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e7a37c9e42
High-level copy_to_user_* APIs already redact SA secret fields when redaction is enabled, but the state teardown path still freed aead, aalg and ealg structs with plain kfree(), which does not clear memory before deallocation. This can leave SA keys and other confidential data in memory, risking exposure via post-free vulnerabilities. Since this path is outside the packet fast path, the cost of zeroization is acceptable and prevents any residual key material. This patch replaces those kfree() calls unconditionally with kfree_sensitive(), which zeroizes the entire buffer before freeing. Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> |
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| .. | ||
| espintcp.c | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| Makefile | ||
| trace_iptfs.h | ||
| xfrm_algo.c | ||
| xfrm_compat.c | ||
| xfrm_device.c | ||
| xfrm_hash.c | ||
| xfrm_hash.h | ||
| xfrm_inout.h | ||
| xfrm_input.c | ||
| xfrm_interface_bpf.c | ||
| xfrm_interface_core.c | ||
| xfrm_ipcomp.c | ||
| xfrm_iptfs.c | ||
| xfrm_nat_keepalive.c | ||
| xfrm_output.c | ||
| xfrm_policy.c | ||
| xfrm_proc.c | ||
| xfrm_replay.c | ||
| xfrm_state_bpf.c | ||
| xfrm_state.c | ||
| xfrm_sysctl.c | ||
| xfrm_user.c | ||