linux/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
Linus Torvalds 136114e0ab mm.git review status for linus..mm-nonmm-stable
Total patches:       107
 Reviews/patch:       1.07
 Reviewed rate:       67%
 
 - The 2 patch series "ocfs2: give ocfs2 the ability to reclaim
   suballocator free bg" from Heming Zhao saves disk space by teaching
   ocfs2 to reclaim suballocator block group space.
 
 - The 4 patch series "Add ARRAY_END(), and use it to fix off-by-one
   bugs" from Alejandro Colomar adds the ARRAY_END() macro and uses it in
   various places.
 
 - The 2 patch series "vmcoreinfo: support VMCOREINFO_BYTES larger than
   PAGE_SIZE" from Pnina Feder makes the vmcore code future-safe, if
   VMCOREINFO_BYTES ever exceeds the page size.
 
 - The 7 patch series "kallsyms: Prevent invalid access when showing
   module buildid" from Petr Mladek cleans up kallsyms code related to
   module buildid and fixes an invalid access crash when printing
   backtraces.
 
 - The 3 patch series "Address page fault in
   ima_restore_measurement_list()" from Harshit Mogalapalli fixes a
   kexec-related crash that can occur when booting the second-stage kernel
   on x86.
 
 - The 6 patch series "kho: ABI headers and Documentation updates" from
   Mike Rapoport updates the kexec handover ABI documentation.
 
 - The 4 patch series "Align atomic storage" from Finn Thain adds the
   __aligned attribute to atomic_t and atomic64_t definitions to get
   natural alignment of both types on csky, m68k, microblaze, nios2,
   openrisc and sh.
 
 - The 2 patch series "kho: clean up page initialization logic" from
   Pratyush Yadav simplifies the page initialization logic in
   kho_restore_page().
 
 - The 6 patch series "Unload linux/kernel.h" from Yury Norov moves
   several things out of kernel.h and into more appropriate places.
 
 - The 7 patch series "don't abuse task_struct.group_leader" from Oleg
   Nesterov removes the usage of ->group_leader when it is "obviously
   unnecessary".
 
 - The 5 patch series "list private v2 & luo flb" from Pasha Tatashin
   adds some infrastructure improvements to the live update orchestrator.
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Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2026-02-12-10-48' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:

 - "ocfs2: give ocfs2 the ability to reclaim suballocator free bg" saves
   disk space by teaching ocfs2 to reclaim suballocator block group
   space (Heming Zhao)

 - "Add ARRAY_END(), and use it to fix off-by-one bugs" adds the
   ARRAY_END() macro and uses it in various places (Alejandro Colomar)

 - "vmcoreinfo: support VMCOREINFO_BYTES larger than PAGE_SIZE" makes
   the vmcore code future-safe, if VMCOREINFO_BYTES ever exceeds the
   page size (Pnina Feder)

 - "kallsyms: Prevent invalid access when showing module buildid" cleans
   up kallsyms code related to module buildid and fixes an invalid
   access crash when printing backtraces (Petr Mladek)

 - "Address page fault in ima_restore_measurement_list()" fixes a
   kexec-related crash that can occur when booting the second-stage
   kernel on x86 (Harshit Mogalapalli)

 - "kho: ABI headers and Documentation updates" updates the kexec
   handover ABI documentation (Mike Rapoport)

 - "Align atomic storage" adds the __aligned attribute to atomic_t and
   atomic64_t definitions to get natural alignment of both types on
   csky, m68k, microblaze, nios2, openrisc and sh (Finn Thain)

 - "kho: clean up page initialization logic" simplifies the page
   initialization logic in kho_restore_page() (Pratyush Yadav)

 - "Unload linux/kernel.h" moves several things out of kernel.h and into
   more appropriate places (Yury Norov)

 - "don't abuse task_struct.group_leader" removes the usage of
   ->group_leader when it is "obviously unnecessary" (Oleg Nesterov)

 - "list private v2 & luo flb" adds some infrastructure improvements to
   the live update orchestrator (Pasha Tatashin)

* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2026-02-12-10-48' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (107 commits)
  watchdog/hardlockup: simplify perf event probe and remove per-cpu dependency
  procfs: fix missing RCU protection when reading real_parent in do_task_stat()
  watchdog/softlockup: fix sample ring index wrap in need_counting_irqs()
  kcsan, compiler_types: avoid duplicate type issues in BPF Type Format
  kho: fix doc for kho_restore_pages()
  tests/liveupdate: add in-kernel liveupdate test
  liveupdate: luo_flb: introduce File-Lifecycle-Bound global state
  liveupdate: luo_file: Use private list
  list: add kunit test for private list primitives
  list: add primitives for private list manipulations
  delayacct: fix uapi timespec64 definition
  panic: add panic_force_cpu= parameter to redirect panic to a specific CPU
  netclassid: use thread_group_leader(p) in update_classid_task()
  RDMA/umem: don't abuse current->group_leader
  drm/pan*: don't abuse current->group_leader
  drm/amd: kill the outdated "Only the pthreads threading model is supported" checks
  drm/amdgpu: don't abuse current->group_leader
  android/binder: use same_thread_group(proc->tsk, current) in binder_mmap()
  android/binder: don't abuse current->group_leader
  kho: skip memoryless NUMA nodes when reserving scratch areas
  ...
2026-02-12 12:13:01 -08:00

268 lines
6.3 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from an X.509 Certificate
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "X.509: "fmt
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <linux/hex.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
#include "x509_parser.h"
/*
* Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves
* digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
*/
int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
struct shash_desc *desc;
size_t desc_size;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
/* Calculate a SHA256 hash of the TBS and check it against the
* blacklist.
*/
sha256(cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, cert->sha256);
ret = is_hash_blacklisted(cert->sha256, sizeof(cert->sha256),
BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS);
if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) {
pr_err("Cert %*phN is blacklisted\n",
(int)sizeof(cert->sha256), cert->sha256);
cert->blacklisted = true;
ret = 0;
}
sig->s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig->s)
return -ENOMEM;
sig->s_size = cert->raw_sig_size;
if (sig->algo_takes_data) {
/* The signature algorithm does whatever passes for hashing. */
sig->m = (u8 *)cert->tbs;
sig->m_size = cert->tbs_size;
sig->m_free = false;
goto out;
}
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
*/
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
cert->unsupported_sig = true;
return 0;
}
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
}
desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
sig->m_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
ret = -ENOMEM;
sig->m = kmalloc(sig->m_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig->m)
goto error;
sig->m_free = true;
desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
goto error;
desc->tfm = tfm;
ret = crypto_shash_digest(desc, cert->tbs, cert->tbs_size, sig->m);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_2;
error_2:
kfree(desc);
error:
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
out:
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
/*
* Check for self-signedness in an X.509 cert and if found, check the signature
* immediately if we can.
*/
int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
{
int ret = 0;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
if (cert->raw_subject_size != cert->raw_issuer_size ||
memcmp(cert->raw_subject, cert->raw_issuer,
cert->raw_issuer_size) != 0)
goto not_self_signed;
if (cert->sig->auth_ids[0] || cert->sig->auth_ids[1]) {
/* If the AKID is present it may have one or two parts. If
* both are supplied, both must match.
*/
bool a = asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->sig->auth_ids[1]);
bool b = asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->sig->auth_ids[0]);
if (!a && !b)
goto not_self_signed;
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
if (((a && !b) || (b && !a)) &&
cert->sig->auth_ids[0] && cert->sig->auth_ids[1])
goto out;
}
if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
ret = public_key_verify_signature(cert->pub, cert->sig);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENOPKG) {
cert->unsupported_sig = true;
ret = 0;
}
goto out;
}
pr_devel("Cert Self-signature verified");
cert->self_signed = true;
out:
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
not_self_signed:
pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [not]\n", __func__);
return 0;
}
/*
* Attempt to parse a data blob for a key as an X509 certificate.
*/
static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct x509_certificate *cert __free(x509_free_certificate) = NULL;
struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids __free(kfree) = NULL;
char *p, *desc __free(kfree) = NULL;
const char *q;
size_t srlen, sulen;
cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
if (IS_ERR(cert))
return PTR_ERR(cert);
pr_devel("Cert Issuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
pr_devel("Cert Subject: %s\n", cert->subject);
pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", cert->pub->pkey_algo);
pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to);
cert->pub->id_type = "X509";
if (cert->unsupported_sig) {
public_key_signature_free(cert->sig);
cert->sig = NULL;
} else {
pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
cert->sig->pkey_algo, cert->sig->hash_algo);
}
/* Don't permit addition of blacklisted keys */
if (cert->blacklisted)
return -EKEYREJECTED;
/* Propose a description */
sulen = strlen(cert->subject);
if (cert->raw_skid) {
srlen = cert->raw_skid_size;
q = cert->raw_skid;
} else {
srlen = cert->raw_serial_size;
q = cert->raw_serial;
}
desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
return -ENOMEM;
p = memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
p += sulen;
*p++ = ':';
*p++ = ' ';
p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
*p = 0;
kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kids)
return -ENOMEM;
kids->id[0] = cert->id;
kids->id[1] = cert->skid;
kids->id[2] = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_subject,
cert->raw_subject_size,
"", 0);
if (IS_ERR(kids->id[2]))
return PTR_ERR(kids->id[2]);
/* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
__module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype;
prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = kids;
prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = cert->pub;
prep->payload.data[asym_auth] = cert->sig;
prep->description = desc;
prep->quotalen = 100;
/* We've finished with the certificate */
cert->pub = NULL;
cert->id = NULL;
cert->skid = NULL;
cert->sig = NULL;
desc = NULL;
kids = NULL;
return 0;
}
static struct asymmetric_key_parser x509_key_parser = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.name = "x509",
.parse = x509_key_preparse,
};
/*
* Module stuff
*/
static int __init x509_key_init(void)
{
return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&x509_key_parser);
}
static void __exit x509_key_exit(void)
{
unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&x509_key_parser);
}
module_init(x509_key_init);
module_exit(x509_key_exit);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("X.509 certificate parser");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");