The cipher_null crypto_alg cipher is never used in a meaningful way,
given that it is always wrapped in ecb(), which has its own dedicated
implementation. IOW, the cipher_null crypto_alg should never be used to
implement the ecb(cipher_null) skcipher, and using it for other things
is bogus.
However, it is accessible from user space, and due to the nature of the
AF_ALG interface, it may be wrapped in arbitrary ways, exposing issues
in template code that wasn't written with block ciphers with a block
size of '1' in mind.
So drop this code.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This loop is a bit hard to read, with the loop counter that's used in
the HMAC being separate from the actual loop counter, which counts
backwards for some reason. Just replace it with a regular loop.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
A few miscellaneous cleanups to make the code a bit more readable:
- Replace (buf, buflen) with (out, outlen)
- Update (out, outlen) as we go along
- Use size_t for lengths
- Use min()
- Adjust some comments and log messages
- Rename a variable named 'len' to 'err', since it isn't a length
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
We're now incorporating 32 bytes from get_random_bytes() in the
additional input string on every request. The additional input string
is processed with a call to drbg_hmac_update(), which is exactly how the
seed is processed. Thus, in reality this is as good as a reseed.
From the perspective of FIPS 140-3, it isn't as good as a reseed. But
it doesn't actually matter, because from FIPS's point of view
get_random_bytes() provides zero entropy anyway.
Thus, neither the reseed with more get_random_bytes() every 300s, nor
the logic that reseeds more frequently before rng_is_initialized(), is
actually needed anymore. Remove it to simplify the code significantly.
(Technically the use of get_random_bytes() in drbg_seed() itself could
be removed too. But it's safer to keep it there for now.)
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently a formal reseed happens only after each 1048576 requests.
That's quite a high number. Let's follow the example of BoringSSL and
use a more conservative value of 4096.
Note that in practice this makes little difference, now that we're
including 32 bytes from get_random_bytes() in the additional input on
every request anyway, which is a de facto reseed.
But for the same reason, we might as well decrease the actual reseed
interval to something more reasonable.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Woodage & Shumow (2018) (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/349.pdf) showed
that contrary to the claims made by NIST in SP800-90A, HMAC_DRBG doesn't
satisfy the formal definition of forward secrecy (i.e. "backtracking
resistance") when it's called with an empty additional input string.
The actual attack seems pretty benign, as it doesn't actually give the
attacker any previous RNG output, but rather just allows them to test
whether their guess of the previous block of RNG output is correct.
Regardless, it's an annoying design flaw, and it's yet another example
of why NIST's DRBGs aren't all that great.
Meanwhile, the kernel's HMAC_DRBG code also tries to reseed itself
automatically after random.c has reseeded itself. But the
implementation is buggy, as it just checks whether 300 seconds have
elapsed, rather than looking at the actual generation counter.
Let's just follow the example of BoringSSL and use the conservative
approach of always including 32 bytes of "regular" random data in the
additional input string. This fixes both issues described above.
This does reduce performance. But this should be tolerable, since:
- Due to earlier changes, the kernel code that was previously using
drbg.c regardless of FIPS mode is now using it only in FIPS mode.
- The additional input string is processed only once per request. So
if a lot of bytes are generated at once, the cost is amortized.
- The NIST DRBGs are notoriously slow anyway.
Note that this fix should have no impact (either positive or negative)
on FIPS 140 certifiability. From FIPS's point of view the code added by
this commit simply doesn't matter: it adds zero entropy to something
that doesn't need to contain entropy.
Fixes: 541af946fe ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
drbg_kcapi_seed() calls drbg_uninstantiate() only to free drbg->jent and
set drbg->instantiated = false. However, the latter is necessary only
because drbg_kcapi_seed() sets drbg->instantiated = true too early. Fix
that, then just inline the freeing of drbg->jent.
Then, simplify the actual "uninstantiate" in drbg_kcapi_exit(). Just
free drbg->jent (note that this is a no-op on error and null pointers),
then memzero_explicit() the entire drbg_state.
Note that in reality the memzero_explicit() is redundant, since the
crypto_rng API zeroizes the memory anyway. But the way SP800-90A is
worded, it's easy to imagine that someone assessing conformance with it
would be looking for code in drbg.c that says it does an "Uninstantiate"
and does the zeroization. So it's probably worth keeping it somewhat
explicit, even though that means double zeroization in practice.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fold drbg_prepare_hrng() into its only caller.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Clearly separate the code for the "reseed" and "instantiate" cases,
since what they need to do is quite different.
Note that the mutex guard makes the mutex start being held during the
call to drbg_uninstantiate(), which is fine.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fold drbg_instantiate() into its only caller.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Put the DRBG implementation of the rng_alg methods in the order in which
they're called (cra_init => set_ent => seed => generate => cra_exit) so
that it's easier to understand the flow.
Also rename drbg_kcapi_random to drbg_kcapi_generate, and
drbg_kcapi_cleanup to drbg_kcapi_exit, so they match the method names.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Simplify drbg_generate_long() to use a more straightforward loop, and
then fold it into its only caller. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Use straightforward (buffer, len) parameters instead of struct
drbg_string or lists of strings. This simplifies the code considerably.
For now struct drbg_string is still used in crypto_drbg_ctr_df(), so
move its definition to crypto/df_sp80090a.h.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Currently some of the steps of "Instantiate the DRBG" occur in a
convoluted way in different places in the call stack:
drbg_instantiate()
=> drbg_seed(reseed=0) sets the raw HMAC key drbg_state::C to its
correct initial value, and it sets the state value
drbg_state::V to an *incorrect* initial value.
=> drbg_hmac_update(reseed=0) overwrites drbg_state::V with the
correct initial value, then prepares the hmac_sha512_key
drbg_state::key from the initial raw HMAC key drbg_state::C.
Later, each time the HMAC key is updated, drbg_hmac_update() also uses
drbg_state::C to temporarily store the new raw key.
Simplify all of this by:
- Making drbg_instantiate() set the correct initial values of
drbg_state::V and drbg_state::key.
- Converting drbg_hmac_update() to generate the raw key in a
temporary on-stack array instead of drbg_state::C.
- Removing drbg_state::C.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Move the MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO lines in the middle of the file to the end
so that they are in the usual place and next to the other one.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Set rng_alg::seed to different functions for the prediction-resistant
and non-prediction-resistant algorithms, so that the function does not
need to parse the algorithm name to figure out which algorithm it is.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that none of the information in struct drbg_core is used, remove it.
The null-ity of the pointer drbg_state::core was used to keep track of
whether the DRBG has been instantiated. Replace it with a boolean.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since the HMAC algorithm is now fixed at HMAC-SHA512, just use the
HMAC-SHA512 library API. This is simpler and more efficient.
Remove error-handling code that is no longer needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that the sizes of V and C are known at compile time, embed them into
struct drbg_state rather than using separate allocations.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Since only one drbg_core remains, the state length, block length, and
security strength are now fixed values. Moreover, the maximum request
length, maximum additional data length, and maximum number of requests
were all already fixed values.
Simplify the code by just using #defines for all these fixed values.
In drbg_seed_from_random(), take advantage of the constant to define the
array size. Remove assertions that are no longer useful.
In the case of drbg_blocklen() and drbg_statelen(), replace these with a
single value DRBG_STATE_LEN, as for HMAC_DRBG they are the same thing.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that there's only one set of state operations, use direct calls to
those operations.
No change in behavior. In particular, drbg_alloc_state() doesn't change
behavior, because the only remaining drbg_core uses HMAC_DRBG.
drbg_uninstantiate() doesn't change behavior, because a NULL d_ops
implied NULL priv_data which makes a drbg_fini_hash_kernel() a no-op.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that "drbg_pr_hmac_sha512" and "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512" are the only
crypto_rng algorithms left in crypto/drbg.c, simplify the algorithm
registration logic to register these more directly without relying on
the drbg_cores[] array (which will be removed).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove support for the HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA384 variants of
HMAC_DRBG, leaving only the HMAC-SHA512 variant of HMAC_DRBG.
HMAC-SHA512 is already the default. The default did used to be
HMAC-SHA256, but several years ago it was upgraded to HMAC-SHA512 "to
support compliance with SP800-90B and SP800-90C". Given that the point
of crypto/drbg.c is compliance with those standards, and there's also no
technical reason to prefer HMAC-SHA384 in this situation even if
acceptable, there's really no point in offering anything else.
Note: now that only HMAC-SHA512 remains, a lot of unnecessary
abstractions can be removed. A later commit will do that. This commit
just straightforwardly removes the HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA384 code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Synchronize the drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512 test vector with the first test
vector from the latest ACVP json files, so that both of the DRBG test
vectors are pulled from a consistent source.
Note that the new test vector has a nonempty personalization string.
That should be helpful as well: Some FIPS labs require this, due to
their interpretation of SP800-90A 11.3.2 which says that a
"representative" value of the personalization string must be tested.
It also now does an explicit reseed, which makes it clearer that the
requirement to test "Reseed" is met, without having to interpret the
additional input processing as covering that.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add a test for drbg_pr_hmac_sha512, which previously didn't have a test.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Now that the menuconfig CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU has no options in it other than
the hidden symbol CRYPTO_DRBG, remove it and move CRYPTO_DRBG to its
parent menu. Give CRYPTO_DRBG an appropriate prompt and help text.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove the support for HASH_DRBG. It's likely unused code, seeing as
HMAC_DRBG is always enabled and prioritized over it unless
NETLINK_CRYPTO is used to change the algorithm priorities.
There's also no compelling reason to support more than one of
[HMAC_DRBG, HASH_DRBG, CTR_DRBG]. By definition, callers cannot tell
any difference in their outputs. And all are FIPS-certifiable, which is
the only point of the kernel's NIST DRBGs anyway.
Switching to HASH_DRBG doesn't seem all that compelling, either. For
one, it's more complex than HMAC_DRBG.
Thus, let's just drop HASH_DRBG support and focus on HMAC_DRBG.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Remove the support for CTR_DRBG. It's likely unused code, seeing as
HMAC_DRBG is always enabled and prioritized over it unless
NETLINK_CRYPTO is used to change the algorithm priorities.
There's also no compelling reason to support more than one of
[HMAC_DRBG, HASH_DRBG, CTR_DRBG]. By definition, callers cannot tell
any difference in their outputs. And all are FIPS-certifiable, which is
the only point of the kernel's NIST DRBGs anyway.
Switching to CTR_DRBG doesn't seem all that compelling, either. While
it's often the fastest NIST DRBG, it has several disadvantages:
- CTR_DRBG uses AES. Some platforms don't have AES acceleration at all,
causing a fallback to the table-based AES code which is very slow and
can be vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. In contrast, HMAC_DRBG
uses primitives that are consistently constant-time.
- CTR_DRBG is usually considered to be somewhat less cryptographically
robust than HMAC_DRBG. Granted, HMAC_DRBG isn't all that great
either, e.g. given the negative result from Woodage & Shumow (2018)
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/349.pdf), but that can be worked around.
- CTR_DRBG is more complex than HMAC_DRBG, risking bugs. Indeed, while
reviewing the CTR_DRBG code, I found two bugs, including one where it
can return success while leaving the output buffer uninitialized.
- The kernel's implementation of CTR_DRBG uses an "ctr(aes)"
crypto_skcipher and relies on it returning the next counter value.
That's fragile, and indeed historically many "ctr(aes)"
crypto_skcipher implementations haven't done that. E.g. see
commit 511306b2d0 ("crypto: arm/aes-ce - update IV after partial final CTR block"),
commit fa5fd3afc7 ("crypto: arm64/aes-blk - update IV after partial final CTR block"),
commit 371731ec21 ("crypto: atmel-aes - Fix saving of IV for CTR mode"),
commit 25baaf8e2c ("crypto: crypto4xx - fix ctr-aes missing output IV"),
commit 334d37c9e2 ("crypto: caam - update IV using HW support"),
commit 0a4491d3fe ("crypto: chelsio - count incomplete block in IV"),
commit e8e3c1ca57 ("crypto: s5p - update iv after AES-CBC op end").
I.e., there were many years where the kernel's CTR_DRBG code (if it
were to have actually been used) repeated outputs on some platforms.
AES-CTR also uses a 128-bit counter, which creates overflow edge cases
that are sometimes gotten wrong. E.g. see commit 009b30ac74
("crypto: vmx - CTR: always increment IV as quadword").
So, while switching to CTR_DRBG for performance reasons isn't completely
out of the question (notably BoringSSL uses it), it would take quite a
bit more work to create a solid implementation of it in the kernel,
including a more solid implementation of AES-CTR itself (in lib/crypto/,
with a scalar bit-sliced fallback, etc). Since HMAC_DRBG has always
been the default NIST DRBG variant in the kernel and is in a better
state, let's just standardize on it for now.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The inclusion of <crypto/internal/cipher.h> and the import of the
internal crypto namespace became unnecessary in commit ba0570bdf1
("crypto: drbg - Replace AES cipher calls with library calls").
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
include/crypto/drbg.h no longer contains anything that is used
externally to crypto/drbg.c. Therefore, fold it into crypto/drbg.c.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
FIPS 140-2 required that a continuous test for repeated outputs be done
on both "Approved RNGs" and "Non-Approved RNGs".
That's apparently why crypto/drbg.c does such a test on the bytes it
pulls from get_random_bytes(), despite get_random_bytes() being a
"Non-Approved RNG" that is credited with zero entropy for FIPS purposes.
(From FIPS's point of view, the "Approved RNG" is jitterentropy.)
FIPS 140-3 "modernized" the continuous RNG test requirements. They're
now a bit more sophisticated, requiring both an "Adaptive Proportion
Test" and a "Repetition Count Test".
At the same time, FIPS 140-3 doesn't require continuous RNG tests on
"Non-Approved RNGs" if a "vetted conditioning component" is used. The
SP800-90A DRBGs are exactly such a vetted conditioning component, by
their design. (In the case of HASH_DRBG and CTR_DRBG, the derivation
function does have to be implemented. But the kernel does that.)
In other words: from FIPS 140-3's point of view, get_random_bytes()
still produces zero entropy, but the way the DRBG combines those bytes
with the jitterentropy bytes preserves all the "approved" entropy from
jitterentropy. Thus no test for get_random_bytes() is required.
Seeing as FIPS 140-2 certificates stopped being issued in 2021 in favor
of FIPS 140-3, this means this code is obsolete. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fold the contents of the inline functions crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl(),
crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl_test(), and crypto_drbg_reset_test() into
their only caller in drbg_cavs_test(). It ends up being much simpler.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This commented-out code doesn't compile. Even if it did, it wouldn't
actually do what it was apparently intended to do, seeing as the "test"
for "drbg_pr_hmac_sha512" and "drbg_pr_ctr_aes256" is alg_test_null().
Just delete it to avoid keeping broken code around, and so that there
isn't any perceived need to try to update it as the DRBG code is
refactored.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The kconfig symbol CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC is always enabled when
CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU is enabled, and all checks for CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC are in
code conditional on CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU. Thus, the only purpose of the
CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC symbol is to select CRYPTO_HMAC and CRYPTO_SHA512.
Move those two selections to CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU, remove the checks for
CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC, and remove the CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC symbol itself.
Note that this also fixes an issue where CRYPTO_HMAC and CRYPTO_SHA512
were unnecessarily being forced to built-in when CRYPTO_DRBG=m.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
When fips_enabled=1, it seems to have been intended for one of the
algorithms defined in crypto/drbg.c to be the highest priority "stdrng"
algorithm, so that it is what is used by "stdrng" users.
However, the code only boosts the priority to 400, which is less than
the priority 500 used in drivers/crypto/caam/caamprng.c. Thus, the CAAM
RNG could be used instead.
Fix this by boosting the priority by 2000 instead of 200.
Fixes: 541af946fe ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
On 64-bit kernels, drbg_max_addtl() returns 2**35 bytes. That's too
large, for two reasons:
1. SP800-90A says the maximum limit is 2**35 *bits*, not 2**35 bytes.
So the implemented limit has confused bits and bytes.
2. When drbg_kcapi_hash() calls crypto_shash_update() on the additional
information string, the length is implicitly cast to 'unsigned int'.
That truncates the additional information string to U32_MAX bytes.
Fix the maximum additional information string length to always be
U32_MAX - 1, causing an error to be returned for any longer lengths.
Fixes: 541af946fe ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Fix drbg_healthcheck_sanity() to correctly check the return value of
drbg_generate(). drbg_generate() returns 0 on success, or a negative
errno value on failure. drbg_healthcheck_sanity() incorrectly assumed
that it returned a positive value on success.
This didn't make the sanity check fail, but it made it ineffective.
Fixes: cde001e4c3 ("crypto: rng - RNGs must return 0 in success case")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
drbg_cpu_to_be32() is being used to do a plain write to a byte array,
which doesn't have any alignment guarantee. This can cause a misaligned
write. Replace it with the correct function, put_unaligned_be32().
Fixes: 72f3e00dd6 ("crypto: drbg - replace int2byte with cpu_to_be")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
drbg_ctr_generate() sometimes returns success when it fails, leaving the
output buffer uninitialized. Fix it.
Fixes: cde001e4c3 ("crypto: rng - RNGs must return 0 in success case")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Document the crypto engine on Glymur platform.
Signed-off-by: Harshal Dev <harshal.dev@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Add entry for ATECC608B. Update the ATECC508A comment for consistency.
Acked-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested on hardware with an ATECC608B at 0x60. The device binds
successfully, passes the driver's sanity check, and registers the
ecdh-nist-p256 KPP algorithm.
The hardware ECDH path was also exercised using a minimal KPP test
module, covering private key generation, public key derivation, and
shared secret computation.
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Sashiko notes:
> is the stack variable data left uninitialized when taking the else branch?
> Since data.tio_en is later evaluated unconditionally, could stack garbage
> cause it to evaluate to true, leading to erroneous attempts to allocate
> pages and initialize SEV-TIO on unsupported hardware?
If the firmware is too old to support SEV_INIT_EX, data is left
uninitialized but used in the debug logging about whether TIO is enabled or
not.
Fixes: 4be423572d ("crypto/ccp: Implement SEV-TIO PCIe IDE (phase1)")
Reported-by: Sashiko
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho%40kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Sashiko notes:
> if __snp_alloc_firmware_pages() returns NULL under memory pressure, is it
> safe to pass it directly to page_address()?
>
> On architectures without HASHED_PAGE_VIRTUAL, page_address(NULL) might
> compute a deterministic but invalid, non-zero virtual address. The
> subsequent if (tio_status) check would then evaluate to true, and
> sev_tsm_init_locked() would dereference the invalid pointer.
Indeed, page_address(NULL) will return non-NULL garbage here. Fix this by
checking the page allocation itself for NULL, not the resulting virtual
address.
Fixes: 4be423572d ("crypto/ccp: Implement SEV-TIO PCIe IDE (phase1)")
Reported-by: Sashiko
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho%40kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Sashiko notes:
> regarding the bounds check in snp_filter_reserved_mem_regions()
> called via walk_iomem_res_desc(): does the check
> if ((range_list->num_elements * 16 + 8) > PAGE_SIZE)
> allow an off-by-one heap buffer overflow?
>
> If range_list->num_elements is 255, 255 * 16 + 8 = 4088, which is <= 4096.
> Writing range->base (8 bytes) fills 4088-4095, but writing range->page_count
> (4 bytes) would write to 4096-4099, overflowing the kzalloc-allocated
> PAGE_SIZE buffer.
Fix this by accounting for the entry about to be written to, in addition to
the entries that are already allocated.
Fixes: 1ca5614b84 ("crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP")
Reported-by: Sashiko
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho%40kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Before SNP x86 shutdown [1], all HV_FIXED pages were always leaked on
module unload. Now pages can be reclaimed if they are freed before SNP
shutdown.
The SFS driver does sfs_dev_destroy() -> snp_free_hv_fixed_pages(), marking
the command buffer as free. But this happens after sev_dev_destroy() in
psp_dev_destroy(), so the pages are always leaked.
Rearrange psp_dev_destroy() to destroy things in the reverse order from
psp_init(), so that any dependencies can be unwound accordingly. This lets
SFS free the page and the subsequent SNP shutdown release it.
This was identified with use of Chris Mason's review-prompts:
https://github.com/masoncl/review-prompts
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260324161301.1353976-1-tycho@kernel.org/
Fixes: 648dbccc03 ("crypto: ccp - Add AMD Seamless Firmware Servicing (SFS) driver")
Reported-by: review-prompts
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-4.6-opus
Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen (AMD) <tycho@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Document the QCE crypto engine on Qualcomm Eliza SoC, fully compatible
with earlier generations.
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harshal Dev <harshal.dev@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuldeep Singh <kuldeep.singh@oss.qualcomm.com>
Acked-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
The current implementation of the heartbeat error injection uses
adf_disable_arb_thd() to stop a specific accelerator engine thread
from processing requests. This does not reliably prevent the device
from generating responses.
Fix the error injection by disabling the device arbiter through
exit_arb() instead. This properly simulates a device failure by
stopping all arbitration, which results in missing responses for
sent requests.
Remove the now unused adf_disable_arb_thd() function and its
declaration.
Fixes: e2b67859ab ("crypto: qat - add heartbeat error simulator")
Signed-off-by: Damian Muszynski <damian.muszynski@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ahsan Atta <ahsan.atta@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Document the crypto engine on the Milos platform.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Koskovich <akoskovich@pm.me>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuldeep Singh <kuldeep.singh@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
There is already an 'if ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE' condition wrapping
FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST, making the 'depends on' statement a
duplicate dependency (dead code).
I propose leaving the outer 'if ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE...endif' and removing
the individual 'depends on' statement.
This dead code was found by kconfirm, a static analysis tool for Kconfig.
Signed-off-by: Julian Braha <julianbraha@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
