linux/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c
Zong Li 2ee1cc0bbd riscv: cfi: reduce shadow stack size limit from 2GB to 512MB
Change the shadow stack size calculation from RLIMIT_STACK/2 (capped at
2GB) to RLIMIT_STACK/8 (capped at 512MB), following David Laight's
analysis and recommendation.

Rationale:

David Laight pointed out that the focus should be on the ratio between
shadow stack size and the normal stack size, rather than just the
absolute upper limit. His analysis showed that while there are many
functions with small stack frames, the majority have stack deltas of
over 64 bytes due to saved registers and local variables.

Shadow stacks only store return addresses (8 bytes per entry on 64-bit
systems), whereas normal stack frames typically consume 64+ bytes. This
8:64 byte ratio means that programs using a lot of stack space are
dominated by large buffer allocations and local variables, not extreme
recursion depths with minimal local data.

For example, with the default RLIMIT_STACK of 8MB:
- RLIMIT_STACK/2 gives a 4MB shadow stack supporting 512K nested calls
- RLIMIT_STACK/8 gives a 1MB shadow stack supporting 128K nested calls

Given typical stack frame sizes of 64+ bytes, RLIMIT_STACK/8 is still
conservative and provides adequate depth for practical applications.
David noted that this could even be safely halved again.

This reduction also better accommodates memory-constrained platforms.
On systems with limited physical memory, allocating large shadow stacks
can cause virtual memory allocation failures when overcommit mode is set
to OVERCOMMIT_GUESS or OVERCOMMIT_NEVER.

Suggested-by: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260518105725.7afe7a4c@pumpkin/
Signed-off-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522093634.3530233-1-zong.li@sifive.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
2026-08-07 19:24:30 -06:00

536 lines
14 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Copyright (C) 2024 Rivos, Inc.
* Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
*/
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/sizes.h>
#include <linux/user.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <asm/csr.h>
#include <asm/usercfi.h>
unsigned long riscv_nousercfi __read_mostly;
#define SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE sizeof(void *)
bool is_shstk_enabled(struct task_struct *task)
{
return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en;
}
bool is_shstk_allocated(struct task_struct *task)
{
return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_base;
}
bool is_shstk_locked(struct task_struct *task)
{
return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_locked;
}
void set_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr, unsigned long size)
{
task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_base = shstk_addr;
task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_size = size;
}
unsigned long get_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long *size)
{
if (size)
*size = task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_size;
return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_base;
}
void set_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr)
{
task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk = shstk_addr;
}
unsigned long get_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task)
{
return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk;
}
void set_shstk_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable)
{
if (!is_user_shstk_enabled())
return;
task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en = enable ? 1 : 0;
if (enable)
task->thread.envcfg |= ENVCFG_SSE;
else
task->thread.envcfg &= ~ENVCFG_SSE;
csr_write(CSR_ENVCFG, task->thread.envcfg);
}
void set_shstk_lock(struct task_struct *task, bool lock)
{
task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_locked = lock;
}
bool is_indir_lp_enabled(struct task_struct *task)
{
return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_en;
}
bool is_indir_lp_locked(struct task_struct *task)
{
return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_locked;
}
void set_indir_lp_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable)
{
if (!is_user_lpad_enabled())
return;
task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_en = enable ? 1 : 0;
if (enable)
task->thread.envcfg |= ENVCFG_LPE;
else
task->thread.envcfg &= ~ENVCFG_LPE;
csr_write(CSR_ENVCFG, task->thread.envcfg);
}
void set_indir_lp_lock(struct task_struct *task, bool lock)
{
task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_locked = lock;
}
/*
* The shadow stack only stores the return address and not any variables
* 512M should be more than sufficient for most applications.
* Else PAGE_ALIGN it and return back
*/
static unsigned long calc_shstk_size(unsigned long size)
{
if (size)
return PAGE_ALIGN(size);
return PAGE_ALIGN(min(rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK) / 8, SZ_512M));
}
/*
* Writes on shadow stack can either be `sspush` or `ssamoswap`. `sspush` can happen
* implicitly on current shadow stack pointed to by CSR_SSP. `ssamoswap` takes pointer to
* shadow stack. To keep it simple, we plan to use `ssamoswap` to perform writes on shadow
* stack.
*/
static noinline unsigned long amo_user_shstk(unsigned long __user *addr, unsigned long val)
{
/*
* Never expect -1 on shadow stack. Expect return addresses and zero
*/
unsigned long swap = -1;
__enable_user_access();
asm goto(".option push\n"
".option arch, +zicfiss\n"
"1: ssamoswap.d %[swap], %[val], %[addr]\n"
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])
".option pop\n"
: [swap] "=r" (swap), [addr] "+A" (*(__force unsigned long *)addr)
: [val] "r" (val)
: "memory"
: fault
);
__disable_user_access();
return swap;
fault:
__disable_user_access();
return -1;
}
/*
* Create a restore token on the shadow stack. A token is always XLEN wide
* and aligned to XLEN.
*/
static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *token_addr)
{
unsigned long addr;
/* Token must be aligned */
if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
/* On RISC-V we're constructing token to be function of address itself */
addr = ssp - SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE;
if (amo_user_shstk((unsigned long __user *)addr, (unsigned long)ssp) == -1)
return -EFAULT;
if (token_addr)
*token_addr = addr;
return 0;
}
/*
* Save user shadow stack pointer on the shadow stack itself and return a pointer to saved location.
* Returns -EFAULT if unsuccessful.
*/
int save_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *saved_shstk_ptr)
{
unsigned long ss_ptr = 0;
unsigned long token_loc = 0;
int ret = 0;
if (!saved_shstk_ptr)
return -EINVAL;
ss_ptr = get_active_shstk(tsk);
ret = create_rstor_token(ss_ptr, &token_loc);
if (!ret) {
*saved_shstk_ptr = token_loc;
set_active_shstk(tsk, token_loc);
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Restores the user shadow stack pointer from the token on the shadow stack for task 'tsk'.
* Returns -EFAULT if unsuccessful.
*/
int restore_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long shstk_ptr)
{
unsigned long token = 0;
token = amo_user_shstk((unsigned long __user *)shstk_ptr, 0);
if (token == -1)
return -EFAULT;
/* invalid token, return EINVAL */
if ((token - shstk_ptr) != SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE) {
pr_info_ratelimited("%s[%d]: bad restore token in %s: pc=%p sp=%p, token=%p, shstk_ptr=%p\n",
tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), __func__,
(void *)(task_pt_regs(tsk)->epc),
(void *)(task_pt_regs(tsk)->sp),
(void *)token, (void *)shstk_ptr);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* all checks passed, set active shstk and return success */
set_active_shstk(tsk, token);
return 0;
}
static unsigned long allocate_shadow_stack(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
unsigned long token_offset, bool set_tok)
{
addr = vm_mmap_shadow_stack(addr, size, 0);
if (!set_tok || IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
goto out;
if (create_rstor_token(addr + token_offset, NULL)) {
vm_munmap(addr, size);
return -EINVAL;
}
out:
return addr;
}
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
{
bool set_tok = flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN;
unsigned long aligned_size = 0;
if (!is_user_shstk_enabled())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Anything other than set token should result in invalid param */
if (flags & ~SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Unlike other architectures, on RISC-V, SSP pointer is held in CSR_SSP and is an available
* CSR in all modes. CSR accesses are performed using 12bit index programmed in instruction
* itself. This provides static property on register programming and writes to CSR can't
* be unintentional from programmer's perspective. As long as programmer has guarded areas
* which perform writes to CSR_SSP properly, shadow stack pivoting is not possible. Since
* CSR_SSP is writable by user mode, it itself can setup a shadow stack token subsequent
* to allocation. Although in order to provide portablity with other architectures (because
* `map_shadow_stack` is arch agnostic syscall), RISC-V will follow expectation of a token
* flag in flags and if provided in flags, will setup a token at the base.
*/
/* If there isn't space for a token */
if (set_tok && size < SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE)
return -ENOSPC;
if (addr && (addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
return -EINVAL;
aligned_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
if (aligned_size < size)
return -EOVERFLOW;
return allocate_shadow_stack(addr, aligned_size, size, set_tok);
}
/*
* This gets called during clone/clone3/fork. And is needed to allocate a shadow stack for
* cases where CLONE_VM is specified and thus a different stack is specified by user. We
* thus need a separate shadow stack too. How a separate shadow stack is specified by
* user is still being debated. Once that's settled, remove this part of the comment.
* This function simply returns 0 if shadow stacks are not supported or if separate shadow
* stack allocation is not needed (like in case of !CLONE_VM)
*/
unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
{
unsigned long addr, size;
/* If shadow stack is not supported, return 0 */
if (!is_user_shstk_enabled())
return 0;
/*
* If shadow stack is not enabled on the new thread, skip any
* switch to a new shadow stack.
*/
if (!is_shstk_enabled(tsk))
return 0;
/*
* For CLONE_VFORK the child will share the parents shadow stack.
* Set base = 0 and size = 0, this is special means to track this state
* so the freeing logic run for child knows to leave it alone.
*/
if (args->flags & CLONE_VFORK) {
set_shstk_base(tsk, 0, 0);
return 0;
}
/*
* For !CLONE_VM the child will use a copy of the parents shadow
* stack.
*/
if (!(args->flags & CLONE_VM))
return 0;
/*
* reaching here means, CLONE_VM was specified and thus a separate shadow
* stack is needed for new cloned thread. Note: below allocation is happening
* using current mm.
*/
size = calc_shstk_size(args->stack_size);
addr = allocate_shadow_stack(0, size, 0, false);
if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
return addr;
set_shstk_base(tsk, addr, size);
return addr + size;
}
void shstk_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
unsigned long base = 0, size = 0;
/* If shadow stack is not supported or not enabled, nothing to release */
if (!is_user_shstk_enabled() || !is_shstk_enabled(tsk))
return;
/*
* When fork() with CLONE_VM fails, the child (tsk) already has a
* shadow stack allocated, and exit_thread() calls this function to
* free it. In this case the parent (current) and the child share
* the same mm struct. Move forward only when they're same.
*/
if (!tsk->mm || tsk->mm != current->mm)
return;
/*
* We know shadow stack is enabled but if base is NULL, then
* this task is not managing its own shadow stack (CLONE_VFORK). So
* skip freeing it.
*/
base = get_shstk_base(tsk, &size);
if (!base)
return;
vm_munmap(base, size);
set_shstk_base(tsk, 0, 0);
}
int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __user *status)
{
unsigned long bcfi_status = 0;
if (!is_user_shstk_enabled())
return -EINVAL;
/* this means shadow stack is enabled on the task */
bcfi_status |= (is_shstk_enabled(t) ? PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE : 0);
return copy_to_user(status, &bcfi_status, sizeof(bcfi_status)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status)
{
unsigned long size = 0, addr = 0;
bool enable_shstk = false;
if (!is_user_shstk_enabled())
return -EINVAL;
/* Reject unknown flags */
if (status & ~PR_SHADOW_STACK_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
/* bcfi status is locked and further can't be modified by user */
if (is_shstk_locked(t))
return -EINVAL;
enable_shstk = status & PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE;
/* Request is to enable shadow stack and shadow stack is not enabled already */
if (enable_shstk && !is_shstk_enabled(t)) {
/* shadow stack was allocated and enable request again
* no need to support such usecase and return EINVAL.
*/
if (is_shstk_allocated(t))
return -EINVAL;
size = calc_shstk_size(0);
addr = allocate_shadow_stack(0, size, 0, false);
if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
return -ENOMEM;
set_shstk_base(t, addr, size);
set_active_shstk(t, addr + size);
}
/*
* If a request to disable shadow stack happens, let's go ahead and release it
* Although, if CLONE_VFORKed child did this, then in that case we will end up
* not releasing the shadow stack (because it might be needed in parent). Although
* we will disable it for VFORKed child. And if VFORKed child tries to enable again
* then in that case, it'll get entirely new shadow stack because following condition
* are true
* - shadow stack was not enabled for vforked child
* - shadow stack base was anyways pointing to 0
* This shouldn't be a big issue because we want parent to have availability of shadow
* stack whenever VFORKed child releases resources via exit or exec but at the same
* time we want VFORKed child to break away and establish new shadow stack if it desires
*
*/
if (!enable_shstk)
shstk_release(t);
set_shstk_status(t, enable_shstk);
return 0;
}
int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned long arg)
{
/* If shtstk not supported or not enabled on task, nothing to lock here */
if (!is_user_shstk_enabled() ||
!is_shstk_enabled(task) || arg != 0)
return -EINVAL;
set_shstk_lock(task, true);
return 0;
}
int arch_prctl_get_branch_landing_pad_state(struct task_struct *t,
unsigned long __user *state)
{
unsigned long fcfi_status = 0;
if (!is_user_lpad_enabled())
return -EINVAL;
fcfi_status = (is_indir_lp_enabled(t) ? PR_CFI_ENABLE : PR_CFI_DISABLE);
fcfi_status |= (is_indir_lp_locked(t) ? PR_CFI_LOCK : 0);
return copy_to_user(state, &fcfi_status, sizeof(fcfi_status)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
int arch_prctl_set_branch_landing_pad_state(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long state)
{
if (!is_user_lpad_enabled())
return -EINVAL;
if (state & ~PR_CFI_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
/* indirect branch tracking is locked and further can't be modified by user */
if (is_indir_lp_locked(t))
return -EINVAL;
if (!(state & (PR_CFI_ENABLE | PR_CFI_DISABLE)))
return -EINVAL;
if (state & PR_CFI_ENABLE && state & PR_CFI_DISABLE)
return -EINVAL;
set_indir_lp_status(t, !!(state & PR_CFI_ENABLE));
return 0;
}
int arch_prctl_lock_branch_landing_pad_state(struct task_struct *task)
{
/*
* If indirect branch tracking is not supported or not enabled on task,
* nothing to lock here
*/
if (!is_user_lpad_enabled() ||
!is_indir_lp_enabled(task))
return -EINVAL;
set_indir_lp_lock(task, true);
return 0;
}
bool is_user_shstk_enabled(void)
{
return (cpu_supports_shadow_stack() &&
!(riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI));
}
bool is_user_lpad_enabled(void)
{
return (cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr() &&
!(riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_FCFI));
}
static int __init setup_global_riscv_enable(char *str)
{
if (strcmp(str, "all") == 0)
riscv_nousercfi = CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI;
if (strcmp(str, "fcfi") == 0)
riscv_nousercfi |= CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_FCFI;
if (strcmp(str, "bcfi") == 0)
riscv_nousercfi |= CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI;
if (riscv_nousercfi)
pr_info("RISC-V user CFI disabled via cmdline - shadow stack status : %s, landing pad status : %s\n",
(riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI) ? "disabled" :
"enabled", (riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_FCFI) ?
"disabled" : "enabled");
return 1;
}
__setup("riscv_nousercfi=", setup_global_riscv_enable);