chore: Bundle/2.x (#34680)

Co-authored-by: Charlie Kolb <charlie@n8n.io>
Co-authored-by: Guillaume Jacquart <jacquart.guillaume@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Stephen Wright <sjw948@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Bernhard Wittmann <bernhard.wittmann@n8n.io>
Co-authored-by: Nikhil Kuriakose <nikhil.kuriakose@n8n.io>
Co-authored-by: Albert Alises <albert.alises@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Michael Kret <88898367+michael-radency@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Andreas Fitzek <andreas.fitzek@n8n.io>
Co-authored-by: Elias Meire <elias@meire.dev>
Co-authored-by: Robin Braumann <50590409+bjorger@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: yehorkardash <yehor.kardash@n8n.io>
Co-authored-by: Mike Repeć <mike.repec@n8n.io>
Co-authored-by: Yuliia Pominchuk <31064937+yuliia-pominchuk@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: RomanDavydchuk <roman.davydchuk@n8n.io>

package.json

@@ -218,7 +218,8 @@
       "@lezer/highlight": "patches/@lezer__highlight.patch",
       "v-code-diff": "patches/v-code-diff.patch",
       "vuedraggable@4.1.0": "patches/vuedraggable@4.1.0.patch",
-      "assert@2.1.0": "patches/assert@2.1.0.patch"
+      "assert@2.1.0": "patches/assert@2.1.0.patch",
+      "lodash@4.18.1": "patches/lodash@4.18.1.patch"
     }
   }
 }

packages/@n8n/ai-utilities/src/__tests__/utils/http-proxy-agent.test.ts

@@ -245,6 +245,32 @@ describe('getProxyAgent', () => {
 			expect(Agent).toHaveBeenCalled();
 		});
 	});
+
+	describe('secure lookup', () => {
+		it('should build an Agent with the lookup on connect when no proxy is configured', () => {
+			const lookup = vi.fn();
+
+			const agent = getProxyAgent('https://api.openai.com/v1', undefined, lookup);
+
+			expect(Agent).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ connect: { lookup } }));
+			expect(agent).toEqual(expect.objectContaining({ type: 'Agent' }));
+			expect(ProxyAgent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+
+		it('should not attach the lookup to a ProxyAgent when a proxy is configured', () => {
+			const proxyUrl = 'https://proxy.example.com:8080';
+			process.env.HTTPS_PROXY = proxyUrl;
+			const lookup = vi.fn();
+
+			getProxyAgent('https://api.openai.com/v1', undefined, lookup);
+
+			expect(ProxyAgent).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ uri: proxyUrl }));
+			expect(ProxyAgent).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({ connect: expect.anything() }),
+			);
+			expect(Agent).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+	});
 });
 
 describe('proxyFetch', () => {

packages/@n8n/ai-utilities/src/utils/http-proxy-agent.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
  * raw dispatcher). See CAT-3377 for the consolidation this completes.
  */
 import { createHttpsProxyAgent, resolveProxyUrl } from '@n8n/backend-network/proxy'; // `@n8n/backend-network/proxy` is a DI-free subpath: it pulls in only the proxy-agent libs
+import type { LookupFunction } from 'node:net';
 /* eslint-disable n8n-local-rules/no-uncentralized-http -- langchain consumers pin undici v6, incompatible with backend-network's v7 dispatchers; see block comment below */
 import { Agent, ProxyAgent } from 'undici';
 
@@ -49,15 +50,21 @@ const PROXY_FALLBACK_TARGET = 'https://example.nonexistent/';
  * @param targetUrl - The target URL to check proxy configuration for (optional)
  * @param timeoutOptions - Optional timeout configuration to override defaults. When provided,
  *                         always returns an Agent/ProxyAgent (even without proxy) to ensure timeouts are applied.
- * @returns An Agent (no proxy with timeout options) or ProxyAgent (with proxy) configured with timeouts,
- *          or undefined if no proxy is configured and no timeout options are provided (backward compatible behavior).
+ * @param lookup - Optional DNS lookup to pin the resolved address at connect time (e.g. an egress
+ *                 filter's secure lookup). When provided (without a proxy) an Agent is always returned.
+ * @returns An Agent (no proxy with timeout options or a lookup) or ProxyAgent (with proxy) configured with timeouts,
+ *          or undefined if no proxy, timeout options, nor lookup are provided (backward compatible behavior).
  *
  * @remarks
  * When timeoutOptions are provided, this function always returns an agent to ensure timeouts are properly configured.
  * The default undici timeouts (5 minutes) are too short for many AI operations.
  * When timeoutOptions are NOT provided, returns undefined if no proxy is configured (backward compatible).
  */
-export function getProxyAgent(targetUrl?: string, timeoutOptions?: AgentTimeoutOptions) {
+export function getProxyAgent(
+	targetUrl?: string,
+	timeoutOptions?: AgentTimeoutOptions,
+	lookup?: LookupFunction,
+) {
 	const proxyUrl = resolveProxyUrl(targetUrl, PROXY_FALLBACK_TARGET);
 
 	const agentOptions = {
@@ -69,6 +76,9 @@ export function getProxyAgent(targetUrl?: string, timeoutOptions?: AgentTimeoutO
 	};
 
 	if (!proxyUrl) {
+		if (lookup) {
+			return new Agent({ ...agentOptions, connect: { lookup } });
+		}
 		if (timeoutOptions) {
 			return new Agent(agentOptions);
 		}
@@ -85,14 +95,16 @@ export function getProxyAgent(targetUrl?: string, timeoutOptions?: AgentTimeoutO
  * @param input - The URL to fetch
  * @param init - Standard fetch RequestInit options
  * @param timeoutOptions - Optional timeout configuration to override defaults
+ * @param lookup - Optional connect-time DNS lookup (e.g. an egress filter's secure lookup)
  */
 export async function proxyFetch(
 	input: RequestInfo | URL,
 	init?: RequestInit,
 	timeoutOptions?: AgentTimeoutOptions,
+	lookup?: LookupFunction,
 ): Promise<Response> {
 	const targetUrl = input instanceof Request ? input.url : input.toString();
-	const dispatcher = getProxyAgent(targetUrl, timeoutOptions);
+	const dispatcher = getProxyAgent(targetUrl, timeoutOptions, lookup);
 
 	return await fetch(input, {
 		...init,

packages/@n8n/computer-use/src/tools/filesystem/search-files.test.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import fastGlob from 'fast-glob';
 import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises';
 import * as os from 'node:os';
 import * as path from 'node:path';
@@ -5,6 +6,11 @@ import * as path from 'node:path';
 import { textOf } from '../test-utils';
 import { searchFilesTool } from './search-files';
 
+vi.mock('fast-glob', async (importOriginal) => {
+	const actual = await importOriginal<{ default: typeof fastGlob }>();
+	return { default: vi.fn(actual.default) };
+});
+
 type FileMatch = { path: string };
 type ContentMatch = { path: string; lineNumber: number; line: string };
 
@@ -252,6 +258,10 @@ describe('searchFilesTool', () => {
 	});
 
 	describe('execute — security', () => {
+		afterEach(() => {
+			vi.mocked(fastGlob).mockClear();
+		});
+
 		it.each(['/etc/passwd', '../../etc/passwd', '../../../etc/**'])(
 			'rejects pattern that escapes the base directory: %s',
 			async (pattern) => {
@@ -260,6 +270,73 @@ describe('searchFilesTool', () => {
 				);
 			},
 		);
+
+		it('drops matches that resolve outside the base even when the pattern passes', async () => {
+			// The pattern contains no literal `..`, but glob expansion produces a match
+			// that resolves outside the base directory.
+			vi.mocked(fastGlob).mockResolvedValueOnce(['../SECRET.txt']);
+
+			const result = await searchFilesTool.execute({ name: '{a,..}/SECRET.txt' }, context);
+			const data = parseResult<NameOnlyResult>(result);
+
+			expect(data.matches).toEqual([]);
+			expect(data.totalMatches).toBe(0);
+		});
+
+		it('does not read the contents of a match that resolves outside the base', async () => {
+			// `query` is set, so a match that slipped through would be read and returned.
+			vi.mocked(fastGlob).mockResolvedValueOnce(['../SECRET.txt']);
+
+			const result = await searchFilesTool.execute(
+				{ name: '{a,..}/SECRET.txt', query: 'SECRET' },
+				context,
+			);
+			const data = parseResult<ContentResult>(result);
+
+			expect(data.matches).toEqual([]);
+			expect(data.totalMatches).toBe(0);
+		});
+
+		it('keeps in-base matches while dropping ones outside the base', async () => {
+			await writeFile(baseDir, 'inside.txt', 'value');
+			// Glob expansion can yield both an in-base and an out-of-base match.
+			vi.mocked(fastGlob).mockResolvedValueOnce(['inside.txt', '../SECRET.txt']);
+
+			const result = await searchFilesTool.execute({ name: '{.,..}/inside.txt' }, context);
+			const data = parseResult<NameOnlyResult>(result);
+
+			expect(data.matches).toEqual([{ path: 'inside.txt' }]);
+			expect(data.totalMatches).toBe(1);
+		});
+
+		it('does not return a file that lives outside the base directory', async () => {
+			// The target file sits one level above the sandbox base.
+			const outerDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'search-files-outer-'));
+			const sandbox = path.join(outerDir, 'sandbox');
+			await fs.mkdir(sandbox);
+			await fs.writeFile(path.join(outerDir, 'SECRET.txt'), 'SECRET=topsecret');
+
+			// The tool either rejects the pattern or, on glob versions that expand it
+			// differently, returns no match — never the outside file's content.
+			const runSearch = async (): Promise<string> => {
+				try {
+					const result = await searchFilesTool.execute(
+						{ name: '{a,..}/SECRET.txt', query: 'SECRET' },
+						{ dir: sandbox },
+					);
+					return textOf(result);
+				} catch (error) {
+					expect(String(error)).toContain('escapes the base directory');
+					return '';
+				}
+			};
+
+			try {
+				expect(await runSearch()).not.toContain('topsecret');
+			} finally {
+				await fs.rm(outerDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+			}
+		});
 	});
 
 	describe('CallToolResult shape', () => {

packages/@n8n/computer-use/src/tools/filesystem/search-files.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 import fastGlob from 'fast-glob';
 import * as fs from 'node:fs/promises';
-import * as path from 'node:path';
 import { z } from 'zod';
 
 import type { ToolDefinition } from '../types';
@@ -62,7 +61,7 @@ export const searchFilesTool: ToolDefinition<typeof inputSchema> = {
 		const resolvedDir = await resolveReadablePath(dir, '.');
 		const limit = maxResults ?? 50;
 
-		const files = await fastGlob(name, {
+		const globbed = await fastGlob(name, {
 			cwd: resolvedDir,
 			ignore: IGNORE_PATTERNS,
 			onlyFiles: true,
@@ -70,63 +69,77 @@ export const searchFilesTool: ToolDefinition<typeof inputSchema> = {
 			suppressErrors: true,
 		});
 
+		// The literal-pattern check above cannot see paths produced by glob expansion,
+		// so re-resolve every match through the shared resolver, which re-checks
+		// containment (following symlinks safely) and drops anything outside the base.
+		const resolved = await Promise.all(
+			globbed.map(async (path) => {
+				const absolutePath = await resolveReadablePath(dir, path).catch(() => null);
+				return absolutePath ? { path, absolutePath } : null;
+			}),
+		);
+		const files = resolved.filter((file): file is ResolvedFile => file !== null);
+
 		if (!query) {
-			const matches = files.slice(0, limit).map((p) => ({ path: p }));
 			return formatCallToolResult({
 				name,
-				matches,
+				matches: files.slice(0, limit).map(({ path }) => ({ path })),
 				truncated: files.length > limit,
 				totalMatches: files.length,
 			});
 		}
 
-		const regex = new RegExp(escapeRegex(query), ignoreCase ? 'gi' : 'g');
-		const matches: Array<{ path: string; lineNumber: number; line: string }> = [];
-		let totalMatches = 0;
-
-		for (const fp of files) {
-			if (matches.length >= limit) break;
-
-			try {
-				const fullPath = path.join(resolvedDir, fp);
-				const stat = await fs.stat(fullPath);
-				if (stat.size > MAX_FILE_SIZE) continue;
-
-				const fileContent = await fs.readFile(fullPath);
-				const buffer = Buffer.isBuffer(fileContent) ? fileContent : Buffer.from(fileContent);
-				if (isLikelyBinaryContent(buffer)) continue;
-
-				const lines = buffer.toString('utf-8').split('\n');
-				for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
-					if (regex.test(lines[i])) {
-						totalMatches++;
-						if (matches.length < limit) {
-							matches.push({ path: fp, lineNumber: i + 1, line: lines[i].substring(0, 200) });
-						}
-					}
-					regex.lastIndex = 0;
-				}
-			} catch {
-				// Skip unreadable files
-			}
-		}
+		const regex = new RegExp(escapeRegex(query), ignoreCase ? 'i' : '');
+		const matches = await Promise.all(files.map(async (file) => await grepFile(file, regex))).then(
+			(results) => results.flat(),
+		);
 
 		return formatCallToolResult({
 			name,
 			query,
-			matches,
-			truncated: totalMatches > limit,
-			totalMatches,
+			matches: matches.slice(0, limit),
+			truncated: matches.length > limit,
+			totalMatches: matches.length,
 		});
 	},
 };
 
+interface ResolvedFile {
+	path: string;
+	absolutePath: string;
+}
+
 function assertPatternStaysInside(pattern: string): void {
 	if (pattern.startsWith('/') || pattern.split('/').includes('..')) {
 		throw new Error(`Pattern "${pattern}" escapes the base directory`);
 	}
 }
 
+async function grepFile(
+	file: ResolvedFile,
+	regex: RegExp,
+): Promise<Array<{ path: string; lineNumber: number; line: string }>> {
+	try {
+		const stat = await fs.stat(file.absolutePath);
+		if (stat.size > MAX_FILE_SIZE) return [];
+
+		const buffer = await fs.readFile(file.absolutePath);
+		if (isLikelyBinaryContent(buffer)) return [];
+
+		const lines = buffer.toString('utf-8').split('\n');
+		const hits: Array<{ path: string; lineNumber: number; line: string }> = [];
+		for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
+			if (regex.test(lines[i])) {
+				hits.push({ path: file.path, lineNumber: i + 1, line: lines[i].substring(0, 200) });
+			}
+		}
+		return hits;
+	} catch {
+		// Unreadable file
+		return [];
+	}
+}
+
 function escapeRegex(str: string): string {
 	return str.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
 }

packages/@n8n/expression-runtime/src/__tests__/integration.test.ts

@@ -377,6 +377,72 @@ describe('Integration: ExpressionEvaluator + IsolatedVmBridge', () => {
 		expect(result).toBe('name,age,city');
 	});
 
+	it('should not leak host references through non-index array access', () => {
+		// Reading a non-index key like $json.a.constructor must return undefined,
+		// so a guest can't walk from an array to the host Object prototype.
+		const data = { $json: { a: [1337] } };
+		const expression = `{{
+  (function() {
+    const hostLookupParams = (() => eval)()(\`(args, res) => {
+      const _copy = {copy: true};
+      const _reference = {reference: true};
+      const params = {};
+      params.arguments = args === 'copy' ? _copy : _reference;
+      params.result = res === 'copy' ? _copy : _reference;
+      return params;
+    }\`);
+    const refs = (() => eval)()(\`
+(function () { return arguments.callee.caller.caller.caller.arguments })()
+\`);
+    const getArrayElement = refs[1];
+
+    var log = [];
+
+    function t(label, fn) {
+      try {
+        const result = fn();
+        log.push(label + '=' + result);
+        return result;
+      } catch (e) {
+        log.push(label + ':ERR ' + String(e && e.message ? e.message : e));
+      }
+    }
+
+    const hostArrayPath = ['$json', 'a'];
+    const HostArray = t('host array', function() {
+      return getArrayElement.applySync(null, [hostArrayPath, 'constructor'], hostLookupParams('copy', 'reference'));
+    });
+    const HostLookupGetter = t('host lookup getter', function() {
+      return getArrayElement.applySync(null, [hostArrayPath, '__lookupGetter__'], hostLookupParams('copy', 'reference'));
+    });
+    const hostArrayInstance = t('host array instance', function() {
+      return HostArray.applySync(null, [1], hostLookupParams('copy', 'reference'));
+    });
+    const HostProtoGetter = t('host __proto__ getter', function() {
+      return HostLookupGetter.applySync(hostArrayInstance.derefInto(), ['__proto__'], hostLookupParams('copy', 'reference'));
+    });
+    const arrProto = t('host Array prototype', function() {
+      return HostProtoGetter.applySync(hostArrayInstance.derefInto(), [], hostLookupParams('copy', 'reference'));
+    });
+    const objProto = t('host Object prototype', function() {
+      return HostProtoGetter.applySync(arrProto.derefInto(), [], hostLookupParams('copy', 'reference'));
+    });
+
+    objProto.setSync('win', 1337);
+    return log;
+  })();
+}}`;
+
+		try {
+			// The bridge swallows the TypeError; what matters is the host Object
+			// prototype was never mutated.
+			evaluator.evaluate(expression, data, caller);
+			expect((Object.prototype as Record<string, unknown>).win).toBeUndefined();
+		} finally {
+			delete (Object.prototype as Record<string, unknown>).win;
+		}
+	});
+
 	it('should preserve error name, message, and custom properties across isolate boundary', () => {
 		const data = { $json: {} };
 

packages/@n8n/expression-runtime/src/bridge/isolated-vm-bridge.ts

@@ -400,8 +400,21 @@ export class IsolatedVmBridge implements RuntimeBridge {
 					return undefined;
 				}
 
+				// Only genuine array indices are reachable; anything else (e.g.
+				// 'constructor', '__lookupGetter__') would read off the prototype
+				// chain and could leak a host function reference across the boundary.
+				if (!Number.isInteger(index) || index < 0) {
+					return undefined;
+				}
+
 				const element = arr[index];
 
+				// Functions are never reachable through the data surface — mirror the
+				// guard in getValueAtPath so a host callable can't cross the boundary.
+				if (typeof element === 'function') {
+					return undefined;
+				}
+
 				// Dates have no enumerable own keys; pass through instead of
 				// marshaling as an empty object.
 				if (element instanceof Date) {

packages/@n8n/nodes-langchain/nodes/embeddings/EmbeddingsHuggingFaceInference/EmbeddingsHuggingFaceInference.node.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import type { InferenceProviderOrPolicy } from '@huggingface/inference';
 import { PROVIDERS_OR_POLICIES } from '@huggingface/inference';
 import { HuggingFaceInferenceEmbeddings } from '@langchain/community/embeddings/hf';
 import {
+	assertCredentialAllowsUrl,
 	NodeConnectionTypes,
 	NodeOperationError,
 	type INodeType,
@@ -104,6 +105,18 @@ export class EmbeddingsHuggingFaceInference implements INodeType {
 			throw new NodeOperationError(this.getNode(), 'Unsupported provider');
 		}
 
+		if (
+			'endpointUrl' in options &&
+			typeof options.endpointUrl === 'string' &&
+			options.endpointUrl
+		) {
+			assertCredentialAllowsUrl({
+				node: this.getNode(),
+				credentialData: credentials,
+				url: options.endpointUrl,
+			});
+		}
+
 		const embeddings = new HuggingFaceInferenceEmbeddings({
 			apiKey: credentials.apiKey as string,
 			model,

packages/@n8n/nodes-langchain/nodes/embeddings/test/EmbeddingsHuggingFaceInference.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+import { HuggingFaceInferenceEmbeddings } from '@langchain/community/embeddings/hf';
+import { createMockExecuteFunction } from 'n8n-nodes-base/test/nodes/Helpers';
+import type { INode, ISupplyDataFunctions } from 'n8n-workflow';
+import type { Mocked } from 'vitest';
+
+import { EmbeddingsHuggingFaceInference } from '../EmbeddingsHuggingFaceInference/EmbeddingsHuggingFaceInference.node';
+
+vi.mock('@huggingface/inference', () => ({ PROVIDERS_OR_POLICIES: ['auto'] }));
+vi.mock('@langchain/community/embeddings/hf');
+vi.mock('@n8n/ai-utilities');
+
+describe('EmbeddingsHuggingFaceInference', () => {
+	let node: EmbeddingsHuggingFaceInference;
+
+	const mockNode: INode = {
+		id: '1',
+		name: 'Embeddings HuggingFace Inference',
+		typeVersion: 1,
+		type: 'n8n-nodes-langchain.embeddingsHuggingFaceInference',
+		position: [0, 0],
+		parameters: {},
+	};
+
+	const setup = (credentials: Record<string, unknown>, options: Record<string, unknown>) => {
+		const ctx = createMockExecuteFunction<ISupplyDataFunctions>(
+			{},
+			mockNode,
+		) as Mocked<ISupplyDataFunctions>;
+		ctx.getCredentials = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(credentials);
+		ctx.getNode = vi.fn().mockReturnValue(mockNode);
+		ctx.logger = { debug: vi.fn() } as unknown as ISupplyDataFunctions['logger'];
+		ctx.getNodeParameter = vi.fn().mockImplementation((paramName: string) => {
+			if (paramName === 'modelName') return 'sentence-transformers/distilbert-base-nli-mean-tokens';
+			if (paramName === 'options') return options;
+			return undefined;
+		});
+		return ctx;
+	};
+
+	beforeEach(() => {
+		node = new EmbeddingsHuggingFaceInference();
+		vi.clearAllMocks();
+	});
+
+	it('should reject a custom endpoint URL the credential domain restriction disallows', async () => {
+		const ctx = setup(
+			{
+				apiKey: 'k',
+				allowedHttpRequestDomains: 'domains',
+				allowedDomains: 'api-inference.huggingface.co',
+			},
+			{ endpointUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:9099' },
+		);
+
+		await expect(node.supplyData.call(ctx, 0)).rejects.toThrow('Domain not allowed');
+		expect(HuggingFaceInferenceEmbeddings).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+	});
+
+	it('should allow a custom endpoint URL the credential domain restriction permits', async () => {
+		const ctx = setup(
+			{
+				apiKey: 'k',
+				allowedHttpRequestDomains: 'domains',
+				allowedDomains: 'my-endpoint.example.com',
+			},
+			{ endpointUrl: 'https://my-endpoint.example.com' },
+		);
+
+		await node.supplyData.call(ctx, 0);
+		expect(HuggingFaceInferenceEmbeddings).toHaveBeenCalled();
+	});
+});

packages/@n8n/nodes-langchain/nodes/llms/LMOpenAi/LmOpenAi.node.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { OpenAI, type ClientOptions } from '@langchain/openai';
 import { getProxyAgent, makeN8nLlmFailedAttemptHandler, N8nLlmTracing } from '@n8n/ai-utilities';
-import { NodeConnectionTypes } from 'n8n-workflow';
+import { assertCredentialAllowsUrl, NodeConnectionTypes } from 'n8n-workflow';
 import type {
 	INodeType,
 	INodeTypeDescription,
@@ -207,8 +207,17 @@ export class LmOpenAi implements INodeType {
 				const options = this.getNodeParameter('options', {}) as LmOpenAiOptions;
 
 				let uri = 'https://api.openai.com/v1/models';
+				let allowedDomains: string | undefined;
 
 				if (options.baseURL) {
+					const credentials = await this.getCredentials('openAiApi');
+					allowedDomains = assertCredentialAllowsUrl({
+						node: this.getNode(),
+						credentialData: credentials,
+						url: options.baseURL,
+						pinnedUrl: typeof credentials.url === 'string' ? credentials.url : undefined,
+						surface: 'OpenAI',
+					});
 					uri = `${options.baseURL}/models`;
 				}
 
@@ -216,6 +225,7 @@ export class LmOpenAi implements INodeType {
 					method: 'GET',
 					uri,
 					json: true,
+					allowedDomains,
 				})) as { data: Array<{ owned_by: string; id: string }> };
 
 				for (const model of data) {
@@ -264,6 +274,13 @@ export class LmOpenAi implements INodeType {
 		};
 
 		if (options.baseURL) {
+			assertCredentialAllowsUrl({
+				node: this.getNode(),
+				credentialData: credentials,
+				url: options.baseURL,
+				pinnedUrl: typeof credentials.url === 'string' ? credentials.url : undefined,
+				surface: 'OpenAI',
+			});
 			configuration.baseURL = options.baseURL;
 		}
 

packages/@n8n/nodes-langchain/nodes/llms/LMOpenHuggingFaceInference/LmOpenHuggingFaceInference.node.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { HuggingFaceInference } from '@langchain/community/llms/hf';
 import {
+	assertCredentialAllowsUrl,
 	NodeConnectionTypes,
 	type INodeType,
 	type INodeTypeDescription,
@@ -138,7 +139,15 @@ export class LmOpenHuggingFaceInference implements INodeType {
 		const credentials = await this.getCredentials('huggingFaceApi');
 
 		const modelName = this.getNodeParameter('model', itemIndex) as string;
-		const options = this.getNodeParameter('options', itemIndex, {}) as object;
+		const options = this.getNodeParameter('options', itemIndex, {}) as { endpointUrl?: string };
+
+		if (options.endpointUrl) {
+			assertCredentialAllowsUrl({
+				node: this.getNode(),
+				credentialData: credentials,
+				url: options.endpointUrl,
+			});
+		}
 
 		// LangChain does not yet support specifying Provider
 		// That's why mistral's model is the default value

packages/@n8n/nodes-langchain/nodes/llms/test/LmOpenAi.test.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 import { OpenAI } from '@langchain/openai';
 import { makeN8nLlmFailedAttemptHandler, N8nLlmTracing, getProxyAgent } from '@n8n/ai-utilities';
 import { createMockExecuteFunction } from 'n8n-nodes-base/test/nodes/Helpers';
-import type { INode, ISupplyDataFunctions } from 'n8n-workflow';
+import type { ILoadOptionsFunctions, INode, ISupplyDataFunctions } from 'n8n-workflow';
 import type { Mocked } from 'vitest';
 
 import { LmOpenAi } from '../LMOpenAi/LmOpenAi.node';
@@ -91,5 +91,102 @@ describe('LmOpenAi', () => {
 				redactedHeaders: ['x-custom-header'],
 			});
 		});
+
+		it('should reject a baseURL override that the credential domain restriction disallows', async () => {
+			const mockContext = setupMockContext({
+				apiKey: 'test-api-key',
+				allowedHttpRequestDomains: 'domains',
+				allowedDomains: 'api.openai.com',
+			});
+			mockContext.getNodeParameter = vi.fn().mockImplementation((paramName: string) => {
+				if (paramName === 'model') return 'gpt-3.5-turbo-instruct';
+				if (paramName === 'options') return { baseURL: 'http://127.0.0.1:9099/v1' };
+				return undefined;
+			});
+
+			await expect(lmOpenAi.supplyData.call(mockContext, 0)).rejects.toThrow('Domain not allowed');
+			expect(OpenAI).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+
+		it('should allow a baseURL override that the credential domain restriction permits', async () => {
+			const mockContext = setupMockContext({
+				apiKey: 'test-api-key',
+				allowedHttpRequestDomains: 'domains',
+				allowedDomains: 'api.openai.com',
+			});
+			mockContext.getNodeParameter = vi.fn().mockImplementation((paramName: string) => {
+				if (paramName === 'model') return 'gpt-3.5-turbo-instruct';
+				if (paramName === 'options') return { baseURL: 'https://api.openai.com/v1' };
+				return undefined;
+			});
+
+			await lmOpenAi.supplyData.call(mockContext, 0);
+			expect(OpenAI).toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+	});
+
+	describe('openAiModelSearch', () => {
+		const setupMockLoadContext = (
+			credentials: Record<string, unknown>,
+			options: Record<string, unknown>,
+		) => {
+			const requestWithAuthentication = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ data: [] });
+
+			return {
+				getCredentials: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(credentials),
+				getNode: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(mockNode),
+				getNodeParameter: vi.fn().mockImplementation((paramName: string) => {
+					if (paramName === 'options') return options;
+					return undefined;
+				}),
+				helpers: {
+					requestWithAuthentication,
+				},
+			} as unknown as Mocked<ILoadOptionsFunctions> & {
+				helpers: { requestWithAuthentication: typeof requestWithAuthentication };
+			};
+		};
+
+		it('should not send credentials to a domain the credential restricts', async () => {
+			const mockLoadContext = setupMockLoadContext(
+				{
+					apiKey: 'test-api-key',
+					allowedHttpRequestDomains: 'domains',
+					allowedDomains: 'api.openai.com',
+				},
+				{ baseURL: 'http://127.0.0.1:9099/v1' },
+			);
+
+			await expect(
+				lmOpenAi.methods.listSearch.openAiModelSearch.call(mockLoadContext),
+			).rejects.toThrow('Domain not allowed');
+			expect(mockLoadContext.helpers.requestWithAuthentication).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+
+		it('should forward the allowed domains to the request when the base URL is on the allowlist', async () => {
+			const mockLoadContext = setupMockLoadContext(
+				{
+					apiKey: 'test-api-key',
+					allowedHttpRequestDomains: 'domains',
+					allowedDomains: 'api.openai.com',
+				},
+				{ baseURL: 'https://api.openai.com/v1' },
+			);
+			mockLoadContext.helpers.requestWithAuthentication.mockResolvedValue({
+				data: [{ id: 'gpt-4', owned_by: 'system' }],
+			});
+
+			await expect(
+				lmOpenAi.methods.listSearch.openAiModelSearch.call(mockLoadContext),
+			).resolves.toBeDefined();
+
+			expect(mockLoadContext.helpers.requestWithAuthentication).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				'openAiApi',
+				expect.objectContaining({
+					uri: 'https://api.openai.com/v1/models',
+					allowedDomains: 'api.openai.com',
+				}),
+			);
+		});
 	});
 });

packages/@n8n/nodes-langchain/nodes/llms/test/LmOpenHuggingFaceInference.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/* eslint-disable n8n-nodes-base/node-filename-against-convention */
+import { HuggingFaceInference } from '@langchain/community/llms/hf';
+import { createMockExecuteFunction } from 'n8n-nodes-base/test/nodes/Helpers';
+import type { INode, ISupplyDataFunctions } from 'n8n-workflow';
+import type { Mocked } from 'vitest';
+
+import { LmOpenHuggingFaceInference } from '../LMOpenHuggingFaceInference/LmOpenHuggingFaceInference.node';
+
+vi.mock('@langchain/community/llms/hf');
+vi.mock('@n8n/ai-utilities');
+
+describe('LmOpenHuggingFaceInference', () => {
+	let node: LmOpenHuggingFaceInference;
+
+	const mockNode: INode = {
+		id: '1',
+		name: 'Hugging Face Inference Model',
+		typeVersion: 1,
+		type: 'n8n-nodes-langchain.lmOpenHuggingFaceInference',
+		position: [0, 0],
+		parameters: {},
+	};
+
+	const setup = (credentials: Record<string, unknown>, options: Record<string, unknown>) => {
+		const ctx = createMockExecuteFunction<ISupplyDataFunctions>(
+			{},
+			mockNode,
+		) as Mocked<ISupplyDataFunctions>;
+		ctx.getCredentials = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(credentials);
+		ctx.getNode = vi.fn().mockReturnValue(mockNode);
+		ctx.getNodeParameter = vi.fn().mockImplementation((paramName: string) => {
+			if (paramName === 'model') return 'mistralai/Mistral-Nemo-Base-2407';
+			if (paramName === 'options') return options;
+			return undefined;
+		});
+		return ctx;
+	};
+
+	beforeEach(() => {
+		node = new LmOpenHuggingFaceInference();
+		vi.clearAllMocks();
+	});
+
+	it('should reject a custom endpoint URL the credential domain restriction disallows', async () => {
+		const ctx = setup(
+			{
+				apiKey: 'k',
+				allowedHttpRequestDomains: 'domains',
+				allowedDomains: 'api-inference.huggingface.co',
+			},
+			{ endpointUrl: 'http://127.0.0.1:9099' },
+		);
+
+		await expect(node.supplyData.call(ctx, 0)).rejects.toThrow('Domain not allowed');
+		expect(HuggingFaceInference).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+	});
+
+	it('should allow a custom endpoint URL the credential domain restriction permits', async () => {
+		const ctx = setup(
+			{
+				apiKey: 'k',
+				allowedHttpRequestDomains: 'domains',
+				allowedDomains: 'my-endpoint.example.com',
+			},
+			{ endpointUrl: 'https://my-endpoint.example.com' },
+		);
+
+		await node.supplyData.call(ctx, 0);
+		expect(HuggingFaceInference).toHaveBeenCalled();
+	});
+});

packages/@n8n/nodes-langchain/nodes/mcp/McpClientTool/__test__/McpClientTool.node.test.ts

@@ -311,10 +311,15 @@ describe('McpClientTool', () => {
 			// Verify the eventSourceInit fetch injects auth headers and Accept header
 			const customFetch = vi.mocked(SSEClientTransport).mock.calls[0][1]?.eventSourceInit?.fetch;
 			await customFetch?.(url, {} as any);
-			expect(mockedProxyFetch).toHaveBeenCalledWith(url, {
-				headers: { Accept: 'text/event-stream', 'my-header': 'header-value' },
-				redirect: 'manual',
-			});
+			expect(mockedProxyFetch).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				url,
+				{
+					headers: { Accept: 'text/event-stream', 'my-header': 'header-value' },
+					redirect: 'manual',
+				},
+				undefined,
+				undefined,
+			);
 		});
 
 		it('should support bearer auth', async () => {
@@ -363,10 +368,15 @@ describe('McpClientTool', () => {
 			// Verify the eventSourceInit fetch injects auth headers and Accept header
 			const customFetch = vi.mocked(SSEClientTransport).mock.calls[0][1]?.eventSourceInit?.fetch;
 			await customFetch?.(url, {} as any);
-			expect(mockedProxyFetch).toHaveBeenCalledWith(url, {
-				headers: { Accept: 'text/event-stream', Authorization: 'Bearer my-token' },
-				redirect: 'manual',
-			});
+			expect(mockedProxyFetch).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				url,
+				{
+					headers: { Accept: 'text/event-stream', Authorization: 'Bearer my-token' },
+					redirect: 'manual',
+				},
+				undefined,
+				undefined,
+			);
 		});
 
 		it('should successfully execute a tool', async () => {

packages/@n8n/nodes-langchain/nodes/mcp/shared/__test__/utils.test.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ import { Client } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js';
 import { SSEClientTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/sse.js';
 import { StreamableHTTPClientTransport } from '@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/streamableHttp.js';
 import { proxyFetch } from '@n8n/ai-utilities';
-import type { IExecuteFunctions, INode } from 'n8n-workflow';
+import { createResultError, createResultOk } from '@n8n/utils/result';
+import type { IExecuteFunctions, INode, NodeEgressFilter } from 'n8n-workflow';
 import type { Mock, MockedClass, MockedFunction } from 'vitest';
 import { mockDeep } from 'vitest-mock-extended';
 import { expect } from 'vitest';
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ import { expect } from 'vitest';
 import type { McpAuthenticationOption } from '../types';
 import {
 	connectMcpClient,
+	connectMcpClientForCredential,
 	getAuthHeaders,
 	mapToNodeOperationError,
 	tryRefreshOAuth2Token,
@@ -675,6 +677,69 @@ describe('utils', () => {
 				expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
 				expect(mockedProxyFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
 			});
+
+			it('should block requests to a target rejected by the instance egress filter', async () => {
+				mockClient.connect.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+				mockedProxyFetch.mockResolvedValue(new Response('ok', { status: 200 }));
+
+				const secureLookup = vi.fn();
+				const egressFilter: NodeEgressFilter = {
+					validateUrl: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(createResultError(new Error('Egress blocked'))),
+					createSecureLookup: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(secureLookup),
+				};
+
+				const ctx = mockDeep<IExecuteFunctions>();
+				ctx.getNode.mockReturnValue({ type: 'test-client', typeVersion: 1 } as unknown as INode);
+				ctx.helpers.getSecureEgressFilter.mockReturnValue(egressFilter);
+
+				const result = await connectMcpClientForCredential(ctx, {
+					authentication: 'none',
+					serverTransport: transport,
+					endpointUrl: 'https://blocked.example.com/',
+					surface: 'MCP Client Tool',
+				});
+
+				expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+
+				const [, opts] = (TransportClass as Mock).mock.calls[0];
+
+				// The egress filter must reject the target before any request is sent.
+				await expect(opts.fetch('https://blocked.example.com/', {})).rejects.toThrow(
+					'Egress blocked',
+				);
+				expect(egressFilter.validateUrl).toHaveBeenCalledWith('https://blocked.example.com/');
+				expect(mockedProxyFetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+			});
+
+			it('should allow requests to a target accepted by the instance egress filter', async () => {
+				mockClient.connect.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+				mockedProxyFetch.mockResolvedValue(new Response('ok', { status: 200 }));
+
+				const secureLookup = vi.fn();
+				const egressFilter: NodeEgressFilter = {
+					validateUrl: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(createResultOk(undefined)),
+					createSecureLookup: vi.fn().mockReturnValue(secureLookup),
+				};
+
+				const ctx = mockDeep<IExecuteFunctions>();
+				ctx.getNode.mockReturnValue({ type: 'test-client', typeVersion: 1 } as unknown as INode);
+				ctx.helpers.getSecureEgressFilter.mockReturnValue(egressFilter);
+
+				const result = await connectMcpClientForCredential(ctx, {
+					authentication: 'none',
+					serverTransport: transport,
+					endpointUrl: 'https://mcp.example.com/',
+					surface: 'MCP Client Tool',
+				});
+
+				expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+
+				const [, opts] = (TransportClass as Mock).mock.calls[0];
+				await opts.fetch('https://mcp.example.com/', {});
+
+				expect(egressFilter.validateUrl).toHaveBeenCalledWith('https://mcp.example.com/');
+				expect(mockedProxyFetch).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+			});
 		});
 	});
 

packages/@n8n/nodes-langchain/nodes/mcp/shared/utils.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import type {
 	ILoadOptionsFunctions,
 	INode,
 	ISupplyDataFunctions,
+	NodeEgressFilter,
 } from 'n8n-workflow';
 import { assertCredentialAllowsUrl, assertUrlAllowed, NodeOperationError } from 'n8n-workflow';
 
@@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ export async function connectMcpClient({
 	onUnauthorized,
 	signal,
 	allowedDomains,
+	secureEgressFilter,
 }: {
 	serverTransport: McpServerTransport;
 	endpointUrl: string;
@@ -150,6 +152,12 @@ export async function connectMcpClient({
 	 * (including redirect hops) is validated against it via `assertUrlAllowed`.
 	 */
 	allowedDomains?: string;
+	/**
+	 * Instance egress filter. When set, every request (including redirect hops)
+	 * is validated against the configured egress policy, and the connection is
+	 * pinned to the validated address.
+	 */
+	secureEgressFilter?: NodeEgressFilter;
 }): Promise<Result<Client, ConnectMcpClientError>> {
 	const endpoint = normalizeAndValidateUrl(endpointUrl);
 
@@ -157,7 +165,7 @@ export async function connectMcpClient({
 		return createResultError({ type: 'invalid_url', error: endpoint.error });
 	}
 
-	const authFetch = createAuthFetch(headers, onUnauthorized, allowedDomains);
+	const authFetch = createAuthFetch(headers, onUnauthorized, allowedDomains, secureEgressFilter);
 	const client = new Client({ name, version: version.toString() }, { capabilities: {} });
 
 	let onAbort: (() => void) | undefined;
@@ -276,23 +284,30 @@ function headersToRecord(headers: HeadersInit | undefined): Record<string, strin
  *   - injects auth headers into every request,
  *   - retries once on 401 after refreshing the token via onUnauthorized,
  *   - validates the initial URL and every redirect hop against `allowedDomains`
- *     so credentials are never sent to a host the credential doesn't allow.
+ *     so credentials are never sent to a host the credential doesn't allow,
+ *   - validates the initial URL and every redirect hop against the instance
+ *     `secureEgressFilter`, and pins the connection to the validated address.
  */
 function createAuthFetch(
 	initialHeaders: Record<string, string> | undefined,
 	onUnauthorized?: OnUnauthorizedHandler,
 	allowedDomains?: string,
+	secureEgressFilter?: NodeEgressFilter,
 ): typeof fetch {
 	let headers = initialHeaders;
 
+	const secureLookup = secureEgressFilter?.createSecureLookup();
+
+	const doFetch = async (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> =>
+		await proxyFetch(
+			input,
+			{ ...init, headers: { ...headersToRecord(init?.headers), ...headers } },
+			undefined,
+			secureLookup,
+		);
+
 	const authedFetch = async (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> => {
-		const response = await proxyFetch(input, {
-			...init,
-			headers: {
-				...headersToRecord(init?.headers),
-				...headers,
-			},
-		});
+		const response = await doFetch(input, init);
 
 		if (response.status !== 401 || !onUnauthorized) {
 			return response;
@@ -304,13 +319,7 @@ function createAuthFetch(
 		}
 
 		headers = refreshedHeaders;
-		return await proxyFetch(input, {
-			...init,
-			headers: {
-				...headersToRecord(init?.headers),
-				...headers,
-			},
-		});
+		return await doFetch(input, init);
 	};
 
 	return async (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> => {
@@ -318,7 +327,13 @@ function createAuthFetch(
 		// unwrapped to their URL so the redirect loop can carry a stable input.
 		const startUrl = input instanceof Request ? input.url : input;
 		return await fetchFollowingRedirects(authedFetch, startUrl, init, {
-			onBeforeHop: (hopUrl) => assertUrlAllowed({ url: hopUrl, allowedDomains }),
+			onBeforeHop: async (hopUrl) => {
+				assertUrlAllowed({ url: hopUrl, allowedDomains });
+				if (secureEgressFilter) {
+					const result = await secureEgressFilter.validateUrl(hopUrl);
+					if (!result.ok) throw result.error;
+				}
+			},
 		});
 	};
 }
@@ -473,6 +488,7 @@ export async function connectMcpClientForCredential(
 		endpointUrl: config.endpointUrl,
 		headers,
 		allowedDomains,
+		secureEgressFilter: ctx.helpers.getSecureEgressFilter?.(),
 		name: node.type,
 		version: node.typeVersion,
 		onUnauthorized: async (h) => await tryRefreshOAuth2Token(ctx, config.authentication, h),

packages/@n8n/nodes-langchain/nodes/tools/ToolHttpRequest/test/ToolHttpRequest.node.test.ts

@@ -238,6 +238,81 @@ describe('ToolHttpRequest', () => {
 			);
 		});
 
+		it('should not send generic credentials to a domain the credential restricts', async () => {
+			executeFunctions.getNodeParameter.mockImplementation((paramName: string) => {
+				switch (paramName) {
+					case 'method':
+						return 'GET';
+					case 'url':
+						return 'http://attacker.example/exfil';
+					case 'authentication':
+						return 'genericCredentialType';
+					case 'genericAuthType':
+						return 'httpHeaderAuth';
+					case 'options':
+						return {};
+					case 'placeholderDefinitions.values':
+						return [];
+					default:
+						return undefined;
+				}
+			});
+
+			executeFunctions.getCredentials.mockResolvedValue({
+				name: 'X-Secret-Token',
+				value: 'SECRET-TOOLHTTP-CANARY',
+				allowedHttpRequestDomains: 'domains',
+				allowedDomains: 'api.example.com',
+			});
+
+			const { response } = await httpTool.supplyData.call(executeFunctions, 0);
+			const res = await (response as N8nTool).invoke({});
+
+			expect(helpers.httpRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+			expect(res).toContain('Domain not allowed');
+		});
+
+		it('should send generic credentials to a domain the credential allows', async () => {
+			helpers.httpRequest.mockResolvedValue({
+				body: 'Hello World',
+				headers: { 'content-type': 'text/plain' },
+			});
+
+			executeFunctions.getNodeParameter.mockImplementation((paramName: string) => {
+				switch (paramName) {
+					case 'method':
+						return 'GET';
+					case 'url':
+						return 'https://api.example.com/data';
+					case 'authentication':
+						return 'genericCredentialType';
+					case 'genericAuthType':
+						return 'httpHeaderAuth';
+					case 'options':
+						return {};
+					case 'placeholderDefinitions.values':
+						return [];
+					default:
+						return undefined;
+				}
+			});
+
+			executeFunctions.getCredentials.mockResolvedValue({
+				name: 'X-Secret-Token',
+				value: 'SECRET-TOOLHTTP-CANARY',
+				allowedHttpRequestDomains: 'domains',
+				allowedDomains: 'api.example.com',
+			});
+
+			const { response } = await httpTool.supplyData.call(executeFunctions, 0);
+			const res = await (response as N8nTool).invoke({});
+
+			expect(helpers.httpRequest).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({ allowedDomains: 'api.example.com' }),
+			);
+			expect(res).toEqual('Hello World');
+		});
+
 		it('should return the error when receiving text that contains a null character', async () => {
 			helpers.httpRequest.mockResolvedValue({
 				body: 'Hello\0World',

packages/@n8n/nodes-langchain/nodes/tools/ToolHttpRequest/utils.ts

@@ -13,8 +13,14 @@ import type {
 	ExecutionError,
 	NodeApiError,
 	ISupplyDataFunctions,
+	ICredentialDataDecryptedObject,
+} from 'n8n-workflow';
+import {
+	assertCredentialAllowsUrl,
+	NodeConnectionTypes,
+	NodeOperationError,
+	jsonParse,
 } from 'n8n-workflow';
-import { NodeConnectionTypes, NodeOperationError, jsonParse } from 'n8n-workflow';
 import { z } from 'zod';
 
 import type {
@@ -27,6 +33,24 @@ import type {
 } from './interfaces';
 import type { DynamicZodObject } from '../../../types/zod.types';
 
+// Enforce the credential's "Allowed HTTP Request Domains" restriction against the
+// request URL before the secret is attached, so a tool-controlled URL can't leak it.
+// The resulting allowlist is forwarded onto the options so the HTTP layer re-checks
+// every redirect hop too, not just the initial URL.
+const assertCredentialUrlAllowed = (
+	ctx: ISupplyDataFunctions,
+	credentials: ICredentialDataDecryptedObject | undefined,
+	options: IHttpRequestOptions,
+) => {
+	if (!credentials) return;
+	const allowedDomains = assertCredentialAllowsUrl({
+		node: ctx.getNode(),
+		credentialData: credentials,
+		url: options.url,
+	});
+	if (allowedDomains) options.allowedDomains = allowedDomains;
+};
+
 const genericCredentialRequest = async (ctx: ISupplyDataFunctions, itemIndex: number) => {
 	const genericType = ctx.getNodeParameter('genericAuthType', itemIndex) as string;
 
@@ -35,6 +59,7 @@ const genericCredentialRequest = async (ctx: ISupplyDataFunctions, itemIndex: nu
 		const sendImmediately = genericType === 'httpDigestAuth' ? false : undefined;
 
 		return async (options: IHttpRequestOptions) => {
+			assertCredentialUrlAllowed(ctx, basicAuth, options);
 			options.auth = {
 				username: basicAuth.user as string,
 				password: basicAuth.password as string,
@@ -48,6 +73,7 @@ const genericCredentialRequest = async (ctx: ISupplyDataFunctions, itemIndex: nu
 		const headerAuth = await ctx.getCredentials('httpHeaderAuth', itemIndex);
 
 		return async (options: IHttpRequestOptions) => {
+			assertCredentialUrlAllowed(ctx, headerAuth, options);
 			if (!options.headers) options.headers = {};
 			options.headers[headerAuth.name as string] = headerAuth.value;
 			return await ctx.helpers.httpRequest(options);
@@ -58,6 +84,7 @@ const genericCredentialRequest = async (ctx: ISupplyDataFunctions, itemIndex: nu
 		const queryAuth = await ctx.getCredentials('httpQueryAuth', itemIndex);
 
 		return async (options: IHttpRequestOptions) => {
+			assertCredentialUrlAllowed(ctx, queryAuth, options);
 			if (!options.qs) options.qs = {};
 			options.qs[queryAuth.name as string] = queryAuth.value;
 			return await ctx.helpers.httpRequest(options);
@@ -68,6 +95,7 @@ const genericCredentialRequest = async (ctx: ISupplyDataFunctions, itemIndex: nu
 		const customAuth = await ctx.getCredentials('httpCustomAuth', itemIndex);
 
 		return async (options: IHttpRequestOptions) => {
+			assertCredentialUrlAllowed(ctx, customAuth, options);
 			const auth = jsonParse<IRequestOptionsSimplified>((customAuth.json as string) || '{}', {
 				errorMessage: 'Invalid Custom Auth JSON',
 			});
@@ -85,13 +113,17 @@ const genericCredentialRequest = async (ctx: ISupplyDataFunctions, itemIndex: nu
 	}
 
 	if (genericType === 'oAuth1Api') {
+		const oAuth1 = await ctx.getCredentials('oAuth1Api', itemIndex);
 		return async (options: IHttpRequestOptions) => {
+			assertCredentialUrlAllowed(ctx, oAuth1, options);
 			return await ctx.helpers.requestOAuth1.call(ctx, 'oAuth1Api', options);
 		};
 	}
 
 	if (genericType === 'oAuth2Api') {
+		const oAuth2 = await ctx.getCredentials('oAuth2Api', itemIndex);
 		return async (options: IHttpRequestOptions) => {
+			assertCredentialUrlAllowed(ctx, oAuth2, options);
 			return await ctx.helpers.requestOAuth2.call(ctx, 'oAuth2Api', options, {
 				tokenType: 'Bearer',
 			});
@@ -106,8 +138,10 @@ const genericCredentialRequest = async (ctx: ISupplyDataFunctions, itemIndex: nu
 const predefinedCredentialRequest = async (ctx: ISupplyDataFunctions, itemIndex: number) => {
 	const predefinedType = ctx.getNodeParameter('nodeCredentialType', itemIndex) as string;
 	const additionalOptions = getOAuth2AdditionalParameters(predefinedType);
+	const credentials = await ctx.getCredentials(predefinedType, itemIndex);
 
 	return async (options: IHttpRequestOptions) => {
+		assertCredentialUrlAllowed(ctx, credentials, options);
 		return await ctx.helpers.httpRequestWithAuthentication.call(
 			ctx,
 			predefinedType,

packages/@n8n/task-runner/src/js-task-runner/__tests__/require-resolver.test.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
+import type * as nodeCrypto from 'node:crypto';
+
 import { ExecutionError } from '@/js-task-runner/errors/execution-error';
 
-import { createRequireResolver, type RequireResolverOpts } from '../require-resolver';
+import {
+	createRequireResolver,
+	secureModuleExport,
+	type RequireResolverOpts,
+} from '../require-resolver';
 
 describe('require resolver', () => {
 	let defaultOpts: RequireResolverOpts;
@@ -59,6 +65,194 @@ describe('require resolver', () => {
 		});
 	});
 
+	describe('module securing', () => {
+		it('should not let one resolution mutate the shared module for another', () => {
+			const resolver = createRequireResolver({ ...defaultOpts, secureModules: true });
+
+			const first = resolver('path') as { normalize: unknown };
+			const original = first.normalize;
+			// Own-property reassignment on the shared cached module must not stick.
+			expect(() => {
+				'use strict';
+				first.normalize = () => 'poisoned';
+			}).toThrow();
+
+			const second = resolver('path') as { normalize: unknown };
+			expect(second.normalize).toBe(original);
+			expect((second.normalize as (p: string) => string)('a//b')).toBe('a/b');
+		});
+
+		it('should return the same view for repeated resolutions (stable identity)', () => {
+			const resolver = createRequireResolver({ ...defaultOpts, secureModules: true });
+
+			expect(resolver('path')).toBe(resolver('path'));
+		});
+
+		it('should not secure modules by default', () => {
+			const resolver = createRequireResolver(defaultOpts);
+			const fs = resolver('fs') as Record<string, unknown>;
+
+			const marker = () => 'noop';
+			fs.__probe = marker;
+			expect(fs.__probe).toBe(marker);
+			delete fs.__probe;
+		});
+	});
+
+	describe('secureModuleExport', () => {
+		it('should not throw when securing a non-freezable Buffer/TypedArray export', () => {
+			// Object.freeze throws on these ("Cannot freeze array buffer views with elements").
+			const buf = Buffer.from([1, 2, 3]);
+			const view = secureModuleExport(buf) as Buffer;
+
+			expect(view[0]).toBe(1); // reads pass through
+			expect(() => {
+				'use strict';
+				view[0] = 9;
+			}).toThrow(); // writes are blocked
+			expect(buf[0]).toBe(1); // underlying buffer untouched
+		});
+
+		it('should block assignment through accessor setters', () => {
+			let sideEffect = 0;
+			const mod = {};
+			Object.defineProperty(mod, 'danger', {
+				get: () => sideEffect,
+				set: (v: number) => {
+					sideEffect = v;
+				},
+				configurable: true,
+			});
+
+			const secured = secureModuleExport(mod) as { danger: number };
+			// Strict-mode module code: the blocked write throws instead of the setter running.
+			expect(() => {
+				secured.danger = 99;
+			}).toThrow();
+
+			expect(sideEffect).toBe(0); // the real setter never ran
+		});
+
+		it('should block adding, redefining, deleting properties and swapping the prototype', () => {
+			const mod: Record<string, unknown> = { existing: 1 };
+			const secured = secureModuleExport(mod) as Record<string, unknown>;
+
+			expect(() => Object.defineProperty(secured, 'added', { value: 1 })).toThrow();
+			expect(Reflect.deleteProperty(secured, 'existing')).toBe(false);
+			expect(Reflect.setPrototypeOf(secured, {})).toBe(false);
+			expect(mod.existing).toBe(1);
+		});
+
+		it('should keep a real module callable and usable through the view', () => {
+			const resolver = createRequireResolver({
+				allowedBuiltInModules: new Set(['crypto']),
+				allowedExternalModules: new Set(),
+				secureModules: true,
+			});
+			const crypto = resolver('crypto') as typeof nodeCrypto;
+
+			expect(crypto.randomBytes(8)).toHaveLength(8);
+			expect(crypto.createHash('sha256').update('x').digest('hex')).toHaveLength(64);
+
+			// poisoning attempts must not stick
+			expect(() => {
+				(crypto as { randomBytes: unknown }).randomBytes = () => Buffer.from('PWNED');
+			}).toThrow();
+			expect(crypto.randomBytes(8)).toHaveLength(8);
+		});
+	});
+
+	describe('secureModuleExport (nested membrane)', () => {
+		it('should wrap nested objects and block writes to them', () => {
+			const shared = { count: 0 };
+			const secured = secureModuleExport({ nested: shared }) as { nested: { count: number } };
+
+			expect(() => {
+				secured.nested.count = 5;
+			}).toThrow();
+			expect(shared.count).toBe(0); // shared nested state untouched
+		});
+
+		it('should return a stable wrapped view for the same nested object', () => {
+			const secured = secureModuleExport({ nested: {} }) as { nested: object };
+
+			expect(secured.nested).toBe(secured.nested);
+		});
+
+		it('should freeze (not wrap) non-configurable non-writable data properties', () => {
+			const mod = {};
+			Object.defineProperty(mod, 'FIXED', {
+				value: { a: 1 },
+				writable: false,
+				configurable: false,
+			});
+			const secured = secureModuleExport(mod) as { FIXED: { a: number } };
+
+			// Proxy invariant forbids wrapping, so it's returned raw — but frozen,
+			// so it still can't be mutated for other tasks.
+			expect(secured.FIXED.a).toBe(1);
+			expect(Object.isFrozen(secured.FIXED)).toBe(true);
+			expect(() => {
+				(secured.FIXED as Record<string, unknown>).evil = 1;
+			}).toThrow();
+		});
+
+		it('should wrap values reached through descriptor reflection', () => {
+			const shared = { count: 0 };
+			const secured = secureModuleExport({ nested: shared });
+
+			const descriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(secured, 'nested');
+			const reflected = descriptor?.value as { count: number };
+			expect(() => {
+				reflected.count = 5;
+			}).toThrow();
+			expect(shared.count).toBe(0); // reflection can't bypass the membrane
+		});
+
+		it('should construct classes exposed by a module', () => {
+			const secured = secureModuleExport({
+				widget: class {
+					constructor(public v: number) {}
+				},
+			}) as { widget: new (v: number) => { v: number } };
+
+			expect(new secured.widget(7).v).toBe(7);
+		});
+
+		it('should preserve new.target when subclassing a module constructor', () => {
+			const secured = secureModuleExport({
+				base: class {
+					kind: string;
+					constructor() {
+						this.kind = new.target.name;
+					}
+				},
+			}) as { base: new () => { kind: string } };
+			class Derived extends secured.base {}
+
+			expect(new Derived().kind).toBe('Derived');
+		});
+
+		it('should keep nested real-module state readable but not mutable', () => {
+			const resolver = createRequireResolver({
+				allowedBuiltInModules: new Set(['crypto']),
+				allowedExternalModules: new Set(),
+				secureModules: true,
+			});
+			const crypto = resolver('crypto') as typeof nodeCrypto;
+
+			// nested reads and receiver-sensitive method calls still work
+			expect(typeof crypto.constants.RSA_PKCS1_PADDING).toBe('number');
+			expect(crypto.webcrypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(4))).toHaveLength(4);
+
+			// nested writes are blocked
+			expect(() => {
+				(crypto.webcrypto as { getRandomValues: unknown }).getRandomValues = () => null;
+			}).toThrow();
+			expect(crypto.webcrypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(2))).toHaveLength(2);
+		});
+	});
+
 	describe('error handling', () => {
 		it('should wrap DisallowedModuleError in ExecutionError', () => {
 			const resolver = createRequireResolver(defaultOpts);

packages/@n8n/task-runner/src/js-task-runner/js-task-runner.ts

@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ export class JsTaskRunner extends TaskRunner {
 		this.requireResolver = createRequireResolver({
 			allowedBuiltInModules,
 			allowedExternalModules,
+			secureModules: this.mode === 'secure',
 		});
 
 		if (this.mode === 'secure') this.preventPrototypePollution(allowedExternalModules);

packages/@n8n/task-runner/src/js-task-runner/require-resolver.ts

@@ -15,13 +15,105 @@ export type RequireResolverOpts = {
 	 * execution sandbox. `"*"` means all are allowed.
 	 */
 	allowedExternalModules: Set<string> | '*';
+
+	/**
+	 * When true, return a write-blocking view of each resolved module. The
+	 * module cache is shared across every task in the runner process, so an
+	 * unprotected module object lets one task's changes leak into other tasks.
+	 */
+	secureModules?: boolean;
 };
 
 export type RequireResolver = (request: string) => unknown;
 
+type Constructor = new (...args: unknown[]) => object;
+
+const isWrappable = (value: unknown): value is object =>
+	value !== null && (typeof value === 'object' || typeof value === 'function');
+
+// Views (write-blocking proxies) keyed by their real target, plus the reverse
+// lookup used to unwrap `this`/arguments back to the real object before a
+// wrapped function runs. One view per target keeps identity stable across reads.
+const viewByTarget = new WeakMap<object, unknown>();
+const targetByView = new WeakMap<object, object>();
+
+const unwrap = (value: unknown): unknown =>
+	isWrappable(value) ? (targetByView.get(value) ?? value) : value;
+
+// A non-configurable, non-writable data property: a Proxy must hand back its
+// exact value (invariant), so it can't be wrapped.
+const isFixedData = (descriptor: PropertyDescriptor | undefined): boolean =>
+	!!descriptor && 'value' in descriptor && !descriptor.configurable && !descriptor.writable;
+
+// Secure a value read off the module. Normally wrap it in the membrane; when an
+// invariant forces us to return the exact object, freeze it best-effort instead
+// so it still can't be mutated for other tasks.
+function secureReadValue(value: unknown, mustReturnRaw: boolean): unknown {
+	if (!mustReturnRaw) return secureModuleExport(value);
+	if (isWrappable(value) && !Object.isFrozen(value)) {
+		try {
+			Object.freeze(value);
+		} catch {
+			// Non-freezable (e.g. a populated TypedArray) — nothing more we can do.
+		}
+	}
+	return value;
+}
+
+// Blocks every write (assignment incl. accessor setters, (re)definition,
+// deletion, prototype change) and wraps values read from the module — via both
+// property reads and descriptor reflection — so nested objects can't be mutated
+// either. Function calls forward to the real module with `this`/arguments
+// unwrapped, so internal-slot/brand checks still pass.
+const membraneHandler: ProxyHandler<object> = {
+	set: () => false,
+	defineProperty: () => false,
+	deleteProperty: () => false,
+	setPrototypeOf: () => false,
+	get(target, prop) {
+		const value = Reflect.get(target, prop, target) as unknown;
+		const descriptor = Reflect.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(target, prop);
+		return secureReadValue(value, isFixedData(descriptor));
+	},
+	getOwnPropertyDescriptor(target, prop) {
+		const descriptor = Reflect.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(target, prop);
+		if (descriptor && 'value' in descriptor) {
+			descriptor.value = secureReadValue(descriptor.value, isFixedData(descriptor));
+		}
+		return descriptor;
+	},
+	apply: (target, thisArg, args) =>
+		Reflect.apply(target as (...a: unknown[]) => unknown, unwrap(thisArg), args.map(unwrap)),
+	// Return values are left unwrapped so callers keep ownership of what a
+	// module hands back (e.g. a Buffer they can still mutate).
+	construct: (target, args, newTarget) =>
+		Reflect.construct(target as Constructor, args.map(unwrap), unwrap(newTarget) as Constructor),
+};
+
+/**
+ * Wrap a resolved module in a write-blocking membrane. Proxying rather than
+ * `Object.freeze` avoids two problems: freezing throws on non-freezable
+ * exports (e.g. a non-empty `Buffer`/`TypedArray`), and it leaves accessor
+ * setters (e.g. `crypto.fips`) able to mutate shared process state. The
+ * membrane also wraps nested objects on read, so one task cannot mutate a
+ * module's nested state (e.g. `http.globalAgent`) for the others.
+ */
+export function secureModuleExport(resolved: unknown): unknown {
+	if (!isWrappable(resolved)) return resolved;
+
+	const cached = viewByTarget.get(resolved);
+	if (cached !== undefined) return cached;
+
+	const view = new Proxy(resolved, membraneHandler);
+	viewByTarget.set(resolved, view);
+	targetByView.set(view, resolved);
+	return view;
+}
+
 export function createRequireResolver({
 	allowedBuiltInModules,
 	allowedExternalModules,
+	secureModules = false,
 }: RequireResolverOpts) {
 	return (request: string) => {
 		const checkIsAllowed = (allowList: Set<string> | '*', moduleName: string) => {
@@ -37,6 +129,9 @@ export function createRequireResolver({
 			throw new ExecutionError(error);
 		}
 
-		return require(request) as unknown;
+		// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
+		const resolved = require(request) as unknown;
+
+		return secureModules ? secureModuleExport(resolved) : resolved;
 	};
 }

packages/@n8n/tournament/src/VariablePolyfill.ts

@@ -109,6 +109,15 @@ const customPatches: Partial<Record<ParentKind['type'], CustomPatcher>> = {
 			polyfillVar(path, dataNode);
 		}
 	},
+	ArrowFunctionExpression(path, parent: namedTypes.ArrowFunctionExpression, dataNode) {
+		// A concise arrow body that is a bare identifier (`() => process`) must be
+		// routed through the data context like any other free read. Params are not
+		// the body, and body identifiers that reference a param are left alone by
+		// polyfillVar's in-scope check.
+		if (parent.body === path.node) {
+			polyfillVar(path, dataNode);
+		}
+	},
 };
 
 export const jsVariablePolyfill = (
@@ -134,6 +143,7 @@ export const jsVariablePolyfill = (
 				case 'MemberExpression':
 				case 'OptionalMemberExpression':
 				case 'VariableDeclarator':
+				case 'ArrowFunctionExpression':
 					if (!customPatches[parent.type]) {
 						throw new Error(`Couldn't find custom patcher for parent type: ${parent.type}`);
 					}
@@ -174,7 +184,6 @@ export const jsVariablePolyfill = (
 				// Do nothing
 				case 'Super':
 				case 'Identifier':
-				case 'ArrowFunctionExpression':
 				case 'FunctionDeclaration':
 				case 'FunctionExpression':
 				case 'ThisExpression':

packages/cli/src/__tests__/workflow-execute-additional-data.test.ts

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ describe('WorkflowExecuteAdditionalData', () => {
 	mockInstance(Telemetry);
 	const workflowRepository = mockInstance(WorkflowRepository);
 	const activeExecutions = mockInstance(ActiveExecutions);
-	mockInstance(CredentialsPermissionChecker);
+	const credentialsPermissionChecker = mockInstance(CredentialsPermissionChecker);
 	mockInstance(SubworkflowPolicyChecker);
 	mockInstance(WorkflowStatisticsService);
 	mockInstance(WorkflowPublishHistoryRepository);
@@ -273,6 +273,100 @@ describe('WorkflowExecuteAdditionalData', () => {
 			expect(getVariablesSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(workflowId, undefined);
 		});
 
+		describe('credential permission check routing', () => {
+			const subWorkflowData = () =>
+				mock<IWorkflowBase>({
+					id: 'sub-id',
+					name: 'Sub Workflow',
+					nodes: [],
+					connections: {},
+					staticData: {},
+					settings: {},
+				});
+
+			beforeEach(() => {
+				vi.mocked(credentialsPermissionChecker.check).mockClear();
+				vi.mocked(credentialsPermissionChecker.checkForUser).mockClear();
+				vi.mocked(WorkflowExecute).mockClear();
+			});
+
+			it('checks credentials against the triggering user for an inline sub-workflow', async () => {
+				await executeWorkflow(
+					mock<IExecuteWorkflowInfo>({ id: undefined, code: subWorkflowData() }),
+					mock<IWorkflowExecuteAdditionalData>({ userId: 'user-1' }),
+					mock<ExecuteWorkflowOptions>({
+						loadedWorkflowData: subWorkflowData(),
+						doNotWaitToFinish: false,
+						parentWorkflowId: 'parent-1',
+					}),
+				);
+
+				expect(credentialsPermissionChecker.checkForUser).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+				expect(vi.mocked(credentialsPermissionChecker.checkForUser).mock.calls[0][0]).toBe(
+					'user-1',
+				);
+				expect(credentialsPermissionChecker.check).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+			});
+
+			it('checks credentials against the project for a database sub-workflow', async () => {
+				await executeWorkflow(
+					mock<IExecuteWorkflowInfo>({ id: 'db-id', code: undefined }),
+					mock<IWorkflowExecuteAdditionalData>({ userId: 'user-1' }),
+					mock<ExecuteWorkflowOptions>({
+						loadedWorkflowData: subWorkflowData(),
+						doNotWaitToFinish: false,
+					}),
+				);
+
+				expect(credentialsPermissionChecker.check).toHaveBeenCalled();
+				expect(credentialsPermissionChecker.checkForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+			});
+
+			it('falls back to the project check for an inline sub-workflow without a triggering user', async () => {
+				await executeWorkflow(
+					mock<IExecuteWorkflowInfo>({ id: undefined, code: subWorkflowData() }),
+					mock<IWorkflowExecuteAdditionalData>({ userId: undefined }),
+					mock<ExecuteWorkflowOptions>({
+						loadedWorkflowData: subWorkflowData(),
+						doNotWaitToFinish: false,
+						parentWorkflowId: 'parent-1',
+					}),
+				);
+
+				expect(credentialsPermissionChecker.check).toHaveBeenCalled();
+				expect(credentialsPermissionChecker.checkForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+			});
+
+			it('preserves the triggering user in the sub-workflow additional data for inline sub-workflows so nested inline calls stay scoped to that user', async () => {
+				await executeWorkflow(
+					mock<IExecuteWorkflowInfo>({ id: undefined, code: subWorkflowData() }),
+					mock<IWorkflowExecuteAdditionalData>({ userId: 'user-1' }),
+					mock<ExecuteWorkflowOptions>({
+						loadedWorkflowData: subWorkflowData(),
+						doNotWaitToFinish: false,
+						parentWorkflowId: 'parent-1',
+					}),
+				);
+
+				const integratedAdditionalData = vi.mocked(WorkflowExecute).mock.calls[0][0];
+				expect(integratedAdditionalData.userId).toBe('user-1');
+			});
+
+			it('does not carry the triggering user into a database sub-workflow (runs under its own project scope)', async () => {
+				await executeWorkflow(
+					mock<IExecuteWorkflowInfo>({ id: 'db-id', code: undefined }),
+					mock<IWorkflowExecuteAdditionalData>({ userId: 'user-1' }),
+					mock<ExecuteWorkflowOptions>({
+						loadedWorkflowData: subWorkflowData(),
+						doNotWaitToFinish: false,
+					}),
+				);
+
+				const integratedAdditionalData = vi.mocked(WorkflowExecute).mock.calls[0][0];
+				expect(integratedAdditionalData.userId).toBeUndefined();
+			});
+		});
+
 		describe('sub-workflow dynamic credential reporting', () => {
 			const getMockRunWithCredentialFlags = (task: Partial<ITaskData>, executedByUserId?: string) =>
 				mock<IRun>({

packages/cli/src/executions/pre-execution-checks/__tests__/credentials-permission-checker.test.ts

@@ -4,11 +4,14 @@ import {
 	type SharedCredentialsRepository,
 	type CredentialsRepository,
 	type CredentialsEntity,
+	type UserRepository,
 	GLOBAL_OWNER_ROLE,
+	GLOBAL_MEMBER_ROLE,
 } from '@n8n/db';
 import type { INode } from 'n8n-workflow';
 import { mock } from 'vitest-mock-extended';
 
+import type { CredentialsFinderService } from '@/credentials/credentials-finder.service';
 import type { NodeTypes } from '@/node-types';
 import type { OwnershipService } from '@/services/ownership.service';
 import type { ProjectService } from '@/services/project.service.ee';
@@ -21,12 +24,16 @@ describe('CredentialsPermissionChecker', () => {
 	const ownershipService = mock<OwnershipService>();
 	const projectService = mock<ProjectService>();
 	const nodeTypes = mock<NodeTypes>();
+	const userRepository = mock<UserRepository>();
+	const credentialsFinderService = mock<CredentialsFinderService>();
 	const permissionChecker = new CredentialsPermissionChecker(
 		sharedCredentialsRepository,
 		credentialsRepository,
 		ownershipService,
 		projectService,
 		nodeTypes,
+		userRepository,
+		credentialsFinderService,
 	);
 
 	const workflowId = 'workflow123';
@@ -302,6 +309,82 @@ describe('CredentialsPermissionChecker', () => {
 			);
 		});
 
+		it('should check the credential when genericAuthType is an expression', async () => {
+			const victimCredentialId = 'victim-cred';
+			const httpRequestNodeWithExpressionAuth: INode = {
+				id: 'node-3',
+				name: 'HTTP Request',
+				type: 'n8n-nodes-base.httpRequest',
+				typeVersion: 4.2,
+				position: [0, 0],
+				parameters: {
+					authentication: 'genericCredentialType',
+					// Resolves to "httpHeaderAuth" only at execution time
+					genericAuthType: '={{ "httpHeaderAuth" }}',
+				},
+				credentials: {
+					httpHeaderAuth: {
+						id: victimCredentialId,
+						name: 'Victim Header Auth',
+					},
+				},
+			};
+
+			nodeTypes.getByNameAndVersion.mockReturnValue({
+				description: { credentials: [] },
+			} as never);
+
+			sharedCredentialsRepository.getFilteredAccessibleCredentials.mockResolvedValue([]);
+			credentialsRepository.find.mockResolvedValue([]);
+
+			await expect(
+				permissionChecker.check(workflowId, [httpRequestNodeWithExpressionAuth]),
+			).rejects.toThrow('Node "HTTP Request" does not have access to the credential');
+
+			// The unresolved expression must not let the credential bypass the check
+			expect(sharedCredentialsRepository.getFilteredAccessibleCredentials).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				[teamProject.id],
+				[victimCredentialId],
+			);
+		});
+
+		it('should check the credential when nodeCredentialType is an expression', async () => {
+			const victimCredentialId = 'victim-cred';
+			const httpRequestNodeWithExpressionAuth: INode = {
+				id: 'node-4',
+				name: 'HTTP Request',
+				type: 'n8n-nodes-base.httpRequest',
+				typeVersion: 4.3,
+				position: [0, 0],
+				parameters: {
+					authentication: 'predefinedCredentialType',
+					nodeCredentialType: '={{ "googleOAuth2Api" }}',
+				},
+				credentials: {
+					googleOAuth2Api: {
+						id: victimCredentialId,
+						name: 'Victim OAuth2',
+					},
+				},
+			};
+
+			nodeTypes.getByNameAndVersion.mockReturnValue({
+				description: { credentials: [] },
+			} as never);
+
+			sharedCredentialsRepository.getFilteredAccessibleCredentials.mockResolvedValue([]);
+			credentialsRepository.find.mockResolvedValue([]);
+
+			await expect(
+				permissionChecker.check(workflowId, [httpRequestNodeWithExpressionAuth]),
+			).rejects.toThrow('Node "HTTP Request" does not have access to the credential');
+
+			expect(sharedCredentialsRepository.getFilteredAccessibleCredentials).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				[teamProject.id],
+				[victimCredentialId],
+			);
+		});
+
 		it('should fall back to checking all credentials if node type cannot be resolved', async () => {
 			nodeTypes.getByNameAndVersion.mockImplementation(() => {
 				throw new Error('Unknown node type');
@@ -322,4 +405,56 @@ describe('CredentialsPermissionChecker', () => {
 			);
 		});
 	});
+
+	describe('checkForUser', () => {
+		const userId = 'user-123';
+
+		it('should not throw when the workflow has no credentials', async () => {
+			await expect(permissionChecker.checkForUser(userId, [])).resolves.not.toThrow();
+
+			expect(userRepository.findOne).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+			expect(credentialsFinderService.findCredentialsForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+
+		it('should throw when the triggering user cannot be resolved', async () => {
+			userRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValueOnce(null);
+
+			await expect(permissionChecker.checkForUser(userId, [node])).rejects.toThrow(
+				'Node "Test Node" uses a credential you do not have access to',
+			);
+		});
+
+		it('should throw when the user does not have access to the credential', async () => {
+			userRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValueOnce(
+				mock<User>({ id: userId, role: GLOBAL_MEMBER_ROLE }),
+			);
+			credentialsFinderService.findCredentialsForUser.mockResolvedValueOnce([]);
+
+			await expect(permissionChecker.checkForUser(userId, [node])).rejects.toThrow(
+				'Node "Test Node" uses a credential you do not have access to',
+			);
+			expect(credentialsFinderService.findCredentialsForUser).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({ id: userId }),
+				['credential:read'],
+			);
+		});
+
+		it('should not throw when the user has access to the credential', async () => {
+			userRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValueOnce(
+				mock<User>({ id: userId, role: GLOBAL_MEMBER_ROLE }),
+			);
+			credentialsFinderService.findCredentialsForUser.mockResolvedValueOnce([
+				mock<CredentialsEntity>({ id: credentialId }),
+			]);
+
+			await expect(permissionChecker.checkForUser(userId, [node])).resolves.not.toThrow();
+		});
+
+		it('should skip the check for a user with instance-wide credential listing', async () => {
+			userRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValueOnce(mock<User>({ role: GLOBAL_OWNER_ROLE }));
+
+			await expect(permissionChecker.checkForUser(userId, [node])).resolves.not.toThrow();
+			expect(credentialsFinderService.findCredentialsForUser).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+	});
 });

packages/cli/src/executions/pre-execution-checks/credentials-permission-checker.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 import type { Project } from '@n8n/db';
-import { CredentialsRepository, SharedCredentialsRepository } from '@n8n/db';
+import { CredentialsRepository, SharedCredentialsRepository, UserRepository } from '@n8n/db';
 import { Service } from '@n8n/di';
 import { hasGlobalScope } from '@n8n/permissions';
 import type { INode } from 'n8n-workflow';
-import { displayParameter, UserError } from 'n8n-workflow';
+import { displayParameter, isExpression, UserError } from 'n8n-workflow';
 
+import { CredentialsFinderService } from '@/credentials/credentials-finder.service';
 import { NodeTypes } from '@/node-types';
 import { OwnershipService } from '@/services/ownership.service';
 import { ProjectService } from '@/services/project.service.ee';
@@ -17,6 +18,15 @@ class InvalidCredentialError extends UserError {
 	}
 }
 
+class InaccessibleCredentialForUserError extends UserError {
+	override description =
+		'This node uses a credential you do not have access to. Ask its owner to share it with you.';
+
+	constructor(readonly node: INode) {
+		super(`Node "${node.name}" uses a credential you do not have access to`);
+	}
+}
+
 class InaccessibleCredentialError extends UserError {
 	override description =
 		this.project.type === 'personal'
@@ -39,8 +49,48 @@ export class CredentialsPermissionChecker {
 		private readonly ownershipService: OwnershipService,
 		private readonly projectService: ProjectService,
 		private readonly nodeTypes: NodeTypes,
+		private readonly userRepository: UserRepository,
+		private readonly credentialsFinderService: CredentialsFinderService,
 	) {}
 
+	/**
+	 * Check that a specific user can use every credential referenced by the given
+	 * nodes. Used for sub-workflows whose source is not a stored database workflow
+	 * (inline/parameter, file, url): these carry no project of their own, so their
+	 * credentials must be evaluated against the user triggering the run rather than
+	 * against the parent workflow's project.
+	 */
+	async checkForUser(userId: string, nodes: INode[]) {
+		const credIdsToNodes = this.mapCredIdsToNodes(nodes);
+		const workflowCredIds = Object.keys(credIdsToNodes);
+
+		if (workflowCredIds.length === 0) return;
+
+		// Load the role relation (scopes are eager) so hasGlobalScope can resolve.
+		const user = await this.userRepository.findOne({
+			where: { id: userId },
+			relations: ['role'],
+		});
+		if (!user) {
+			// Cannot resolve the triggering user - fail closed.
+			throw new InaccessibleCredentialForUserError(credIdsToNodes[workflowCredIds[0]][0]);
+		}
+
+		// A user with instance-wide credential listing can use any credential.
+		if (hasGlobalScope(user, 'credential:list')) return;
+
+		const accessibleCredentials = await this.credentialsFinderService.findCredentialsForUser(user, [
+			'credential:read',
+		]);
+		const accessibleSet = new Set(accessibleCredentials.map((cred) => cred.id));
+
+		for (const credentialsId of workflowCredIds) {
+			if (!accessibleSet.has(credentialsId)) {
+				throw new InaccessibleCredentialForUserError(credIdsToNodes[credentialsId][0]);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	/**
 	 * Check if a workflow has the ability to execute based on the projects it's apart of.
 	 */
@@ -141,6 +191,10 @@ export class CredentialsPermissionChecker {
 			// the active credential is specified by the nodeCredentialType parameter
 			const { nodeCredentialType } = node.parameters;
 			if (typeof nodeCredentialType === 'string' && nodeCredentialType) {
+				// An expression only resolves to its real type at execution time, so the
+				// static filter can't know which credential it activates. Check all
+				// referenced credentials rather than trust the unresolved literal.
+				if (isExpression(nodeCredentialType)) return null;
 				activeTypes.add(nodeCredentialType);
 			}
 
@@ -149,6 +203,7 @@ export class CredentialsPermissionChecker {
 			// specified by the genericAuthType parameter
 			const { genericAuthType } = node.parameters;
 			if (typeof genericAuthType === 'string' && genericAuthType) {
+				if (isExpression(genericAuthType)) return null;
 				activeTypes.add(genericAuthType);
 			}
 

packages/cli/src/modules/redaction/executions/strategies/__tests__/full-item-redaction.strategy.test.ts

@@ -440,6 +440,92 @@ describe('FullItemRedactionStrategy', () => {
 		});
 	});
 
+	describe('executionData subtrees', () => {
+		const stackNode = {
+			id: 'node-1',
+			name: 'Test Node',
+			type: 'n8n-nodes-base.httpRequest',
+			typeVersion: 1,
+			position: [0, 0] as [number, number],
+			parameters: {},
+		};
+
+		it('clears item json and binary in nodeExecutionStack', async () => {
+			const execution = makeExecution({});
+			execution.data.executionData!.nodeExecutionStack = [
+				{
+					node: stackNode,
+					source: null,
+					data: {
+						main: [
+							[
+								{
+									json: { secret: 'stack-value' },
+									binary: { file: { mimeType: 'text/plain', data: 'abc' } },
+								},
+							],
+						],
+					},
+				},
+			];
+
+			await strategy.apply(execution, makeContext());
+
+			const item = execution.data.executionData!.nodeExecutionStack[0].data.main[0]![0];
+			expect(item.json).toEqual({});
+			expect(item.binary).toBeUndefined();
+			expect(item.redaction).toEqual({ redacted: true, reason: 'workflow_redaction_policy' });
+		});
+
+		it('moves item error to redaction.error in nodeExecutionStack', async () => {
+			const error = new NodeApiError(stackNode, { message: 'Bad Gateway' }, { httpCode: '502' });
+			const execution = makeExecution({});
+			execution.data.executionData!.nodeExecutionStack = [
+				{
+					node: stackNode,
+					source: null,
+					data: { main: [[{ json: { secret: 'stack-value' }, error }]] },
+				},
+			];
+
+			await strategy.apply(execution, makeContext());
+
+			const item = execution.data.executionData!.nodeExecutionStack[0].data.main[0]![0];
+			expect(item.error).toBeUndefined();
+			expect(item.redaction?.error).toEqual({ type: 'NodeApiError', httpCode: '502' });
+		});
+
+		it('clears item json and binary in waitingExecution', async () => {
+			const execution = makeExecution({});
+			execution.data.executionData!.waitingExecution = {
+				'Test Node': {
+					0: {
+						main: [
+							[
+								{
+									json: { secret: 'waiting-value' },
+									binary: { file: { mimeType: 'text/plain', data: 'abc' } },
+								},
+							],
+						],
+					},
+				},
+			};
+
+			await strategy.apply(execution, makeContext());
+
+			const item = execution.data.executionData!.waitingExecution['Test Node'][0].main[0]![0];
+			expect(item.json).toEqual({});
+			expect(item.binary).toBeUndefined();
+			expect(item.redaction).toEqual({ redacted: true, reason: 'workflow_redaction_policy' });
+		});
+
+		it('does nothing when executionData has no stack or waiting items', async () => {
+			const execution = makeExecution({});
+			await expect(strategy.apply(execution, makeContext())).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+		});
+	});
+
 	describe('redactionInfo', () => {
 		it('sets isRedacted: true with canReveal from context', async () => {
 			const execution = makeExecution({

packages/cli/src/modules/redaction/executions/strategies/full-item-redaction.strategy.ts

@@ -53,6 +53,22 @@ export class FullItemRedactionStrategy implements IExecutionRedactionStrategy {
 			delete resultData.error;
 		}
 
+		const executionData = execution.data.executionData;
+
+		if (executionData) {
+			for (const executeData of executionData.nodeExecutionStack ?? []) {
+				if (executeData.data) {
+					this.redactConnections(executeData.data, reason);
+				}
+			}
+
+			for (const runIndexMap of Object.values(executionData.waitingExecution ?? {})) {
+				for (const waitingExecution of Object.values(runIndexMap)) {
+					this.redactConnections(waitingExecution, reason);
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
 		execution.data.redactionInfo = {
 			...execution.data.redactionInfo,
 			isRedacted: true,

packages/cli/src/modules/token-exchange/services/__tests__/identity-resolution.service.test.ts

@@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ import type { EventService } from '@/events/event.service';
 import type { RoleService } from '@/services/role.service';
 import type { UserService } from '@/services/user.service';
 
+import type { TokenExchangeConfig } from '../../token-exchange.config';
 import { TokenExchangeAuthError } from '../../token-exchange.errors';
 import type { ExternalTokenClaims } from '../../token-exchange.schemas';
+import { TokenExchangeFailureReason } from '../../token-exchange.types';
 import { IdentityResolutionService } from '../identity-resolution.service';
 import type { TrustedKeyService } from '../trusted-key.service';
 
@@ -26,6 +28,7 @@ const eventService = mock<EventService>();
 const userService = mock<UserService>();
 const trustedKeyService = mock<TrustedKeyService>();
 const roleService = mock<RoleService>();
+const config = mock<TokenExchangeConfig>();
 
 const service = new IdentityResolutionService(
 	logger,
@@ -35,10 +38,20 @@ const service = new IdentityResolutionService(
 	userService,
 	trustedKeyService,
 	roleService,
+	config,
 );
 
 const CUSTOM_ROLE = 'global:custom-abc123';
 
+function makeUser(roleSlug: string): User {
+	return {
+		...mock<User>(),
+		id: 'user-id',
+		email: 'user@example.com',
+		role: { ...mock<User['role']>(), slug: roleSlug },
+	} as User;
+}
+
 function makeClaims(overrides: Partial<ExternalTokenClaims> = {}): ExternalTokenClaims {
 	return {
 		sub: 'external-user-1',
@@ -52,11 +65,19 @@ function makeClaims(overrides: Partial<ExternalTokenClaims> = {}): ExternalToken
 	};
 }
 
+function ctx(requireVerifiedEmail = false) {
+	return { kid: 'kid-1', issuer: 'https://issuer.example.com', requireVerifiedEmail };
+}
+
 describe('IdentityResolutionService', () => {
 	beforeEach(() => {
 		vi.clearAllMocks();
 		roleService.isGlobalRole.mockResolvedValue(true);
 		roleService.isRoleLicensed.mockReturnValue(true);
+		config.excludeOwner = false;
+		// Default: no linked identity, no existing user (JIT territory unless overridden).
+		authIdentityRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValue(null);
+		userRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValue(null);
 	});
 
 	describe('JIT provisioning (new user)', () => {
@@ -78,7 +99,7 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService', () => {
 		});
 
 		it('provisions a licensed custom global role', async () => {
-			const user = await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }));
+			const user = await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }), undefined, ctx());
 
 			expect(user.id).toBe('new-user-1');
 			expect(userRepository.createUserWithProject).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
@@ -92,7 +113,7 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService', () => {
 		});
 
 		it('provisions a built-in global role without a license check', async () => {
-			await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: 'global:member' }));
+			await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: 'global:member' }), undefined, ctx());
 
 			expect(roleService.isRoleLicensed).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 			expect(userRepository.createUserWithProject).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
@@ -102,7 +123,7 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService', () => {
 		});
 
 		it('defaults to global:member when no role claim is present', async () => {
-			await service.resolve(makeClaims());
+			await service.resolve(makeClaims(), undefined, ctx());
 
 			expect(userRepository.createUserWithProject).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 				expect.objectContaining({ role: GLOBAL_MEMBER_ROLE }),
@@ -117,35 +138,35 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService', () => {
 		it('throws when the role is not an existing global role', async () => {
 			roleService.isGlobalRole.mockResolvedValue(false);
 
-			await expect(service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: 'global:nonexistent' }))).rejects.toThrow(
-				TokenExchangeAuthError,
-			);
+			await expect(
+				service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: 'global:nonexistent' }), undefined, ctx()),
+			).rejects.toThrow(TokenExchangeAuthError);
 			expect(userRepository.createUserWithProject).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 		});
 
 		it('throws when a custom role is unlicensed', async () => {
 			roleService.isRoleLicensed.mockReturnValue(false);
 
-			await expect(service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }))).rejects.toThrow(
-				TokenExchangeAuthError,
-			);
+			await expect(
+				service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }), undefined, ctx()),
+			).rejects.toThrow(TokenExchangeAuthError);
 			expect(userRepository.createUserWithProject).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 		});
 
 		it('throws on a global:owner role claim', async () => {
-			await expect(service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: 'global:owner' }))).rejects.toThrow(
-				TokenExchangeAuthError,
-			);
+			await expect(
+				service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: 'global:owner' }), undefined, ctx()),
+			).rejects.toThrow(TokenExchangeAuthError);
 		});
 
 		it('throws when the role is not in the key allowedRoles', async () => {
 			await expect(
-				service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }), ['global:member']),
+				service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }), ['global:member'], ctx()),
 			).rejects.toThrow(TokenExchangeAuthError);
 		});
 
 		it('provisions when the role is in the key allowedRoles', async () => {
-			await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }), [CUSTOM_ROLE]);
+			await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }), [CUSTOM_ROLE], ctx());
 
 			expect(userRepository.createUserWithProject).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 				expect.objectContaining({ role: { slug: CUSTOM_ROLE } }),
@@ -165,7 +186,7 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService', () => {
 		it('changes to a licensed custom role and emits an update event', async () => {
 			mockLinkedUser('global:member');
 
-			await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }));
+			await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }), undefined, ctx());
 
 			expect(userService.changeUserRole).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.anything(), {
 				newRoleName: CUSTOM_ROLE,
@@ -180,7 +201,7 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService', () => {
 			mockLinkedUser('global:member');
 			roleService.isGlobalRole.mockResolvedValue(false);
 
-			await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: 'global:nonexistent' }));
+			await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: 'global:nonexistent' }), undefined, ctx());
 
 			expect(userService.changeUserRole).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 		});
@@ -189,16 +210,16 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService', () => {
 			mockLinkedUser('global:member');
 			roleService.isRoleLicensed.mockReturnValue(false);
 
-			await expect(service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }))).rejects.toThrow(
-				TokenExchangeAuthError,
-			);
+			await expect(
+				service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }), undefined, ctx()),
+			).rejects.toThrow(TokenExchangeAuthError);
 			expect(userService.changeUserRole).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 		});
 
 		it('never changes the role of an existing owner', async () => {
 			mockLinkedUser('global:owner');
 
-			await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }));
+			await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }), undefined, ctx());
 
 			expect(userService.changeUserRole).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 		});
@@ -206,7 +227,7 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService', () => {
 		it('ignores a global:owner role claim', async () => {
 			mockLinkedUser('global:member');
 
-			await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: 'global:owner' }));
+			await service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: 'global:owner' }), undefined, ctx());
 
 			expect(userService.changeUserRole).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 		});
@@ -215,9 +236,89 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService', () => {
 			mockLinkedUser('global:member');
 
 			await expect(
-				service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }), ['global:member']),
+				service.resolve(makeClaims({ role: CUSTOM_ROLE }), ['global:member'], ctx()),
 			).rejects.toThrow(TokenExchangeAuthError);
 			expect(userService.changeUserRole).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 		});
 	});
+
+	describe('allowedRoles authority ceiling', () => {
+		it('rejects when a key authenticates as an existing user whose role exceeds allowedRoles (email match)', async () => {
+			userRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValue(makeUser('global:owner'));
+
+			await expect(service.resolve(makeClaims(), ['global:member'], ctx())).rejects.toMatchObject({
+				reason: TokenExchangeFailureReason.RoleNotAllowed,
+			});
+		});
+
+		it('rejects when an already-linked identity resolves to a user whose role exceeds allowedRoles', async () => {
+			authIdentityRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValueOnce(
+				mock<AuthIdentity>({ user: makeUser('global:owner') }),
+			);
+
+			await expect(service.resolve(makeClaims(), ['global:member'], ctx())).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(
+				TokenExchangeAuthError,
+			);
+		});
+
+		it('resolves the existing user when its role is within allowedRoles', async () => {
+			const member = makeUser('global:member');
+			userRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValue(member);
+
+			await expect(service.resolve(makeClaims(), ['global:member'], ctx())).resolves.toBe(member);
+		});
+
+		it('resolves any existing user when allowedRoles is undefined (unrestricted)', async () => {
+			const owner = makeUser('global:owner');
+			userRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValue(owner);
+
+			await expect(service.resolve(makeClaims(), undefined, ctx())).resolves.toBe(owner);
+		});
+	});
+
+	describe('excludeOwner lockout', () => {
+		it('rejects an owner even when allowedRoles explicitly permits it', async () => {
+			config.excludeOwner = true;
+			userRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValue(makeUser('global:owner'));
+
+			await expect(service.resolve(makeClaims(), ['global:owner'], ctx())).rejects.toMatchObject({
+				reason: TokenExchangeFailureReason.RoleNotAllowed,
+			});
+		});
+	});
+
+	describe('requireVerifiedEmail', () => {
+		it('rejects email-fallback linking when email_verified is missing', async () => {
+			userRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValue(makeUser('global:member'));
+
+			await expect(
+				service.resolve(makeClaims(), ['global:member'], ctx(true)),
+			).rejects.toMatchObject({ reason: TokenExchangeFailureReason.EmailNotVerified });
+		});
+
+		it('rejects JIT provisioning when email_verified is missing', async () => {
+			// No existing identity and no existing user → JIT path.
+			await expect(
+				service.resolve(makeClaims(), ['global:member'], ctx(true)),
+			).rejects.toMatchObject({ reason: TokenExchangeFailureReason.EmailNotVerified });
+		});
+
+		it('links an existing user when email_verified is true', async () => {
+			const member = makeUser('global:member');
+			userRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValue(member);
+
+			await expect(
+				service.resolve(makeClaims({ email_verified: true }), ['global:member'], ctx(true)),
+			).resolves.toBe(member);
+		});
+
+		it('links without an email_verified claim when the key does not require it', async () => {
+			const member = makeUser('global:member');
+			userRepository.findOne.mockResolvedValue(member);
+
+			await expect(service.resolve(makeClaims(), ['global:member'], ctx(false))).resolves.toBe(
+				member,
+			);
+		});
+	});
 });

packages/cli/src/modules/token-exchange/services/__tests__/token-exchange.service.test.ts

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ const resolvedKey: ResolvedTrustedKey = {
 	key: 'test-public-key',
 	issuer: 'https://issuer.example.com',
 	allowedRoles: ['global:member', 'global:admin'],
+	requireVerifiedEmail: false,
 };
 
 const mockUser = mock<User>({
@@ -94,7 +95,11 @@ describe('TokenExchangeService', () => {
 			expect(identityResolutionService.resolve).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
 				validClaims,
 				resolvedKey.allowedRoles,
-				{ kid: resolvedKey.kid, issuer: resolvedKey.issuer },
+				{
+					kid: resolvedKey.kid,
+					issuer: resolvedKey.issuer,
+					requireVerifiedEmail: resolvedKey.requireVerifiedEmail,
+				},
 			);
 		});
 

packages/cli/src/modules/token-exchange/services/identity-resolution.service.ts

@@ -7,13 +7,14 @@ import {
 	type User,
 } from '@n8n/db';
 import { Service } from '@n8n/di';
-import { isBuiltInRole } from '@n8n/permissions';
+import { GLOBAL_OWNER_ROLE_SLUG, isBuiltInRole } from '@n8n/permissions';
 import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
 
 import { EventService } from '@/events/event.service';
 import { RoleService } from '@/services/role.service';
 import { UserService } from '@/services/user.service';
 
+import { TokenExchangeConfig } from '../token-exchange.config';
 import { TokenExchangeAuthError } from '../token-exchange.errors';
 import type { ExternalTokenClaims } from '../token-exchange.schemas';
 import { TokenExchangeFailureReason } from '../token-exchange.types';
@@ -49,10 +50,38 @@ export class IdentityResolutionService {
 		private readonly userService: UserService,
 		private readonly trustedKeyService: TrustedKeyService,
 		private readonly roleService: RoleService,
+		private readonly config: TokenExchangeConfig,
 	) {
 		this.logger = logger.scoped('token-exchange');
 	}
 
+	private assertKeyMayActAsUser(user: User, allowedRoles?: string[]) {
+		if (this.config.excludeOwner && user.role?.slug === GLOBAL_OWNER_ROLE_SLUG) {
+			throw new TokenExchangeAuthError(
+				TokenExchangeFailureReason.RoleNotAllowed,
+				'User role is not allowed for this key',
+			);
+		}
+		if (allowedRoles?.length && !allowedRoles.includes(user.role?.slug ?? '')) {
+			throw new TokenExchangeAuthError(
+				TokenExchangeFailureReason.RoleNotAllowed,
+				'User role is not allowed for this key',
+			);
+		}
+	}
+
+	private assertEmailVerified(
+		claims: ExternalTokenClaims,
+		tokenContext: { requireVerifiedEmail: boolean },
+	) {
+		if (tokenContext?.requireVerifiedEmail && !claims.email_verified) {
+			throw new TokenExchangeAuthError(
+				TokenExchangeFailureReason.EmailNotVerified,
+				'Email is not verified',
+			);
+		}
+	}
+
 	/**
 	 * Map external identity claims to a local n8n user, creating one if necessary.
 	 *
@@ -67,8 +96,8 @@ export class IdentityResolutionService {
 	 */
 	async resolve(
 		claims: ExternalTokenClaims,
-		allowedRoles?: string[],
-		tokenContext?: { kid: string; issuer: string },
+		allowedRoles: string[] | undefined,
+		tokenContext: { kid: string; issuer: string; requireVerifiedEmail: boolean },
 	): Promise<User> {
 		const email = claims.email?.toLowerCase();
 
@@ -97,8 +126,8 @@ export class IdentityResolutionService {
 			this.eventService.emit('token-exchange-identity-rebound', {
 				userId: identity.user.id,
 				sub: claims.sub,
-				kid: tokenContext?.kid ?? '',
-				issuer: tokenContext?.issuer ?? claims.iss,
+				kid: tokenContext.kid,
+				issuer: tokenContext.issuer,
 			});
 			return await this.resolveByIdentity(claims, identity, allowedRoles, tokenContext);
 		}
@@ -131,8 +160,10 @@ export class IdentityResolutionService {
 		claims: ExternalTokenClaims,
 		identity: AuthIdentity,
 		allowedRoles: string[] | undefined,
-		tokenContext: { kid: string; issuer: string } | undefined,
+		tokenContext: { kid: string; issuer: string; requireVerifiedEmail: boolean } | undefined,
 	): Promise<User> {
+		this.assertKeyMayActAsUser(identity.user, allowedRoles);
+
 		this.logger.debug('Resolved user by auth identity', { sub: claims.sub });
 		const resolvedRole = await this.resolveRoleForExistingUser(
 			claims.role,
@@ -148,12 +179,14 @@ export class IdentityResolutionService {
 		email: string,
 		existingUser: User,
 		allowedRoles: string[] | undefined,
-		tokenContext: { kid: string; issuer: string } | undefined,
+		tokenContext: { kid: string; issuer: string; requireVerifiedEmail: boolean },
 	): Promise<User> {
 		this.logger.debug('Linking external identity to existing user by email', {
 			sub: claims.sub,
 			email,
 		});
+		this.assertKeyMayActAsUser(existingUser, allowedRoles);
+		this.assertEmailVerified(claims, tokenContext);
 		const resolvedRole = await this.resolveRoleForExistingUser(
 			claims.role,
 			allowedRoles,
@@ -178,8 +211,9 @@ export class IdentityResolutionService {
 		claims: ExternalTokenClaims,
 		email: string,
 		allowedRoles: string[] | undefined,
-		tokenContext: { kid: string; issuer: string } | undefined,
+		tokenContext: { kid: string; issuer: string; requireVerifiedEmail: boolean },
 	): Promise<User> {
+		this.assertEmailVerified(claims, tokenContext);
 		this.logger.debug('JIT provisioning new user', { sub: claims.sub, email });
 
 		const jitRole = await this.resolveRoleForNewUser(claims.role, allowedRoles);
@@ -334,7 +368,7 @@ export class IdentityResolutionService {
 		user: User,
 		claims: ExternalTokenClaims,
 		resolvedRole?: string,
-		tokenContext?: { kid: string; issuer: string },
+		tokenContext?: { kid: string; issuer: string; requireVerifiedEmail: boolean },
 	): Promise<User> {
 		let needsReload = false;
 

packages/cli/src/modules/token-exchange/services/token-exchange.service.ts

@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ export class TokenExchangeService {
 		const user = await this.identityResolutionService.resolve(claims, resolvedKey.allowedRoles, {
 			kid: resolvedKey.kid,
 			issuer: resolvedKey.issuer,
+			requireVerifiedEmail: resolvedKey.requireVerifiedEmail,
 		});
 		return { user, subject: claims.sub, issuer: resolvedKey.issuer, kid: resolvedKey.kid };
 	}

packages/cli/src/modules/token-exchange/services/trusted-key.service.ts

@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ export class TrustedKeyService {
 				issuer: data.issuer,
 				expectedAudience: data.expectedAudience,
 				allowedRoles: data.allowedRoles,
+				requireVerifiedEmail: data.requireVerifiedEmail ?? true,
 			};
 		}
 
@@ -512,6 +513,7 @@ export class TrustedKeyService {
 					issuer: key.issuer,
 					expectedAudience: key.expectedAudience,
 					allowedRoles: key.allowedRoles,
+					requireVerifiedEmail: jwksConfig.requireVerifiedEmail ?? true,
 					expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + result.ttlSeconds * 1000).toISOString(),
 				},
 			})),
@@ -550,7 +552,15 @@ export class TrustedKeyService {
 		const seenKids = new Set<string>();
 
 		for (const config of configs) {
-			const { kid, algorithms, key: pemString, issuer, expectedAudience, allowedRoles } = config;
+			const {
+				kid,
+				algorithms,
+				key: pemString,
+				issuer,
+				expectedAudience,
+				allowedRoles,
+				requireVerifiedEmail,
+			} = config;
 
 			if (seenKids.has(kid)) {
 				throw new UnexpectedError(`Trusted key "${kid}": duplicate kid`);
@@ -567,6 +577,7 @@ export class TrustedKeyService {
 					issuer,
 					expectedAudience,
 					allowedRoles,
+					requireVerifiedEmail,
 				},
 			});
 		}

packages/cli/src/modules/token-exchange/token-exchange.config.ts

@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ export class TokenExchangeConfig {
 	@Env('N8N_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_MAX_TOKEN_TTL')
 	maxTokenTtl: number = 900;
 
+	@Env('N8N_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_EXCLUDE_OWNER')
+	excludeOwner: boolean = true;
+
 	/**
 	 * JSON array of trusted key sources for JWT verification.
 	 * Each entry is validated against `TrustedKeySourceSchema`.

packages/cli/src/modules/token-exchange/token-exchange.schemas.ts

@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ export const ExternalTokenClaimsSchema = z.object({
 	given_name: z.string().optional(),
 	family_name: z.string().optional(),
 	role: z.string().optional(),
+	email_verified: z
+		.union([z.boolean(), z.enum(['true', 'false'])])
+		.transform((v) => v === true || v === 'true')
+		.optional(),
 });
 
 export type ExternalTokenClaims = z.infer<typeof ExternalTokenClaimsSchema>;
@@ -55,6 +59,7 @@ export const TrustedKeySourceSchema = z.discriminatedUnion('type', [
 		algorithms: z.array(JwtAlgorithmSchema).min(1),
 		key: z.string().min(1),
 		issuer: z.string().min(1),
+		requireVerifiedEmail: z.boolean().optional(),
 		expectedAudience: z.string().optional(),
 		allowedRoles: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
 	}),
@@ -62,6 +67,7 @@ export const TrustedKeySourceSchema = z.discriminatedUnion('type', [
 		type: z.literal('jwks'),
 		url: z.string().url(),
 		issuer: z.string().min(1),
+		requireVerifiedEmail: z.boolean().optional(),
 		expectedAudience: z.string().optional(),
 		allowedRoles: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
 		cacheTtlSeconds: z.number().int().positive().optional(),
@@ -88,6 +94,7 @@ export const TrustedKeyDataSchema = z.object({
 	expectedAudience: z.string().optional(),
 	allowedRoles: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
 	expiresAt: z.string().optional(),
+	requireVerifiedEmail: z.boolean().optional(),
 });
 
 export type TrustedKeyData = z.infer<typeof TrustedKeyDataSchema>;
@@ -116,6 +123,9 @@ export interface ResolvedTrustedKey {
 
 	/** Roles allowed for tokens signed with this key, if restricted. */
 	allowedRoles?: string[];
+
+	/** Flag indicating that the token's `email_verified` claim must be true, for email linking. */
+	requireVerifiedEmail: boolean;
 }
 
 /**

packages/cli/src/modules/token-exchange/token-exchange.types.ts

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ export const TokenExchangeFailureReason = {
 	InvalidClaims: 'invalid_claims',
 	InternalError: 'internal_error',
 	RoleNotAllowed: 'role_not_allowed',
+	EmailNotVerified: 'email_not_verified',
 	Other: 'other',
 } as const;
 

packages/cli/src/workflow-execute-additional-data.ts

@@ -335,12 +335,18 @@ export async function executeWorkflow(
 		source: 'integrated',
 	});
 
+	// A sub-workflow loaded from inline JSON / file / URL (source other than a
+	// stored database workflow) carries no project of its own. Its credentials
+	// must be evaluated against the triggering user, not the parent's project.
+	const isInlineSubworkflow = workflowInfo.code !== undefined && workflowInfo.id === undefined;
+
 	const executionPromise = startExecution(
 		additionalData,
 		options,
 		executionId,
 		runData,
 		workflowData,
+		isInlineSubworkflow,
 	);
 
 	if (options.doNotWaitToFinish) {
@@ -493,6 +499,7 @@ async function startExecution(
 	executionId: string,
 	runData: IWorkflowExecutionDataProcess,
 	workflowData: IWorkflowBase,
+	isInlineSubworkflow = false,
 ): Promise<ExecuteWorkflowData> {
 	const nodeTypes = Container.get(NodeTypes);
 	const activeExecutions = Container.get(ActiveExecutions);
@@ -521,7 +528,17 @@ async function startExecution(
 
 	let data;
 	try {
-		await Container.get(CredentialsPermissionChecker).check(workflowData.id, workflowData.nodes);
+		if (isInlineSubworkflow && additionalData.userId) {
+			// Inline sub-workflow triggered by a specific user: its credentials were
+			// never vetted against that user (they live only in the parameter JSON),
+			// so validate them against the user rather than the parent's project.
+			await Container.get(CredentialsPermissionChecker).checkForUser(
+				additionalData.userId,
+				workflowData.nodes,
+			);
+		} else {
+			await Container.get(CredentialsPermissionChecker).check(workflowData.id, workflowData.nodes);
+		}
 		await Container.get(SubworkflowPolicyChecker).check(
 			workflow,
 			options.parentWorkflowId,
@@ -533,6 +550,11 @@ async function startExecution(
 		// different webhooks
 		const workflowSettings = workflowData.settings;
 		const additionalDataIntegrated = await getBase({
+			// Inline sub-workflows carry no project, so the triggering user must be
+			// preserved for nested inline calls to be validated against that user too.
+			// Stored sub-workflows run under their own project scope, so their userId
+			// stays unset (their credentials are validated against the project instead).
+			userId: isInlineSubworkflow ? additionalData.userId : undefined,
 			workflowId: workflowData.id,
 			workflowSettings,
 		});

packages/cli/src/workflows/workflow.service.ee.ts

@@ -21,8 +21,15 @@ import { Service } from '@n8n/di';
 import { hasGlobalScope } from '@n8n/permissions';
 import { In, type EntityManager } from '@n8n/typeorm';
 import omit from 'lodash/omit';
-import type { IWorkflowBase, WorkflowId } from 'n8n-workflow';
-import { NodeOperationError, PROJECT_ROOT, UserError, WorkflowActivationError } from 'n8n-workflow';
+import type { INode, IWorkflowBase, WorkflowId } from 'n8n-workflow';
+import {
+	EXECUTE_WORKFLOW_NODE_TYPE,
+	jsonParse,
+	NodeOperationError,
+	PROJECT_ROOT,
+	UserError,
+	WorkflowActivationError,
+} from 'n8n-workflow';
 
 import { ActiveWorkflowManager } from '@/active-workflow-manager';
 import { CredentialsFinderService } from '@/credentials/credentials-finder.service';
@@ -262,17 +269,62 @@ export class EnterpriseWorkflowService {
 			return [];
 		}
 		return workflow.nodes.filter((node) => {
-			if (!node.credentials) return false;
-
-			const allUsedCredentials = Object.values(node.credentials);
-
-			const allUsedCredentialIds = allUsedCredentials.map((nodeCred) => nodeCred.id?.toString());
-			return allUsedCredentialIds.some(
-				(nodeCredId) => nodeCredId && !userCredIds.includes(nodeCredId),
-			);
+			const usedCredentialIds = this.getCredentialIdsUsedByNode(node);
+			return usedCredentialIds.some((credId) => !userCredIds.includes(credId));
 		});
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * Collect every credential id a node references. Besides the node's own
+	 * `credentials`, an Execute Sub-workflow node with an inline source embeds a
+	 * whole workflow — including its nodes' credentials — inside a single string
+	 * parameter, so those references are parsed out and returned as well.
+	 */
+	private getCredentialIdsUsedByNode(node: INode): string[] {
+		const credentialIds: string[] = [];
+
+		if (node.credentials) {
+			for (const nodeCred of Object.values(node.credentials)) {
+				const id = nodeCred.id?.toString();
+				if (id) credentialIds.push(id);
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (node.type === EXECUTE_WORKFLOW_NODE_TYPE) {
+			credentialIds.push(...this.getCredentialIdsFromInlineWorkflow(node.parameters?.workflowJson));
+		}
+
+		return credentialIds;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Extract the credential ids referenced by the nodes of an inline sub-workflow
+	 * passed as the `workflowJson` parameter of an Execute Sub-workflow node.
+	 * Non-string or unparseable values reference no resolvable credentials and are
+	 * ignored (the node would fail at run time).
+	 */
+	private getCredentialIdsFromInlineWorkflow(workflowJson: unknown): string[] {
+		if (typeof workflowJson !== 'string') return [];
+
+		let parsed: Partial<IWorkflowBase>;
+		try {
+			parsed = jsonParse<Partial<IWorkflowBase>>(workflowJson);
+		} catch {
+			return [];
+		}
+		if (!parsed || !Array.isArray(parsed.nodes)) return [];
+
+		const credentialIds: string[] = [];
+		for (const subNode of parsed.nodes) {
+			if (!subNode?.credentials) continue;
+			for (const nodeCred of Object.values(subNode.credentials)) {
+				const id = nodeCred?.id?.toString();
+				if (id) credentialIds.push(id);
+			}
+		}
+		return credentialIds;
+	}
+
 	/**
 	 * Get workflow IDs that use at least one resolvable credential.
 	 * Used to populate `hasResolvableCredentials` in workflow list responses.

packages/cli/test/integration/execution-redaction.test.ts

@@ -7,7 +7,14 @@ import {
 } from '@n8n/backend-test-utils';
 import type { User } from '@n8n/db';
 import { stringify } from 'flatted';
-import type { INode, IRunExecutionData, IWorkflowBase, WorkflowExecuteMode } from 'n8n-workflow';
+import type {
+	IBinaryKeyData,
+	IDataObject,
+	INode,
+	IRunExecutionData,
+	IWorkflowBase,
+	WorkflowExecuteMode,
+} from 'n8n-workflow';
 import { createRunExecutionData, NodeApiError, NodeOperationError } from 'n8n-workflow';
 
 import { ConcurrencyControlService } from '@/concurrency/concurrency-control.service';
@@ -60,10 +67,25 @@ const BINARY_DATA = {
 	fileName: 'secret.txt',
 };
 
+const STACK_NODE: INode = {
+	id: 'node-1',
+	name: 'Test Node',
+	type: 'n8n-nodes-base.httpRequest',
+	typeVersion: 1,
+	position: [0, 0],
+	parameters: {},
+};
+
+type SensitiveItem = { json: IDataObject; binary?: IBinaryKeyData };
+
 function buildRunExecutionData(opts: {
 	policy?: 'none' | 'non-manual' | 'all';
 	channels?: { production: boolean; manual: boolean };
 	mode?: WorkflowExecuteMode;
+	/** Item to plant in runData (and, with `withStack`, the executionData subtrees). */
+	item?: SensitiveItem;
+	/** Also plant the item in executionData.nodeExecutionStack and waitingExecution. */
+	withStack?: boolean;
 }): IRunExecutionData {
 	const redaction = opts.channels
 		? {
@@ -75,6 +97,27 @@ function buildRunExecutionData(opts: {
 			? { version: 1 as const, policy: opts.policy }
 			: undefined;
 
+	const item: SensitiveItem = opts.item ?? {
+		json: { ...SENSITIVE_JSON },
+		binary: { file: { ...BINARY_DATA } },
+	};
+
+	const runtimeData = redaction
+		? {
+				version: 1 as const,
+				establishedAt: Date.now(),
+				source: opts.mode ?? 'trigger',
+				redaction,
+			}
+		: undefined;
+
+	const stackSubtrees = opts.withStack
+		? {
+				nodeExecutionStack: [{ node: STACK_NODE, source: null, data: { main: [[{ ...item }]] } }],
+				waitingExecution: { 'Test Node': { 0: { main: [[{ ...item }]] } } },
+			}
+		: undefined;
+
 	return createRunExecutionData({
 		resultData: {
 			runData: {
@@ -85,30 +128,15 @@ function buildRunExecutionData(opts: {
 						executionTime: 0,
 						executionStatus: 'success',
 						source: [],
-						data: {
-							main: [
-								[
-									{
-										json: { ...SENSITIVE_JSON },
-										binary: { file: { ...BINARY_DATA } },
-									},
-								],
-							],
-						},
+						data: { main: [[{ ...item }]] },
 					},
 				],
 			},
 		},
-		executionData: redaction
-			? {
-					runtimeData: {
-						version: 1 as const,
-						establishedAt: Date.now(),
-						source: opts.mode ?? 'trigger',
-						redaction,
-					},
-				}
-			: undefined,
+		executionData:
+			runtimeData || stackSubtrees
+				? { ...(runtimeData && { runtimeData }), ...stackSubtrees }
+				: undefined,
 	});
 }
 
@@ -117,11 +145,15 @@ async function createExecutionWithRedaction(opts: {
 	mode?: WorkflowExecuteMode;
 	policy?: 'none' | 'non-manual' | 'all';
 	channels?: { production: boolean; manual: boolean };
+	item?: SensitiveItem;
+	withStack?: boolean;
 }) {
 	const runData = buildRunExecutionData({
 		policy: opts.policy,
 		channels: opts.channels,
 		mode: opts.mode,
+		item: opts.item,
+		withStack: opts.withStack,
 	});
 	return await createExecution(
 		{ data: stringify(runData), mode: opts.mode ?? 'trigger' },
@@ -163,6 +195,21 @@ function assertNotRedacted(data: IRunExecutionData) {
 	expect(data.redactionInfo).toBeUndefined();
 }
 
+// Asserts the executionData subtrees (nodeExecutionStack, waitingExecution) had
+// their item data cleared. Requires the execution to have been built with
+// `withStack: true`.
+function assertStackRedacted(data: IRunExecutionData) {
+	const stackItem = data.executionData!.nodeExecutionStack[0].data.main[0]![0];
+	expect(stackItem.json).toEqual({});
+	expect(stackItem.binary).toBeUndefined();
+	expect(stackItem.redaction).toMatchObject({ redacted: true });
+
+	const waitItem = data.executionData!.waitingExecution['Test Node'][0].main[0]![0];
+	expect(waitItem.json).toEqual({});
+	expect(waitItem.binary).toBeUndefined();
+	expect(waitItem.redaction).toMatchObject({ redacted: true });
+}
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Tests
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -1017,3 +1064,163 @@ describe('GET /api/v1/executions — Execution Redaction', () => {
 		});
 	});
 });
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// executionData subtrees (nodeExecutionStack / waitingExecution) redaction
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+describe('executionData subtrees — redaction through DB round-trip', () => {
+	test('REST GET /executions/:id — stack and waiting items are redacted', async () => {
+		const workflow = await createWorkflow({}, owner);
+		const execution = await createExecutionWithRedaction({
+			workflow,
+			mode: 'trigger',
+			policy: 'all',
+			withStack: true,
+		});
+
+		const response = await testServer
+			.authAgentFor(owner)
+			.get(`/executions/${execution.id}`)
+			.expect(200);
+
+		const data = parseResponseData(response.body);
+		assertRedacted(data);
+		assertStackRedacted(data);
+	});
+
+	test('Public API GET /api/v1/executions/:id — stack and waiting items are redacted', async () => {
+		const workflow = await createWorkflow({}, publicApiMember);
+		const execution = await createExecutionWithRedaction({
+			workflow,
+			mode: 'trigger',
+			policy: 'all',
+			withStack: true,
+		});
+
+		const response = await testServer
+			.publicApiAgentFor(publicApiMember)
+			.get(`/executions/${execution.id}?includeData=true`)
+			.expect(200);
+
+		const data = response.body.data as IRunExecutionData;
+		assertRedacted(data, 'workflow_redaction_policy', true);
+		assertStackRedacted(data);
+	});
+});
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Canary: a sensitive item value planted in every item-bearing subtree must
+// not appear anywhere in a redacted response, on any surface that serves data.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+describe('sensitive item values are not exposed across surfaces', () => {
+	const SENTINEL_JSON = 'IAM950-SENTINEL-JSON-8f3a2b';
+	const SENTINEL_BINARY = 'IAM950-SENTINEL-BINARY-8f3a2b';
+
+	const item: SensitiveItem = {
+		json: { deep: SENTINEL_JSON },
+		binary: { file: { mimeType: 'text/plain', fileName: 'x.txt', data: SENTINEL_BINARY } },
+	};
+
+	// Search the whole serialized response — surface-agnostic, so it catches the
+	// value regardless of which subtree (runData, stack, waiting) or encoding
+	// (flatted string vs. nested object) it hides in.
+	const exposesSentinel = (body: unknown): boolean => {
+		const serialized = JSON.stringify(body);
+		return serialized.includes(SENTINEL_JSON) || serialized.includes(SENTINEL_BINARY);
+	};
+
+	test('REST GET /executions/:id', async () => {
+		const workflow = await createWorkflow({}, owner);
+		const execution = await createExecutionWithRedaction({
+			workflow,
+			mode: 'trigger',
+			policy: 'all',
+			item,
+			withStack: true,
+		});
+
+		const response = await testServer
+			.authAgentFor(owner)
+			.get(`/executions/${execution.id}`)
+			.expect(200);
+
+		expect(exposesSentinel(response.body)).toBe(false);
+	});
+
+	test('REST GET /workflows/:workflowId/executions/last-successful', async () => {
+		const workflow = await createWorkflow({}, owner);
+		await createExecutionWithRedaction({
+			workflow,
+			mode: 'trigger',
+			policy: 'all',
+			item,
+			withStack: true,
+		});
+
+		const response = await testServer
+			.authAgentFor(owner)
+			.get(`/workflows/${workflow.id}/executions/last-successful`)
+			.expect(200);
+
+		expect(exposesSentinel(response.body)).toBe(false);
+	});
+
+	test('Public API GET /api/v1/executions/:id', async () => {
+		const workflow = await createWorkflow({}, publicApiOwner);
+		const execution = await createExecutionWithRedaction({
+			workflow,
+			mode: 'trigger',
+			policy: 'all',
+			item,
+			withStack: true,
+		});
+
+		const response = await testServer
+			.publicApiAgentFor(publicApiOwner)
+			.get(`/executions/${execution.id}?includeData=true`)
+			.expect(200);
+
+		expect(exposesSentinel(response.body)).toBe(false);
+	});
+
+	test('Public API GET /api/v1/executions', async () => {
+		const workflow = await createWorkflow({}, publicApiOwner);
+		await createExecutionWithRedaction({
+			workflow,
+			mode: 'trigger',
+			policy: 'all',
+			item,
+			withStack: true,
+		});
+
+		const response = await testServer
+			.publicApiAgentFor(publicApiOwner)
+			.get('/executions?includeData=true')
+			.expect(200);
+
+		expect(exposesSentinel(response.body)).toBe(false);
+	});
+
+	// Guards against a vacuously-green canary: on the reveal path the value must
+	// still be observable, proving the search would catch a real exposure.
+	test('control: revealed (unredacted) response does expose the sentinel', async () => {
+		const workflow = await createWorkflow({}, owner);
+		const execution = await createExecutionWithRedaction({
+			workflow,
+			mode: 'trigger',
+			policy: 'all',
+			item,
+			withStack: true,
+		});
+
+		const response = await testServer
+			.authAgentFor(owner)
+			.get(`/executions/${execution.id}`)
+			.query({ redactExecutionData: 'false' })
+			.expect(200);
+
+		expect(exposesSentinel(response.body)).toBe(true);
+	});
+});

packages/cli/test/integration/shared/workflow.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { WorkflowEntity, WorkflowHistory } from '@n8n/db';
-import type { INode } from 'n8n-workflow';
+import { EXECUTE_WORKFLOW_NODE_TYPE, type INode } from 'n8n-workflow';
 
 export const FIRST_CREDENTIAL_ID = '1';
 export const SECOND_CREDENTIAL_ID = '2';
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ export const THIRD_CREDENTIAL_ID = '3';
 const NODE_WITH_NO_CRED = '0133467b-df4a-473d-9295-fdd9d01fa45a';
 const NODE_WITH_ONE_CRED = '4673f869-f2dc-4a33-b053-ca3193bc5226';
 const NODE_WITH_TWO_CRED = '9b4208bd-8f10-4a6a-ad3b-da47a326f7da';
+const NODE_WITH_INLINE_SUBWORKFLOW_CRED = 'a1f8c2e0-1b2c-4d3e-9f0a-1234567890ab';
 
 const nodeWithNoCredentials: INode = {
 	id: NODE_WITH_NO_CRED,
@@ -53,10 +54,39 @@ const nodeWithTwoCredentials: INode = {
 	parameters: {},
 };
 
+// Execute Sub-workflow node whose inline `workflowJson` embeds a sub-workflow
+// referencing a credential (FIRST_CREDENTIAL_ID) that is not exposed via the
+// node's own top-level `credentials`.
+const nodeWithInlineSubworkflowCredential: INode = {
+	id: NODE_WITH_INLINE_SUBWORKFLOW_CRED,
+	name: 'Execute Sub-workflow',
+	typeVersion: 1.2,
+	type: EXECUTE_WORKFLOW_NODE_TYPE,
+	position: [0, 0],
+	parameters: {
+		source: 'parameter',
+		workflowJson: JSON.stringify({
+			nodes: [
+				{
+					name: 'Steal',
+					type: 'n8n-nodes-base.httpRequest',
+					typeVersion: 4.2,
+					parameters: {},
+					credentials: {
+						httpHeaderAuth: { id: FIRST_CREDENTIAL_ID, name: 'First fake credential' },
+					},
+				},
+			],
+			connections: {},
+		}),
+	},
+};
+
 export function getWorkflow(options?: {
 	addNodeWithoutCreds?: boolean;
 	addNodeWithOneCred?: boolean;
 	addNodeWithTwoCreds?: boolean;
+	addNodeWithInlineSubworkflowCred?: boolean;
 }) {
 	const workflow = new WorkflowEntity();
 
@@ -74,6 +104,10 @@ export function getWorkflow(options?: {
 		workflow.nodes.push(nodeWithTwoCredentials);
 	}
 
+	if (options?.addNodeWithInlineSubworkflowCred) {
+		workflow.nodes.push(nodeWithInlineSubworkflowCredential);
+	}
+
 	return workflow;
 }
 

packages/cli/test/integration/token-exchange/embed-auth.api.test.ts

@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ function signEmbedToken(overrides: Record<string, unknown> = {}): string {
 		exp: now + 30,
 		jti: randomUUID(),
 		email: `embed-${randomUUID()}@test.example.com`,
+		email_verified: true,
 		given_name: 'Test',
 		family_name: 'User',
 		...overrides,

packages/cli/test/integration/token-exchange/identity-resolution.service.test.ts

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import {
 	qualifiedProviderId,
 } from '@/modules/token-exchange/services/identity-resolution.service';
 import { TrustedKeyService } from '@/modules/token-exchange/services/trusted-key.service';
+import { TokenExchangeConfig } from '@/modules/token-exchange/token-exchange.config';
 import type { ExternalTokenClaims } from '@/modules/token-exchange/token-exchange.schemas';
 
 import { createOwner, createUser } from '../shared/db/users';
@@ -63,6 +64,11 @@ const baseClaims: ExternalTokenClaims = {
 /** The issuer-scoped provider id a token-exchange identity is stored under. */
 const providerIdFor = (sub: string, iss: string = baseClaims.iss) => qualifiedProviderId(iss, sub);
 
+/** Key context passed to resolve(); requireVerifiedEmail defaults off for these tests. */
+function ctx(requireVerifiedEmail = false) {
+	return { kid: 'kid-1', issuer: baseClaims.iss, requireVerifiedEmail };
+}
+
 describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 	describe('Path 1 — known sub', () => {
 		it('should resolve user by auth identity and return role with scopes', async () => {
@@ -71,11 +77,15 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 				AuthIdentity.create(user, providerIdFor('ext-known'), 'token-exchange'),
 			);
 
-			const result = await service.resolve({
-				...baseClaims,
-				sub: 'ext-known',
-				email: 'known@example.com',
-			});
+			const result = await service.resolve(
+				{
+					...baseClaims,
+					sub: 'ext-known',
+					email: 'known@example.com',
+				},
+				undefined,
+				ctx(),
+			);
 
 			expect(result.id).toBe(user.id);
 			expect(result.email).toBe('known@example.com');
@@ -94,13 +104,17 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 				AuthIdentity.create(user, providerIdFor('ext-unchanged'), 'token-exchange'),
 			);
 
-			const result = await service.resolve({
-				...baseClaims,
-				sub: 'ext-unchanged',
-				email: 'unchanged@example.com',
-				given_name: 'Same',
-				family_name: 'Name',
-			});
+			const result = await service.resolve(
+				{
+					...baseClaims,
+					sub: 'ext-unchanged',
+					email: 'unchanged@example.com',
+					given_name: 'Same',
+					family_name: 'Name',
+				},
+				undefined,
+				ctx(),
+			);
 
 			expect(result.id).toBe(user.id);
 
@@ -120,12 +134,12 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 			};
 
 			// First call: email fallback creates the identity link
-			const result = await service.resolve(claims);
+			const result = await service.resolve(claims, undefined, ctx());
 			expect(result.id).toBe(user.id);
 
 			// Second call: should now resolve via Path 1 (known sub),
 			// proving the identity was correctly linked to the user
-			const secondResult = await service.resolve(claims);
+			const secondResult = await service.resolve(claims, undefined, ctx());
 			expect(secondResult.id).toBe(user.id);
 			expect(secondResult.role).toBeDefined();
 			expect(secondResult.role.slug).toBe('global:member');
@@ -141,7 +155,8 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 					email: 'fallback-role@example.com',
 					role: 'global:admin',
 				},
-				['global:admin'],
+				['global:member', 'global:admin'],
+				ctx(),
 			);
 
 			expect(result.id).toBe(user.id);
@@ -157,11 +172,15 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 		it('should match existing user when email claim has different casing', async () => {
 			const user = await createUser({ email: 'casetest@example.com' });
 
-			const result = await service.resolve({
-				...baseClaims,
-				sub: 'ext-case',
-				email: 'CaseTest@Example.COM',
-			});
+			const result = await service.resolve(
+				{
+					...baseClaims,
+					sub: 'ext-case',
+					email: 'CaseTest@Example.COM',
+				},
+				undefined,
+				ctx(),
+			);
 
 			expect(result.id).toBe(user.id);
 
@@ -183,7 +202,7 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 				family_name: 'Tee',
 			};
 
-			const result = await service.resolve(claims);
+			const result = await service.resolve(claims, undefined, ctx());
 
 			expect(result.email).toBe('jit@example.com');
 			expect(result.firstName).toBe('Jay');
@@ -225,6 +244,7 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 				service.resolve(
 					{ ...baseClaims, sub: 'ext-rejected', email: 'rejected@example.com', role },
 					allowedRoles,
+					ctx(),
 				),
 			).rejects.toThrow(errorMsg);
 		});
@@ -232,19 +252,23 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 		it('should throw when email is missing and no identity match exists', async () => {
 			const claimsWithoutEmail = { ...baseClaims, sub: 'ext-no-email', email: undefined };
 
-			await expect(service.resolve(claimsWithoutEmail)).rejects.toThrow(
+			await expect(service.resolve(claimsWithoutEmail, undefined, ctx())).rejects.toThrow(
 				'Email claim is required for user provisioning',
 			);
 		});
 
 		it('should throw on unknown role claim for new user', async () => {
 			await expect(
-				service.resolve({
-					...baseClaims,
-					sub: 'ext-jit-unknown-role',
-					email: 'jit-unknown-role@example.com',
-					role: 'global:nonsense',
-				}),
+				service.resolve(
+					{
+						...baseClaims,
+						sub: 'ext-jit-unknown-role',
+						email: 'jit-unknown-role@example.com',
+						role: 'global:nonsense',
+					},
+					undefined,
+					ctx(),
+				),
 			).rejects.toThrow("Unrecognized role 'global:nonsense' cannot be assigned to new user");
 		});
 
@@ -257,6 +281,7 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 					role: 'global:admin',
 				},
 				['global:admin', 'global:member'],
+				ctx(),
 			);
 
 			expect(result.role.slug).toBe('global:admin');
@@ -270,33 +295,31 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 	});
 
 	describe('profile and role sync', () => {
-		it('should allow global:owner user to log in without changing their role', async () => {
+		it('rejects a global:owner user by default (excludeOwner)', async () => {
+			Container.get(TokenExchangeConfig).excludeOwner = true;
 			const owner = await createOwner();
 			await authIdentityRepository.save(
 				AuthIdentity.create(owner, providerIdFor('ext-owner'), 'token-exchange'),
 			);
 
-			const result = await service.resolve({
-				...baseClaims,
-				sub: 'ext-owner',
-				email: owner.email,
-				role: 'global:owner',
-			});
-
-			expect(result.id).toBe(owner.id);
-			expect(result.role.slug).toBe('global:owner');
-
-			const dbUser = await userRepository.findOne({
-				where: { id: owner.id },
-				relations: ['role'],
-			});
-			expect(dbUser!.role.slug).toBe('global:owner');
+			await expect(
+				service.resolve(
+					{
+						...baseClaims,
+						sub: 'ext-owner',
+						email: owner.email,
+						role: 'global:owner',
+					},
+					undefined,
+					ctx(),
+				),
+			).rejects.toThrow('User role is not allowed for this key');
 		});
 
 		it('should throw when claimed role is not in allowedRoles for known identity', async () => {
-			const admin = await createUser({ email: 'admin-keep@example.com', role: GLOBAL_ADMIN_ROLE });
+			const user = await createUser({ email: 'admin-keep@example.com' });
 			await authIdentityRepository.save(
-				AuthIdentity.create(admin, providerIdFor('ext-admin-keep'), 'token-exchange'),
+				AuthIdentity.create(user, providerIdFor('ext-admin-keep'), 'token-exchange'),
 			);
 
 			await expect(
@@ -308,12 +331,13 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 						role: 'global:admin',
 					},
 					['global:member'],
+					ctx(),
 				),
 			).rejects.toThrow("Role 'global:admin' is not allowed for this token exchange key");
 		});
 
 		it('should throw when claimed role is not in allowedRoles for email fallback', async () => {
-			await createUser({ email: 'admin-email@example.com', role: GLOBAL_ADMIN_ROLE });
+			await createUser({ email: 'admin-email@example.com' });
 
 			await expect(
 				service.resolve(
@@ -324,6 +348,7 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 						role: 'global:admin',
 					},
 					['global:member'],
+					ctx(),
 				),
 			).rejects.toThrow("Role 'global:admin' is not allowed for this token exchange key");
 
@@ -340,12 +365,16 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 				AuthIdentity.create(user, providerIdFor('ext-unknown-role'), 'token-exchange'),
 			);
 
-			const result = await service.resolve({
-				...baseClaims,
-				sub: 'ext-unknown-role',
-				email: 'unknown-role@example.com',
-				role: 'global:nonsense',
-			});
+			const result = await service.resolve(
+				{
+					...baseClaims,
+					sub: 'ext-unknown-role',
+					email: 'unknown-role@example.com',
+					role: 'global:nonsense',
+				},
+				undefined,
+				ctx(),
+			);
 
 			expect(result.id).toBe(user.id);
 			expect(result.role.slug).toBe('global:member');
@@ -357,12 +386,16 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 				AuthIdentity.create(user, providerIdFor('ext-escalation'), 'token-exchange'),
 			);
 
-			const result = await service.resolve({
-				...baseClaims,
-				sub: 'ext-escalation',
-				email: 'escalation@example.com',
-				role: 'global:owner',
-			});
+			const result = await service.resolve(
+				{
+					...baseClaims,
+					sub: 'ext-escalation',
+					email: 'escalation@example.com',
+					role: 'global:owner',
+				},
+				undefined,
+				ctx(),
+			);
 
 			expect(result.id).toBe(user.id);
 			expect(result.role.slug).toBe('global:member');
@@ -385,6 +418,7 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 					role: 'global:member',
 				},
 				['global:admin', 'global:member'],
+				ctx(),
 			);
 
 			expect(result.id).toBe(admin.id);
@@ -416,7 +450,8 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 					family_name: 'Last',
 					role: 'global:admin',
 				},
-				['global:admin'],
+				['global:member', 'global:admin'],
+				ctx(),
 			);
 
 			expect(result.firstName).toBe('New');
@@ -440,18 +475,26 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 			const issuerA = 'https://issuer-a.example.com';
 			const issuerB = 'https://issuer-b.example.com';
 
-			const userA = await service.resolve({
-				...baseClaims,
-				sub: sharedSub,
-				iss: issuerA,
-				email: 'a@example.com',
-			});
-			const userB = await service.resolve({
-				...baseClaims,
-				sub: sharedSub,
-				iss: issuerB,
-				email: 'b@example.com',
-			});
+			const userA = await service.resolve(
+				{
+					...baseClaims,
+					sub: sharedSub,
+					iss: issuerA,
+					email: 'a@example.com',
+				},
+				undefined,
+				ctx(),
+			);
+			const userB = await service.resolve(
+				{
+					...baseClaims,
+					sub: sharedSub,
+					iss: issuerB,
+					email: 'b@example.com',
+				},
+				undefined,
+				ctx(),
+			);
 
 			expect(userB.id).not.toBe(userA.id);
 
@@ -470,7 +513,11 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 			const emitSpy = vi.spyOn(eventService, 'emit');
 
 			// No email claim — the rebind must work for email-less integrations.
-			const result = await service.resolve({ ...baseClaims, sub: 'legacy-sub', email: undefined });
+			const result = await service.resolve(
+				{ ...baseClaims, sub: 'legacy-sub', email: undefined },
+				undefined,
+				ctx(),
+			);
 
 			expect(result.id).toBe(user.id);
 
@@ -493,7 +540,11 @@ describe('IdentityResolutionService (integration)', () => {
 
 			// An email-less token sharing a subject cannot be safely attributed to one issuer.
 			await expect(
-				service.resolve({ ...baseClaims, sub: 'legacy-multi-sub', email: undefined }),
+				service.resolve(
+					{ ...baseClaims, sub: 'legacy-multi-sub', email: undefined },
+					undefined,
+					ctx(),
+				),
 			).rejects.toThrow('Email claim is required for user provisioning');
 
 			const identities = await authIdentityRepository.findBy({ providerType: 'token-exchange' });

packages/cli/test/integration/token-exchange/token-exchange.controller.test.ts

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ function makeExternalJwt(
 		exp: number;
 		jti: string;
 		email: string;
+		email_verified: boolean;
 		given_name: string;
 		family_name: string;
 		role: string;
@@ -58,6 +59,7 @@ function makeExternalJwt(
 			iat: now,
 			exp: now + 300,
 			jti: randomUUID(),
+			email_verified: true,
 			...overrides,
 		},
 		privateKey,

packages/cli/test/integration/workflows/workflow.service.ee.test.ts

@@ -108,6 +108,14 @@ describe('EnterpriseWorkflowService', () => {
 				service.validateWorkflowCredentialUsage(newWorkflowVersion, previousWorkflowVersion, []);
 			}).toThrow();
 		});
+
+		it('Should throw error saving a workflow adding an Execute Sub-workflow node whose inline JSON uses an inaccessible credential', () => {
+			const newWorkflowVersion = getWorkflow({ addNodeWithInlineSubworkflowCred: true });
+			const previousWorkflowVersion = getWorkflow();
+			expect(() => {
+				service.validateWorkflowCredentialUsage(newWorkflowVersion, previousWorkflowVersion, []);
+			}).toThrow();
+		});
 	});
 
 	describe('getNodesWithInaccessibleCreds', () => {
@@ -188,5 +196,19 @@ describe('EnterpriseWorkflowService', () => {
 			const nodesWithInaccessibleCreds = service.getNodesWithInaccessibleCreds(workflow, []);
 			expect(nodesWithInaccessibleCreds).toHaveLength(2);
 		});
+
+		test('Should flag an Execute Sub-workflow node referencing an inaccessible credential inside its inline workflow JSON', () => {
+			const workflow = getWorkflow({ addNodeWithInlineSubworkflowCred: true });
+			const nodesWithInaccessibleCreds = service.getNodesWithInaccessibleCreds(workflow, []);
+			expect(nodesWithInaccessibleCreds).toHaveLength(1);
+		});
+
+		test('Should not flag an Execute Sub-workflow node when the inline credential is accessible', () => {
+			const workflow = getWorkflow({ addNodeWithInlineSubworkflowCred: true });
+			const nodesWithInaccessibleCreds = service.getNodesWithInaccessibleCreds(workflow, [
+				FIRST_CREDENTIAL_ID,
+			]);
+			expect(nodesWithInaccessibleCreds).toHaveLength(0);
+		});
 	});
 });

packages/core/src/execution-engine/__tests__/routing-node.test.ts

@@ -779,6 +779,78 @@ describe('RoutingNode', () => {
 				expect(result).toEqual(testData.output);
 			});
 		}
+
+		describe('when a routed property name is an inherited object member', () => {
+			// Guard the shared prototype so a regression here cannot cascade to other tests.
+			const hadOwnCall = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Object.prototype.toString, 'call');
+			afterEach(() => {
+				if (!hadOwnCall) {
+					delete (Object.prototype.toString as unknown as { call?: unknown }).call;
+				}
+			});
+
+			it('keeps built-in object prototypes intact', () => {
+				const nodeTypeProperties: INodeProperties = {
+					displayName: 'Value',
+					name: 'value',
+					type: 'string',
+					routing: {
+						send: {
+							property: 'toString.call',
+							type: 'body',
+							value: 'x',
+						},
+					},
+					default: '',
+				};
+				node.parameters = {};
+				nodeType.description.properties = [nodeTypeProperties];
+
+				const workflow = new Workflow({
+					nodes: workflowData.nodes,
+					connections: workflowData.connections,
+					active: false,
+					nodeTypes,
+				});
+
+				const executeFunctions = mock<executionContexts.ExecuteContext>();
+				Object.assign(executeFunctions, {
+					runIndex,
+					additionalData,
+					workflow,
+					node,
+					mode,
+					connectionInputData,
+					runExecutionData,
+					nodeType,
+				});
+				const routingNode = new RoutingNode(executeFunctions, nodeType);
+
+				const executeSingleFunctions = getExecuteSingleFunctions(
+					workflow,
+					runExecutionData,
+					runIndex,
+					node,
+					itemIndex,
+				);
+
+				const result = routingNode.getRequestOptionsFromParameters(
+					executeSingleFunctions,
+					nodeTypeProperties,
+					itemIndex,
+					runIndex,
+					path,
+					{},
+				);
+
+				// Prototype untouched; the value lands as an own property on the request body.
+				expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Object.prototype.toString, 'call')).toBe(false);
+				expect(Object.prototype.toString.call([])).toBe('[object Array]');
+				expect((result?.options.body as { toString?: { call?: unknown } }).toString?.call).toBe(
+					'x',
+				);
+			});
+		});
 	});
 
 	describe('runNode', () => {

packages/frontend/editor-ui/src/app/utils/parameterUtils.test.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { describe, it, expect, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import type { INodeParameters } from 'n8n-workflow';
 import { setParameterValue } from './parameterUtils';
 
 describe('parameterUtils', () => {
@@ -62,4 +63,38 @@ describe('parameterUtils', () => {
 			expect(target).toEqual({ foo: 'bar' });
 		});
 	});
+
+	describe('dot-notation paths that name inherited members', () => {
+		// Guard the shared prototype so a regression in one test cannot cascade to others.
+		const hadOwnCall = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Object.prototype.toString, 'call');
+
+		afterEach(() => {
+			if (!hadOwnCall) {
+				delete (Object.prototype.toString as unknown as { call?: unknown }).call;
+			}
+		});
+
+		it('keeps built-in object prototypes intact for a top-level inherited key', () => {
+			const target: INodeParameters = {};
+
+			setParameterValue(target, 'toString.call', 'x');
+
+			// The shared prototype member must be untouched.
+			expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Object.prototype.toString, 'call')).toBe(false);
+			expect(Object.prototype.toString.call([])).toBe('[object Array]');
+			// The value lands as a plain own property on the target instead.
+			expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(target, 'toString')).toBe(true);
+			expect((target as { toString: { call: unknown } }).toString.call).toBe('x');
+		});
+
+		it('keeps built-in object prototypes intact for a nested inherited key', () => {
+			const target: INodeParameters = {};
+
+			setParameterValue(target, 'a.toString.call', 'y');
+
+			expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Object.prototype.toString, 'call')).toBe(false);
+			expect(Object.prototype.toString.call({})).toBe('[object Object]');
+			expect((target as { a: { toString: { call: unknown } } }).a.toString.call).toBe('y');
+		});
+	});
 });

packages/frontend/editor-ui/src/features/ndv/shared/ndv.utils.test.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import { describe, it, expect, afterAll } from 'vitest';
+import { describe, it, expect, afterAll, afterEach } from 'vitest';
 import { mock } from 'vitest-mock-extended';
 import type {
 	IConnections,
@@ -775,3 +775,39 @@ describe('setValue', () => {
 		expect(nodeValues.value.customTelemetryTags).toEqual({});
 	});
 });
+
+describe('setValue with dot-notation paths that name inherited members', () => {
+	// Guard the shared prototype so a regression in one test cannot cascade to others.
+	const hadOwnCall = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Object.prototype.toString, 'call');
+
+	afterEach(() => {
+		if (!hadOwnCall) {
+			delete (Object.prototype.toString as unknown as { call?: unknown }).call;
+		}
+	});
+
+	it('keeps built-in object prototypes intact when a path names an inherited member', () => {
+		const nodeValues: Ref<INodeParameters> = ref({ parameters: {} });
+
+		setValue(nodeValues, 'parameters.toString.call', 'x');
+
+		expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Object.prototype.toString, 'call')).toBe(false);
+		expect(Object.prototype.toString.call([])).toBe('[object Array]');
+		// The value lands as a plain own property on the parameters object.
+		expect((nodeValues.value.parameters as { toString?: { call?: unknown } }).toString?.call).toBe(
+			'x',
+		);
+	});
+
+	it('keeps built-in object prototypes intact for a nested inherited key', () => {
+		const nodeValues: Ref<INodeParameters> = ref({ parameters: {} });
+
+		setValue(nodeValues, 'parameters.a.toString.call', 'y');
+
+		expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Object.prototype.toString, 'call')).toBe(false);
+		expect(Object.prototype.toString.call({})).toBe('[object Object]');
+		expect(
+			(nodeValues.value.parameters as { a?: { toString?: { call?: unknown } } }).a?.toString?.call,
+		).toBe('y');
+	});
+});

packages/frontend/editor-ui/src/features/ndv/shared/ndv.utils.ts

@@ -116,20 +116,13 @@ export function setValue(
 				}
 			}
 		} else {
-			// Value should be set
-			if (typeof value === 'object') {
-				set(
-					get(nodeValues.value, nameParts.join('.')) as Record<string, unknown>,
-					lastNamePart as string,
-					deepCopy(value),
-				);
-			} else {
-				set(
-					get(nodeValues.value, nameParts.join('.')) as Record<string, unknown>,
-					lastNamePart as string,
-					value,
-				);
-			}
+			// Value should be set. Write from the root via the full path so the setter
+			// builds own-property intermediates rather than reading an inherited member
+			// of an object along the path.
+			const fullPath = isArray
+				? `${nameParts.join('.')}[${lastNamePart}]`
+				: `${nameParts.join('.')}.${lastNamePart}`;
+			set(nodeValues.value, fullPath, typeof value === 'object' ? deepCopy(value) : value);
 		}
 	}
 

packages/nodes-base/nodes/EditImage/EditImage.node.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import type {
 	IDataObject,
 	IExecuteFunctions,
 	ILoadOptionsFunctions,
+	INode,
 	INodeExecutionData,
 	INodeProperties,
 	INodePropertyOptions,
@@ -24,6 +25,19 @@ type EditImageNodeOptions = {
 	quality?: number;
 };
 
+const VALID_IMAGE_FORMATS = new Set(['bmp', 'gif', 'jpeg', 'png', 'tiff', 'tif', 'webp']);
+
+function validateImageFormat(format: unknown, node: INode): string {
+	if (typeof format === 'string' && VALID_IMAGE_FORMATS.has(format)) {
+		return format;
+	}
+
+	throw new NodeOperationError(
+		node,
+		`Invalid image format: ${format}. Valid formats are: ${Array.from(VALID_IMAGE_FORMATS).join(', ')}`,
+	);
+}
+
 const nodeOperations: INodePropertyOptions[] = [
 	{
 		name: 'Blur',
@@ -1297,7 +1311,8 @@ export class EditImage implements INodeType {
 				}
 
 				if (options.format !== undefined) {
-					gmInstance = gmInstance!.setFormat(options.format as string);
+					const format = validateImageFormat(options.format, this.getNode());
+					gmInstance = gmInstance!.setFormat(format);
 					newItem.binary![binaryPropertyName].fileExtension = options.format as string;
 					newItem.binary![binaryPropertyName].mimeType = `image/${options.format}`;
 					const fileName = newItem.binary![binaryPropertyName].fileName;

packages/nodes-base/nodes/EditImage/test/EditImage.node.test.ts

@@ -615,6 +615,41 @@ describe('EditImage Node', () => {
 			expect(result[0][0].binary?.data?.fileExtension).toBe('jpeg');
 		});
 
+		it.each([
+			['unsupported string', 'pdf'],
+			['non-string value', 123],
+		])('should reject an %s format', async (_, format) => {
+			const testBuffer = createTestBuffer();
+			const items: INodeExecutionData[] = [
+				{
+					json: {},
+					binary: {
+						data: {
+							data: testBuffer.toString('base64'),
+							mimeType: 'image/png',
+							fileExtension: 'png',
+							fileName: 'test.png',
+						},
+					},
+				},
+			];
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getInputData.mockReturnValue(items);
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter.mockImplementation((paramName: string) => {
+				if (paramName === 'operation') return 'blur';
+				if (paramName === 'dataPropertyName') return 'data';
+				if (paramName === 'blur') return 5;
+				if (paramName === 'sigma') return 2;
+				if (paramName === 'options') return { format };
+				return {};
+			});
+			mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.getBinaryDataBuffer.mockResolvedValue(testBuffer);
+
+			await expect(editImageNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
+				`Invalid image format: ${format}`,
+			);
+			expect(mockGmInstance.setFormat).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+
 		it('should apply custom fileName option', async () => {
 			const testBuffer = createTestBuffer();
 			const items: INodeExecutionData[] = [

packages/nodes-base/nodes/EmailSend/test/v1/EmailSendV1.node.test.ts

@@ -517,4 +517,45 @@ describe('Test EmailSendV1', () => {
 			);
 		});
 	});
+
+	describe('message parameters', () => {
+		it('should serialize object message values before sending', async () => {
+			const items = [{ json: { data: 'test' } }];
+
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getInputData.mockReturnValue(items);
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getCredentials.mockResolvedValue({
+				host: 'smtp.example.com',
+				port: 587,
+				secure: false,
+			});
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('from@example.com')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('to@example.com')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('cc@example.com')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('bcc@example.com')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('Test Subject')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce({ path: 'message.txt' })
+				.mockReturnValueOnce({ href: 'https://example.test/message' })
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce({ replyTo: 'reply@example.com' });
+			transporter.sendMail.mockResolvedValue({ messageId: 'test-id' });
+
+			await emailSendV1.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+			expect(transporter.sendMail).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({
+					from: 'from@example.com',
+					to: 'to@example.com',
+					cc: 'cc@example.com',
+					bcc: 'bcc@example.com',
+					subject: 'Test Subject',
+					text: '{"path":"message.txt"}',
+					html: '{"href":"https://example.test/message"}',
+					replyTo: 'reply@example.com',
+					disableFileAccess: true,
+					disableUrlAccess: true,
+				}),
+			);
+		});
+	});
 });

packages/nodes-base/nodes/EmailSend/test/v2/send.operation.test.ts

@@ -602,4 +602,47 @@ describe('Test EmailSendV2, send operation', () => {
 			);
 		});
 	});
+
+	describe('message parameters', () => {
+		it('should request normalized text and HTML values before sending', async () => {
+			const items = [{ json: { data: 'test' } }];
+
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getInputData.mockReturnValue(items);
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getNode.mockReturnValue({ typeVersion: 2.1 } as any);
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getInstanceId.mockReturnValue('instanceId');
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getCredentials.mockResolvedValue({
+				host: 'smtp.example.com',
+				port: 587,
+			});
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('from@example.com')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('to@example.com')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('Test Subject')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('both')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce({
+					appendAttribution: false,
+					ccEmail: 'cc@example.com',
+					bccEmail: 'bcc@example.com',
+					replyTo: 'reply@example.com',
+				})
+				.mockReturnValueOnce(['plain text'])
+				.mockReturnValueOnce(['rich text']);
+			transporter.sendMail.mockResolvedValue({ messageId: 'test-id' });
+
+			await sendOperation.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+			expect(transporter.sendMail).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({
+					from: 'from@example.com',
+					to: 'to@example.com',
+					cc: 'cc@example.com',
+					bcc: 'bcc@example.com',
+					subject: 'Test Subject',
+					text: '["plain text"]',
+					html: '["rich text"]',
+					replyTo: 'reply@example.com',
+				}),
+			);
+		});
+	});
 });

packages/nodes-base/nodes/EmailSend/test/v2/sendAndWait.operation.test.ts

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ describe('Test EmailSendV2, email => sendAndWait', () => {
 		vi.clearAllMocks();
 	});
 
-	it('should send message and put execution to wait', async () => {
+	it('should use the shared transport configuration and put execution to wait', async () => {
 		const items = [{ json: { data: 'test' } }];
 		//node
 		mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter.mockReturnValueOnce(SEND_AND_WAIT_OPERATION);
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ describe('Test EmailSendV2, email => sendAndWait', () => {
 		const result = await emailSendV2.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
 
 		expect(result).toEqual([items]);
-		expect(utils.configureTransport).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+		expect(utils.configureTransport).toHaveBeenCalledWith({}, {});
 		expect(mockExecuteFunctions.putExecutionToWait).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
 
 		expect(transporter.sendMail).toHaveBeenCalledWith({

packages/nodes-base/nodes/EmailSend/test/v2/utils.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+import { configureTransport } from '../../v2/utils';
+
+const { createTransport } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+	createTransport: vi.fn(),
+}));
+
+vi.mock('nodemailer', () => ({
+	createTransport,
+}));
+
+describe('EmailSend transport configuration', () => {
+	it('should apply content access restrictions to the transport', () => {
+		configureTransport(
+			{
+				host: 'smtp.example.com',
+				port: 587,
+				secure: false,
+			},
+			{},
+		);
+
+		expect(createTransport).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+			expect.objectContaining({
+				host: 'smtp.example.com',
+				port: 587,
+				secure: false,
+			}),
+			{
+				disableFileAccess: true,
+				disableUrlAccess: true,
+			},
+		);
+	});
+});

packages/nodes-base/nodes/EmailSend/utils.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+export function toMailString(value: unknown): string | undefined {
+	if (value === null || value === undefined) return undefined;
+	if (typeof value === 'string') return value;
+	if (typeof value === 'number' || typeof value === 'boolean' || typeof value === 'bigint') {
+		return value.toString();
+	}
+	if (typeof value === 'symbol' || typeof value === 'function') return value.toString();
+	return JSON.stringify(value);
+}

packages/nodes-base/nodes/EmailSend/v1/EmailSendV1.node.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import { NodeConnectionTypes } from 'n8n-workflow';
 import { createTransport } from 'nodemailer';
 import type SMTPTransport from 'nodemailer/lib/smtp-transport';
 import { prepareBinariesDataList } from '../../../utils/binary';
+import { toMailString } from '../utils';
 
 const versionDescription: INodeTypeDescription = {
 	displayName: 'Send Email',
@@ -150,15 +151,16 @@ export class EmailSendV1 implements INodeType {
 			try {
 				item = items[itemIndex];
 
-				const fromEmail = this.getNodeParameter('fromEmail', itemIndex) as string;
-				const toEmail = this.getNodeParameter('toEmail', itemIndex) as string;
-				const ccEmail = this.getNodeParameter('ccEmail', itemIndex) as string;
-				const bccEmail = this.getNodeParameter('bccEmail', itemIndex) as string;
-				const subject = this.getNodeParameter('subject', itemIndex) as string;
-				const text = this.getNodeParameter('text', itemIndex) as string;
-				const html = this.getNodeParameter('html', itemIndex) as string;
+				const fromEmail = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('fromEmail', itemIndex));
+				const toEmail = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('toEmail', itemIndex));
+				const ccEmail = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('ccEmail', itemIndex));
+				const bccEmail = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('bccEmail', itemIndex));
+				const subject = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('subject', itemIndex));
+				const text = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('text', itemIndex, ''));
+				const html = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('html', itemIndex, ''));
 				const attachmentPropertyString = this.getNodeParameter('attachments', itemIndex) as string;
 				const options = this.getNodeParameter('options', itemIndex, {});
+				const replyTo = toMailString(options.replyTo);
 
 				const credentials = await this.getCredentials('smtp');
 
@@ -192,7 +194,9 @@ export class EmailSendV1 implements INodeType {
 					subject,
 					text,
 					html,
-					replyTo: options.replyTo as string | undefined,
+					replyTo,
+					disableFileAccess: true,
+					disableUrlAccess: true,
 				};
 
 				if (attachmentPropertyString && item.binary) {

packages/nodes-base/nodes/EmailSend/v2/send.operation.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import { fromEmailProperty, toEmailProperty } from './descriptions';
 import { configureTransport, type EmailSendOptions } from './utils';
 import { appendAttributionOption } from '../../../utils/descriptions';
 import { prepareBinariesDataList } from '../../../utils/binary';
+import { toMailString } from '../utils';
 
 const properties: INodeProperties[] = [
 	// TODO: Add choice for text as text or html  (maybe also from name)
@@ -195,29 +196,35 @@ export async function execute(this: IExecuteFunctions): Promise<INodeExecutionDa
 		try {
 			item = items[itemIndex];
 
-			const fromEmail = this.getNodeParameter('fromEmail', itemIndex) as string;
-			const toEmail = this.getNodeParameter('toEmail', itemIndex) as string;
-			const subject = this.getNodeParameter('subject', itemIndex) as string;
+			const fromEmail = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('fromEmail', itemIndex));
+			const toEmail = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('toEmail', itemIndex));
+			const subject = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('subject', itemIndex));
 			const emailFormat = this.getNodeParameter('emailFormat', itemIndex) as string;
 			const options = this.getNodeParameter('options', itemIndex, {}) as EmailSendOptions;
 
+			const ccEmail = toMailString(options.ccEmail);
+			const bccEmail = toMailString(options.bccEmail);
+			const replyTo = toMailString(options.replyTo);
+
 			const transporter = configureTransport(credentials, options);
 
 			const mailOptions: IDataObject = {
 				from: fromEmail,
 				to: toEmail,
-				cc: options.ccEmail,
-				bcc: options.bccEmail,
+				cc: ccEmail,
+				bcc: bccEmail,
 				subject,
-				replyTo: options.replyTo,
+				replyTo,
 			};
 
 			if (emailFormat === 'text' || emailFormat === 'both') {
-				mailOptions.text = this.getNodeParameter('text', itemIndex, '');
+				const text = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('text', itemIndex, ''));
+				mailOptions.text = text;
 			}
 
 			if (emailFormat === 'html' || emailFormat === 'both') {
-				mailOptions.html = this.getNodeParameter('html', itemIndex, '');
+				const html = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('html', itemIndex, ''));
+				mailOptions.html = html;
 			}
 
 			let appendAttribution = options.appendAttribution;

packages/nodes-base/nodes/EmailSend/v2/sendAndWait.operation.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import {
 	getSendAndWaitConfig,
 	getSendAndWaitProperties,
 } from '../../../utils/sendAndWait/utils';
+import { toMailString } from '../utils';
 
 export const description: INodeProperties[] = getSendAndWaitProperties(
 	[fromEmailProperty, toEmailProperty],
@@ -25,8 +26,8 @@ export const description: INodeProperties[] = getSendAndWaitProperties(
 );
 
 export async function execute(this: IExecuteFunctions): Promise<INodeExecutionData[][]> {
-	const fromEmail = this.getNodeParameter('fromEmail', 0) as string;
-	const toEmail = this.getNodeParameter('toEmail', 0) as string;
+	const fromEmail = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('fromEmail', 0));
+	const toEmail = toMailString(this.getNodeParameter('toEmail', 0));
 
 	const config = getSendAndWaitConfig(this);
 	const buttons: string[] = [];

packages/nodes-base/nodes/EmailSend/v2/utils.ts

@@ -45,7 +45,10 @@ export function configureTransport(credentials: IDataObject, options: EmailSendO
 		};
 	}
 
-	return createTransport(connectionOptions);
+	return createTransport(connectionOptions, {
+		disableFileAccess: true,
+		disableUrlAccess: true,
+	});
 }
 
 export async function smtpConnectionTest(

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Git/GenericFunctions.ts

@@ -3,19 +3,21 @@ import { NodeOperationError } from 'n8n-workflow';
 import type { ConfigListSummary } from 'simple-git';
 
 /**
- * Validates a git reference to prevent command injection attacks
- * @param reference - The git reference to validate (e.g., branch name, HEAD, refs/heads/main)
- * @param node - The node instance for error throwing
- * @throws {NodeOperationError} If the reference contains unsafe characters or patterns
+ * Shared safeguards for git references: block argument injection, path
+ * traversal, and control characters. The caller supplies the allowed-character
+ * whitelist so tags (which permit `+`) can be validated less strictly than
+ * branch/ref names without weakening the injection protections.
  */
-export function validateGitReference(reference: string, node: INode): void {
-	// Allow only safe characters: alphanumeric, /, @, {, }, ., -, _, :
-	const safeReferencePattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9/@{}._:-]+$/;
-
+function assertSafeGitReference(
+	reference: string,
+	node: INode,
+	safeReferencePattern: RegExp,
+	allowedCharsMessage: string,
+): void {
 	if (!safeReferencePattern.test(reference)) {
 		throw new NodeOperationError(
 			node,
-			'Invalid reference format. Reference contains unsafe characters. Only alphanumeric characters and /@{}._:- are allowed',
+			`Invalid reference format. Reference contains unsafe characters. Only alphanumeric characters and ${allowedCharsMessage} are allowed`,
 		);
 	}
 
@@ -42,10 +44,119 @@ export function validateGitReference(reference: string, node: INode): void {
 	}
 }
 
+/**
+ * Validates a git reference to prevent command injection attacks
+ * @param reference - The git reference to validate (e.g., branch name, HEAD, refs/heads/main)
+ * @param node - The node instance for error throwing
+ * @throws {NodeOperationError} If the reference contains unsafe characters or patterns
+ */
+export function validateGitReference(reference: string, node: INode): void {
+	// Allow only safe characters: alphanumeric, /, @, {, }, ., -, _, :
+	assertSafeGitReference(reference, node, /^[a-zA-Z0-9/@{}._:-]+$/, '/@{}._:-');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validates a git tag name. Tags follow git's ref-format rules, which permit
+ * `+` (e.g. SemVer build metadata like `v1.2.3+build.1`), so the whitelist is
+ * a superset of `validateGitReference` while keeping the same safeguards.
+ * @param name - The tag name to validate
+ * @param node - The node instance for error throwing
+ * @throws {NodeOperationError} If the tag name contains unsafe characters or patterns
+ */
+export function validateGitTag(name: string, node: INode): void {
+	assertSafeGitReference(name, node, /^[a-zA-Z0-9/@{}._:+-]+$/, '/@{}._:+-');
+}
+
 const REMOTE_ORIGIN_URL_KEY = 'remote.origin.url';
 
 const REMOTE_ORIGIN_PUSH_URL_KEY = 'remote.origin.pushurl';
 
+const REMOTE_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERN = /^remote\.(.+)\.(url|pushurl)$/i;
+
+export type GitRepositoryType = 'source' | 'target';
+
+export interface ConfiguredRemoteRepositories {
+	sourceValidationTargets: string[];
+	targetValidationTargets: string[];
+	pushTarget: string | undefined;
+}
+
+export function getRepositoryTypeForRemoteConfigKey(key: string): GitRepositoryType | undefined {
+	const match = REMOTE_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERN.exec(key);
+
+	if (!match) {
+		return undefined;
+	}
+
+	return match[2].toLowerCase() === 'pushurl' ? 'target' : 'source';
+}
+
+function addRemoteValue(
+	remoteValuesByName: Map<string, string[]>,
+	remoteName: string,
+	value: string,
+) {
+	const existingValues = remoteValuesByName.get(remoteName) ?? [];
+	existingValues.push(value);
+	remoteValuesByName.set(remoteName, existingValues);
+}
+
+export function getConfiguredRemoteRepositories(
+	configValues: Record<string, Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>>,
+	node: INode,
+): ConfiguredRemoteRepositories {
+	const sourceValidationTargets: string[] = [];
+	const targetValidationTargets: string[] = [];
+	const remoteOriginUrls: string[] = [];
+	const remoteOriginPushUrls: string[] = [];
+	const remoteUrlsByName = new Map<string, string[]>();
+	const remotePushUrlsByName = new Map<string, string[]>();
+
+	for (const values of Object.values(configValues)) {
+		for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(values)) {
+			const match = REMOTE_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERN.exec(key);
+			if (value === undefined || match === null) {
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			if (typeof value !== 'string') {
+				throw new NodeOperationError(node, 'Target repository is required');
+			}
+
+			const remoteName = match[1].toLowerCase();
+			const repositoryType = match[2].toLowerCase();
+
+			const normalizedKey = key.toLowerCase();
+			if (repositoryType === 'pushurl') {
+				addRemoteValue(remotePushUrlsByName, remoteName, value);
+				if (normalizedKey === REMOTE_ORIGIN_PUSH_URL_KEY) {
+					remoteOriginPushUrls.push(value);
+				}
+			} else {
+				sourceValidationTargets.push(value);
+				addRemoteValue(remoteUrlsByName, remoteName, value);
+			}
+
+			if (normalizedKey === REMOTE_ORIGIN_URL_KEY) {
+				remoteOriginUrls.push(value);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	const remoteNames = new Set([...remoteUrlsByName.keys(), ...remotePushUrlsByName.keys()]);
+	for (const remoteName of remoteNames) {
+		const remoteUrls = remoteUrlsByName.get(remoteName) ?? [];
+		const remotePushUrls = remotePushUrlsByName.get(remoteName);
+		targetValidationTargets.push.apply(targetValidationTargets, remotePushUrls ?? remoteUrls);
+	}
+
+	return {
+		sourceValidationTargets,
+		targetValidationTargets,
+		pushTarget: remoteOriginPushUrls[0] ?? remoteOriginUrls[0],
+	};
+}
+
 function sanitizeUrl(url: string): string {
 	const urlObj = new URL(url);
 	urlObj.username = '';

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Git/Git.node.ts

@@ -32,7 +32,14 @@ import {
 	switchBranchFields,
 	tagFields,
 } from './descriptions';
-import { mapGitConfigList, validateGitReference } from './GenericFunctions';
+import {
+	type ConfiguredRemoteRepositories,
+	getConfiguredRemoteRepositories,
+	getRepositoryTypeForRemoteConfigKey,
+	mapGitConfigList,
+	validateGitReference,
+	validateGitTag,
+} from './GenericFunctions';
 
 const REMOTE_HELPER_TRANSPORT = /^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*::/;
 
@@ -303,8 +310,20 @@ export class Git implements INodeType {
 		const hasUrlScheme = (repositoryPath: string) =>
 			/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*:/.test(repositoryPath);
 
-		const isSshRepositoryPath = (repositoryPath: string) =>
-			/^(?:[^@\s]+@)?[^:\s]+:.+/.test(repositoryPath);
+		const isSshRepositoryPath = (repositoryPath: string) => {
+			const colonIndex = repositoryPath.indexOf(':');
+			if (colonIndex === -1) {
+				return false;
+			}
+
+			const remoteHost = repositoryPath.slice(0, colonIndex);
+			return (
+				remoteHost.length > 0 &&
+				!remoteHost.includes('/') &&
+				!remoteHost.includes('\\') &&
+				/^(?:[^@\s]+@)?[^@\s]+$/.test(remoteHost)
+			);
+		};
 
 		const assertLocalRepositoryPathAllowed = async (
 			repositoryPath: string,
@@ -375,35 +394,23 @@ export class Git implements INodeType {
 			}
 		};
 
-		const getRemoteOriginTargetRepositories = (
-			configValues: Record<string, Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>>,
-		) => {
-			const remoteOriginUrls: string[] = [];
-			const remoteOriginPushUrls: string[] = [];
+		const validateConfiguredRemoteRepositories = async (
+			git: SimpleGit,
+			repositoryType: 'source' | 'target',
+			baseDir: string,
+		): Promise<ConfiguredRemoteRepositories> => {
+			const config = await git.listConfig();
+			const remoteRepositories = getConfiguredRemoteRepositories(config.values, this.getNode());
+			const validationTargets =
+				repositoryType === 'source'
+					? remoteRepositories.sourceValidationTargets
+					: remoteRepositories.targetValidationTargets;
 
-			for (const values of Object.values(configValues)) {
-				for (const key of ['remote.origin.url', 'remote.origin.pushurl'] as const) {
-					const value = values[key];
-					if (value === undefined) {
-						continue;
-					}
-
-					if (typeof value !== 'string') {
-						throw new NodeOperationError(this.getNode(), 'Target repository is required');
-					}
-
-					if (key === 'remote.origin.pushurl') {
-						remoteOriginPushUrls.push(value);
-					} else {
-						remoteOriginUrls.push(value);
-					}
-				}
+			for (const repository of validationTargets) {
+				await assertRepositoryReferenceAllowed(repository, repositoryType, baseDir);
 			}
 
-			return {
-				validationTargets: [...remoteOriginUrls, ...remoteOriginPushUrls],
-				pushTarget: remoteOriginPushUrls[0] ?? remoteOriginUrls[0],
-			};
+			return remoteRepositories;
 		};
 
 		const isFileNotFoundError = (error: unknown) =>
@@ -506,11 +513,13 @@ export class Git implements INodeType {
 				};
 
 				const cleanEnv = Object.create(null) as Record<string, unknown>;
+				const isWriteOperation = operation === 'push' || operation === 'pushTags';
 				// Tell git not to ask for any information via the terminal like for
 				// example the username. As nobody will be able to answer it would
 				// n8n keep on waiting forever.
 				cleanEnv['GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT'] = '0';
-				cleanEnv['GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL'] = 'file:git:http:https:ssh';
+				cleanEnv['GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL'] =
+					isWriteOperation && !enableHooks ? 'git:http:https:ssh' : 'file:git:http:https:ssh';
 				const git: SimpleGit = simpleGit(gitOptions).env(cleanEnv);
 
 				if (operation === 'add') {
@@ -552,6 +561,11 @@ export class Git implements INodeType {
 						);
 					}
 
+					const repositoryType = getRepositoryTypeForRemoteConfigKey(key);
+					if (repositoryType) {
+						await assertRepositoryReferenceAllowed(value, repositoryType, resolvedRepositoryPath);
+					}
+
 					if (options.mode === 'append') {
 						append = true;
 					}
@@ -653,6 +667,7 @@ export class Git implements INodeType {
 					//         fetch
 					// ----------------------------------
 
+					await validateConfiguredRemoteRepositories(git, 'source', resolvedRepositoryPath);
 					await git.fetch();
 					returnItems.push({
 						json: {
@@ -693,6 +708,7 @@ export class Git implements INodeType {
 					//         pull
 					// ----------------------------------
 
+					await validateConfiguredRemoteRepositories(git, 'source', resolvedRepositoryPath);
 					await git.pull();
 					returnItems.push({
 						json: {
@@ -725,19 +741,12 @@ export class Git implements INodeType {
 						await git.push(targetRepository);
 					} else {
 						const authentication = this.getNodeParameter('authentication', 0) as string;
-						const config = await git.listConfig();
-						const { validationTargets, pushTarget } = getRemoteOriginTargetRepositories(
-							config.values,
+						const { pushTarget } = await validateConfiguredRemoteRepositories(
+							git,
+							'target',
+							resolvedRepositoryPath,
 						);
 
-						for (const targetRepository of validationTargets) {
-							await assertRepositoryReferenceAllowed(
-								targetRepository,
-								'target',
-								resolvedRepositoryPath,
-							);
-						}
-
 						if (authentication === 'gitPassword') {
 							if (pushTarget === undefined) {
 								throw new NodeOperationError(this.getNode(), 'Target repository is required');
@@ -763,6 +772,7 @@ export class Git implements INodeType {
 					//         pushTags
 					// ----------------------------------
 
+					await validateConfiguredRemoteRepositories(git, 'target', resolvedRepositoryPath);
 					await git.pushTags();
 					returnItems.push({
 						json: {
@@ -912,6 +922,7 @@ export class Git implements INodeType {
 					// ----------------------------------
 
 					const name = this.getNodeParameter('name', itemIndex, '') as string;
+					validateGitTag(name, this.getNode());
 
 					await git.addTag(name);
 					returnItems.push({

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Git/__test__/GenericFunctions.test.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 import { mockDeep } from 'vitest-mock-extended';
 import type { ConfigListSummary } from 'simple-git';
+import type { INode } from 'n8n-workflow';
 
-import { mapGitConfigList } from '../GenericFunctions';
+import { getConfiguredRemoteRepositories, mapGitConfigList } from '../GenericFunctions';
 
 describe('GenericFunctions', () => {
 	describe('mapGitConfigList', () => {
@@ -131,4 +132,43 @@ describe('GenericFunctions', () => {
 			]);
 		});
 	});
+
+	describe('getConfiguredRemoteRepositories', () => {
+		it('should return every configured remote URL as a validation target', () => {
+			const config = mockDeep<ConfigListSummary>({
+				values: {
+					'.git/config': {
+						'remote.origin.url': 'https://github.com/test/repo.git',
+						'remote.origin.pushurl': 'https://github.com/test/push-repo.git',
+						'remote.upstream.url': '/outside/source-repo',
+						'remote.upstream.pushurl': '/outside/target-repo',
+						'branch.main.remote': 'upstream',
+					},
+				},
+			});
+
+			const result = getConfiguredRemoteRepositories(config.values, mockDeep<INode>());
+
+			expect(result).toEqual({
+				sourceValidationTargets: ['https://github.com/test/repo.git', '/outside/source-repo'],
+				targetValidationTargets: ['https://github.com/test/push-repo.git', '/outside/target-repo'],
+				pushTarget: 'https://github.com/test/push-repo.git',
+			});
+		});
+
+		it('should keep using origin as the prepared push target', () => {
+			const config = mockDeep<ConfigListSummary>({
+				values: {
+					'.git/config': {
+						'remote.upstream.url': '/outside/source-repo',
+						'remote.origin.url': 'https://github.com/test/repo.git',
+					},
+				},
+			});
+
+			const result = getConfiguredRemoteRepositories(config.values, mockDeep<INode>());
+
+			expect(result.pushTarget).toBe('https://github.com/test/repo.git');
+		});
+	});
 });

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Git/__test__/Git.node.test.ts

@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
-import { DeploymentConfig, SecurityConfig } from '@n8n/config';
-import { Container } from '@n8n/di';
-import { mock } from 'vitest-mock-extended';
-import type { IExecuteFunctions } from 'n8n-workflow';
-import type { SimpleGit } from 'simple-git';
-import simpleGit from 'simple-git';
-
-import { Git } from '../Git.node';
-import type { Mock, Mocked, MockedFunction } from 'vitest';
-
-const mockGit = {
-	log: vi.fn(),
-	env: vi.fn().mockReturnThis(),
-};
-
-vi.mock('simple-git');
-const mockSimpleGit = simpleGit as MockedFunction<typeof simpleGit>;
-mockSimpleGit.mockReturnValue(mockGit as unknown as SimpleGit);
-
-describe('Git Node', () => {
-	let gitNode: Git;
-	let executeFunctions: Mocked<IExecuteFunctions>;
-	let deploymentConfig: Mocked<DeploymentConfig>;
-	let securityConfig: Mocked<SecurityConfig>;
-
-	beforeEach(() => {
-		vi.clearAllMocks();
-
-		deploymentConfig = mock<DeploymentConfig>({
-			type: 'default',
-		});
-		securityConfig = mock<SecurityConfig>({
-			disableBareRepos: false,
-			enableGitNodeHooks: true,
-		});
-		Container.set(DeploymentConfig, deploymentConfig);
-		Container.set(SecurityConfig, securityConfig);
-
-		executeFunctions = mock<IExecuteFunctions>({
-			getInputData: vi.fn().mockReturnValue([{ json: {} }]),
-			getNodeParameter: vi.fn(),
-			helpers: {
-				isFilePathBlocked: vi.fn(),
-				returnJsonArray: vi
-					.fn()
-					.mockImplementation((data: unknown[]) => data.map((item: unknown) => ({ json: item }))),
-			},
-		});
-		executeFunctions.getNodeParameter.mockImplementation((name: string) => {
-			switch (name) {
-				case 'operation':
-					return 'log';
-				case 'repositoryPath':
-					return '/tmp/test-repo';
-				case 'options':
-					return {};
-				default:
-					return '';
-			}
-		});
-
-		mockGit.log.mockResolvedValue({ all: [] });
-
-		gitNode = new Git();
-	});
-
-	describe('Bare Repository Configuration', () => {
-		it('should add safe.bareRepository=explicit when deployment type is cloud', async () => {
-			deploymentConfig.type = 'cloud';
-			securityConfig.disableBareRepos = false;
-
-			await gitNode.execute.call(executeFunctions);
-
-			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-				expect.objectContaining({
-					config: ['safe.bareRepository=explicit'],
-				}),
-			);
-		});
-
-		it('should add safe.bareRepository=explicit when disableBareRepos is true', async () => {
-			deploymentConfig.type = 'default';
-			securityConfig.disableBareRepos = true;
-
-			await gitNode.execute.call(executeFunctions);
-
-			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-				expect.objectContaining({
-					config: ['safe.bareRepository=explicit'],
-				}),
-			);
-		});
-
-		it('should add safe.bareRepository=explicit when both cloud and disableBareRepos are true', async () => {
-			deploymentConfig.type = 'cloud';
-			securityConfig.disableBareRepos = true;
-
-			await gitNode.execute.call(executeFunctions);
-
-			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-				expect.objectContaining({
-					config: ['safe.bareRepository=explicit'],
-				}),
-			);
-		});
-
-		it('should not add safe.bareRepository=explicit when neither cloud nor disableBareRepos is true', async () => {
-			deploymentConfig.type = 'default';
-			securityConfig.disableBareRepos = false;
-
-			await gitNode.execute.call(executeFunctions);
-
-			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-				expect.objectContaining({
-					config: [],
-				}),
-			);
-		});
-	});
-
-	describe('Hooks Configuration', () => {
-		it('should add core.hooksPath=/dev/null when enableGitNodeHooks is false', async () => {
-			securityConfig.enableGitNodeHooks = false;
-
-			await gitNode.execute.call(executeFunctions);
-
-			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-				expect.objectContaining({
-					config: ['core.hooksPath=/dev/null'],
-				}),
-			);
-		});
-
-		it('should opt into allowUnsafeHooksPath when enableGitNodeHooks is false', async () => {
-			securityConfig.enableGitNodeHooks = false;
-
-			await gitNode.execute.call(executeFunctions);
-
-			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-				expect.objectContaining({
-					unsafe: { allowUnsafeHooksPath: true },
-				}),
-			);
-		});
-
-		it('should not add core.hooksPath=/dev/null when enableGitNodeHooks is true', async () => {
-			securityConfig.enableGitNodeHooks = true;
-
-			await gitNode.execute.call(executeFunctions);
-
-			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-				expect.objectContaining({
-					config: [],
-				}),
-			);
-		});
-
-		it('should not opt into allowUnsafeHooksPath when enableGitNodeHooks is true', async () => {
-			securityConfig.enableGitNodeHooks = true;
-
-			await gitNode.execute.call(executeFunctions);
-
-			const options = mockSimpleGit.mock.calls[0][0] as { unsafe?: unknown };
-			expect(options.unsafe).toBeUndefined();
-		});
-	});
-
-	describe('Restricted file paths', () => {
-		it('should throw an error if the repository path is blocked', async () => {
-			(executeFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked as Mock).mockReturnValue(true);
-			(executeFunctions.helpers.resolvePath as Mock).mockResolvedValue('/tmp/test-repo');
-
-			await expect(gitNode.execute.call(executeFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
-				'Access to the repository path is not allowed',
-			);
-		});
-
-		it('should use the resolved repository path for git operations', async () => {
-			const originalPath = '/tmp/link-to-repo';
-			const resolvedPath = '/tmp/actual-repo';
-
-			executeFunctions.getNodeParameter.mockImplementation((name: string) => {
-				switch (name) {
-					case 'operation':
-						return 'log';
-					case 'repositoryPath':
-						return originalPath;
-					case 'options':
-						return {};
-					default:
-						return '';
-				}
-			});
-
-			(executeFunctions.helpers.resolvePath as Mock).mockResolvedValue(resolvedPath);
-			(executeFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked as Mock).mockReturnValue(false);
-
-			await gitNode.execute.call(executeFunctions);
-
-			// Verify git is initialized with the resolved path, not the original
-			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-				expect.objectContaining({
-					baseDir: resolvedPath,
-				}),
-			);
-		});
-	});
-});

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Git/test/Git.node.test.ts

@@ -1,17 +1,20 @@
 import { mock } from 'vitest-mock-extended';
 import type { IExecuteFunctions, ResolvedFilePath } from 'n8n-workflow';
 import type { Mocked } from 'vitest';
-import { dirname } from 'node:path';
+import { dirname, resolve, sep } from 'node:path';
+import { pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';
 import simpleGit, { type SimpleGit } from 'simple-git';
 import { mkdir, rename, rm } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { Container } from '@n8n/di';
-import { SecurityConfig } from '@n8n/config';
+import { DeploymentConfig, SecurityConfig } from '@n8n/config';
 
 import { Git } from '../Git.node';
 import { ALLOWED_CONFIG_KEYS } from '../descriptions';
 
 // Matches the unguessable staging directory the clone operation creates under the base.
-const CLONE_STAGING_RE = /^\/git\/\.n8n-clone-[0-9a-f]{24}$/;
+const CLONE_STAGING_RE = /^[\\/]git[\\/]\.n8n-clone-[0-9a-f]{24}$/;
+const GIT_ROOT_RE = /^[\\/]git$/;
+const GIT_NEW_REPO_RE = /^[\\/]git[\\/]new-repo$/;
 
 // Mock simple-git
 const mockGit = {
@@ -56,9 +59,21 @@ const mockRm = vi.mocked(rm);
 describe('Git Node', () => {
 	let gitNode: Git;
 	let mockExecuteFunctions: Mocked<IExecuteFunctions>;
+	let deploymentConfig: Mocked<DeploymentConfig>;
+	let securityConfig: Mocked<SecurityConfig>;
 
 	beforeEach(() => {
 		gitNode = new Git();
+		deploymentConfig = mock<DeploymentConfig>({
+			type: 'default',
+		});
+		securityConfig = mock<SecurityConfig>({
+			disableBareRepos: false,
+			enableGitNodeHooks: true,
+			enableGitNodeAllConfigKeys: false,
+		});
+		Container.set(DeploymentConfig, deploymentConfig);
+		Container.set(SecurityConfig, securityConfig);
 		mockExecuteFunctions = mock<IExecuteFunctions>({
 			getInputData: vi.fn(() => [{ json: {} }]),
 			getNodeParameter: vi.fn(),
@@ -76,7 +91,22 @@ describe('Git Node', () => {
 			},
 		});
 		vi.clearAllMocks();
+		mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter.mockImplementation(
+			(name: string, _itemIndex: number, fallbackValue?: unknown) => {
+				switch (name) {
+					case 'operation':
+						return 'log';
+					case 'repositoryPath':
+						return '/repo';
+					case 'options':
+						return {};
+					default:
+						return fallbackValue ?? '';
+				}
+			},
+		);
 		mockGit.listConfig.mockResolvedValue({ values: {} } as any);
+		mockGit.log.mockResolvedValue({ all: [] } as any);
 		mockMkdir.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
 		mockRename.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
 		mockRm.mockResolvedValue(undefined);
@@ -108,6 +138,151 @@ describe('Git Node', () => {
 		});
 	});
 
+	describe('Bare repository configuration', () => {
+		it('should add safe.bareRepository=explicit when deployment type is cloud', async () => {
+			deploymentConfig.type = 'cloud';
+			securityConfig.disableBareRepos = false;
+
+			await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({
+					config: ['safe.bareRepository=explicit'],
+				}),
+			);
+		});
+
+		it('should add safe.bareRepository=explicit when disableBareRepos is true', async () => {
+			deploymentConfig.type = 'default';
+			securityConfig.disableBareRepos = true;
+
+			await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({
+					config: ['safe.bareRepository=explicit'],
+				}),
+			);
+		});
+
+		it('should add safe.bareRepository=explicit when both cloud and disableBareRepos are true', async () => {
+			deploymentConfig.type = 'cloud';
+			securityConfig.disableBareRepos = true;
+
+			await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({
+					config: ['safe.bareRepository=explicit'],
+				}),
+			);
+		});
+
+		it('should not add safe.bareRepository=explicit when neither cloud nor disableBareRepos is true', async () => {
+			deploymentConfig.type = 'default';
+			securityConfig.disableBareRepos = false;
+
+			await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({
+					config: [],
+				}),
+			);
+		});
+	});
+
+	describe('Hooks configuration', () => {
+		it('should add core.hooksPath=/dev/null when enableGitNodeHooks is false', async () => {
+			securityConfig.enableGitNodeHooks = false;
+
+			await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({
+					config: ['core.hooksPath=/dev/null'],
+				}),
+			);
+		});
+
+		it('should opt into allowUnsafeHooksPath when enableGitNodeHooks is false', async () => {
+			securityConfig.enableGitNodeHooks = false;
+
+			await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({
+					unsafe: { allowUnsafeHooksPath: true },
+				}),
+			);
+		});
+
+		it('should not add core.hooksPath=/dev/null when enableGitNodeHooks is true', async () => {
+			securityConfig.enableGitNodeHooks = true;
+
+			await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({
+					config: [],
+				}),
+			);
+		});
+
+		it('should not opt into allowUnsafeHooksPath when enableGitNodeHooks is true', async () => {
+			securityConfig.enableGitNodeHooks = true;
+
+			await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+			const options = mockSimpleGit.mock.calls[0][0] as { unsafe?: unknown };
+			expect(options.unsafe).toBeUndefined();
+		});
+	});
+
+	describe('Restricted file paths', () => {
+		it('should throw an error if the repository path is blocked', async () => {
+			mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked = vi.fn(() => true);
+			mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.resolvePath = vi.fn(
+				async () => '/tmp/test-repo' as ResolvedFilePath,
+			);
+
+			await expect(gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
+				'Access to the repository path is not allowed',
+			);
+		});
+
+		it('should use the resolved repository path for git operations', async () => {
+			const originalPath = '/tmp/link-to-repo';
+			const resolvedPath = '/tmp/actual-repo';
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter.mockImplementation(
+				(name: string, _itemIndex: number, fallbackValue?: unknown) => {
+					switch (name) {
+						case 'operation':
+							return 'log';
+						case 'repositoryPath':
+							return originalPath;
+						case 'options':
+							return {};
+						default:
+							return fallbackValue ?? '';
+					}
+				},
+			);
+			mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.resolvePath = vi.fn(
+				async () => resolvedPath as ResolvedFilePath,
+			);
+			mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked = vi.fn(() => false);
+
+			await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({
+					baseDir: resolvedPath,
+				}),
+			);
+		});
+	});
+
 	describe('Branch switching', () => {
 		const mockNodeParameters = (params: Record<string, unknown>) => {
 			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter.mockImplementation(
@@ -766,6 +941,226 @@ describe('Git Node', () => {
 			expect(mockGit.addConfig).toHaveBeenCalledWith('user.name', 'test user', false);
 		});
 
+		describe('Configured remotes', () => {
+			const expectRemoteOperationNotCalled = (operation: 'fetch' | 'pull' | 'pushTags') => {
+				if (operation === 'fetch') {
+					expect(mockGit.fetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+				} else if (operation === 'pull') {
+					expect(mockGit.pull).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+				} else {
+					expect(mockGit.pushTags).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+				}
+			};
+
+			it('should validate remote.origin.url before writing git config', async () => {
+				mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('addConfig')
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('/repo')
+					.mockReturnValueOnce({})
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('remote.origin.url')
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('/outside/repo');
+				mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked = vi.fn(
+					(path: string) => path === '/outside/repo',
+				);
+
+				await expect(gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
+					'Access to the source repository path is not allowed',
+				);
+
+				expect(mockGit.addConfig).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+			});
+
+			it('should validate remote.origin.pushurl before writing git config when custom keys are enabled', async () => {
+				Container.set(
+					SecurityConfig,
+					mock<SecurityConfig>({
+						enableGitNodeAllConfigKeys: true,
+					}),
+				);
+				mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('addConfig')
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('/repo')
+					.mockReturnValueOnce({})
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('remote.origin.pushurl')
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('/outside/repo');
+				mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked = vi.fn(
+					(path: string) => path === '/outside/repo',
+				);
+
+				await expect(gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
+					'Access to the target repository path is not allowed',
+				);
+
+				expect(mockGit.addConfig).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+			});
+
+			it.each([
+				{ key: 'remote.upstream.url', repositoryType: 'source' },
+				{ key: 'remote.upstream.pushurl', repositoryType: 'target' },
+				{ key: 'remote.team.upstream.url', repositoryType: 'source' },
+				{ key: 'remote.team.upstream.pushurl', repositoryType: 'target' },
+				{ key: 'remote.upstream.URL', repositoryType: 'source' },
+				{ key: 'remote.upstream.PushURL', repositoryType: 'target' },
+			])(
+				'should validate $key before writing git config when custom keys are enabled',
+				async ({ key, repositoryType }) => {
+					Container.set(
+						SecurityConfig,
+						mock<SecurityConfig>({
+							enableGitNodeAllConfigKeys: true,
+						}),
+					);
+					mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+						.mockReturnValueOnce('addConfig')
+						.mockReturnValueOnce('/repo')
+						.mockReturnValueOnce({})
+						.mockReturnValueOnce(key)
+						.mockReturnValueOnce('/outside/repo');
+					mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked = vi.fn(
+						(path: string) => path === '/outside/repo',
+					);
+
+					await expect(gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
+						`Access to the ${repositoryType} repository path is not allowed`,
+					);
+
+					expect(mockGit.addConfig).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+				},
+			);
+
+			it.each([
+				{ operation: 'fetch' as const, configKey: 'remote.origin.url', repositoryType: 'source' },
+				{
+					operation: 'fetch' as const,
+					configKey: 'remote.upstream.url',
+					repositoryType: 'source',
+				},
+				{ operation: 'pull' as const, configKey: 'remote.origin.url', repositoryType: 'source' },
+				{
+					operation: 'pull' as const,
+					configKey: 'remote.upstream.url',
+					repositoryType: 'source',
+				},
+				{
+					operation: 'pushTags' as const,
+					configKey: 'remote.origin.url',
+					repositoryType: 'target',
+				},
+				{
+					operation: 'pushTags' as const,
+					configKey: 'remote.origin.pushurl',
+					repositoryType: 'target',
+				},
+				{
+					operation: 'pushTags' as const,
+					configKey: 'remote.upstream.pushurl',
+					repositoryType: 'target',
+				},
+			])(
+				'should validate configured $configKey before $operation',
+				async ({ operation, configKey, repositoryType }) => {
+					mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+						.mockReturnValueOnce(operation)
+						.mockReturnValueOnce('/repo')
+						.mockReturnValueOnce({});
+					mockGit.listConfig.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+						values: {
+							'.git/config': {
+								'remote.origin.url': 'https://github.com/test/repo.git',
+								[configKey]: '/outside/repo',
+							},
+						},
+					} as any);
+					mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked = vi.fn(
+						(path: string) => path === '/outside/repo',
+					);
+
+					await expect(gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
+						`Access to the ${repositoryType} repository path is not allowed`,
+					);
+
+					expectRemoteOperationNotCalled(operation);
+				},
+			);
+
+			it.each(['fetch' as const, 'pull' as const])(
+				'should not validate configured push URLs before %s',
+				async (operation) => {
+					mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+						.mockReturnValueOnce(operation)
+						.mockReturnValueOnce('/repo')
+						.mockReturnValueOnce({});
+					mockGit.listConfig.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+						values: {
+							'.git/config': {
+								'remote.origin.url': 'https://github.com/test/repo.git',
+								'remote.origin.pushurl': '/outside/repo',
+							},
+						},
+					} as any);
+					mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked = vi.fn(
+						(path: string) => path === '/outside/repo',
+					);
+
+					await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+					if (operation === 'fetch') {
+						expect(mockGit.fetch).toHaveBeenCalled();
+					} else {
+						expect(mockGit.pull).toHaveBeenCalled();
+					}
+				},
+			);
+
+			it('should validate non-origin remotes before default push', async () => {
+				mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('push')
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('/repo')
+					.mockReturnValueOnce({})
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('none');
+				mockGit.listConfig.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+					values: {
+						'.git/config': {
+							'remote.origin.url': 'https://github.com/test/repo.git',
+							'remote.upstream.pushurl': '/outside/repo',
+						},
+					},
+				} as any);
+				mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked = vi.fn(
+					(path: string) => path === '/outside/repo',
+				);
+
+				await expect(gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
+					'Access to the target repository path is not allowed',
+				);
+
+				expect(mockGit.push).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+			});
+
+			it('should prefer push URLs over source URLs when validating default push targets', async () => {
+				mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('push')
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('/repo')
+					.mockReturnValueOnce({})
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('none');
+				mockGit.listConfig.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+					values: {
+						'.git/config': {
+							'remote.origin.url': '/outside/source-repo',
+							'remote.origin.pushurl': 'https://github.com/test/push-repo.git',
+						},
+					},
+				} as any);
+				mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked = vi.fn(
+					(path: string) => path === '/outside/source-repo',
+				);
+
+				await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+				expect(mockGit.push).toHaveBeenCalled();
+			});
+		});
+
 		it('should handle clone operation and create the parent directory', async () => {
 			const missingParentError = Object.assign(new Error('Directory does not exist'), {
 				code: 'ENOENT',
@@ -785,7 +1180,9 @@ describe('Git Node', () => {
 
 			expect(mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.resolvePath).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/git/new-repo');
 			expect(mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.resolvePath).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/git');
-			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ baseDir: '/git' }));
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({ baseDir: expect.stringMatching(GIT_ROOT_RE) }),
+			);
 
 			// The clone goes into an unguessable staging directory, not the target.
 			const stagingPath = mockGit.clone.mock.calls[0][1] as unknown as string;
@@ -798,11 +1195,11 @@ describe('Git Node', () => {
 			// The target is verified and then the staged clone is moved into place.
 			expect(
 				mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.ensureParentDirectoryWithoutFollowingSymlinks,
-			).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/git/new-repo');
+			).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.stringMatching(GIT_NEW_REPO_RE));
 			expect(mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.assertNoSymlinkInPath).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-				'/git/new-repo',
+				expect.stringMatching(GIT_NEW_REPO_RE),
 			);
-			expect(mockRename).toHaveBeenCalledWith(stagingPath, '/git/new-repo');
+			expect(mockRename).toHaveBeenCalledWith(stagingPath, expect.stringMatching(GIT_NEW_REPO_RE));
 			expect(result[0]).toEqual([{ json: { success: true }, pairedItem: { item: 0 } }]);
 		});
 
@@ -836,7 +1233,9 @@ describe('Git Node', () => {
 			expect(
 				mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.ensureParentDirectoryWithoutFollowingSymlinks,
 			).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/git/existing-repo');
-			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ baseDir: '/git' }));
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({ baseDir: expect.stringMatching(GIT_ROOT_RE) }),
+			);
 			const stagingPath = mockGit.clone.mock.calls[0][1] as unknown as string;
 			expect(stagingPath).toMatch(CLONE_STAGING_RE);
 			expect(mockGit.clone).toHaveBeenCalledWith('https://github.com/test/repo.git', stagingPath, [
@@ -916,19 +1315,61 @@ describe('Git Node', () => {
 			expect(mockGit.clone).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
 		});
 
-		it('should check file URL source repository paths', async () => {
+		it('should not treat Unix local source repository paths with colons as scp-style remotes', async () => {
 			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
 				.mockReturnValueOnce('clone')
 				.mockReturnValueOnce('/git/new-repo')
 				.mockReturnValueOnce({})
-				.mockReturnValueOnce('file:/tmp/source-repo');
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('/blocked/source:repo');
+			mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked = vi.fn(
+				(path: string) => path === '/blocked/source:repo',
+			);
+
+			await expect(gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
+				'Access to the source repository path is not allowed',
+			);
+
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+			expect(mockGit.clone).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+
+		it('should keep validating Windows local source repository paths', async () => {
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('clone')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('/git/new-repo')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce({})
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('C:\\blocked\\source-repo');
+			mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.resolvePath = vi.fn(
+				async (path: string) => path as ResolvedFilePath,
+			);
+			mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked = vi.fn((path: string) =>
+				path.includes('C:\\blocked\\source-repo'),
+			);
+
+			await expect(gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
+				'Access to the source repository path is not allowed',
+			);
+
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+			expect(mockGit.clone).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+
+		it('should check file URL source repository paths', async () => {
+			const sourcePath = resolve(sep, 'tmp', 'source-repo');
+			const sourceRepository = pathToFileURL(sourcePath).href;
+
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('clone')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('/git/new-repo')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce({})
+				.mockReturnValueOnce(sourceRepository);
 
 			await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
 
-			expect(mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.resolvePath).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/tmp/source-repo');
+			expect(mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.resolvePath).toHaveBeenCalledWith(sourcePath);
 			const stagingPath = mockGit.clone.mock.calls[0][1] as unknown as string;
 			expect(stagingPath).toMatch(CLONE_STAGING_RE);
-			expect(mockGit.clone).toHaveBeenCalledWith('file:/tmp/source-repo', stagingPath, ['--']);
+			expect(mockGit.clone).toHaveBeenCalledWith(sourceRepository, stagingPath, ['--']);
 			expect(mockRename).toHaveBeenCalledWith(stagingPath, '/git/new-repo');
 		});
 
@@ -950,6 +1391,25 @@ describe('Git Node', () => {
 			);
 		});
 
+		it('should reject malformed scp-like source repository references with extra at signs', async () => {
+			const sourceRepository = 'git@malformed@github.com:org/repo.git';
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('clone')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('/git/new-repo')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce({})
+				.mockReturnValueOnce(sourceRepository);
+			mockExecuteFunctions.helpers.isFilePathBlocked = vi.fn((path: string) =>
+				path.includes('git@malformed@github.com:org'),
+			);
+
+			await expect(gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
+				'Access to the source repository path is not allowed',
+			);
+
+			expect(mockSimpleGit).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+			expect(mockGit.clone).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+
 		it('should reject clone source repositories starting with a hyphen', async () => {
 			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
 				.mockReturnValueOnce('clone')
@@ -1033,6 +1493,22 @@ describe('Git Node', () => {
 			expect(envArg.GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL).toBe('file:git:http:https:ssh');
 		});
 
+		it.each(['push', 'pushTags'])(
+			'should disable the file transport for %s when hooks are disabled',
+			async (operation) => {
+				securityConfig.enableGitNodeHooks = false;
+				mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+					.mockReturnValueOnce(operation)
+					.mockReturnValueOnce('/repo')
+					.mockReturnValueOnce({});
+
+				await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+				const envArg = mockGit.env.mock.calls[0][0] as Record<string, string>;
+				expect(envArg.GIT_ALLOW_PROTOCOL).toBe('git:http:https:ssh');
+			},
+		);
+
 		it('should not place the repository when a target path component is a symlink', async () => {
 			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
 				.mockReturnValueOnce('clone')
@@ -1314,6 +1790,48 @@ invalid line without proper format`;
 		});
 	});
 
+	describe('Tag reference validation', () => {
+		it('should accept tag operation when name contains a plus sign', async () => {
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('tag')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('/repo')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce({})
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('v1.2.3+build.1');
+
+			await gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions);
+
+			expect(mockGit.addTag).toHaveBeenCalledWith('v1.2.3+build.1');
+		});
+
+		it('should reject tag operation when name starts with a hyphen', async () => {
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('tag')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('/repo')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce({})
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('--force');
+
+			await expect(gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
+				'Reference cannot start with a hyphen',
+			);
+
+			expect(mockGit.addTag).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+
+		it('should reject tag operation when name contains unsafe characters', async () => {
+			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('tag')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('/repo')
+				.mockReturnValueOnce({})
+				.mockReturnValueOnce('v1;id');
+
+			await expect(gitNode.execute.call(mockExecuteFunctions)).rejects.toThrow(
+				'Reference contains unsafe characters',
+			);
+
+			expect(mockGit.addTag).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		});
+	});
+
 	describe('Error handling', () => {
 		it('should continue on fail when enabled', async () => {
 			mockExecuteFunctions.getNodeParameter

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Postgres/PostgresTrigger.functions.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,31 @@ import { OperationalError, UserError } from 'n8n-workflow';
 import { configurePostgres } from './transport';
 import type { PgpDatabase, PostgresNodeCredentials } from './v2/helpers/interfaces';
 
+const postgresIdentifierRegex = /^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*$/;
+const triggerEvents = ['INSERT', 'UPDATE', 'DELETE'] as const;
+
+type TriggerEvent = (typeof triggerEvents)[number];
+
+export function validatePostgresIdentifier(
+	name: unknown,
+	parameterName: string,
+): asserts name is string {
+	if (typeof name !== 'string' || !postgresIdentifierRegex.test(name)) {
+		throw new UserError(
+			`${parameterName} must start with a letter or underscore and contain only letters, digits, and underscores`,
+			{ level: 'warning' },
+		);
+	}
+}
+
+function getTriggerEvent(firesOn: string): TriggerEvent {
+	if (triggerEvents.includes(firesOn as TriggerEvent)) {
+		return firesOn as TriggerEvent;
+	}
+
+	throw new UserError('Event must be Insert, Update, or Delete', { level: 'warning' });
+}
+
 export function prepareNames(id: string, mode: string, additionalFields: IDataObject) {
 	let suffix = id.replace(/-/g, '_');
 
@@ -17,19 +42,18 @@ export function prepareNames(id: string, mode: string, additionalFields: IDataOb
 		suffix = `${suffix}_manual`;
 	}
 
-	let functionName =
-		(additionalFields.functionName as string) || `n8n_trigger_function_${suffix}()`;
+	let functionName = (additionalFields.functionName as string) || `n8n_trigger_function_${suffix}`;
 
-	if (!(functionName.includes('(') && functionName.includes(')'))) {
-		functionName = `${functionName}()`;
+	if (typeof functionName === 'string' && functionName.endsWith('()')) {
+		functionName = functionName.slice(0, -2);
 	}
 
 	const triggerName = (additionalFields.triggerName as string) || `n8n_trigger_${suffix}`;
 	const channelName = (additionalFields.channelName as string) || `n8n_channel_${suffix}`;
 
-	if (channelName.includes('-')) {
-		throw new UserError('Channel name cannot contain hyphens (-)', { level: 'warning' });
-	}
+	validatePostgresIdentifier(functionName, 'Function name');
+	validatePostgresIdentifier(triggerName, 'Trigger name');
+	validatePostgresIdentifier(channelName, 'Channel name');
 
 	return { functionName, triggerName, channelName };
 }
@@ -47,43 +71,28 @@ export async function pgTriggerFunction(
 		extractValue: true,
 	}) as string;
 
-	const target = `${schema}."${tableName}"`;
+	const firesOn = getTriggerEvent(this.getNodeParameter('firesOn', 0) as string);
+	const rowRecord = firesOn === 'DELETE' ? 'OLD' : 'NEW';
 
-	const firesOn = this.getNodeParameter('firesOn', 0) as string;
+	// Identifiers use :name (double-quote escaped); the channel is bound as a text
+	// value to pg_notify, and the event/row-record are validated keywords.
+	const functionBody = `$1:name() RETURNS trigger LANGUAGE 'plpgsql' COST 100 VOLATILE NOT LEAKPROOF AS $BODY$ begin perform pg_notify($2, row_to_json(${rowRecord})::text); return null; end; $BODY$`;
+	const functionReplace = `CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION ${functionBody};`;
+	const functionExists = `CREATE FUNCTION ${functionBody}`;
 
-	const functionReplace =
-		"CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION $1:raw RETURNS trigger LANGUAGE 'plpgsql' COST 100 VOLATILE NOT LEAKPROOF AS $BODY$ begin perform pg_notify('$2:raw', row_to_json($3:raw)::text); return null; end; $BODY$;";
+	const dropIfExist = 'DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS $1:name ON $2:name.$3:name';
 
-	const dropIfExist = 'DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS $1:raw ON $2:raw';
-
-	const functionExists =
-		"CREATE FUNCTION $1:raw RETURNS trigger LANGUAGE 'plpgsql' COST 100 VOLATILE NOT LEAKPROOF AS $BODY$ begin perform pg_notify('$2:raw', row_to_json($3:raw)::text); return null; end; $BODY$";
-
-	const trigger =
-		'CREATE TRIGGER $4:raw AFTER $3:raw ON $1:raw FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION $2:raw';
-
-	const whichData = firesOn === 'DELETE' ? 'old' : 'new';
-
-	if (channelName.includes('-')) {
-		throw new UserError('Channel name cannot contain hyphens (-)', { level: 'warning' });
-	}
+	const trigger = `CREATE TRIGGER $3:name AFTER ${firesOn} ON $1:name.$2:name FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION $4:name()`;
 
 	const replaceIfExists = additionalFields.replaceIfExists ?? false;
 
-	try {
-		if (replaceIfExists || !(additionalFields.triggerName ?? additionalFields.functionName)) {
-			await db.any(functionReplace, [functionName, channelName, whichData]);
-			await db.any(dropIfExist, [triggerName, target, whichData]);
-		} else {
-			await db.any(functionExists, [functionName, channelName, whichData]);
-		}
-		await db.any(trigger, [target, functionName, firesOn, triggerName]);
-	} catch (error) {
-		if ((error as Error).message.includes('near "-"')) {
-			throw new UserError('Names cannot contain hyphens (-)', { level: 'warning' });
-		}
-		throw error;
+	if (replaceIfExists || !(additionalFields.triggerName ?? additionalFields.functionName)) {
+		await db.any(functionReplace, [functionName, channelName]);
+		await db.any(dropIfExist, [triggerName, schema, tableName]);
+	} else {
+		await db.any(functionExists, [functionName, channelName]);
 	}
+	await db.any(trigger, [schema, tableName, triggerName, functionName]);
 }
 
 export async function initDB(this: ITriggerFunctions | ILoadOptionsFunctions) {

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Postgres/PostgresTrigger.node.ts

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import {
 	searchSchema,
 	searchTables,
 	prepareNames,
+	validatePostgresIdentifier,
 } from './PostgresTrigger.functions';
 
 export class PostgresTrigger implements INodeType {
@@ -252,6 +253,18 @@ export class PostgresTrigger implements INodeType {
 		const triggerMode = this.getNodeParameter('triggerMode', 0) as string;
 		const additionalFields = this.getNodeParameter('additionalFields', 0) as IDataObject;
 
+		// Resolve and validate identifiers before opening a connection, so an
+		// invalid name fails fast without leaking a direct connection.
+		const pgNames = prepareNames(this.getNode().id, this.getMode(), additionalFields);
+		if (triggerMode === 'listenTrigger') {
+			pgNames.channelName = this.getNodeParameter('channelName', '') as string;
+			validatePostgresIdentifier(pgNames.channelName, 'Channel name');
+			// Postgres folds unquoted LISTEN identifiers to lower case; since :name
+			// quotes the channel, lower-case it so an existing channel notified as
+			// e.g. `NOTIFY MyChannel` is still matched.
+			pgNames.channelName = pgNames.channelName.toLowerCase();
+		}
+
 		// initialize and connect to database
 		const { db } = await initDB.call(this);
 		const connection = await db.connect({ direct: true });
@@ -266,23 +279,27 @@ export class PostgresTrigger implements INodeType {
 			this.emit([this.helpers.returnJsonArray([data])]);
 		};
 
-		// create trigger, function and channel or use existing channel
-		const pgNames = prepareNames(this.getNode().id, this.getMode(), additionalFields);
-		if (triggerMode === 'createTrigger') {
-			await pgTriggerFunction.call(
-				this,
-				db,
-				additionalFields,
-				pgNames.functionName,
-				pgNames.triggerName,
-				pgNames.channelName,
-			);
-		} else {
-			pgNames.channelName = this.getNodeParameter('channelName', '') as string;
-		}
+		// Release the direct connection if setup fails, so an error while creating
+		// the trigger or issuing LISTEN doesn't leak it.
+		try {
+			// create trigger and function, or use the existing channel
+			if (triggerMode === 'createTrigger') {
+				await pgTriggerFunction.call(
+					this,
+					db,
+					additionalFields,
+					pgNames.functionName,
+					pgNames.triggerName,
+					pgNames.channelName,
+				);
+			}
 
-		// listen to channel
-		await connection.none(`LISTEN ${pgNames.channelName}`);
+			// listen to channel
+			await connection.none('LISTEN $1:name', [pgNames.channelName]);
+		} catch (error) {
+			await connection.done();
+			throw error;
+		}
 
 		const cleanUpDb = async () => {
 			try {
@@ -298,10 +315,7 @@ export class PostgresTrigger implements INodeType {
 				try {
 					await connection.none('UNLISTEN $1:name', [pgNames.channelName]);
 					if (triggerMode === 'createTrigger') {
-						const functionName = pgNames.functionName.includes('(')
-							? pgNames.functionName.split('(')[0]
-							: pgNames.functionName;
-						await connection.any('DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS $1:name CASCADE', [functionName]);
+						await connection.any('DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS $1:name CASCADE', [pgNames.functionName]);
 
 						const schema = this.getNodeParameter('schema', undefined, {
 							extractValue: true,

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Postgres/test/PostgresTrigger.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+import type { IDataObject, ITriggerFunctions } from 'n8n-workflow';
+import pgPromise from 'pg-promise';
+
+import {
+	pgTriggerFunction,
+	prepareNames,
+	validatePostgresIdentifier,
+} from '../PostgresTrigger.functions';
+import { PostgresTrigger } from '../PostgresTrigger.node';
+import { configurePostgres } from '../transport';
+
+vi.mock('../transport', () => ({ configurePostgres: vi.fn() }));
+
+const invalidIdentifiers = [
+	'name; select 1',
+	'name"',
+	"name'",
+	'name()',
+	'name.other',
+	'a-b',
+	'1abc',
+	'has space',
+	'',
+];
+
+describe('validatePostgresIdentifier', () => {
+	it.each(['n8n_channel', '_fn1', 'MyTrigger', 'a', 'x_1_y'])(
+		'accepts the valid identifier %s',
+		(name) => {
+			expect(() => validatePostgresIdentifier(name, 'Channel name')).not.toThrow();
+		},
+	);
+
+	it.each(invalidIdentifiers)('rejects the invalid identifier %j', (name) => {
+		expect(() => validatePostgresIdentifier(name, 'Channel name')).toThrow(/Channel name must/);
+	});
+});
+
+describe('prepareNames', () => {
+	it('returns safe defaults when no names are provided', () => {
+		const names = prepareNames('abc-123', 'trigger', {});
+		expect(names.functionName).toBe('n8n_trigger_function_abc_123');
+		expect(names.triggerName).toBe('n8n_trigger_abc_123');
+		expect(names.channelName).toBe('n8n_channel_abc_123');
+	});
+
+	it('strips a trailing () from a provided function name', () => {
+		const names = prepareNames('id1', 'trigger', { functionName: 'my_fn()' });
+		expect(names.functionName).toBe('my_fn');
+	});
+
+	it.each([
+		['channelName', { channelName: 'name; select 1' }],
+		['functionName', { functionName: 'name(); select 1' }],
+		['triggerName', { triggerName: 'name on t' }],
+	])('rejects an invalid %s', (_field, additionalFields) => {
+		expect(() => prepareNames('id1', 'trigger', additionalFields as IDataObject)).toThrow();
+	});
+});
+
+describe('pgTriggerFunction', () => {
+	const createContext = (params: IDataObject) => {
+		const getNodeParameter = vi.fn((name: string, _i?: unknown, fallback?: unknown) =>
+			name in params ? params[name] : fallback,
+		);
+		return { getNodeParameter } as unknown as ITriggerFunctions;
+	};
+
+	const invoke = (firesOn: string, additionalFields: IDataObject = { replaceIfExists: true }) => {
+		const db = { any: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]) };
+		const ctx = createContext({ schema: 'public', tableName: 'users', firesOn });
+		const run = async () =>
+			await pgTriggerFunction.call(
+				ctx,
+				db as never,
+				additionalFields,
+				'my_fn',
+				'my_trigger',
+				'my_channel',
+			);
+		const sqls = () => db.any.mock.calls.map(([sql]) => sql as string);
+		return { db, run, sqls };
+	};
+
+	it('never emits a :raw modifier in any executed statement', async () => {
+		const { db, run } = invoke('INSERT');
+		await run();
+
+		expect(db.any).toHaveBeenCalled();
+		for (const [sql] of db.any.mock.calls) {
+			expect(sql).not.toContain(':raw');
+		}
+	});
+
+	it('produces templates pg-promise can format without error', async () => {
+		const { db, run } = invoke('INSERT');
+		await run();
+
+		const pgp = pgPromise();
+		for (const [sql, params] of db.any.mock.calls) {
+			expect(() => pgp.as.format(sql as string, params)).not.toThrow();
+		}
+	});
+
+	it('passes schema and table as separate identifier parameters', async () => {
+		const { db, run } = invoke('INSERT');
+		await run();
+
+		const dropCall = db.any.mock.calls.find(([sql]) => (sql as string).includes('DROP TRIGGER'));
+		expect(dropCall?.[1]).toEqual(['my_trigger', 'public', 'users']);
+	});
+
+	it('uses the OLD row record for DELETE triggers', async () => {
+		const { run, sqls } = invoke('DELETE');
+		await run();
+
+		const notifySql = sqls().find((s) => s.includes('pg_notify'));
+		expect(notifySql).toContain('row_to_json(OLD)');
+	});
+
+	it('embeds the validated event keyword in the trigger', async () => {
+		const { run, sqls } = invoke('UPDATE');
+		await run();
+
+		const triggerSql = sqls().find((s) => s.includes('CREATE TRIGGER'));
+		expect(triggerSql).toContain('AFTER UPDATE');
+	});
+
+	it('creates without OR REPLACE and skips the drop when a name is provided', async () => {
+		const { run, sqls } = invoke('INSERT', { triggerName: 'my_trigger' });
+		await run();
+
+		expect(sqls().some((s) => s.startsWith('CREATE FUNCTION'))).toBe(true);
+		expect(sqls().some((s) => s.startsWith('CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION'))).toBe(false);
+		expect(sqls().some((s) => s.includes('DROP TRIGGER'))).toBe(false);
+	});
+
+	it('rejects an invalid firesOn event', async () => {
+		const { run } = invoke('DROP');
+		await expect(run()).rejects.toThrow();
+	});
+});
+
+describe('PostgresTrigger.trigger (Table Row Change Events mode)', () => {
+	const setup = (additionalFields: IDataObject = {}, firesOn = 'INSERT') => {
+		const connection = {
+			none: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+			any: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
+			query: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
+			done: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+			client: { on: vi.fn(), removeListener: vi.fn() },
+		};
+		const db = {
+			connect: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(connection),
+			any: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]),
+		};
+		vi.mocked(configurePostgres).mockResolvedValue({ db, pgp: {} } as never);
+
+		const params: IDataObject = {
+			triggerMode: 'createTrigger',
+			additionalFields,
+			options: {},
+			schema: 'public',
+			tableName: 'users',
+			firesOn,
+		};
+		const fns = {
+			getNodeParameter: vi.fn((name: string, _i?: unknown, fallback?: unknown) =>
+				name in params ? params[name] : fallback,
+			),
+			getCredentials: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({}),
+			getNode: vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ id: 'node-1' }),
+			getMode: vi.fn().mockReturnValue('trigger'),
+			emit: vi.fn(),
+			helpers: { returnJsonArray: vi.fn((d: unknown) => d) },
+		} as unknown as ITriggerFunctions;
+
+		return { connection, db, fns };
+	};
+
+	it('creates the trigger objects without any :raw modifier', async () => {
+		const { db, fns } = setup();
+		await new PostgresTrigger().trigger.call(fns);
+
+		expect(db.any).toHaveBeenCalled();
+		for (const [sql] of db.any.mock.calls) {
+			expect(sql).not.toContain(':raw');
+		}
+	});
+
+	it('drops the created objects with matching identifiers on close', async () => {
+		const { connection, fns } = setup();
+		const response = await new PostgresTrigger().trigger.call(fns);
+		await response.closeFunction?.();
+
+		expect(connection.any).toHaveBeenCalledWith('DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS $1:name CASCADE', [
+			'n8n_trigger_function_node_1',
+		]);
+		expect(connection.any).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+			'DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS $1:name ON $2:name.$3:name CASCADE',
+			['n8n_trigger_node_1', 'public', 'users'],
+		);
+	});
+
+	it('releases the connection when setup fails', async () => {
+		const { connection, fns } = setup({}, 'INVALID');
+		await expect(new PostgresTrigger().trigger.call(fns)).rejects.toThrow();
+		expect(connection.done).toHaveBeenCalled();
+	});
+});
+
+describe('PostgresTrigger.trigger (Advanced mode)', () => {
+	const setup = (channelName: string) => {
+		const connection = {
+			none: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined),
+			client: { on: vi.fn(), removeListener: vi.fn() },
+		};
+		const db = { connect: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(connection) };
+		vi.mocked(configurePostgres).mockResolvedValue({ db, pgp: {} } as never);
+
+		const params: IDataObject = {
+			triggerMode: 'listenTrigger',
+			additionalFields: {},
+			options: {},
+			channelName,
+		};
+		const fns = {
+			getNodeParameter: vi.fn((name: string, _i?: unknown, fallback?: unknown) =>
+				name in params ? params[name] : fallback,
+			),
+			getCredentials: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({}),
+			getNode: vi.fn().mockReturnValue({ id: 'node-1' }),
+			getMode: vi.fn().mockReturnValue('trigger'),
+			emit: vi.fn(),
+			helpers: { returnJsonArray: vi.fn((d: unknown) => d) },
+		} as unknown as ITriggerFunctions;
+
+		return { connection, db, fns };
+	};
+
+	it('listens via a parameterized identifier', async () => {
+		const { connection, fns } = setup('my_channel');
+		await new PostgresTrigger().trigger.call(fns);
+		expect(connection.none).toHaveBeenCalledWith('LISTEN $1:name', ['my_channel']);
+	});
+
+	it('lower-cases the channel to match unquoted notifications', async () => {
+		const { connection, fns } = setup('MyChannel');
+		await new PostgresTrigger().trigger.call(fns);
+		expect(connection.none).toHaveBeenCalledWith('LISTEN $1:name', ['mychannel']);
+	});
+
+	it('rejects an invalid channel before opening a connection', async () => {
+		const { db, connection, fns } = setup('bad; select 1');
+		await expect(new PostgresTrigger().trigger.call(fns)).rejects.toThrow(/Channel name must/);
+		expect(db.connect).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+		expect(connection.none).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+	});
+});
+
+describe('pg-promise identifier and value formatting', () => {
+	const pgp = pgPromise();
+
+	it('wraps a :name identifier in a single double-quoted token', () => {
+		const formatted = pgp.as.format('LISTEN $1:name', ['a"b']);
+		expect(formatted).toBe('LISTEN "a""b"');
+	});
+
+	it('formats a bound value inside a dollar-quoted body as an escaped literal', () => {
+		const formatted = pgp.as.format("AS $BODY$ begin perform pg_notify($1, 'x'); end; $BODY$", [
+			"a'b",
+		]);
+		expect(formatted).toContain("pg_notify('a''b',");
+		expect(formatted).toContain('$BODY$');
+	});
+});

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Set/v2/helpers/__tests__/utils.test.ts

@@ -52,6 +52,29 @@ describe('prepareReturnItem', () => {
 		(mockContext.getWorkflowSettings as Mock).mockReturnValue({});
 	});
 
+	describe('when an assignment name is an inherited object member', () => {
+		// Guard the shared prototype so a regression here cannot cascade to other tests.
+		const hadOwnCall = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Object.prototype.toString, 'call');
+		afterEach(() => {
+			if (!hadOwnCall) {
+				delete (Object.prototype.toString as unknown as { call?: unknown }).call;
+			}
+		});
+
+		it('keeps built-in object prototypes intact', () => {
+			const value: AssignmentCollectionValue = {
+				assignments: [{ id: '1', name: 'toString.call', value: 'x', type: 'string' }],
+			};
+
+			const result = prepareReturnItem(mockContext, value, 0, baseItem, mockNode, baseOptions);
+
+			// Prototype untouched; the value lands as an own property on the item's json.
+			expect(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(Object.prototype.toString, 'call')).toBe(false);
+			expect(Object.prototype.toString.call([])).toBe('[object Array]');
+			expect((result.json as { toString?: { call?: unknown } }).toString?.call).toBe('x');
+		});
+	});
+
 	describe('JSON assignments', () => {
 		it('should handle string assignments', () => {
 			const value: AssignmentCollectionValue = {

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Snowflake/GenericFunctions.ts

@@ -122,11 +122,7 @@ export function escapeSnowflakeObjectIdentifier(identifier: string): string {
 	return parts.map(escapeSnowflakeIdentifier).join('.');
 }
 
-export async function execute(
-	conn: snowflake.Connection,
-	sqlText: string,
-	binds: snowflake.InsertBinds,
-) {
+export async function execute(conn: snowflake.Connection, sqlText: string, binds: snowflake.Binds) {
 	return await new Promise<any[] | undefined>((resolve, reject) => {
 		conn.execute({
 			sqlText,

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Snowflake/Snowflake.node.ts

@@ -119,7 +119,33 @@ export class Snowflake implements INodeType {
 				default: '',
 				placeholder: 'SELECT id, name FROM product WHERE id < 40',
 				required: true,
-				description: 'The SQL query to execute',
+				description:
+					"The SQL query to execute. Use ? (bound in order) or :1, :2, :3 to refer to the 'Query Parameters' set in the options below.",
+				hint: 'Consider using query parameters to prevent SQL injection attacks. Add them in the options below',
+			},
+			{
+				displayName: 'Options',
+				name: 'options',
+				type: 'collection',
+				displayOptions: {
+					show: {
+						operation: ['executeQuery'],
+					},
+				},
+				default: {},
+				placeholder: 'Add option',
+				options: [
+					{
+						displayName: 'Query Parameters',
+						name: 'queryReplacement',
+						type: 'string',
+						default: '',
+						placeholder: 'e.g. value1,value2,value3',
+						description:
+							'Comma-separated list of the values you want to use as query parameters. You can drag the values from the input panel on the left.',
+						hint: 'Comma-separated list of values: reference them in your query as ? (in order) or :1, :2, :3…',
+					},
+				],
 			},
 
 			// ----------------------------------
@@ -262,7 +288,25 @@ export class Snowflake implements INodeType {
 					query = query.replace(resolvable, this.evaluateExpression(resolvable, i) as string);
 				}
 
-				const responseData = await execute(connection, query, []);
+				const options = this.getNodeParameter('options', i, {}) as IDataObject;
+				const rawReplacement = options.queryReplacement;
+				let binds: snowflake.Bind[] = [];
+
+				if (rawReplacement !== undefined && rawReplacement !== '') {
+					if (typeof rawReplacement === 'string') {
+						binds = rawReplacement.split(',').map((entry) => entry.trim());
+					} else if (Array.isArray(rawReplacement)) {
+						binds = rawReplacement as snowflake.Bind[];
+					} else {
+						throw new NodeOperationError(
+							this.getNode(),
+							'Query Parameters must be a string of comma-separated values, or an array of values',
+							{ itemIndex: i },
+						);
+					}
+				}
+
+				const responseData = await execute(connection, query, binds);
 				const executionData = this.helpers.constructExecutionMetaData(
 					this.helpers.returnJsonArray(responseData as IDataObject[]),
 					{ itemData: { item: i } },
@@ -284,7 +328,7 @@ export class Snowflake implements INodeType {
 			const query = `INSERT INTO ${quotedTable} (${quotedColumns.join(',')}) VALUES (${columns.map(() => '?').join(',')})`;
 			const data = this.helpers.copyInputItems(items, columns);
 			const binds = data.map((element) => [...Object.values(element)]);
-			await execute(connection, query, binds as unknown as snowflake.InsertBinds);
+			await execute(connection, query, binds as snowflake.Binds);
 			data.forEach((d, i) => {
 				const executionData = this.helpers.constructExecutionMetaData(
 					this.helpers.returnJsonArray(d),
@@ -323,7 +367,7 @@ export class Snowflake implements INodeType {
 				return rowBinds;
 			});
 			for (let i = 0; i < binds.length; i++) {
-				await execute(connection, query, binds[i] as unknown as snowflake.InsertBinds);
+				await execute(connection, query, binds[i] as snowflake.Binds);
 			}
 			data.forEach((d, i) => {
 				const executionData = this.helpers.constructExecutionMetaData(

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Snowflake/__tests__/executeQuery.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+import { NodeTestHarness } from '@nodes-testing/node-test-harness';
+import { NodeConnectionTypes, type WorkflowTestData } from 'n8n-workflow';
+import snowflake from 'snowflake-sdk';
+
+const mockExecute = vi.fn();
+const mockConnect = vi.fn();
+const mockDestroy = vi.fn();
+const mockConnection = { connect: mockConnect, execute: mockExecute, destroy: mockDestroy };
+
+const snowflakeCredentials = {
+	authentication: 'password',
+	account: 'test-account',
+	database: 'TEST_DB',
+	schema: 'PUBLIC',
+	warehouse: 'WH',
+	role: 'SYSADMIN',
+	clientSessionKeepAlive: false,
+	username: 'user',
+	password: 'pass',
+};
+
+// The harness loads the node from dist via require(), so vi.mock cannot intercept its
+// `snowflake-sdk` import. The module is externalized, so the test and the node share the same
+// instance — spy on it instead. Re-applied per test since restoreMocks resets spies.
+beforeEach(() => {
+	vi.spyOn(snowflake, 'configure').mockImplementation(() => ({}) as never);
+	vi.spyOn(snowflake, 'createConnection').mockReturnValue(mockConnection as never);
+	mockConnect.mockImplementation((callback: (err: null) => void) => callback(null));
+	mockDestroy.mockImplementation((callback: (err: null) => void) => callback(null));
+	mockExecute.mockImplementation(
+		({ complete }: { complete: (err: null, stmt: undefined, rows: unknown[]) => void }) =>
+			complete(null, undefined, []),
+	);
+});
+
+afterEach(() => vi.clearAllMocks());
+
+// A manual trigger (one empty item) feeding a single executeQuery Snowflake node.
+function executeQueryWorkflow(
+	query: string,
+	queryReplacement: string,
+): WorkflowTestData['input']['workflowData'] {
+	return {
+		nodes: [
+			{
+				parameters: {},
+				id: 'a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890',
+				name: 'When clicking "Execute Workflow"',
+				type: 'n8n-nodes-base.manualTrigger',
+				typeVersion: 1,
+				position: [460, 460],
+			},
+			{
+				parameters: { operation: 'executeQuery', query, options: { queryReplacement } },
+				id: 'c3d4e5f6-a7b8-9012-cdef-123456789012',
+				name: 'Snowflake',
+				type: 'n8n-nodes-base.snowflake',
+				typeVersion: 1,
+				position: [680, 460],
+				credentials: { snowflake: { id: '1', name: 'Snowflake account' } },
+			},
+		],
+		connections: {
+			'When clicking "Execute Workflow"': {
+				main: [[{ node: 'Snowflake', type: NodeConnectionTypes.Main, index: 0 }]],
+			},
+		},
+	};
+}
+
+describe('Test Snowflake, executeQuery - query parameters are bound', () => {
+	new NodeTestHarness().setupTests({
+		workflowFiles: ['executeQuery.workflow.json'],
+		credentials: { snowflake: snowflakeCredentials },
+		customAssertions() {
+			// The value is sent as a ? bind; it never touches the SQL string.
+			expect(mockExecute).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+				expect.objectContaining({
+					sqlText: 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?',
+					binds: ["O'Brien"],
+				}),
+			);
+			// The bound value must not appear in any executed statement.
+			for (const [{ sqlText }] of mockExecute.mock.calls as Array<[{ sqlText: string }]>) {
+				expect(sqlText).not.toContain("O'Brien");
+			}
+		},
+	});
+});
+
+describe('Test Snowflake, executeQuery - comma-separated query parameters', () => {
+	new NodeTestHarness().setupTest(
+		{
+			description: 'splits on commas, trims, and binds in placeholder order',
+			input: {
+				workflowData: executeQueryWorkflow(
+					'SELECT * FROM users WHERE first = ? AND last = ?',
+					"Ada, O'Brien",
+				),
+			},
+			output: { nodeData: {} },
+		},
+		{
+			credentials: { snowflake: snowflakeCredentials },
+			customAssertions() {
+				expect(mockExecute).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+					expect.objectContaining({
+						sqlText: 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE first = ? AND last = ?',
+						binds: ['Ada', "O'Brien"],
+					}),
+				);
+			},
+		},
+	);
+});
+
+describe('Test Snowflake, executeQuery - query parameters provided as an array', () => {
+	new NodeTestHarness().setupTest(
+		{
+			description: 'binds each array entry positionally',
+			input: {
+				workflowData: executeQueryWorkflow(
+					'SELECT * FROM users WHERE first = ? AND last = ?',
+					"={{ ['Ada', 'Lovelace'] }}",
+				),
+			},
+			output: { nodeData: {} },
+		},
+		{
+			credentials: { snowflake: snowflakeCredentials },
+			customAssertions() {
+				expect(mockExecute).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+					expect.objectContaining({
+						sqlText: 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE first = ? AND last = ?',
+						binds: ['Ada', 'Lovelace'],
+					}),
+				);
+			},
+		},
+	);
+});
+
+describe('Test Snowflake, executeQuery - invalid query parameters', () => {
+	new NodeTestHarness().setupTest(
+		{
+			description: 'errors when query parameters are neither a string nor an array',
+			input: {
+				workflowData: executeQueryWorkflow('SELECT * FROM users WHERE first = ?', '={{ 42 }}'),
+			},
+			output: {
+				nodeData: {},
+				error: 'Query Parameters must be a string of comma-separated values, or an array of values',
+			},
+		},
+		{ credentials: { snowflake: snowflakeCredentials } },
+	);
+});

packages/nodes-base/nodes/Snowflake/__tests__/executeQuery.workflow.json

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+{
+	"name": "Snowflake executeQuery - query parameters",
+	"nodes": [
+		{
+			"parameters": {},
+			"id": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
+			"name": "When clicking \"Execute Workflow\"",
+			"type": "n8n-nodes-base.manualTrigger",
+			"typeVersion": 1,
+			"position": [460, 460]
+		},
+		{
+			"parameters": {
+				"fields": {
+					"values": [{ "name": "q", "stringValue": "O'Brien" }]
+				},
+				"include": "none",
+				"options": {}
+			},
+			"id": "b2c3d4e5-f6a7-8901-bcde-f12345678901",
+			"name": "Edit Fields",
+			"type": "n8n-nodes-base.set",
+			"typeVersion": 3.2,
+			"position": [680, 460]
+		},
+		{
+			"parameters": {
+				"operation": "executeQuery",
+				"query": "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?",
+				"options": {
+					"queryReplacement": "={{ $json.q }}"
+				}
+			},
+			"id": "c3d4e5f6-a7b8-9012-cdef-123456789012",
+			"name": "Snowflake Execute Query",
+			"type": "n8n-nodes-base.snowflake",
+			"typeVersion": 1,
+			"position": [900, 460],
+			"credentials": {
+				"snowflake": {
+					"id": "1",
+					"name": "Snowflake account"
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	],
+	"pinData": {},
+	"connections": {
+		"When clicking \"Execute Workflow\"": {
+			"main": [[{ "node": "Edit Fields", "type": "main", "index": 0 }]]
+		},
+		"Edit Fields": {
+			"main": [[{ "node": "Snowflake Execute Query", "type": "main", "index": 0 }]]
+		}
+	},
+	"active": false,
+	"settings": { "executionOrder": "v1" },
+	"versionId": "d4e5f6a7-b8c9-0123-defa-234567890124",
+	"id": "SnowflakeExecuteQueryParameters",
+	"meta": {
+		"instanceId": "b888bd11cd1ddbb95450babf3e199556799d999b896f650de768b8370ee50363"
+	},
+	"tags": []
+}

packages/nodes-base/test/lodash-set.patch.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+import set from 'lodash/set';
+
+// Guards the lodash@4.18.1 patch (patches/lodash@4.18.1.patch): while walking a
+// dot-notation path, `baseSet` reuses the value already present at a segment only
+// when it is an own property, otherwise it creates a fresh object. A segment that
+// matches an inherited member is therefore stored as plain own data instead of
+// being followed onto an object shared through the prototype chain. These tests
+// fail if the patch is ever dropped (e.g. on a lodash bump).
+describe('lodash/set patch', () => {
+	const originalToStringCall = Object.prototype.toString.call;
+	afterEach(() => {
+		Object.prototype.toString.call = originalToStringCall;
+	});
+
+	it('writes a top-level built-in-named segment as own data', () => {
+		const obj: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+		set(obj, 'toString.call', 'x');
+
+		// Read the global into a local and restore it before any expect(), since
+		// expect()/toEqual themselves use Object.prototype.toString.call.
+		const callType = typeof Object.prototype.toString.call;
+		Object.prototype.toString.call = originalToStringCall;
+
+		expect(callType).toBe('function');
+		expect(obj).toEqual({ toString: { call: 'x' } });
+	});
+
+	it('writes a nested built-in-named segment as own data', () => {
+		const obj: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+		set(obj, 'a.toString.call', 'x');
+
+		const callType = typeof Object.prototype.toString.call;
+		Object.prototype.toString.call = originalToStringCall;
+
+		expect(callType).toBe('function');
+		expect(obj).toEqual({ a: { toString: { call: 'x' } } });
+	});
+
+	it('preserves normal and array paths', () => {
+		const obj: Record<string, unknown> = {};
+		set(obj, 'a.b.c', 1);
+		set(obj, 'list[0].name', 'n');
+
+		expect(obj).toEqual({ a: { b: { c: 1 } }, list: [{ name: 'n' }] });
+	});
+});

packages/testing/playwright/helpers/jwt-helper.ts

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ interface ExternalJwtClaims {
 	exp: number;
 	jti: string;
 	email: string;
+	email_verified: boolean;
 	given_name: string;
 	family_name: string;
 	role: string;
@@ -55,6 +56,7 @@ export function mintExternalJwt(overrides: Partial<ExternalJwtClaims> = {}): str
 			exp: now + 300,
 			jti: randomUUID(),
 			email: `e2e-${id}@test.example`,
+			email_verified: true,
 			given_name: 'E2E',
 			family_name: `User-${id}`,
 			role: 'global:member',
@@ -81,6 +83,7 @@ export function mintExternalJwtWithKey(
 			exp: now + 300,
 			jti: randomUUID(),
 			email: `e2e-${id}@test.example`,
+			email_verified: true,
 			given_name: 'E2E',
 			family_name: `User-${id}`,
 			role: 'global:member',

packages/workflow/test/expression-sandboxing.test.ts

@@ -1056,4 +1056,45 @@ describe('ThisSanitizer', () => {
 			expect(result).toEqual({});
 		});
 	});
+
+	describe('global access via concise arrow bodies', () => {
+		it('should resolve a concise arrow body identifier from the data context', () => {
+			const result = tournament.execute('{{ (() => safeVar)() }}', {
+				__sanitize: sanitizer,
+				safeVar: 'ok',
+			});
+			expect(result).toBe('ok');
+		});
+
+		it('should not expose real process members via a concise arrow body', () => {
+			const result = tournament.execute('{{ typeof (() => process)().arch }}', {
+				__sanitize: sanitizer,
+				process: {},
+			});
+			expect(result).toBe('undefined');
+		});
+
+		it('should not expose real Reflect via a concise arrow body', () => {
+			const result = tournament.execute('{{ typeof (() => Reflect)().get }}', {
+				__sanitize: sanitizer,
+				Reflect: {},
+			});
+			expect(result).toBe('undefined');
+		});
+
+		it('should not resolve host globals through arrow-captured identifiers', () => {
+			expect(() => {
+				tournament.execute(
+					// eslint-disable-next-line n8n-local-rules/no-interpolation-in-regular-string
+					"{{ ((R,p)=>R.get(p,'getBuiltinModule'))((()=>Reflect)(),(()=>process)())('child_process').execSync('id').toString() }}",
+					{ __sanitize: sanitizer },
+				);
+			}).toThrow();
+		});
+
+		it('should not rewrite arrow parameters used in a concise body', () => {
+			const result = tournament.execute('{{ ((x) => x)(42) }}', { __sanitize: sanitizer });
+			expect(result).toBe(42);
+		});
+	});
 });

patches/lodash@4.18.1.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+diff --git a/_baseSet.js b/_baseSet.js
+index 99f4fbf9c347a74594f975df62ee353d06c85c55..316f9e8b537e294230c5123789c224c41a7034e8 100644
+--- a/_baseSet.js
++++ b/_baseSet.js
+@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ function baseSet(object, path, value, customizer) {
+       var objValue = nested[key];
+       newValue = customizer ? customizer(objValue, key, nested) : undefined;
+       if (newValue === undefined) {
+-        newValue = isObject(objValue)
++        newValue = isObject(objValue) && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(nested, key)
+           ? objValue
+           : (isIndex(path[index + 1]) ? [] : {});
+       }
+diff --git a/lodash.js b/lodash.js
+index 8634cab16747f81f9336d1a231dc501af460179d..b1939f267103be4e76b4828b37472797f4859632 100644
+--- a/lodash.js
++++ b/lodash.js
+@@ -4045,7 +4045,7 @@
+           var objValue = nested[key];
+           newValue = customizer ? customizer(objValue, key, nested) : undefined;
+           if (newValue === undefined) {
+-            newValue = isObject(objValue)
++            newValue = isObject(objValue) && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(nested, key)
+               ? objValue
+               : (isIndex(path[index + 1]) ? [] : {});
+           }

pnpm-workspace.yaml

@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ catalog:
   eslint-plugin-n8n-nodes-base: ^1.16.7
   express: 5.1.0
   fast-check: ^3.23.2
-  fast-glob: 3.2.12
+  fast-glob: 3.3.3
   fast-json-patch: ^3.1.1
   fastest-levenshtein: 1.0.16
   fflate: 0.8.3