Sync up with android12-5.10 for the following commits:
1efc36b815 ANDROID: sched: add a helper function to change PELT half-life
bda49ad060 FROMGIT: loop: Select I/O scheduler 'none' from inside add_disk()
d8b946254e FROMGIT: blk-mq: Introduce the BLK_MQ_F_NO_SCHED_BY_DEFAULT flag
8914725a58 FROMGIT: usb: typec: tcpm: Keep other events when receiving FRS and Sourcing_vbus events
bed43a725d FROMGIT: usb: dwc3: gadget: Avoid runtime resume if disabling pullup
41b79ac98d FROMGIT: usb: dwc3: gadget: Use list_replace_init() before traversing lists
58f1839adc FROMGIT: arm64/cpufeature: Optionally disable MTE via command-line
20c3903ad7 ANDROID: ABI: update ABI XML
e9ab28e1c5 ANDROID: ABI: update generic symbol list
bce9e7942a ANDROID: PCI/PM: Use usleep_range for d3hot_delay
045204b080 FROMGIT: KVM: arm64: Unregister HYP sections from kmemleak in protected mode
21e59d0563 FROMGIT: arm64: Move .hyp.rodata outside of the _sdata.._edata range
Change-Id: I0e1e2203a0790184c2b0ac7acda39b9c384e60f7
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Add a new helper function and export it for vendor module to
dynamically switch to an alternative half-life at runtime.
Bug: 195474490
Signed-off-by: JianMin Liu <jian-min.liu@mediatek.com>
Change-Id: Ife41997a032fe3384cfa126cbf7aee929c5c11cf
We noticed that the user interface of Android devices becomes very slow
under memory pressure. This is because Android uses the zram driver on top
of the loop driver for swapping, because under memory pressure the swap
code alternates reads and writes quickly, because mq-deadline is the
default scheduler for loop devices and because mq-deadline delays writes by
five seconds for such a workload with default settings. Fix this by making
the kernel select I/O scheduler 'none' from inside add_disk() for loop
devices. This default can be overridden at any time from user space,
e.g. via a udev rule. This approach has an advantage compared to changing
the I/O scheduler from userspace from 'mq-deadline' into 'none', namely
that synchronize_rcu() does not get called.
Additionally, this patch reduces the Android boot time on my test setup
with 0.5 seconds compared to configuring the loop I/O scheduler from user
space.
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Bug: 194450129
(cherry picked from commit 2112f5c133 git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block/ for-5.15/block)
Change-Id: I6f9579b4cd2cb22fcb5c858d4f292f1870336fdd
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@google.com>
elevator_get_default() uses the following algorithm to select an I/O
scheduler from inside add_disk():
- In case of a single hardware queue or sharing hardware queues across
multiple request queues (BLK_MQ_F_TAG_HCTX_SHARED), use mq-deadline.
- Otherwise, use 'none'.
This is a good choice for most but not for all block drivers. Make it
possible to override the selection of mq-deadline with a new flag,
namely BLK_MQ_F_NO_SCHED_BY_DEFAULT.
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Bug: 194450129
(cherry picked from commit 90b7198001 git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block/ for-5.15/block)
Change-Id: I4fb658957c193f350e74bdb5876c20a8f628fcb1
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@google.com>
When receiving FRS and Sourcing_Vbus events from low-level drivers, keep
other events which come a bit earlier so that they will not be ignored
in the event handler.
Fixes: 8dc4bd0736 ("usb: typec: tcpm: Add support for Sink Fast Role SWAP(FRS)")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kyle Tso <kyletso@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210803091314.3051302-1-kyletso@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit 43ad944cd7https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git usb-linus)
Bug: 194987217
Signed-off-by: Kyle Tso <kyletso@google.com>
Change-Id: Ibb4a2ccd2bbb34e53d4fbe44803aad521bb7029f
If the device is already in the runtime suspended state, any call to
the pullup routine will issue a runtime resume on the DWC3 core
device. If the USB gadget is disabling the pullup, then avoid having
to issue a runtime resume, as DWC3 gadget has already been
halted/stopped.
This fixes an issue where the following condition occurs:
usb_gadget_remove_driver()
-->usb_gadget_disconnect()
-->dwc3_gadget_pullup(0)
-->pm_runtime_get_sync() -> ret = 0
-->pm_runtime_put() [async]
-->usb_gadget_udc_stop()
-->dwc3_gadget_stop()
-->dwc->gadget_driver = NULL
...
dwc3_suspend_common()
-->dwc3_gadget_suspend()
-->DWC3 halt/stop routine skipped, driver_data == NULL
This leads to a situation where the DWC3 gadget is not properly
stopped, as the runtime resume would have re-enabled EP0 and event
interrupts, and since we avoided the DWC3 gadget suspend, these
resources were never disabled.
Fixes: 77adb8bdf4 ("usb: dwc3: gadget: Allow runtime suspend if UDC unbinded")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wesley Cheng <wcheng@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1628058245-30692-1-git-send-email-wcheng@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb10f68ad8https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git usb-linus)
Bug: 195568631
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: I98cb28c7cfbc2965aa6e470912e0eb6700a74be9
The list_for_each_entry_safe() macro saves the current item (n) and
the item after (n+1), so that n can be safely removed without
corrupting the list. However, when traversing the list and removing
items using gadget giveback, the DWC3 lock is briefly released,
allowing other routines to execute. There is a situation where, while
items are being removed from the cancelled_list using
dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_cancelled_requests(), the pullup disable
routine is running in parallel (due to UDC unbind). As the cleanup
routine removes n, and the pullup disable removes n+1, once the
cleanup retakes the DWC3 lock, it references a request who was already
removed/handled. With list debug enabled, this leads to a panic.
Ensure all instances of the macro are replaced where gadget giveback
is used.
Example call stack:
Thread#1:
__dwc3_gadget_ep_set_halt() - CLEAR HALT
-> dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_cancelled_requests()
->list_for_each_entry_safe()
->dwc3_gadget_giveback(n)
->dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_request()- n deleted[cancelled_list]
->spin_unlock
->Thread#2 executes
...
->dwc3_gadget_giveback(n+1)
->Already removed!
Thread#2:
dwc3_gadget_pullup()
->waiting for dwc3 spin_lock
...
->Thread#1 released lock
->dwc3_stop_active_transfers()
->dwc3_remove_requests()
->fetches n+1 item from cancelled_list (n removed by Thread#1)
->dwc3_gadget_giveback()
->dwc3_gadget_del_and_unmap_request()- n+1
deleted[cancelled_list]
->spin_unlock
Fix this condition by utilizing list_replace_init(), and traversing
through a local copy of the current elements in the endpoint lists.
This will also set the parent list as empty, so if another thread is
also looping through the list, it will be empty on the next iteration.
Fixes: d4f1afe5e8 ("usb: dwc3: gadget: move requests to cancelled_list")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wesley Cheng <wcheng@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1627543994-20327-1-git-send-email-wcheng@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit d25d85061bhttps://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb.git usb-linus)
Bug: 195570448
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: I0eebb6938d7fac97f6126deda2984387dec1e794
MTE support needs to be optionally disabled in runtime
for HW issue workaround, FW development and some
evaluation works on system resource and performance.
This patch makes two changes:
(1) moves init of tag-allocation bits(ATA/ATA0) to
cpu_enable_mte() as not cached in TLB.
(2) allows ID_AA64PFR1_EL1.MTE to be overridden on
its shadow value by giving "arm64.nomte" on cmdline.
When the feature value is off, ATA and TCF will not set
and the related functionalities are accordingly suppressed.
Change-Id: Ic9cf6d3a12a33b312643d96101c72a657cb714af
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210803070824.7586-2-yee.lee@mediatek.com/
(cherry picked from commit 7a062ce318 git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git next)
Bug: 195507092
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yee Lee <yee.lee@mediatek.com>
This patch implements a vendor hook that changes d3hot_delay to use
usleep_range() instead of msleep() to reduce the resume time from 20ms to 10ms.
The call sequence is as follows:
pci_pm_resume_noirq()
pci_pm_default_resume_early()
pci_power_up()
pci_raw_set_power_state() --> msleep(10)
The default d3hot_delay is 10ms. Using msleep for delays less than 20ms could
result in delays up to 20ms.
Reference: Documentation/timers/timers-howto.rst
Using usleep_range() results in the delay being closer to 10ms and this reduces
the resume time.
Bug: 194231641
Change-Id: If3e4dcfb99edad302371273933fa6784854cf892
Signed-off-by: Sajid Dalvi <sdalvi@google.com>
Booting a KVM host in protected mode with kmemleak quickly results
in a pretty bad crash, as kmemleak doesn't know that the HYP sections
have been taken away. This is specially true for the BSS section,
which is part of the kernel BSS section and registered at boot time
by kmemleak itself.
Unregister the HYP part of the BSS before making that section
HYP-private. The rest of the HYP-specific data is obtained via
the page allocator or lives in other sections, none of which is
subjected to kmemleak.
Fixes: 90134ac9ca ("KVM: arm64: Protect the .hyp sections from the host")
Reviewed-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.13
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210802123830.2195174-3-maz@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit 47e6223c84 git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm.git next)
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <mzyngier@google.com>
Bug: 194868924
Change-Id: I2881fc146d8a8dd8c9ad9bd9da3a8356968be794
The HYP rodata section is currently lumped together with the BSS,
which isn't exactly what is expected (it gets registered with
kmemleak, for example).
Move it away so that it is actually marked RO. As an added
benefit, it isn't registered with kmemleak anymore.
Fixes: 380e18ade4 ("KVM: arm64: Introduce a BSS section for use at Hyp")
Suggested-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org #5.13
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210802123830.2195174-2-maz@kernel.org
(cherry picked from commit eb48d154cd git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm.git next)
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <mzyngier@google.com>
Bug: 194868924
Change-Id: I83eb8a573640a37d7272f004d5f1626080395d93
Sync up with android12-5.10 for the following commits:
43223c8e15 ANDROID: GKI: update .xml file after xhci bugfix
34f6c9c308 ANDROID: usb: host: fix slab-out-of-bounds in xhci_vendor_get_ops
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: I470e83dac326c4ba0414f1f07260896d4d233e66
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Merge 5.10.56 into android12-5.10-lts
Changes in 5.10.56
selftest: fix build error in tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c
io_uring: fix null-ptr-deref in io_sq_offload_start()
x86/asm: Ensure asm/proto.h can be included stand-alone
pipe: make pipe writes always wake up readers
btrfs: fix rw device counting in __btrfs_free_extra_devids
btrfs: mark compressed range uptodate only if all bio succeed
Revert "ACPI: resources: Add checks for ACPI IRQ override"
ACPI: DPTF: Fix reading of attributes
x86/kvm: fix vcpu-id indexed array sizes
KVM: add missing compat KVM_CLEAR_DIRTY_LOG
ocfs2: fix zero out valid data
ocfs2: issue zeroout to EOF blocks
can: j1939: j1939_xtp_rx_dat_one(): fix rxtimer value between consecutive TP.DT to 750ms
can: raw: raw_setsockopt(): fix raw_rcv panic for sock UAF
can: peak_usb: pcan_usb_handle_bus_evt(): fix reading rxerr/txerr values
can: mcba_usb_start(): add missing urb->transfer_dma initialization
can: usb_8dev: fix memory leak
can: ems_usb: fix memory leak
can: esd_usb2: fix memory leak
alpha: register early reserved memory in memblock
HID: wacom: Re-enable touch by default for Cintiq 24HDT / 27QHDT
NIU: fix incorrect error return, missed in previous revert
drm/amd/display: ensure dentist display clock update finished in DCN20
drm/amdgpu: Avoid printing of stack contents on firmware load error
drm/amdgpu: Fix resource leak on probe error path
blk-iocost: fix operation ordering in iocg_wake_fn()
nfc: nfcsim: fix use after free during module unload
cfg80211: Fix possible memory leak in function cfg80211_bss_update
RDMA/bnxt_re: Fix stats counters
bpf: Fix OOB read when printing XDP link fdinfo
mac80211: fix enabling 4-address mode on a sta vif after assoc
netfilter: conntrack: adjust stop timestamp to real expiry value
netfilter: nft_nat: allow to specify layer 4 protocol NAT only
i40e: Fix logic of disabling queues
i40e: Fix firmware LLDP agent related warning
i40e: Fix queue-to-TC mapping on Tx
i40e: Fix log TC creation failure when max num of queues is exceeded
tipc: fix implicit-connect for SYN+
tipc: fix sleeping in tipc accept routine
net: Set true network header for ECN decapsulation
net: qrtr: fix memory leaks
ionic: remove intr coalesce update from napi
ionic: fix up dim accounting for tx and rx
ionic: count csum_none when offload enabled
tipc: do not write skb_shinfo frags when doing decrytion
octeontx2-pf: Fix interface down flag on error
mlx4: Fix missing error code in mlx4_load_one()
KVM: x86: Check the right feature bit for MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK access
net: llc: fix skb_over_panic
drm/msm/dpu: Fix sm8250_mdp register length
drm/msm/dp: Initialize the INTF_CONFIG register
skmsg: Make sk_psock_destroy() static
net/mlx5: Fix flow table chaining
net/mlx5e: Fix nullptr in mlx5e_hairpin_get_mdev()
sctp: fix return value check in __sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup
tulip: windbond-840: Fix missing pci_disable_device() in probe and remove
sis900: Fix missing pci_disable_device() in probe and remove
can: hi311x: fix a signedness bug in hi3110_cmd()
bpf: Introduce BPF nospec instruction for mitigating Spectre v4
bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation
bpf: Remove superfluous aux sanitation on subprog rejection
bpf: verifier: Allocate idmap scratch in verifier env
bpf: Fix pointer arithmetic mask tightening under state pruning
SMB3: fix readpage for large swap cache
powerpc/pseries: Fix regression while building external modules
Revert "perf map: Fix dso->nsinfo refcounting"
i40e: Add additional info to PHY type error
can: j1939: j1939_session_deactivate(): clarify lifetime of session object
Linux 5.10.56
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: Ib3c9244afb7ee5d6ee8d3235efe8956898f486c4
Sync up with android12-5.10 for the following commits:
3de34cc5ea UPSTREAM: pipe: make pipe writes always wake up readers
6b7e007164 ANDROID: Revert "ANDROID: fs: pipe: wakeup readers on small writes even if pipe had data"
dac8af7144 ANDROID: GKI: Enable CONFIG_USB_EHCI_ROOT_HUB_TT
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
Change-Id: I220ff2999b3aa0b066e84de25da8e2307bb31685
commit 0c71437dd5 upstream.
The j1939_session_deactivate() is decrementing the session ref-count and
potentially can free() the session. This would cause use-after-free
situation.
However, the code calling j1939_session_deactivate() does always hold
another reference to the session, so that it would not be free()ed in
this code path.
This patch adds a comment to make this clear and a WARN_ON, to ensure
that future changes will not violate this requirement. Further this
patch avoids dereferencing the session pointer as a precaution to avoid
use-after-free if the session is actually free()ed.
Fixes: 9d71dd0c70 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210714111602.24021-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de
Reported-by: Xiaochen Zou <xzou017@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dc614c4617 upstream.
In case of PHY type error occurs, the message was too generic.
Add additional info to PHY type error indicating that it can be
wrong cable connected.
Fixes: 124ed15bf1 ("i40e: Add dual speed module support")
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Cieplicki <lukaszx.cieplicki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Maloszewski <michal.maloszewski@intel.com>
Tested-by: Tony Brelinski <tonyx.brelinski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9bac1bd6e6 upstream.
This makes 'perf top' abort in some cases, and the right fix will
involve surgery that is too much to do at this stage, so revert for now
and fix it in the next merge window.
This reverts commit 2d6b74baa7.
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 333cf50746 upstream.
With commit c9f3401313 ("powerpc: Always enable queued spinlocks for
64s, disable for others") CONFIG_PPC_QUEUED_SPINLOCKS is always
enabled on ppc64le, external modules that use spinlock APIs are
failing.
ERROR: modpost: GPL-incompatible module XXX.ko uses GPL-only symbol 'shared_processor'
Before the above commit, modules were able to build without any
issues. Also this problem is not seen on other architectures. This
problem can be workaround if CONFIG_UNINLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK is enabled in
the config. However CONFIG_UNINLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK is not enabled by
default and only enabled in certain conditions like
CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCKS is set in the kernel config.
#include <linux/module.h>
spinlock_t spLock;
static int __init spinlock_test_init(void)
{
spin_lock_init(&spLock);
spin_lock(&spLock);
spin_unlock(&spLock);
return 0;
}
static void __exit spinlock_test_exit(void)
{
printk("spinlock_test unloaded\n");
}
module_init(spinlock_test_init);
module_exit(spinlock_test_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION ("spinlock_test");
MODULE_LICENSE ("non-GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR ("Srikar Dronamraju");
Given that spin locks are one of the basic facilities for module code,
this effectively makes it impossible to build/load almost any non GPL
modules on ppc64le.
This was first reported at https://github.com/openzfs/zfs/issues/11172
Currently shared_processor is exported as GPL only symbol.
Fix this for parity with other architectures by exposing
shared_processor to non-GPL modules too.
Fixes: 14c73bd344 ("powerpc/vcpu: Assume dedicated processors as non-preempt")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.5+
Reported-by: marc.c.dionne@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210729060449.292780-1-srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f2a26a3cff upstream.
readpage was calculating the offset of the page incorrectly
for the case of large swapcaches.
loff_t offset = (loff_t)page->index << PAGE_SHIFT;
As pointed out by Matthew Wilcox, this needs to use
page_file_offset() to calculate the offset instead.
Pages coming from the swap cache have page->index set
to their index within the swapcache, not within the backing
file. For a sufficiently large swapcache, we could have
overlapping values of page->index within the same backing file.
Suggested by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.7+
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e042aa532c upstream.
In 7fedb63a83 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask") we
narrowed the offset mask for unprivileged pointer arithmetic in order to
mitigate a corner case where in the speculative domain it is possible to
advance, for example, the map value pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-
bounds in order to leak kernel memory via side-channel to user space.
The verifier's state pruning for scalars leaves one corner case open
where in the first verification path R_x holds an unknown scalar with an
aux->alu_limit of e.g. 7, and in a second verification path that same
register R_x, here denoted as R_x', holds an unknown scalar which has
tighter bounds and would thus satisfy range_within(R_x, R_x') as well as
tnum_in(R_x, R_x') for state pruning, yielding an aux->alu_limit of 3:
Given the second path fits the register constraints for pruning, the final
generated mask from aux->alu_limit will remain at 7. While technically
not wrong for the non-speculative domain, it would however be possible
to craft similar cases where the mask would be too wide as in 7fedb63a83.
One way to fix it is to detect the presence of unknown scalar map pointer
arithmetic and force a deeper search on unknown scalars to ensure that
we do not run into a masking mismatch.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c9e73e3d2b upstream.
func_states_equal makes a very short lived allocation for idmap,
probably because it's too large to fit on the stack. However the
function is called quite often, leading to a lot of alloc / free
churn. Replace the temporary allocation with dedicated scratch
space in struct bpf_verifier_env.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210429134656.122225-4-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 59089a189e upstream.
Follow-up to fe9a5ca7e3 ("bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative
path verification"). The sanitize_insn_aux_data() helper does not serve a
particular purpose in today's code. The original intention for the helper
was that if function-by-function verification fails, a given program would
be cleared from temporary insn_aux_data[], and then its verification would
be re-attempted in the context of the main program a second time.
However, a failure in do_check_subprogs() will skip do_check_main() and
propagate the error to the user instead, thus such situation can never occur.
Given its interaction is not compatible to the Spectre v1 mitigation (due to
comparing aux->seen with env->pass_cnt), just remove sanitize_insn_aux_data()
to avoid future bugs in this area.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 2039f26f3a ]
Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of
techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and
stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section 2.4.4.5:
A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many
microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are
known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on
any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does
not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data
cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is
detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed.
af86ca4e30 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") tried to mitigate
this attack by sanitizing the memory locations through preemptive "fast"
(low latency) stores of zero prior to the actual "slow" (high latency) store
of a pointer value such that upon dependency misprediction the CPU then
speculatively executes the load of the pointer value and retrieves the zero
value instead of the attacker controlled scalar value previously stored at
that location, meaning, subsequent access in the speculative domain is then
redirected to the "zero page".
The sanitized preemptive store of zero prior to the actual "slow" store is
done through a simple ST instruction based on r10 (frame pointer) with
relative offset to the stack location that the verifier has been tracking
on the original used register for STX, which does not have to be r10. Thus,
there are no memory dependencies for this store, since it's only using r10
and immediate constant of zero; hence af86ca4e30 /assumed/ a low latency
operation.
However, a recent attack demonstrated that this mitigation is not sufficient
since the preemptive store of zero could also be turned into a "slow" store
and is thus bypassed as well:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
31: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// r9 will remain "fast" register, r10 will become "slow" register below
32: (bf) r9 = r10
// JIT maps BPF reg to x86 reg:
// r9 -> r15 (callee saved)
// r10 -> rbp
// train store forward prediction to break dependency link between both r9
// and r10 by evicting them from the predictor's LRU table.
33: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24576)
34: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
35: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24580)
36: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
37: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24584)
38: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
39: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24588)
40: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
[...]
543: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
544: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// prepare call to bpf_ringbuf_output() helper. the latter will cause rbp
// to spill to stack memory while r13/r14/r15 (all callee saved regs) remain
// in hardware registers. rbp becomes slow due to push/pop latency. below is
// disasm of bpf_ringbuf_output() helper for better visual context:
//
// ffffffff8117ee20: 41 54 push r12
// ffffffff8117ee22: 55 push rbp
// ffffffff8117ee23: 53 push rbx
// ffffffff8117ee24: 48 f7 c1 fc ff ff ff test rcx,0xfffffffffffffffc
// ffffffff8117ee2b: 0f 85 af 00 00 00 jne ffffffff8117eee0 <-- jump taken
// [...]
// ffffffff8117eee0: 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff mov r12,0xffffffffffffffea
// ffffffff8117eee7: 5b pop rbx
// ffffffff8117eee8: 5d pop rbp
// ffffffff8117eee9: 4c 89 e0 mov rax,r12
// ffffffff8117eeec: 41 5c pop r12
// ffffffff8117eeee: c3 ret
545: (18) r1 = map[id:4]
547: (bf) r2 = r7
548: (b7) r3 = 0
549: (b7) r4 = 4
550: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_output#194288
// instruction 551 inserted by verifier \
551: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
// storing map value pointer r7 at fp-16 | since value of r10 is "slow".
552: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 /
// following "fast" read to the same memory location, but due to dependency
// misprediction it will speculatively execute before insn 551/552 completes.
553: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r9 -16)
// in speculative domain contains attacker controlled r2. in non-speculative
// domain this contains r7, and thus accesses r7 +0 below.
554: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
As can be seen, the current speculative store bypass mitigation which the
verifier inserts at line 551 is insufficient since /both/, the write of
the zero sanitation as well as the map value pointer are a high latency
instruction due to prior memory access via push/pop of r10 (rbp) in contrast
to the low latency read in line 553 as r9 (r15) which stays in hardware
registers. Thus, architecturally, fp-16 is r7, however, microarchitecturally,
fp-16 can still be r2.
Initial thoughts to address this issue was to track spilled pointer loads
from stack and enforce their load via LDX through r10 as well so that /both/
the preemptive store of zero /as well as/ the load use the /same/ register
such that a dependency is created between the store and load. However, this
option is not sufficient either since it can be bypassed as well under
speculation. An updated attack with pointer spill/fills now _all_ based on
r10 would look as follows:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
[...]
// longer store forward prediction training sequence than before.
2062: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25588)
2063: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30708) = r0
2064: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25592)
2065: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30712) = r0
2066: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
2067: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// store the speculative load address (scalar) this time after the store
// forward prediction training.
2068: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
2069: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
2070: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
2071: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
2072: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
2073: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29712) = r0
2074: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29716) = r0
2075: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29720) = r0
2076: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29724) = r0
2077: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29728) = r0
2078: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29732) = r0
2079: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29736) = r0
2080: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29740) = r0
2081: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29744) = r0
2082: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29748) = r0
2083: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29752) = r0
2084: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29756) = r0
2085: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29760) = r0
2086: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29764) = r0
2087: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29768) = r0
2088: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29772) = r0
2089: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29776) = r0
2090: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29780) = r0
2091: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29784) = r0
2092: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29788) = r0
2093: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29792) = r0
2094: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2095: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2096: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2097: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2098: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; same as before, also including the
// sanitation store with 0 from the current mitigation by the verifier.
2099: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
2100: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 | since store unit is still busy.
// load from stack intended to bypass stores.
2101: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2102: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
[...]
Looking at the CPU microarchitecture, the scheduler might issue loads (such
as seen in line 2101) before stores (line 2099,2100) because the load execution
units become available while the store execution unit is still busy with the
sequence of dummy stores (line 2069-2098). And so the load may use the prior
stored scalar from r2 at address r10 -16 for speculation. The updated attack
may work less reliable on CPU microarchitectures where loads and stores share
execution resources.
This concludes that the sanitizing with zero stores from af86ca4e30 ("bpf:
Prevent memory disambiguation attack") is insufficient. Moreover, the detection
of stack reuse from af86ca4e30 where previously data (STACK_MISC) has been
written to a given stack slot where a pointer value is now to be stored does
not have sufficient coverage as precondition for the mitigation either; for
several reasons outlined as follows:
1) Stack content from prior program runs could still be preserved and is
therefore not "random", best example is to split a speculative store
bypass attack between tail calls, program A would prepare and store the
oob address at a given stack slot and then tail call into program B which
does the "slow" store of a pointer to the stack with subsequent "fast"
read. From program B PoV such stack slot type is STACK_INVALID, and
therefore also must be subject to mitigation.
2) The STACK_SPILL must not be coupled to register_is_const(&stack->spilled_ptr)
condition, for example, the previous content of that memory location could
also be a pointer to map or map value. Without the fix, a speculative
store bypass is not mitigated in such precondition and can then lead to
a type confusion in the speculative domain leaking kernel memory near
these pointer types.
While brainstorming on various alternative mitigation possibilities, we also
stumbled upon a retrospective from Chrome developers [0]:
[...] For variant 4, we implemented a mitigation to zero the unused memory
of the heap prior to allocation, which cost about 1% when done concurrently
and 4% for scavenging. Variant 4 defeats everything we could think of. We
explored more mitigations for variant 4 but the threat proved to be more
pervasive and dangerous than we anticipated. For example, stack slots used
by the register allocator in the optimizing compiler could be subject to
type confusion, leading to pointer crafting. Mitigating type confusion for
stack slots alone would have required a complete redesign of the backend of
the optimizing compiler, perhaps man years of work, without a guarantee of
completeness. [...]
From BPF side, the problem space is reduced, however, options are rather
limited. One idea that has been explored was to xor-obfuscate pointer spills
to the BPF stack:
[...]
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
[...]
2106: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2107: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2108: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2109: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2110: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; xored with random 'secret' value
// of 943576462 before store ...
2111: (b4) w11 = 943576462
2112: (af) r11 ^= r7
2113: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11
2114: (79) r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2115: (b4) w2 = 943576462
2116: (af) r2 ^= r11
// ... and restored with the same 'secret' value with the help of AX reg.
2117: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
While the above would not prevent speculation, it would make data leakage
infeasible by directing it to random locations. In order to be effective
and prevent type confusion under speculation, such random secret would have
to be regenerated for each store. The additional complexity involved for a
tracking mechanism that prevents jumps such that restoring spilled pointers
would not get corrupted is not worth the gain for unprivileged. Hence, the
fix in here eventually opted for emitting a non-public BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
instruction which the x86 JIT translates into a lfence opcode. Inserting the
latter in between the store and load instruction is one of the mitigations
options [1]. The x86 instruction manual notes:
[...] An LFENCE that follows an instruction that stores to memory might
complete before the data being stored have become globally visible. [...]
The latter meaning that the preceding store instruction finished execution
and the store is at minimum guaranteed to be in the CPU's store queue, but
it's not guaranteed to be in that CPU's L1 cache at that point (globally
visible). The latter would only be guaranteed via sfence. So the load which
is guaranteed to execute after the lfence for that local CPU would have to
rely on store-to-load forwarding. [2], in section 2.3 on store buffers says:
[...] For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is
allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual and
physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry in the store
buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot available in the
store buffer again. Otherwise, the CPU can immediately continue adding
subsequent instructions to the ROB and execute them out of order. On Intel
CPUs, the store buffer has up to 56 entries. [...]
One small upside on the fix is that it lifts constraints from af86ca4e30
where the sanitize_stack_off relative to r10 must be the same when coming
from different paths. The BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC gets emitted after a BPF_STX
or BPF_ST instruction. This happens either when we store a pointer or data
value to the BPF stack for the first time, or upon later pointer spills.
The former needs to be enforced since otherwise stale stack data could be
leaked under speculation as outlined earlier. For non-x86 JITs the BPF_ST |
BPF_NOSPEC mapping is currently optimized away, but others could emit a
speculation barrier as well if necessary. For real-world unprivileged
programs e.g. generated by LLVM, pointer spill/fill is only generated upon
register pressure and LLVM only tries to do that for pointers which are not
used often. The program main impact will be the initial BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
sanitation for the STACK_INVALID case when the first write to a stack slot
occurs e.g. upon map lookup. In future we might refine ways to mitigate
the latter cost.
[0] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.05178.pdf
[1] https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2018/05/21/analysis-and-mitigation-of-speculative-store-bypass-cve-2018-3639/
[2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.05725.pdf
Fixes: af86ca4e30 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack")
Fixes: f7cf25b202 ("bpf: track spill/fill of constants")
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f5e81d1117 ]
In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction
/either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to
/no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected
by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already.
This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation
as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled,
it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional
instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow
as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4
since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and
ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs.
The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does
annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers.
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f6b3c7848e ]
The hi3110_cmd() is supposed to return zero on success and negative
error codes on failure, but it was accidentally declared as a u8 when
it needs to be an int type.
Fixes: 57e83fb9b7 ("can: hi311x: Add Holt HI-311x CAN driver")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210729141246.GA1267@kili
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 89fb62fde3 ]
Replace pci_enable_device() with pcim_enable_device(),
pci_disable_device() and pci_release_regions() will be
called in release automatically.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 76a16be07b ]
Replace pci_enable_device() with pcim_enable_device(),
pci_disable_device() and pci_release_regions() will be
called in release automatically.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 557fb5862c ]
As Ben Hutchings noticed, this check should have been inverted: the call
returns true in case of success.
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: 0c5dc070ff ("sctp: validate from_addr_param return")
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b1c2f6312c ]
The result of __dev_get_by_index() is not checked for NULL and then gets
dereferenced immediately.
Also, __dev_get_by_index() must be called while holding either RTNL lock
or @dev_base_lock, which isn't satisfied by mlx5e_hairpin_get_mdev() or
its callers. This makes the underlying hlist_for_each_entry() loop not
safe, and can have adverse effects in itself.
Fix by using dev_get_by_index() and handling nullptr return value when
ifindex device is not found. Update mlx5e_hairpin_get_mdev() callers to
check for possible PTR_ERR() result.
Fixes: 77ab67b7f0 ("net/mlx5e: Basic setup of hairpin object")
Addresses-Coverity: ("Dereference null return value")
Signed-off-by: Dima Chumak <dchumak@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8b54874ef1 ]
Fix a bug when flow table is created in priority that already
has other flow tables as shown in the below diagram.
If the new flow table (FT-B) has the lowest level in the priority,
we need to connect the flow tables from the previous priority (p0)
to this new table. In addition when this flow table is destroyed
(FT-B), we need to connect the flow tables from the previous
priority (p0) to the next level flow table (FT-C) in the same
priority of the destroyed table (if exists).
---------
|root_ns|
---------
|
--------------------------------
| | |
---------- ---------- ---------
|p(prio)-x| | p-y | | p-n |
---------- ---------- ---------
| |
---------------- ------------------
|ns(e.g bypass)| |ns(e.g. kernel) |
---------------- ------------------
| | |
------- ------ ----
| p0 | | p1 | |p2|
------- ------ ----
| | \
-------- ------- ------
| FT-A | |FT-B | |FT-C|
-------- ------- ------
Fixes: f90edfd279 ("net/mlx5_core: Connect flow tables")
Signed-off-by: Maor Gottlieb <maorg@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8063e184e4 ]
sk_psock_destroy() is a RCU callback, I can't see any reason why
it could be used outside.
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Cc: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Cc: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210127221501.46866-1-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f9a39932fa ]
Some bootloaders set the widebus enable bit in the INTF_CONFIG register,
but configuration of widebus isn't yet supported ensure that the
register has a known value, with widebus disabled.
Fixes: c943b4948b ("drm/msm/dp: add displayPort driver support")
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210722024434.3313167-1-bjorn.andersson@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b910a0206b ]
The downstream dts lists this value as 0x494, and not
0x45c.
Fixes: af776a3e1c ("drm/msm/dpu: add SM8250 to hw catalog")
Signed-off-by: Robert Foss <robert.foss@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@somainline.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210628085033.9905-1-robert.foss@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c7c9d2102c ]
Syzbot reported skb_over_panic() in llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). The
problem was in wrong LCC header manipulations.
Syzbot's reproducer tries to send XID packet. llc_ui_sendmsg() is
doing following steps:
1. skb allocation with size = len + header size
len is passed from userpace and header size
is 3 since addr->sllc_xid is set.
2. skb_reserve() for header_len = 3
3. filling all other space with memcpy_from_msg()
Ok, at this moment we have fully loaded skb, only headers needs to be
filled.
Then code comes to llc_sap_action_send_xid_c(). This function pushes 3
bytes for LLC PDU header and initializes it. Then comes
llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). It initalizes next 3 bytes *AFTER* LLC PDU
header and call skb_push(skb, 3). This looks wrong for 2 reasons:
1. Bytes rigth after LLC header are user data, so this function
was overwriting payload.
2. skb_push(skb, 3) call can cause skb_over_panic() since
all free space was filled in llc_ui_sendmsg(). (This can
happen is user passed 686 len: 686 + 14 (eth header) + 3 (LLC
header) = 703. SKB_DATA_ALIGN(703) = 704)
So, in this patch I added 2 new private constansts: LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID
and LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID. LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID is used to correctly reserve
header size to handle LLC + XID case. LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID is used by
llc_pdu_header_init() function to push 6 bytes instead of 3. And finally
I removed skb_push() call from llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd().
This changes should not affect other parts of LLC, since after
all steps we just transmit buffer.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+5e5a981ad7cc54c4b2b4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0a31df6823 ]
MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ACK MSR is part of interrupt based asynchronous page fault
interface and not the original (deprecated) KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF. This is
stated in Documentation/virt/kvm/msr.rst.
Fixes: 66570e966d ("kvm: x86: only provide PV features if enabled in guest's CPUID")
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210722123018.260035-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7e4960b3d6 ]
The error code is missing in this code scenario, add the error code
'-EINVAL' to the return value 'err'.
Eliminate the follow smatch warning:
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c:3538 mlx4_load_one() warn:
missing error code 'err'.
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Fixes: 7ae0e400cd ("net/mlx4_core: Flexible (asymmetric) allocation of EQs and MSI-X vectors for PF/VFs")
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 69f0aeb13b ]
In the existing code while changing the number of TX/RX
queues using ethtool the PF/VF interface resources are
freed and reallocated (otx2_stop and otx2_open is called)
if the device is in running state. If any resource allocation
fails in otx2_open, driver free already allocated resources
and return. But again, when the number of queues changes
as the device state still running oxt2_stop is called.
In which we try to free already freed resources leading
to driver crash.
This patch fixes the issue by setting the INTF_DOWN flag on
error and free the resources in otx2_stop only if the flag is
not set.
Fixes: 50fe6c02e5 ("octeontx2-pf: Register and handle link notifications")
Signed-off-by: Geetha sowjanya <gakula@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Sunil Kovvuri Goutham <Sunil.Goutham@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3cf4375a09 ]
One skb's skb_shinfo frags are not writable, and they can be shared with
other skbs' like by pskb_copy(). To write the frags may cause other skb's
data crash.
So before doing en/decryption, skb_cow_data() should always be called for
a cloned or nonlinear skb if req dst is using the same sg as req src.
While at it, the likely branch can be removed, as it will be covered
by skb_cow_data().
Note that esp_input() has the same issue, and I will fix it in another
patch. tipc_aead_encrypt() doesn't have this issue, as it only processes
linear data in the unlikely branch.
Fixes: fc1b6d6de2 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication")
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f07f9815b7 ]
Be sure to count the csum_none cases when csum offload is
enabled.
Fixes: 0f3154e6bc ("ionic: Add Tx and Rx handling")
Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 76ed8a4a00 ]
We need to count the correct Tx and/or Rx packets for dynamic
interrupt moderation, depending on which we're processing on
the queue interrupt.
Fixes: 04a834592b ("ionic: dynamic interrupt moderation")
Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a6ff85e0a2 ]
Move the interrupt coalesce value update out of the napi
thread and into the dim_work thread and set it only when it
has actually changed.
Fixes: 04a834592b ("ionic: dynamic interrupt moderation")
Signed-off-by: Shannon Nelson <snelson@pensando.io>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 52f3456a96 ]
Syzbot reported memory leak in qrtr. The problem was in unputted
struct sock. qrtr_local_enqueue() function calls qrtr_port_lookup()
which takes sock reference if port was found. Then there is the following
check:
if (!ipc || &ipc->sk == skb->sk) {
...
return -ENODEV;
}
Since we should drop the reference before returning from this function and
ipc can be non-NULL inside this if, we should add qrtr_port_put() inside
this if.
The similar corner case is in qrtr_endpoint_post() as Manivannan
reported. In case of sock_queue_rcv_skb() failure we need to put
port reference to avoid leaking struct sock pointer.
Fixes: e04df98adf ("net: qrtr: Remove receive worker")
Fixes: bdabad3e36 ("net: Add Qualcomm IPC router")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+35a511c72ea7356cdcf3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <mani@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 227adfb2b1 ]
In cases where the header straight after the tunnel header was
another ethernet header (TEB), instead of the network header,
the ECN decapsulation code would treat the ethernet header as if
it was an IP header, resulting in mishandling and possible
wrong drops or corruption of the IP header.
In this case, ECT(1) is sent, so IP_ECN_decapsulate tries to copy it to the
inner IPv4 header, and correct its checksum.
The offset of the ECT bits in an IPv4 header corresponds to the
lower 2 bits of the second octet of the destination MAC address
in the ethernet header.
The IPv4 checksum corresponds to end of the source address.
In order to reproduce:
$ ip netns add A
$ ip netns add B
$ ip -n A link add _v0 type veth peer name _v1 netns B
$ ip -n A link set _v0 up
$ ip -n A addr add dev _v0 10.254.3.1/24
$ ip -n A route add default dev _v0 scope global
$ ip -n B link set _v1 up
$ ip -n B addr add dev _v1 10.254.1.6/24
$ ip -n B route add default dev _v1 scope global
$ ip -n B link add gre1 type gretap local 10.254.1.6 remote 10.254.3.1 key 0x49000000
$ ip -n B link set gre1 up
# Now send an IPv4/GRE/Eth/IPv4 frame where the outer header has ECT(1),
# and the inner header has no ECT bits set:
$ cat send_pkt.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from scapy.all import *
pkt = IP(b'E\x01\x00\xa7\x00\x00\x00\x00@/`%\n\xfe\x03\x01\n\xfe\x01\x06 \x00eXI\x00'
b'\x00\x00\x18\xbe\x92\xa0\xee&\x18\xb0\x92\xa0l&\x08\x00E\x00\x00}\x8b\x85'
b'@\x00\x01\x01\xe4\xf2\x82\x82\x82\x01\x82\x82\x82\x02\x08\x00d\x11\xa6\xeb'
b'3\x1e\x1e\\xf3\\xf7`\x00\x00\x00\x00ZN\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x10\x11\x12'
b'\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f !"#$%&\'()*+,-./01234'
b'56789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ')
send(pkt)
$ sudo ip netns exec B tcpdump -neqlllvi gre1 icmp & ; sleep 1
$ sudo ip netns exec A python3 send_pkt.py
In the original packet, the source/destinatio MAC addresses are
dst=18:be:92:a0:ee:26 src=18:b0:92:a0:6c:26
In the received packet, they are
dst=18:bd:92:a0:ee:26 src=18:b0:92:a0:6c:27
Thanks to Lahav Schlesinger <lschlesinger@drivenets.com> and Isaac Garzon <isaac@speed.io>
for helping me pinpoint the origin.
Fixes: b723748750 ("tunnel: Propagate ECT(1) when decapsulating as recommended by RFC6040")
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gilad Naaman <gnaaman@drivenets.com>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d237a7f117 ]
The release_sock() is blocking function, it would change the state
after sleeping. In order to evaluate the stated condition outside
the socket lock context, switch to use wait_woken() instead.
Fixes: 6398e23cdb ("tipc: standardize accept routine")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le <hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f8dd60de19 ]
For implicit-connect, when it's either SYN- or SYN+, an ACK should
be sent back to the client immediately. It's not appropriate for
the client to enter established state only after receiving data
from the server.
On client side, after the SYN is sent out, tipc_wait_for_connect()
should be called to wait for the ACK if timeout is set.
This patch also restricts __tipc_sendstream() to call __sendmsg()
only when it's in TIPC_OPEN state, so that the client can program
in a single loop doing both connecting and data sending like:
for (...)
sendmsg(dest, buf);
This makes the implicit-connect more implicit.
Fixes: b97bf3fd8f ("[TIPC] Initial merge")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ea52faae1d ]
Fix missing failed message if driver does not have enough queues to
complete TC command. Without this fix no message is displayed in dmesg.
Fixes: a9ce82f744 ("i40e: Enable 'channel' mode in mqprio for TC configs")
Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Szczurek <grzegorzx.szczurek@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jedrzej Jagielski <jedrzej.jagielski@intel.com>
Tested-by: Imam Hassan Reza Biswas <imam.hassan.reza.biswas@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 89ec1f0886 ]
In SW DCB mode the packets sent receive incorrect UP tags. They are
constructed correctly and put into tx_ring, but UP is later remapped by
HW on the basis of TCTUPR register contents according to Tx queue
selected, and BW used is consistent with the new UP values. This is
caused by Tx queue selection in kernel not taking into account DCB
configuration. This patch fixes the issue by implementing the
ndo_select_queue NDO callback.
Fixes: fd0a05ce74 ("i40e: transmit, receive, and NAPI")
Signed-off-by: Arkadiusz Kubalewski <arkadiusz.kubalewski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jedrzej Jagielski <jedrzej.jagielski@intel.com>
Tested-by: Imam Hassan Reza Biswas <imam.hassan.reza.biswas@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
