linux/fs/fhandle.c
Linus Torvalds 00b04f4495 vfs-7.4-rc1.idmap
Please consider pulling these changes from the signed vfs-7.4-rc1.idmap tag.
 
 Thanks!
 Christian
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Merge tag 'vfs-7.4-rc1.idmap' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs

Pull vfs idmap constification from Christian Brauner:
 "This makes struct mnt_idmap const throughout the tree.

  A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing modified after
  alloc_mnt_idmap() is the reference count and that is hidden behind
  mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only reads from
  it. That is the same model struct cred uses and the idmapping is
  sensitive enough to deserve it.

  The conversion goes bottom up through the vfs{g,u}id and fs{g,u}id
  helpers, the privilege checks, acl, xattr and quota and then every
  inode operation that takes an idmap, so ->permission(), ->getattr(),
  ->setattr(), ->create(), ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), ->symlink(),
  ->rename(), ->tmpfile(), ->get_acl(), ->set_acl() and ->fileattr_set()
  with their implementations in every filesystem, plus the LSM hooks.

  struct vfsmount, struct mount_kattr and struct kstatmount store a
  const pointer and nop_mnt_idmap and invalid_mnt_idmap live in rodata,
  so anything that tries to modify them faults instead of silently
  corrupting the initial idmapping"

* tag 'vfs-7.4-rc1.idmap' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (27 commits)
  fs: make nop_mnt_idmap and invalid_mnt_idmap const
  fs: port mnt_idmap() and file_mnt_idmap() to const mnt_idmap
  fs: port vfs_*() helpers to const mnt_idmap
  fs: port ->setattr() to pass const mnt_idmap
  fs: port ->getattr() to pass const mnt_idmap
  fs: port ->create() to pass const mnt_idmap
  fs: port ->symlink() to pass const mnt_idmap
  fs: port ->mkdir() to pass const mnt_idmap
  fs: port ->rename() to pass const mnt_idmap
  fs: port ->mknod() to pass const mnt_idmap
  fs: port ->tmpfile() to pass const mnt_idmap
  fs: port ->get_acl() to pass const mnt_idmap
  fs: port ->set_acl() to pass const mnt_idmap
  fs: port ->fileattr_set() to pass const mnt_idmap
  fs: port xattr to const mnt_idmap
  fs: port ->permission() to pass const mnt_idmap
  fs: port acl to const mnt_idmap
  fs: port inode_init_owner() to const mnt_idmap
  fs: port inode_owner_or_capable() to const mnt_idmap
  fs: port privilege checking helpers to const mnt_idmap
  ...
2026-10-19 17:57:49 -10:00

489 lines
14 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/exportfs.h>
#include <linux/fs_struct.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/nsfs.h>
#include "internal.h"
#include "mount.h"
static long do_sys_name_to_handle(const struct path *path,
struct file_handle __user *ufh,
void __user *mnt_id, bool unique_mntid,
int fh_flags)
{
long retval;
struct file_handle f_handle;
int handle_dwords, handle_bytes;
struct file_handle *handle = NULL;
/*
* We need to make sure whether the file system support decoding of
* the file handle if decodeable file handle was requested.
*/
if (!exportfs_can_encode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb->s_export_op, fh_flags))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/*
* A request to encode a connectable handle for a disconnected dentry
* is unexpected since AT_EMPTY_PATH is not allowed.
*/
if (fh_flags & EXPORT_FH_CONNECTABLE &&
WARN_ON(path->dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_DISCONNECTED))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&f_handle, ufh, sizeof(struct file_handle)))
return -EFAULT;
if (f_handle.handle_bytes > MAX_HANDLE_SZ)
return -EINVAL;
handle = kzalloc_flex(*handle, f_handle, f_handle.handle_bytes);
if (!handle)
return -ENOMEM;
/* convert handle size to multiple of sizeof(u32) */
handle_dwords = f_handle.handle_bytes >> 2;
/* Encode a possibly decodeable/connectable file handle */
retval = exportfs_encode_fh(path->dentry,
(struct fid *)handle->f_handle,
&handle_dwords, fh_flags);
handle->handle_type = retval;
/* convert handle size to bytes */
handle_bytes = handle_dwords * sizeof(u32);
handle->handle_bytes = handle_bytes;
if ((handle->handle_bytes > f_handle.handle_bytes) ||
(retval == FILEID_INVALID) || (retval < 0)) {
/* As per old exportfs_encode_fh documentation
* we could return ENOSPC to indicate overflow
* But file system returned 255 always. So handle
* both the values
*/
if (retval == FILEID_INVALID || retval == -ENOSPC)
retval = -EOVERFLOW;
/*
* set the handle size to zero so we copy only
* non variable part of the file_handle
*/
handle_bytes = 0;
} else {
/*
* When asked to encode a connectable file handle, encode this
* property in the file handle itself, so that we later know
* how to decode it.
* For sanity, also encode in the file handle if the encoded
* object is a directory and verify this during decode, because
* decoding directory file handles is quite different than
* decoding connectable non-directory file handles.
*/
if (fh_flags & EXPORT_FH_CONNECTABLE) {
handle->handle_type |= FILEID_IS_CONNECTABLE;
if (d_is_dir(path->dentry))
handle->handle_type |= FILEID_IS_DIR;
}
retval = 0;
}
/* copy the mount id */
if (unique_mntid) {
if (put_user(real_mount(path->mnt)->mnt_id_unique,
(u64 __user *) mnt_id))
retval = -EFAULT;
} else {
if (put_user(real_mount(path->mnt)->mnt_id,
(int __user *) mnt_id))
retval = -EFAULT;
}
/* copy the handle */
if (retval != -EFAULT &&
copy_to_user(ufh, handle,
struct_size(handle, f_handle, handle_bytes)))
retval = -EFAULT;
kfree(handle);
return retval;
}
/**
* sys_name_to_handle_at: convert name to handle
* @dfd: directory relative to which name is interpreted if not absolute
* @name: name that should be converted to handle.
* @handle: resulting file handle
* @mnt_id: mount id of the file system containing the file
* (u64 if AT_HANDLE_MNT_ID_UNIQUE, otherwise int)
* @flag: flag value to indicate whether to follow symlink or not
* and whether a decodable file handle is required.
*
* @handle->handle_size indicate the space available to store the
* variable part of the file handle in bytes. If there is not
* enough space, the field is updated to return the minimum
* value required.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(name_to_handle_at, int, dfd, const char __user *, name,
struct file_handle __user *, handle, void __user *, mnt_id,
int, flag)
{
struct path path;
int lookup_flags;
int fh_flags = 0;
int err;
if (flag & ~(AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW | AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_HANDLE_FID |
AT_HANDLE_MNT_ID_UNIQUE | AT_HANDLE_CONNECTABLE))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* AT_HANDLE_FID means there is no intention to decode file handle
* AT_HANDLE_CONNECTABLE means there is an intention to decode a
* connected fd (with known path), so these flags are conflicting.
* AT_EMPTY_PATH could be used along with a dfd that refers to a
* disconnected non-directory, which cannot be used to encode a
* connectable file handle, because its parent is unknown.
*/
if (flag & AT_HANDLE_CONNECTABLE &&
flag & (AT_HANDLE_FID | AT_EMPTY_PATH))
return -EINVAL;
else if (flag & AT_HANDLE_FID)
fh_flags |= EXPORT_FH_FID;
else if (flag & AT_HANDLE_CONNECTABLE)
fh_flags |= EXPORT_FH_CONNECTABLE;
lookup_flags = (flag & AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW) ? LOOKUP_FOLLOW : 0;
CLASS(filename_uflags, filename)(name, flag);
err = filename_lookup(dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path, NULL);
if (!err) {
err = do_sys_name_to_handle(&path, handle, mnt_id,
flag & AT_HANDLE_MNT_ID_UNIQUE,
fh_flags);
path_put(&path);
}
return err;
}
static int get_path_anchor(int fd, struct path *root)
{
if (fd >= 0) {
CLASS(fd, f)(fd);
if (fd_empty(f))
return -EBADF;
*root = fd_file(f)->f_path;
path_get(root);
return 0;
}
if (fd == AT_FDCWD) {
get_fs_pwd(current->fs, root);
return 0;
}
if (fd == FD_PIDFS_ROOT) {
pidfs_get_root(root);
return 0;
}
if (fd == FD_NSFS_ROOT) {
nsfs_get_root(root);
return 0;
}
return -EBADF;
}
static int vfs_dentry_acceptable(void *context, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx = context;
struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
struct dentry *d, *root = ctx->root.dentry;
const struct mnt_idmap *idmap = mnt_idmap(ctx->root.mnt);
int retval = 0;
if (!root)
return 1;
/* Old permission model with global CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. */
if (!ctx->flags)
return 1;
/*
* Verify that the decoded dentry itself has a valid id mapping.
* In case the decoded dentry is the mountfd root itself, this
* verifies that the mountfd inode itself has a valid id mapping.
*/
if (!privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, idmap, d_inode(dentry)))
return 0;
/*
* It's racy as we're not taking rename_lock but we're able to ignore
* permissions and we just need an approximation whether we were able
* to follow a path to the file.
*
* It's also potentially expensive on some filesystems especially if
* there is a deep path.
*/
d = dget(dentry);
while (d != root && !IS_ROOT(d)) {
struct dentry *parent = dget_parent(d);
/*
* We know that we have the ability to override DAC permissions
* as we've verified this earlier via CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH. But
* we also need to make sure that there aren't any unmapped
* inodes in the path that would prevent us from reaching the
* file.
*/
if (!privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(user_ns, idmap,
d_inode(parent))) {
dput(d);
dput(parent);
return retval;
}
dput(d);
d = parent;
}
if (!(ctx->flags & HANDLE_CHECK_SUBTREE) || d == root)
retval = 1;
/*
* exportfs_decode_fh_raw() does not call acceptable() callback with
* a disconnected directory dentry, so we should have reached either
* mount fd directory or sb root.
*/
if (ctx->fh_flags & EXPORT_FH_DIR_ONLY)
WARN_ON_ONCE(d != root && d != root->d_sb->s_root);
dput(d);
return retval;
}
static int do_handle_to_path(struct file_handle *handle, struct path *path,
struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx)
{
int handle_dwords;
struct vfsmount *mnt = ctx->root.mnt;
struct dentry *dentry;
/* change the handle size to multiple of sizeof(u32) */
handle_dwords = handle->handle_bytes >> 2;
dentry = exportfs_decode_fh_raw(mnt, (struct fid *)handle->f_handle,
handle_dwords, handle->handle_type,
ctx->fh_flags, vfs_dentry_acceptable,
ctx);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dentry)) {
if (dentry == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM))
return -ENOMEM;
return -ESTALE;
}
path->dentry = dentry;
path->mnt = mntget(mnt);
return 0;
}
static bool capable_wrt_mount(struct mount *mount)
{
struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;
/*
* For ->mnt_ns access.
* The following READ_ONCE() is semantically rcu_dereference().
*/
guard(rcu)();
mnt_ns = READ_ONCE(mount->mnt_ns);
return mnt_ns && ns_capable(mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
}
/*
* Does the caller have an unobstructed way to everything below @root? Only
* if the mount is mounted, the caller is privileged over its mount namespace
* and no locked child covers something below @root->dentry. One answer from
* under mount_lock: an umount in between clears ->mnt_ns and takes the
* children off the mount, the locked ones too.
*/
static bool subtree_unobstructed(const struct path *root)
{
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(root->mnt);
guard(mount_locked_reader)();
return is_mounted(root->mnt) && capable_wrt_mount(mnt) &&
!has_locked_children(mnt, root->dentry);
}
static inline int may_decode_fh(struct handle_to_path_ctx *ctx,
unsigned int o_flags)
{
struct path *root = &ctx->root;
if (capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
/*
* Allow relaxed permissions of file handles if the caller has
* the ability to mount the filesystem or create a bind-mount of
* the provided @mountdirfd.
*
* In both cases the caller may be able to get an unobstructed
* way to the encoded file handle. If the caller is only able to
* create a bind-mount we need to verify that there are no
* locked mounts on top of it that could prevent us from getting
* to the encoded file.
*
* In principle, locked mounts can prevent the caller from
* mounting the filesystem but that only applies to procfs and
* sysfs neither of which support decoding file handles.
*
* Restrict to O_DIRECTORY to provide a deterministic API that
* avoids a confusing api in the face of disconnected non-dir
* dentries.
*
* There's only one dentry for each directory inode (VFS rule)...
*/
if (!(o_flags & O_DIRECTORY))
return -EPERM;
if (ns_capable(root->mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
ctx->flags = HANDLE_CHECK_PERMS;
else if (subtree_unobstructed(root))
ctx->flags = HANDLE_CHECK_PERMS | HANDLE_CHECK_SUBTREE;
else
return -EPERM;
/* Are we able to override DAC permissions? */
if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return -EPERM;
ctx->fh_flags = EXPORT_FH_DIR_ONLY;
return 0;
}
static int handle_to_path(int mountdirfd, struct file_handle __user *ufh,
struct path *path, unsigned int o_flags)
{
int retval = 0;
struct file_handle f_handle;
struct file_handle *handle __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct handle_to_path_ctx ctx = {};
const struct export_operations *eops;
if (copy_from_user(&f_handle, ufh, sizeof(struct file_handle)))
return -EFAULT;
if ((f_handle.handle_bytes > MAX_HANDLE_SZ) ||
(f_handle.handle_bytes == 0))
return -EINVAL;
if (f_handle.handle_type < 0 ||
FILEID_USER_FLAGS(f_handle.handle_type) & ~FILEID_VALID_USER_FLAGS)
return -EINVAL;
retval = get_path_anchor(mountdirfd, &ctx.root);
if (retval)
return retval;
eops = ctx.root.mnt->mnt_sb->s_export_op;
if (eops && eops->permission)
retval = eops->permission(&ctx, o_flags);
else
retval = may_decode_fh(&ctx, o_flags);
if (retval)
goto out_path;
handle = kmalloc_flex(*handle, f_handle, f_handle.handle_bytes);
if (!handle) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto out_path;
}
/* copy the full handle */
*handle = f_handle;
if (copy_from_user(&handle->f_handle,
&ufh->f_handle,
f_handle.handle_bytes)) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto out_path;
}
/*
* If handle was encoded with AT_HANDLE_CONNECTABLE, verify that we
* are decoding an fd with connected path, which is accessible from
* the mount fd path.
*/
if (f_handle.handle_type & FILEID_IS_CONNECTABLE) {
ctx.fh_flags |= EXPORT_FH_CONNECTABLE;
ctx.flags |= HANDLE_CHECK_SUBTREE;
}
if (f_handle.handle_type & FILEID_IS_DIR)
ctx.fh_flags |= EXPORT_FH_DIR_ONLY;
/* Filesystem code should not be exposed to user flags */
handle->handle_type &= ~FILEID_USER_FLAGS_MASK;
retval = do_handle_to_path(handle, path, &ctx);
out_path:
path_put(&ctx.root);
return retval;
}
static struct file *file_open_handle(struct path *path, int open_flag)
{
const struct export_operations *eops;
eops = path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_export_op;
if (eops->open)
return eops->open(path, open_flag);
return file_open_root(path, "", open_flag, 0);
}
static long do_handle_open(int mountdirfd, struct file_handle __user *ufh,
int open_flag)
{
long retval;
struct path path __free(path_put) = {};
retval = handle_to_path(mountdirfd, ufh, &path, open_flag);
if (retval)
return retval;
return FD_ADD(open_flag, file_open_handle(&path, open_flag));
}
/**
* sys_open_by_handle_at: Open the file handle
* @mountdirfd: directory file descriptor
* @handle: file handle to be opened
* @flags: open flags.
*
* @mountdirfd indicate the directory file descriptor
* of the mount point. file handle is decoded relative
* to the vfsmount pointed by the @mountdirfd. @flags
* value is same as the open(2) flags.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(open_by_handle_at, int, mountdirfd,
struct file_handle __user *, handle,
int, flags)
{
long ret;
if (force_o_largefile())
flags |= O_LARGEFILE;
ret = do_handle_open(mountdirfd, handle, flags);
return ret;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
/*
* Exactly like fs/open.c:sys_open_by_handle_at(), except that it
* doesn't set the O_LARGEFILE flag.
*/
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(open_by_handle_at, int, mountdirfd,
struct file_handle __user *, handle, int, flags)
{
return do_handle_open(mountdirfd, handle, flags);
}
#endif