linux/security/landlock/access.h
Mickaël Salaün e761a88ced
landlock: Split denial logging from audit into common framework
Tracepoint emission requires the denial framework (layer identification,
request validation) without depending on CONFIG_AUDIT.  Separate the
denial logging infrastructure from the audit-specific code by
introducing a common log framework.

Create CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG, enabled by default when
CONFIG_AUDIT is set; a following commit extends it to CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS
when the first tracepoint consumer is added.  Move the common framework
(the request types, the layer identification and request validation, and
the landlock_log_denial() and landlock_log_free_domain() entry points)
into log.c and log.h, and keep the audit-specific record formatting in
audit.c. log.o is built for CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG and audit.o for
CONFIG_AUDIT, so the common framework is available to a tracepoints-only
build.  The entry points dispatch to no-op static inline audit stubs
without CONFIG_AUDIT, so the call sites stay unconditional.  Rename the
former landlock_log_drop_domain() to landlock_log_free_domain() to match
the landlock_free_domain tracepoint added in a following commit.

landlock_log_denial() counts denials even without audit, so its
declaration and no-op stub are guarded by CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG,
not CONFIG_AUDIT; a CONFIG_AUDIT guard would expose the stub and clash
with log.c's definition in a tracepoints-only build.

Widen the ID allocation (id.o and the landlock_init_id() /
landlock_get_id_range() declarations) and the log-state representation
(the domain_exec and log_subdomains_off credential fields, the
landlock_hierarchy log fields, and the code that maintains them) from
CONFIG_AUDIT to CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG, so each field and its
writer share one guard and are available to tracing without audit
support.

Widen the denial-path state that feeds the per-denial logging decision
the same way, so the "logged" verdict is computed identically whether or
not CONFIG_AUDIT is set.  Widening fown_layer is what keeps the
file-owner-signal path valid without audit: otherwise
hook_file_send_sigiotask() would leave layer_plus_one at zero, tripping
the is_valid_request() canary and dropping the LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL
denial from tracing.

The ruleset-level quiet_masks stays on no CONFIG guard: it is builder
state validated and stored from user input, kept available so
LANDLOCK_ADD_RULE_QUIET flags are accepted and ignored, not rejected,
when CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG is disabled.

Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811094338.288094-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
2026-08-17 10:17:11 +02:00

152 lines
4.7 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
/*
* Landlock - Access types and helpers
*
* Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
* Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
* Copyright © 2024-2025 Microsoft Corporation
*/
#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_H
#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_H
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/build_bug.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
#include "limits.h"
/*
* All access rights that are denied by default whether they are handled or not
* by a ruleset/layer. This must be ORed with all domain->handled_masks[]
* entries when we need to get the absolute handled access masks, see
* landlock_upgrade_handled_access_masks().
*/
/* clang-format off */
#define _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED ( \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
/* clang-format on */
/* clang-format off */
#define _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL ( \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | \
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV)
/* clang-format on */
typedef u32 access_mask_t;
/* Makes sure all filesystem access rights can be stored. */
static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
/* Makes sure all network access rights can be stored. */
static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
/* Makes sure all scoped rights can be stored. */
static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE);
/* Makes sure for_each_set_bit() and for_each_clear_bit() calls are OK. */
static_assert(sizeof(unsigned long) >= sizeof(access_mask_t));
/* Ruleset access masks. */
struct access_masks {
access_mask_t fs : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS;
access_mask_t net : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET;
access_mask_t scope : LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE;
} __packed __aligned(sizeof(u32));
union access_masks_all {
struct access_masks masks;
u32 all;
};
/* Makes sure all fields are covered. */
static_assert(sizeof(typeof_member(union access_masks_all, masks)) ==
sizeof(typeof_member(union access_masks_all, all)));
/**
* struct layer_mask - The access rights and rule flags for a layer.
*
* This has a bit for each access rights and rule flags. During access checks,
* it is used to represent the access rights for each layer which still need to
* be fulfilled. When all bits are 0, the access request is considered to be
* fulfilled.
*/
struct layer_mask {
/**
* @access: The unfulfilled access rights for this layer.
*/
access_mask_t access : LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_MAX;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG
/**
* @quiet: Whether we have encountered a rule with the quiet flag for
* this layer. Used to control logging.
*/
access_mask_t quiet : 1;
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG */
} __packed __aligned(sizeof(access_mask_t));
/*
* Make sure that we don't increase the size of struct layer_mask when storing
* rule flags.
*/
static_assert(sizeof(struct layer_mask) == sizeof(access_mask_t));
/**
* struct layer_masks - An array of struct layer_mask, one per layer.
*/
struct layer_masks {
/**
* @layers: The unfulfilled access rights for each layer.
*/
struct layer_mask layers[LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS];
};
/*
* Tracks domains responsible of a denied access. This avoids storing in each
* object the full matrix of per-layer unfulfilled access rights, which is
* required by update_request().
*
* Each nibble represents the layer index of the newest layer which denied a
* certain access right. For file system access rights, the upper four bits are
* the index of the layer which denies LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV and the
* lower nibble represents LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE.
*/
typedef u8 deny_masks_t;
/*
* Makes sure all optional access rights can be tied to a layer index (cf.
* get_deny_mask).
*/
static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(deny_masks_t) >=
(HWEIGHT(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS - 1) *
HWEIGHT(_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL)));
/* LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS must be a power of two (cf. deny_masks_t assert). */
static_assert(HWEIGHT(LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS) == 1);
/* Upgrades with all initially denied by default access rights. */
static inline struct access_masks
landlock_upgrade_handled_access_masks(struct access_masks access_masks)
{
/*
* All access rights that are denied by default whether they are
* explicitly handled or not.
*/
if (access_masks.fs)
access_masks.fs |= _LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
return access_masks;
}
/* Checks the subset relation between access masks. */
static inline bool access_mask_subset(access_mask_t subset,
access_mask_t superset)
{
return (subset | superset) == superset;
}
/* A bitmask that is large enough to hold set of optional accesses. */
typedef u8 optional_access_t;
static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(optional_access_t) >=
HWEIGHT(_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_OPTIONAL));
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_H */