mirror of
https://github.com/Crosstalk-Solutions/project-nomad.git
synced 2026-03-28 03:29:25 +01:00
fix(security): path traversal and SSRF protections from pre-launch audit
Fixes 4 high-severity findings from a comprehensive security audit: 1. Path traversal on ZIM file delete — resolve()+startsWith() containment 2. Path traversal on Map file delete — same pattern 3. Path traversal on docs read — same pattern (already used in rag_service) 4. SSRF on download endpoints — block private/internal IPs, require TLD Also adds assertNotPrivateUrl() to content update endpoints. Full audit report attached as admin/docs/security-audit-v1.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chris Sherwood
Jake Turner
parent
9093d06a64
commit
db1fe84553
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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import { CollectionUpdateService } from '#services/collection_update_service'
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import {
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assertNotPrivateUrl,
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applyContentUpdateValidator,
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applyAllContentUpdatesValidator,
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} from '#validators/common'
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@ -13,12 +14,16 @@ export default class CollectionUpdatesController {
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async applyUpdate({ request }: HttpContext) {
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const update = await request.validateUsing(applyContentUpdateValidator)
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assertNotPrivateUrl(update.download_url)
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const service = new CollectionUpdateService()
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return await service.applyUpdate(update)
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}
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async applyAllUpdates({ request }: HttpContext) {
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const { updates } = await request.validateUsing(applyAllContentUpdatesValidator)
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for (const update of updates) {
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assertNotPrivateUrl(update.download_url)
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}
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const service = new CollectionUpdateService()
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return await service.applyAllUpdates(updates)
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}
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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import { MapService } from '#services/map_service'
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import {
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assertNotPrivateUrl,
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downloadCollectionValidator,
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filenameParamValidator,
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remoteDownloadValidator,
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@ -25,12 +26,14 @@ export default class MapsController {
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async downloadBaseAssets({ request }: HttpContext) {
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const payload = await request.validateUsing(remoteDownloadValidatorOptional)
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if (payload.url) assertNotPrivateUrl(payload.url)
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await this.mapService.downloadBaseAssets(payload.url)
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return { success: true }
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}
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async downloadRemote({ request }: HttpContext) {
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const payload = await request.validateUsing(remoteDownloadValidator)
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assertNotPrivateUrl(payload.url)
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const filename = await this.mapService.downloadRemote(payload.url)
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return {
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message: 'Download started successfully',
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@ -52,6 +55,7 @@ export default class MapsController {
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// For providing a "preflight" check in the UI before actually starting a background download
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async downloadRemotePreflight({ request }: HttpContext) {
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const payload = await request.validateUsing(remoteDownloadValidator)
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assertNotPrivateUrl(payload.url)
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const info = await this.mapService.downloadRemotePreflight(payload.url)
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return info
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}
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@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
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import { ZimService } from '#services/zim_service'
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import {
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assertNotPrivateUrl,
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downloadCategoryTierValidator,
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filenameParamValidator,
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remoteDownloadWithMetadataValidator,
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@ -25,6 +26,7 @@ export default class ZimController {
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async downloadRemote({ request }: HttpContext) {
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const payload = await request.validateUsing(remoteDownloadWithMetadataValidator)
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assertNotPrivateUrl(payload.url)
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const { filename, jobId } = await this.zimService.downloadRemote(payload.url)
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return {
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@ -66,12 +66,19 @@ export class DocsService {
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const filename = _filename.endsWith('.md') ? _filename : `${_filename}.md`
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const fileExists = await getFileStatsIfExists(path.join(this.docsPath, filename))
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// Prevent path traversal — resolved path must stay within the docs directory
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const basePath = path.resolve(this.docsPath)
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const fullPath = path.resolve(path.join(this.docsPath, filename))
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if (!fullPath.startsWith(basePath + path.sep)) {
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throw new Error('Invalid document slug')
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}
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const fileExists = await getFileStatsIfExists(fullPath)
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if (!fileExists) {
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throw new Error(`File not found: ${filename}`)
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}
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const fileStream = await getFile(path.join(this.docsPath, filename), 'stream')
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const fileStream = await getFile(fullPath, 'stream')
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if (!fileStream) {
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throw new Error(`Failed to read file stream: ${filename}`)
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}
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@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import {
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getFile,
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ensureDirectoryExists,
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} from '../utils/fs.js'
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import { join } from 'path'
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import { join, resolve, sep } from 'path'
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import urlJoin from 'url-join'
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import { RunDownloadJob } from '#jobs/run_download_job'
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import logger from '@adonisjs/core/services/logger'
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@ -404,7 +404,13 @@ export class MapService implements IMapService {
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fileName += '.pmtiles'
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}
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const fullPath = join(this.baseDirPath, 'pmtiles', fileName)
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const basePath = resolve(join(this.baseDirPath, 'pmtiles'))
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const fullPath = resolve(join(basePath, fileName))
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// Prevent path traversal — resolved path must stay within the storage directory
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if (!fullPath.startsWith(basePath + sep)) {
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throw new Error('Invalid filename')
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}
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const exists = await getFileStatsIfExists(fullPath)
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if (!exists) {
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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import {
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listDirectoryContents,
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ZIM_STORAGE_PATH,
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} from '../utils/fs.js'
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import { join } from 'path'
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import { join, resolve, sep } from 'path'
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import { WikipediaOption, WikipediaState } from '../../types/downloads.js'
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import vine from '@vinejs/vine'
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import { wikipediaOptionsFileSchema } from '#validators/curated_collections'
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@ -332,7 +332,13 @@ export class ZimService {
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fileName += '.zim'
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}
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const fullPath = join(process.cwd(), ZIM_STORAGE_PATH, fileName)
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const basePath = resolve(join(process.cwd(), ZIM_STORAGE_PATH))
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const fullPath = resolve(join(basePath, fileName))
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// Prevent path traversal — resolved path must stay within the storage directory
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if (!fullPath.startsWith(basePath + sep)) {
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throw new Error('Invalid filename')
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}
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const exists = await getFileStatsIfExists(fullPath)
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if (!exists) {
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@ -1,12 +1,39 @@
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import vine from '@vinejs/vine'
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/**
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* Checks whether a URL points to a private/internal network address.
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* Used to prevent SSRF — the server should not fetch from localhost,
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* private RFC1918 ranges, link-local, or cloud metadata endpoints.
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*
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* Throws an error if the URL is internal/private.
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*/
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export function assertNotPrivateUrl(urlString: string): void {
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const parsed = new URL(urlString)
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const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase()
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const privatePatterns = [
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/^localhost$/,
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/^127\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/,
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/^10\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/,
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/^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.\d+\.\d+$/,
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/^192\.168\.\d+\.\d+$/,
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/^169\.254\.\d+\.\d+$/, // Link-local / cloud metadata
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/^0\.0\.0\.0$/,
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/^\[::1\]$/,
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/^\[?fe80:/i,
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/^\[?fd[0-9a-f]{2}:/i, // Unique local IPv6
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]
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if (privatePatterns.some((re) => re.test(hostname))) {
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throw new Error(`Download URL must not point to a private/internal address: ${hostname}`)
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}
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}
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export const remoteDownloadValidator = vine.compile(
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vine.object({
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url: vine
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.string()
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.url({
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require_tld: false, // Allow local URLs
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})
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.url()
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.trim(),
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})
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)
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@ -15,9 +42,7 @@ export const remoteDownloadWithMetadataValidator = vine.compile(
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vine.object({
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url: vine
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.string()
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.url({
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require_tld: false, // Allow local URLs
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})
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.url()
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.trim(),
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metadata: vine
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.object({
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@ -34,9 +59,7 @@ export const remoteDownloadValidatorOptional = vine.compile(
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vine.object({
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url: vine
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.string()
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.url({
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require_tld: false, // Allow local URLs
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})
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.url()
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.trim()
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.optional(),
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})
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299
admin/docs/security-audit-v1.md
Normal file
299
admin/docs/security-audit-v1.md
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
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# Project NOMAD Security Audit Report
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**Date:** 2026-03-08
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**Version audited:** v1.28.0 (main branch)
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**Auditor:** Claude Code (automated + manual review)
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**Target:** Pre-launch security review
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---
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## Executive Summary
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Project NOMAD's codebase is **reasonably clean for a LAN appliance**, with no critical authentication bypasses or remote code execution vulnerabilities. However, there are **4 findings that should be fixed before public launch** — all are straightforward path traversal and SSRF issues with known fix patterns already used elsewhere in the codebase.
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| Severity | Count | Summary |
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|----------|-------|---------|
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| **HIGH** | 4 | Path traversal (3), SSRF (1) |
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| **MEDIUM** | 5 | Dozzle shell, unvalidated settings read, content update URL injection, verbose errors, no rate limiting |
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| **LOW** | 5 | CSRF disabled, CORS wildcard, debug logging, npm dep CVEs, hardcoded HMAC |
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| **INFO** | 2 | No auth by design, Docker socket exposure by design |
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---
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## Scans Performed
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| Scan | Tool | Result |
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|------|------|--------|
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| Dependency audit | `npm audit` | 2 CVEs (1 high, 1 moderate) |
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| Secret scan | Manual grep (passwords, keys, tokens, certs) | Clean — all secrets from env vars |
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| SAST | Semgrep (security-audit, OWASP, nodejs rulesets) | 0 findings (AdonisJS not in rulesets) |
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| Docker config review | Manual review of compose, Dockerfiles, scripts | 2 actionable findings |
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| Code review | Manual review of services, controllers, validators | 4 path traversal + 1 SSRF |
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| API endpoint audit | Manual review of all 60+ routes | Attack surface documented |
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| DAST (OWASP ZAP) | Skipped — Docker Desktop not running | Recommended as follow-up |
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---
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## FIX BEFORE LAUNCH
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### 1. Path Traversal — ZIM File Delete (HIGH)
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**File:** `admin/app/services/zim_service.ts:329-342`
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**Endpoint:** `DELETE /api/zim/:filename`
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The `filename` parameter flows into `path.join()` with no directory containment check. An attacker can delete `.zim` files outside the storage directory:
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```
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DELETE /api/zim/..%2F..%2Fsome-file.zim
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```
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**Fix:** Resolve the full path and verify it starts with the expected storage directory:
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```typescript
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async delete(file: string): Promise<void> {
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let fileName = file
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if (!fileName.endsWith('.zim')) {
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fileName += '.zim'
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}
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const basePath = join(process.cwd(), ZIM_STORAGE_PATH)
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const fullPath = resolve(basePath, fileName)
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// Prevent path traversal
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if (!fullPath.startsWith(basePath)) {
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throw new Error('Invalid filename')
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}
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// ... rest of delete logic
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}
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```
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This pattern is already used correctly in `rag_service.ts:deleteFileBySource()`.
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---
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### 2. Path Traversal — Map File Delete (HIGH)
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**File:** `admin/app/services/map_service.ts` (delete method)
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**Endpoint:** `DELETE /api/maps/:filename`
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Identical pattern to the ZIM delete. Same fix — resolve path, verify `startsWith(basePath)`.
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---
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### 3. Path Traversal — Documentation Read (HIGH)
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**File:** `admin/app/services/docs_service.ts:61-83`
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**Endpoint:** `GET /docs/:slug`
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The `slug` parameter flows into `path.join(this.docsPath, filename)` with no containment check. An attacker can read arbitrary `.md` files on the filesystem:
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```
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GET /docs/..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
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```
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Limited by the mandatory `.md` extension, but could still read sensitive markdown files outside the docs directory (like CLAUDE.md, README.md, etc.).
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**Fix:**
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```typescript
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const basePath = this.docsPath
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const fullPath = path.resolve(basePath, filename)
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if (!fullPath.startsWith(path.resolve(basePath))) {
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throw new Error('Invalid document slug')
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}
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```
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---
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### 4. SSRF — Download Endpoints (HIGH)
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**File:** `admin/app/validators/common.ts:3-12`
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**Endpoints:** `POST /api/zim/download-remote`, `POST /api/maps/download-remote`, `POST /api/maps/download-base-assets`, `POST /api/maps/download-remote-preflight`
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The URL validator uses `require_tld: false`, allowing internal/private URLs:
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```typescript
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url: vine.string().url({ require_tld: false })
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```
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An attacker on the LAN can make NOMAD fetch from:
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- `http://localhost:3306` (MySQL)
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- `http://localhost:6379` (Redis)
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- `http://169.254.169.254/` (cloud metadata — if NOMAD is ever cloud-hosted)
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- Any internal network service
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**Fix:** Add a URL validation helper that rejects private/internal IPs:
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```typescript
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function isPrivateUrl(urlString: string): boolean {
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const url = new URL(urlString)
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const hostname = url.hostname
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// Block localhost, private ranges, link-local, metadata
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const blocked = [
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/^localhost$/i,
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/^127\./,
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/^10\./,
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/^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\./,
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/^192\.168\./,
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/^169\.254\./,
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/^0\./,
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/^\[::1\]$/,
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/^\[fe80:/i,
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]
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return blocked.some(re => re.test(hostname))
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}
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```
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Alternatively, maintain an allowlist of known-good download domains (e.g., `download.kiwix.org`, `github.com`, `api.projectnomad.us`).
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**Note:** The `require_tld: false` setting was intentionally added with the comment "Allow local URLs" — but this should only be needed for dev/testing. Consider making it configurable via environment variable, or keeping the allowlist approach for production.
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---
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## FIX AFTER LAUNCH (Medium Priority)
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### 5. Dozzle Web Shell Access (MEDIUM)
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**File:** `install/management_compose.yaml:56`
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```yaml
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- DOZZLE_ENABLE_SHELL=true
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```
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Dozzle on port 9999 is bound to all interfaces with shell access enabled. Anyone on the LAN can open a web shell into containers, including `nomad_admin` which has the Docker socket mounted. This creates a path from "LAN access" → "container shell" → "Docker socket" → "host root."
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**Fix:** Set `DOZZLE_ENABLE_SHELL=false`. Log viewing and container restart functionality are preserved.
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---
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### 6. Unvalidated Settings Key Read (MEDIUM)
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**File:** `admin/app/controllers/settings_controller.ts`
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**Endpoint:** `GET /api/system/settings?key=...`
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The `updateSetting` endpoint validates the key against an enum, but `getSetting` accepts any arbitrary key string. Currently harmless since the KV store only contains settings data, but could leak sensitive info if new keys are added.
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**Fix:** Apply the same enum validation to the read endpoint.
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---
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### 7. Content Update URL Injection (MEDIUM)
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**File:** `admin/app/validators/common.ts:72-88`
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**Endpoint:** `POST /api/content-updates/apply`
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The `download_url` comes directly from the client request body. An attacker can supply any URL and NOMAD will download from it. The URL should be looked up server-side from the content manifest instead.
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**Fix:** Validate `download_url` against the cached manifest, or apply the same SSRF protections as finding #4.
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---
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### 8. Verbose Error Messages (MEDIUM)
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**Files:** `rag_controller.ts`, `docker_service.ts`, `system_update_service.ts`
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Several controllers return raw `error.message` in API responses, potentially leaking internal paths, stack details, or Docker error messages to the client.
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**Fix:** Return generic error messages in production. Log the details server-side.
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---
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### 9. No Rate Limiting (MEDIUM)
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Zero rate limiting across all 60+ endpoints. While acceptable for a LAN appliance, some endpoints are particularly abusable:
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- `POST /api/benchmark/run` — spins up Docker containers for CPU/memory/disk stress tests
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- `POST /api/rag/upload` — file uploads (20MB limit per bodyparser config)
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- `POST /api/system/services/affect` — can stop/start any service repeatedly
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**Fix:** Consider basic rate limiting on the benchmark and service control endpoints (e.g., 1 benchmark per minute, service actions throttled to prevent rapid cycling).
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---
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## LOW PRIORITY / ACCEPTED RISK
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### 10. CSRF Protection Disabled (LOW)
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**File:** `admin/config/shield.ts`
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CSRF is disabled, meaning any website a LAN user visits could fire requests at NOMAD's API. This amplifies findings 1-4 — path traversal and SSRF could be triggered by a malicious webpage, not just direct LAN access.
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**Assessment:** Acceptable for a LAN appliance with no auth system. Enabling CSRF would require significant auth/session infrastructure changes.
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### 11. CORS Wildcard with Credentials (LOW)
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**File:** `admin/config/cors.ts`
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`origin: ['*']` with `credentials: true`. Standard for LAN appliances.
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### 12. npm Dependency CVEs (LOW)
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```
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tar <=7.5.9 HIGH Hardlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath
|
||||
ajv <6.14.0 MODERATE ReDoS when using $data option
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Both fixable via `npm audit fix`. Low practical risk since these are build/dev dependencies not directly exposed to user input.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix:** Run `npm audit fix` and commit the updated lockfile.
|
||||
|
||||
### 13. Hardcoded HMAC Secret (LOW)
|
||||
|
||||
**File:** `admin/app/services/benchmark_service.ts:35`
|
||||
|
||||
The benchmark HMAC secret `'nomad-benchmark-v1-2026'` is hardcoded in open-source code. Anyone can forge leaderboard submissions.
|
||||
|
||||
**Assessment:** Accepted risk. The leaderboard has compensating controls (rate limiting, plausibility validation, hardware fingerprint dedup). The secret stops casual abuse, not determined attackers.
|
||||
|
||||
### 14. Production Debug Logging (LOW)
|
||||
|
||||
**File:** `install/management_compose.yaml:22`
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
LOG_LEVEL=debug
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Debug logging in production can expose internal state in log files.
|
||||
|
||||
**Fix:** Change to `LOG_LEVEL=info` for production compose template.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## INFORMATIONAL (By Design)
|
||||
|
||||
### No Authentication
|
||||
|
||||
All 60+ API endpoints are unauthenticated. This is by design — NOMAD is a LAN appliance and the network boundary is the access control. Issue #73 tracks the edge case of public IP interfaces.
|
||||
|
||||
### Docker Socket Exposure
|
||||
|
||||
The `nomad_admin` container mounts `/var/run/docker.sock`. This is necessary for NOMAD's core functionality (managing Docker containers). The socket is not exposed to the network — only the admin container can use it.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Recommendations Summary
|
||||
|
||||
| Priority | Action | Effort |
|
||||
|----------|--------|--------|
|
||||
| **Before launch** | Fix 3 path traversals (ZIM delete, Map delete, Docs read) | ~30 min |
|
||||
| **Before launch** | Add SSRF protection to download URL validators | ~1 hour |
|
||||
| **Soon after** | Disable Dozzle shell access | 1 line change |
|
||||
| **Soon after** | Validate settings key on read endpoint | ~15 min |
|
||||
| **Soon after** | Sanitize error messages in responses | ~30 min |
|
||||
| **Nice to have** | Run `npm audit fix` | 5 min |
|
||||
| **Nice to have** | Change production log level to info | 1 line change |
|
||||
| **Follow-up** | OWASP ZAP dynamic scan against NOMAD3 | ~1 hour |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## What Went Right
|
||||
|
||||
- **No hardcoded secrets** — all credentials properly use environment variables
|
||||
- **No command injection** — Docker operations use the Docker API (dockerode), not shell commands
|
||||
- **No SQL injection** — all database queries use AdonisJS Lucid ORM with parameterized queries
|
||||
- **No eval/Function** — no dynamic code execution anywhere
|
||||
- **RAG service already has the correct fix pattern** — `deleteFileBySource()` uses `resolve()` + `startsWith()` for path containment
|
||||
- **Install script generates strong random passwords** — uses `/dev/urandom` for APP_KEY and DB passwords
|
||||
- **No privileged containers** — GPU passthrough uses DeviceRequests, not --privileged
|
||||
- **Health checks don't leak data** — internal-only calls
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user