Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> says:
ep_remove() (via __ep_remove_file()) cleared file->f_ep under
file->f_lock but then kept using @file in the same critical section:
is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock. A
concurrent __fput() on the watched eventpoll caught the transient
NULL in eventpoll_release()'s lockless fast path, skipped
eventpoll_release_file() entirely, and ran to ep_eventpoll_release()
-> ep_clear_and_put() -> ep_free(). That kfree()s the struct
eventpoll whose embedded ->refs hlist_head is exactly where
epi->fllink.pprev points and the subsequent hlist_del_rcu()'s
"*pprev = next" scribbles into freed kmalloc-192 memory, which is
the slab-use-after-free KASAN caught.
struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU on top of that so the same window
also lets the slot recycle while ep_remove() is still nominally
inside file->f_lock. The upshot is an attacker-influencable
kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache.
The comment on eventpoll_release()'s fast path - "False positives
simply cannot happen because the file in on the way to be removed
and nobody ( but eventpoll ) has still a reference to this file" -
was itself the wrong invariant this race exploits.
The fix pins @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and
gates the f_ep clear / hlist_del_rcu() on the pin succeeding. With
the pin held __fput() cannot start which transitively keeps the
watched struct eventpoll alive across the critical section and also
prevents the struct file slot from recycling. Both UAFs are closed.
If the pin fails __fput() is already in flight on @file. Because we
bail before clearing f_ep that path takes eventpoll_release()'s slow
path into eventpoll_release_file() which blocks on ep->mtx until
ep_clear_and_put() drops it and then cleans up the orphaned epi. The
bailed epi's share of ep->refcount stays intact so
ep_clear_and_put()'s trailing ep_refcount_dec_and_test() cannot free
the eventpoll out from under eventpoll_release_file().
With epi_fget() now gating every ep_remove() call the epi->dying
flag becomes vestigial. epi->dying == true always coincides with
file_ref_get() == false because __fput() is reachable only once the
refcount hits zero and the refcount is monotone there. The last
patch drops the flag and leaves a single coordination mechanism
instead of two.
* patches from https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-0-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org:
eventpoll: drop vestigial epi->dying flag
eventpoll: drop dead bool return from __ep_remove_epi()
eventpoll: refresh eventpoll_release() fast-path comment
eventpoll: move f_lock acquisition into __ep_remove_file()
eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF
eventpoll: move epi_fget() up
eventpoll: rename ep_remove_safe() back to ep_remove()
eventpoll: kill __ep_remove()
eventpoll: split __ep_remove()
eventpoll: use hlist_is_singular_node() in __ep_remove()
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-0-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
With ep_remove() now pinning @file via epi_fget() across the
f_ep clear and hlist_del_rcu(), the dying flag no longer
orchestrates anything: it was set in eventpoll_release_file()
(which only runs from __fput(), i.e. after @file's refcount has
reached zero) and read in __ep_remove() / ep_remove() as a cheap
bail before attempting the same synchronization epi_fget() now
provides unconditionally.
The implication is simple: epi->dying == true always coincides
with file_ref_get(&file->f_ref) == false, because __fput() is
reachable only once the refcount hits zero and the refcount is
monotone in that state. The READ_ONCE(epi->dying) in ep_remove()
therefore selects exactly the same callers that epi_fget() would
reject, just one atomic cheaper. That's not worth a struct
field, a second coordination mechanism, and the comments on
both.
Refresh the eventpoll_release_file() comment to describe what
actually makes the path race-free now (the pin in ep_remove()).
No functional change: the correctness argument is unchanged,
only the mechanism is now a single one instead of two.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-10-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
ep_remove_epi() always returns true -- the "can be disposed"
answer was meaningful back when the dying-check lived inside the
pre-split __ep_remove(), but after that check moved to ep_remove()
the return value is just noise. Both callers gate on it
unconditionally:
if (ep_remove_epi(ep, epi))
WARN_ON_ONCE(ep_refcount_dec_and_test(ep));
dispose = ep_remove_epi(ep, epi);
...
if (dispose && ep_refcount_dec_and_test(ep))
ep_free(ep);
Make ep_remove_epi() return void, drop the dispose local in
eventpoll_release_file(), and the useless conditionals at both
callers. No functional change.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-9-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
The old comment justified the lockless READ_ONCE(file->f_ep) check
with "False positives simply cannot happen because the file is on
the way to be removed and nobody ( but eventpoll ) has still a
reference to this file." That reasoning was the root of the UAF
fixed in "eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file
UAF": __ep_remove() could clear f_ep while another close raced
past the fast path and freed the watched eventpoll / recycled the
struct file slot.
With ep_remove() now pinning @file via epi_fget() across the f_ep
clear and hlist_del_rcu(), the invariant is re-established for the
right reason: anyone who might clear f_ep holds @file alive for
the duration, so a NULL observation really does mean no
concurrent eventpoll path has work left on this file. Refresh the
comment accordingly so the next reader doesn't inherit the broken
model.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-8-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Let the helper own its critical section end-to-end: take &file->f_lock
at the top, read file->f_ep inside the lock, release on exit. Callers
(ep_remove() and eventpoll_release_file()) no longer need to wrap the
call, and the function-comment lock-handoff contract is gone.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-7-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
ep_remove() (via ep_remove_file()) cleared file->f_ep under
file->f_lock but then kept using @file inside the critical section
(is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock).
A concurrent __fput() taking the eventpoll_release() fastpath in
that window observed the transient NULL, skipped
eventpoll_release_file() and ran to f_op->release / file_free().
For the epoll-watches-epoll case, f_op->release is
ep_eventpoll_release() -> ep_clear_and_put() -> ep_free(), which
kfree()s the watched struct eventpoll. Its embedded ->refs
hlist_head is exactly where epi->fllink.pprev points, so the
subsequent hlist_del_rcu()'s "*pprev = next" scribbles into freed
kmalloc-192 memory.
In addition, struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so the slot
backing @file could be recycled by alloc_empty_file() --
reinitializing f_lock and f_ep -- while ep_remove() is still
nominally inside that lock. The upshot is an attacker-controllable
kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache.
Pin @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and gate the
critical section on the pin succeeding. With the pin held @file
cannot reach refcount zero, which holds __fput() off and
transitively keeps the watched struct eventpoll alive across the
hlist_del_rcu() and the f_lock use, closing both UAFs.
If the pin fails @file has already reached refcount zero and its
__fput() is in flight. Because we bailed before clearing f_ep,
that path takes the eventpoll_release() slow path into
eventpoll_release_file() and blocks on ep->mtx until the waiter
side's ep_clear_and_put() drops it. The bailed epi's share of
ep->refcount stays intact, so the trailing ep_refcount_dec_and_test()
in ep_clear_and_put() cannot free the eventpoll out from under
eventpoll_release_file(); the orphaned epi is then cleaned up
there.
A successful pin also proves we are not racing
eventpoll_release_file() on this epi, so drop the now-redundant
re-check of epi->dying under f_lock. The cheap lockless
READ_ONCE(epi->dying) fast-path bailout stays.
Fixes: 58c9b016e1 ("epoll: use refcount to reduce ep_mutex contention")
Reported-by: Jaeyoung Chung <jjy600901@snu.ac.kr>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-6-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
With __ep_remove() gone, the double-underscore on __ep_remove_file()
and __ep_remove_epi() no longer contrasts with a __-less parent and
just reads as noise. Rename both to ep_remove_file() and
ep_remove_epi(). No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Remove the boolean conditional in __ep_remove() and restructure the code
so the check for racing with eventpoll_release_file() are only done in
the ep_remove_safe() path where they belong.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-3-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Replace the open-coded "epi is the only entry in file->f_ep" check
with hlist_is_singular_node(). Same semantics, and the helper avoids
the head-cacheline access in the common false case.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423-work-epoll-uaf-v1-1-2470f9eec0f5@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
When a metadata block is referenced by multiple inodes and tracked by
metadata bh infrastructure (which is forbidden and generally indicates
filesystem corruption), it can happen that mmb_mark_buffer_dirty() is
called for two different mmb structures in parallel. This can lead to a
corruption of mmb linked list. Handle that situation gracefully (at
least from mmb POV) by serializing on setting bh->b_mmb.
Reported-by: Ruikai Peng <ruikai@pwno.io>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423090311.10955-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Use the correct parameter name ("__ns") for function parameter kernel-doc
to avoid 3 warnings:
Warning: include/linux/nstree.h:68 function parameter '__ns' not described in 'ns_tree_add_raw'
Warning: include/linux/nstree.h:77 function parameter '__ns' not described in 'ns_tree_add'
Warning: include/linux/nstree.h:88 function parameter '__ns' not described in 'ns_tree_remove'
Fixes: 885fc8ac0a ("nstree: make iterator generic")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260416215429.948898-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[BUG]
Recently, our internal syzkaller testing uncovered a null pointer
dereference issue:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
[ 51.111664] filemap_read_folio+0x25/0xe0
[ 51.112410] filemap_fault+0xad7/0x1250
[ 51.113112] __do_fault+0x4b/0x460
[ 51.113699] do_pte_missing+0x5bc/0x1db0
[ 51.114250] ? __pte_offset_map+0x23/0x170
[ 51.114822] __handle_mm_fault+0x9f8/0x1680
...
Crash analysis showed the file involved was an AIO ring file. The
phenomenon triggered is the same as the issue described in [1].
[CAUSE]
Consider the following scenario: userspace sets up an AIO context via
io_setup(), which creates a VMA covering the entire ring buffer. Then
userspace calls mremap() with the AIO ring address as the source, a smaller
old_len (less than the full ring size), MREMAP_MAYMOVE set, and without
MREMAP_DONTUNMAP. The kernel will relocate the requested portion to a new
destination address.
During this move, __split_vma() splits the original AIO ring VMA. The
requested portion is unmapped from the source and re-established at the
destination, while the remainder stays at the original source address as
an orphan VMA. The aio_ring_mremap() callback fires on the new destination
VMA, updating ctx->mmap_base to the destination address. But the callback
is unaware that only a partial region was moved and that an orphan VMA
still exists at the source:
source(AIO):
+-------------------+---------------------+
| moved to dest | orphan VMA (AIO) |
+-------------------+---------------------+
A A+partial_len A+ctx->mmap_size
dest:
+-------------------+
| moved VMA (AIO) |
+-------------------+
B B+partial_len
Later, io_destroy() calls vm_munmap(ctx->mmap_base, ctx->mmap_size), which
unmaps the destination. This not only fails to unmap the orphan VMA at the
source, but also overshoots the destination VMA and may unmap unrelated
mappings adjacent to it! After put_aio_ring_file() calls truncate_setsize()
to remove all pages from the pagecache, any subsequent access to the orphan
VMA triggers filemap_fault(), which calls a_ops->read_folio(). Since aio
does not implement read_folio, this results in a NULL pointer dereference.
[FIX]
Note that expanding mremap (new_len > old_len) is already rejected because
AIO ring VMAs are created with VM_DONTEXPAND. The only problematic case is
a partial move where "old_len == new_len" but both are smaller than the
full ring size.
Fix this by checking in aio_ring_mremap() that the new VMA covers the
entire ring. This ensures the AIO ring is always moved as a whole,
preventing orphan VMAs and the subsequent crash.
[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260413010814.548568-1-wozizhi@huawei.com/
Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi@huaweicloud.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260418060634.3713620-1-wozizhi@huaweicloud.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
fuse_add_dirent_to_cache() computes a serialized dirent size from the
server-controlled namelen field and copies the dirent into a single
page-cache page. The existing logic only checks whether the dirent fits
in the remaining space of the current page and advances to a fresh page
if not. It never checks whether the dirent itself exceeds PAGE_SIZE.
As a result, a malicious FUSE server can return a dirent with
namelen=4095, producing a serialized record size of 4120 bytes. On 4 KiB
page systems this causes memcpy() to overflow the cache page by 24 bytes
into the following kernel page.
Reject dirents that cannot fit in a single page before copying them into
the readdir cache.
Fixes: 69e3455115 ("fuse: allow caching readdir")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.16+
Assisted-by: Bynario AI
Signed-off-by: Samuel Page <sam@bynar.io>
Reported-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zijun Hu <nightu@northwestern.edu>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260420090139.662772-1-mszeredi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() has a loop like:
wb_get(new_wb);
while (1) {
list = llist_del_all(&new_wb->switch_wbs_ctxs);
/* Nothing to do? */
if (!list)
break;
... process the items ...
}
Now adding of items to the list looks like:
wb_queue_isw()
if (llist_add(&isw->list, &wb->switch_wbs_ctxs))
queue_work(isw_wq, &wb->switch_work);
Because inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() loops when processing isw items, it
can happen that wb->switch_work is pending while wb->switch_wbs_ctxs is
empty. This is a problem because in that case wb can get freed (no isw
items -> no wb reference) while the work is still pending causing
use-after-free issues.
We cannot just fix this by cancelling work when freeing wb because that
could still trigger problematic 0 -> 1 transitions on wb refcount due to
wb_get() in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn(). It could be all handled with
more careful code but that seems unnecessarily complex so let's avoid
that until it is proven that the looping actually brings practical
benefit. Just remove the loop from inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() instead.
That way when wb_queue_isw() queues work, we are guaranteed we have
added the first item to wb->switch_wbs_ctxs and nobody is going to
remove it (and drop the wb reference it holds) until the queued work
runs.
Fixes: e1b849cfa6 ("writeback: Avoid contention on wb->list_lock when switching inodes")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413093618.17244-2-jack@suse.cz
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
[BUG]
Recently, our internal syzkaller testing uncovered a null pointer
dereference issue:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
[ 51.111664] filemap_read_folio+0x25/0xe0
[ 51.112410] filemap_fault+0xad7/0x1250
[ 51.113112] __do_fault+0x4b/0x460
[ 51.113699] do_pte_missing+0x5bc/0x1db0
[ 51.114250] ? __pte_offset_map+0x23/0x170
[ 51.114822] __handle_mm_fault+0x9f8/0x1680
[ 51.115408] handle_mm_fault+0x24c/0x570
[ 51.115958] do_user_addr_fault+0x226/0xa50
...
Crash analysis showed the file involved was an AIO ring file.
[CAUSE]
PARENT process CHILD process
t=0 io_setup(1, &ctx)
[access ctx addr]
fork()
io_destroy
vm_munmap // not affect child vma
percpu_ref_put
...
put_aio_ring_file
t=1 [access ctx addr] // pagefault
...
__do_fault
filemap_fault
max_idx = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(inode), PAGE_SIZE)
t=2 truncate_setsize
truncate_pagecache
t=3 filemap_get_folio // no folio, create folio
__filemap_get_folio(..., FGP_CREAT, ...) // page_not_uptodate
filemap_read_folio(file, mapping->a_ops->read_folio, folio) // oops!
At t=0, the parent process calls io_setup and then fork. The child process
gets its own VMA but without any PTEs. The parent then calls io_destroy.
Before i_size is truncated to 0, at t=1 the child process accesses this AIO
ctx address and triggers a pagefault. After the max_idx check passes, at
t=2 the parent calls truncate_setsize and truncate_pagecache. At t=3 the
child fails to obtain the folio, falls into the "page_not_uptodate" path,
and hits this problem because AIO does not implement "read_folio".
[Fix]
Fix this by marking the AIO ring buffer VMA with VM_DONTCOPY so
that fork()'s dup_mmap() skips it entirely. This is the correct
semantic because:
1) The child's ioctx_table is already reset to NULL by mm_init_aio() during
fork(), so the child has no AIO context and no way to perform any AIO
operations on this mapping.
2) The AIO ring VMA is only meaningful in conjunction with its associated
kioctx, which is never inherited across fork(). So child process with no
AIO context has no legitimate reason to access the ring buffer. Delivering
SIGSEGV on such an erroneous access is preferable to a kernel crash.
Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi@huaweicloud.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260413010814.548568-1-wozizhi@huawei.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Mingyu Wang says:
====================
net: packetengines: remove obsolete PCI drivers
As discussed with Andrew Lunn, this patch series removes the obsolete
hamachi and yellowfin PCI drivers. Both drivers support hardware that
is over two decades old and no longer in active use.
Removing them eliminates dead code and reduces the overall maintenance
burden on the netdev subsystem.
====================
Jakub: trim defconfigs appropriately
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422044820.485660-1-25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Similar to the hamachi driver, the yellowfin driver supports hardware
that is over two decades old and no longer in active use.
Since yellowfin was the last remaining driver in the packetengines
vendor directory, we can now safely remove the entire directory and
drop its associated references from the parent Kconfig and Makefile.
This eliminates dead code and reduces the overall maintenance burden
on the netdev subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422044820.485660-3-25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The PacketEngine Hamachi driver is for PCI hardware that has been
obsolete for over two decades. It recently triggered arithmetic
exceptions during automated fuzzing.
As suggested by maintainers, remove the driver entirely to eliminate
dead code and reduce the maintenance burden.
Signed-off-by: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422044820.485660-2-25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
David Howells says:
====================
rxrpc: Miscellaneous fixes
Here are some fixes for rxrpc, as found by Sashiko[1]:
(1) Fix rxrpc_input_call_event() to only unshare DATA packets.
(2) Fix re-decryption of RESPONSE packets where a partially decrypted
skbuff gets requeued if there was a failure due to ENOMEM.
(3) Fix error handling in rxgk_extract_token() where the ENOMEM case is
unhandled.
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260422161438.2593376-4-dhowells@redhat.com [1]
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423200909.3049438-1-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
If a RESPONSE packet gets a temporary failure during processing, it may end
up in a partially decrypted state - and then get requeued for a retry.
Fix this by just discarding the packet; we will send another CHALLENGE
packet and thereby elicit a further response. Similarly, discard an
incoming CHALLENGE packet if we get an error whilst generating a RESPONSE;
the server will send another CHALLENGE.
Fixes: 17926a7932 ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260422161438.2593376-4-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260423200909.3049438-3-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
David Howells says:
====================
rxrpc: Miscellaneous fixes
Here are some fixes for rxrpc, as found by Sashiko[1]:
(1) Fix leaks in rxkad_verify_response().
(2) Fix handling of rxkad-encrypted packets with crypto-misaligned
lengths.
(3) Fix problem with unsharing DATA packets potentially causing a crash in
the caller.
(4) Fix lack of unsharing of RESPONSE packets.
(5) Fix integer overflow in RxGK ticket length check.
(6) Fix missing length check in RxKAD tickets.
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-1-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
In rxrpc_preparse(), there are two paths for parsing key payloads: the
XDR path (for large payloads) and the non-XDR path (for payloads <= 28
bytes). While the XDR path (rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad()) correctly
validates the ticket length against AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX, the non-XDR
path fails to do so.
This allows an unprivileged user to provide a very large ticket length.
When this key is later read via rxrpc_read(), the total
token size (toksize) calculation results in a value that exceeds
AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON().
[ 2001.302904] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2108 at net/rxrpc/key.c:778 rxrpc_read+0x109/0x5c0 [rxrpc]
Fix this by adding a check in the non-XDR parsing path of rxrpc_preparse()
to ensure the ticket length does not exceed AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX,
bringing it into parity with the XDR parsing logic.
Fixes: 8a7a3eb4dd ("KEYS: RxRPC: Use key preparsing")
Fixes: 84924aac08 ("rxrpc: Fix checker warning")
Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson@allelesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-7-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The security operations that verify the RESPONSE packets decrypt bits of it
in place - however, the sk_buff may be shared with a packet sniffer, which
would lead to the sniffer seeing an apparently corrupt packet (actually
decrypted).
Fix this by handing a copy of the packet off to the specific security
handler if the packet was cloned.
Fixes: 17926a7932 ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-5-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
If skb_unshare() fails to unshare a packet due to allocation failure in
rxrpc_input_packet(), the skb pointer in the parent (rxrpc_io_thread())
will be NULL'd out. This will likely cause the call to
trace_rxrpc_rx_done() to oops.
Fix this by moving the unsharing down to where rxrpc_input_call_event()
calls rxrpc_input_call_packet(). There are a number of places prior to
that where we ignore DATA packets for a variety of reasons (such as the
call already being complete) for which an unshare is then avoided.
And with that, rxrpc_input_packet() doesn't need to take a pointer to the
pointer to the packet, so change that to just a pointer.
Fixes: 2d1faf7a0c ("rxrpc: Simplify skbuff accounting in receive path")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-4-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Fix rxkad_verify_response() to free the ticket and the server key under all
circumstances by initialising the ticket pointer to NULL and then making
all paths through the function after the first allocation has been done go
through a single common epilogue that just releases everything - where all
the releases skip on a NULL pointer.
Fixes: 57af281e53 ("rxrpc: Tidy up abort generation infrastructure")
Fixes: ec832bd06d ("rxrpc: Don't retain the server key in the connection")
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260408121252.2249051-1-dhowells%40redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422161438.2593376-2-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
- Add an acpi_get_cpu_uid() stub helper to address an x86 Xen support
build breakage (Arnd Bergmann)
- Use acpi_dev_put() in object add error paths in the ACPI core to
avoid refcount leaks (Guangshuo Li)
- Adjust the file entry in the recently added NVIDIA GHES HANDLER entry
in MAINTAINERS to the actual existing file (Lukas Bulwahn)
- Add backlight=native quirk for Dell OptiPlex 7770 AIO to the ACPI
video bus driver (Jan Schär)
- Move Lenovo Legion S7 15ACH6 quirk to the right section of the quirk
list in the ACPI video bus driver (Hans de Goede)
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Merge tag 'acpi-7.1-rc1-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm
Pull ACPI support fixes from Rafael Wysocki:
"These fix two potential refcount leaks in error code paths in the ACPI
core code, address a recently introduced build breakage related to the
CPU UID handling consolidation, fix up a recently added MAINTAINERS
entry, fix the quirk list in the ACPI video bus driver, and add a new
quirk to it:
- Add an acpi_get_cpu_uid() stub helper to address an x86 Xen support
build breakage (Arnd Bergmann)
- Use acpi_dev_put() in object add error paths in the ACPI core to
avoid refcount leaks (Guangshuo Li)
- Adjust the file entry in the recently added NVIDIA GHES HANDLER
entry in MAINTAINERS to the actual existing file (Lukas Bulwahn)
- Add backlight=native quirk for Dell OptiPlex 7770 AIO to the ACPI
video bus driver (Jan Schär)
- Move Lenovo Legion S7 15ACH6 quirk to the right section of the
quirk list in the ACPI video bus driver (Hans de Goede)"
* tag 'acpi-7.1-rc1-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm:
ACPI: video: Move Lenovo Legion S7 15ACH6 quirk to the right section
ACPI: video: Add backlight=native quirk for Dell OptiPlex 7770 AIO
ACPI: add acpi_get_cpu_uid() stub helper
MAINTAINERS: adjust file entry in NVIDIA GHES HANDLER
ACPI: scan: Use acpi_dev_put() in object add error paths
__rds_rdma_map() hands sg/pages ownership to the transport after
get_mr() succeeds. If copying the generated cookie back to user space
fails after that point, the error path must not free those resources
again before dropping the MR reference.
Remove the duplicate unpin/free from the put_user() failure branch so
that MR teardown is handled only through the existing final cleanup
path.
Fixes: 0d4597c8c5 ("net/rds: Track user mapped pages through special API")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Ao Zhou <draw51280@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Allison Henderson <achender@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/79c8ef73ec8e5844d71038983940cc2943099baf.1776764247.git.draw51280@163.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
I'm actively using mainline + patches on this board as a bootloader
for another VME board and as a terminal server using a multiport
serial board in the same VME backplane. I even have mainline u-boot
on real EPROMs.
Make me the maintainer of its ethernet, scsi and arch code so I get
an email before one or more of them get deleted.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Palmer <daniel@thingy.jp>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422132710.2855826-1-daniel@thingy.jp
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
For the device SP, the firmware version is a 32-bit value where the
lower 20 bits represent the base version number. And the customized
firmware version populates the upper 12 bits with a specific
identification number.
For other devices AML 25G and 40G, the upper 12 bits of the firmware
version is always non-zero, and they have other naming conventions.
Only SP devices need to check this to tell if XPCS will work properly.
So the judgement of MAC type is added here.
And the original logic compared the entire 32-bit value against 0x20010,
which caused the outdated base firmwares bypass the version check
without a warning. Apply a mask 0xfffff to isolate the lower 20 bits for
an accurate base version comparison.
Fixes: ab928c24e6 ("net: txgbe: add FW version warning")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiawen Wu <jiawenwu@trustnetic.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/C787AA5C07598B13+20260422071837.372731-1-jiawenwu@trustnetic.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Merge an ACPI core fix, a fix for the new NVIDIA GHES HANDLER entry in
MAINTAINERS, a new quirk for the ACPI video bus driver and a quirk list
fix for that driver for 7.1-rc1:
- Use acpi_dev_put() in object add error paths in the ACPI core to
avoid refcount leaks (Guangshuo Li)
- Adjust the file entry in the recently added NVIDIA GHES HANDLER entry
in MAINTAINERS to the actual existing file (Lukas Bulwahn)
- Add backlight=native quirk for Dell OptiPlex 7770 AIO to the ACPI
video bus driver (Jan Schär)
- Move Lenovo Legion S7 15ACH6 quirk to the right section of the quirk
list in the ACPI video bus driver (Hans de Goede)
* acpi-scan:
ACPI: scan: Use acpi_dev_put() in object add error paths
* acpi-apei:
MAINTAINERS: adjust file entry in NVIDIA GHES HANDLER
* acpi-video:
ACPI: video: Move Lenovo Legion S7 15ACH6 quirk to the right section
ACPI: video: Add backlight=native quirk for Dell OptiPlex 7770 AIO
Zhenzhong Wu says:
====================
tcp: fix listener wakeup after reuseport migration
This series fixes a missing wakeup when inet_csk_listen_stop() migrates
an established child socket from a closing listener to another socket
in the same SO_REUSEPORT group after the child has already been queued
for accept.
The target listener receives the migrated accept-queue entry via
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(), but its waiters are not notified.
Nonblocking accept() still succeeds because it checks the accept queue
directly, but readiness-based waiters can remain asleep until another
connection generates a wakeup.
Patch 1 notifies the target listener after a successful migration in
inet_csk_listen_stop() and protects the post-queue_add() nsk accesses
with rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock().
Patch 2 extends the existing migrate_reuseport BPF selftest with epoll
readiness checks inside migrate_dance(), around shutdown() where the
migration happens. The test now verifies that the target listener is
not ready before migration and becomes ready immediately after it, for
both TCP_ESTABLISHED and TCP_SYN_RECV. TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV remains
excluded because it still depends on later handshake completion.
Testing:
- On a local unpatched kernel, the focused migrate_reuseport test
fails for the listener-migration cases and passes for the
TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV cases:
not ok 1 IPv4 TCP_ESTABLISHED inet_csk_listen_stop
not ok 2 IPv4 TCP_SYN_RECV inet_csk_listen_stop
ok 3 IPv4 TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV reqsk_timer_handler
ok 4 IPv4 TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV inet_csk_complete_hashdance
not ok 5 IPv6 TCP_ESTABLISHED inet_csk_listen_stop
not ok 6 IPv6 TCP_SYN_RECV inet_csk_listen_stop
ok 7 IPv6 TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV reqsk_timer_handler
ok 8 IPv6 TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV inet_csk_complete_hashdance
- On a patched kernel booted under QEMU, the full migrate_reuseport
selftest passes:
ok 1 IPv4 TCP_ESTABLISHED inet_csk_listen_stop
ok 2 IPv4 TCP_SYN_RECV inet_csk_listen_stop
ok 3 IPv4 TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV reqsk_timer_handler
ok 4 IPv4 TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV inet_csk_complete_hashdance
ok 5 IPv6 TCP_ESTABLISHED inet_csk_listen_stop
ok 6 IPv6 TCP_SYN_RECV inet_csk_listen_stop
ok 7 IPv6 TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV reqsk_timer_handler
ok 8 IPv6 TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV inet_csk_complete_hashdance
SELFTEST_RC=0
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422024554.130346-1-jt26wzz@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Inside migrate_dance(), add epoll checks around shutdown() to
verify that the target listener is not ready before shutdown()
and becomes ready immediately after shutdown() triggers migration.
Cover TCP_ESTABLISHED and TCP_SYN_RECV. Exclude TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV
as it depends on later handshake completion.
Suggested-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Wu <jt26wzz@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422024554.130346-3-jt26wzz@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
When inet_csk_listen_stop() migrates an established child socket from
a closing listener to another socket in the same SO_REUSEPORT group,
the target listener gets a new accept-queue entry via
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(), but that path never notifies the target
listener's waiters. A nonblocking accept() still works because it
checks the queue directly, but poll()/epoll_wait() waiters and
blocking accept() callers can also remain asleep indefinitely.
Call READ_ONCE(nsk->sk_data_ready)(nsk) after a successful migration
in inet_csk_listen_stop().
However, after inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() succeeds, the ref acquired
in reuseport_migrate_sock() is effectively transferred to
nreq->rsk_listener. Another CPU can then dequeue nreq via accept()
or listener shutdown, hit reqsk_put(), and drop that listener ref.
Since listeners are SOCK_RCU_FREE, wrap the post-queue_add()
dereferences of nsk in rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), which also
covers the existing sock_net(nsk) access in that path.
The reqsk_timer_handler() path does not need the same changes for two
reasons: half-open requests become readable only after the final ACK,
where tcp_child_process() already wakes the listener; and once nreq is
visible via inet_ehash_insert(), the success path no longer touches
nsk directly.
Fixes: 54b92e8419 ("tcp: Migrate TCP_ESTABLISHED/TCP_SYN_RECV sockets in accept queues.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Wu <jt26wzz@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260422024554.130346-2-jt26wzz@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Commit 47d3d7ac65 ("ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and
Destination options") added net.ipv6.max_{hbh,dst}_opts_{cnt,len}
and applied them in ip6_parse_tlv(), the generic TLV walker
invoked from ipv6_destopt_rcv() and ipv6_parse_hopopts().
ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim() does not go through ip6_parse_tlv();
it has its own hand-rolled TLV scanner inside its NEXTHDR_DEST
branch which looks for IPV6_TLV_TNL_ENCAP_LIMIT. That inner
loop is bounded only by optlen, which can be up to 2048 bytes.
Stuffing the Destination Options header with 2046 Pad1 (type=0)
entries advances the scanner a single byte at a time, yielding
~2000 TLV iterations per extension header.
Reusing max_dst_opts_cnt to bound the TLV iterations, matching
the semantics from 47d3d7ac65, would require duplicating
ip6_parse_tlv() to also validate Pad1/PadN payload. It would
also mandate enforcing max_dst_opts_len, since otherwise an
attacker shifts the axis to few options with a giant PadN and
recovers the original DoS. Allowing up to 8 options before the
tunnel encapsulation limit TLV is liberal enough; in practice
encap limit is the first TLV. Thus, go with a hard-coded limit
IP6_TUNNEL_MAX_DEST_TLVS (8).
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
tipc_msg_validate() can potentially reallocate the skb it is validating,
freeing the old one. In tipc_buf_append(), it was being called with a
pointer to a local variable which was a copy of the caller's skb
pointer.
If the skb was reallocated and validation subsequently failed, the error
handling path would free the original skb pointer, which had already
been freed, leading to double-free.
Fix this by checking if head now points to a newly allocated reassembled
skb. If it does, reassign *headbuf for later freeing operations.
Fixes: d618d09a68 ("tipc: enforce valid ratio between skb truesize and contents")
Suggested-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Given a zero sk_sndtimeo, llc_ui_connect() skips waiting for state
change and returns 0, confusing userspace applications that will assume
the socket is connected, making e.g. getpeername() calls error out.
More specifically, the issue was discovered in libcoap, where
newly-added AF_LLC socket support was behaving differently from AF_INET
connections due to EINPROGRESS handling being skipped.
Set rc to -EINPROGRESS if connect() would not block, akin to AF_INET
sockets.
Signed-off-by: Ernestas Kulik <ernestas.k@iconn-networks.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260421060304.285419-1-ernestas.k@iconn-networks.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
