commit 5e722b217a upstream.
The commit that added this check did so in a very strange way - first
security_locked_down() is called, its value stored into retval, and if
it's nonzero, then an additional check is made for (change_irq ||
change_port), and if this is true, the function returns. However, if
the goto exit branch is not taken, the code keeps the retval value and
continues executing the function. Then, depending on whether
uport->ops->verify_port is set, the retval value may or may not be reset
to zero and eventually the error value from security_locked_down() may
abort the function a few lines below.
I will go out on a limb and assume that this isn't the intended behavior
and that an error value from security_locked_down() was supposed to
abort the function only in case (change_irq || change_port) is true.
Note that security_locked_down() should be called last in any series of
checks, since the SELinux implementation of this hook will do a check
against the policy and generate an audit record in case of denial. If
the operation was to carry on after calling security_locked_down(), then
the SELinux denial record would be bogus.
See commit 59438b4647 ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux
lockdown") for how SELinux implements this hook.
Fixes: 794edf30ee ("lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL")
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210507115719.140799-1-omosnace@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
1a2494c9eb