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0b91fda3a1
Prior to this patch, the mark is sanitized (applying the state's mask to
the state's value) only on inserts when checking if a conflicting XFRM
state or policy exists.
We discovered in Cilium that this same sanitization does not occur
in the hot-path __xfrm_state_lookup. In the hot-path, the sk_buff's mark
is simply compared to the state's value:
if ((mark & x->mark.m) != x->mark.v)
continue;
Therefore, users can define unsanitized marks (ex. 0xf42/0xf00) which will
never match any packet.
This commit updates __xfrm_state_insert and xfrm_policy_insert to store
the sanitized marks, thus removing this footgun.
This has the side effect of changing the ip output, as the
returned mark will have the mask applied to it when printed.
Fixes:
|
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| espintcp.c | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Makefile | ||
| trace_iptfs.h | ||
| xfrm_algo.c | ||
| xfrm_compat.c | ||
| xfrm_device.c | ||
| xfrm_hash.c | ||
| xfrm_hash.h | ||
| xfrm_inout.h | ||
| xfrm_input.c | ||
| xfrm_interface_bpf.c | ||
| xfrm_interface_core.c | ||
| xfrm_ipcomp.c | ||
| xfrm_iptfs.c | ||
| xfrm_nat_keepalive.c | ||
| xfrm_output.c | ||
| xfrm_policy.c | ||
| xfrm_proc.c | ||
| xfrm_replay.c | ||
| xfrm_state_bpf.c | ||
| xfrm_state.c | ||
| xfrm_sysctl.c | ||
| xfrm_user.c | ||