add keyring and use it for datasource credentials

docker/env/core.example.env

@@ -128,7 +128,13 @@ OXYNOTE_CORE_DB_MAX_DOCUMENT_HISTORY_ENTRIES=100
 OXYNOTE_CORE_DB_DOCUMENT_HISTORY_RETENTION=2160h
 
 # secrets
-OXYNOTE_CORE_DB_DATA_SOURCE_CREDENTIALS_SIGNING_SECRET=devsigningsecret
+# data source credentials encryption keys: comma-separated, newest first,
+# each the standard base64 of exactly 32 random bytes (`openssl rand
+# -base64 32`). The first key encrypts, every key decrypts; rotate by
+# prepending a key and dropping the old one once core has restarted.
+# The committed key below is for the dev stack only; any real deployment
+# generates its own.
+OXYNOTE_CORE_DB_DATA_SOURCE_CREDENTIALS_KEYS=wPpYGb4f7nmKRSeeVi1L1knqQa3f6pkt5CisctvQYEg=
 
 # observability
 # an empty DSN disables sentry.

docker/prod/AGENTS.md

@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ mailpit, since signup needs a verified address.
   undeclared `OXYNOTE_*` variable is a boot error.
 - **Secrets precedence** (`launcher/src/secrets.ts`): explicit env (never
   persisted) → existing volume file → generate and persist 0600. The
-  data-source encryption key cannot be rotated; never weaken this path.
+  data-source override may carry a whole keyring; the generated file holds
+  one key. Never weaken this path.
 - **Sentry DSNs are build-time only** (esbuild `--define` from Dockerfile
   ARGs); `OXYNOTE_CRASH_REPORTING_DISABLED` is the only runtime switch. The
   launcher keeps its own DSN (`bakedLauncherSentryDsn`) to report a child

docker/prod/README.md

@@ -94,12 +94,23 @@ owner-only permissions — keep that volume.
 - Unless an object store is configured, every uploaded image lives there
   too, under `/oxynote/data/object-storage`.
 - **Losing the volume signs everyone out, permanently orphans every stored
-  data-source credential** — the encryption key cannot be rotated — **and
-  takes the uploaded images, and the embedded database, with it.**
+  data-source credential, and takes the uploaded images, and the embedded
+  database, with it.**
 - Two advanced overrides exist for migrating an existing deployment in:
   `OXYNOTE_AUTH_SECRET` (session/token signing) and
-  `OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEY` (exactly 16, 24, or 32 bytes). An
-  override always wins and is never written to disk.
+  `OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS` (comma-separated, newest first,
+  each the standard base64 of exactly 32 bytes). An override always wins
+  and is never written to disk.
+- To rotate the data-source encryption key, read the current key from
+  `secrets/data-source-encryption-key` on the volume (or from your
+  existing override), set `OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS` to
+  `<new key>,<current key>` and restart: core re-encrypts every stored
+  credential under the new key at boot and logs how many it moved. On a
+  later restart set the override to `<new key>` alone. The override is
+  never written back, so from then on it stays set; to return to the
+  generated file instead, write `<new key>` into
+  `secrets/data-source-encryption-key` before dropping the override, or
+  core boots with only the retired key and reads no credential.
 
 ## Security model
 

docker/prod/launcher/src/env.test.ts

@@ -528,43 +528,67 @@ describe("loadConfig", () => {
 			const config = loadConfig(completeEnv())
 
 			expect(config.authSecret).toBeUndefined()
-			expect(config.dataSourceEncryptionKey).toBeUndefined()
+			expect(config.dataSourceEncryptionKeys).toBeUndefined()
 		})
 
 		it.for([
-			{ name: "16", input: "0123456789abcdef" },
-			{ name: "24", input: "0123456789abcdef01234567" },
 			{
-				name: "32",
-				input: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
+				name: "one key",
+				input: "MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZjAxMjM0NTY3ODlhYmNkZWY=",
+			},
+			{
+				name: "two keys",
+				input: "MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZjAxMjM0NTY3ODlhYmNkZWY=, ZmVkY2JhOTg3NjU0MzIxMGZlZGNiYTk4NzY1NDMyMTA=",
 			},
 		])(
-			"accepts a $name byte encryption key",
+			"accepts $name as the encryption keys",
 			({ input }, { expect }) => {
 				const config = loadConfig(
 					completeEnv({
-						OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
+						OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS:
 							input,
 					}),
 				)
 
-				expect(config.dataSourceEncryptionKey).toBe(
+				expect(config.dataSourceEncryptionKeys).toBe(
 					input,
 				)
 			},
 		)
 
-		it("rejects an encryption key of any other length", ({
-			expect,
-		}) => {
-			expect(() =>
-				loadConfig(
-					completeEnv({
-						OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEY:
-							"tooshort",
-					}),
-				),
-			).toThrow("OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEY")
-		})
+		it.for([
+			{
+				name: "a raw 32-byte string",
+				input: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
+			},
+			{
+				name: "base64 of 16 bytes",
+				input: "MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZg==",
+			},
+			{
+				name: "one bad key among good ones",
+				input: "MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZjAxMjM0NTY3ODlhYmNkZWY=,tooshort",
+			},
+			{
+				name: "non-canonical base64",
+				input: "MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZjAxMjM0NTY3ODlhYmNkZWZ=",
+			},
+			{
+				name: "the same key twice",
+				input: "MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZjAxMjM0NTY3ODlhYmNkZWY=,MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZjAxMjM0NTY3ODlhYmNkZWY=",
+			},
+		])(
+			"rejects $name as the encryption keys",
+			({ input }, { expect }) => {
+				expect(() =>
+					loadConfig(
+						completeEnv({
+							OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS:
+								input,
+						}),
+					),
+				).toThrow("OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS")
+			},
+		)
 	})
 })

docker/prod/launcher/src/env.ts

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ export interface Config {
 	crashReportingDisabled: boolean
 	// explicit secret overrides; unset means generate-and-persist.
 	authSecret: string | undefined
-	dataSourceEncryptionKey: string | undefined
+	dataSourceEncryptionKeys: string | undefined
 }
 
 // every URL here is dialed or redirected to, so the scheme is pinned: bare
@@ -266,19 +266,39 @@ const smtpDsn = z
 		}
 	})
 
-// the key encrypts stored data-source credentials with AES, which accepts
-// exactly these lengths; core never validates it and would fail on the
-// first credential save instead.
-const encryptionKey = z
+// the standard base64 encoding of exactly 32 bytes, as core's strict
+// decoder reads it: 43 characters and one pad, and the last character
+// carries two zero padding bits, which leaves it 16 of the alphabet.
+const dataSourceKeyPattern = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]{42}[AEIMQUYcgkosw048]=$/
+
+// the keys encrypt stored data-source credentials: a comma-separated list,
+// newest first, each the standard base64 of exactly 32 bytes and none
+// listed twice. Core refuses to boot on anything else, so the check here
+// names the public variable.
+const encryptionKeys = z
 	.string()
 	.optional()
 	.refine(
 		(value) =>
 			value === undefined ||
-			[16, 24, 32].includes(
-				new TextEncoder().encode(value).length,
-			),
-		{ error: "must be exactly 16, 24, or 32 bytes" },
+			value
+				.split(",")
+				.every((key) =>
+					dataSourceKeyPattern.test(key.trim()),
+				),
+		{ error: "every key must be base64 of exactly 32 bytes" },
+	)
+	.refine(
+		(value) => {
+			if (value === undefined) {
+				return true
+			}
+
+			const keys = value.split(",").map((key) => key.trim())
+
+			return new Set(keys).size === keys.length
+		},
+		{ error: "lists the same key twice" },
 	)
 
 // the value core parses with Go's time.ParseDuration.
@@ -384,7 +404,7 @@ const baseSchema = z.object({
 	OXYNOTE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL: httpUrl().optional(),
 	OXYNOTE_CRASH_REPORTING_DISABLED: flag(),
 	OXYNOTE_AUTH_SECRET: z.string().optional(),
-	OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: encryptionKey,
+	OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS: encryptionKeys,
 })
 
 type ParsedValues = z.infer<typeof baseSchema>
@@ -617,7 +637,7 @@ export function loadConfig(source: Record<string, string | undefined>): Config {
 		privacyPolicyUrl: values.OXYNOTE_PRIVACY_POLICY_URL ?? "",
 		crashReportingDisabled: values.OXYNOTE_CRASH_REPORTING_DISABLED,
 		authSecret: values.OXYNOTE_AUTH_SECRET,
-		dataSourceEncryptionKey:
-			values.OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEY,
+		dataSourceEncryptionKeys:
+			values.OXYNOTE_DATA_SOURCE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS,
 	}
 }

docker/prod/launcher/src/index.ts

@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
 
 	const { secrets, report } = ensureSecrets(join(dataDir, "secrets"), {
 		authSecret: config.authSecret,
-		dataSourceEncryptionKey: config.dataSourceEncryptionKey,
+		dataSourceEncryptionKeys: config.dataSourceEncryptionKeys,
 	})
 
 	for (const name of report.generated) {

docker/prod/launcher/src/mapping.test.ts

@@ -195,9 +195,8 @@ describe("buildChildEnvs", () => {
 				.OXYNOTE_AUTH_REALTIME_BETTER_AUTH_SECRET,
 		).toBe("test-auth-secret")
 		expect(
-			envs.core
-				.OXYNOTE_CORE_DB_DATA_SOURCE_CREDENTIALS_SIGNING_SECRET,
-		).toBe("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef")
+			envs.core.OXYNOTE_CORE_DB_DATA_SOURCE_CREDENTIALS_KEYS,
+		).toBe("MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZjAxMjM0NTY3ODlhYmNkZWY=")
 		expect(
 			Object.values(envs.web).includes("test-auth-secret"),
 		).toBe(false)

docker/prod/launcher/src/mapping.ts

@@ -164,8 +164,8 @@ export function buildChildEnvs(
 			config.maxDocumentHistoryEntries,
 		OXYNOTE_CORE_DB_DOCUMENT_HISTORY_RETENTION:
 			config.documentHistoryRetention,
-		OXYNOTE_CORE_DB_DATA_SOURCE_CREDENTIALS_SIGNING_SECRET:
-			secrets.dataSourceEncryptionKey,
+		OXYNOTE_CORE_DB_DATA_SOURCE_CREDENTIALS_KEYS:
+			secrets.dataSourceEncryptionKeys,
 		OXYNOTE_CORE_EMAIL_SMTP_HOST: config.smtp?.host ?? "",
 		OXYNOTE_CORE_EMAIL_SMTP_PORT: config.smtp?.port ?? "",
 		OXYNOTE_CORE_EMAIL_SMTP_USERNAME: config.smtp?.username ?? "",

docker/prod/launcher/src/secrets.test.ts

@@ -16,9 +16,12 @@ function tempDir(): string {
 
 const noOverrides = {
 	authSecret: undefined,
-	dataSourceEncryptionKey: undefined,
+	dataSourceEncryptionKeys: undefined,
 }
 
+// a key in the shape ensureSecrets generates.
+const validKey = "MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZjAxMjM0NTY3ODlhYmNkZWY="
+
 describe("ensureSecrets", () => {
 	it("generates every secret on first boot and persists it", ({
 		expect,
@@ -27,9 +30,19 @@ describe("ensureSecrets", () => {
 
 		const { secrets, report } = ensureSecrets(dir, noOverrides)
 
-		for (const value of Object.values(secrets)) {
+		// 32 random bytes as standard base64, the one key of a fresh
+		// keyring
+		expect(secrets.dataSourceEncryptionKeys).toMatch(
+			/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]{43}=$/,
+		)
+
+		for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(secrets)) {
+			if (name === "dataSourceEncryptionKeys") {
+				continue
+			}
+
 			// 24 random bytes as base64url — 32 ASCII characters,
-			// satisfying the AES-256 and 32-byte signing constraints
+			// satisfying the 32-byte signing constraints
 			expect(value).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32}$/)
 		}
 
@@ -92,7 +105,7 @@ describe("ensureSecrets", () => {
 
 		const { secrets, report } = ensureSecrets(dir, {
 			authSecret: "operator-provided",
-			dataSourceEncryptionKey: undefined,
+			dataSourceEncryptionKeys: undefined,
 		})
 
 		expect(secrets.authSecret).toBe("operator-provided")
@@ -100,6 +113,35 @@ describe("ensureSecrets", () => {
 		expect(readdirSync(dir)).not.toContain("auth-secret")
 	})
 
+	it("passes an overridden keyring through as it is", ({ expect }) => {
+		const dir = tempDir()
+		const keys = `${validKey},ZmVkY2JhOTg3NjU0MzIxMGZlZGNiYTk4NzY1NDMyMTA=`
+
+		const { secrets, report } = ensureSecrets(dir, {
+			authSecret: undefined,
+			dataSourceEncryptionKeys: keys,
+		})
+
+		expect(secrets.dataSourceEncryptionKeys).toBe(keys)
+		expect(report.fromEnv).toEqual(["data-source-encryption-key"])
+		expect(readdirSync(dir)).not.toContain(
+			"data-source-encryption-key",
+		)
+	})
+
+	it("reuses a stored data-source key of the right shape", ({
+		expect,
+	}) => {
+		const dir = tempDir()
+
+		mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true })
+		writeFileSync(join(dir, "data-source-encryption-key"), validKey)
+
+		const { secrets } = ensureSecrets(dir, noOverrides)
+
+		expect(secrets.dataSourceEncryptionKeys).toBe(validKey)
+	})
+
 	it("keeps an overridden secret out of the volume across boots", ({
 		expect,
 	}) => {
@@ -107,11 +149,11 @@ describe("ensureSecrets", () => {
 
 		ensureSecrets(dir, {
 			authSecret: "operator-provided",
-			dataSourceEncryptionKey: undefined,
+			dataSourceEncryptionKeys: undefined,
 		})
 		const { secrets } = ensureSecrets(dir, {
 			authSecret: "operator-provided",
-			dataSourceEncryptionKey: undefined,
+			dataSourceEncryptionKeys: undefined,
 		})
 
 		expect(secrets.authSecret).toBe("operator-provided")

docker/prod/launcher/src/secrets.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { join } from "node:path"
 
 export interface Secrets {
 	authSecret: string
-	dataSourceEncryptionKey: string
+	dataSourceEncryptionKeys: string
 	githubInstallationSigningSecret: string
 	slackInstallationSigningSecret: string
 	databasePassword: string
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export interface Secrets {
 
 export interface SecretOverrides {
 	authSecret: string | undefined
-	dataSourceEncryptionKey: string | undefined
+	dataSourceEncryptionKeys: string | undefined
 }
 
 export interface SecretReport {
@@ -41,13 +41,23 @@ function readSecret(path: string): string | undefined {
 	}
 }
 
+// generateAscii draws 24 random bytes as base64url, which is exactly the 32
+// ASCII bytes core's installation signing secrets must be.
+function generateAscii(): string {
+	return randomBytes(24).toString("base64url")
+}
+
+// generateDataSourceKey draws the 32 random bytes of one AES-256 key, in
+// the base64 form core's keyring reads.
+function generateDataSourceKey(): string {
+	return randomBytes(32).toString("base64")
+}
+
 // ensureSecrets resolves every internal secret with the precedence the
 // established all-in-one images use: an explicit override wins and is never
 // written to disk, an existing volume file is reused, and only a secret
 // with neither is generated — from the CSPRNG — and persisted with
-// owner-only permissions. Everything generated is 32 ASCII bytes, which
-// satisfies both the AES-256 key length the data-source encryption needs
-// and core's exactly-32-byte installation signing secrets.
+// owner-only permissions.
 export function ensureSecrets(
 	dir: string,
 	overrides: SecretOverrides,
@@ -58,7 +68,11 @@ export function ensureSecrets(
 		fromEnv: [],
 	}
 
-	function resolve(file: string, override?: string): string {
+	function resolve(
+		file: string,
+		generate: () => string,
+		override?: string,
+	): string {
 		if (override !== undefined) {
 			report.fromEnv.push(file)
 
@@ -74,8 +88,7 @@ export function ensureSecrets(
 			return existing
 		}
 
-		// base64url of 24 random bytes is exactly 32 ASCII bytes.
-		const value = randomBytes(24).toString("base64url")
+		const value = generate()
 
 		try {
 			mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 })
@@ -108,18 +121,25 @@ export function ensureSecrets(
 	}
 
 	const secrets: Secrets = {
-		authSecret: resolve("auth-secret", overrides.authSecret),
-		dataSourceEncryptionKey: resolve(
+		authSecret: resolve(
+			"auth-secret",
+			generateAscii,
+			overrides.authSecret,
+		),
+		dataSourceEncryptionKeys: resolve(
 			"data-source-encryption-key",
-			overrides.dataSourceEncryptionKey,
+			generateDataSourceKey,
+			overrides.dataSourceEncryptionKeys,
 		),
 		githubInstallationSigningSecret: resolve(
 			"github-installation-signing-secret",
+			generateAscii,
 		),
 		slackInstallationSigningSecret: resolve(
 			"slack-installation-signing-secret",
+			generateAscii,
 		),
-		databasePassword: resolve("database-password"),
+		databasePassword: resolve("database-password", generateAscii),
 	}
 
 	return { secrets, report }

docker/prod/launcher/src/test-helpers.ts

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ export function testConfig(overrides: Partial<Config> = {}): Config {
 		privacyPolicyUrl: "",
 		crashReportingDisabled: false,
 		authSecret: undefined,
-		dataSourceEncryptionKey: undefined,
+		dataSourceEncryptionKeys: undefined,
 		...overrides,
 	}
 }
@@ -74,7 +74,8 @@ export function testConfig(overrides: Partial<Config> = {}): Config {
 export function testSecrets(): Secrets {
 	return {
 		authSecret: "test-auth-secret",
-		dataSourceEncryptionKey: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
+		dataSourceEncryptionKeys:
+			"MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZjAxMjM0NTY3ODlhYmNkZWY=",
 		githubInstallationSigningSecret: "github-installation-secret",
 		slackInstallationSigningSecret: "slack-installation-secret",
 		databasePassword: "test-database-password",

e2e/docker-compose.dev.yaml

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ services:
       - OXYNOTE_CORE_SERVER_PUBLIC_URL=http://localhost:18080/core
       - OXYNOTE_CORE_BASE_APP_URL=http://localhost:18080
       - OXYNOTE_CORE_ORIGINS=http://localhost:18080,localhost:18080
-      - OXYNOTE_CORE_DB_DATA_SOURCE_CREDENTIALS_SIGNING_SECRET=e2esigningsecret
+      - OXYNOTE_CORE_DB_DATA_SOURCE_CREDENTIALS_KEYS=49i0eQzCx6VZfY7ZSravUYR4CvvsDtkQlG4wPnizm+Y=
       - OXYNOTE_CORE_EMAIL_SMTP_HOST=mailpit
       - OXYNOTE_CORE_EMAIL_SMTP_PORT=1025
       - OXYNOTE_CORE_EMAIL_SMTP_TLS=none

server/core/cmd/core/main.go

@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/internal/storage"
 	storageFS "github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/internal/storage/fs"
 	storageS3 "github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/internal/storage/s3"
+	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/cryptoutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/ioutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/logutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/metricutil"
@@ -117,13 +118,19 @@ func main() { //nolint:maintidx // main performs linear wiring of all components
 		return
 	}
 
+	dataSourceKeys, err := cryptoutil.ParseKeyring(buildinfo.Getenv("DB_DATA_SOURCE_CREDENTIALS_KEYS"))
+	if err != nil {
+		fail(log, closers, "invalid "+buildinfo.EnvName("DB_DATA_SOURCE_CREDENTIALS_KEYS"), err)
+		return
+	}
+
 	dbc, err := db.New(log, metrics, db.Options{
-		DSN:                                buildinfo.Getenv("DB_DSN"),
-		MaxNotifications:                   _maxNotifications,
-		MaxSlackMessages:                   _maxSlackMessages,
-		MaxDocumentHistoryEntries:          maxDocumentHistoryEntries,
-		DocumentHistoryRetention:           documentHistoryRetention,
-		DataSourceCredentialsSigningSecret: buildinfo.Getenv("DB_DATA_SOURCE_CREDENTIALS_SIGNING_SECRET"),
+		DSN:                       buildinfo.Getenv("DB_DSN"),
+		MaxNotifications:          _maxNotifications,
+		MaxSlackMessages:          _maxSlackMessages,
+		MaxDocumentHistoryEntries: maxDocumentHistoryEntries,
+		DocumentHistoryRetention:  documentHistoryRetention,
+		DataSourceCredentialsKeys: dataSourceKeys,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		fail(log, closers, "cannot create a database connection", err)
@@ -132,6 +139,23 @@ func main() { //nolint:maintidx // main performs linear wiring of all components
 
 	closers = append([]io.Closer{dbc}, closers...)
 
+	// a key prepended to the keyring is only safe to drop once nothing is
+	// sealed under the one it replaced, so every row moves before the
+	// process serves anything.
+	moved, unreadable, err := dbc.ReencryptDataSourceCredentials(context.Background())
+	if err != nil {
+		fail(log, closers, "cannot re-encrypt data source credentials", err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	if moved > 0 {
+		log.Info("moved data source credentials to the newest key", "count", moved)
+	}
+
+	if unreadable > 0 {
+		log.Warn("data source credentials no configured key can read", "count", unreadable)
+	}
+
 	// an empty VALKEY_DSN is a deployment running without valkey at
 	// all. The nil pool is what tells the assistant to keep its
 	// conversations in this process instead.

server/core/internal/datasource/datasource_test.go

@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
 package datasource
 
 import (
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/guregu/null/v5"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/internal/datasource/processor"
+	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/cryptoutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/testutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/timeutil"
 	"github.com/rs/xid"
@@ -23,8 +25,11 @@ func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
 func undecryptableCredentials(t *testing.T) processor.Credentials {
 	t.Helper()
 
+	keys, err := cryptoutil.ParseKeyring(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef")))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
 	creds := processor.NewCredentials([]byte("ciphertext"))
-	require.Error(t, creds.Decrypt("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"))
+	require.Error(t, creds.Decrypt(keys, nil))
 
 	return creds
 }

server/core/internal/datasource/processor/processor.go

@@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ const (
 	// ConnectionStatusNotReadOnly indicates that the connection is not read-only.
 	ConnectionStatusNotReadOnly ConnectionStatus = "not_read_only"
 
-	// ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret indicates that the stored credentials
-	// cannot be decrypted with the configured signing secret.
-	ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret ConnectionStatus = "invalid_signing_secret"
+	// ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey indicates that the stored
+	// credentials cannot be decrypted with the configured keys.
+	ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey ConnectionStatus = "invalid_encryption_key"
 )
 
 // Error returns an error corresponding to the ConnectionStatus.
@@ -61,11 +61,11 @@ func (cs ConnectionStatus) Error() error {
 		return errutil.New(http.StatusBadRequest, "data_source.version_not_supported", "The data source version is not supported.")
 	case ConnectionStatusNotReadOnly:
 		return errutil.New(http.StatusBadRequest, "data_source.not_read_only", "The data source connection must be read-only.")
-	case ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret:
+	case ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey:
 		return errutil.New(
 			http.StatusBadRequest,
-			"data_source.invalid_signing_secret",
-			"The data source credentials cannot be decrypted and must be entered again.",
+			"data_source.invalid_encryption_key",
+			"The data source credentials cannot be decrypted with the configured keys and must be entered again.",
 		)
 	default:
 		return nil
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ type Credentials struct {
 	data []byte
 
 	// unreadable indicates that the stored credentials could not be
-	// decrypted, which is what a signing secret rotated since they were
-	// written leaves behind. Only Decrypt can decide it, so credentials
+	// decrypted, which is what a key dropped since they were written
+	// leaves behind. Only Decrypt can decide it, so credentials
 	// carrying it are the ones that came out of a failed read and no
 	// others.
 	unreadable bool
@@ -143,39 +143,42 @@ func (c *Credentials) Scan(src any) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// Encrypt encrypts the credentials using the provided signing key.
+// Encrypt encrypts the credentials under the keyring's newest key, bound to
+// the associated data, which is the owning row's id.
 //
 // Credentials that could not be read encrypt to nothing, so writing them back
-// would replace the stored ciphertext — still readable once the right secret
+// would replace the stored ciphertext — still readable once the right key
 // returns — with an encryption of the emptiness left in its place. They are
 // refused instead.
-func (c *Credentials) Encrypt(signingKey string) ([]byte, error) {
+func (c *Credentials) Encrypt(keys *cryptoutil.Keyring, aad []byte) ([]byte, error) {
 	if !c.IsValid() {
 		return nil, errors.New("cannot encrypt credentials that could not be decrypted")
 	}
 
-	state, err := cryptoutil.EncryptText(string(c.data), []byte(signingKey))
+	sealed, err := keys.Encrypt(c.data, aad)
 	if err != nil {
+		// NOCOV: crypto/rand failures cannot be simulated in tests.
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to encrypt credentials: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	return []byte(state), nil
+	return sealed, nil
 }
 
-// Decrypt decrypts the stored credentials using the provided signing key.
+// Decrypt decrypts the stored credentials with whichever key of the keyring
+// sealed them, given the same associated data Encrypt was handed.
 //
 // Credentials it cannot read are emptied and marked unreadable rather than
 // left holding ciphertext nobody can use, so every later reader is told the
 // same thing the error says here.
-func (c *Credentials) Decrypt(signingKey string) error {
-	decrypted, err := cryptoutil.DecryptText(string(c.data), []byte(signingKey))
+func (c *Credentials) Decrypt(keys *cryptoutil.Keyring, aad []byte) error {
+	decrypted, err := keys.Decrypt(c.data, aad)
 	if err != nil {
 		*c = Credentials{unreadable: true}
 
 		return fmt.Errorf("failed to decrypt credentials: %w", err)
 	}
 
-	*c = Credentials{data: []byte(decrypted)}
+	*c = Credentials{data: decrypted}
 
 	return nil
 }

server/core/internal/datasource/processor/processor_test.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package processor
 import (
 	"context"
 	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ import (
 	mysqlDriver "github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql"
 	"github.com/orlangure/gnomock"
 	pgDocker "github.com/orlangure/gnomock/preset/postgres"
+	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/cryptoutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/errutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/testutil"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
@@ -21,8 +23,18 @@ import (
 	"go.uber.org/goleak"
 )
 
-// _testSigningKey is a 32-byte AES key used by credentials crypto tests.
-const _testSigningKey = "01234567890123456789012345678901"
+// _testKeys is the keyring used by credentials crypto tests.
+var _testKeys = func() *cryptoutil.Keyring {
+	keys, err := cryptoutil.ParseKeyring(base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("01234567890123456789012345678901")))
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("cannot parse test keyring: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	return keys
+}()
+
+// _testAAD is the associated data credentials crypto tests seal with.
+var _testAAD = []byte("data-source-id")
 
 const (
 	// _testDB is the database name used in the throwaway containers.
@@ -197,12 +209,12 @@ func Test_ConnectionStatus_Error(t *testing.T) {
 			Status: ConnectionStatusNotReadOnly,
 			Err:    errutil.New(http.StatusBadRequest, "data_source.not_read_only", "The data source connection must be read-only."),
 		},
-		"Invalid signing secret status": {
-			Status: ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret,
+		"Invalid encryption key status": {
+			Status: ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey,
 			Err: errutil.New(
 				http.StatusBadRequest,
-				"data_source.invalid_signing_secret",
-				"The data source credentials cannot be decrypted and must be entered again.",
+				"data_source.invalid_encryption_key",
+				"The data source credentials cannot be decrypted with the configured keys and must be entered again.",
 			),
 		},
 		"Success status": {
@@ -260,8 +272,8 @@ func Test_Credentials_IsValid(t *testing.T) {
 	assert.True(t, empty.IsValid())
 
 	// only a decrypt that could not make sense of them says otherwise.
-	unreadable := NewCredentials([]byte("not-hex-encoded"))
-	require.Error(t, unreadable.Decrypt(_testSigningKey))
+	unreadable := NewCredentials([]byte("not-sealed"))
+	require.Error(t, unreadable.Decrypt(_testKeys, _testAAD))
 	assert.False(t, unreadable.IsValid())
 }
 
@@ -319,25 +331,21 @@ func Test_Credentials_Encrypt(t *testing.T) {
 
 	c := NewCredentials([]byte(`{"username":"user"}`))
 
-	// error
-	_, err := c.Encrypt("short-key")
-	assert.Error(t, err)
-
 	// success
-	data, err := c.Encrypt(_testSigningKey)
+	data, err := c.Encrypt(_testKeys, _testAAD)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NotEmpty(t, data)
 
 	decrypted := NewCredentials(data)
-	require.NoError(t, decrypted.Decrypt(_testSigningKey))
+	require.NoError(t, decrypted.Decrypt(_testKeys, _testAAD))
 	assert.Equal(t, c, decrypted)
 
 	// credentials a decrypt could not read are refused, so the ciphertext
 	// they came from is never overwritten by an encryption of nothing.
-	unreadable := NewCredentials([]byte("not-hex-encoded"))
-	require.Error(t, unreadable.Decrypt(_testSigningKey))
+	unreadable := NewCredentials([]byte("not-sealed"))
+	require.Error(t, unreadable.Decrypt(_testKeys, _testAAD))
 
-	_, err = unreadable.Encrypt(_testSigningKey)
+	_, err = unreadable.Encrypt(_testKeys, _testAAD)
 	assert.Error(t, err)
 }
 
@@ -345,22 +353,27 @@ func Test_Credentials_Decrypt(t *testing.T) {
 	t.Parallel()
 
 	// error
-	c := NewCredentials([]byte("not-hex-encoded"))
-	assert.Error(t, c.Decrypt(_testSigningKey))
+	c := NewCredentials([]byte("not-sealed"))
+	assert.Error(t, c.Decrypt(_testKeys, _testAAD))
 
 	// what it could not read is dropped rather than left as ciphertext
 	// nobody can use, and says so to every later reader.
 	assert.False(t, c.IsValid())
 	assert.Equal(t, Credentials{unreadable: true}, c)
 
-	// success
+	// error - sealed for another row
 	original := NewCredentials([]byte(`{"username":"user"}`))
 
-	data, err := original.Encrypt(_testSigningKey)
+	data, err := original.Encrypt(_testKeys, _testAAD)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	c = NewCredentials(data)
-	require.NoError(t, c.Decrypt(_testSigningKey))
+	assert.Error(t, c.Decrypt(_testKeys, []byte("other-id")))
+	assert.False(t, c.IsValid())
+
+	// success
+	c = NewCredentials(data)
+	require.NoError(t, c.Decrypt(_testKeys, _testAAD))
 	assert.Equal(t, original, c)
 }
 

server/core/internal/datasource/runner.go

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func (r *runner) Type() Type {
 // data source in use, which is the observation worth keeping.
 func (r *runner) TestConnection(ctx context.Context) (processor.ConnectionStatus, error) {
 	if !r.ds.Credentials.IsValid() {
-		return processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret, nil
+		return processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey, nil
 	}
 
 	if err := r.ensurePrepared(); err != nil {
@@ -131,9 +131,9 @@ func connect[C any](ctx context.Context, r *runner, allowed ...Type) (C, error)
 	// attempting: there is nothing left to authenticate with, and the data
 	// source would answer for the empty login rather than for the reason.
 	if !r.ds.Credentials.IsValid() {
-		r.recordStatus(ctx, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret)
+		r.recordStatus(ctx, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey)
 
-		return zero, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret.Error()
+		return zero, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey.Error()
 	}
 
 	if err := r.ensurePrepared(); err != nil {

server/core/internal/datasource/runner_test.go

@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ func Test_runner_TestConnection(t *testing.T) {
 		"Credentials that cannot be decrypted": {
 			Type:          TypePrometheus,
 			Undecryptable: true,
-			Result:        processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret,
+			Result:        processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey,
 		},
 		"A connection that answers": {
 			Type:    TypePrometheus,
@@ -355,11 +355,11 @@ func Test_connect(t *testing.T) {
 	r.ds.Credentials = undecryptableCredentials(t)
 
 	_, err = connect[Prometheus](context.Background(), r, TypePrometheus)
-	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret.Error(), err)
+	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey.Error(), err)
 
 	ff = store.UpdateDataSourceStatusCalls()
 	require.Len(t, ff, 1)
-	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret, ff[0].Status)
+	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey, ff[0].Status)
 
 	// the wanted client is not one this data source serves
 	_, err = connect[Prometheus](context.Background(), prepRunner(TypePostgreSQL, "", nil), TypePrometheus)

server/core/internal/db/data_source.go

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import (
 
 // InsertDataSource inserts a data source into the database.
 func (a *agent) InsertDataSource(ctx context.Context, ds *datasource.DataSource) error {
-	safeCredentials, err := ds.Credentials.Encrypt(a.opts.DataSourceCredentialsSigningSecret)
+	safeCredentials, err := ds.Credentials.Encrypt(a.opts.DataSourceCredentialsKeys, ds.ID.Bytes())
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ func (a *agent) InsertDataSource(ctx context.Context, ds *datasource.DataSource)
 
 // UpdateDataSource updates an existing data source in the database.
 func (a *agent) UpdateDataSource(ctx context.Context, ds *datasource.DataSource) error {
-	safeCredentials, err := ds.Credentials.Encrypt(a.opts.DataSourceCredentialsSigningSecret)
+	safeCredentials, err := ds.Credentials.Encrypt(a.opts.DataSourceCredentialsKeys, ds.ID.Bytes())
 	if err != nil {
 		return err
 	}
@@ -90,6 +90,70 @@ func (a *agent) UpdateDataSourceStatus(
 	return err
 }
 
+// ReencryptDataSourceCredentials moves every data source's credentials onto
+// the newest key and reports how many rows it rewrote and how many no key
+// reads. It is what lets an operator drop a retired key: once it returns,
+// nothing is sealed under any other key.
+//
+// It deliberately spans every organization: it belongs to boot, and no
+// consumer interface lists it. Rows already on the newest key are left
+// alone without being decrypted. Unreadable rows keep their ciphertext, as
+// every read does, and surface through their status on first use.
+func (a *agent) ReencryptDataSourceCredentials(ctx context.Context) (int, int, error) {
+	keys := a.opts.DataSourceCredentialsKeys
+
+	var moved, unreadable int
+
+	q, args := a.builder.Select("id", "credentials").
+		From("data_sources").
+		MustSql()
+
+	var rows []struct {
+		ID          xid.ID `db:"id"`
+		Credentials []byte `db:"credentials"`
+	}
+
+	if err := sqlx.SelectContext(ctx, a.sql, &rows, q, args...); err != nil {
+		return 0, 0, err
+	}
+
+	for _, row := range rows {
+		if keys.IsCurrent(row.Credentials) {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		plaintext, err := keys.Decrypt(row.Credentials, row.ID.Bytes())
+		if err != nil {
+			unreadable++
+
+			continue
+		}
+
+		sealed, err := keys.Encrypt(plaintext, row.ID.Bytes())
+		if err != nil {
+			// NOCOV: crypto/rand failures cannot be simulated in tests.
+			return moved, unreadable, err
+		}
+
+		q, args := a.builder.Update("data_sources").
+			SetMap(map[string]any{
+				"credentials": sealed,
+			}).
+			Where(sq.Eq{
+				"id": row.ID,
+			}).
+			MustSql()
+
+		if _, err := a.sql.ExecContext(ctx, q, args...); err != nil {
+			return moved, unreadable, err
+		}
+
+		moved++
+	}
+
+	return moved, unreadable, nil
+}
+
 // DeleteDataSource removes a data source from the database.
 func (a *agent) DeleteDataSource(ctx context.Context, id xid.ID, organizationID string) error {
 	q, args := a.builder.Delete("data_sources").
@@ -119,7 +183,7 @@ func (a *agent) FetchDataSource(ctx context.Context, id xid.ID, organizationID s
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	if err := ds.Credentials.Decrypt(a.opts.DataSourceCredentialsSigningSecret); err != nil {
+	if err := ds.Credentials.Decrypt(a.opts.DataSourceCredentialsKeys, ds.ID.Bytes()); err != nil {
 		if merr := a.markCredentialsUndecryptable(ctx, ds); merr != nil {
 			return nil, merr
 		}
@@ -144,7 +208,7 @@ func (a *agent) FetchDataSources(ctx context.Context, organizationID string) ([]
 	}
 
 	for i := range sources {
-		if err := sources[i].Credentials.Decrypt(a.opts.DataSourceCredentialsSigningSecret); err != nil {
+		if err := sources[i].Credentials.Decrypt(a.opts.DataSourceCredentialsKeys, sources[i].ID.Bytes()); err != nil {
 			if merr := a.markCredentialsUndecryptable(ctx, &sources[i]); merr != nil {
 				return nil, merr
 			}
@@ -155,19 +219,19 @@ func (a *agent) FetchDataSources(ctx context.Context, organizationID string) ([]
 }
 
 // markCredentialsUndecryptable records on a data source's row that its stored
-// credentials cannot be read with the configured signing secret. The failed
-// Decrypt has already marked the credentials themselves.
+// credentials cannot be read with the configured keys. The failed Decrypt has
+// already marked the credentials themselves.
 //
-// The ciphertext is left alone — a secret restored later decrypts it again —
-// but the data source travels carrying the status that says why, so a rotated
-// secret surfaces as one broken connection rather than as a read that fails
-// for everything the organization owns.
+// The ciphertext is left alone — a key restored later decrypts it again — but
+// the data source travels carrying the status that says why, so a dropped
+// key surfaces as one broken connection rather than as a read that fails for
+// everything the organization owns.
 func (a *agent) markCredentialsUndecryptable(ctx context.Context, ds *datasource.DataSource) error {
-	if ds.Status == processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret {
+	if ds.Status == processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey {
 		return nil
 	}
 
-	ds.Status = processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret
+	ds.Status = processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey
 
 	return a.UpdateDataSourceStatus(ctx, ds.ID, ds.OrganizationID, ds.Status)
 }

server/core/internal/db/data_source_test.go

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ func prepDataSources(t *testing.T, db *DB, count int, fn func(int, *datasource.D
 
 		res[i] = ds
 
-		safeCredentials, err := ds.Credentials.Encrypt(db.opts.DataSourceCredentialsSigningSecret)
+		safeCredentials, err := ds.Credentials.Encrypt(db.opts.DataSourceCredentialsKeys, ds.ID.Bytes())
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 
 		q, args := db.builder.Insert("data_sources").
@@ -87,19 +87,19 @@ func Test_agent_InsertDataSource(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	type tcase struct {
-		InvalidSecret bool
-		DataSource    *datasource.DataSource
-		Err           error
+		DataSource *datasource.DataSource
+		Err        error
 	}
 
 	cc := map[string]func(*testing.T, *DB) tcase{
-		"Invalid signing secret": func(t *testing.T, db *DB) tcase {
-			org := prepOrganizations(t, db, 1)[0]
+		"Credentials that could not be read are refused": func(t *testing.T, db *DB) tcase {
+			ds := stubDataSource(prepOrganizations(t, db, 1)[0], "Data Source 1")
+			ds.Credentials = processor.NewCredentials([]byte("garbage"))
+			require.Error(t, ds.Credentials.Decrypt(_dataSourceKeys, ds.ID.Bytes()))
 
 			return tcase{
-				InvalidSecret: true,
-				DataSource:    stubDataSource(org, "Data Source 1"),
-				Err:           assert.AnError,
+				DataSource: ds,
+				Err:        assert.AnError,
 			}
 		},
 		"Duplicate name within the organization": func(t *testing.T, db *DB) tcase {
@@ -130,10 +130,6 @@ func Test_agent_InsertDataSource(t *testing.T) {
 			db := prepTempDB(t)
 			c := cfn(t, db)
 
-			if c.InvalidSecret {
-				db.opts.DataSourceCredentialsSigningSecret = "bad"
-			}
-
 			err := db.InsertDataSource(context.Background(), c.DataSource)
 			testutil.RequireEqualError(t, c.Err, err)
 
@@ -150,21 +146,11 @@ func Test_agent_InsertDataSource(t *testing.T) {
 
 func Test_agent_UpdateDataSource(t *testing.T) {
 	type tcase struct {
-		InvalidSecret bool
-		DataSource    *datasource.DataSource
-		Err           error
+		DataSource *datasource.DataSource
+		Err        error
 	}
 
 	cc := map[string]func(*testing.T, *DB) tcase{
-		"Invalid signing secret": func(t *testing.T, db *DB) tcase {
-			ds := prepDataSources(t, db, 1, nil)[0]
-
-			return tcase{
-				InvalidSecret: true,
-				DataSource:    ds,
-				Err:           assert.AnError,
-			}
-		},
 		"Successful update": func(t *testing.T, db *DB) tcase {
 			ds := prepDataSources(t, db, 1, nil)[0]
 			ds.Name = "Updated Data Source"
@@ -186,10 +172,6 @@ func Test_agent_UpdateDataSource(t *testing.T) {
 			db := prepTempDB(t)
 			c := cfn(t, db)
 
-			if c.InvalidSecret {
-				db.opts.DataSourceCredentialsSigningSecret = "bad"
-			}
-
 			err := db.UpdateDataSource(context.Background(), c.DataSource)
 			testutil.RequireEqualError(t, c.Err, err)
 
@@ -269,6 +251,112 @@ func Test_agent_UpdateDataSource(t *testing.T) {
 	})
 }
 
+func Test_agent_ReencryptDataSourceCredentials(t *testing.T) {
+	type tcase struct {
+		CancelledContext bool
+		Moved            int
+		Unreadable       int
+		Err              error
+		// Check inspects the rows the sweep left behind.
+		Check func(t *testing.T, db *DB)
+	}
+
+	cc := map[string]func(*testing.T, *DB) tcase{
+		"Cancelled context": func(t *testing.T, db *DB) tcase {
+			prepDataSources(t, db, 1, nil)
+
+			return tcase{
+				CancelledContext: true,
+				Err:              assert.AnError,
+			}
+		},
+		"No data sources": func(*testing.T, *DB) tcase {
+			return tcase{}
+		},
+		"Rows on the newest key are left alone": func(t *testing.T, db *DB) tcase {
+			sources := prepDataSources(t, db, 2, nil)
+			before := [][]byte{
+				fetchDataSourceCredentials(t, db, sources[0].ID),
+				fetchDataSourceCredentials(t, db, sources[1].ID),
+			}
+
+			return tcase{
+				Check: func(t *testing.T, db *DB) {
+					assert.Equal(t, before[0], fetchDataSourceCredentials(t, db, sources[0].ID))
+					assert.Equal(t, before[1], fetchDataSourceCredentials(t, db, sources[1].ID))
+				},
+			}
+		},
+		"Rows sealed under a retired key are moved": func(t *testing.T, db *DB) tcase {
+			// the rows are written while the retired key was the only
+			// one, then the keyring gains the key that replaces it.
+			db.opts.DataSourceCredentialsKeys = mustParseKeys(_retiredDataSourceKey)
+			retired := prepDataSources(t, db, 1, nil)[0]
+
+			db.opts.DataSourceCredentialsKeys = mustParseKeys(_dataSourceKey + "," + _retiredDataSourceKey)
+			current := prepDataSources(t, db, 1, nil)[0]
+
+			return tcase{
+				Moved: 1,
+				Check: func(t *testing.T, db *DB) {
+					assert.True(t, db.opts.DataSourceCredentialsKeys.IsCurrent(fetchDataSourceCredentials(t, db, retired.ID)))
+					assert.True(t, db.opts.DataSourceCredentialsKeys.IsCurrent(fetchDataSourceCredentials(t, db, current.ID)))
+
+					// only the ciphertext changed: the row still reads as
+					// it was written, and nothing the user sees moved.
+					db.opts.DataSourceCredentialsKeys = _dataSourceKeys
+
+					res, err := db.FetchDataSource(context.Background(), retired.ID, retired.OrganizationID)
+					require.NoError(t, err)
+					testutil.AssertFilterEqual(t, retired, res)
+				},
+			}
+		},
+		"Unreadable rows are skipped": func(t *testing.T, db *DB) tcase {
+			ds := prepDataSources(t, db, 1, nil)[0]
+			poisonDataSourceCredentials(t, db, ds.ID)
+
+			return tcase{
+				Unreadable: 1,
+				Check: func(t *testing.T, db *DB) {
+					assert.Equal(t, []byte("garbage"), fetchDataSourceCredentials(t, db, ds.ID))
+					assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusSuccess, fetchDataSourceStatus(t, db, ds.ID))
+				},
+			}
+		},
+	}
+
+	for cn, cfn := range cc {
+		t.Run(cn, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			db := prepTempDB(t)
+			c := cfn(t, db)
+
+			ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
+			defer cancel()
+
+			if c.CancelledContext {
+				cancel()
+			}
+
+			moved, unreadable, err := db.ReencryptDataSourceCredentials(ctx)
+			testutil.RequireEqualError(t, c.Err, err)
+
+			if err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+
+			assert.Equal(t, c.Moved, moved)
+			assert.Equal(t, c.Unreadable, unreadable)
+
+			if c.Check != nil {
+				c.Check(t, db)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
 func Test_agent_DeleteDataSource(t *testing.T) {
 	type tcase struct {
 		CancelledContext bool
@@ -334,8 +422,8 @@ func Test_agent_DeleteDataSource(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 // poisonDataSourceCredentials overwrites a data source's stored credentials
-// with bytes no signing secret decrypts, which is what a secret rotated since
-// the credentials were written leaves behind.
+// with bytes no key decrypts, which is what a key dropped since the
+// credentials were written leaves behind.
 func poisonDataSourceCredentials(t *testing.T, db *DB, id xid.ID) {
 	t.Helper()
 
@@ -371,26 +459,45 @@ func fetchDataSourceStatus(t *testing.T, db *DB, id xid.ID) processor.Connection
 	return status
 }
 
-// rejectInvalidSigningSecretStatus installs a constraint the status cannot
+// rejectInvalidEncryptionKeyStatus installs a constraint the status cannot
 // satisfy, so the recording of an undecryptable data source fails while the
 // row itself still reads fine. It is dropped again when the test ends.
-func rejectInvalidSigningSecretStatus(t *testing.T, db *DB) {
+func rejectInvalidEncryptionKeyStatus(t *testing.T, db *DB) {
 	t.Helper()
 
 	// NOT VALID leaves the rows already carrying the status alone; the
 	// constraint still refuses every write that arrives after it.
 	_, err := db.sql.Exec(
-		`ALTER TABLE data_sources ADD CONSTRAINT status_not_invalid_signing_secret ` +
-			`CHECK (status <> 'invalid_signing_secret') NOT VALID`,
+		`ALTER TABLE data_sources ADD CONSTRAINT status_not_invalid_encryption_key ` +
+			`CHECK (status <> 'invalid_encryption_key') NOT VALID`,
 	)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 
 	t.Cleanup(func() {
-		_, err := db.sql.Exec(`ALTER TABLE data_sources DROP CONSTRAINT status_not_invalid_signing_secret`)
+		_, err := db.sql.Exec(`ALTER TABLE data_sources DROP CONSTRAINT status_not_invalid_encryption_key`)
 		require.NoError(t, err)
 	})
 }
 
+// fetchDataSourceCredentials reads a data source's stored ciphertext as it
+// is.
+func fetchDataSourceCredentials(t *testing.T, db *DB, id xid.ID) []byte {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	q, args := db.builder.Select("credentials").
+		From("data_sources").
+		Where(sq.Eq{
+			"id": id,
+		}).
+		MustSql()
+
+	var credentials []byte
+
+	require.NoError(t, db.sql.Get(&credentials, q, args...))
+
+	return credentials
+}
+
 func Test_agent_FetchDataSource(t *testing.T) {
 	db := prepTempDB(t)
 
@@ -407,20 +514,20 @@ func Test_agent_FetchDataSource(t *testing.T) {
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NotNil(t, res)
 	assert.False(t, res.Credentials.IsValid())
-	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret, res.Status)
-	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret, fetchDataSourceStatus(t, db, ds.ID))
+	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey, res.Status)
+	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey, fetchDataSourceStatus(t, db, ds.ID))
 
 	// success - undecryptable credentials already recorded
 	res, err = db.FetchDataSource(context.Background(), ds.ID, ds.OrganizationID)
 	require.NoError(t, err)
 	require.NotNil(t, res)
 	assert.False(t, res.Credentials.IsValid())
-	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret, res.Status)
+	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey, res.Status)
 
 	// error - undecryptable credentials cannot be recorded
 	ds = prepDataSources(t, db, 1, nil)[0]
 	poisonDataSourceCredentials(t, db, ds.ID)
-	rejectInvalidSigningSecretStatus(t, db)
+	rejectInvalidEncryptionKeyStatus(t, db)
 
 	res, err = db.FetchDataSource(context.Background(), ds.ID, ds.OrganizationID)
 	require.Error(t, err)
@@ -465,8 +572,8 @@ func Test_agent_FetchDataSources(t *testing.T) {
 	testutil.AssertFilterEqual(t, *mixed[0], res[0])
 
 	assert.False(t, res[1].Credentials.IsValid())
-	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret, res[1].Status)
-	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret, fetchDataSourceStatus(t, db, mixed[1].ID))
+	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey, res[1].Status)
+	assert.Equal(t, processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey, fetchDataSourceStatus(t, db, mixed[1].ID))
 
 	// error - undecryptable credentials cannot be recorded
 	org = prepOrganizations(t, db, 1)[0]
@@ -475,7 +582,7 @@ func Test_agent_FetchDataSources(t *testing.T) {
 	})[0]
 
 	poisonDataSourceCredentials(t, db, ds.ID)
-	rejectInvalidSigningSecretStatus(t, db)
+	rejectInvalidEncryptionKeyStatus(t, db)
 
 	res, err = db.FetchDataSources(context.Background(), org)
 	require.Error(t, err)

server/core/internal/db/db.go

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/jmoiron/sqlx"
 	"github.com/lann/builder"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/internal/tag"
+	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/cryptoutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/errutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/ioutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/metricutil"
@@ -103,9 +104,11 @@ type Options struct {
 	// Zero means no age limit.
 	DocumentHistoryRetention time.Duration
 
-	// DataSourceCredentialsSigningSecret is the secret used to sign
-	// data source credentials.
-	DataSourceCredentialsSigningSecret string
+	// DataSourceCredentialsKeys holds the keys data source credentials
+	// are encrypted with. The first key encrypts; every key decrypts.
+	// It must be set: New does not check it, and a nil keyring panics on
+	// the first credential written or read.
+	DataSourceCredentialsKeys *cryptoutil.Keyring
 }
 
 // New creates a fresh instance of database.

server/core/internal/db/db_test.go

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/orlangure/gnomock"
 	pgDocker "github.com/orlangure/gnomock/preset/postgres"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/internal/tag"
+	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/cryptoutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/errutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/ioutil"
 	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/metricutil"
@@ -34,12 +35,29 @@ const (
 	_pgUser string = "pgtest"
 	_pgPass string = "pgpass"
 
-	// _dataSourceSecret is the credentials signing secret used by
-	// all temporary test databases. It must be a valid AES key
-	// length (32 bytes).
-	_dataSourceSecret string = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
+	// _dataSourceKey is the base64 credentials encryption key every
+	// temporary test database is configured with.
+	_dataSourceKey = "MDEyMzQ1Njc4OWFiY2RlZjAxMjM0NTY3ODlhYmNkZWY="
+
+	// _retiredDataSourceKey is a base64 credentials encryption key no
+	// temporary test database is configured with unless a test says so.
+	_retiredDataSourceKey = "ZmVkY2JhOTg3NjU0MzIxMGZlZGNiYTk4NzY1NDMyMTA="
 )
 
+// _dataSourceKeys is the keyring every temporary test database is
+// configured with.
+var _dataSourceKeys = mustParseKeys(_dataSourceKey)
+
+// mustParseKeys parses a keyring list or panics.
+func mustParseKeys(list string) *cryptoutil.Keyring {
+	keys, err := cryptoutil.ParseKeyring(list)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("cannot parse test keyring: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	return keys
+}
+
 func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
 	container, err := gnomock.Start(pgDocker.Preset(
 		pgDocker.WithUser(
@@ -281,8 +299,8 @@ func prepTempDB(t *testing.T) *DB {
 	name := uniuri.NewLenChars(10, []byte("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"))
 
 	opts := Options{
-		DSN:                                fmt.Sprintf("postgres://%s:%s@%s/%s?sslmode=disable", _pgUser, _pgPass, _pgDSN, name),
-		DataSourceCredentialsSigningSecret: _dataSourceSecret,
+		DSN:                       fmt.Sprintf("postgres://%s:%s@%s/%s?sslmode=disable", _pgUser, _pgPass, _pgDSN, name),
+		DataSourceCredentialsKeys: _dataSourceKeys,
 	}
 
 	tmpDB, err := sqlx.Connect(

server/core/internal/server/internal/datasource/http_test.go

@@ -558,14 +558,14 @@ func Test_Handler_TestDataSourceConnection(t *testing.T) {
 		"Credentials that cannot be decrypted are reported": {
 			DB: func() *DBMock {
 				ds := stubDataSource(datasourceCore.TypePrometheus)
-				ds.Status = processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret
+				ds.Status = processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey
 
 				return stubDB(ds, nil)
 			}(),
-			Clients: &clientMocks{status: processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidSigningSecret, statusErr: nil},
+			Clients: &clientMocks{status: processor.ConnectionStatusInvalidEncryptionKey, statusErr: nil},
 			ID:      _testID.String(),
 			Checks: checks(
-				hasResp(http.StatusOK, `{"status":"invalid_signing_secret"}`),
+				hasResp(http.StatusOK, `{"status":"invalid_encryption_key"}`),
 				// the read already recorded the status, and a write here
 				// would store an encryption of the credentials it could
 				// not read in place of the ones it could not.

server/core/pkg/cryptoutil/cryptoutil_test.go

@@ -6,8 +6,13 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
 	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+	"go.uber.org/goleak"
 )
 
+func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
+	goleak.VerifyTestMain(m)
+}
+
 func Test_EncryptText(t *testing.T) {
 	// Invalid key length.
 	encryptedText, err := EncryptText("text", []byte("key"))

server/core/pkg/cryptoutil/keyring.go

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+package cryptoutil
+
+import (
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"strings"
+)
+
+const (
+	// _keyringVersion is the version byte every Keyring ciphertext starts
+	// with. A later layout bumps it, so rows written by both can coexist.
+	_keyringVersion byte = 1
+
+	// _keyIDSize is the length of the key id a ciphertext carries.
+	_keyIDSize = 8
+
+	// _keyringHeaderSize is the length of the version byte and key id
+	// that precede the nonce.
+	_keyringHeaderSize = 1 + _keyIDSize
+)
+
+var (
+	// ErrEmptyKeyring is returned when the keyring list holds no key.
+	ErrEmptyKeyring = errors.New("keyring holds no keys")
+
+	// ErrDuplicateKey is returned when the keyring lists a key twice.
+	ErrDuplicateKey = errors.New("keyring lists the same key twice")
+
+	// ErrUnknownVersion is returned when a ciphertext starts with a
+	// version byte this keyring does not read.
+	ErrUnknownVersion = errors.New("ciphertext version is not supported")
+
+	// ErrUnknownKey is returned when a ciphertext names a key the keyring
+	// does not hold.
+	ErrUnknownKey = errors.New("ciphertext was sealed with a key the keyring does not hold")
+
+	// ErrCiphertextTooShort is returned when a ciphertext cannot even hold
+	// its header and nonce.
+	ErrCiphertextTooShort = errors.New("ciphertext too short")
+)
+
+// keyringKey is one key of a Keyring, identified by the first bytes of its
+// SHA-256 so operators never have to name keys.
+type keyringKey struct {
+	id   [_keyIDSize]byte
+	aead cipher.AEAD
+}
+
+// Keyring holds the AES-256-GCM keys data is sealed and opened with. The
+// first key seals; every key opens what it sealed. Rotation is prepending a
+// key, re-encrypting what the old one sealed, and dropping the old one.
+type Keyring struct {
+	keys []keyringKey
+	byID map[[_keyIDSize]byte]cipher.AEAD
+}
+
+// ParseKeyring parses a comma-separated list of keys, newest first, each
+// the standard base64 encoding of exactly KeySize random bytes.
+func ParseKeyring(list string) (*Keyring, error) {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(list) == "" {
+		return nil, ErrEmptyKeyring
+	}
+
+	kr := &Keyring{
+		byID: make(map[[_keyIDSize]byte]cipher.AEAD),
+	}
+
+	for i, entry := range strings.Split(list, ",") {
+		key, err := base64.StdEncoding.Strict().DecodeString(strings.TrimSpace(entry))
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("key %d: %w", i+1, err)
+		}
+
+		if len(key) != KeySize {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("key %d: %w", i+1, ErrInvalidKeySize)
+		}
+
+		kk, err := newKeyringKey(key)
+		if err != nil {
+			// NOCOV: aes.NewCipher and cipher.NewGCM cannot fail with a
+			// key of KeySize bytes.
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("key %d: %w", i+1, err)
+		}
+
+		if _, ok := kr.byID[kk.id]; ok {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("key %d: %w", i+1, ErrDuplicateKey)
+		}
+
+		kr.keys = append(kr.keys, kk)
+		kr.byID[kk.id] = kk.aead
+	}
+
+	return kr, nil
+}
+
+// Encrypt seals the plaintext under the newest key, bound to the associated
+// data, which Decrypt must be handed again. The result is the version byte,
+// the key id, the nonce and the sealed bytes.
+func (k *Keyring) Encrypt(plaintext, aad []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	kk := k.keys[0]
+	nonceSize := kk.aead.NonceSize()
+
+	out := make([]byte, _keyringHeaderSize+nonceSize, _keyringHeaderSize+nonceSize+len(plaintext)+kk.aead.Overhead())
+	out[0] = _keyringVersion
+	copy(out[1:], kk.id[:])
+
+	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, out[_keyringHeaderSize:]); err != nil {
+		// NOCOV: crypto/rand failures cannot be simulated in tests.
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	return kk.aead.Seal(out, out[_keyringHeaderSize:], plaintext, aad), nil
+}
+
+// Decrypt opens a ciphertext Encrypt produced under any key the keyring
+// holds, given the same associated data.
+func (k *Keyring) Decrypt(ciphertext, aad []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	if len(ciphertext) < _keyringHeaderSize {
+		return nil, ErrCiphertextTooShort
+	}
+
+	if ciphertext[0] != _keyringVersion {
+		return nil, ErrUnknownVersion
+	}
+
+	aead, ok := k.byID[[_keyIDSize]byte(ciphertext[1:_keyringHeaderSize])]
+	if !ok {
+		return nil, ErrUnknownKey
+	}
+
+	rest := ciphertext[_keyringHeaderSize:]
+	if len(rest) < aead.NonceSize() {
+		return nil, ErrCiphertextTooShort
+	}
+
+	return aead.Open(nil, rest[:aead.NonceSize()], rest[aead.NonceSize():], aad)
+}
+
+// IsCurrent reports whether the ciphertext was sealed under the newest key.
+// Anything the keyring would not read at all is not current either.
+func (k *Keyring) IsCurrent(ciphertext []byte) bool {
+	return len(ciphertext) >= _keyringHeaderSize &&
+		ciphertext[0] == _keyringVersion &&
+		[_keyIDSize]byte(ciphertext[1:_keyringHeaderSize]) == k.keys[0].id
+}
+
+// newKeyringKey derives the key's id and prepares its cipher.
+func newKeyringKey(key []byte) (keyringKey, error) {
+	block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
+	if err != nil {
+		return keyringKey{}, err
+	}
+
+	aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(block)
+	if err != nil {
+		return keyringKey{}, err
+	}
+
+	sum := sha256.Sum256(key)
+
+	return keyringKey{
+		id:   [_keyIDSize]byte(sum[:_keyIDSize]),
+		aead: aead,
+	}, nil
+}

server/core/pkg/cryptoutil/keyring_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+package cryptoutil
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/oxynote/oxynote/server/core/pkg/testutil"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
+	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+)
+
+var (
+	// _keyA is a base64 test key.
+	_keyA = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, KeySize))
+
+	// _keyB is another base64 test key.
+	_keyB = base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(bytes.Repeat([]byte{'b'}, KeySize))
+)
+
+// testKeyring parses the given keys or fails the test.
+func testKeyring(t *testing.T, keys ...string) *Keyring {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	kr, err := ParseKeyring(joinKeys(keys...))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	return kr
+}
+
+// joinKeys builds the list ParseKeyring reads.
+func joinKeys(keys ...string) string {
+	return strings.Join(keys, ",")
+}
+
+func Test_ParseKeyring(t *testing.T) {
+	cc := map[string]struct {
+		List   string
+		Result [][KeySize]byte
+		Err    error
+	}{
+		"Empty list": {
+			List: "",
+			Err:  ErrEmptyKeyring,
+		},
+		"Whitespace only": {
+			List: "  ",
+			Err:  ErrEmptyKeyring,
+		},
+		"Invalid base64": {
+			List: "not base64!",
+			Err:  assert.AnError,
+		},
+		"Key of 16 bytes": {
+			List: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, 16)),
+			Err:  assert.AnError,
+		},
+		"Key of 33 bytes": {
+			List: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, 33)),
+			Err:  assert.AnError,
+		},
+		"Duplicate key": {
+			List: joinKeys(_keyA, _keyB, _keyA),
+			Err:  assert.AnError,
+		},
+		"Trailing comma": {
+			List: _keyA + ",",
+			Err:  assert.AnError,
+		},
+		"One key": {
+			List:   _keyA,
+			Result: [][KeySize]byte{[KeySize]byte(bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, KeySize))},
+		},
+		"Two keys keep their order": {
+			List: " " + _keyB + " , " + _keyA,
+			Result: [][KeySize]byte{
+				[KeySize]byte(bytes.Repeat([]byte{'b'}, KeySize)),
+				[KeySize]byte(bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, KeySize)),
+			},
+		},
+	}
+
+	for cn, c := range cc {
+		t.Run(cn, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			kr, err := ParseKeyring(c.List)
+			testutil.AssertEqualError(t, c.Err, err)
+
+			if err != nil {
+				assert.Nil(t, kr)
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			require.NotNil(t, kr)
+			require.Len(t, kr.keys, len(c.Result))
+			assert.Len(t, kr.byID, len(c.Result))
+
+			for i, key := range c.Result {
+				sum := sha256.Sum256(key[:])
+				assert.Equal(t, [_keyIDSize]byte(sum[:_keyIDSize]), kr.keys[i].id)
+				assert.Equal(t, kr.keys[i].aead, kr.byID[kr.keys[i].id])
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func Test_Keyring_Encrypt(t *testing.T) {
+	kr := testKeyring(t, _keyA, _keyB)
+
+	out, err := kr.Encrypt([]byte("text"), []byte("aad"))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	sum := sha256.Sum256(bytes.Repeat([]byte{'a'}, KeySize))
+	nonceSize := kr.keys[0].aead.NonceSize()
+
+	assert.Equal(t, _keyringVersion, out[0])
+	assert.Equal(t, sum[:_keyIDSize], out[1:_keyringHeaderSize])
+	assert.Len(t, out, _keyringHeaderSize+nonceSize+len("text")+kr.keys[0].aead.Overhead())
+
+	// a second call draws a fresh nonce.
+	again, err := kr.Encrypt([]byte("text"), []byte("aad"))
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.NotEqual(t, out[_keyringHeaderSize:_keyringHeaderSize+nonceSize], again[_keyringHeaderSize:_keyringHeaderSize+nonceSize])
+}
+
+func Test_Keyring_Decrypt(t *testing.T) {
+	sealed := func(t *testing.T, kr *Keyring) []byte {
+		t.Helper()
+
+		out, err := kr.Encrypt([]byte("text"), []byte("aad"))
+		require.NoError(t, err)
+
+		return out
+	}
+
+	cc := map[string]struct {
+		Keyring    *Keyring
+		Ciphertext []byte
+		AAD        []byte
+		Result     []byte
+		Err        error
+	}{
+		"Too short for the header": {
+			Keyring:    testKeyring(t, _keyA),
+			Ciphertext: []byte{_keyringVersion, 1, 2},
+			AAD:        []byte("aad"),
+			Err:        ErrCiphertextTooShort,
+		},
+		"Too short for the nonce": {
+			Keyring:    testKeyring(t, _keyA),
+			Ciphertext: sealed(t, testKeyring(t, _keyA))[:_keyringHeaderSize+3],
+			AAD:        []byte("aad"),
+			Err:        ErrCiphertextTooShort,
+		},
+		"Unknown version": {
+			Keyring: testKeyring(t, _keyA),
+			Ciphertext: func() []byte {
+				out := sealed(t, testKeyring(t, _keyA))
+				out[0] = 2
+
+				return out
+			}(),
+			AAD: []byte("aad"),
+			Err: ErrUnknownVersion,
+		},
+		"Unknown key": {
+			Keyring:    testKeyring(t, _keyA),
+			Ciphertext: sealed(t, testKeyring(t, _keyB)),
+			AAD:        []byte("aad"),
+			Err:        ErrUnknownKey,
+		},
+		"Associated data mismatch": {
+			Keyring:    testKeyring(t, _keyA),
+			Ciphertext: sealed(t, testKeyring(t, _keyA)),
+			AAD:        []byte("other"),
+			Err:        assert.AnError,
+		},
+		"Tampered ciphertext": {
+			Keyring: testKeyring(t, _keyA),
+			Ciphertext: func() []byte {
+				out := sealed(t, testKeyring(t, _keyA))
+				out[len(out)-1] ^= 1
+
+				return out
+			}(),
+			AAD: []byte("aad"),
+			Err: assert.AnError,
+		},
+		"Sealed under a retired key": {
+			Keyring:    testKeyring(t, _keyB, _keyA),
+			Ciphertext: sealed(t, testKeyring(t, _keyA)),
+			AAD:        []byte("aad"),
+			Result:     []byte("text"),
+		},
+		"Sealed under the newest key": {
+			Keyring:    testKeyring(t, _keyA, _keyB),
+			Ciphertext: sealed(t, testKeyring(t, _keyA)),
+			AAD:        []byte("aad"),
+			Result:     []byte("text"),
+		},
+	}
+
+	for cn, c := range cc {
+		t.Run(cn, func(t *testing.T) {
+			t.Parallel()
+
+			res, err := c.Keyring.Decrypt(c.Ciphertext, c.AAD)
+			testutil.AssertEqualError(t, c.Err, err)
+
+			if err != nil {
+				assert.Nil(t, res)
+
+				return
+			}
+
+			assert.Equal(t, c.Result, res)
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+func Test_Keyring_IsCurrent(t *testing.T) {
+	kr := testKeyring(t, _keyA, _keyB)
+
+	out, err := kr.Encrypt([]byte("text"), nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+
+	// too short
+	assert.False(t, kr.IsCurrent(out[:_keyringHeaderSize-1]))
+
+	// unknown version
+	other := bytes.Clone(out)
+	other[0] = 2
+	assert.False(t, kr.IsCurrent(other))
+
+	// retired key
+	retired, err := testKeyring(t, _keyB).Encrypt([]byte("text"), nil)
+	require.NoError(t, err)
+	assert.False(t, kr.IsCurrent(retired))
+
+	// newest key
+	assert.True(t, kr.IsCurrent(out))
+}

web/app/utils/api/data-source/index.ts

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ export enum DataSourceStatus {
 	Unreachable = "unreachable",
 	VersionNotSupported = "version_not_supported",
 	NotReadOnly = "not_read_only",
-	InvalidSigningSecret = "invalid_signing_secret",
+	InvalidEncryptionKey = "invalid_encryption_key",
 
 	// local-only
 	LocalOptimisticInsert = "local_optimistic_insert", // aka pending
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ export const DataSourceErrorStatuses = [
 	DataSourceStatus.Unreachable,
 	DataSourceStatus.VersionNotSupported,
 	DataSourceStatus.NotReadOnly,
-	DataSourceStatus.InvalidSigningSecret,
+	DataSourceStatus.InvalidEncryptionKey,
 ] as const
 
 export interface DataSource {

web/i18n/locales/en/settings.json

@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@
 							},
 							"description": "The data source user has write access, but Oxynote only needs read permissions. Please provide a read-only user to continue"
 						},
-						"invalid_signing_secret": {
+						"invalid_encryption_key": {
 							"title": {
 								"creation": "{name} couldn't be connected",
 								"update": "{name} couldn't be updated"