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When fanotify reports a permission event, copy_event_to_user() creates the event fd with dentry_open_nonotify(), so that the listener's use of that fd does not generate further events. If the event's path is on a stacked filesystem, the stacked filesystem's ->open() opens the real file with backing_file_open(). Since commitebe559609d("fs: get rid of __FMODE_NONOTIFY kludge"), FMODE_NONOTIFY lives in f_mode only and the backing file does not inherit it: it is allocated with the default fsnotify mode, and fsnotify_open_perm_and_set_mode() raises FS_OPEN_PERM on the real path if the backing filesystem has permission event watchers. Before that commit __FMODE_NONOTIFY travelled in f_flags, and overlayfs copies the user file's f_flags into the backing open (ovl_open_realfile()), so the backing file was exempt implicitly. Commitbc2473c90f("ovl: enable fsnotify events on underlying real files") relied on that when it dropped FMODE_NONOTIFY from OVL_OPEN_FLAGS. The nested event is queued to the same group, from inside the listener's read(2), and can only be answered by another reader thread of that group. A listener holding filesystem marks on both the stacked and the backing filesystem therefore deadlocks as soon as all of its reader threads are inside such a read(2) at the same time, and every other task that touches a marked filesystem queues up behind it. Observed with a commercial anti-malware agent (16 reader threads) on an ostree/composefs host: / is an overlayfs whose data layer is the ostree object store on the same btrfs that holds /etc and /home, and a systemd-sysext overlay sits on /usr. Every on-demand scan of /usr wedged the whole machine until the group was killed. Stack of a blocked reader thread on 7.2.7: fanotify_get_response fanotify_handle_event send_to_group fsnotify __fsnotify_parent do_dentry_open vfs_open backing_file_open ovl_open_realfile [overlay] ovl_open [overlay] do_dentry_open vfs_open backing_file_open ovl_open_realfile [overlay] ovl_open [overlay] do_dentry_open vfs_open dentry_open_nonotify copy_event_to_user fanotify_read vfs_read ksys_read Userspace cannot avoid this: the backing open happens while the kernel builds the fd, before the event is reported, and fid reporting is not available for permission event classes. Make a backing file inherit FMODE_NONOTIFY when the user file it is opened for must not generate events. This restores the pre-6.14 behaviour for the fds that fanotify creates (and for any other FMODE_NONOTIFY file), while ordinary opens through a stacked filesystem keep generating events on the real path, as intended bybc2473c90f. Verified with a self-contained reproducer (private tmpfs lower layers, an overlayfs over them, FAN_OPEN_PERM filesystem marks on the overlay and on one lower layer, a child opening a file through the overlay) in a qemu VM on this tree built with defconfig plus OVERLAY_FS, FANOTIFY and FANOTIFY_ACCESS_PERMISSIONS: without this patch the listener's read(2) never returns and the child's open is released only by the listener's death; with it read(2) returns, the event is answered and the open completes. backing_tmpfile_open() is left alone: its only caller is ovl_create_tmpfile(), whose user file is a regular overlayfs file. Fixes:ebe559609d("fs: get rid of __FMODE_NONOTIFY kludge") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Edvard Conrad <edvard@tuta.io> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/P58Wrer--F-9@tuta.io Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
409 lines
10 KiB
C
409 lines
10 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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/*
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* Common helpers for stackable filesystems and backing files.
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*
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* Forked from fs/overlayfs/file.c.
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*
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* Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat, Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 2023 CTERA Networks.
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*/
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#include <linux/fs.h>
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#include <linux/backing-file.h>
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#include <linux/splice.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/security.h>
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#include "internal.h"
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/**
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* backing_file_open - open a backing file for kernel internal use
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* @user_file: file the user requested to open
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* @flags: open flags
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* @real_path: path of the backing file
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* @cred: credentials for open
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*
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* Open a backing file for a stackable filesystem (e.g., overlayfs).
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* @user_file->f_path may be on the stackable filesystem and @real_path
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* on the underlying filesystem. In this case, we want to be able to
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* return the path of the stackable filesystem. This is done by
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* embedding the returned file into a container structure that also
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* stores the stacked file's path, which can be retrieved using
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* backing_file_user_path().
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*/
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struct file *backing_file_open(const struct file *user_file, int flags,
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const struct path *real_path,
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const struct cred *cred)
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{
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const struct path *user_path = file_user_path(user_file);
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struct inode *real_inode = d_inode(real_path->dentry);
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struct file *f;
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int error;
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/*
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* may_open() checked the inode of the user file, which need not carry
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* S_APPEND and S_IMMUTABLE of the backing inode.
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*/
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if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) {
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if (IS_IMMUTABLE(real_inode))
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return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
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if (IS_APPEND(real_inode) && !(flags & O_APPEND))
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return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
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}
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f = alloc_empty_backing_file(flags, cred, user_file);
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if (IS_ERR(f))
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return f;
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/*
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* A user file that must not generate fsnotify events (e.g. the fd
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* that fanotify creates for a permission event with
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* dentry_open_nonotify()) must not generate them through its backing
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* file either. Otherwise a listener watching the backing filesystem
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* gets a nested permission event from its own read(2), which only
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* another reader of the same group can answer.
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*/
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if (FMODE_FSNOTIFY_NONE(user_file->f_mode))
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file_set_fsnotify_mode(f, FMODE_NONOTIFY);
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path_get(user_path);
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backing_file_set_user_path(f, user_path);
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error = vfs_open(real_path, f);
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if (error) {
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fput(f);
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f = ERR_PTR(error);
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}
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return f;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_open);
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struct file *backing_tmpfile_open(const struct file *user_file, int flags,
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const struct path *real_parentpath,
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umode_t mode, const struct cred *cred)
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{
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const struct mnt_idmap *real_idmap = mnt_idmap(real_parentpath->mnt);
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const struct path *user_path = &user_file->f_path;
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struct file *f;
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int error;
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f = alloc_empty_backing_file(flags, cred, user_file);
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if (IS_ERR(f))
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return f;
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path_get(user_path);
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backing_file_set_user_path(f, user_path);
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error = vfs_tmpfile(real_idmap, real_parentpath, f, mode);
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if (error) {
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fput(f);
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f = ERR_PTR(error);
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}
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return f;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(backing_tmpfile_open);
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struct backing_aio {
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struct kiocb iocb;
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refcount_t ref;
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struct kiocb *orig_iocb;
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/* used for aio completion */
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bool is_write;
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void (*end_write)(struct kiocb *iocb, ssize_t);
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struct work_struct work;
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long res;
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};
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static struct kmem_cache *backing_aio_cachep;
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#define BACKING_IOCB_MASK \
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(IOCB_NOWAIT | IOCB_HIPRI | IOCB_DSYNC | IOCB_SYNC | IOCB_APPEND)
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static rwf_t iocb_to_rw_flags(int flags)
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{
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return (__force rwf_t)(flags & BACKING_IOCB_MASK);
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}
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static void backing_aio_put(struct backing_aio *aio)
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{
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if (refcount_dec_and_test(&aio->ref)) {
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fput(aio->iocb.ki_filp);
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kmem_cache_free(backing_aio_cachep, aio);
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}
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}
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static void backing_aio_cleanup(struct backing_aio *aio, long res)
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{
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struct kiocb *iocb = &aio->iocb;
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struct kiocb *orig_iocb = aio->orig_iocb;
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orig_iocb->ki_pos = iocb->ki_pos;
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if (aio->end_write)
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aio->end_write(orig_iocb, res);
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backing_aio_put(aio);
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}
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static void backing_aio_rw_complete(struct kiocb *iocb, long res)
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{
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struct backing_aio *aio = container_of(iocb, struct backing_aio, iocb);
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struct kiocb *orig_iocb = aio->orig_iocb;
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/* Pairs with kiocb_start_write() in vfs_iocb_iter_write() */
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if (aio->is_write)
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kiocb_end_write(iocb);
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backing_aio_cleanup(aio, res);
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orig_iocb->ki_complete(orig_iocb, res);
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}
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static void backing_aio_complete_work(struct work_struct *work)
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{
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struct backing_aio *aio = container_of(work, struct backing_aio, work);
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backing_aio_rw_complete(&aio->iocb, aio->res);
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}
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static void backing_aio_queue_completion(struct kiocb *iocb, long res)
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{
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struct backing_aio *aio = container_of(iocb, struct backing_aio, iocb);
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/*
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* Punt to a work queue to serialize updates of mtime/size.
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*/
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aio->res = res;
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INIT_WORK(&aio->work, backing_aio_complete_work);
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queue_work(file_inode(aio->orig_iocb->ki_filp)->i_sb->s_dio_done_wq,
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&aio->work);
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}
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static int backing_aio_init_wq(struct kiocb *iocb)
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{
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struct super_block *sb = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp)->i_sb;
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if (sb->s_dio_done_wq)
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return 0;
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return sb_init_dio_done_wq(sb);
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}
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static int do_backing_file_read_iter(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *iter,
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struct kiocb *iocb, int flags)
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{
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struct backing_aio *aio = NULL;
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int ret;
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if (is_sync_kiocb(iocb)) {
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rwf_t rwf = iocb_to_rw_flags(flags);
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return vfs_iter_read(file, iter, &iocb->ki_pos, rwf);
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}
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aio = kmem_cache_zalloc(backing_aio_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!aio)
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return -ENOMEM;
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aio->orig_iocb = iocb;
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kiocb_clone(&aio->iocb, iocb, get_file(file));
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aio->iocb.ki_complete = backing_aio_rw_complete;
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refcount_set(&aio->ref, 2);
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ret = vfs_iocb_iter_read(file, &aio->iocb, iter);
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backing_aio_put(aio);
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if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED)
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backing_aio_cleanup(aio, ret);
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return ret;
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}
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ssize_t backing_file_read_iter(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *iter,
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struct kiocb *iocb, int flags,
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struct backing_file_ctx *ctx)
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{
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ssize_t ret;
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)))
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return -EIO;
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if (!iov_iter_count(iter))
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return 0;
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if (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_DIRECT &&
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!(file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_ODIRECT))
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return -EINVAL;
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scoped_with_creds(ctx->cred)
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ret = do_backing_file_read_iter(file, iter, iocb, flags);
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if (ctx->accessed)
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ctx->accessed(iocb->ki_filp);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_read_iter);
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static int do_backing_file_write_iter(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *iter,
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struct kiocb *iocb, int flags,
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void (*end_write)(struct kiocb *, ssize_t))
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{
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struct backing_aio *aio;
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int ret;
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if (is_sync_kiocb(iocb)) {
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rwf_t rwf = iocb_to_rw_flags(flags);
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ret = vfs_iter_write(file, iter, &iocb->ki_pos, rwf);
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if (end_write)
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end_write(iocb, ret);
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return ret;
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}
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ret = backing_aio_init_wq(iocb);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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aio = kmem_cache_zalloc(backing_aio_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!aio)
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return -ENOMEM;
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aio->orig_iocb = iocb;
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aio->is_write = true;
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aio->end_write = end_write;
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kiocb_clone(&aio->iocb, iocb, get_file(file));
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aio->iocb.ki_flags = flags;
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aio->iocb.ki_complete = backing_aio_queue_completion;
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refcount_set(&aio->ref, 2);
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ret = vfs_iocb_iter_write(file, &aio->iocb, iter);
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backing_aio_put(aio);
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if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED)
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backing_aio_cleanup(aio, ret);
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return ret;
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}
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ssize_t backing_file_write_iter(struct file *file, struct iov_iter *iter,
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struct kiocb *iocb, int flags,
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struct backing_file_ctx *ctx)
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{
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ssize_t ret;
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)))
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return -EIO;
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if (!iov_iter_count(iter))
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return 0;
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/*
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* F_SETFL and RWF_NOAPPEND can take append mode away from the user
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* file. They checked its inode, not the backing one.
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*/
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if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(flags & IOCB_APPEND) &&
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IS_APPEND(file_inode(file)))
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return -EPERM;
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ret = file_remove_privs(iocb->ki_filp);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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if (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_DIRECT &&
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!(file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_ODIRECT))
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return -EINVAL;
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scoped_with_creds(ctx->cred)
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return do_backing_file_write_iter(file, iter, iocb, flags, ctx->end_write);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_write_iter);
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ssize_t backing_file_splice_read(struct file *in, struct kiocb *iocb,
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struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
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unsigned int flags,
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struct backing_file_ctx *ctx)
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{
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ssize_t ret;
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(in->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)))
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return -EIO;
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scoped_with_creds(ctx->cred)
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ret = vfs_splice_read(in, &iocb->ki_pos, pipe, len, flags);
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if (ctx->accessed)
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ctx->accessed(iocb->ki_filp);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_splice_read);
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ssize_t backing_file_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
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struct file *out, struct kiocb *iocb,
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size_t len, unsigned int flags,
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struct backing_file_ctx *ctx)
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{
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ssize_t ret;
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(out->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)))
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return -EIO;
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if (!out->f_op->splice_write)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* splice refuses a user file in append mode, so F_SETFL cleared it */
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if ((out->f_flags & O_APPEND) && IS_APPEND(file_inode(out)))
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return -EPERM;
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ret = file_remove_privs(iocb->ki_filp);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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scoped_with_creds(ctx->cred) {
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file_start_write(out);
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ret = out->f_op->splice_write(pipe, out, &iocb->ki_pos, len, flags);
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file_end_write(out);
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}
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if (ctx->end_write)
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ctx->end_write(iocb, ret);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_splice_write);
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int backing_file_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
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struct backing_file_ctx *ctx)
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{
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struct file *user_file = vma->vm_file;
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int ret;
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if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)))
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return -EIO;
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if (!can_mmap_file(file))
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return -ENODEV;
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/* do_mmap() checked the inode of the user file */
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if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && IS_APPEND(file_inode(file)))
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return -EACCES;
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vma_set_file(vma, file);
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scoped_with_creds(ctx->cred) {
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ret = security_mmap_backing_file(vma, file, user_file);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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ret = vfs_mmap(vma->vm_file, vma);
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}
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if (ctx->accessed)
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ctx->accessed(user_file);
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return ret;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(backing_file_mmap);
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static int __init backing_aio_init(void)
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{
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backing_aio_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(backing_aio, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN);
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if (!backing_aio_cachep)
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return -ENOMEM;
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return 0;
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}
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fs_initcall(backing_aio_init);
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