diff --git a/cubic.yaml b/cubic.yaml
index ff99b6be1fa..de660c02fc5 100644
--- a/cubic.yaml
+++ b/cubic.yaml
@@ -107,6 +107,88 @@ reviews:
         - Exports, types, configs
         - Metadata files
         - Version files
+    - name: Security Review
+      description: |-
+        Proactively review PRs and flag security vulnerabilities specific to n8n's architecture:
+
+        **Code Execution & Sandboxing:**
+        - Changes that weaken expression evaluation sandbox protections
+        - Modifications to Code node sandboxes (JavaScript/Python) that reduce isolation
+        - New access to Node.js builtins or external modules in sandboxed contexts
+        - Prototype pollution or constructor access bypasses
+        - Weakening of prototype sanitizers or function context validators
+        - Changes that expose `process.env` access in Code nodes
+
+        **Credential & Secret Handling:**
+        - Credentials being logged or exposed in error messages
+        - Hardcoded secrets, API keys, or tokens in code
+        - Changes to credential encryption/decryption that weaken security
+        - OAuth state/CSRF token handling that bypasses validation
+        - Webhook requests that don't sanitize auth cookies
+        - External secrets provider integrations with insecure configurations
+        - Credential access not respecting scope boundaries (instance/project/user)
+        - Data fetched via credentials being exposed to unauthorized user groups
+
+        **Authentication & Session Security:**
+        - JWT token handling that weakens validation or expiration
+        - Missing or disabled cookie security flags (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite)
+        - Changes that bypass MFA enforcement
+        - SSO/SAML/OIDC authentication flows with validation gaps
+        - OAuth 2.0 implementations missing PKCE or with weak redirect URI validation
+
+        **Authorization & Access Control:**
+        - Missing or bypassed RBAC and scope-based permission checks
+        - Missing credential permission validation before workflow execution
+        - Subworkflow execution that bypasses caller policies or ownership validation
+        - Missing project-level or resource-level access controls
+
+        **License Enforcement:**
+        - Changes that weaken license enforcement
+        - Missing `FeatureNotLicensedError` for unlicensed feature access
+        - Bypassed license quota checks
+        - New licensed features without proper middleware or module-level enforcement
+        - New controller endpoints in `*.ee.ts` files that access licensed features without `@Licensed` decorator
+        - `@Licensed` decorator usage that doesn't match feature requirements (check `LICENSE_FEATURES` in `@n8n/constants`)
+        - Endpoints in `*.ee.ts` files with `@GlobalScope` or `@ProjectScope` but missing `@Licensed` (license check is separate from permission check)
+        - Preferred pattern: `@Licensed` decorator over custom licensing middleware
+        - Decorator order should be: route decorator → `@Licensed` → scope decorators
+        - Enterprise features not properly isolated in modules (newer features should use the module system)
+        - Enterprise code accessible outside of `*.ee.ts` files or licensed modules
+
+        **Input Validation & Injection Prevention:**
+        - Unsanitized user input flowing to file paths
+        - SQL nodes with expressions in query fields without parameterization
+        - Command execution nodes with unsanitized shell arguments
+        - Path traversal risks in file operation nodes
+        - Community package names with suspicious patterns
+
+        **File System Access:**
+        - Changes that weaken file access restriction enforcement
+        - File operations that bypass allowlist/blocklist patterns
+        - Access to n8n internal directories
+
+        **Database Security & Performance:**
+        - Missing indexes on frequently queried columns in migrations
+        - Resource-intensive queries without pagination or limits
+        - Missing encryption for sensitive fields beyond credentials
+        - Raw SQL queries that bypass TypeORM protections
+
+        **HTTP, Webhooks & Network Security:**
+        - SSRF risks in user-controlled URLs
+        - CORS configuration that allows all origins
+        - CSP or iframe sandbox modifications that weaken protections
+        - Rate limiting configuration changes that reduce protection
+        - Disabled TLS certificate validation (`rejectUnauthorized: false`)
+
+        **Audit Logging & Event Bus:**
+        - Missing logging for security-relevant events
+        - Sensitive data appearing in logs or error messages
+        - Incomplete audit trails for authentication and authorization events
+
+        **Context-aware review:**
+        - Higher scrutiny for: expression engine, credential handling, code execution nodes, license enforcement, SSO integrations
+        - Consider n8n's security audit categories: credentials, database, nodes, instance, filesystem risks
+        - Community/custom nodes have higher risk profile than official nodes
 pr_descriptions:
   generate: false
   instructions: Each PR is supposed to have a limited scope. In your review, focus on changes made in the PR and avoid pointing out problems you found in the code that already existed.