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106985 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Linus Torvalds
|
4235cb24ec |
vfs-7.2-rc5.fixes
Please consider pulling these changes from the signed vfs-7.2-rc5.fixes tag.
Thanks!
Christian
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Merge tag 'vfs-7.2-rc5.fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs fixes from Christian Brauner:
- vfs: Preserve the ACL_DONT_CACHE state in forget_cached_acl().
ACL_DONT_CACHE is meant to be a permanent opt-out from ACL caching
which FUSE relies on for servers that don't negotiate FUSE_POSIX_ACL.
The helper replaced it with ACL_NOT_CACHED, silently re-enabling the
cache, and as fuse doesn't invalidate the cache for such servers a
properly timed get_acl() returned stale ACLs. Comes with a fuse
selftest reproducing this.
- pidfs:
- Preserve PIDFD_THREAD when a thread pidfd is reopened via
open_by_handle_at(). PIDFD_THREAD shares the O_EXCL bit which
do_dentry_open() strips after the flags have been validated, so
the reopened pidfd silently became a process pidfd. Comes with a
selftest.
- Add a pidfs_dentry_open() helper so the regular pidfd allocation
path and the file handle path share the code that forces O_RDWR
and reapplies the pidfd flags that do_dentry_open() strips.
- Handle FS_IOC32_GETVERSION in the compat ioctl path.
- Make pidfs_ino_lock static.
- iomap:
- Fix the block range calculation in ifs_clear_range_dirty() so a
partial clear doesn't drop the dirty state of blocks the range
only partially covers.
- Support invalidating partial folios so a partial truncate or hole
punch with blocksize < foliosize doesn't leave stale dirty bits
behind.
- Only set did_zero when iomap_zero_iter() actually zeroed
something.
- Guard ifs_set_range_dirty() and ifs_set_range_uptodate() against
zero-length ranges where the unsigned last-block calculation
underflows and bitmap_set() writes far beyond the ifs->state
allocation.
- Don't merge ioends with different io_private values as the merge
could leak or corrupt the private data of the individual ioends.
- exec:
- Raise bprm->have_execfd only once the binfmt_misc interpreter has
actually been opened. The flag was set as soon as a matching 'O'
or 'C' entry was found. If the interpreter open failed with
ENOEXEC the exec fell through to the next binary format with
have_execfd raised but no executable staged and begin_new_exec()
NULL derefed past the point of no return.
- Fix an unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack() on
nommu. An overlong argument or environment string pushes bprm->p
below PAGE_SIZE, the stop index becomes zero, and the loop never
terminates, wrapping its counter and copying garbage from in
front of the page array into the new process stack.
- Make binfmt_elf_fdpic only honour the first PT_INTERP like
binfmt_elf does. Each additional PT_INTERP overwrote the previous
interpreter, leaking the name allocation and the interpreter file
reference together with the write denial open_exec() took,
leaving the file unwritable for as long as the system runs.
- overlayfs:
- Compare the full escaped xattr prefix including the trailing dot.
An xattr like "trusted.overlay.overlayfoo" was misclassified as
an escaped overlay xattr.
- Check read access to the copy_file_range() source with the
source's mounter credentials.
- super: Thawing a filesystem whose block device was frozen with
bdev_freeze() deadlocked. Dropping the last block layer freeze
reference from under s_umount ends up in fs_bdev_thaw() which
reacquires s_umount on the same task. Pin the superblock with an
active reference instead and call bdev_thaw() without holding
s_umount.
- procfs: Return EACCES instead of success when the ptrace access check
for namespace links fails.
- afs: Use afs_dir_get_block() rather than afs_dir_find_block() for
block 0 in afs_edit_dir_remove(), matching afs_edit_dir_add().
- Push the memcg gating of ->nr_cached_objects() down into the btrfs
and shmem callbacks instead of skipping every callback during
non-root memcg reclaim. The blanket check short-circuited XFS whose
inode reclaim hook is intentionally driven from per-memcg contexts to
free memcg-charged slab.
- eventpoll: Pin files while checking reverse paths.
Since struct file became SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU a concurrent close
could free and recycle the file under the check which then took and
dropped the f_lock of whatever live file now occupies that slot.
* tag 'vfs-7.2-rc5.fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (24 commits)
super: fix emergency thaw deadlock on frozen block devices
pidfs: make pidfs_ino_lock static
eventpoll: pin files while checking reverse paths
fs: push nr_cached_objects memcg gating into individual filesystems
afs: Fix afs_edit_dir_remove() to get, not find, block 0
iomap: prevent ioend merge when io_private differs
iomap: add comments for ifs_clear/set_range_dirty()
iomap: fix out-of-bounds bitmap_set() with zero-length range
iomap: fix incorrect did_zero setting in iomap_zero_iter()
iomap: support invalidating partial folios
iomap: correct the range of a partial dirty clear
fs/super: fix emergency thaw double-unlock of s_umount
pidfs: handle FS_IOC32_GETVERSION in compat ioctl
ovl: check access to copy_file_range source with src mounter creds
proc: Fix broken error paths for namespace links
pidfs: add pidfs_dentry_open() helper
selftests/pidfd: check PIDFD_THREAD survives open_by_handle_at()
pidfs: preserve thread pidfds reopened by file handle
ovl: fix trusted xattr escape prefix matching
selftests/fuse: add ACL_DONT_CACHE regression test
...
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
749d7aa037
|
super: fix emergency thaw deadlock on frozen block devices
do_thaw_all_callback() calls bdev_thaw() while holding sb->s_umount
exclusively. If the block device was frozen via bdev_freeze() dropping
the last block layer freeze reference calls fs_bdev_thaw() which
reacquires s_umount:
do_thaw_all_callback(sb)
super_lock_excl(sb) # holds sb->s_umount
bdev_thaw(sb->s_bdev)
mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex)
# bd_fsfreeze_count drops 1 -> 0
bd_holder_ops->thaw == fs_bdev_thaw
get_bdev_super(bdev)
bdev_super_lock(bdev, true)
super_lock(sb, true)
down_write(&sb->s_umount) # same task: deadlock
The emergency thaw worker deadlocks against itself holding both
s_umount and bd_fsfreeze_mutex. That fscks any subsequent unmount,
freeze, or thaw of that filesystem and block device.
[ 81.878470] sysrq: Show Blocked State
[ 81.880140] task:kworker/0:1 state:D stack:0 pid:11 tgid:11 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208060 flags:0x00080000
[ 81.884876] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all
[ 81.886656] Call Trace:
[ 81.887759] <TASK>
[ 81.888763] __schedule+0x579/0x1420
[ 81.890372] schedule+0x3a/0x100
[ 81.891794] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30
[ 81.893848] rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x1ea/0x900
[ 81.895191] ? __pfx_do_thaw_all_callback+0x10/0x10
[ 81.896528] down_write+0xbd/0xc0
[ 81.897505] super_lock+0x91/0x180
[ 81.898457] ? __mutex_lock+0xa99/0x1140
[ 81.900748] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x1f/0x400
[ 81.902069] bdev_super_lock+0x5b/0x150
[ 81.903132] get_bdev_super+0x10/0x60
[ 81.904042] fs_bdev_thaw+0x23/0xf0
[ 81.904755] bdev_thaw+0x82/0x100
[ 81.905484] do_thaw_all_callback+0x2c/0x50
[ 81.906298] __iterate_supers+0x5d/0x130
[ 81.907067] do_thaw_all+0x20/0x40
[ 81.907739] process_one_work+0x206/0x5e0
[ 81.908545] worker_thread+0x1e2/0x3c0
[ 81.909339] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 81.910171] kthread+0xf4/0x130
[ 81.910799] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 81.911528] ret_from_fork+0x2e2/0x3b0
[ 81.912259] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 81.913010] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 81.913806] </TASK>
bdev_super_lock() even documents the violated requirement with
lockdep_assert_not_held(&sb->s_umount).
Acquiring bd_fsfreeze_mutex under s_umount also inverts the
bd_fsfreeze_mutex vs. s_umount ordering established by
bdev_{freeze,thaw}() and can thus ABBA against a concurrent block-layer
freeze even when the recursive path isn't hit.
Fix this by not holding s_umount around the bdev_thaw() loop at all. Pin
the superblock with an active reference instead as
filesystems_freeze_callback() does. The active reference keeps the
superblock from being shut down and so ->s_bdev stays valid without
holding s_umount. The block-layer-held freeze is dropped by
fs_bdev_thaw() with FREEZE_MAY_NEST | FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE exactly as
a regular unfreeze would and thaw_super_locked() handles
filesystem-level freezes as before.
The emergency thaw path has deadlocked like this in one form or
another for a long long time but the current exclusively-held
shape dates back to commit [1] where thaw_bdev() already ended in
thaw_super() with s_umount held by do_thaw_all_callback().
Fixes:
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
8e371eff3f |
eight ksmbd server fixes
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Merge tag 'v7.2-rc4-smb3-server-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/ksmbd
Pull smb server fixes from Steve French:
"This contains eight ksmbd fixes covering POSIX ACL handling, SMB
signing enforcement, DACL parsing and construction hardening, session
lifetime handling, and validation of malformed transform and
compressed SMB2 requests:
- preserve inherited POSIX ACL mask when creating objects.
- enforce the session signing requirement for plaintext SMB requests.
- harden DACL/ACE processing against size overflows, incomplete ACE
copies, and undersized SIDs.
- defer teardown of a previous session until NTLM authentication
succeeds.
- reject undersized encryption-transform and decompressed SMB2
requests before they can reach normal SMB2 request processing"
* tag 'v7.2-rc4-smb3-server-fixes' of git://git.samba.org/ksmbd:
ksmbd: reject undersized decompressed SMB2 requests
ksmbd: validate minimum PDU size for transform requests
ksmbd: defer destroy_previous_session() until after NTLM authentication
ksmbd: validate ACE size against SID sub-authorities
ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL
ksmbd: bound DACL dedup walk to copied ACEs
ksmbd: enforce signing required by the session
ksmbd: preserve VFS inherited POSIX ACL mask
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
dad0a87d79 |
A bunch of assorted fixes with the majority being hardening against
malformed input and invalid data scenarios that don't happen in real deployments but can be utilized to trigger use-after-free and similar issues, some error path leak fixups and two patches from Max to avoid a potential hang in __ceph_get_caps() and unintended nesting of current->journal_info while handling replies from the MDS. All marked for stable. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQFHBAABCgAxFiEEydHwtzie9C7TfviiSn/eOAIR84sFAmpjx6wTHGlkcnlvbW92 QGdtYWlsLmNvbQAKCRBKf944AhHzixDmB/4/J+dqhhDKg69t0ADnAPLgxe3AoXwi 7GRd2Uk5/AU9o+1fexyfWt2u+3ZtAVGLVRZPF1ARFQQDGUoj99X06NlTyVAFRNMb p78Sun5iuiDJb72UOD3WzW9lmpjSeCVUbTuTadtmF4y34KIvZ7AYltjZBpycE2Yj lyiUr4CSkXMAa/wWDKg+8SAw2tBI61WdyJeyu8ESCUmm9Q2XLq1+2N/jhfifk0oC Dc7EHUZmg7YNbTr0DKyLXdAoZHE54zKC2qDrvfTPmpTsOhMI2v5LY6JtXzm8/l6c wAGgIj5hRePGDDPb1V5Mbz3rkY/VIGdKmkqEV4PZn+IHafZGp45lnS7V =q2wM -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'ceph-for-7.2-rc5' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client Pull ceph fixes from Ilya Dryomov: "A bunch of assorted fixes with the majority being hardening against malformed input and invalid data scenarios that don't happen in real deployments but can be utilized to trigger use-after-free and similar issues, some error path leak fixups and two patches from Max to avoid a potential hang in __ceph_get_caps() and unintended nesting of current->journal_info while handling replies from the MDS. All marked for stable" * tag 'ceph-for-7.2-rc5' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client: ceph: avoid fs reclaim while using current->journal_info ceph: add owner/capability checks for CEPH_IOC_SET_LAYOUT* ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted rbd: Reset positive result codes to zero in object map update path libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE libceph: refresh auth->authorizer_buf{,_len} after authorizer update ceph: fix refcount leak in ceph_readdir() libceph: guard missing CRUSH type name lookup libceph: remove debugfs files before client teardown libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len ceph: fix writeback_count leak in write_folio_nounlock() libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers() ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() libceph: Reject monmaps advertising zero monitors libceph: reject zero bucket types in crush_decode libceph: Fix multiplication overflow in decode_new_up_state_weight() |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
981f4a2baa |
fscrypt fixes for v7.2-rc5
A couple fixes for AI-detected bugs. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iIkEABYIADIWIQSacvsUNc7UX4ntmEPzXCl4vpKOKwUCamPDWBQcZWJpZ2dlcnNA a2VybmVsLm9yZwAKCRDzXCl4vpKOK4C8APjY2sD4jMa1oX05SiLL7iUulkTXivOb n14nFabjqF25AP9MZImv0oS5eQWt/QPLHfNlB6olRd9Q0GqVOYYdKQ/6DA== =pStx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/linux Pull fscrypt fixes from Eric Biggers: "A couple fixes for AI-detected bugs" * tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/linux: fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices() fscrypt: Add missing superblock check in find_or_insert_direct_key() |
||
|
Mateusz Guzik
|
c1d04c1bce |
pidfs: make pidfs_ino_lock static
Fixes:
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
48a5a7ab8d |
six client fixes
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||
|
Max Kellermann
|
5b602344a4 |
ceph: avoid fs reclaim while using current->journal_info
handle_reply() stores a `ceph_mds_request` pointer in
`current->journal_info` while filling the inode and dentry cache from
an MDS reply.
An allocation in this section can enter direct reclaim and prune
dentries from another filesystem. If this dirties an ext4 inode, ext4
starts a JBD2 transaction. JBD2 interprets the Ceph request in
`current->journal_info` as a journal handle and dereferences the
request's `r_tid` as `h_transaction`, causing a kernel crash, e.g.:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000000077b4818
[...]
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 2699135 Comm: kworker/6:3 Tainted: G W 6.18.38-i3 #1113 NONE
[...]
Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn
pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : jbd2__journal_start+0x2c/0x208
lr : __ext4_journal_start_sb+0x100/0x178
[...]
Call trace:
jbd2__journal_start+0x2c/0x208 (P)
__ext4_journal_start_sb+0x100/0x178
ext4_dirty_inode+0x3c/0x90
__mark_inode_dirty+0x58/0x400
iput.part.0+0x2b0/0x370
iput+0x18/0x30
dentry_unlink_inode+0xc0/0x158
__dentry_kill+0x80/0x250
shrink_dentry_list+0x90/0x130
prune_dcache_sb+0x60/0x98
super_cache_scan+0xe8/0x190
do_shrink_slab+0x174/0x388
shrink_slab+0xd8/0x4c0
shrink_node+0x31c/0x908
do_try_to_free_pages+0xd0/0x508
try_to_free_pages+0x11c/0x238
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x4d0/0xdd0
__folio_alloc_noprof+0x18/0x70
__filemap_get_folio+0x248/0x440
ceph_readdir_prepopulate+0x570/0x9e8
mds_dispatch+0x1424/0x1ba0
ceph_con_process_message+0x74/0xa0
ceph_con_v1_try_read+0x3a0/0x1510
ceph_con_workfn+0x260/0x460
Enter a scoped NOFS allocation context and leave it after clearing
`journal_info`. This prevents filesystem reclaim from recursing into
another filesystem while the field contains Ceph-private data.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Max Kellermann
|
cee38bbf55 |
ceph: add owner/capability checks for CEPH_IOC_SET_LAYOUT*
These permission checks were already missing in the initial
impementation of these ioctls. This Ceph allows any user who owns a
file descriptor to manipulate the layout of any file, even if they
don't have write permissions.
It might be a good idea to guard other ioctls with permission checks
as well or even disallow regular users (even if they own the file) to
manipulate layout settings completely, as this may be abused to DoS
the Ceph servers, but right now, I find it most urgent to have setter
checks at all.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Max Kellermann
|
50958bb928 |
ceph: fix hanging __ceph_get_caps() with stale mds_wanted
A reader can hang forever in __ceph_get_caps() when the client no
longer holds `FILE_RD`, but local cap state still says that the
capability is already wanted (via `mds_wanted`).
One way to trigger this is through MDS cap revocation. If another
client performs a conflicting operation, the MDS can revoke `FILE_RD`
from the reader; the next read then has to reacquire `FILE_RD`. If
the cap update that should request `FILE_RD` never reaches the MDS
after `cap->mds_wanted` was raised, the reader is left holding only
non-file caps while local `mds_wanted` still includes the file read
caps.
In that state, try_get_cap_refs() sees `need <= mds_wanted` and
returns 0, so __ceph_get_caps() just waits on `i_cap_wq`. If the cap
update that was supposed to request `FILE_RD never reaches the MDS
after `cap->mds_wanted was` raised, no further request is sent and the
waiter can sleep indefinitely until unrelated cap traffic happens to
wake it up.
The ordering issue is that `cap->mds_wanted` is updated in
__prep_cap() before the `CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS message` is actually
queued for send. That makes one field serve two different meanings at
once: what this client wants, and what the client believes the MDS
already knows it wants.
A proper fix would be to split those states and track whether a cap
update is actually in flight or has been observed by the MDS.
However, simply moving the `cap->mds_wanted assignment` later would
not be sufficient: queueing the message in the messenger does not
guarantee that the MDS processed that specific wanted set, and
reconnect or message loss can still invalidate that assumption.
Fixing that properly would require a larger rework of the cap state
machine.
To allow simpler backports to stable kernels, this patch implements a
simpler workaround:
- stop waiting forever in __ceph_get_caps(); after a bounded wait,
fall back to the renew path
- make ceph_renew_caps() issue a synchronous `OPEN` request whenever
the inode still does not actually hold the wanted caps, instead of
only calling ceph_check_caps()
The extra issued-vs-wanted check in ceph_renew_caps() is necessary
because the previous test only checked whether the inode still had any
real caps at all. That is not enough after revocation: the client can
still hold something like `pLs` and yet be missing `FILE_RD`
completely. In that case, falling back to ceph_check_caps() is not
sufficient, because it still trusts `cap->mds_wanted` and may resend
nothing. By requiring `(issued & wanted) == wanted` before taking the
asynchronous path, the code only uses ceph_check_caps() when the
`wanted caps` are already actually issued. Otherwise, it sends the
synchronous `OPEN` renew.
This preserves the existing asynchronous fast path when the wanted
caps are already issued, avoids changing cap-state semantics, and
fixes the hang by guaranteeing that a stalled waiter eventually
retries through a path that does not rely on the stale `mds_wanted`
state.
[ idryomov: move CEPH_GET_CAPS_WAIT_TIMEOUT from libceph.h to
mds_client.h, formatting ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
WenTao Liang
|
c3e64079d8 |
ceph: fix refcount leak in ceph_readdir()
The ceph_readdir() function allocates a ceph_mds_request via
ceph_mdsc_create_request() and stores it in dfi->last_readdir. In
the directory entry processing loop, if the entry's offset is less
than ctx->pos or if the inode pointer is unexpectedly NULL, the
function returns -EIO without releasing the reference held by
dfi->last_readdir, causing a refcount leak.
Fix this by adding ceph_mdsc_put_request(dfi->last_readdir) before
returning on these error paths. Also set dfi->last_readdir to NULL
for safety, matching the cleanup done at the normal exit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Wentao Liang
|
cbf59617cd |
ceph: fix writeback_count leak in write_folio_nounlock()
write_folio_nounlock() increments fsc->writeback_count to track
in-flight writeback operations. On several error paths where the
function returns early (folio lookup failure, snapshot context
allocation failure, and writepages submission failure), the function
returns without calling atomic_long_dec_return() to decrement the
counter.
Each leaked increment keeps the counter above zero, which can prevent
the filesystem from cleanly unmounting or suspending writes.
Add atomic_long_dec_return() calls on all error paths that currently
return without decrementing the counter.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Bryam Vargas
|
4dbc71bcaf |
ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps()
ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format
ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake
end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to
ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case:
snaptrace = h + 1;
snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len);
p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len;
...
case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT:
if (snaptrace_len) {
...
if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace,
snaptrace + snaptrace_len,
false, &realm)) { ... }
ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm
from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad)
with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len.
With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially
satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past
the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps /
ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds
reads of the encoded snap arrays.
The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks
above the op switch each catch this OOB through their
ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit
behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised
MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with
no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The
shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced.
Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before
consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room()
helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p,
guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe
for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where
p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the
rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines
below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit
path.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Guidong Han
|
8b7e8245e2 |
eventpoll: pin files while checking reverse paths
Commit |
||
|
Usama Arif
|
0ef8faff49 |
fs: push nr_cached_objects memcg gating into individual filesystems
Commit 0baad6f9b997 ("fs/super: skip non-memcg-aware nr_cached_objects
in memcg slab shrink") added a check in fs/super.c that skipped every
->nr_cached_objects() hook whenever the shrinker was invoked for a
non-root memcg, on the assumption that none of them honour sc->memcg.
That assumption is wrong for XFS, whose inode-reclaim hook is
intentionally driven from per-memcg contexts to free memcg-charged
slab. Encoding a blanket "never memcg-aware" policy in fs/super.c
short-circuits that path.
Push the check down into the callbacks whose counters really are
irrelevant to per-memcg reclaim - btrfs_nr_cached_objects() and
shmem_unused_huge_count() - and drop the fs/super.c gate. Each
filesystem can now lift the restriction independently if its counter
later grows memcg awareness, without touching fs/super.c.
Introduce mem_cgroup_shrink_is_root() in <linux/memcontrol.h> so the
callbacks don't open-code "sc->memcg is NULL or root".
Fixes: 0baad6f9b997 ("fs/super: skip non-memcg-aware nr_cached_objects in memcg slab shrink")
Acked-by: Qi Zheng <qi.zheng@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Usama Arif <usama.arif@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260715103516.2410175-1-usama.arif@linux.dev
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
||
|
David Howells
|
62d9853aa4 |
afs: Fix afs_edit_dir_remove() to get, not find, block 0
Fix afs_edit_dir_remove() to use afs_dir_get_block() to get block 0 rather
than afs_dir_find_block() as the latter caches the found block in the
afs_dir_iter and may[*] switch out the page it's on if another
afs_dir_find_block() is done. This parallels what afs_edit_dir_add() does.
[*] There's more than one block per page.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Zhang Yi
|
c97cd6f447 |
iomap: prevent ioend merge when io_private differs
Different io_private values indicate distinct completion contexts that must not be merged together, as this could leak or corrupt the private data associated with each ioend. Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260713074206.1768006-1-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo <ojaswin@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
1c9cb1826b |
Merge patch series "iomap: trivial fixes for ext4 conversion"
Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com> says: This patch series contains a few trivial iomap-related fixes in preparation for converting ext4 buffered I/O to use iomap. The first three patches are taken from my ext4 conversion series [1], as suggested by Christoph. The fourth patch fixes a bug originally reported by Sashiko during review of my series; although unrelated to the ext4 conversion, it is worth fixing on its own. Please see the following patches for detail. The fifth patch add comments for ifs_clear/set_range_dirty(), and the last patch avoids merging ioends that have different private data. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-ext4/20260511072344.191271-1-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com/ * patches from https://patch.msgid.link/20260714082325.325163-1-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com: iomap: add comments for ifs_clear/set_range_dirty() iomap: fix out-of-bounds bitmap_set() with zero-length range iomap: fix incorrect did_zero setting in iomap_zero_iter() iomap: support invalidating partial folios iomap: correct the range of a partial dirty clear Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714082325.325163-1-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Zhang Yi
|
09b53b0787 |
iomap: add comments for ifs_clear/set_range_dirty()
The range alignment strategy differs between ifs_clear_range_dirty() and ifs_set_range_dirty(). The former rounds inwards to clear only fully-covered blocks, while the latter rounds outwards to mark any partially-touched block as dirty. Add comments to document this asymmetry in block range calculation. Suggested-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714082325.325163-6-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Zhang Yi
|
9c7d8f7c89 |
iomap: fix out-of-bounds bitmap_set() with zero-length range
ifs_set_range_dirty() and ifs_set_range_uptodate() compute last_blk
as (off + len - 1) >> i_blkbits. When off is 0 and len is 0, the
unsigned subtraction underflows to SIZE_MAX, producing a huge
last_blk and nr_blks value that causes bitmap_set() to write far
beyond the ifs->state allocation.
Regarding ifs_set_range_uptodate(), it is temporarily safe because len
cannot be passed in as 0. However, for ifs_set_range_dirty() this is
reachable from __iomap_write_end(): when copy_folio_from_iter_atomic()
returns 0 (e.g. user buffer fault) and the folio is already uptodate,
the guard at the top of __iomap_write_end() does not trigger because
!folio_test_uptodate() is false, and iomap_set_range_dirty() is called
with copied == 0.
Add a !len guard to both functions before the computation, so that a
zero-length range is a no-op.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Zhang Yi
|
7a6fd6b21d |
iomap: fix incorrect did_zero setting in iomap_zero_iter()
The did_zero output parameter was unconditionally set after the loop,
which is incorrect. It should only be set when the zeroing operation
actually completes, not when IOMAP_F_STALE is set or when
IOMAP_F_FOLIO_BATCH is set but !folio causes the loop to break early,
or when iomap_iter_advance() returns an error.
This causes did_zero to be incorrectly set when zeroing a clean
unwritten extent because the loop exits early without actually zeroing
any data.
Fix it by using a local variable to track whether any folio was actually
zeroed, and only set did_zero after the loop if zeroing happened.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Zhang Yi
|
562d192c43 |
iomap: support invalidating partial folios
Current iomap_invalidate_folio() can only invalidate an entire folio. If we truncate a partial folio on a filesystem where the block size is smaller than the folio size, it will leave behind dirty bits for the truncated or punched blocks. During the write-back process, it will attempt to map the invalid hole range. Fortunately, this has not caused any real problems so far because the ->writeback_range() function corrects the length. However, the implementation of FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE in ext4 depends on the support for invalidating partial folios. When ext4 partially zeroes out a dirty and unwritten folio, it does not perform a flush first like XFS. Therefore, if the dirty bits of the corresponding area cannot be cleared, the zeroed area after writeback remains in the written state rather than reverting to the unwritten state. Fix this by supporting invalidation of partial folios. Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260714082325.325163-3-yi.zhang@huaweicloud.com Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Zhang Yi
|
88c2651531 |
iomap: correct the range of a partial dirty clear
The block range calculation in ifs_clear_range_dirty() is incorrect when
partially clearing a range in a folio. We cannot clear the dirty bit of
the first block or the last block if the start or end offset is not
blocksize-aligned. This has not yet caused any issues since we always
clear a whole folio in iomap_writeback_folio().
Fix this by rounding up the first block to blocksize alignment, and
calculate the last block by rounding down (using truncation). Correct
the nr_blks calculation accordingly.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Chen Changcheng
|
503d67fbae |
fs/super: fix emergency thaw double-unlock of s_umount
do_thaw_all() iterates over all superblocks via __iterate_supers()
with SUPER_ITER_EXCL, which acquires s_umount exclusively before
calling the callback and releases it afterwards. However, the
callback do_thaw_all_callback() calls thaw_super_locked() which
unconditionally releases s_umount on every code path. This results
in a second unlock attempt in __iterate_supers() that corrupts the
rwsem state, triggering a DEBUG_RWSEMS warning:
[ 182.601148] sysrq: Emergency Thaw of all frozen filesystems
[ 182.601865] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 182.602375] DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && !rwsem_test_oflags(sem, RWSEM_NONSPINNABLE)): count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff99b1011e5870, owner = 0x0, curr 0xffff99b101b06c80, list not empty
[ 182.603817] WARNING: kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1412 at up_write+0xa3/0x170, CPU#2: kworker/2:1/53
[ 182.604578] Modules linked in:
[ 182.604864] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-00001-gbd3bd93ea98a-dirty #4 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 182.605711] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1kylin1 04/01/2014
[ 182.606417] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all
[ 182.606750] RIP: 0010:up_write+0xaf/0x170
[ 182.607076] Code: 19 3a 92 48 0f 44 c2 48 8b 55 08 48 8b 55 00 4c 8b 45 08 48 8b 55 00 48 8d 3d ad 91 e0 01 48 8b 4d 20 50 48 c7 c6 f0 8c 26 92 <67> 48 0f b9 3a e8 d7 93 4e 00 58 eb 81 48 83 7f 18 00 48 c7 c2 8d
[ 182.608563] RSP: 0018:ffffb670001d7e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 182.609007] RAX: ffffffff92349e8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff99b1011e5870
[ 182.609595] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff92268cf0 RDI: ffffffff92914d10
[ 182.610283] RBP: ffff99b1011e5870 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff99b101b06c80
[ 182.610847] R10: ffff99b10139a808 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: 0000000000000000
[ 182.611414] R13: ffffffff90cf74d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff99b1011e5800
[ 182.612009] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff99b1eaaee000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 182.612670] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 182.613146] CR2: 00000000005c631c CR3: 00000000013ee000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 182.613722] Call Trace:
[ 182.613946] <TASK>
[ 182.614130] __iterate_supers+0x128/0x150
[ 182.614463] do_thaw_all+0x1b/0x30
[ 182.614759] process_scheduled_works+0xbb/0x3f0
[ 182.615150] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.615499] worker_thread+0x129/0x270
[ 182.615816] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.616201] kthread+0xe2/0x120
[ 182.616469] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.616792] ret_from_fork+0x15b/0x240
[ 182.617115] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.617426] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 182.617761] </TASK>
[ 182.617968] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 182.618412] Emergency Thaw complete
Fix this by switching to SUPER_ITER_UNLOCKED and acquiring s_umount
in the callback via super_lock_excl() before calling
thaw_super_locked(). This matches the locking pattern expected by
thaw_super_locked() and eliminates the double unlock.
While at it, remove the dead 'return;' at the end of
do_thaw_all_callback().
Fixes:
|
||
|
Namjae Jeon
|
5e1b924808 |
ksmbd: reject undersized decompressed SMB2 requests
ksmbd_decompress_request() bounds the decompressed size only against
the maximum request size. A compression transform can therefore
produce a buffer smaller than an SMB2 PDU and install it as
conn->request_buf.
The receive path subsequently calls ksmbd_smb_request(), which reads
the protocol ID before the normal SMB2 minimum-size check. If the
decompressed output is too short, that read can access beyond the
request allocation.
Require the decompressed output to contain at least a complete minimum
SMB2 PDU before allocating and installing the replacement request
buffer.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Namjae Jeon
|
cfc0b8e508 |
ksmbd: validate minimum PDU size for transform requests
The receive path applies the minimum SMB2 PDU size check only when
ProtocolId is SMB2_PROTO_NUMBER. A packet carrying
SMB2_TRANSFORM_PROTO_NUM bypasses the check even when the negotiated
dialect does not provide transform handling.
On an SMB 2.1 connection, a short transform packet therefore reaches
init_smb2_rsp_hdr(), which interprets the request as a full SMB2 header
and reads beyond the request allocation. The copied fields can then be
returned to the unauthenticated client.
Compression transforms are converted to ordinary SMB2 messages before
protocol validation. After that conversion, validate ordinary SMB2
requests against SMB2_MIN_SUPPORTED_PDU_SIZE and require encryption
transform requests to contain both a transform header and an SMB2
header. This rejects truncated requests before work allocation.
Fixes:
|
||
|
James Montgomery
|
c74801ee52 |
ksmbd: defer destroy_previous_session() until after NTLM authentication
In ntlm_authenticate(), destroy_previous_session() is called using a
user pointer resolved from the client-supplied NTLM blob username field
before the NTLMv2 response is validated. An authenticated attacker can
set the NTLM blob username to match a victim account and set
PreviousSessionId to the victim's session ID; destroy_previous_session()
destroys the victim's session while ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()
subsequently rejects the request with -EPERM.
Move destroy_previous_session() and the prev_id assignment to after
ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() returns success and use sess->user
rather than the pre-authentication lookup result. This matches the
ordering already used by krb5_authenticate(), where
destroy_previous_session() is called only after
ksmbd_krb5_authenticate() returns success.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Namjae Jeon
|
5152c6d49e |
ksmbd: validate ACE size against SID sub-authorities
set_ntacl_dacl() validates sid.num_subauth before copying an ACE, but does not verify that the declared ACE size contains all sub-authorities described by that field. An undersized ACE can therefore be copied and later make the POSIX ACL deduplication walk inspect data beyond the copied ACE boundary. The existing initial bound check is also too small. It only ensures that the ACE size field is accessible before set_ntacl_dacl() reads sid.num_subauth farther into the input buffer. Require enough input for the fixed SID header before accessing num_subauth, reject ACEs smaller than that header, and skip ACEs whose declared size cannot contain the complete SID. This makes the validation consistent with the other ACE walk paths. Reported-by: LocalHost <localhost.detect@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> |
||
|
Wentao Guan
|
bbf0a8e931 |
ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL
check_add_overflow() unconditionally writes the truncated sum into *d
even on overflow, per its contract in include/linux/overflow.h.
The four check_add_overflow() guards in set_posix_acl_entries_dacl()
and set_ntacl_dacl() break out of the ACE-building loops on overflow,
but the truncated *size is then consumed downstream at the end of
set_ntacl_dacl():
pndacl->size = cpu_to_le16(le16_to_cpu(pndacl->size) + size);
This produces an on-wire NT ACL whose pndacl->size under-reports the
bytes actually written by the preceding fill_ace_for_sid()/memcpy()
calls, yielding a malformed ACL that can trigger out-of-bounds reads
when re-parsed by clients or ksmbd itself.
Restore *size to its pre-addition value on each overflow branch (via
`*size -= ace_sz` / `size -= nt_ace_size`) so that after the break,
*size once again holds the cumulative size of the successfully-written
ACEs. The committed ACL is then truncated-but-self-consistent rather
than malformed.
The ksmbd DACL builders are the only check_add_overflow() sites found
where an overflow path breaks out of a loop and the destination value
is consumed afterward. The other nearby break-style cases either
return -EINVAL on overflow (transport_ipc.c) or break without
consuming the overflowed destination value afterward (buildid.c).
Fixes:
|
||
|
Namjae Jeon
|
58d97fcd0b |
ksmbd: bound DACL dedup walk to copied ACEs
set_ntacl_dacl() can stop copying ACEs before consuming the full input DACL when size accounting overflows. When that happens, num_aces reflects only the ACEs that were actually copied into the output DACL, but set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() still receives nt_num_aces and uses it to walk the existing ACE array during dedup. That makes the dedup walk scan past the copied ACE array and inspect buffer tail that does not contain valid ACEs. Split the two meanings currently carried by the NT ACE count. Pass the number of copied NT ACEs to bound the dedup walk, and preserve the original "input DACL had NT ACEs" state separately for the Everyone/default ACL fallback. This keeps the dedup walk aligned with the ACEs that are actually present in the rebuilt DACL. Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> |
||
|
Namjae Jeon
|
2bebf2470a |
ksmbd: enforce signing required by the session
SMB2_FLAGS_SIGNED is controlled by the incoming request and only indicates that a signature accompanies that request. Do not use it to decide whether a signing-required session must authenticate the request. Reject an unsigned plaintext request before dispatch when the session requires signing. Continue to validate signatures on signed requests, including when signing is optional. Encrypted requests have already been authenticated during decryption. An OPLOCK_BREAK acknowledgment is a session request and is subject to the same signing rule, so do not exclude it from signed-request detection. Reported-by: Charles Vosburgh <trilobyte777@gmail.com> Tested-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn> Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> |
||
|
Namjae Jeon
|
e148e567a9 |
ksmbd: preserve VFS inherited POSIX ACL mask
The VFS initializes a child's POSIX ACL from the parent's default ACL and the requested creation mode. Do not mutate the parent ACL or overwrite the child's VFS-computed access and default ACLs afterwards. This preserves restrictive ACL_MASK entries and prevents SMB object creation from widening effective permissions. Reported-by: Charles Vosburgh <trilobyte777@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> |
||
|
Li Chen
|
1d0cff74d8 |
pidfs: handle FS_IOC32_GETVERSION in compat ioctl
FS_IOC32_GETVERSION has a distinct compat command encoding. Passing it through compat_ptr_ioctl() leaves pidfd_ioctl() unable to recognize the otherwise architecture-independent inode generation query. Translate the compat command to FS_IOC_GETVERSION before dispatching it through the native pidfd ioctl implementation. Signed-off-by: Li Chen <me@linux.beauty> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260716052822.1034228-1-me@linux.beauty Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Amir Goldstein
|
a1e0eb8f55 |
ovl: check access to copy_file_range source with src mounter creds
Commit |
||
|
Jann Horn
|
425224c2d7 |
proc: Fix broken error paths for namespace links
Don't return the return value of down_read_killable() (0) when a ptrace
access check fails, return -EACCES as intended.
Reported-by: Magnus Lindholm <linmag7@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260706170735.2941493-1-linmag7@gmail.com
Fixes:
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
927b89700e |
pidfs: add pidfs_dentry_open() helper
Both pidfs_alloc_file() and pidfs_export_open() need to force O_RDWR and reapply the pidfd flags that do_dentry_open() strips. Move the common logic into a helper. PIDFD_AUTOKILL is now part of the restore mask in the file handle path as well, but pidfs_export_permission() rejects O_TRUNC, so this is a no-op there. But warn nonetheless. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260722-esszimmer-umsetzen-nennt-ed5fc604300a@brauner Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
bb6bc13c53 |
pidfs: preserve thread pidfds reopened by file handle
PIDFD_THREAD shares O_EXCL. do_dentry_open() clears O_EXCL after pidfs_export_open() validates the flags, so open_by_handle_at() silently turns a thread pidfd into a process pidfd. Restore PIDFD_THREAD on the opened file, matching pidfs_alloc_file(). Signed-off-by: Li Chen <me@linux.beauty> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260716052726.1032092-1-me@linux.beauty Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Yichong Chen
|
a8e72879cd |
ovl: fix trusted xattr escape prefix matching
In the trusted.* xattr namespace, ovl_is_escaped_xattr() compares
one byte less than the escaped overlay xattr prefix length. This makes
it match "trusted.overlay.overlay" without requiring the trailing dot.
As a result, an xattr such as "trusted.overlay.overlayfoo" is
incorrectly treated as an escaped overlay xattr. This can be reproduced
by setting "trusted.overlay.overlayfoo" on a lower file and listing xattrs
through an overlay mount. listxattr() then exposes it as
"trusted.overlay.oo", and a following getxattr() on that listed name fails
with ENODATA.
Compare the full escaped prefix, including the trailing dot, so
similarly-prefixed private xattrs are not misclassified.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Frank Sorenson
|
c2f2e83e3b |
cifs: fix cifsFileInfo leak on kmalloc failure in deferred close drain paths
In cifs_close_deferred_file(), cifs_close_all_deferred_files(), and
cifs_close_deferred_file_under_dentry(), when a pending deferred close
is cancelled via cancel_delayed_work(), the subsequent kmalloc_obj() to
add the file to the local processing list may fail under memory pressure.
The loop breaks immediately, but the cancelled work is no longer pending
(it would have called _cifsFileInfo_put()), and the cfile is never added
to file_head for processing. The cifsFileInfo reference and the open
server handle both leak.
Fix by saving the cfile that failed allocation in a local variable,
breaking as before, and calling _cifsFileInfo_put() on it after
releasing the lock. Any files later in the iteration are unaffected
since their deferred work is still pending and will fire normally.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Frank Sorenson
|
e8a8d54c2d |
cifs: prevent readdir from changing file size due to stale directory metadata
Windows Server's directory enumeration metadata lags behind the actual
file size after a write+close or rename. A concurrent readdir() in the
window between close() returning to userspace and stat() being called
overwrites the correct cached i_size with the stale server value, causing
stat() to return the wrong size.
Once _cifsFileInfo_put() removes the last writable handle from
openFileList, is_size_safe_to_change() permits readdir to overwrite
i_size. smb2_close_getattr() then stamps cifs_i->time = jiffies, making
the corrupt cached value appear fresh to the next stat().
The existing check (see Fixes:) only blocked stale size updates while
an active RW lease was held, not after the last writable handle closes.
Add cifsInodeInfo->time_last_write, written via smp_store_release() at
writable close and on setattr/truncate. is_size_safe_to_change() checks
is_inode_writable() first (acquiring open_file_lock), then rejects a
readdir size update if time_last_write falls within acregmax jiffies.
The spinlock release in _cifsFileInfo_put() forms a store-release barrier
that pairs with the spin_lock() (load-acquire) in is_inode_writable(),
ensuring the subsequent smp_load_acquire() on time_last_write observes
any update from a concurrent close(). When a size update is rejected and
the server value differs from the cached one, cifs_i->time is cleared to
force a fresh QUERY_INFO on the next stat().
readdir is also blocked from changing i_size while writable handles are
open or an RW lease is held, even on direct-IO mounts.
For deferred close (closetimeo > 0), time_last_write is refreshed at the
actual server close in smb2_deferred_work_close() and in the
cifs_close_deferred_file*() drain paths invoked by lease/oplock breaks
and tcon teardown, anchoring the protection window to the real close time
rather than the earlier userspace close.
time_last_write == 0 skips the time_before() check to avoid false
positives near boot on 32-bit systems where jiffies starts close to
INITIAL_JIFFIES.
Does not reproduce against Samba or with actimeo=0.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Carl Johnson
|
2eb74eef4b |
smb: client: handle STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK responses without a symlink target
The macOS built-in SMB server returns STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK for a
CREATE on a path whose final component is a symlink, but it does not
include a Symbolic Link Error Response in the error data: both
ErrorContextCount and ByteCount are zero, so the symlink target is not
present in the response at all. Per [MS-SMB2] section 2.2.2 such a
response should carry a valid Symbolic Link Error Response, so this is a
server bug, but the target can still be retrieved with
FSCTL_GET_REPARSE_POINT.
Frame from a capture against macOS 26.5.2 (build 25F84):
SMB2 hdr : Status=0x8000002d STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK, Cmd=Create
Error Rsp: StructureSize=0x0009
Error Context Count: 0
Byte Count: 0
Error Data: 00
symlink_data() cannot find a struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp in such a
response and returns -EINVAL, which parse_create_response() propagates,
so smb2_query_path_info() bails out at
if (rc || !data->reparse_point)
goto out;
before it can retry with SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE. stat(), readlink() and ls
of any server-side symlink then fail with -EINVAL:
$ ls -la Config
l????????? ? ? ? ? ? Config.json
$ stat Config/Config.json
stat: cannot statx 'Config/Config.json': Invalid argument
A 5.10 client resolves these symlinks correctly against the same server
and share, so this is a regression for Apple SMB servers.
Handle it in several places:
- symlink_data() detects the empty response (ErrorContextCount and
ByteCount both zero) and returns a distinct -ENODATA, so that "server
did not send the target" can be told apart from a genuinely malformed
response and only this case is worked around.
- parse_create_response() treats -ENODATA like
STATUS_IO_REPARSE_TAG_NOT_HANDLED, which does not carry the target
either: leave the reparse tag unset and clear rc, so the existing
SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE path retrieves the target.
- smb2_query_path_info() only fixes up the symlink target type when the
target is already known. SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE sets data->reparse.tag
but does not parse the target out of the reparse buffer; that happens
later, in reparse_info_to_fattr(). Without this check
smb2_fix_symlink_target_type() is called with a NULL target and
returns -EIO. This could not happen with servers that send the target
inline and therefore skip SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE.
- smb2_open_file() maps -ENODATA to -EIO, matching
STATUS_IO_REPARSE_TAG_NOT_HANDLED, so its callers retrieve the target
with SMB2_OP_GET_REPARSE as well.
Tested on Debian 13, kernel 6.18.38 (armv7), against macOS 26.5.2:
symlinks now resolve, including relative, parent-traversing and directory
symlinks, and reads through symlinks succeed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár <pali@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Carl Johnson <carl@jpartners.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
|
||
|
Amir Goldstein
|
4b9a5458d0 |
fs: preserve ACL_DONT_CACHE state in forget_cached_acl()
The ACL_DONT_CACHE state is meant to be a constant state for the inode for filesystems that want to opt out of posix acl caching. Commit |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
5a52217525 |
nfsd-7.2 fixes:
Issues reported with v7.2-rc: - Fix issue with NLMv3 GRANTED_MSG introduced in v7.2 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEKLLlsBKG3yQ88j7+M2qzM29mf5cFAmpftS0ACgkQM2qzM29m f5epbA/+OdiOdpnmxMClc7tKcvNlbPzDQxM8yi1LCKWD5IYbDzdtZatnfHsjGkIw pYtoDTrvlJC9nC8LyNu2eaj8BQXM8IYNNDlQ/m2zLWQ+5E59JUwBPzZyLCMBRHb+ l7h7SCsCb/6S6+sn0/iAi7DFvlreDPNOMCSlArmulmRZRq99JbIOfbHg02qXK3bx huPNMeU/3y9GZccqHRz6l8joxCGYn2iXlFIs8wex+MecifmhfKhyAhjA5QP6ZbjL vCkluLrlPy+nM/ZjESx7UgKZQYkwnq9zitYNakIr7I53wrPci7z/6ZzCucEEtwSN q+Zl+8fmLfr1MyicNn30hVFuZ7Q04+K3GjaV4beuSj5YGe5lI1rlNultQBGSK3WZ 1GmdOo7XiKQ2x4k37HXf38DxKFYYCJp//HYXKRHnjOhKIaXDaMqj1Qq8H0fyElPG txIFm3ZNLgUyoULihpA8sx/j/mCcub3GIu/yplXFCBOwMKf0fKFPdY9jTWU93cDN krIhucg6RGWMoHQ8WnWDY1/+B5NrAska4/RHzqLhSESiLAUOtgLCQHPsJSufqf3h +Qbf6XTM4G/ABEXkOB4P515fcNYxHx6v0/qkyUdESHGLFrAuP2leSAWG1oKmeBDn HUYKaJvjZcx+Tvd5xhXm9jPBBkwfzDFhURm4IZ0rLKpDu489BIE= =dW6d -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'nfsd-7.2-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux Pull nfsd fix from Chuck Lever: - Fix issue with NLMv3 GRANTED_MSG introduced in v7.2 * tag 'nfsd-7.2-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux: lockd: fix NLMv3 GRANTED_MSG handling |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
51f247c4b2 |
for-7.2-rc4-tag
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Merge tag 'for-7.2-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux
Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba:
"I'm catching up with the fix backlog in the development branch, so
here's a number of them and will probably send one more for this or
the next rc:
- relocation fixes:
- skip attempting compression on reloc inodes
- exclude inline extents from file extent offset checks
- fix minor memory leak after error when adding reloc root
- fix root cleanup after inserting and merging
- fix clearing folio tags after writeback
- clear logging flag of extent map before splitting
- fix unsigned 32/64 type conversions when accounting dirty metadata,
leading to continually exceeding threshold
- fix regression in 32bit compat ioctl for subvolume info
- fix type of SEARCH_TREE ioctl buffer in UAPI header
- fix expression in ASSERT expression which can be unconditionally
evaluated on some compilers
- only account delalloc bytes for regular inodes"
* tag 'for-7.2-rc4-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux:
btrfs: fix GET_SUBVOL_INFO after compat refactor
btrfs: free mapping node on duplicate reloc root insert
btrfs: fix a regression where PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY is never cleared
btrfs: don't propagate EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING to split extent maps
btrfs: fix u32 to s64 type conversion in dirty_metadata_bytes accounting
btrfs: fix NULL pointer deref during assertion in btrfs_backref_free_node()
btrfs: only account delalloc bytes for regular file inodes in btrfs_getattr()
btrfs: reject inline file extents item in get_new_location()
btrfs: do not try compression for data reloc inodes
btrfs: declare btrfs_ioctl_search_args_v2::buf as __u8
btrfs: fix reloc root cleanup in merge_reloc_roots()
btrfs: fix use-after-free on reloc root after error in insert_dirty_subvol()
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
3349ef6a36 |
binfmt_elf_fdpic: only honour the first PT_INTERP
The program header scan handles PT_INTERP from a switch nested in the
scan loop, so its break leaves the switch and not the loop. A binary
carrying more than one PT_INTERP runs the case again and overwrites both
interpreter_name and interpreter. The previous name allocation leaks and
so does the previous interpreter reference, along with the write denial
open_exec() took on it. The denial is never released, so the file stays
unwritable for as long as the system runs.
An unprivileged caller reaches this with a crafted binary and repeats it
at will. binfmt_elf stops at the first PT_INTERP. Do the same here.
The flaw dates back to the driver's introduction in the pre-git history
tree introduced in v2.6.11 by 91808d6ebe39 ("[PATCH] FRV: Add FDPIC ELF
binary format driver").
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260721-gezittert-medium-kreide-b41fc1f0277e@brauner
Fixes:
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
16cc4f5c1c |
exec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack()
The stop value is derived from bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable is an unsigned long. If bprm->p drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes zero the loop condition index >= stop is always true. After the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and bprm->page[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array. The pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to kmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that lands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn't terminate either... Getting there only requires bprm->p < PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU bprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only constraint on how far bprm->p is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e. that each individual string still fits in what is left. bprm->p starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a single argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves it in the first page: Oops - load access fault [#1] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1 epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae s4 : ffffffffffffffff s2 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ffffffdc98000000 a2 : 0000000000001000 status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005 [<801a5324>] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 [<800d5f6a>] load_flat_binary+0x43a/0x65e [<800a2de4>] bprm_execve+0x1d4/0x316 [<800a351a>] do_execveat_common+0x12e/0x138 [<800a3d44>] __riscv_sys_execve+0x38/0x4e Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt This is an arcane bug but we should still fix it. Count down from MAX_ARG_PAGES so the loop ends when index reaches stop, stop == 0 included. The iterations performed are unchanged for every other value of stop. Only CONFIG_MMU=n builds are affected, transfer_args_to_stack() is used by binfmt_flat and binfmt_elf_fdpic on nommu only. The loop predates git history. commit |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
bbf5f63991
|
binfmt_misc: set have_execfd only once the interpreter is opened
load_misc_binary() raises bprm->have_execfd as soon as it sees the 'O'
(or 'C') flag. This happens well before it opens the interpreter. If
that open fails the flag stays set on the bprm. binfmt_misc is at the
head of the format list so an interpreter open failure that returns
-ENOEXEC lets the search fall through to a later format. This means it
runs the matched binary directly having never staged an interpreter. So
bprm->executable is NULL while have_execfd falsely claims a descriptor
is present.
Consequently, begin_new_exec() dereferences the missing executable:
would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
and NULL derefs. Had it not, the hand-off later in the same function
would have failed anyway. FD_ADD(0, bprm->executable) rejects a NULL
file with -ENOMEM. Both sites are past the point of no return so the
exec cannot be unwound either way.
This can be reached by unprivileged users as binfmt_misc can be mounted
in user namespaces. So a user can register an 'O' entry whose
interpreter lives on a FUSE mount, have the FUSE server fail the open
with -ENOEXEC and execute a native ELF file that matches the entry.
have_execfd only means anything alongside the executable it describes
which is not set until the interpreter has been opened and staged.
So lets raise it there, next to execfd_creds, which is already set at
that point. An open failure now leaves it clear, so the fallback format
derives credentials from the binary and emits no AT_EXECFD, as it would
for any native exec. The argv rewrite load_misc_binary() performs before
the open is still not undone. This means the binary sees the interpreter
path in argv[0] and its own path in argv[1] but that predates this
change and only became observable once the exec stopped faulting.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260720-beglichen-kognitiv-organismus-5e1e55326c56@brauner
Fixes:
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
b95f03f04d |
12 hotfixes. 8 are cc:stable and the remainder address post-7.1 issues or
aren't considered appropriate for backporting. 10 are for MM. All are singletons - please see the relevant changelogs for details. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQTTMBEPP41GrTpTJgfdBJ7gKXxAjgUCal5rBQAKCRDdBJ7gKXxA jtgtAQCuWNUTCR7u+MzAuO3Nh46DxHXeb27OTHZL8JcazQTEQgD+NZfwqVYnNNX/ 4CVqqZvrXJQDg0aiWtIP4VdLirNh/Ac= =Gslp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2026-07-20-11-37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm Pull misc fixes from Andrew Morton: "12 hotfixes. 8 are cc:stable and the remainder address post-7.1 issues or aren't considered appropriate for backporting. 10 are for MM. All are singletons - please see the relevant changelogs for details" * tag 'mm-hotfixes-stable-2026-07-20-11-37' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: mm/memory-failure: trace: change memory_failure_event to ras subsystem mm: page_reporting: allow driver to set batch capacity mm/kmemleak: fix checksum computation for per-cpu objects mm/damon/core: disallow overlapping input ranges for damon_set_regions() MAINTAINERS: add Usama as a THP reviewer fat: avoid stack overflow warning mm/damon/core: validate ranges in damon_set_regions() m68k: avoid -Wunused-but-set-parameter in clear_user_page() mm/huge_memory: set PG_has_hwpoisoned only after new folio head is established mm/page_vma_mapped: fix device-private PMD handling MAINTAINERS: s/SeongJae/SJ/ userfaultfd: prevent registration of special VMAs |
||
|
Eric Biggers
|
6fe4e4b825 |
fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()
When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls
fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices,
then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(),
blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.
Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically
allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because:
- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call
site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.
- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It
just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling
blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free.
For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable
way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt
multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded
limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that.
(Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block
devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block
device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which
will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call
blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.)
Fixes:
|
||
|
Eric Biggers
|
b5fa40226e |
fscrypt: Add missing superblock check in find_or_insert_direct_key()
The legacy 'fscrypt_direct_keys' table caches master keys that are used
by v1 encryption policies that have FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY.
It's just a global table for all filesystems (since the keys can be
provided by the legacy process-subscribed keyrings mechanism, which
makes it difficult to reuse super_block::s_master_keys).
The entries in it ('struct fscrypt_direct_key') do contain a super_block
pointer, though, for passing to fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() when
the last inode that references the key is evicted.
However, when finding the fscrypt_direct_key for an inode, we weren't
actually comparing the super_block pointer. As a result, inodes with
different super_blocks could point to the same fscrypt_direct_key. That
could extend the lifetime of a fscrypt_direct_key beyond the
super_block it points to, causing a use-after-free later.
Fix this by creating distinct fscrypt_direct_key structs for distinct
super_block structs.
Note that this problem doesn't exist in the v2 policy equivalent
("per-mode keys"), since the data structures there are per super_block.
Fixes:
|