linux/arch/s390/kvm/gmap/gmap.c
Linus Torvalds 7bb6284aa7 Arm:
* Add support for 'slot' based PMU events, paired with new UAPI that
   compels the user to select a specific PMU implementation
 
 * Lazy save/restore of vCPU state for pKVM, along with various fixes
   and cleanups to the management of vCPU state between the untrusted
   host and pKVM hypervisor
 
 * Disable traps of EL1 registers for nested hypervisors when FEAT_NV2p1
   is present, guaranteeing that EL2-specific register bits are stateful
   in the EL1 counterpart
 
 * Leverage FEAT_NV3 to avoid unnecessary ERET/TLBI traps when the scope
   of those instructions remains 'in host' (i.e. L1 kernel/userspace)
 
 * Pile of fixes for the management of the VNCR pseudo-TLB, such as
   under-invalidations and races with concurrent TLBIs on other vCPUs
 
 * Consolidate the non-protected and pKVM view of ICH_VTR_EL2 to a
   runtime-patched constant, allowing the same data to be shared with
   pKVM prior to dropping host privileges
 
 * Considerable pile of LLM-assisted fixes around the shop but mostly in
   the VGIC, our in-kernel generator of bugs (and sometimes interrupts)
 
 LoongArch:
 
 * Advertise already-supported capabilities.
 
 * Some bug fixes about timer and MMIO.
 
 * Some hardening about interrupt injection.
 
 * Replace kvm_err() with kvm_pr_unimpl().
 
 * Add FPU/LSX/LASX test cases for selftests.
 
 RISC-V:
 
 * Svadu/Zicfiss/Zicfilp FWFT support for Guest
 
 * Use try_cmpxchg for IMSIC MRIF RMW
 
 * More arch-specific tracepoints in KVM RISC-V
 
 * Eager page splitting when enabling dirty logging
 
 * Optimize hfence request handling for SMP Guests
 
 * Improve dirty log clearing by skipping zero bits in mask
 
 * Guard HFENCE range loops against overflow
 
 * CPU PM notifiers in KVM RISC-V for non-retentive idle states
 
 * Fix kernel-mode vector context save/restore for Guest
 
 s390:
 
 * Fixes for vfio-ap
 
 * Fixes for the gmap rework
 
 * Fixes for vsie
 
 * AI triggered fixes all over
 
 * diag9c tracing
 
 * code move preparation for the additional arm64 support
 
 * enable CONTEXT_ANALYSIS
 
 x86:
 
 * Perform spring cleaning on x86.{c,h} and asm/kvm_host.h, by adding regs.c
   (the kvm_cache_regs.h => regs.h is already applied) and msrs.{c,h}, and moving
   relevant code out of x86.c.
 
 * Split kvm_mmu in three parts, respectively to describe the format of page
   tables, walking the guest page tables and building the page tables.  Always
   use the same page table walker kvm->arch.gva_walk as the entry point to
   convert a guest's virtual address, where the previous code used two
   different kvm_mmu structs depending on whether the walk included nested
   EPT/NPT or not.  Make page fault vmexits reuse the permission checking
   machinery that is used for guest page faults.  This is both a cleanup
   and a baby step towards supporting XS/XU memory permissions.
 
 * Document some of the "fun" gotchas with the APIC base when creating IRQCHIPs
   on x86.
 
 * Remove a defunct masterclock update from kvm_xen_shared_info_init().  It
   could result in incorrect kvmclock due to triggering an unnecessary
   switch to/from masterclock mode.
 
 * Skip Xen runstate time updates if time has effectively gone backwards, so
   that the guest doesn't report 100% steal time for a very, very long time.
 
 * Drop KVM's runtime updates of the Xen PV timing CPUID leaf, as KVM was
   updating the wrong sub-leaf, and upstream KVM will soon provide all the
   information needed by userspace to populate the CPUID field itself.
 
 * Fix a bug where KVM would walk a newly created rmap without holding the rmap
   lock (or mmu_lock) during aging.
 
 * Fix a bug where aging TDP MMU SPTEs could clobber FROZEN SPTEs.
 
 * Fix a variety of #DB priority bugs.
 
 * Fix a class of races related to enabling Hyper-V emulation on a vCPU after
   the vCPU is visible to the rest of KVM.
 
 * Use static calls for nested virtualization ops.
 
 * Move more KVM-internal code out of x86's kvm_host.h.
 
 * Enumerate support for a variety of Zhaoxin instructions that don't require
   explicit virtualization.
 
 * Fix missing EFER validation bugs, including in the KVM_SET_SREGS* path.
 
 * Harden kvm_vcpu_map() against double-mapping and thus leaking references.
 
 * Misc fixes and cleanups, e.g. for largely benign syzkaller splats.
 
 x86 (Intel):
 
 * Zero a vCPU's entry in VMX's Posted Interrupt Descriptor table used for IPI
   virtualization when the vCPU is freed, to fix a use-after-free where hardware
   will write to a freed vCPU's PID.
 
 * Service local TLB flushes on a failed nested VM-Enter to fix a bug where KVM
   could miss a TLB on a future, successful VM-Enter with the same L2 VPID.
 
 * Cap the maximum value shoved into the VMX Preemption Timer to workaround an
   erratum that affects all existing Intel CPUs that support CPUID 0x15.
 
 * Fix VPID virtualization bugs where KVM would fail to flush hardware TLBs.
 
 * Harden the TDX "populate" ioctls against bad input, and to prepare
   for supporting in-place private<=>shared conversion.
 
 x86 (AMD):
 
 * Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA pages if their backing guest_memfd page is
   zapped/invalidated, e.g. due to a PUNCH_HOLE in response to a Page-State
   Change request.
 
 * Remove a dying VM from the GA Log notifier list before the VM is actually
   destroyed, to fix a potential use-after-free.
 
 * While FOLL_WRITE was needed in the past to trigger CoW unsharing, nowadays
   FOLL_LONGTERM does that already even without FOLL_WRITE, and in fact,
   get_user_pages() actually disallows FOLL_WRITE together with FOLL_LONGTERM.
   So don't pass FOLL_WRITE when registering encrypted memory regions, i.e. when
   pinning SEV/SEV-ES guest memory, to fix a regression with file-backed memory
   introduced by KVM's (correct) usage of long-term pins.
 
   (This was reviewed by mm maintainers; for more information, see commit
   ee1a586dd1).
 
 * Allocate full pages for SEV/SEV-ES {DE,EN}CRYPT ops on SNP-enabled hosts to
   fix a data corruption issue due to the PSP driver assigning to-be-written
   pages to firmware (as required by the SNP specs).
 
 * Unconditionally intercept ICBEP so that KVM generates the correct guest RIP
   when handling an ICEBP-induced TASK_SWITCH #VMEXIT.
 
 * Harden the SNP "populate" ioctls against bad input, and to prepare
   for supporting in-place private<=>shared conversion.
 
 Generic:
 
 * Remove kvm_debugfs_dir if kvm_init() fails after creating KVM's debugfs.
 
 * Add a per-VM bitmap to track which vCPU IDs have been "claimed" but for
   which the vCPU isn't yet online, and use the bitmap to reject duplicate IDs
   before calling into arch code.  This allows arch code to consume vcpu_id
   without having to worry about cross-vCPU clobbering (at least s390 and x86
   have had related bugs).
 
 * Rework the so called "prepare" and "invalidate" guest_memfd hooks to prepare
   for in-place private<=>shared conversion, and clean up a few warts along the
   way.
 
 Selftests:
 
 * Automatically allocate a full page for L2 guest stacks on x86 instead of
   requiring test-specific L1 guest code to carve out a portion of the L1
   stack for L2 usage, and to ensure the L2 stack also adheres to the x86-64
   calling convention ABI.
 
 * Add a selftest to verify {Guest,Host}-Only behavior in x86's mediated PMU.
 
 * Clean up nested SVM's handling of GPRs on L2<=>L1 transitions, reuse the
   functionality for nested VMX, and drop the ucall hack that was fudging
   around the lack of GPR switching on nVMX.
 
 * Add a stress test to verify KVM doesn't clobber/drop #PF state, e.g. CR2,
   across save/restore, including when L2 is active.
 
 * Add a test to verify KVM_CREATE_VM accepts exactly what is reported by
   KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES.
 
 * Misc selftests fixes and cleanups
 
 * Fix several issues with seeding the pRNG, and rework the pRNG APIs to that
   the pRNG can be sanely used in host code, not just guest code.
 
 * Add an IRQ test to validate virtual IRQ deliverty for IRQs wired up via
   KVM_IRQFD + KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING, with optional support for triggering IRQs
   via writes to an assigned VFIO device.
 
 * Add syscall wrappers to assert success on a variety of pthreads and CPU
   affinity APIs.
 
 * Set vCPU pthread affinity as early as possible to reduce contention issues
   that were surfaced by PREEMPT_LAZY, which result in runtimes of over a
   minute on large hosts, versus the expected ~5 seconds.
 
 * Rework the PMU counters test to run each testcase using a single VM with
   many vCPUs for each sub-testcase, instead of using a unique VM for each
   sub-testcase.  This cuts the runtime by ~20x.
 
 Miscellaneous:
 
 * MAINTAINERS updates for vfio-ap, guest_memfd, kvm-x86.  Mostly representing
   the status quo more accurately, but also... welcome David Hildenbrand
   as guest_memfd reviewer!
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM64:

   - Add support for 'slot' based PMU events, paired with new UAPI that
     compels the user to select a specific PMU implementation

   - Lazy save/restore of vCPU state for pKVM, along with various fixes
     and cleanups to the management of vCPU state between the untrusted
     host and pKVM hypervisor

   - Disable traps of EL1 registers for nested hypervisors when
     FEAT_NV2p1 is present, guaranteeing that EL2-specific register bits
     are stateful in the EL1 counterpart

   - Leverage FEAT_NV3 to avoid unnecessary ERET/TLBI traps when the
     scope of those instructions remains 'in host' (i.e. L1
     kernel/userspace)

   - Pile of fixes for the management of the VNCR pseudo-TLB, such as
     under-invalidations and races with concurrent TLBIs on other vCPUs

   - Consolidate the non-protected and pKVM view of ICH_VTR_EL2 to a
     runtime-patched constant, allowing the same data to be shared with
     pKVM prior to dropping host privileges

   - Considerable pile of LLM-assisted fixes around the shop but mostly
     in the VGIC, our in-kernel generator of bugs (and sometimes
     interrupts)

  LoongArch:

   - Advertise already-supported capabilities

   - Some bug fixes about timer and MMIO

   - Some hardening about interrupt injection

   - Replace kvm_err() with kvm_pr_unimpl()

   - Add FPU/LSX/LASX test cases for selftests

  RISC-V:

   - Svadu/Zicfiss/Zicfilp FWFT support for Guest

   - Use try_cmpxchg for IMSIC MRIF RMW

   - More arch-specific tracepoints in KVM RISC-V

   - Eager page splitting when enabling dirty logging

   - Optimize hfence request handling for SMP Guests

   - Improve dirty log clearing by skipping zero bits in mask

   - Guard HFENCE range loops against overflow

   - CPU PM notifiers in KVM RISC-V for non-retentive idle states

   - Fix kernel-mode vector context save/restore for Guest

  s390:

   - Fixes for vfio-ap

   - Fixes for the gmap rework

   - Fixes for vsie

   - AI triggered fixes all over

   - diag9c tracing

   - code move preparation for the additional arm64 support

   - enable CONTEXT_ANALYSIS

  x86:

   - Perform spring cleaning on x86.{c,h} and asm/kvm_host.h, by adding
     regs.c (the kvm_cache_regs.h => regs.h is already applied) and
     msrs.{c,h}, and moving relevant code out of x86.c

   - Split kvm_mmu in three parts, respectively to describe the format
     of page tables, walking the guest page tables and building the page
     tables. Always use the same page table walker kvm->arch.gva_walk as
     the entry point to convert a guest's virtual address, where the
     previous code used two different kvm_mmu structs depending on
     whether the walk included nested EPT/NPT or not. Make page fault
     vmexits reuse the permission checking machinery that is used for
     guest page faults. This is both a cleanup and a baby step towards
     supporting XS/XU memory permissions

   - Document some of the "fun" gotchas with the APIC base when creating
     IRQCHIPs on x86

   - Remove a defunct masterclock update from kvm_xen_shared_info_init().
     It could result in incorrect kvmclock due to triggering an
     unnecessary switch to/from masterclock mode

   - Skip Xen runstate time updates if time has effectively gone
     backwards, so that the guest doesn't report 100% steal time for
     a very, very long time

   - Drop KVM's runtime updates of the Xen PV timing CPUID leaf, as KVM
     was updating the wrong sub-leaf, and upstream KVM will soon provide
     all the information needed by userspace to populate the CPUID field
     itself

   - Fix a bug where KVM would walk a newly created rmap without holding
     the rmap lock (or mmu_lock) during aging

   - Fix a bug where aging TDP MMU SPTEs could clobber FROZEN SPTEs

   - Fix a variety of #DB priority bugs

   - Fix a class of races related to enabling Hyper-V emulation on a
     vCPU after the vCPU is visible to the rest of KVM

   - Use static calls for nested virtualization ops

   - Move more KVM-internal code out of x86's kvm_host.h

   - Enumerate support for a variety of Zhaoxin instructions that don't
     require explicit virtualization

   - Fix missing EFER validation bugs, including in the KVM_SET_SREGS*
     path

   - Harden kvm_vcpu_map() against double-mapping and thus leaking
     references

   - Misc fixes and cleanups, e.g. for largely benign syzkaller splats

  x86 (Intel):

   - Zero a vCPU's entry in VMX's Posted Interrupt Descriptor table used
     for IPI virtualization when the vCPU is freed, to fix a
     use-after-free where hardware will write to a freed vCPU's PID

   - Service local TLB flushes on a failed nested VM-Enter to fix a bug
     where KVM could miss a TLB on a future, successful VM-Enter with
     the same L2 VPID

   - Cap the maximum value shoved into the VMX Preemption Timer to
     workaround an erratum that affects all existing Intel CPUs that
     support CPUID 0x15

   - Fix VPID virtualization bugs where KVM would fail to flush hardware
     TLBs

   - Harden the TDX "populate" ioctls against bad input, and to prepare
     for supporting in-place private<=>shared conversion

  x86 (AMD):

   - Forcefully invalidate SNP VMSA pages if their backing guest_memfd
     page is zapped/invalidated, e.g. due to a PUNCH_HOLE in response to
     a Page-State Change request

   - Remove a dying VM from the GA Log notifier list before the VM is
     actually destroyed, to fix a potential use-after-free

   - While FOLL_WRITE was needed in the past to trigger CoW unsharing,
     nowadays FOLL_LONGTERM does that already even without FOLL_WRITE,
     and in fact, get_user_pages() actually disallows FOLL_WRITE
     together with FOLL_LONGTERM. So don't pass FOLL_WRITE when
     registering encrypted memory regions, i.e. when pinning SEV/SEV-ES
     guest memory, to fix a regression with file-backed memory
     introduced by KVM's (correct) usage of long-term pins

     (This was reviewed by mm maintainers; for more information, see
     commit ee1a586dd1 "KVM: SEV: Drop FOLL_WRITE for encrypted region
     registration")

   - Allocate full pages for SEV/SEV-ES {DE,EN}CRYPT ops on SNP-enabled
     hosts to fix a data corruption issue due to the PSP driver
     assigning to-be-written pages to firmware (as required by the SNP
     specs)

   - Unconditionally intercept ICBEP so that KVM generates the correct
     guest RIP when handling an ICEBP-induced TASK_SWITCH #VMEXIT

   - Harden the SNP "populate" ioctls against bad input, and to prepare
     for supporting in-place private<=>shared conversion

  Generic:

   - Remove kvm_debugfs_dir if kvm_init() fails after creating KVM's
     debugfs

   - Add a per-VM bitmap to track which vCPU IDs have been "claimed" but
     for which the vCPU isn't yet online, and use the bitmap to reject
     duplicate IDs before calling into arch code. This allows arch code
     to consume vcpu_id without having to worry about cross-vCPU
     clobbering (at least s390 and x86 have had related bugs)

   - Rework the so called "prepare" and "invalidate" guest_memfd hooks
     to prepare for in-place private<=>shared conversion, and clean up a
     few warts along the way

  Selftests:

   - Automatically allocate a full page for L2 guest stacks on x86
     instead of requiring test-specific L1 guest code to carve out a
     portion of the L1 stack for L2 usage, and to ensure the L2 stack
     also adheres to the x86-64 calling convention ABI

   - Add a selftest to verify {Guest,Host}-Only behavior in x86's
     mediated PMU

   - Clean up nested SVM's handling of GPRs on L2<=>L1 transitions,
     reuse the functionality for nested VMX, and drop the ucall hack
     that was fudging around the lack of GPR switching on nVMX

   - Add a stress test to verify KVM doesn't clobber/drop #PF state,
     e.g. CR2, across save/restore, including when L2 is active

   - Add a test to verify KVM_CREATE_VM accepts exactly what is reported
     by KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES

   - Misc selftests fixes and cleanups

   - Fix several issues with seeding the pRNG, and rework the pRNG APIs
     to that the pRNG can be sanely used in host code, not just guest
     code

   - Add an IRQ test to validate virtual IRQ deliverty for IRQs wired up
     via KVM_IRQFD + KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING, with optional support for
     triggering IRQs via writes to an assigned VFIO device

   - Add syscall wrappers to assert success on a variety of pthreads and
     CPU affinity APIs

   - Set vCPU pthread affinity as early as possible to reduce contention
     issues that were surfaced by PREEMPT_LAZY, which result in runtimes
     of over a minute on large hosts, versus the expected ~5 seconds

   - Rework the PMU counters test to run each testcase using a single VM
     with many vCPUs for each sub-testcase, instead of using a unique VM
     for each sub-testcase. This cuts the runtime by ~20x

  Miscellaneous:

   - MAINTAINERS updates for vfio-ap, guest_memfd, kvm-x86. Mostly
     representing the status quo more accurately, but also... welcome
     David Hildenbrand as guest_memfd reviewer!"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (413 commits)
  KVM: arm64: Validate GICv5 timer PPIs before claiming ownership
  KVM: arm64: vgic: Reject out-of-range GICv5 PPI IDs
  KVM: arm64: vgic: Prevent speculative SPI array underflow
  KVM: arm64: vgic: Free gic_kvm_info on initialization failure
  KVM: arm64: Avoid mismatched accesses to 'struct kvm_nvhe_init_params'
  s390/vfio-ap: Fix NULL deref in status_show() during queue probe
  s390/vfio-ap: Fix hot-unplug skipped when last AP adapter or domain removed
  s390/vfio-ap: fix potential use of uninitialized apm_filtered bitmap
  s390/vfio-ap: Fix control domain removal in vfio_ap_mdev_cfg_remove
  s390/vfio-ap: Fix required lock not held during update of ap_matrix_mdev object
  s390/vfio-ap: Fix missing lock required to access list of ap_matrix_mdev objects
  s390/vfio-ap: Fix dereference matrix_mdev->kvm without checking for NULL
  s390/vfio-ap: Fix stale do_remove flag across iterations in vfio_ap_mdev_cfg_remove
  RISC-V: KVM: fix vcpu vector context handling for kernel-mode vector
  riscv: vector: allow non-preemptible kernel-mode vector with IRQs off
  riscv: vector: refactor riscv_v_start_kernel_context
  KVM: s390: gmap: Make prefix handling optional
  KVM: s390: gmap: Make CMMA optional
  KVM: s390: gmap: Make storage keys optional
  KVM: s390: Prepare gmap for a second KVM implementation
  ...
2026-08-25 11:48:04 -07:00

1409 lines
38 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* Guest memory management for KVM/s390
*
* Copyright IBM Corp. 2008, 2020, 2024
*
* Author(s): Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
* Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
* David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
* Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
*/
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
#include <linux/pgtable.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <asm/lowcore.h>
#include <asm/uv.h>
#include <asm/gmap_helpers.h>
#include "dat.h"
#include "gmap.h"
#include "s390.h"
#include "faultin.h"
static int gmap_limit_to_type(gfn_t limit)
{
if (!limit)
return TABLE_TYPE_REGION1;
if (limit <= _REGION3_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT)
return TABLE_TYPE_SEGMENT;
if (limit <= _REGION2_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT)
return TABLE_TYPE_REGION3;
if (limit <= _REGION1_SIZE >> PAGE_SHIFT)
return TABLE_TYPE_REGION2;
return TABLE_TYPE_REGION1;
}
/**
* gmap_new() - Allocate and initialize a guest address space.
* @kvm: The kvm owning the guest.
* @limit: Maximum address of the gmap address space.
*
* Return: A guest address space structure.
*/
struct gmap *gmap_new(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t limit)
{
struct crst_table *table;
struct gmap *gmap;
int type;
type = gmap_limit_to_type(limit);
gmap = kzalloc_obj(*gmap, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!gmap)
return NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&gmap->children);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&gmap->list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&gmap->scb_users);
INIT_RADIX_TREE(&gmap->host_to_rmap, GFP_KVM_S390_MMU_CACHE);
spin_lock_init(&gmap->children_lock);
spin_lock_init(&gmap->host_to_rmap_lock);
refcount_set(&gmap->refcount, 1);
table = dat_alloc_crst_sleepable(_CRSTE_EMPTY(type).val);
if (!table) {
kfree(gmap);
return NULL;
}
gmap->asce.val = __pa(table);
gmap->asce.dt = type;
gmap->asce.tl = _ASCE_TABLE_LENGTH;
gmap->asce.x = 1;
gmap->asce.p = 1;
gmap->asce.s = 1;
gmap->kvm = kvm;
set_bit(GMAP_FLAG_OWNS_PAGETABLES, &gmap->flags);
return gmap;
}
static void gmap_add_child(struct gmap *parent, struct gmap *child)
{
KVM_BUG_ON(is_ucontrol(parent) && parent->parent, parent->kvm);
KVM_BUG_ON(is_ucontrol(parent) && !owns_page_tables(parent), parent->kvm);
KVM_BUG_ON(!refcount_read(&child->refcount), parent->kvm);
lockdep_assert_held(&parent->children_lock);
child->parent = parent;
if (is_ucontrol(parent))
set_bit(GMAP_FLAG_IS_UCONTROL, &child->flags);
else
clear_bit(GMAP_FLAG_IS_UCONTROL, &child->flags);
if (test_bit(GMAP_FLAG_ALLOW_HPAGE_1M, &parent->flags))
set_bit(GMAP_FLAG_ALLOW_HPAGE_1M, &child->flags);
else
clear_bit(GMAP_FLAG_ALLOW_HPAGE_1M, &child->flags);
if (test_bit(GMAP_FLAG_ALLOW_HPAGE_2G, &parent->flags))
set_bit(GMAP_FLAG_ALLOW_HPAGE_2G, &child->flags);
else
clear_bit(GMAP_FLAG_ALLOW_HPAGE_2G, &child->flags);
if (kvm_is_ucontrol(parent->kvm))
clear_bit(GMAP_FLAG_OWNS_PAGETABLES, &child->flags);
list_add(&child->list, &parent->children);
}
struct gmap *gmap_new_child(struct gmap *parent, gfn_t limit)
{
struct gmap *res;
lockdep_assert_not_held(&parent->children_lock);
res = gmap_new(parent->kvm, limit);
if (res) {
scoped_guard(spinlock, &parent->children_lock)
gmap_add_child(parent, res);
}
return res;
}
int gmap_set_limit(struct gmap *gmap, gfn_t limit)
{
struct kvm_s390_mmu_cache *mc __free(kvm_s390_mmu_cache) = NULL;
int rc, type;
type = gmap_limit_to_type(limit);
mc = kvm_s390_new_mmu_cache();
if (!mc)
return -ENOMEM;
do {
rc = kvm_s390_mmu_cache_topup(mc);
if (rc)
return rc;
scoped_guard(write_lock, &gmap->kvm->mmu_lock)
rc = dat_set_asce_limit(mc, &gmap->asce, type);
} while (rc == -ENOMEM);
return 0;
}
static void gmap_rmap_radix_tree_free(struct radix_tree_root *root)
{
struct vsie_rmap *rmap, *rnext, *head;
struct radix_tree_iter iter;
unsigned long indices[16];
unsigned long index;
void __rcu **slot;
int i, nr;
/* A radix tree is freed by deleting all of its entries */
index = 0;
do {
nr = 0;
radix_tree_for_each_slot(slot, root, &iter, index) {
indices[nr] = iter.index;
if (++nr == 16)
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < nr; i++) {
index = indices[i];
head = radix_tree_delete(root, index);
gmap_for_each_rmap_safe(rmap, rnext, head)
kfree(rmap);
}
} while (nr > 0);
}
void gmap_remove_child(struct gmap *child)
{
if (KVM_BUG_ON(!child->parent, child->kvm))
return;
lockdep_assert_held(&child->parent->children_lock);
list_del(&child->list);
child->parent = NULL;
child->invalidated = true;
}
/**
* gmap_dispose() - Remove and free a guest address space and its children.
* @gmap: Pointer to the guest address space structure.
*/
void gmap_dispose(struct gmap *gmap)
{
/* The gmap must have been removed from the parent beforehands */
KVM_BUG_ON(gmap->parent, gmap->kvm);
/* All children of this gmap must have been removed beforehands */
KVM_BUG_ON(!list_empty(&gmap->children), gmap->kvm);
/* No VSIE shadow block is allowed to use this gmap */
KVM_BUG_ON(!list_empty(&gmap->scb_users), gmap->kvm);
/* The ASCE must be valid */
KVM_BUG_ON(!gmap->asce.val, gmap->kvm);
/* The refcount must be 0 */
KVM_BUG_ON(refcount_read(&gmap->refcount), gmap->kvm);
/* Flush tlb of all gmaps */
asce_flush_tlb(gmap->asce);
/* Free all DAT tables. */
dat_free_level(dereference_asce(gmap->asce), owns_page_tables(gmap));
/* Free additional data for a shadow gmap */
if (is_shadow(gmap))
gmap_rmap_radix_tree_free(&gmap->host_to_rmap);
kfree(gmap);
}
/**
* s390_replace_asce() - Try to replace the current ASCE of a gmap with a copy.
* @gmap: The gmap whose ASCE needs to be replaced.
*
* If the ASCE is a SEGMENT type then this function will return -EINVAL,
* otherwise the pointers in the host_to_guest radix tree will keep pointing
* to the wrong pages, causing use-after-free and memory corruption.
* If the allocation of the new top level page table fails, the ASCE is not
* replaced.
* In any case, the old ASCE is always removed from the gmap CRST list.
* Therefore the caller has to make sure to save a pointer to it
* beforehand, unless a leak is actually intended.
*
* Return: 0 in case of success, -EINVAL if the ASCE is segment type ASCE,
* -ENOMEM if runinng out of memory.
*/
int s390_replace_asce(struct gmap *gmap)
{
struct crst_table *table;
union asce asce;
/* Replacing segment type ASCEs would cause serious issues */
if (gmap->asce.dt == ASCE_TYPE_SEGMENT)
return -EINVAL;
table = dat_alloc_crst_sleepable(0);
if (!table)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(table, dereference_asce(gmap->asce), sizeof(*table));
/* Set new table origin while preserving existing ASCE control bits */
asce = gmap->asce;
asce.rsto = virt_to_pfn(table);
WRITE_ONCE(gmap->asce, asce);
return 0;
}
#if KVM_S390_MANAGES_S390_GUEST
static inline bool kvm_s390_is_in_sie(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return vcpu->arch.sie_block->prog0c & PROG_IN_SIE;
}
bool _gmap_unmap_prefix(struct gmap *gmap, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t end, bool hint)
{
struct kvm *kvm = gmap->kvm;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
gfn_t prefix_gfn;
unsigned long i;
if (is_shadow(gmap))
return false;
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
/* Match against both prefix pages */
prefix_gfn = gpa_to_gfn(kvm_s390_get_prefix(vcpu));
if (prefix_gfn < end && gfn <= prefix_gfn + 1) {
if (hint && kvm_s390_is_in_sie(vcpu))
return false;
VCPU_EVENT(vcpu, 2, "gmap notifier for %llx-%llx",
gfn_to_gpa(gfn), gfn_to_gpa(end));
kvm_s390_sync_request(KVM_REQ_REFRESH_GUEST_PREFIX, vcpu);
}
}
return true;
}
#endif /* KVM_S390_MANAGES_S390_GUEST */
struct clear_young_pte_priv {
struct gmap *gmap;
bool young;
};
static long gmap_clear_young_pte(union pte *ptep, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t end, struct dat_walk *walk)
{
struct clear_young_pte_priv *p = walk->priv;
union pgste pgste;
union pte pte, new;
pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
if (!pte.s.pr || (!pte.s.y && pte.h.i))
return 0;
pgste = pgste_get_lock(ptep);
if (!pgste.prefix_notif || gmap_mkold_prefix(p->gmap, gfn, end)) {
new = pte;
new.h.i = 1;
new.s.y = 0;
if ((new.s.d || !new.h.p) && !new.s.s)
folio_set_dirty(pfn_folio(pte.h.pfra));
new.s.d = 0;
new.h.p = 1;
pgste.prefix_notif = 0;
pgste = __dat_ptep_xchg(ptep, pgste, new, gfn, walk->asce, uses_skeys(p->gmap));
}
p->young = 1;
pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste);
return 0;
}
static long gmap_clear_young_crste(union crste *crstep, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t end, struct dat_walk *walk)
{
struct clear_young_pte_priv *priv = walk->priv;
union crste crste, new;
do {
crste = READ_ONCE(*crstep);
if (!crste.h.fc)
return 0;
if (!crste.s.fc1.y && crste.h.i)
return 0;
if (crste_prefix(crste) && !gmap_mkold_prefix(priv->gmap, gfn, end))
break;
new = crste;
new.h.i = 1;
new.s.fc1.y = 0;
new.s.fc1.prefix_notif = 0;
if ((new.s.fc1.d || !new.h.p) && !new.s.fc1.s)
folio_set_dirty(phys_to_folio(crste_origin_large(crste)));
new.s.fc1.d = 0;
new.h.p = 1;
} while (!dat_crstep_xchg_atomic(crstep, crste, new, gfn, walk->asce));
priv->young = 1;
return 0;
}
/**
* gmap_age_gfn() - Clear young.
* @gmap: The guest gmap.
* @start: The first gfn to test.
* @end: The gfn after the last one to test.
*
* Context: Called with the kvm mmu write lock held.
* Return: 1 if any page in the given range was young, otherwise 0.
*/
bool gmap_age_gfn(struct gmap *gmap, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
{
const struct dat_walk_ops ops = {
.pte_entry = gmap_clear_young_pte,
.pmd_entry = gmap_clear_young_crste,
.pud_entry = gmap_clear_young_crste,
};
struct clear_young_pte_priv priv = {
.gmap = gmap,
.young = false,
};
_dat_walk_gfn_range(start, end, gmap->asce, &ops, 0, &priv);
return priv.young;
}
struct gmap_unmap_priv {
struct gmap *gmap;
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
};
static long _gmap_unmap_pte(union pte *ptep, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t next, struct dat_walk *w)
{
struct gmap_unmap_priv *priv = w->priv;
struct folio *folio = NULL;
unsigned long vmaddr;
union pgste pgste;
pgste = pgste_get_lock(ptep);
if (ptep->s.pr && pgste.usage == PGSTE_GPS_USAGE_UNUSED) {
vmaddr = __gfn_to_hva_memslot(priv->slot, gfn);
gmap_helper_try_set_pte_unused(priv->gmap->kvm->mm, vmaddr);
}
if (ptep->s.pr && test_bit(GMAP_FLAG_EXPORT_ON_UNMAP, &priv->gmap->flags))
folio = pfn_folio(ptep->h.pfra);
pgste = gmap_ptep_xchg(priv->gmap, ptep, _PTE_EMPTY, pgste, gfn);
pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste);
if (folio)
uv_convert_from_secure_folio(folio);
return 0;
}
static long _gmap_unmap_crste(union crste *crstep, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t next, struct dat_walk *walk)
{
struct gmap_unmap_priv *priv = walk->priv;
struct folio *folio = NULL;
union crste old = *crstep;
bool ok;
if (!old.h.fc)
return 0;
if (old.s.fc1.pr && test_bit(GMAP_FLAG_EXPORT_ON_UNMAP, &priv->gmap->flags))
folio = phys_to_folio(crste_origin_large(old));
/*
* No races should happen because kvm->mmu_lock is held in write mode,
* but the unmap operation could have triggered an unshadow, which
* causes gmap_crstep_xchg_atomic() to return false and clear the
* vsie_notif bit. Allow the operation to fail once, if the old crste
* had the vsie_notif bit set. A second failure is not allowed, for
* the reasons above.
*/
ok = gmap_crstep_xchg_atomic(priv->gmap, crstep, old, _CRSTE_EMPTY(old.h.tt), gfn);
if (!ok) {
KVM_BUG_ON(!old.s.fc1.vsie_notif, priv->gmap->kvm);
old.s.fc1.vsie_notif = 0;
ok = gmap_crstep_xchg_atomic(priv->gmap, crstep, old, _CRSTE_EMPTY(old.h.tt), gfn);
KVM_BUG_ON(!ok, priv->gmap->kvm);
}
if (folio)
uv_convert_from_secure_folio(folio);
return 0;
}
/**
* gmap_unmap_gfn_range() - Unmap a range of guest addresses.
* @gmap: The gmap to act on.
* @slot: The memslot in which the range is located.
* @start: The first gfn to unmap.
* @end: The gfn after the last one to unmap.
*
* Context: Called with the kvm mmu write lock held.
* Return: false
*/
bool gmap_unmap_gfn_range(struct gmap *gmap, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
{
const struct dat_walk_ops ops = {
.pte_entry = _gmap_unmap_pte,
.pmd_entry = _gmap_unmap_crste,
.pud_entry = _gmap_unmap_crste,
};
struct gmap_unmap_priv priv = {
.gmap = gmap,
.slot = slot,
};
lockdep_assert_held_write(&gmap->kvm->mmu_lock);
_dat_walk_gfn_range(start, end, gmap->asce, &ops, 0, &priv);
return false;
}
static union pgste __pte_test_and_clear_softdirty(union pte *ptep, union pgste pgste, gfn_t gfn,
struct gmap *gmap)
{
union pte pte = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
if (!pte.s.pr || (pte.h.p && !pte.s.sd))
return pgste;
/*
* If this page contains one or more prefixes of vCPUS that are currently
* running, do not reset the protection, leave it marked as dirty.
*/
if (!pgste.prefix_notif || gmap_mkold_prefix(gmap, gfn, gfn + 1)) {
pte.h.p = 1;
pte.s.sd = 0;
pgste = gmap_ptep_xchg(gmap, ptep, pte, pgste, gfn);
}
mark_page_dirty(gmap->kvm, gfn);
return pgste;
}
static long _pte_test_and_clear_softdirty(union pte *ptep, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t end,
struct dat_walk *walk)
{
struct gmap *gmap = walk->priv;
union pgste pgste;
pgste = pgste_get_lock(ptep);
pgste = __pte_test_and_clear_softdirty(ptep, pgste, gfn, gmap);
pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste);
return 0;
}
static long _crste_test_and_clear_softdirty(union crste *table, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t end,
struct dat_walk *walk)
{
struct gmap *gmap = walk->priv;
union crste crste, new;
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
return 1;
do {
crste = READ_ONCE(*table);
if (!crste.h.fc)
return 0;
if (crste.h.p && !crste.s.fc1.sd)
return 0;
/*
* If this large page contains one or more prefixes of vCPUs that are
* currently running, do not reset the protection, leave it marked as
* dirty.
*/
if (crste.s.fc1.prefix_notif && !gmap_mkold_prefix(gmap, gfn, end))
break;
new = crste;
new.h.p = 1;
new.s.fc1.sd = 0;
} while (!gmap_crstep_xchg_atomic(gmap, table, crste, new, gfn));
for ( ; gfn < end; gfn++)
mark_page_dirty(gmap->kvm, gfn);
return 0;
}
void gmap_sync_dirty_log(struct gmap *gmap, gfn_t start, gfn_t end)
{
const struct dat_walk_ops walk_ops = {
.pte_entry = _pte_test_and_clear_softdirty,
.pmd_entry = _crste_test_and_clear_softdirty,
.pud_entry = _crste_test_and_clear_softdirty,
};
lockdep_assert_held(&gmap->kvm->mmu_lock);
_dat_walk_gfn_range(start, end, gmap->asce, &walk_ops, 0, gmap);
}
static int gmap_handle_minor_crste_fault(struct gmap *gmap, struct guest_fault *f)
{
union crste newcrste, oldcrste = READ_ONCE(*f->crstep);
/* Somehow the crste is not large anymore, let the slow path deal with it. */
if (!oldcrste.h.fc)
return 1;
f->pfn = PHYS_PFN(large_crste_to_phys(oldcrste, f->gfn));
f->writable = oldcrste.s.fc1.w;
f->crste_region3 = is_pud(oldcrste);
/* Appropriate permissions already (race with another handler), nothing to do. */
if (!oldcrste.h.i && !(f->write_attempt && oldcrste.h.p))
return 0;
if (!f->write_attempt || oldcrste.s.fc1.w) {
f->write_attempt |= oldcrste.s.fc1.w && oldcrste.s.fc1.d;
newcrste = oldcrste;
newcrste.h.i = 0;
newcrste.s.fc1.y = 1;
if (f->write_attempt) {
newcrste.h.p = 0;
newcrste.s.fc1.d = 1;
newcrste.s.fc1.sd = 1;
}
/* In case of races, let the slow path deal with it. */
return !gmap_crstep_xchg_atomic(gmap, f->crstep, oldcrste, newcrste, f->gfn);
}
/* Trying to write on a read-only page, let the slow path deal with it. */
return 1;
}
static int _gmap_handle_minor_pte_fault(struct gmap *gmap, union pgste *pgste,
struct guest_fault *f)
{
union pte newpte, oldpte = READ_ONCE(*f->ptep);
f->pfn = oldpte.h.pfra;
f->writable = oldpte.s.w;
/* Appropriate permissions already (race with another handler), nothing to do. */
if (!oldpte.h.i && !(f->write_attempt && oldpte.h.p))
return 0;
/* Trying to write on a read-only page, let the slow path deal with it. */
if (!oldpte.s.pr || (f->write_attempt && !oldpte.s.w))
return 1;
newpte = oldpte;
newpte.h.i = 0;
newpte.s.y = 1;
if (f->write_attempt) {
newpte.h.p = 0;
newpte.s.d = 1;
newpte.s.sd = 1;
}
*pgste = gmap_ptep_xchg(gmap, f->ptep, newpte, *pgste, f->gfn);
return 0;
}
/**
* gmap_try_fixup_minor() -- Try to fixup a minor gmap fault.
* @gmap: The gmap whose fault needs to be resolved.
* @fault: Describes the fault that is being resolved.
*
* A minor fault is a fault that can be resolved quickly within gmap.
* The page is already mapped, the fault is only due to dirty/young tracking.
*
* Return: 0 in case of success, < 0 in case of error, > 0 if the fault could
* not be resolved and needs to go through the slow path.
*/
int gmap_try_fixup_minor(struct gmap *gmap, struct guest_fault *fault)
{
union pgste pgste;
int rc;
lockdep_assert_held(&gmap->kvm->mmu_lock);
rc = dat_entry_walk(NULL, fault->gfn, gmap->asce, DAT_WALK_LEAF, TABLE_TYPE_PAGE_TABLE,
&fault->crstep, &fault->ptep);
/* If a PTE or a leaf CRSTE could not be reached, slow path. */
if (rc)
return 1;
if (fault->ptep) {
pgste = pgste_get_lock(fault->ptep);
rc = _gmap_handle_minor_pte_fault(gmap, &pgste, fault);
if (!rc && fault->callback)
fault->callback(fault);
pgste_set_unlock(fault->ptep, pgste);
} else {
rc = gmap_handle_minor_crste_fault(gmap, fault);
if (!rc && fault->callback)
fault->callback(fault);
}
return rc;
}
/**
* gmap_2g_allowed() - Check whether a 2G hugepage is allowed.
* @gmap: The gmap of the guest.
* @f: Describes the fault that is being resolved.
* @slot: The memslot the faulting address belongs to.
*
* The function checks whether the GMAP_FLAG_ALLOW_HPAGE_2G flag is set for
* @gmap, whether the offset of the address in the 2G virtual frame is the
* same as the offset in the physical 2G frame, and finally whether the whole
* 2G page would fit in the given memslot.
*
* Return: true if a 2G hugepage is allowed to back the faulting address, false
* otherwise.
*/
static inline bool gmap_2g_allowed(struct gmap *gmap, struct guest_fault *f,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
return test_bit(GMAP_FLAG_ALLOW_HPAGE_2G, &gmap->flags) &&
!((f->gfn ^ f->pfn) & ~_REGION3_FR_MASK) &&
slot->base_gfn <= ALIGN_DOWN(f->gfn, _PAGES_PER_REGION3) &&
slot->base_gfn + slot->npages >= ALIGN(f->gfn + 1, _PAGES_PER_REGION3);
}
/**
* gmap_1m_allowed() - Check whether a 1M hugepage is allowed.
* @gmap: The gmap of the guest.
* @f: Describes the fault that is being resolved.
* @slot: The memslot the faulting address belongs to.
*
* The function checks whether the GMAP_FLAG_ALLOW_HPAGE_1M flag is set for
* @gmap, whether the offset of the address in the 1M virtual frame is the
* same as the offset in the physical 1M frame, and finally whether the whole
* 1M page would fit in the given memslot.
*
* Return: true if a 1M hugepage is allowed to back the faulting address, false
* otherwise.
*/
static inline bool gmap_1m_allowed(struct gmap *gmap, struct guest_fault *f,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
return test_bit(GMAP_FLAG_ALLOW_HPAGE_1M, &gmap->flags) &&
!((f->gfn ^ f->pfn) & ~_SEGMENT_FR_MASK) &&
slot->base_gfn <= ALIGN_DOWN(f->gfn, _PAGES_PER_SEGMENT) &&
slot->base_gfn + slot->npages >= ALIGN(f->gfn + 1, _PAGES_PER_SEGMENT);
}
static int _gmap_link(struct kvm_s390_mmu_cache *mc, struct gmap *gmap, int level,
struct guest_fault *f)
{
union crste oldval, newval;
union pte newpte, oldpte;
union pgste pgste;
int rc = 0;
rc = dat_entry_walk(mc, f->gfn, gmap->asce, DAT_WALK_ALLOC_CONTINUE, level,
&f->crstep, &f->ptep);
if (rc == -ENOMEM)
return rc;
if (KVM_BUG_ON(rc == -EINVAL, gmap->kvm))
return rc;
if (rc)
return -EAGAIN;
if (KVM_BUG_ON(get_level(f->crstep, f->ptep) > level, gmap->kvm))
return -EINVAL;
if (f->ptep) {
pgste = pgste_get_lock(f->ptep);
oldpte = *f->ptep;
newpte = _pte(f->pfn, f->writable, f->write_attempt | oldpte.s.d, !f->page);
newpte.s.sd = oldpte.s.sd;
oldpte.s.sd = 0;
if (oldpte.val == _PTE_EMPTY.val || oldpte.h.pfra == f->pfn) {
pgste = gmap_ptep_xchg(gmap, f->ptep, newpte, pgste, f->gfn);
if (f->callback)
f->callback(f);
} else {
rc = -EAGAIN;
}
pgste_set_unlock(f->ptep, pgste);
} else {
do {
oldval = READ_ONCE(*f->crstep);
newval = _crste_fc1(f->pfn, oldval.h.tt, f->writable,
f->write_attempt | oldval.s.fc1.d);
newval.s.fc1.s = !f->page;
newval.s.fc1.sd = oldval.s.fc1.sd;
if (oldval.val != _CRSTE_EMPTY(oldval.h.tt).val &&
crste_origin_large(oldval) != crste_origin_large(newval))
return -EAGAIN;
f->crste_region3 = is_pud(newval);
} while (!gmap_crstep_xchg_atomic(gmap, f->crstep, oldval, newval, f->gfn));
if (f->callback)
f->callback(f);
}
return rc;
}
int gmap_link(struct kvm_s390_mmu_cache *mc, struct gmap *gmap, struct guest_fault *f,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
{
unsigned int order;
int level;
lockdep_assert_held(&gmap->kvm->mmu_lock);
level = TABLE_TYPE_PAGE_TABLE;
if (f->page) {
order = folio_order(page_folio(f->page));
if (order >= get_order(_REGION3_SIZE) && gmap_2g_allowed(gmap, f, slot))
level = TABLE_TYPE_REGION3;
else if (order >= get_order(_SEGMENT_SIZE) && gmap_1m_allowed(gmap, f, slot))
level = TABLE_TYPE_SEGMENT;
}
return _gmap_link(mc, gmap, level, f);
}
static int gmap_ucas_map_one(struct kvm_s390_mmu_cache *mc, struct gmap *gmap,
gfn_t p_gfn, gfn_t c_gfn, bool force_alloc)
{
union crste newcrste, oldcrste;
struct page_table *pt;
union crste *crstep;
union pte *ptep;
int rc;
if (force_alloc)
rc = dat_entry_walk(mc, p_gfn, gmap->parent->asce, DAT_WALK_ALLOC,
TABLE_TYPE_PAGE_TABLE, &crstep, &ptep);
else
rc = dat_entry_walk(mc, p_gfn, gmap->parent->asce, DAT_WALK_ALLOC_CONTINUE,
TABLE_TYPE_SEGMENT, &crstep, &ptep);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (!ptep) {
newcrste = _crste_fc0(p_gfn, TABLE_TYPE_SEGMENT);
newcrste.h.i = 1;
newcrste.h.fc0.tl = 1;
} else {
pt = pte_table_start(ptep);
dat_set_ptval(pt, PTVAL_VMADDR, p_gfn >> (_SEGMENT_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT));
newcrste = _crste_fc0(virt_to_pfn(pt), TABLE_TYPE_SEGMENT);
}
rc = dat_entry_walk(mc, c_gfn, gmap->asce, DAT_WALK_ALLOC, TABLE_TYPE_SEGMENT,
&crstep, &ptep);
if (rc)
return rc;
do {
oldcrste = READ_ONCE(*crstep);
if (oldcrste.val == newcrste.val)
break;
} while (!dat_crstep_xchg_atomic(crstep, oldcrste, newcrste, c_gfn, gmap->asce));
return 0;
}
static int gmap_ucas_translate_simple(struct gmap *gmap, gpa_t *gaddr, union crste **crstepp)
{
union pte *ptep;
int rc;
rc = dat_entry_walk(NULL, gpa_to_gfn(*gaddr), gmap->asce, DAT_WALK_CONTINUE,
TABLE_TYPE_SEGMENT, crstepp, &ptep);
if (rc || (!ptep && !crste_is_ucas(**crstepp)))
return -EREMOTE;
if (!ptep)
return 1;
*gaddr &= ~_SEGMENT_MASK;
*gaddr |= dat_get_ptval(pte_table_start(ptep), PTVAL_VMADDR) << _SEGMENT_SHIFT;
return 0;
}
/**
* gmap_ucas_translate() - Translate a vcpu address into a host gmap address
* @mc: The memory cache to be used for allocations.
* @gmap: The per-cpu gmap.
* @gaddr: Pointer to the address to be translated, will get overwritten with
* the translated address in case of success.
* Translates the per-vCPU guest address into a fake guest address, which can
* then be used with the fake memslots that are identity mapping userspace.
* This allows ucontrol VMs to use the normal fault resolution path, like
* normal VMs.
*
* Return: %0 in case of success, otherwise %-EREMOTE.
*/
int gmap_ucas_translate(struct kvm_s390_mmu_cache *mc, struct gmap *gmap, gpa_t *gaddr)
{
gpa_t translated_address;
union crste *crstep;
gfn_t gfn;
int rc;
gfn = gpa_to_gfn(*gaddr);
scoped_guard(read_lock, &gmap->kvm->mmu_lock) {
rc = gmap_ucas_translate_simple(gmap, gaddr, &crstep);
if (rc <= 0)
return rc;
}
do {
scoped_guard(write_lock, &gmap->kvm->mmu_lock) {
rc = gmap_ucas_translate_simple(gmap, gaddr, &crstep);
if (rc <= 0)
return rc;
translated_address = (*gaddr & ~_SEGMENT_MASK) |
(crstep->val & _SEGMENT_MASK);
rc = gmap_ucas_map_one(mc, gmap, gpa_to_gfn(translated_address), gfn, true);
}
if (!rc) {
*gaddr = translated_address;
return 0;
}
if (rc != -ENOMEM)
return -EREMOTE;
rc = kvm_s390_mmu_cache_topup(mc);
if (rc)
return rc;
} while (1);
return 0;
}
int gmap_ucas_map(struct gmap *gmap, gfn_t p_gfn, gfn_t c_gfn, unsigned long count)
{
struct kvm_s390_mmu_cache *mc __free(kvm_s390_mmu_cache) = NULL;
int rc = 0;
mc = kvm_s390_new_mmu_cache();
if (!mc)
return -ENOMEM;
while (count) {
scoped_guard(write_lock, &gmap->kvm->mmu_lock)
rc = gmap_ucas_map_one(mc, gmap, p_gfn, c_gfn, false);
if (rc == -ENOMEM) {
rc = kvm_s390_mmu_cache_topup(mc);
if (rc)
return rc;
continue;
}
if (rc)
return rc;
count--;
c_gfn += _PAGE_ENTRIES;
p_gfn += _PAGE_ENTRIES;
}
return rc;
}
static void gmap_ucas_unmap_one(struct gmap *gmap, gfn_t c_gfn)
{
union crste *crstep;
union pte *ptep;
int rc;
rc = dat_entry_walk(NULL, c_gfn, gmap->asce, 0, TABLE_TYPE_SEGMENT, &crstep, &ptep);
if (rc)
return;
while (!dat_crstep_xchg_atomic(crstep, READ_ONCE(*crstep), _PMD_EMPTY, c_gfn, gmap->asce))
;
}
void gmap_ucas_unmap(struct gmap *gmap, gfn_t c_gfn, unsigned long count)
{
guard(read_lock)(&gmap->kvm->mmu_lock);
for ( ; count; count--, c_gfn += _PAGE_ENTRIES)
gmap_ucas_unmap_one(gmap, c_gfn);
}
static long _gmap_split_crste(union crste *crstep, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t next, struct dat_walk *walk)
{
struct gmap *gmap = walk->priv;
union crste crste, newcrste;
crste = READ_ONCE(*crstep);
newcrste = _CRSTE_EMPTY(crste.h.tt);
while (crste_leaf(crste)) {
if (crste_prefix(crste))
gmap_unmap_prefix(gmap, gfn, next);
if (crste.s.fc1.vsie_notif)
gmap_handle_vsie_unshadow_event(gmap, gfn);
if (dat_crstep_xchg_atomic(crstep, crste, newcrste, gfn, walk->asce))
break;
crste = READ_ONCE(*crstep);
}
if (need_resched())
return next;
return 0;
}
void gmap_split_huge_pages(struct gmap *gmap)
{
const struct dat_walk_ops ops = {
.pmd_entry = _gmap_split_crste,
.pud_entry = _gmap_split_crste,
};
gfn_t start = 0;
do {
scoped_guard(read_lock, &gmap->kvm->mmu_lock)
start = _dat_walk_gfn_range(start, asce_end(gmap->asce), gmap->asce,
&ops, DAT_WALK_IGN_HOLES, gmap);
} while (start);
}
#if KVM_S390_MANAGES_S390_GUEST
static int _gmap_enable_skeys(struct gmap *gmap)
{
gfn_t start = 0;
int rc;
if (uses_skeys(gmap))
return 0;
set_bit(GMAP_FLAG_USES_SKEYS, &gmap->flags);
rc = gmap_helper_disable_cow_sharing();
if (rc) {
clear_bit(GMAP_FLAG_USES_SKEYS, &gmap->flags);
return rc;
}
do {
scoped_guard(write_lock, &gmap->kvm->mmu_lock)
start = dat_reset_skeys(gmap->asce, start);
} while (start);
return 0;
}
int gmap_enable_skeys(struct gmap *gmap)
{
int rc;
mmap_write_lock(gmap->kvm->mm);
rc = _gmap_enable_skeys(gmap);
mmap_write_unlock(gmap->kvm->mm);
return rc;
}
#endif /* KVM_S390_MANAGES_S390_GUEST */
static long _destroy_pages_pte(union pte *ptep, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t next, struct dat_walk *walk)
{
if (!ptep->s.pr)
return 0;
__kvm_s390_pv_destroy_page(phys_to_page(pte_origin(*ptep)));
if (need_resched())
return next;
return 0;
}
static long _destroy_pages_crste(union crste *crstep, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t next, struct dat_walk *walk)
{
phys_addr_t origin, cur, end;
if (!crstep->h.fc || !crstep->s.fc1.pr)
return 0;
origin = crste_origin_large(*crstep);
cur = ((max(gfn, walk->start) - gfn) << PAGE_SHIFT) + origin;
end = ((min(next, walk->end) - gfn) << PAGE_SHIFT) + origin;
for ( ; cur < end; cur += PAGE_SIZE)
__kvm_s390_pv_destroy_page(phys_to_page(cur));
if (need_resched())
return next;
return 0;
}
int gmap_pv_destroy_range(struct gmap *gmap, gfn_t start, gfn_t end, bool interruptible)
{
const struct dat_walk_ops ops = {
.pte_entry = _destroy_pages_pte,
.pmd_entry = _destroy_pages_crste,
.pud_entry = _destroy_pages_crste,
};
do {
scoped_guard(read_lock, &gmap->kvm->mmu_lock)
start = _dat_walk_gfn_range(start, end, gmap->asce, &ops,
DAT_WALK_IGN_HOLES, NULL);
if (interruptible && fatal_signal_pending(current))
return -EINTR;
} while (start && start < end);
return 0;
}
int gmap_insert_rmap(struct kvm_s390_mmu_cache *mc, struct gmap *sg, gfn_t p_gfn,
gfn_t r_gfn, int level)
{
struct vsie_rmap *rmap __free(kvfree) = NULL;
struct vsie_rmap *temp;
void __rcu **slot;
int rc = 0;
KVM_BUG_ON(!is_shadow(sg), sg->kvm);
lockdep_assert_held(&sg->host_to_rmap_lock);
rmap = kvm_s390_mmu_cache_alloc_rmap(mc);
if (!rmap)
return -ENOMEM;
rmap->r_gfn = r_gfn;
rmap->level = level;
slot = radix_tree_lookup_slot(&sg->host_to_rmap, p_gfn);
if (slot) {
rmap->next = radix_tree_deref_slot_protected(slot, &sg->host_to_rmap_lock);
for (temp = rmap->next; temp; temp = temp->next) {
if (temp->val == rmap->val)
return 0;
}
radix_tree_replace_slot(&sg->host_to_rmap, slot, rmap);
} else {
rmap->next = NULL;
rc = radix_tree_insert(&sg->host_to_rmap, p_gfn, rmap);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
rmap = NULL;
return 0;
}
int gmap_protect_rmap(struct kvm_s390_mmu_cache *mc, struct gmap *sg, gfn_t p_gfn, gfn_t r_gfn,
kvm_pfn_t pfn, int level, bool wr)
{
unsigned long bitmask;
union crste *crstep;
union pgste pgste;
union pte *ptep;
union pte pte;
int flags, rc;
if (KVM_BUG_ON(!is_shadow(sg) || level <= TABLE_TYPE_PAGE_TABLE, sg->kvm))
return -EINVAL;
lockdep_assert_held(&sg->parent->children_lock);
flags = DAT_WALK_SPLIT_ALLOC | (uses_skeys(sg->parent) ? DAT_WALK_USES_SKEYS : 0);
rc = dat_entry_walk(mc, p_gfn, sg->parent->asce, flags,
TABLE_TYPE_PAGE_TABLE, &crstep, &ptep);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (level <= TABLE_TYPE_REGION1) {
bitmask = -1UL << (8 + 11 * level);
scoped_guard(spinlock, &sg->host_to_rmap_lock)
rc = gmap_insert_rmap(mc, sg, p_gfn, r_gfn & bitmask, level);
}
if (rc)
return rc;
if (!pgste_get_trylock(ptep, &pgste))
return -EAGAIN;
pte = ptep->s.pr ? *ptep : _pte(pfn, wr, false, false);
pte.h.p = 1;
pgste = _gmap_ptep_xchg(sg->parent, ptep, pte, pgste, p_gfn, false);
pgste.vsie_notif = 1;
pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste);
return 0;
}
#if KVM_S390_MANAGES_S390_GUEST
static long __set_cmma_clean_pte(union pte *ptep, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t next, struct dat_walk *walk)
{
union pgste pgste;
pgste = pgste_get_lock(ptep);
pgste.cmma_d = 0;
pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste);
if (need_resched())
return next;
return 0;
}
static long __set_cmma_dirty_pte(union pte *ptep, gfn_t gfn, gfn_t next, struct dat_walk *walk)
{
union pgste pgste;
pgste = pgste_get_lock(ptep);
if (!pgste.cmma_d)
atomic64_inc(walk->priv);
pgste.cmma_d = 1;
pgste_set_unlock(ptep, pgste);
if (need_resched())
return next;
return 0;
}
void _gmap_set_cmma_all(struct gmap *gmap, bool dirty)
{
const struct dat_walk_ops ops = {
.pte_entry = dirty ? __set_cmma_dirty_pte : __set_cmma_clean_pte,
};
gfn_t gfn = 0;
do {
scoped_guard(read_lock, &gmap->kvm->mmu_lock)
gfn = _dat_walk_gfn_range(gfn, asce_end(gmap->asce), gmap->asce, &ops,
DAT_WALK_IGN_HOLES,
&gmap->kvm->arch.cmma_dirty_pages);
} while (gfn);
}
#endif /* KVM_S390_MANAGES_S390_GUEST */
static void gmap_unshadow_level(struct gmap *sg, gfn_t r_gfn, int level)
{
unsigned long align = PAGE_SIZE;
gpa_t gaddr = gfn_to_gpa(r_gfn);
union crste *crstep;
union crste crste;
union pte *ptep;
if (level > TABLE_TYPE_PAGE_TABLE)
align = 1UL << (11 * level + _SEGMENT_SHIFT);
kvm_s390_vsie_gmap_notifier(sg, ALIGN_DOWN(gaddr, align), ALIGN(gaddr + 1, align));
sg->invalidated = true;
if (dat_entry_walk(NULL, r_gfn, sg->asce, 0, level, &crstep, &ptep))
return;
if (ptep) {
if (READ_ONCE(*ptep).val != _PTE_EMPTY.val)
dat_ptep_xchg(ptep, _PTE_EMPTY, r_gfn, sg->asce, uses_skeys(sg));
return;
}
crste = dat_crstep_clear_atomic(crstep, r_gfn, sg->asce);
if (crste_leaf(crste) || crste.h.i)
return;
if (is_pmd(crste))
dat_free_pt(dereference_pmd(crste.pmd));
else
dat_free_level(dereference_crste(crste), true);
}
static void gmap_unshadow(struct gmap *sg)
{
struct gmap_cache *gmap_cache, *next;
KVM_BUG_ON(!is_shadow(sg), sg->kvm);
KVM_BUG_ON(!sg->parent, sg->kvm);
lockdep_assert_held(&sg->parent->children_lock);
gmap_remove_child(sg);
kvm_s390_vsie_gmap_notifier(sg, 0, -1UL);
list_for_each_entry_safe(gmap_cache, next, &sg->scb_users, list) {
gmap_cache->gmap = NULL;
list_del(&gmap_cache->list);
}
gmap_put(sg);
}
void _gmap_handle_vsie_unshadow_event(struct gmap *parent, gfn_t gfn)
{
struct vsie_rmap *rmap, *rnext, *head;
struct gmap *sg, *next;
gfn_t start, end;
list_for_each_entry_safe(sg, next, &parent->children, list) {
start = sg->guest_asce.rsto;
end = start + sg->guest_asce.tl + 1;
if (!sg->guest_asce.r && gfn >= start && gfn < end) {
gmap_unshadow(sg);
continue;
}
scoped_guard(spinlock, &sg->host_to_rmap_lock)
head = radix_tree_delete(&sg->host_to_rmap, gfn);
gmap_for_each_rmap_safe(rmap, rnext, head) {
gmap_unshadow_level(sg, rmap->r_gfn, rmap->level);
kfree(rmap);
}
}
}
/**
* gmap_find_shadow() - Find a specific ASCE in the list of shadow tables.
* @parent: Pointer to the parent gmap.
* @asce: ASCE for which the shadow table is created.
* @edat_level: Edat level to be used for the shadow translation.
*
* Context: Called with parent->children_lock held.
*
* Return: The pointer to a gmap if a shadow table with the given asce is
* already available, ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN) if another one is just being created,
* otherwise NULL.
*/
static struct gmap *gmap_find_shadow(struct gmap *parent, union asce asce, int edat_level)
{
struct gmap *sg;
lockdep_assert_held(&parent->children_lock);
list_for_each_entry(sg, &parent->children, list) {
if (!gmap_is_shadow_valid(sg, asce, edat_level))
continue;
return sg;
}
return NULL;
}
#define CRST_TABLE_PAGES (_CRST_TABLE_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE)
struct gmap_protect_asce_top_level {
unsigned long seq;
struct guest_fault f[CRST_TABLE_PAGES];
};
static inline int __gmap_protect_asce_top_level(struct kvm_s390_mmu_cache *mc, struct gmap *sg,
struct gmap_protect_asce_top_level *context)
{
struct gmap *parent;
int rc, i;
guard(write_lock)(&sg->kvm->mmu_lock);
if (kvm_s390_array_needs_retry_safe(sg->kvm, context->seq, context->f))
return -EAGAIN;
parent = READ_ONCE(sg->parent);
if (!parent)
return -EAGAIN;
scoped_guard(spinlock, &parent->children_lock) {
if (READ_ONCE(sg->parent) != parent)
return -EAGAIN;
sg->invalidated = false;
for (i = 0; i < CRST_TABLE_PAGES; i++) {
if (!context->f[i].valid)
continue;
rc = gmap_protect_rmap(mc, sg, context->f[i].gfn, 0, context->f[i].pfn,
TABLE_TYPE_REGION1 + 1, context->f[i].writable);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
gmap_add_child(sg->parent, sg);
}
kvm_s390_release_faultin_array(sg->kvm, context->f, false);
return 0;
}
static inline int _gmap_protect_asce_top_level(struct kvm_s390_mmu_cache *mc, struct gmap *sg,
struct gmap_protect_asce_top_level *context)
{
int rc;
if (kvm_s390_array_needs_retry_unsafe(sg->kvm, context->seq, context->f))
return -EAGAIN;
do {
rc = kvm_s390_mmu_cache_topup(mc);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = radix_tree_preload(GFP_KERNEL);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = __gmap_protect_asce_top_level(mc, sg, context);
radix_tree_preload_end();
} while (rc == -ENOMEM);
return rc;
}
static int gmap_protect_asce_top_level(struct kvm_s390_mmu_cache *mc, struct gmap *sg)
{
struct gmap_protect_asce_top_level context = {};
union asce asce = sg->guest_asce;
int rc;
KVM_BUG_ON(!is_shadow(sg), sg->kvm);
context.seq = sg->kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq;
/* Pairs with the smp_wmb() in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(). */
smp_rmb();
rc = kvm_s390_get_guest_pages(sg->kvm, context.f, asce.rsto, asce.tl + 1, false);
if (rc > 0)
rc = -EFAULT;
if (!rc)
rc = _gmap_protect_asce_top_level(mc, sg, &context);
if (rc)
kvm_s390_release_faultin_array(sg->kvm, context.f, true);
return rc;
}
/**
* gmap_create_shadow() - Create/find a shadow guest address space.
* @mc: The cache to use to allocate dat tables.
* @parent: Pointer to the parent gmap.
* @asce: ASCE for which the shadow table is created.
* @edat_level: Edat level to be used for the shadow translation.
*
* The pages of the top level page table referred by the asce parameter
* will be set to read-only and marked in the PGSTEs of the kvm process.
* The shadow table will be removed automatically on any change to the
* PTE mapping for the source table.
*
* The returned shadow gmap will be returned with one extra reference.
*
* Return: A guest address space structure, ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) if out of memory,
* ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN) if the caller has to retry and ERR_PTR(-EFAULT) if the
* parent gmap table could not be protected.
*/
struct gmap *gmap_create_shadow(struct kvm_s390_mmu_cache *mc, struct gmap *parent,
union asce asce, int edat_level)
{
struct gmap *sg, *new;
int rc;
if (WARN_ON(!parent))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
scoped_guard(spinlock, &parent->children_lock) {
sg = gmap_find_shadow(parent, asce, edat_level);
if (sg) {
gmap_get(sg);
return sg;
}
}
/* Create a new shadow gmap. */
new = gmap_new(parent->kvm, asce.r ? 1UL << (64 - PAGE_SHIFT) : asce_end(asce));
if (!new)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
new->guest_asce = asce;
new->edat_level = edat_level;
set_bit(GMAP_FLAG_SHADOW, &new->flags);
scoped_guard(spinlock, &parent->children_lock) {
/* Recheck if another CPU created the same shadow. */
sg = gmap_find_shadow(parent, asce, edat_level);
if (sg) {
gmap_put(new);
gmap_get(sg);
return sg;
}
if (asce.r) {
/* Only allow one real-space gmap shadow. */
list_for_each_entry(sg, &parent->children, list) {
if (sg->guest_asce.r) {
if (write_trylock(&parent->kvm->mmu_lock)) {
gmap_unshadow(sg);
write_unlock(&parent->kvm->mmu_lock);
} else {
gmap_put(new);
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
}
break;
}
}
gmap_add_child(parent, new);
/* Nothing to protect, return right away. */
gmap_get(new);
return new;
}
}
gmap_get(new);
new->parent = parent;
/* Protect while inserting, protects against invalidation races. */
rc = gmap_protect_asce_top_level(mc, new);
if (rc) {
new->parent = NULL;
gmap_put(new);
gmap_put(new);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
return new;
}