Commit Graph

1883 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jakub Kicinski
50720728b1 ipsec-2026-08-18
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Merge tag 'ipsec-2026-08-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec

Steffen Klassert says:

====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2026-08-18

1) xfrm6: fix out-of-bounds write in xfrm6_input_addr() when secpath is full
   Tighten the secpath-depth check so a full chain can't write
   past xvec[].

2) Add and revert "esp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()"
   The patch does not fully fully resolve the issue, a corrected version
   will follow.

3) xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close
   Synchronize espintcp close with the xfrm_trans_reinject work
   queue so the freed socket message isn't dereferenced again.

4) xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device
   Drop queued ESP-in-TCP records whose saved ingress device has
   gone away, avoiding a NULL device deref in the XFRM input path.

5) xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work
   Split the NAT keepalive walk into a reference-collection phase
   and a per-state lock phase to break the AB-BA with state removal.
   This patch has some issues that are fixed with a followup patch.

6) xfrm: Fix skb double-free in xfrm_dev_direct_output()
   Stop freeing the skb unconditionally in xfrm_dev_direct_output(),
   letting local_out()'s result indicate when ownership has moved on.

7) xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left
   Validate the segments_left/hdrlen invariant before rearranging
   the routing-header addresses, avoiding an OOB memmove on
   malformed HDRINCL packets.

8) xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak
   Detect an already-attached auth-trunc allocation by the pointer
   rather than inferring it from the algorithm id, so a prior
   attach isn't overwritten and lost.

9) xfrm: bound nat keepalive state collection
   Replace the per-state allocation in the NAT keepalive walk
   with a fixed-size batch that drains under BH-disabled locking
   and resumes from the cursor, bounding the worker's memory.

* tag 'ipsec-2026-08-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec:
  xfrm: bound nat keepalive state collection
  Revert "esp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()"
  xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak
  xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left
  xfrm: Fix skb double-free in xfrm_dev_direct_output()
  xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work
  xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device
  xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close
  esp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()
  xfrm6: fix out-of-bounds write in xfrm6_input_addr() when secpath is full
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260818092920.653034-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2026-08-20 11:38:14 -07:00
Zihan Xi
4e9442ce55 xfrm: bound nat keepalive state collection
The v1 nat keepalive fix allocates a GFP_ATOMIC object for every state
while collecting references for phase two. This makes the worker's
temporary memory use depend on the number of states and lets -ENOMEM abort
the scan.

Replace the allocated list with a fixed-size batch. When the batch is full,
return a private walk status so xfrm_state_walk() leaves a cursor; drain
the references after the walk releases xfrm_state_lock and resume from
the cursor. This bounds temporary memory use and avoids the allocation
failure path.

The v1 fix also moved nat_keepalive_send() out of the walk callback. Keep
the phase-two drain BH-disabled, as required by local_lock_nested_bh()
used by the keepalive sockets.

Fixes: 763fe700b7 ("xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-08-18 07:35:01 +02:00
Joel Granados
09190c59cd net: Const qualify ctl_tables that kmemdup unconditionally
Const qualify clt_table arrays in the net directory that always pass a
memory duplicate to sysctl register. The template would then be in
.rodata and the kmemdup'ed array would be outside.

Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260810-jag-net_const_qualify-v4-2-77e888237c69@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2026-08-13 13:12:24 +02:00
Zihan Xi
c12cbf5632 xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak
attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving
x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no
sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes).

xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth
algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites
x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown
only frees the replacement pointer.

Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that
state from x->props.aalgo.

Fixes: 4447bb33f0 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-07-28 10:48:18 +02:00
Sanghyun Park
2aed51fc58 xfrm: Fix skb double-free in xfrm_dev_direct_output()
A return value other than 1 from local_out() means that the skb has been
consumed or its ownership was transferred. xfrm_dev_direct_output()
nevertheless frees the skb on this path, causing a double-free when
netfilter drops the packet and invalidating any other owner.

Return the local_out() result directly, matching the ownership handling
in xfrm_output_resume().

Fixes: 5eddd76ec2 ("xfrm: fix tunnel mode TX datapath in packet offload mode")
Signed-off-by: Sanghyun Park <sanghyun.park.cnu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-07-23 10:07:21 +02:00
Zihan Xi
763fe700b7 xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work
nat_keepalive_work() walks the state table while xfrm_state_walk()
holds net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock. Its callback then acquires x->lock,
which conflicts with the delete path taking the same locks in reverse
order via xfrm_state_delete() and __xfrm_state_delete(). This creates
an AB-BA deadlock that is reported by lockdep when a NAT keepalive
worker races with SA deletion.

Fix this by splitting the keepalive walk into two phases. First,
collect the candidate states while the walk holds xfrm_state_lock and
take a reference on each state. Then, after the walk completes, process
each collected state and acquire x->lock without nesting it under
xfrm_state_lock.

Fixes: f531d13bdf ("xfrm: support sending NAT keepalives in ESP in UDP states")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <xizh2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-07-23 10:07:20 +02:00
Paolo Abeni
4d3365d5d3 Merge branch 'big-tcp-for-udp-tunnels'
Alice Mikityanska says:

====================
BIG TCP for UDP tunnels

This series is a follow-up to "BIG TCP without HBH in IPv6", and it adds
support for BIG TCP IPv4/IPv6 workloads in vxlan and geneve. Now that
IPv6 BIG TCP doesn't require stripping the HBH in all various
combinations in tunneled traffic, adding BIG TCP becomes feasible.

Patch 01 adds accessors for the length field in the UDP header, as
suggested by Paolo in review. The usage of udp_set_len is then added in
the following patches that start using length=0 in BIG TCP UDP packets.

Patches 02-04 close the gaps that prevent BIG TCP packets from going
through UDP tunnel code.

Patch 05 validates packets in udp_gro_receive to exclude packets with
length=0 from GRO aggregation.

Patch 06 is for proper formatting in tcpdump (set UDP len to 0 rather
than a trimmed value on overflow).

Patches 07-08 bump up tso_max_size for VXLAN and GENEVE.

Patch 09 adds selftests.
====================$

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710134242.216538-1-alice.kernel@fastmail.im
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2026-07-22 13:49:03 +02:00
Alice Mikityanska
5329647dad net: Use helpers to get/set UDP len tree-wide
Since BIG TCP for UDP tunnels will start using len=0 in the UDP header
as an indicator of a GSO packet bigger than 65535 bytes, this commit
introduces the following getter and setters to use tree-wide, in order
to explicitly mark places where len=0 may be expected, and handle them
properly:

1. udp_set_len() sets uh->len to its real value if it's not bigger than
65535, and to 0 otherwise: to be used in GSO context with aggregated
packets.

2. udp_set_len_short() is to be used when the length is known to fit 16
bits. It WARNs when the caller tries to assign a bigger value if
CONFIG_DEBUG_NET=y.

3. udp_get_len_short() returns len in host byte order: to be used on the
RX side to deal with non-aggregated packets, or to access the raw value
of the len field.

4. udp_get_len() decodes uh->len set by udp_set_len(). It checks whether
the packet is GSO to guard from malformed packets.

At the moment udp_set_len() is not used, a following commit will start
using it after enabling len>65535 for GSO.

Raw uh->len (in network byte order) is still accessed in a few places
for checksum calculation purposes, and to decode len=0 in udpv6_rcv for
jumbograms. udp_rcv and udpv6_rcv will be addressed by the commit that
starts using udp_set_len() to set UDP len=0 for BIG TCP packets in UDP
tunnels.

Signed-off-by: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710134242.216538-2-alice.kernel@fastmail.im
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2026-07-22 13:47:02 +02:00
Zhiling Zou
e1d7c5ac1c xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device
ESP-in-TCP receives records through the TCP strparser. handle_esp()
restores skb->dev from the saved skb_iif before passing the packet into
the XFRM input path.

Queued TCP data can be processed after the original ingress device has
been removed, for example during veth or net namespace teardown. In that
case dev_get_by_index_rcu() returns NULL. The XFRM IPv4 and IPv6 input
paths both expect skb->dev to be valid while building the route lookup,
so queued ESP-in-TCP data can dereference a NULL device.

Drop the packet if the saved ingress device can no longer be resolved.
Such a packet can no longer be routed through the normal XFRM receive
path, and this preserves the existing behaviour for packets whose ingress
device still exists.

Fixes: e27cca96cd ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou <roxy520tt@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Reviewed-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-07-20 12:24:33 +02:00
Sabrina Dubroca
deb232e884 xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close
ZDI reported and analyzed a race condition during close for espintcp
sockets:

    espintcp_close() frees emsg->skb via kfree_skb() without holding
    any socket lock. Concurrently, the xfrm_trans_reinject work queue
    invokes esp_output_tcp_finish() -> espintcp_push_skb() ->
    espintcp_push_msgs() -> skb_send_sock_locked(), which reads the
    same skb as a data source.

Fix this by adding a synchronize_rcu() call after resetting sk_prot,
since esp_output_tcp_finish() runs under RCU and won't use a socket
with sk_prot == &tcp_prot.  Simply taking the socket lock in
espintcp_close() could lead to leaks, if esp_output_tcp_finish()
re-adds an skb in the slot we just freed. After this, the existing
barrier() is no longer needed.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e27cca96cd ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-07-20 12:21:12 +02:00
Xiang Mei (Microsoft)
f38f8cce2f xfrm: policy: preallocate inexact bins before xfrm_hash_rebuild reinsert
xfrm_hash_rebuild()'s first loop preallocates the bins/chains the reinsert
loop needs, so the reinsert (after hlist_del_rcu()) cannot allocate or
fail. But its guard is inverted: it skips policies with prefixlen <
threshold and preallocates for the rest.

prefixlen < threshold is exactly when policy_hash_bysel() returns NULL and
the reinsert takes the allocating xfrm_policy_inexact_insert() path. So the
loop preallocates for the exact policies (which never allocate) and skips
the inexact ones, whose bin/node is then allocated GFP_ATOMIC during
reinsert. On failure the error path only WARN_ONCE()s and continues,
leaving a poisoned bydst node; the next rebuild's hlist_del_rcu()
dereferences LIST_POISON2 and takes a GPF. Reachable under memory pressure,
deterministic via failslab.

Invert the guard so preallocation covers exactly the reinserted policies;
the reinsert then allocates nothing and cannot fail.

Crash:
  Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
  0xfbd59c0000000024: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead...]
  ...
  Workqueue: events xfrm_hash_rebuild
  RIP: 0010:xfrm_hash_rebuild+0x5b3/0x1190
  RAX: dead000000000122   (LIST_POISON2 + offset)
  ...
  Call Trace:
   hlist_del_rcu (include/linux/rculist.h:599)
   xfrm_hash_rebuild (net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1365)
   process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322)
   worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
   kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
   ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
   ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
   ...
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

Fixes: 24969facd7 ("xfrm: policy: store inexact policies in an rhashtable")
Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-07-06 08:30:02 +02:00
Chen YanJun
430ea57d6d xfrm: iptfs: propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG in iptfs_skb_add_frags()
When iptfs_skb_add_frags() copies frag references from the source
frag walk into a new SKB, it increments the page reference count via
__skb_frag_ref() but does not propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to the
destination SKB's skb_shinfo->flags.

If the source SKB carries shared frags (e.g. from a page-pool backed
receive path), the new inner SKB will appear to ESP as having privately
owned frags.  A subsequent esp_input() call for a nested transport-mode
SA then takes the no-COW fast path and decrypts in place, writing over
pages that are still referenced by the outer IPTFS SKB.  This causes
kernel-visible memory corruption and can trigger a panic.

All other frag-transfer helpers in the kernel (skb_try_coalesce,
skb_gro_receive, __pskb_copy_fclone, skb_shift, skb_segment) correctly
propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; align iptfs_skb_add_frags() with this
convention by setting the flag inside the loop immediately after
__skb_frag_ref() and nr_frags++, so every exit path that attaches a frag
unconditionally propagates SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG.

Fixes: 5f2b6a9095 ("xfrm: iptfs: add skb-fragment sharing code")
Signed-off-by: Chen YanJun <moomichen@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-07-06 08:29:07 +02:00
Cen Zhang
2538bd3cd1 xfrm: clear mode callbacks after failed mode setup
xfrm_state_gc_task can run long after a failed IPTFS state setup. In the
reproduced case, __xfrm_init_state() cached x->mode_cbs, IPTFS setup
returned -ENOMEM before publishing mode_data, and the temporary module
reference from xfrm_get_mode_cbs() was dropped immediately. The dead state
then kept x->mode_cbs until deferred GC ran after xfrm_iptfs had been
unloaded.

Clear x->mode_cbs when mode init or clone fails before publishing
mode_data. Those states never installed mode-specific state or the
long-term IPTFS module pin, so deferred GC has nothing mode-specific to
destroy and must not retain a callback table pointer past the temporary
lookup reference.

The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:

failed setup path:
1. cache x->mode_cbs
2. mode setup fails before mode_data
3. drop the temporary module ref
4. dead state keeps x->mode_cbs cached

GC/unload path:
1. xfrm_state_put() queues GC work
2. xfrm_iptfs unloads later
3. xfrm_state_gc_task runs
4. GC dereferences stale x->mode_cbs

This also covers the failed clone path where clone_state() returns before
publishing mode_data.

Validation reproduced this kernel report:
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_STACKTRACE_FILTER=y
failslab_stacktrace_filter matched xfrm_iptfs frames
ack_error=-12
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure
BUG: unable to handle page fault
Workqueue: events xfrm_state_gc_task
RIP: xfrm_state_gc_task+0x142/0x650
Modules linked in: esp4_offload xfrm_user [last unloaded: xfrm_iptfs]
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Fixes: 4b3faf610c ("xfrm: iptfs: add new iptfs xfrm mode impl")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-07-06 08:29:06 +02:00
Antony Antony
ea528f1823 xfrm: reject optional IPTFS templates in outbound policies
syzbot reported a stack-out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find()
which flows from xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one().

Commit 3d776e31c8 ("xfrm: Reject optional tunnel/BEET mode
templates in outbound policies") disallowed optional tunnel and
BEET in outbound policies to prevent this. Later when IPTFS
added, it was not covered by that fix and can still trigger
the out-of-bounds read;

Extend the check to disallow optional IPTFS in outbound policies
as well. IPTFS should be identical to tunnel mode.
IN and FWD policies are not affected: xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one()
is only reachable via the outbound path.

Reproducer, before:

ip link add dummy0 type dummy
ip link set dummy0 up
ip addr add 10.1.1.1/24 dev dummy0
ip xfrm policy add src 10.1.1.1/32 dst 10.1.1.2/32 dir out tmpl
  src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid 1 mode iptfs
  level use tmpl src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid
  2 mode transport
ping -W 1 -c 1 10.1.1.2
PING 10.1.1.2 (10.1.1.2) 56(84) bytes of data.

[   64.168420] ==================================================================
[   64.169977] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[   64.169977] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800e1ffd20 by task ping/2844

[   64.169977] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 2844 Comm: ping Not tainted 7.1.0-rc7-00180-geb23b588430a #98 PREEMPT(full)
[   64.169977] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   64.169977] Call Trace:
[   64.169977]  <TASK>
[   64.169977]  dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x70
[   64.169977]  ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[   64.169977]  print_report+0x152/0x4b0
[   64.169977]  ? ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x6d/0xa0
[   64.169977]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   64.169977]  ? rcu_read_unlock_sched+0xa/0x20
[   64.169977]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x21b/0x230
[   64.169977]  ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[   64.169977]  kasan_report+0xa8/0xd0
[   64.169977]  ? __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[   64.169977]  __xfrm6_addr_hash+0x11e/0x170
[   64.169977]  __xfrm_dst_hash+0x24/0xc0
[   64.169977]  xfrm_state_find+0xa2d/0x2f90
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_xfrm_state_find+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one+0x210/0x570
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  ? kernel_text_address+0x5b/0x80
[   64.169977]  ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
[   64.169977]  ? unwind_get_return_address+0x5e/0x90
[   64.169977]  ? arch_stack_walk+0x8c/0xe0
[   64.169977]  xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x130/0x200
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup_rcu+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  ? __refcount_add_not_zero.constprop.0+0xb2/0x110
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx___refcount_add_not_zero.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0xd5/0x310
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x3d8/0xb80
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  ? ip_route_output_key_hash+0xc6/0x110
[   64.169977]  ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
[   64.169977]  xfrm_lookup_route+0x18/0xe0
[   64.169977]  ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x4c9/0x530
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x71/0xc0
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  release_sock+0xb0/0x170
[   64.169977]  udp_connect+0x43/0x50
[   64.169977]  __sys_connect+0xa6/0x100
[   64.169977]  ? alloc_fd+0x2e9/0x300
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx___sys_connect+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  ? preempt_latency_start+0x1f/0x70
[   64.169977]  ? fd_install+0x7e/0x150
[   64.169977]  ? rcu_read_unlock_sched+0xa/0x20
[   64.169977]  ? __sys_socket+0xdf/0x130
[   64.169977]  ? __pfx___sys_socket+0x10/0x10
[   64.169977]  ? vma_refcount_put+0x43/0xa0
[   64.169977]  __x64_sys_connect+0x7e/0x90
[   64.169977]  do_syscall_64+0x11b/0x2b0
[   64.169977]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   64.169977] RIP: 0033:0x7f4851ecb570
[   64.169977] Code: 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 80 3d f9 ca 0d 00 00 74 17 b8 2a 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 58 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 83 ec 18 89 54
[   64.169977] RSP: 002b:00007ffc830e3498 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
[   64.169977] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc830e34d0 RCX: 00007f4851ecb570
[   64.169977] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00007ffc830e34d0 RDI: 0000000000000005
[   64.169977] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
[   64.169977] R10: 0000000000000006 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000005
[   64.169977] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005619a863f340 R15: 0000000000000000
[   64.169977]  </TASK>

[   64.169977] The buggy address belongs to stack of task ping/2844
[   64.169977]  and is located at offset 88 in frame:
[   64.169977]  ip4_datagram_release_cb+0x0/0x530

[   64.169977] This frame has 1 object:
[   64.169977]  [32, 88) 'fl4'

[   64.169977] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[   64.169977] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xe1ff
[   64.169977] flags: 0x4000000000000000(zone=1)
[   64.169977] raw: 4000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffffea0000387fc8 0000000000000000
[   64.169977] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
[   64.169977] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[   64.169977] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   64.169977]  ffff88800e1ffc00: f2 f2 00 00 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   64.169977]  ffff88800e1ffc80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00
[   64.169977] >ffff88800e1ffd00: 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   64.169977]                                ^
[   64.169977]  ffff88800e1ffd80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1
[   64.169977]  ffff88800e1ffe00: f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[   64.169977] ==================================================================
[   64.245153] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

After the fix:

ip xfrm policy add src 10.1.1.1/32 dst 10.1.1.2/32 dir out tmpl \
 src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid 1 mode iptfs \
 level use tmpl src fc00::dead:1 dst fc00::dead:2 proto esp reqid 2 \
 mode transport

Error: Mode in optional template not allowed in outbound policy.

Fixes: d1716d5a44 ("xfrm: add generic iptfs defines and functionality")
Reported-by: syzbot+0ac4d84afe1066a1f3e9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6a3ceb94.43b4ff68.30a095.0004.GAE@google.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-07-02 09:22:54 +02:00
Cen Zhang
c4a5f0071c xfrm: cache the offload ifindex for netlink dumps
copy_to_user_state_extra() only holds a reference to the outer xfrm_state.
That does not pin x->xso.dev. NETDEV_DOWN and NETDEV_UNREGISTER can race
through xfrm_dev_state_flush(), xfrm_state_delete(), and
xfrm_dev_state_free(), which clears xso->dev and drops the netdev
reference before the GETSA dump reaches xso_to_xuo() and reads
xso->dev->ifindex.

The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:

XFRM_MSG_GETSA dump path:           NETDEV teardown path:
1. xfrm_get_sa() gets xfrm_state    1. xfrm_dev_state_flush() finds x
2. copy_to_user_state_extra() sees  2. xfrm_state_delete() removes x
   x->xso.dev                          from the SAD
3. copy_user_offload() calls        3. xfrm_dev_state_free() clears
   xso_to_xuo()                        xso->dev
4. xso->dev->ifindex dereferences   4. netdev_put() drops the device
   a detached net_device               reference

Avoid following the live net_device from the dump paths. Cache the
attached ifindex in xfrm_dev_offload when state or policy offload is bound
to a device, and serialize that snapshot instead. This preserves the
user-visible XFRMA_OFFLOAD_DEV value without depending on the embedded
net_device lifetime.

Validation reproduced this kernel report:
Oops: general protection fault

Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 copy_to_user_state_extra+0xb8d/0x1370 [xfrm_user]
 ? __pfx_copy_to_user_state_extra+0x10/0x10 [xfrm_user]
 ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? __alloc_skb+0x342/0x960
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? __nlmsg_put+0x147/0x1b0
 dump_one_state+0x1c7/0x3e0 [xfrm_user]
 xfrm_state_netlink+0xcb/0x130 [xfrm_user]
 ? __pfx_xfrm_state_netlink+0x10/0x10 [xfrm_user]
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? xfrm_user_state_lookup.constprop.0+0x230/0x310 [xfrm_user]
 xfrm_get_sa+0x102/0x250 [xfrm_user]
 ? __pfx_xfrm_get_sa+0x10/0x10 [xfrm_user]
 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x504/0xaa0 [xfrm_user]
 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [xfrm_user]
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0
 ? __pfx_stack_trace_save+0x10/0x10
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x350
 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [xfrm_user]
 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x65/0x80 [xfrm_user]
 netlink_unicast+0x600/0x870
 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? __pfx_stack_trace_save+0x10/0x10
 netlink_sendmsg+0x75d/0xc10
 ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x77a/0x900
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_copy_msghdr_from_user+0x10/0x10
 ? release_sock+0x1a/0x1d0
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? netlink_insert+0x143/0xec0
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xff/0x180
 ? __pfx____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x85/0xe0
 ? do_getsockname+0xf9/0x170
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? fdget+0x53/0x3b0
 __sys_sendmsg+0x111/0x1a0
 ? __pfx___sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
 ? __sys_getsockname+0x8c/0x100
 do_syscall_64+0x102/0x5a0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fixes: 07b87f9eea ("xfrm: Fix unregister netdevice hang on hardware offload.")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-07-02 09:12:58 +02:00
Xiang Mei (Microsoft)
c283e9ada7 xfrm: fix sk_dst_cache double-free in xfrm_user_policy()
xfrm_user_policy() clears the socket dst cache with __sk_dst_reset(),
i.e. the non-atomic __sk_dst_set(sk, NULL): it reads sk_dst_cache with
rcu_dereference_protected(), stores NULL and dst_release()s the old dst.
That is only safe if no other thread modifies sk_dst_cache concurrently.

For a connected UDP socket that does not hold: the transmit fast path
(udp_sendmsg -> sk_dst_check -> sk_dst_reset) resets the cache locklessly
with an atomic xchg(). A per-socket policy change racing a send can make
both sides observe the same old dst and each dst_release() it, dropping
the socket's single reference twice and freeing the xfrm_dst bundle while
it is still referenced:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_release
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff88801897b6c0 by task exploit/155
  Call Trace:
   ...
   dst_release (... ./include/linux/rcuref.h:109)
   xfrm_user_policy (./include/net/sock.h:2239 ./include/net/sock.h:2256 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:3053)
   do_ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1347)
   ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1417)
   do_sock_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2368)
   __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393)
   __x64_sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2396)
   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

Reachable by an unprivileged user via a user+network namespace.

Use the atomic sk_dst_reset() so the cache is cleared and released with a
single xchg(): whichever side wins releases the dst once, the other sees
NULL and does nothing. Behaviour is otherwise unchanged.

Fixes: 2b06cdf3e6 ("xfrm: Clear sk_dst_cache when applying per-socket policy.")
Fixes: be8f8284cd ("net: xfrm: allow clearing socket xfrm policies.")
Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-07-02 09:02:59 +02:00
Qianyu Luo
226f4a490d xfrm: nat_keepalive: avoid double free on send error
nat_keepalive_send() frees the keepalive skb whenever the IPv4 or IPv6
send helper reports an error.

That cleanup is only correct before the skb is handed to the output
path. Once ip_build_and_send_pkt() or ip6_xmit() takes ownership, the
networking stack may already have consumed the skb before returning an
error, so freeing it again is unsafe.

Handle the pre-handoff failure cases inside nat_keepalive_send_ipv4()
and nat_keepalive_send_ipv6(), where the caller still owns the skb, and
keep nat_keepalive_send() responsible only for family dispatch and the
unsupported-family cleanup path.

Fixes: f531d13bdf ("xfrm: support sending NAT keepalives in ESP in UDP states")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Qianyu Luo <qianyuluo3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-30 15:59:54 +02:00
Petr Wozniak
3f4c3919ba xfrm: fix stale skb->prev after async crypto steals a GSO segment
skb_gso_segment() leaves the segment list head with ->prev pointing at
the last segment, an invariant validate_xmit_skb_list() relies on when
it sets its tail pointer (tail = skb->prev).

When validate_xmit_xfrm() walks a GSO list and some segments are stolen
by async crypto (->xmit() returns -EINPROGRESS), those segments are
unlinked from the list but the head ->prev is never updated.  If the
last segment is the one stolen, the returned head still has ->prev
pointing at it, even though it is now owned by the crypto engine and may
be freed.  validate_xmit_skb_list() later does tail->next = skb, writing
through that stale pointer -- a use-after-free.

Repoint skb->prev at the last retained segment before returning.

Fixes: f53c723902 ("net: Add asynchronous callbacks for xfrm on layer 2.")
Signed-off-by: Petr Wozniak <petr.wozniak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-26 08:13:55 +02:00
Petr Wozniak
6860b467f5 xfrm: propagate -EINPROGRESS from validate_xmit_xfrm()
validate_xmit_xfrm() returns NULL both when a packet is dropped and
when it is stolen by async crypto (-EINPROGRESS from ->xmit()).
Callers cannot distinguish the two cases.

f53c723902 ("net: Add asynchronous callbacks for xfrm on layer 2.")
changed the semantics of a NULL return from "dropped" to "stolen or
dropped", but __dev_queue_xmit() was not updated.  On virtual/bridge
interfaces (noqueue qdisc) __dev_queue_xmit() initialises rc=-ENOMEM
and jumps to out: when skb is NULL, returning -ENOMEM to the caller
even though the packet will be delivered correctly via xfrm_dev_resume().

Return ERR_PTR(-EINPROGRESS) from validate_xmit_xfrm() for the async
case so callers can tell it apart from a real drop.  Update
__dev_queue_xmit() to handle ERR_PTR(-EINPROGRESS) from
validate_xmit_skb() correctly.  Update validate_xmit_skb_list() to
use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() so that ERR_PTR(-EINPROGRESS) is not mistakenly
added to the transmitted list.

Fixes: f53c723902 ("net: Add asynchronous callbacks for xfrm on layer 2.")
Suggested-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Petr Wozniak <petr.wozniak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-26 08:13:54 +02:00
Jakub Kicinski
e9deb406c1 ipsec-2026-06-22
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEH7ZpcWbFyOOp6OJbrB3Eaf9PW7cFAmo4560ACgkQrB3Eaf9P
 W7fDNg//WWYvJgff2nGNHa0cqm2PGbwlfD8xEyc5d9nn/sz5yO+1BzN6junxAd7b
 U9PE2Y1Zgh8E43TjqCsWebyv6D4/T6X/iIJXEzPoMZeJnBxLHxGf66ThKaQ8RuDH
 sKaOBexllkfrluSyvdL3vpJUS04bbvyBpLFWsaKIsy0hFMSIBRYWv2Z+HF8RBzTb
 YqAsG1bFOKhBxbbj5CXh6Wuc8PFRMoXlrzWjsMKa9KGkXDbIitvdO/t8cc3ZXo9g
 YE5iz8+poJDy+Uvn74TJ5P5w6jhkTtBliJ13Hckoq5th/5USE92c9ZtVqqCCjB2h
 TL3ChPRn3O2FfBaNYZBHqKXEBpgFF91FPlCTviZKtavDTuNVij432XeYKXU7ZBUW
 dNVPHkbylYjNKaFftLFSKIj644aWLCSrit7Uoz07eeMOn7Ef7pkv6VAnDMBCrS5i
 jwH7FJHyTH7cw21SqB20Q8rlpipeBbSl4Z4gCePBomXXgRkgQqQddOtfCTl25xtF
 vLQiAEU8oVUNQ7z41CBR70S6psfxQn+Od9z2UACv1d8yOEt+cWnK/mmxYL8qq6Jz
 2sx753Z7UWcPLOQVbpgh4CxJuA1wjqlip7Evi1bFdeY3NM+o9PZ2NfFzBOWS6ZXH
 ZgEqHVHcYiKqUb59m6LDcLG+AzDmHBJUk7o3w9tr0rqVhN+eLkA=
 =LFlA
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'ipsec-2026-06-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec

Steffen Klassert says:

====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2026-06-22

1) xfrm: use compat translator only for u64 alignment mismatch
   Gate the XFRM_USER_COMPAT translator on COMPAT_FOR_U64_ALIGNMENT
   so 32-bit compat tasks on arches whose 32-bit ABI already matches
   the native 64-bit layout are no longer rejected with -EOPNOTSUPP.
   From Sanman Pradhan.

2) net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states
   Initialize the alg_key_len to 0 in the IPComp branch of
   pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() so an uninitialized value cannot drive
   xfrm_alg_len() into a slab-out-of-bounds kmemdup during
   XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE. From Zijing Yin.

3) xfrm: Fix dev use-after-free in xfrm async resumption
   Stash the original skb->dev and extend the RCU critical section
   across xfrm_rcv_cb() and transport_finish() to prevent a
   tunnel-device UAF and original-device refcount leak when a
   callback replaces skb->dev. From Dong Chenchen.

4) xfrm: Fix xfrm state cache insertion race
   Move the state-validity check inside xfrm_state_lock in the
   input state cache insertion path so a state cannot be killed
   between the check and the insert. From Herbert Xu.

5) xfrm: annotate data-races around xfrm_policy_count[] and xfrm_policy_default[]
   Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations on xfrm_policy_count
   and xfrm_policy_default to silence the KCSAN data race reported
   on net->xfrm.policy_count. From Eric Dumazet.

6) espintcp: use sk_msg_free_partial to fix partial send
   Replace the manual skmsg accounting in espintcp with
   sk_msg_free_partial() so the skmsg stays consistent on every
   iteration and the partial-send accounting bugs go away.
   From Sabrina Dubroca.

7) xfrm: validate selector family and prefixlen during match
   Reject mismatched address families in xfrm_selector_match() and
   bound prefixlen in addr4_match()/addr_match() to prevent the
   shift-out-of-bounds syzbot reported when an AF_UNSPEC selector
   with a large prefixlen is matched against an IPv4 flow.
   From Eric Dumazet.

* tag 'ipsec-2026-06-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec:
  xfrm: validate selector family and prefixlen during match
  espintcp: use sk_msg_free_partial to fix partial send
  xfrm: annotate data-races around xfrm_policy_count[] and xfrm_policy_default[]
  xfrm: Fix xfrm state cache insertion race
  xfrm: Fix dev use-after-free in xfrm async resumption
  net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states
  xfrm: use compat translator only for u64 alignment mismatch
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622075726.29685-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2026-06-23 16:22:24 -07:00
Maoyi Xie
095515d89b xfrm: xfrm_interface: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
xfrmi_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the
interface link netns xi->net. They differ once the device is created in
or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl
changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a
caller privileged there but not in xi->net can rewrite an interface that
lives in xi->net.

Gate xfrmi_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,
before any attribute is parsed.

Reported-by: Xiao Liang <shaw.leon@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CABAhCOSzP1vaThGV35_VnsRCb=87_CPjPVsTHbq905k8A+BuUg@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: f203b76d78 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie <maoyixie.tju@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612085941.3158249-8-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2026-06-17 16:01:53 -07:00
Eric Dumazet
40f0b10479 xfrm: validate selector family and prefixlen during match
syzbot reported a shift-out-of-bounds in xfrm_selector_match()
due to AF_UNSPEC selector with large prefixlen (e.g. 128) matched
against IPv4 flow (when XFRM_STATE_AF_UNSPEC is set).

Fix this by:

- Rejecting mismatched families in xfrm_selector_match.
- Returning false in addr4_match if prefixlen > 32.
- Returning false in addr_match if prefixlen > 128 (prevents overflow).

Fixes: 3f0ab59e65 ("xfrm: validate new SA's prefixlen using SA family when sel.family is unset")
Reported-by: syzbot+9383b1ff0df4b29ca5e6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a2fbe35.be3f099c.2836ae.0018.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-17 11:17:27 +02:00
Sabrina Dubroca
0078004080 espintcp: use sk_msg_free_partial to fix partial send
sk_msg_free_partial() ensures consistency of the skmsg at every
iteration, without having to manually handle uncharges and offsets.
This simplifies the code, and fixes some bugs in skmsg accounting when
we don't send the full contents.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e27cca96cd ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Reported-by: Aaron Esau <aaron1esau@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-17 11:17:27 +02:00
Eric Dumazet
68de007d5a xfrm: annotate data-races around xfrm_policy_count[] and xfrm_policy_default[]
KCSAN reported a data race involving net->xfrm.policy_count access.

Add missing READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations on
xfrm_policy_count and xfrm_policy_default.

Fixes: 2518c7c2b3 ("[XFRM]: Hash policies when non-prefixed.")
Reported-by: syzbot+d85ba1c732720b9a4097@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a2b9e96.99669fcc.12a77b.0006.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-17 11:17:26 +02:00
Herbert Xu
ddd3d01329 xfrm: Fix xfrm state cache insertion race
The xfrm input state cache insertion code checks the validity of
the state before acquiring the global xfrm_state_lock.  Thus it's
possible for someone else to kill the state after it passed the
validity check, and then the insertion will add the dead state
to the cache.

Fix this by moving the validity check inside the lock.

This entire function is called on the input path, where BH must
be off (e.g., the caller of this function xfrm_input acquires
its spinlocks without disabling BH).

So there is no need to disable BH here or take the RCU read lock.
Remove both and replace them with an assertion that trips if BH
is accidentally enabled on some future calling path.

Fixes: 81a331a0e7 ("xfrm: Add an inbound percpu state cache.")
Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative <zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-17 11:17:17 +02:00
Jakub Kicinski
431662b642 ipsec-next-2026-06-12
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Merge tag 'ipsec-next-2026-06-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next

Steffen Klassert says:

====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2026-06-12

1) Replace the open-coded manual cleanup in xfrm_add_policy() error
   path with xfrm_policy_destroy() for consistency with
   xfrm_policy_construct().
   From Deepanshu Kartikey.

2) Limit XFRMA_TFCPAD to a sensible maximum (max IP length, 64k) since
   u32 is excessive for traffic flow confidentiality padding.
   From David Ahern.

3) Add a new netlink message XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE that
   allows migrating individual IPsec SAs independently of
   their policies. The existing XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE is tightly coupled
   to policy+SA migration, lacks SPI for unique SA identification,
   and cannot express reqid changes or migrate Transport mode
   selectors. The new interface identifies the SA via SPI and mark,
   supports reqid changes, address family changes, encap removal,
   and uses an atomic create+install flow under x->lock to prevent
   SN/IV reuse during AEAD SA migration.
   From Antony Antony.

* tag 'ipsec-next-2026-06-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next:
  xfrm: add documentation for XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE
  xfrm: restrict netlink attributes for XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE
  xfrm: add XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE for single SA migration
  xfrm: make xfrm_dev_state_add xuo parameter const
  xfrm: extract address family and selector validation helpers
  xfrm: refactor XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH validation into a helper
  xfrm: move encap and xuo into struct xfrm_migrate
  xfrm: add error messages to state migration
  xfrm: add state synchronization after migration
  xfrm: check family before comparing addresses in migrate
  xfrm: split xfrm_state_migrate into create and install functions
  xfrm: rename reqid in xfrm_migrate
  xfrm: fix NAT-related field inheritance in SA migration
  xfrm: allow migration from UDP encapsulated to non-encapsulated ESP
  xfrm: add extack to xfrm_init_state
  xfrm: remove redundant assignments
  xfrm: Reject excessive values for XFRMA_TFCPAD
  xfrm: cleanup error path in xfrm_add_policy()
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612074725.1760473-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2026-06-13 13:16:39 -07:00
Dong Chenchen
8045c0df98 xfrm: Fix dev use-after-free in xfrm async resumption
xfrm async resumption hold skb->dev refcnt until after transport_finish.
However, xfrm_rcv_cb may modify skb->dev to tunnel dev without taking
device reference, such as vti_rcv_cb. The subsequent async resumption
will decrement the tunnel device's reference count, which lead to uaf
of tunnel dev and refcnt leak of orig dev as below:

unregister_netdevice: waiting for vti1 to become free. Usage count = -2

Stash the original skb->dev to fix refcnt imbalance. The new skb->dev set
by xfrm_rcv_cb can race with device teardown. Extend rcu protection over
xfrm_rcv_cb and transport_finish to prevent races.

Fixes: 1c428b0384 ("xfrm: hold dev ref until after transport_finish NF_HOOK")
Reported-by: Xu Chunxiao <xuchunxiao3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-12 08:39:59 +02:00
Sanman Pradhan
355fbcbdc2 xfrm: use compat translator only for u64 alignment mismatch
The XFRM compat layer (CONFIG_XFRM_USER_COMPAT) translates 32-bit xfrm
netlink and setsockopt messages into the native 64-bit layout. It is
only needed on architectures where the 32-bit and 64-bit ABIs disagree
on u64 alignment, which the kernel encodes as COMPAT_FOR_U64_ALIGNMENT.

That symbol is defined only by arch/x86. XFRM_USER_COMPAT depends on it,
so the translator can never be built on any other architecture,
including arm64, which still provides a 32-bit compat ABI (CONFIG_COMPAT)
for AArch32 EL0 userspace. On arm64 the AArch32 EABI already aligns u64
to 8 bytes, identical to the AArch64 ABI, so no translation is required
and the native code path is correct for 32-bit tasks.

However, xfrm_user_rcv_msg() and xfrm_user_policy() gate on
in_compat_syscall() alone and then call xfrm_get_translator(), which
returns NULL when no translator is registered. On arm64 that is always
the case, so every xfrm netlink message and the XFRM_POLICY setsockopt
issued by a 32-bit task returns -EOPNOTSUPP. A 32-bit userspace process
on arm64 (and on any other arch with CONFIG_COMPAT but without
COMPAT_FOR_U64_ALIGNMENT) therefore cannot configure XFRM state or
policy through the XFRM_USER netlink API, and cannot use the XFRM_POLICY
setsockopt path, because both fail before reaching the native parser.

The translator series replaced the blanket compat rejection with a
translator lookup. That made the path usable on x86 when the translator
is available, but left architectures that cannot build the translator
permanently rejected even when their compat layout already matches the
native layout. Let those architectures use the native parser instead.

Gate the translator requirement on COMPAT_FOR_U64_ALIGNMENT instead of
on in_compat_syscall() alone. Gating on the ABI property rather than on
CONFIG_XFRM_USER_COMPAT is deliberate: on x86 with IA32_EMULATION=y but
XFRM_USER_COMPAT=n, a 32-bit task must still be rejected rather than
routed through the native parser, which would misread genuinely
4-byte-aligned x86-32 messages. COMPAT_FOR_U64_ALIGNMENT is the ABI
property that makes the XFRM translator mandatory.

Only the receive/input direction needs the guard. The send, dump and
notification paths already call the translator as "if (xtr) { ... }"
with no error on NULL, so on arches without a translator they no-op and
the kernel emits native 64-bit-layout messages, which is what an AArch32
task expects.

Tested on Juniper SRX hardware: with the fix, 32-bit IPsec userspace
netlink and XFRM_POLICY setsockopt operations that previously failed
with -EOPNOTSUPP now succeed; x86 behaviour is unchanged by inspection.

Fixes: 5106f4a8ac ("xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translator")
Fixes: 96392ee5a1 ("xfrm/compat: Translate 32-bit user_policy from sockptr")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sanman Pradhan <psanman@juniper.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-12 08:38:48 +02:00
Wyatt Feng
c381039ade xfrm: espintcp: do not reuse an in-progress partial send
espintcp keeps a single in-flight transmit in ctx->partial.
Before building a new sk_msg, espintcp_sendmsg() first tries to flush
that state through espintcp_push_msgs().

For blocking callers, espintcp_push_msgs() may return success even when
the previous partial send is still pending. espintcp_sendmsg() would
then reinitialize emsg->skmsg and reuse ctx->partial while the old
transfer still owns that state.

Do not rebuild the send message when ctx->partial is still in progress.
If espintcp_push_msgs() returns with emsg->len still set, fail the new
send instead of overwriting the live partial state.

This is a memory-safety fix: reusing the live partial-send state can
leave a stale offset attached to a new sk_msg and lead to an out-of-
bounds read in the send path.

tcp_sendmsg_locked() already handles waiting for send buffer memory, so
the fix here is just to preserve espintcp's one-message-at-a-time
transmit state.

Fixes: e27cca96cd ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Wyatt Feng <bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-05 13:20:03 +02:00
Tristan Madani
c8a8a75b73 xfrm: iptfs: fix ABBA deadlock in iptfs_destroy_state()
iptfs_destroy_state() calls hrtimer_cancel() while holding a spinlock
that the timer callback also acquires, leading to an ABBA deadlock on
SMP systems.

For the output timer (iptfs_timer):
  - iptfs_destroy_state() holds x->lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
  - iptfs_delay_timer() callback takes x->lock

For the drop timer (drop_timer):
  - iptfs_destroy_state() holds drop_lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
  - iptfs_drop_timer() callback takes drop_lock

Both timers use HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT, so their callbacks run in softirq
context.  When hrtimer_cancel() is called for a soft timer that is
currently executing on another CPU, hrtimer_cancel_wait_running() spins
on softirq_expiry_lock -- the same lock held by the softirq running the
callback.  If the callback is blocked waiting for the spinlock held by
the caller of hrtimer_cancel(), a circular dependency forms:

  CPU 0: holds lock_A -> waits for softirq_expiry_lock
  CPU 1: holds softirq_expiry_lock -> waits for lock_A

Fix by calling hrtimer_cancel() before acquiring the respective locks.
hrtimer_cancel() is safe to call without holding any lock and will wait
for any in-progress callback to complete.  For the output timer, the
lock is still acquired afterwards to drain the packet queue.  For the
drop timer, the lock/unlock pair is removed entirely since it only
existed to serialize with the timer callback, which hrtimer_cancel()
already guarantees.

Found by source code audit.

Fixes: 4b3faf610c ("xfrm: iptfs: add new iptfs xfrm mode impl")
Cc: Christian Hopps <chopps@labn.net>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-05 13:06:08 +02:00
Antony Antony
c4460171d7 xfrm: restrict netlink attributes for XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE
Only accept XFRMA used in this method, reject the rest.

Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:48 +02:00
Antony Antony
a9d155ea9b xfrm: add XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE for single SA migration
Add a new netlink method to migrate a single xfrm_state.
Unlike the existing migration mechanism (SA + policy), this
supports migrating only the SA and allows changing the reqid.

The SA is looked up via xfrm_usersa_id, which uniquely
identifies it, so old_saddr is not needed. old_daddr is carried in
xfrm_usersa_id.daddr.

The reqid is invariant in the old migration.

Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:47 +02:00
Antony Antony
8eed5ba257 xfrm: make xfrm_dev_state_add xuo parameter const
The xuo pointer is not modified by xfrm_dev_state_add(); make it const.

Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:45 +02:00
Antony Antony
38d400e5d0 xfrm: extract address family and selector validation helpers
Extract verify_xfrm_family() and verify_selector_prefixlen() from
verify_newsa_info() to allow reuse by other netlink handlers.

verify_xfrm_family() validates that a given address family is AF_INET
or AF_INET6 (with CONFIG_IPV6 guard).

verify_selector_prefixlen() validates that the selector prefix lengths
are within the bounds for the given address family.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:44 +02:00
Antony Antony
92550d30c6 xfrm: refactor XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH validation into a helper
Extract verify_mtimer_thresh() to consolidate the XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH
validation logic shared between the add_sa and upcoming patch.

Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:43 +02:00
Antony Antony
1d97daee30 xfrm: move encap and xuo into struct xfrm_migrate
In preparation for an upcoming patch, move the xfrm_encap_tmpl and
xfrm_user_offload pointers from separate parameters into struct
xfrm_migrate, reducing the parameter count of
xfrm_state_migrate_create(), xfrm_state_migrate_install()
and xfrm_state_migrate()

The fields are placed after the four xfrm_address_t members where
the struct is naturally 8-byte aligned, avoiding padding.

No functional change.

Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:42 +02:00
Antony Antony
15e5d32de6 xfrm: add error messages to state migration
Add descriptive(extack) error messages for all error paths
in state migration. This improves diagnostics by
providing clear feedback when migration fails.

After xfrm_init_state() use NL_SET_ERR_MSG_WEAK() as fallback for
error paths not yet propagating extack e.g. mode_cbs->init_state()

No functional change.

Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:41 +02:00
Antony Antony
bac7a60e26 xfrm: add state synchronization after migration
Add xfrm_migrate_sync() to copy curlft and replay state from the old SA
to the new one before installation. The function allocates no memory, so
it can be called under a spinlock. In preparation for a subsequent patch
in this series.

A subsequent patch calls this under x->lock, atomically capturing the
latest lifetime counters and replay state from the original SA and
deleting it in the same critical section to prevent SN/IV reuse
for XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE method.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:40 +02:00
Antony Antony
b2cb192b95 xfrm: check family before comparing addresses in migrate
When migrating between different address families, xfrm_addr_equal()
cannot meaningfully compare addresses, different lengths.
Only call xfrm_addr_equal() when families match, and take
the xfrm_state_insert() path when addresses are equal.

Fixes: 80c9abaabf ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")

Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:40 +02:00
Antony Antony
8de53883a4 xfrm: split xfrm_state_migrate into create and install functions
To prepare for subsequent patches, split
xfrm_state_migrate() into two functions:
- xfrm_state_migrate_create(): creates the migrated state
- xfrm_state_migrate_install(): installs it into the state table

splitting will help to avoid SN/IV reuse when migrating AEAD SA.

And add const whenever possible.
No functional change.

Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:39 +02:00
Antony Antony
e2e92714d0 xfrm: rename reqid in xfrm_migrate
In preparation for a later patch in this series s/reqid/old_reqid/.
No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:38 +02:00
Antony Antony
364e165e0b xfrm: fix NAT-related field inheritance in SA migration
During SA migration via xfrm_state_clone_and_setup(),
nat_keepalive_interval was silently dropped and never copied to the new
SA. mapping_maxage was unconditionally copied even when migrating to a
non-encapsulated SA.

Both fields are only meaningful when UDP encapsulation (NAT-T) is in
use. Move mapping_maxage and add nat_keepalive_interval inside the
existing if (encap) block, so both are inherited when migrating with
encapsulation and correctly absent when migrating without it.

Fixes: f531d13bdf ("xfrm: support sending NAT keepalives in ESP in UDP states")
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:36 +02:00
Antony Antony
b8addb8884 xfrm: allow migration from UDP encapsulated to non-encapsulated ESP
The current code prevents migrating an SA from UDP encapsulation to
plain ESP. This is needed when moving from a NATed path to a non-NATed
one, for example when switching from IPv4+NAT to IPv6.

Only copy the existing encapsulation during migration if the encap
attribute is explicitly provided.

Note: PF_KEY's SADB_X_MIGRATE always passes encap=NULL and never
supported encapsulation in migration. PF_KEY is deprecated and was
in feature freeze when UDP encapsulation was added to xfrm.

Tested-by: Yan Yan <evitayan@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:36 +02:00
Antony Antony
231a1744dc xfrm: add extack to xfrm_init_state
Add a struct extack parameter to xfrm_init_state() and pass it
through to __xfrm_init_state(). This allows validation errors detected
during state initialization to propagate meaningful error messages back
to userspace.

xfrm_state_migrate() now passes extack so that errors from the
XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE path are properly reported. Callers without an
extack context (af_key, ipcomp4, ipcomp6) pass NULL, preserving their
existing behaviour.

Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:35 +02:00
Antony Antony
440bf355d3 xfrm: remove redundant assignments
These assignments are overwritten within the same function further down

commit e8961c50ee ("xfrm: Refactor migration setup
during the cloning process")
x->props.family = m->new_family;

Which actually moved it in the
commit e03c3bba35 ("xfrm: Fix xfrm migrate issues when address family changes")

And the initial
commit 80c9abaabf ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")

added x->props.saddr = orig->props.saddr; and
memcpy(&xc->props.saddr, &m->new_saddr, sizeof(xc->props.saddr));

Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 12:22:33 +02:00
Sanghyun Park
7f2d76c9c0 xfrm: policy: fix use-after-free on inexact bin in xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx()
Fix the race by pruning the bin while still holding xfrm_policy_lock,
before dropping it. Use __xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin() directly since
the lock is already held. The wrapper xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin()
becomes unused and is removed.

Race:

  CPU0 (XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY)           CPU1 (XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO)
  ==========================          ==========================
  xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx():
    spin_lock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
    bin = xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup()
    __xfrm_policy_unlink(pol)
    spin_unlock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
    xfrm_policy_kill(ret)
    // wide window, lock not held
                                       xfrm_hash_rebuild():
                                         spin_lock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
                                         __xfrm_policy_inexact_flush():
                                           kfree_rcu(bin)  // bin freed
                                         spin_unlock_bh(xfrm_policy_lock)
    xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(bin)
    // UAF: bin is freed

Fixes: 6be3b0db6d ("xfrm: policy: add inexact policy search tree infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Sanghyun Park <sanghyun.park.cnu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-04 11:55:22 +02:00
Zhenghang Xiao
eb48730bb8 xfrm: iptfs: fix use-after-free on first_skb in __input_process_payload
__input_process_payload() stores first_skb into xtfs->ra_newskb under
drop_lock when starting partial reassembly, then unlocks and breaks out
of the processing loop. The post-loop check reads xtfs->ra_newskb
without the lock to decide whether first_skb is still owned:

    if (first_skb && first_iplen && !defer && first_skb != xtfs->ra_newskb)

Between spin_unlock and this read, a concurrent CPU running
iptfs_reassem_cont() (or the drop_timer hrtimer) can complete
reassembly, NULL xtfs->ra_newskb, and free the skb. The check then
evaluates first_skb != NULL as true, and pskb_trim/ip_summed/consume_skb
operate on the freed skb — a use-after-free in skbuff_head_cache.

Replace the unlocked read with a local bool that records whether
first_skb was handed to the reassembly state in the current call. The
flag is set after the existing spin_unlock, before the break, using the
pointer equality that is stable at that point (first_skb == skb iff
first_skb was stored in ra_newskb).

Fixes: 3f3339885f ("xfrm: iptfs: add reusing received skb for the tunnel egress packet")
Signed-off-by: Zhenghang Xiao <kipreyyy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-02 12:21:50 +02:00
Takao Sato
e9096a5a17 xfrm: iptfs: preserve shared-frag marker in iptfs_consume_frags()
iptfs_consume_frags() transfers paged fragments from one socket buffer
to another but fails to propagate the SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG flag. This is
the same class of bug that was fixed in skb_try_coalesce() for
CVE-2026-46300: when fragments backed by read-only page-cache pages are
merged, the marker indicating their shared nature must be preserved so
that ESP can decide correctly whether in-place encryption is safe.

Apply the same two-line fix used in skb_try_coalesce() to
iptfs_consume_frags().

Fixes: b96ba312e2 ("xfrm: iptfs: share page fragments of inner packets")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.14+
Signed-off-by: Takao Sato <takaosato1997@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-06-01 08:38:51 +02:00
Zhengchuan Liang
c16f74dc1d xfrm: input: hold netns during deferred transport reinjection
Transport-mode reinjection stores a struct net pointer in skb->cb and
uses it later from xfrm_trans_reinject(). That pointer must stay valid
until the deferred callback runs.

Take a netns reference when queueing deferred reinjection work and drop
it after the callback completes. Use maybe_get_net() so the queueing
path does not revive a namespace that is already being torn down.

This keeps the existing workqueue design and fixes the netns lifetime
handling in one place for all users of xfrm_trans_queue_net().

Fixes: 7b3801927e ("xfrm: introduce xfrm_trans_queue_net")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Co-developed-by: Luxing Yin <tr0jan@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Luxing Yin <tr0jan@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-05-26 10:35:30 +02:00
Usama Arif
3e52417318 xfrm: move policy_bydst RCU sync from per-netns .exit to .pre_exit
The struct pernet_operations docstring in include/net/net_namespace.h
explicitly warns against blocking RCU primitives in .exit handlers:

    Exit methods using blocking RCU primitives, such as
    synchronize_rcu(), should be implemented via exit_batch.
    [...]
    Please, avoid synchronize_rcu() at all, where it's possible.

    Note that a combination of pre_exit() and exit() can
    be used, since a synchronize_rcu() is guaranteed between
    the calls.

xfrm_policy_fini() violates this: it calls synchronize_rcu() before
freeing the policy_bydst hash tables (so no RCU reader is mid-
traversal at free time), but runs from xfrm_net_ops.exit -- once per
namespace -- so a cleanup_net() of N namespaces pays N full RCU
grace periods serially.

Use the documented pre_exit/exit split. Move the policy flush (and
the workqueue drains it depends on) into a new .pre_exit handler;
xfrm_policy_fini() then runs in .exit and frees the hash tables
after the synchronize_rcu_expedited() that cleanup_net() guarantees
between the two phases. Providing O(1) RCU grace periods per batch
instead of O(N).

Observed on Linux 6.18 with a workload doing unshare(CLONE_NEWNET)
at ~13/sec sustained: cleanup_net() and the netns_wq rescuer kthread
both stuck in xfrm_policy_fini()'s synchronize_rcu(), >300k struct
net accumulated in the cleanup queue, Percpu in /proc/meminfo climbed
to 130+ GB on 256-CPU hosts, and memcg OOMs followed. setup_net and
__put_net counts were balanced, ruling out a refcount leak.

Fixes: 069daad4f2 ("xfrm: Wait for RCU readers during policy netns exit")
Signed-off-by: Usama Arif <usama.arif@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2026-05-26 10:35:29 +02:00