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The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3 or 4 bytes to target->nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device. The peer sets the cascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the cascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round follows). ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target->nfcid1 is sized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver actually enforces this. This means a malicious peer can keep the cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each round. Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed the buffer. Commit |
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| .. | ||
| hci | ||
| nci | ||
| af_nfc.c | ||
| core.c | ||
| digital_core.c | ||
| digital_dep.c | ||
| digital_technology.c | ||
| digital.h | ||
| Kconfig | ||
| llcp_commands.c | ||
| llcp_core.c | ||
| llcp_sock.c | ||
| llcp.h | ||
| Makefile | ||
| netlink.c | ||
| nfc.h | ||
| rawsock.c | ||