same cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and
double-restoring the scatterlist.
The double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized
to 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for
pending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the
tls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still
pending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the
freed record.
Fix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async
wait returns an error, since the callback has already handled
encrypt_pending and sge restoration.
Fixes: 8590541473 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260403013617.2838875-1-ramdhan@starlabs.sg
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Userspace can create an unlimited number of rfkill events if the system
is so configured, while not consuming them from the rfkill file
descriptor, causing a potential out of memory situation. Prevent this
from bounding the number of pending rfkill events at a "large" number
(i.e. 1000) to prevent abuses like this.
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2026033013-disfigure-scroll-e25e@gregkh
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
USB drivers bind to USB interfaces and any device managed resources
should have their lifetime tied to the interface rather than parent USB
device. This avoids issues like memory leaks when drivers are unbound
without their devices being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe
deferral or configuration changes).
Fix the USB anchor lifetime so that it is released on driver unbind.
Fixes: 8b4c000931 ("rt2x00usb: Use usb anchor to manage URB")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7
Cc: Vishal Thanki <vishalthanki@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <stf_xl@wp.pl>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260327113219.1313748-1-johan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
brcmf_fweh_handle_if_event() validates the firmware-provided interface
index before it touches drvr->iflist[], but it still uses the raw
bsscfgidx field as an array index without a matching range check.
Reject IF events whose bsscfg index does not fit in drvr->iflist[]
before indexing the interface array.
Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn>
Acked-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260323074551.93530-1-pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn
[add missing wifi prefix]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
dma_alloc_consistent() may change the size to align it. The new size is
saved in alloced.
Change the free size to match the allocation size.
Fixes: 5b435de0d7 ("net: wireless: add brcm80211 drivers")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Fourier <fourier.thomas@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260218130741.46566-3-fourier.thomas@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
PF_KEY export paths use `pfkey_sockaddr_size()` when reserving sockaddr
payload space, so IPv6 addresses occupy 32 bytes on the wire. However,
`pfkey_sockaddr_fill()` initializes only the first 28 bytes of
`struct sockaddr_in6`, leaving the final 4 aligned bytes uninitialized.
Not every PF_KEY message is affected. The state and policy dump builders
already zero the whole message buffer before filling the sockaddr
payloads. Keep the fix to the export paths that still append aligned
sockaddr payloads with plain `skb_put()`:
- `SADB_ACQUIRE`
- `SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING`
- `SADB_X_MIGRATE`
Fix those paths by clearing only the aligned sockaddr tail after
`pfkey_sockaddr_fill()`.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Fixes: 08de61beab ("[PFKEYV2]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Xiao Liu <lx24@stu.ynu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
struct xfrm_user_report is a __u8 proto field followed by a struct
xfrm_selector which means there is three "empty" bytes of padding, but
the padding is never zeroed before copying to userspace. Fix that up by
zeroing the structure before setting individual member variables.
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
struct xfrm_usersa_id has a one-byte padding hole after the proto
field, which ends up never getting set to zero before copying out to
userspace. Fix that up by zeroing out the whole structure before
setting individual variables.
Fixes: 3a2dfbe8ac ("xfrm: Notify changes in UDP encapsulation via netlink")
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: gregkh_clanker_t1000
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
syzkaller reported a memory leak in xfrm_policy_alloc:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888114d79000 (size 1024):
comm "syz.1.17", pid 931
...
xfrm_policy_alloc+0xb3/0x4b0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:432
The root cause is a double call to xfrm_pol_hold_rcu() in
xfrm_migrate_policy_find(). The lookup function already returns
a policy with held reference, making the second call redundant.
Remove the redundant xfrm_pol_hold_rcu() call to fix the refcount
imbalance and prevent the memory leak.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Fixes: 563d5ca93e ("xfrm: switch migrate to xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype")
Signed-off-by: Kotlyarov Mihail <mihailkotlyarow@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
