Port labeling is based on port number and protocol (TCP/UDP/...) but not
based on network family (IPv4/IPv6).
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
For network objects, like interfaces, nodes, port and InfiniBands, the
object to SID lookup is cached in hashtables. OOM during such hashtable
additions of new objects is considered non-fatal and the computed SID is
simply returned without adding the compute result into the hash table.
Actually ignore OOM in the InfiniBand code, despite the comment already
suggesting to do so. This reverts commit c350f8bea2 ("selinux: Fix
error return code in sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow()").
Add comments in the other places.
Use kmalloc() instead of kzalloc(), since all members are initialized on
success and the data is only used in internbal hash tables, so no risk
of information leakage to userspace.
Fixes: c350f8bea2 ("selinux: Fix error return code in sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow()")
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In the network hashtable lookup code add likely() compiler hints in the
fast path, like already done in sel_netif_sid().
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The network address, either an IPv4 or IPv6 one, is not modified.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As for other Audit's "pid" fields, Landlock should use the task's TGID
instead of its TID. Fix this issue by keeping a reference to the TGID
of the domain creator.
Existing tests already check for the PID but only with the thread group
leader, so always the TGID. A following patch adds dedicated tests for
non-leader thread.
Remove the current_real_cred() check which does not make sense because
we only reference a struct pid, whereas a previous version did reference
a struct cred instead.
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250410171725.1265860-1-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
landlock_put_hierarchy() can be called when an error occurs in
landlock_merge_ruleset() due to insufficient memory. In this case, the
domain's audit details might not have been allocated yet, which would
cause landlock_free_hierarchy_details() to print a warning (but still
safely handle this case).
We could keep the WARN_ON_ONCE(!hierarchy) but it's not worth it for
this kind of function, so let's remove it entirely.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+8bca99e91de7e060e4ea@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250331104709.897062-1-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
try_lookup_noperm() and d_hash_and_lookup() are nearly identical. The
former does some validation of the name where the latter doesn't.
Outside of the VFS that validation is likely valuable, and having only
one exported function for this task is certainly a good idea.
So make d_hash_and_lookup() local to VFS files and change all other
callers to try_lookup_noperm(). Note that the arguments are swapped.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250319031545.2999807-6-neil@brown.name
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
The lookup_one_len family of functions is (now) only used internally by
a filesystem on itself either
- in a context where permission checking is irrelevant such as by a
virtual filesystem populating itself, or xfs accessing its ORPHANAGE
or dquota accessing the quota file; or
- in a context where a permission check (MAY_EXEC on the parent) has just
been performed such as a network filesystem finding in "silly-rename"
file in the same directory. This is also the context after the
_parentat() functions where currently lookup_one_qstr_excl() is used.
So the permission check is pointless.
The name "one_len" is unhelpful in understanding the purpose of these
functions and should be changed. Most of the callers pass the len as
"strlen()" so using a qstr and QSTR() can simplify the code.
This patch renames these functions (include lookup_positive_unlocked()
which is part of the family despite the name) to have a name based on
"lookup_noperm". They are changed to receive a 'struct qstr' instead
of separate name and len. In a few cases the use of QSTR() results in a
new call to strlen().
try_lookup_noperm() takes a pointer to a qstr instead of the whole
qstr. This is consistent with d_hash_and_lookup() (which is nearly
identical) and useful for lookup_noperm_unlocked().
The new lookup_noperm_common() doesn't take a qstr yet. That will be
tidied up in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250319031545.2999807-5-neil@brown.name
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Patch series "mseal system mappings", v9.
As discussed during mseal() upstream process [1], mseal() protects the
VMAs of a given virtual memory range against modifications, such as the
read/write (RW) and no-execute (NX) bits. For complete descriptions of
memory sealing, please see mseal.rst [2].
The mseal() is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example,
such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
or .text pages can get remapped.
The system mappings are readonly only, memory sealing can protect them
from ever changing to writable or unmmap/remapped as different attributes.
System mappings such as vdso, vvar, vvar_vclock, vectors (arm
compat-mode), sigpage (arm compat-mode), are created by the kernel during
program initialization, and could be sealed after creation.
Unlike the aforementioned mappings, the uprobe mapping is not established
during program startup. However, its lifetime is the same as the
process's lifetime [3]. It could be sealed from creation.
The vsyscall on x86-64 uses a special address (0xffffffffff600000), which
is outside the mm managed range. This means mprotect, munmap, and mremap
won't work on the vsyscall. Since sealing doesn't enhance the vsyscall's
security, it is skipped in this patch. If we ever seal the vsyscall, it
is probably only for decorative purpose, i.e. showing the 'sl' flag in
the /proc/pid/smaps. For this patch, it is ignored.
It is important to note that the CHECKPOINT_RESTORE feature (CRIU) may
alter the system mappings during restore operations. UML(User Mode Linux)
and gVisor, rr are also known to change the vdso/vvar mappings.
Consequently, this feature cannot be universally enabled across all
systems. As such, CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS is disabled by default.
To support mseal of system mappings, architectures must define
CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS and update their special
mappings calls to pass mseal flag. Additionally, architectures must
confirm they do not unmap/remap system mappings during the process
lifetime. The existence of this flag for an architecture implies that it
does not require the remapping of thest system mappings during process
lifetime, so sealing these mappings is safe from a kernel perspective.
This version covers x86-64 and arm64 archiecture as minimum viable feature.
While no specific CPU hardware features are required for enable this
feature on an archiecture, memory sealing requires a 64-bit kernel. Other
architectures can choose whether or not to adopt this feature. Currently,
I'm not aware of any instances in the kernel code that actively
munmap/mremap a system mapping without a request from userspace. The PPC
does call munmap when _install_special_mapping fails for vdso; however,
it's uncertain if this will ever fail for PPC - this needs to be
investigated by PPC in the future [4]. The UML kernel can add this
support when KUnit tests require it [5].
In this version, we've improved the handling of system mapping sealing
from previous versions, instead of modifying the _install_special_mapping
function itself, which would affect all architectures, we now call
_install_special_mapping with a sealing flag only within the specific
architecture that requires it. This targeted approach offers two key
advantages: 1) It limits the code change's impact to the necessary
architectures, and 2) It aligns with the software architecture by keeping
the core memory management within the mm layer, while delegating the
decision of sealing system mappings to the individual architecture, which
is particularly relevant since 32-bit architectures never require sealing.
Prior to this patch series, we explored sealing special mappings from
userspace using glibc's dynamic linker. This approach revealed several
issues:
- The PT_LOAD header may report an incorrect length for vdso, (smaller
than its actual size). The dynamic linker, which relies on PT_LOAD
information to determine mapping size, would then split and partially
seal the vdso mapping. Since each architecture has its own vdso/vvar
code, fixing this in the kernel would require going through each
archiecture. Our initial goal was to enable sealing readonly mappings,
e.g. .text, across all architectures, sealing vdso from kernel since
creation appears to be simpler than sealing vdso at glibc.
- The [vvar] mapping header only contains address information, not
length information. Similar issues might exist for other special
mappings.
- Mappings like uprobe are not covered by the dynamic linker, and there
is no effective solution for them.
This feature's security enhancements will benefit ChromeOS, Android, and
other high security systems.
Testing:
This feature was tested on ChromeOS and Android for both x86-64 and ARM64.
- Enable sealing and verify vdso/vvar, sigpage, vector are sealed properly,
i.e. "sl" shown in the smaps for those mappings, and mremap is blocked.
- Passing various automation tests (e.g. pre-checkin) on ChromeOS and
Android to ensure the sealing doesn't affect the functionality of
Chromebook and Android phone.
I also tested the feature on Ubuntu on x86-64:
- With config disabled, vdso/vvar is not sealed,
- with config enabled, vdso/vvar is sealed, and booting up Ubuntu is OK,
normal operations such as browsing the web, open/edit doc are OK.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org/ [1]
Link: Documentation/userspace-api/mseal.rst [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkU9BRUnqf70-nksuMCQ+yyiWjo3fM4XkRkL-NrCZxYAyg@mail.gmail.com/ [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABi2SkV6JJwJeviDLsq9N4ONvQ=EFANsiWkgiEOjyT9TQSt+HA@mail.gmail.com/ [4]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202502251035.239B85A93@keescook/ [5]
This patch (of 7):
Provide infrastructure to mseal system mappings. Establish two kernel
configs (CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS,
ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS) and VM_SEALED_SYSMAP macro for future
patches.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250305021711.3867874-1-jeffxu@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250305021711.3867874-2-jeffxu@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Cc: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Benjamin Berg <benjamin@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Elliot Hughes <enh@google.com>
Cc: Florian Faineli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@kernel.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jason A. Donenfeld <jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Waleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcow (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <mike.rapoport@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Here is the big set of driver core updates for 6.15-rc1. Lots of stuff
happened this development cycle, including:
- kernfs scaling changes to make it even faster thanks to rcu
- bin_attribute constify work in many subsystems
- faux bus minor tweaks for the rust bindings
- rust binding updates for driver core, pci, and platform busses,
making more functionaliy available to rust drivers. These are all
due to people actually trying to use the bindings that were in 6.14.
- make Rafael and Danilo full co-maintainers of the driver core
codebase
- other minor fixes and updates.
This has been in linux-next for a while now, with the only reported
issue being some merge conflicts with the rust tree. Depending on which
tree you pull first, you will have conflicts in one of them. The merge
resolution has been in linux-next as an example of what to do, or can be
found here:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/CANiq72n3Xe8JcnEjirDhCwQgvWoE65dddWecXnfdnbrmuah-RQ@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'driver-core-6.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull driver core updatesk from Greg KH:
"Here is the big set of driver core updates for 6.15-rc1. Lots of stuff
happened this development cycle, including:
- kernfs scaling changes to make it even faster thanks to rcu
- bin_attribute constify work in many subsystems
- faux bus minor tweaks for the rust bindings
- rust binding updates for driver core, pci, and platform busses,
making more functionaliy available to rust drivers. These are all
due to people actually trying to use the bindings that were in
6.14.
- make Rafael and Danilo full co-maintainers of the driver core
codebase
- other minor fixes and updates"
* tag 'driver-core-6.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: (52 commits)
rust: platform: require Send for Driver trait implementers
rust: pci: require Send for Driver trait implementers
rust: platform: impl Send + Sync for platform::Device
rust: pci: impl Send + Sync for pci::Device
rust: platform: fix unrestricted &mut platform::Device
rust: pci: fix unrestricted &mut pci::Device
rust: device: implement device context marker
rust: pci: use to_result() in enable_device_mem()
MAINTAINERS: driver core: mark Rafael and Danilo as co-maintainers
rust/kernel/faux: mark Registration methods inline
driver core: faux: only create the device if probe() succeeds
rust/faux: Add missing parent argument to Registration::new()
rust/faux: Drop #[repr(transparent)] from faux::Registration
rust: io: fix devres test with new io accessor functions
rust: io: rename `io::Io` accessors
kernfs: Move dput() outside of the RCU section.
efi: rci2: mark bin_attribute as __ro_after_init
rapidio: constify 'struct bin_attribute'
firmware: qemu_fw_cfg: constify 'struct bin_attribute'
powerpc/perf/hv-24x7: Constify 'struct bin_attribute'
...
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Merge tag 'bpf-next-6.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
"For this merge window we're splitting BPF pull request into three for
higher visibility: main changes, res_spin_lock, try_alloc_pages.
These are the main BPF changes:
- Add DFA-based live registers analysis to improve verification of
programs with loops (Eduard Zingerman)
- Introduce load_acquire and store_release BPF instructions and add
x86, arm64 JIT support (Peilin Ye)
- Fix loop detection logic in the verifier (Eduard Zingerman)
- Drop unnecesary lock in bpf_map_inc_not_zero() (Eric Dumazet)
- Add kfunc for populating cpumask bits (Emil Tsalapatis)
- Convert various shell based tests to selftests/bpf/test_progs
format (Bastien Curutchet)
- Allow passing referenced kptrs into struct_ops callbacks (Amery
Hung)
- Add a flag to LSM bpf hook to facilitate bpf program signing
(Blaise Boscaccy)
- Track arena arguments in kfuncs (Ihor Solodrai)
- Add copy_remote_vm_str() helper for reading strings from remote VM
and bpf_copy_from_user_task_str() kfunc (Jordan Rome)
- Add support for timed may_goto instruction (Kumar Kartikeya
Dwivedi)
- Allow bpf_get_netns_cookie() int cgroup_skb programs (Mahe Tardy)
- Reduce bpf_cgrp_storage_busy false positives when accessing cgroup
local storage (Martin KaFai Lau)
- Introduce bpf_dynptr_copy() kfunc (Mykyta Yatsenko)
- Allow retrieving BTF data with BTF token (Mykyta Yatsenko)
- Add BPF kfuncs to set and get xattrs with 'security.bpf.' prefix
(Song Liu)
- Reject attaching programs to noreturn functions (Yafang Shao)
- Introduce pre-order traversal of cgroup bpf programs (Yonghong
Song)"
* tag 'bpf-next-6.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (186 commits)
selftests/bpf: Add selftests for load-acquire/store-release when register number is invalid
bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read in check_atomic_load/store()
libbpf: Add namespace for errstr making it libbpf_errstr
bpf: Add struct_ops context information to struct bpf_prog_aux
selftests/bpf: Sanitize pointer prior fclose()
selftests/bpf: Migrate test_xdp_vlan.sh into test_progs
selftests/bpf: test_xdp_vlan: Rename BPF sections
bpf: clarify a misleading verifier error message
selftests/bpf: Add selftest for attaching fexit to __noreturn functions
bpf: Reject attaching fexit/fmod_ret to __noreturn functions
bpf: Only fails the busy counter check in bpf_cgrp_storage_get if it creates storage
bpf: Make perf_event_read_output accessible in all program types.
bpftool: Using the right format specifiers
bpftool: Add -Wformat-signedness flag to detect format errors
selftests/bpf: Test freplace from user namespace
libbpf: Pass BPF token from find_prog_btf_id to BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID
bpf: Return prog btf_id without capable check
bpf: BPF token support for BPF_BTF_GET_FD_BY_ID
bpf, x86: Fix objtool warning for timed may_goto
bpf: Check map->record at the beginning of check_and_free_fields()
...
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Merge tag 'landlock-6.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün:
"This brings two main changes to Landlock:
- A signal scoping fix with a new interface for user space to know if
it is compatible with the running kernel.
- Audit support to give visibility on why access requests are denied,
including the origin of the security policy, missing access rights,
and description of object(s). This was designed to limit log spam
as much as possible while still alerting about unexpected blocked
access.
With these changes come new and improved documentation, and a lot of
new tests"
* tag 'landlock-6.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: (36 commits)
landlock: Add audit documentation
selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for network
selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for filesystem
selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for abstract UNIX socket scoping
selftests/landlock: Add audit tests for ptrace
selftests/landlock: Test audit with restrict flags
selftests/landlock: Add tests for audit flags and domain IDs
selftests/landlock: Extend tests for landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags
selftests/landlock: Add test for invalid ruleset file descriptor
samples/landlock: Enable users to log sandbox denials
landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF
landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_*_EXEC_* flags
landlock: Log scoped denials
landlock: Log TCP bind and connect denials
landlock: Log truncate and IOCTL denials
landlock: Factor out IOCTL hooks
landlock: Log file-related denials
landlock: Log mount-related denials
landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN and log domain status
landlock: Add AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS and log ptrace denials
...
This branch contains one patch:
capability: Remove unused has_capability
This removes a helper function whose last user (smack) stopped using
it in 2018.
This has been in linux-next for most of the the last cycle with no
apparent issues. It is available at:
git@git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git #caps-20250327
on top of commit 2014c95afe (tag: v6.14-rc1)
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Merge tag 'caps-pr-20250327' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux
Pull capabilities update from Serge Hallyn:
"This contains just one patch that removes a helper function whose last
user (smack) stopped using it in 2018"
* tag 'caps-pr-20250327' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux:
capability: Remove unused has_capability
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Merge tag 'integrity-v6.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull ima updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Two performance improvements, which minimize the number of integrity
violations"
* tag 'integrity-v6.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: limit the number of ToMToU integrity violations
ima: limit the number of open-writers integrity violations
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Merge tag 'ipe-pr-20250324' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe
Pull ipe update from Fan Wu:
"This contains just one commit from Randy Dunlap, which fixes
kernel-doc warnings in the IPE subsystem"
* tag 'ipe-pr-20250324' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe:
ipe: policy_fs: fix kernel-doc warnings
Each time a file in policy, that is already opened for read, is opened
for write, a Time-of-Measure-Time-of-Use (ToMToU) integrity violation
audit message is emitted and a violation record is added to the IMA
measurement list. This occurs even if a ToMToU violation has already
been recorded.
Limit the number of ToMToU integrity violations per file open for read.
Note: The IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU atomic flag must be set from the reader
side based on policy. This may result in a per file open for read
ToMToU violation.
Since IMA_MUST_MEASURE is only used for violations, rename the atomic
IMA_MUST_MEASURE flag to IMA_MAY_EMIT_TOMTOU.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # applies cleanly up to linux-6.6
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Each time a file in policy, that is already opened for write, is opened
for read, an open-writers integrity violation audit message is emitted
and a violation record is added to the IMA measurement list. This
occurs even if an open-writers violation has already been recorded.
Limit the number of open-writers integrity violations for an existing
file open for write to one. After the existing file open for write
closes (__fput), subsequent open-writers integrity violations may be
emitted.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # applies cleanly up to linux-6.6
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Tested-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* Move vm_table members out of kernel/sysctl.c
All vm_table array members have moved to their respective subsystems leading
to the removal of vm_table from kernel/sysctl.c. This increases modularity by
placing the ctl_tables closer to where they are actually used and at the same
time reducing the chances of merge conflicts in kernel/sysctl.c.
* ctl_table range fixes
Replace the proc_handler function that checks variable ranges in
coredump_sysctls and vdso_table with the one that actually uses the extra{1,2}
pointers as min/max values. This tightens the range of the values that users
can pass into the kernel effectively preventing {under,over}flows.
* Misc fixes
Correct grammar errors and typos in test messages. Update sysctl files in
MAINTAINERS. Constified and removed array size in declaration for
alignment_tbl
* Testing
- These have all been in linux-next for at least 1 month
- They have gone through 0-day
- Ran all these through sysctl selftests in x86_64
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Merge tag 'sysctl-6.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sysctl/sysctl
Pull sysctl updates from Joel Granados:
- Move vm_table members out of kernel/sysctl.c
All vm_table array members have moved to their respective subsystems
leading to the removal of vm_table from kernel/sysctl.c. This
increases modularity by placing the ctl_tables closer to where they
are actually used and at the same time reducing the chances of merge
conflicts in kernel/sysctl.c.
- ctl_table range fixes
Replace the proc_handler function that checks variable ranges in
coredump_sysctls and vdso_table with the one that actually uses the
extra{1,2} pointers as min/max values. This tightens the range of the
values that users can pass into the kernel effectively preventing
{under,over}flows.
- Misc fixes
Correct grammar errors and typos in test messages. Update sysctl
files in MAINTAINERS. Constified and removed array size in
declaration for alignment_tbl
* tag 'sysctl-6.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sysctl/sysctl: (22 commits)
selftests/sysctl: fix wording of help messages
selftests: fix spelling/grammar errors in sysctl/sysctl.sh
MAINTAINERS: Update sysctl file list in MAINTAINERS
sysctl: Fix underflow value setting risk in vm_table
coredump: Fixes core_pipe_limit sysctl proc_handler
sysctl: remove unneeded include
sysctl: remove the vm_table
sh: vdso: move the sysctl to arch/sh/kernel/vsyscall/vsyscall.c
x86: vdso: move the sysctl to arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c
fs: dcache: move the sysctl to fs/dcache.c
sunrpc: simplify rpcauth_cache_shrink_count()
fs: drop_caches: move sysctl to fs/drop_caches.c
fs: fs-writeback: move sysctl to fs/fs-writeback.c
mm: nommu: move sysctl to mm/nommu.c
security: min_addr: move sysctl to security/min_addr.c
mm: mmap: move sysctl to mm/mmap.c
mm: util: move sysctls to mm/util.c
mm: vmscan: move vmscan sysctls to mm/vmscan.c
mm: swap: move sysctl to mm/swap.c
mm: filemap: move sysctl to mm/filemap.c
...
Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF for the case of sandboxer
tools, init systems, or runtime containers launching programs sandboxing
themselves in an inconsistent way. Setting this flag should only
depends on runtime configuration (i.e. not hardcoded).
We don't create a new ruleset's option because this should not be part
of the security policy: only the task that enforces the policy (not the
one that create it) knows if itself or its children may request denied
actions.
This is the first and only flag that can be set without actually
restricting the caller (i.e. without providing a ruleset).
Extend struct landlock_cred_security with a u8 log_subdomains_off.
struct landlock_file_security is still 16 bytes.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-19-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Fix comment]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Most of the time we want to log denied access because they should not
happen and such information helps diagnose issues. However, when
sandboxing processes that we know will try to access denied resources
(e.g. unknown, bogus, or malicious binary), we might want to not log
related access requests that might fill up logs.
By default, denied requests are logged until the task call execve(2).
If the LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF flag is set, denied
requests will not be logged for the same executed file.
If the LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_NEW_EXEC_ON flag is set, denied
requests from after an execve(2) call will be logged.
The rationale is that a program should know its own behavior, but not
necessarily the behavior of other programs.
Because LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SAME_EXEC_OFF is set for a specific
Landlock domain, it makes it possible to selectively mask some access
requests that would be logged by a parent domain, which might be handy
for unprivileged processes to limit logs. However, system
administrators should still use the audit filtering mechanism. There is
intentionally no audit nor sysctl configuration to re-enable these logs.
This is delegated to the user space program.
Increment the Landlock ABI version to reflect this interface change.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-18-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Rename variables and fix __maybe_unused]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Add audit support for unix_stream_connect, unix_may_send, task_kill, and
file_send_sigiotask hooks.
The related blockers are:
- scope.abstract_unix_socket
- scope.signal
Audit event sample for abstract unix socket:
type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.268:30): domain=195ba459b blockers=scope.abstract_unix_socket path=00666F6F
Audit event sample for signal:
type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.291:31): domain=195ba459b blockers=scope.signal opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
Refactor and simplify error handling in LSM hooks.
Extend struct landlock_file_security with fown_layer and use it to log
the blocking domain. The struct aligned size is still 16 bytes.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-17-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Add audit support to the file_truncate and file_ioctl hooks.
Add a deny_masks_t type and related helpers to store the domain's layer
level per optional access rights (i.e. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE and
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL_DEV) when opening a file, which cannot be
inferred later. In practice, the landlock_file_security aligned blob size is
still 16 bytes because this new one-byte deny_masks field follows the
existing two-bytes allowed_access field and precede the packed
fown_subject.
Implementing deny_masks_t with a bitfield instead of a struct enables a
generic implementation to store and extract layer levels.
Add KUnit tests to check the identification of a layer level from a
deny_masks_t, and the computation of a deny_masks_t from an access right
with its layer level or a layer_mask_t array.
Audit event sample:
type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=fs.ioctl_dev path="/dev/tty" dev="devtmpfs" ino=9 ioctlcmd=0x5401
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-15-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Compat and non-compat IOCTL hooks are almost the same, except to compare
the IOCTL command. Factor out these two IOCTL hooks to highlight the
difference and minimize audit changes (see next commit).
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-14-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Add audit support for path_mkdir, path_mknod, path_symlink, path_unlink,
path_rmdir, path_truncate, path_link, path_rename, and file_open hooks.
The dedicated blockers are:
- fs.execute
- fs.write_file
- fs.read_file
- fs.read_dir
- fs.remove_dir
- fs.remove_file
- fs.make_char
- fs.make_dir
- fs.make_reg
- fs.make_sock
- fs.make_fifo
- fs.make_block
- fs.make_sym
- fs.refer
- fs.truncate
- fs.ioctl_dev
Audit event sample for a denied link action:
type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=fs.refer path="/usr/bin" dev="vda2" ino=351
type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=fs.make_reg,fs.refer path="/usr/local" dev="vda2" ino=365
We could pack blocker names (e.g. "fs:make_reg,refer") but that would
increase complexity for the kernel and log parsers. Moreover, this
could not handle blockers of different classes (e.g. fs and net). Make
it simple and flexible instead.
Add KUnit tests to check the identification from a layer_mask_t array of
the first layer level denying such request.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Depends-on: 058518c209 ("landlock: Align partial refer access checks with final ones")
Depends-on: d617f0d72d ("landlock: Optimize file path walks and prepare for audit support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-13-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Add audit support for sb_mount, move_mount, sb_umount, sb_remount, and
sb_pivot_root hooks.
The new related blocker is "fs.change_topology".
Audit event sample:
type=LANDLOCK_DENY msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=fs.change_topology name="/" dev="tmpfs" ino=1
Remove landlock_get_applicable_domain() and get_current_fs_domain()
which are now fully replaced with landlock_get_applicable_subject().
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-12-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Asynchronously log domain information when it first denies an access.
This minimize the amount of generated logs, which makes it possible to
always log denials for the current execution since they should not
happen. These records are identified with the new AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN
type.
The AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN message contains:
- the "domain" ID which is described;
- the "status" which can either be "allocated" or "deallocated";
- the "mode" which is for now only "enforcing";
- for the "allocated" status, a minimal set of properties to easily
identify the task that loaded the domain's policy with
landlock_restrict_self(2): "pid", "uid", executable path ("exe"), and
command line ("comm");
- for the "deallocated" state, the number of "denials" accounted to this
domain, which is at least 1.
This requires each domain to save these task properties at creation
time in the new struct landlock_details. A reference to the PID is kept
for the lifetime of the domain to avoid race conditions when
investigating the related task. The executable path is resolved and
stored to not keep a reference to the filesystem and block related
actions. All these metadata are stored for the lifetime of the related
domain and should then be minimal. The required memory is not accounted
to the task calling landlock_restrict_self(2) contrary to most other
Landlock allocations (see related comment).
The AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN record follows the first AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS
record for the same domain, which is always followed by AUDIT_SYSCALL
and AUDIT_PROCTITLE. This is in line with the audit logic to first
record the cause of an event, and then add context with other types of
record.
Audit event sample for a first denial:
type=LANDLOCK_ACCESS msg=audit(1732186800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=ptrace opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
type=LANDLOCK_DOMAIN msg=audit(1732186800.349:44): domain=195ba459b status=allocated mode=enforcing pid=300 uid=0 exe="/root/sandboxer" comm="sandboxer"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1732186800.349:44): arch=c000003e syscall=101 success=no [...] pid=300 auid=0
Audit event sample for a following denial:
type=LANDLOCK_ACCESS msg=audit(1732186800.372:45): domain=195ba459b blockers=ptrace opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1732186800.372:45): arch=c000003e syscall=101 success=no [...] pid=300 auid=0
Log domain deletion with the "deallocated" state when a domain was
previously logged. This makes it possible for log parsers to free
potential resources when a domain ID will never show again.
The number of denied access requests is useful to easily check how many
access requests a domain blocked and potentially if some of them are
missing in logs because of audit rate limiting, audit rules, or Landlock
log configuration flags (see following commit).
Audit event sample for a deletion of a domain that denied something:
type=LANDLOCK_DOMAIN msg=audit(1732186800.393:46): domain=195ba459b status=deallocated denials=2
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-11-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Update comment and GFP flag for landlock_log_drop_domain()]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Add a new AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS record type dedicated to an access
request denied by a Landlock domain. AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS indicates
that something unexpected happened.
For now, only denied access are logged, which means that any
AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS record is always followed by a SYSCALL record with
"success=no". However, log parsers should check this syscall property
because this is the only sign that a request was denied. Indeed, we
could have "success=yes" if Landlock would support a "permissive" mode.
We could also add a new field to AUDIT_LANDLOCK_DOMAIN for this mode
(see following commit).
By default, the only logged access requests are those coming from the
same executed program that enforced the Landlock restriction on itself.
In other words, no audit record are created for a task after it called
execve(2). This is required to avoid log spam because programs may only
be aware of their own restrictions, but not the inherited ones.
Following commits will allow to conditionally generate
AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS records according to dedicated
landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags.
The AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS message contains:
- the "domain" ID restricting the action on an object,
- the "blockers" that are missing to allow the requested access,
- a set of fields identifying the related object (e.g. task identified
with "opid" and "ocomm").
The blockers are implicit restrictions (e.g. ptrace), or explicit access
rights (e.g. filesystem), or explicit scopes (e.g. signal). This field
contains a list of at least one element, each separated with a comma.
The initial blocker is "ptrace", which describe all implicit Landlock
restrictions related to ptrace (e.g. deny tracing of tasks outside a
sandbox).
Add audit support to ptrace_access_check and ptrace_traceme hooks. For
the ptrace_access_check case, we log the current/parent domain and the
child task. For the ptrace_traceme case, we log the parent domain and
the current/child task. Indeed, the requester and the target are the
current task, but the action would be performed by the parent task.
Audit event sample:
type=LANDLOCK_ACCESS msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): domain=195ba459b blockers=ptrace opid=1 ocomm="systemd"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1729738800.349:44): arch=c000003e syscall=101 success=no [...] pid=300 auid=0
A following commit adds user documentation.
Add KUnit tests to check reading of domain ID relative to layer level.
The quick return for non-landlocked tasks is moved from task_ptrace() to
each LSM hooks.
It is not useful to inline the audit_enabled check because other
computation are performed by landlock_log_denial().
Use scoped guards for RCU read-side critical sections.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-10-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Extend struct landlock_cred_security with a domain_exec bitmask to
identify which Landlock domain were created by the current task's bprm.
The whole bitmask is reset on each execve(2) call.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-9-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
This cosmetic change is needed for audit support, specifically to be
able to filter according to cross-execution boundaries.
struct landlock_file_security's size stay the same for now but it will
increase with struct landlock_cred_security's size.
Only save Landlock domain in hook_file_set_fowner() if the current
domain has LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL, which was previously done for each
hook_file_send_sigiotask() calls. This should improve a bit
performance.
Replace hardcoded LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL with the signal_scope.scope
variable.
Use scoped guards for RCU read-side critical sections.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-8-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
This cosmetic change that is needed for audit support, specifically to
be able to filter according to cross-execution boundaries.
Replace hardcoded LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL with the signal_scope.scope
variable.
Use scoped guards for RCU read-side critical sections.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-7-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Update headers]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
This cosmetic change that is needed for audit support, specifically to
be able to filter according to cross-execution boundaries.
Optimize current_check_access_socket() to only handle the access
request.
Remove explicit domain->num_layers check which is now part of the
landlock_get_applicable_subject() call.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-6-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
This cosmetic change is needed for audit support, specifically to be
able to filter according to cross-execution boundaries.
Add landlock_get_applicable_subject(), mainly a copy of
landlock_get_applicable_domain(), which will fully replace it in a
following commit.
Optimize current_check_access_path() to only handle the access request.
Partially replace get_current_fs_domain() with explicit calls to
landlock_get_applicable_subject(). The remaining ones will follow with
more changes.
Remove explicit domain->num_layers check which is now part of the
landlock_get_applicable_subject() call.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Create a new domain.h file containing the struct landlock_hierarchy
definition and helpers. This type will grow with audit support. This
also prepares for a new domain type.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-4-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Landlock IDs can be generated to uniquely identify Landlock objects.
For now, only Landlock domains get an ID at creation time. These IDs
map to immutable domain hierarchies.
Landlock IDs have important properties:
- They are unique during the lifetime of the running system thanks to
the 64-bit values: at worse, 2^60 - 2*2^32 useful IDs.
- They are always greater than 2^32 and must then be stored in 64-bit
integer types.
- The initial ID (at boot time) is randomly picked between 2^32 and
2^33, which limits collisions in logs across different boots.
- IDs are sequential, which enables users to order them.
- IDs may not be consecutive but increase with a random 2^4 step, which
limits side channels.
Such IDs can be exposed to unprivileged processes, even if it is not the
case with this audit patch series. The domain IDs will be useful for
user space to identify sandboxes and get their properties.
These Landlock IDs are more secure that other absolute kernel IDs such
as pipe's inodes which rely on a shared global counter.
For checkpoint/restore features (i.e. CRIU), we could easily implement a
privileged interface (e.g. sysfs) to set the next ID counter.
IDR/IDA are not used because we only need a bijection from Landlock
objects to Landlock IDs, and we must not recycle IDs. This enables us
to identify all Landlock objects during the lifetime of the system (e.g.
in logs), but not to access an object from an ID nor know if an ID is
assigned. Using a counter is simpler, it scales (i.e. avoids growing
memory footprint), and it does not require locking. We'll use proper
file descriptors (with IDs used as inode numbers) to access Landlock
objects.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Extract code from dump_common_audit_data() into the audit_log_lsm_data()
helper. This helps reuse common LSM audit data while not abusing
AUDIT_AVC records because of the common_lsm_audit() helper.
Depends-on: 7ccbe076d9 ("lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set")
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320190717.2287696-2-mic@digikod.net
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Because Linux credentials are managed per thread, user space relies on
some hack to synchronize credential update across threads from the same
process. This is required by the Native POSIX Threads Library and
implemented by set*id(2) wrappers and libcap(3) to use tgkill(2) to
synchronize threads. See nptl(7) and libpsx(3). Furthermore, some
runtimes like Go do not enable developers to have control over threads
[1].
To avoid potential issues, and because threads are not security
boundaries, let's relax the Landlock (optional) signal scoping to always
allow signals sent between threads of the same process. This exception
is similar to the __ptrace_may_access() one.
hook_file_set_fowner() now checks if the target task is part of the same
process as the caller. If this is the case, then the related signal
triggered by the socket will always be allowed.
Scoping of abstract UNIX sockets is not changed because kernel objects
(e.g. sockets) should be tied to their creator's domain at creation
time.
Note that creating one Landlock domain per thread puts each of these
threads (and their future children) in their own scope, which is
probably not what users expect, especially in Go where we do not control
threads. However, being able to drop permissions on all threads should
not be restricted by signal scoping. We are working on a way to make it
possible to atomically restrict all threads of a process with the same
domain [2].
Add erratum for signal scoping.
Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/go-landlock/issues/36
Fixes: 54a6e6bbf3 ("landlock: Add signal scoping")
Fixes: c899496501 ("selftests/landlock: Test signal scoping for threads")
Depends-on: 26f204380a ("fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies")
Link: https://pkg.go.dev/kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/libcap/psx [1]
Link: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/2 [2]
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318161443.279194-6-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Add extra pointer check and RCU guard, and ease backport]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-6.15' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"This is a larger set of patches than usual, consisting of a set of
build clean-ups, a rework of error handling in setting up CIPSO label
specification and a bug fix in network labeling"
* tag 'Smack-for-6.15' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
smack: recognize ipv4 CIPSO w/o categories
smack: Revert "smackfs: Added check catlen"
smack: remove /smack/logging if audit is not configured
smack: ipv4/ipv6: tcp/dccp/sctp: fix incorrect child socket label
smack: dont compile ipv6 code unless ipv6 is configured
Smack: fix typos and spelling errors
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20250323' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Add additional SELinux access controls for kernel file reads/loads
The SELinux kernel file read/load access controls were never updated
beyond the initial kernel module support, this pull request adds
support for firmware, kexec, policies, and x.509 certificates.
- Add support for wildcards in network interface names
There are a number of userspace tools which auto-generate network
interface names using some pattern of <XXXX>-<NN> where <XXXX> is a
fixed string, e.g. "podman", and <NN> is a increasing counter.
Supporting wildcards in the SELinux policy for network interfaces
simplifies the policy associted with these interfaces.
- Fix a potential problem in the kernel read file SELinux code
SELinux should always check the file label in the
security_kernel_read_file() LSM hook, regardless of if the file is
being read in chunks. Unfortunately, the existing code only
considered the file label on the first chunk; this pull request fixes
this problem.
There is more detail in the individual commit, but thankfully the
existing code didn't expose a bug due to multi-stage reads only
taking place in one driver, and that driver loading a file type that
isn't targeted by the SELinux policy.
- Fix the subshell error handling in the example policy loader
Minor fix to SELinux example policy loader in scripts/selinux due to
an undesired interaction with subshells and errexit.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20250323' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: get netif_wildcard policycap from policy instead of cache
selinux: support wildcard network interface names
selinux: Chain up tool resolving errors in install_policy.sh
selinux: add permission checks for loading other kinds of kernel files
selinux: always check the file label in selinux_kernel_read_file()
selinux: fix spelling error
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20250323' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Various minor updates to the LSM Rust bindings
Changes include marking trivial Rust bindings as inlines and comment
tweaks to better reflect the LSM hooks.
- Add LSM/SELinux access controls to io_uring_allowed()
Similar to the io_uring_disabled sysctl, add a LSM hook to
io_uring_allowed() to enable LSMs a simple way to enforce security
policy on the use of io_uring. This pull request includes SELinux
support for this new control using the io_uring/allowed permission.
- Remove an unused parameter from the security_perf_event_open() hook
The perf_event_attr struct parameter was not used by any currently
supported LSMs, remove it from the hook.
- Add an explicit MAINTAINERS entry for the credentials code
We've seen problems in the past where patches to the credentials code
sent by non-maintainers would often languish on the lists for
multiple months as there was no one explicitly tasked with the
responsibility of reviewing and/or merging credentials related code.
Considering that most of the code under security/ has a vested
interest in ensuring that the credentials code is well maintained,
I'm volunteering to look after the credentials code and Serge Hallyn
has also volunteered to step up as an official reviewer. I posted the
MAINTAINERS update as a RFC to LKML in hopes that someone else would
jump up with an "I'll do it!", but beyond Serge it was all crickets.
- Update Stephen Smalley's old email address to prevent confusion
This includes a corresponding update to the mailmap file.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20250323' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
mailmap: map Stephen Smalley's old email addresses
lsm: remove old email address for Stephen Smalley
MAINTAINERS: add Serge Hallyn as a credentials reviewer
MAINTAINERS: add an explicit credentials entry
cred,rust: mark Credential methods inline
lsm,rust: reword "destroy" -> "release" in SecurityCtx
lsm,rust: mark SecurityCtx methods inline
perf: Remove unnecessary parameter of security check
lsm: fix a missing security_uring_allowed() prototype
io_uring,lsm,selinux: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()
io_uring: refactor io_uring_allowed()
- loadpin: remove unsupported MODULE_COMPRESS_NONE (Arulpandiyan Vadivel)
- samples/check-exec: Fix script name (Mickaël Salaün)
- yama: remove needless locking in yama_task_prctl() (Oleg Nesterov)
- lib/string_choices: Sort by function name (R Sundar)
- hardening: Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time
(Mel Gorman)
- uaccess: Split out compile-time checks into ucopysize.h
- kbuild: clang: Support building UM with SUBARCH=i386
- x86: Enable i386 FORTIFY_SOURCE on Clang 16+
- ubsan/overflow: Rework integer overflow sanitizer option
- Add missing __nonstring annotations for callers of memtostr*()/strtomem*()
- Add __must_be_noncstr() and have memtostr*()/strtomem*() check for it
- Introduce __nonstring_array for silencing future GCC 15 warnings
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Merge tag 'hardening-v6.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull hardening updates from Kees Cook:
"As usual, it's scattered changes all over. Patches touching things
outside of our traditional areas in the tree have been Acked by
maintainers or were trivial changes:
- loadpin: remove unsupported MODULE_COMPRESS_NONE (Arulpandiyan
Vadivel)
- samples/check-exec: Fix script name (Mickaël Salaün)
- yama: remove needless locking in yama_task_prctl() (Oleg Nesterov)
- lib/string_choices: Sort by function name (R Sundar)
- hardening: Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile
time (Mel Gorman)
- uaccess: Split out compile-time checks into ucopysize.h
- kbuild: clang: Support building UM with SUBARCH=i386
- x86: Enable i386 FORTIFY_SOURCE on Clang 16+
- ubsan/overflow: Rework integer overflow sanitizer option
- Add missing __nonstring annotations for callers of
memtostr*()/strtomem*()
- Add __must_be_noncstr() and have memtostr*()/strtomem*() check for
it
- Introduce __nonstring_array for silencing future GCC 15 warnings"
* tag 'hardening-v6.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (26 commits)
compiler_types: Introduce __nonstring_array
hardening: Enable i386 FORTIFY_SOURCE on Clang 16+
x86/build: Remove -ffreestanding on i386 with GCC
ubsan/overflow: Enable ignorelist parsing and add type filter
ubsan/overflow: Enable pattern exclusions
ubsan/overflow: Rework integer overflow sanitizer option to turn on everything
samples/check-exec: Fix script name
yama: don't abuse rcu_read_lock/get_task_struct in yama_task_prctl()
kbuild: clang: Support building UM with SUBARCH=i386
loadpin: remove MODULE_COMPRESS_NONE as it is no longer supported
lib/string_choices: Rearrange functions in sorted order
string.h: Validate memtostr*()/strtomem*() arguments more carefully
compiler.h: Introduce __must_be_noncstr()
nilfs2: Mark on-disk strings as nonstring
uapi: stddef.h: Introduce __kernel_nonstring
x86/tdx: Mark message.bytes as nonstring
string: kunit: Mark nonstring test strings as __nonstring
scsi: qla2xxx: Mark device strings as nonstring
scsi: mpt3sas: Mark device strings as nonstring
scsi: mpi3mr: Mark device strings as nonstring
...
Use the "struct" keyword in kernel-doc when describing struct
ipefs_file. Add kernel-doc for the struct members also.
Don't use kernel-doc notation for 'policy_subdir'. kernel-doc does
not support documentation comments for data definitions.
This eliminates multiple kernel-doc warnings:
security/ipe/policy_fs.c:21: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'struct ipefs_file '
security/ipe/policy_fs.c:407: warning: cannot understand function prototype: 'const struct ipefs_file policy_subdir[] = '
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'vfs-6.15-rc1.async.dir' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs async dir updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains cleanups that fell out of the work from async directory
handling:
- Change kern_path_locked() and user_path_locked_at() to never return
a negative dentry. This simplifies the usability of these helpers
in various places
- Drop d_exact_alias() from the remaining place in NFS where it is
still used. This also allows us to drop the d_exact_alias() helper
completely
- Drop an unnecessary call to fh_update() from nfsd_create_locked()
- Change i_op->mkdir() to return a struct dentry
Change vfs_mkdir() to return a dentry provided by the filesystems
which is hashed and positive. This allows us to reduce the number
of cases where the resulting dentry is not positive to very few
cases. The code in these places becomes simpler and easier to
understand.
- Repack DENTRY_* and LOOKUP_* flags"
* tag 'vfs-6.15-rc1.async.dir' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
doc: fix inline emphasis warning
VFS: Change vfs_mkdir() to return the dentry.
nfs: change mkdir inode_operation to return alternate dentry if needed.
fuse: return correct dentry for ->mkdir
ceph: return the correct dentry on mkdir
hostfs: store inode in dentry after mkdir if possible.
Change inode_operations.mkdir to return struct dentry *
nfsd: drop fh_update() from S_IFDIR branch of nfsd_create_locked()
nfs/vfs: discard d_exact_alias()
VFS: add common error checks to lookup_one_qstr_excl()
VFS: change kern_path_locked() and user_path_locked_at() to never return negative dentry
VFS: repack LOOKUP_ bit flags.
VFS: repack DENTRY_ flags.
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Merge tag 'vfs-6.15-rc1.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs mount updates from Christian Brauner:
- Mount notifications
The day has come where we finally provide a new api to listen for
mount topology changes outside of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo. A mount
namespace file descriptor can be supplied and registered with
fanotify to listen for mount topology changes.
Currently notifications for mount, umount and moving mounts are
generated. The generated notification record contains the unique
mount id of the mount.
The listmount() and statmount() api can be used to query detailed
information about the mount using the received unique mount id.
This allows userspace to figure out exactly how the mount topology
changed without having to generating diffs of /proc/<pid>/mountinfo
in userspace.
- Support O_PATH file descriptors with FSCONFIG_SET_FD in the new mount
api
- Support detached mounts in overlayfs
Since last cycle we support specifying overlayfs layers via file
descriptors. However, we don't allow detached mounts which means
userspace cannot user file descriptors received via
open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) and fsmount() directly. They have to
attach them to a mount namespace via move_mount() first.
This is cumbersome and means they have to undo mounts via umount().
Allow them to directly use detached mounts.
- Allow to retrieve idmappings with statmount
Currently it isn't possible to figure out what idmapping has been
attached to an idmapped mount. Add an extension to statmount() which
allows to read the idmapping from the mount.
- Allow creating idmapped mounts from mounts that are already idmapped
So far it isn't possible to allow the creation of idmapped mounts
from already idmapped mounts as this has significant lifetime
implications. Make the creation of idmapped mounts atomic by allow to
pass struct mount_attr together with the open_tree_attr() system call
allowing to solve these issues without complicating VFS lookup in any
way.
The system call has in general the benefit that creating a detached
mount and applying mount attributes to it becomes an atomic operation
for userspace.
- Add a way to query statmount() for supported options
Allow userspace to query which mount information can be retrieved
through statmount().
- Allow superblock owners to force unmount
* tag 'vfs-6.15-rc1.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (21 commits)
umount: Allow superblock owners to force umount
selftests: add tests for mount notification
selinux: add FILE__WATCH_MOUNTNS
samples/vfs: fix printf format string for size_t
fs: allow changing idmappings
fs: add kflags member to struct mount_kattr
fs: add open_tree_attr()
fs: add copy_mount_setattr() helper
fs: add vfs_open_tree() helper
statmount: add a new supported_mask field
samples/vfs: add STATMOUNT_MNT_{G,U}IDMAP
selftests: add tests for using detached mount with overlayfs
samples/vfs: check whether flag was raised
statmount: allow to retrieve idmappings
uidgid: add map_id_range_up()
fs: allow detached mounts in clone_private_mount()
selftests/overlayfs: test specifying layers as O_PATH file descriptors
fs: support O_PATH fds with FSCONFIG_SET_FD
vfs: add notifications for mount attach and detach
fanotify: notify on mount attach and detach
...
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Merge tag 'vfs-6.15-rc1.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull misc vfs updates from Christian Brauner:
"Features:
- Add CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS infrastucture:
- Catch invalid modes in open
- Use the new debug macros in inode_set_cached_link()
- Use debug-only asserts around fd allocation and install
- Place f_ref to 3rd cache line in struct file to resolve false
sharing
Cleanups:
- Start using anon_inode_getfile_fmode() helper in various places
- Don't take f_lock during SEEK_CUR if exclusion is guaranteed by
f_pos_lock
- Add unlikely() to kcmp()
- Remove legacy ->remount_fs method from ecryptfs after port to the
new mount api
- Remove invalidate_inodes() in favour of evict_inodes()
- Simplify ep_busy_loopER by removing unused argument
- Avoid mmap sem relocks when coredumping with many missing pages
- Inline getname()
- Inline new_inode_pseudo() and de-staticize alloc_inode()
- Dodge an atomic in putname if ref == 1
- Consistently deref the files table with rcu_dereference_raw()
- Dedup handling of struct filename init and refcounts bumps
- Use wq_has_sleeper() in end_dir_add()
- Drop the lock trip around I_NEW wake up in evict()
- Load the ->i_sb pointer once in inode_sb_list_{add,del}
- Predict not reaching the limit in alloc_empty_file()
- Tidy up do_sys_openat2() with likely/unlikely
- Call inode_sb_list_add() outside of inode hash lock
- Sort out fd allocation vs dup2 race commentary
- Turn page_offset() into a wrapper around folio_pos()
- Remove locking in exportfs around ->get_parent() call
- try_lookup_one_len() does not need any locks in autofs
- Fix return type of several functions from long to int in open
- Fix return type of several functions from long to int in ioctls
Fixes:
- Fix watch queue accounting mismatch"
* tag 'vfs-6.15-rc1.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (30 commits)
fs: sort out fd allocation vs dup2 race commentary, take 2
fs: call inode_sb_list_add() outside of inode hash lock
fs: tidy up do_sys_openat2() with likely/unlikely
fs: predict not reaching the limit in alloc_empty_file()
fs: load the ->i_sb pointer once in inode_sb_list_{add,del}
fs: drop the lock trip around I_NEW wake up in evict()
fs: use wq_has_sleeper() in end_dir_add()
VFS/autofs: try_lookup_one_len() does not need any locks
fs: dedup handling of struct filename init and refcounts bumps
fs: consistently deref the files table with rcu_dereference_raw()
exportfs: remove locking around ->get_parent() call.
fs: use debug-only asserts around fd allocation and install
fs: dodge an atomic in putname if ref == 1
vfs: Remove invalidate_inodes()
ecryptfs: remove NULL remount_fs from super_operations
watch_queue: fix pipe accounting mismatch
fs: place f_ref to 3rd cache line in struct file to resolve false sharing
epoll: simplify ep_busy_loop by removing always 0 argument
fs: Turn page_offset() into a wrapper around folio_pos()
kcmp: improve performance adding an unlikely hint to task comparisons
...
Once a key's reference count has been reduced to 0, the garbage collector
thread may destroy it at any time and so key_put() is not allowed to touch
the key after that point. The most key_put() is normally allowed to do is
to touch key_gc_work as that's a static global variable.
However, in an effort to speed up the reclamation of quota, this is now
done in key_put() once the key's usage is reduced to 0 - but now the code
is looking at the key after the deadline, which is forbidden.
Fix this by using a flag to indicate that a key can be gc'd now rather than
looking at the key's refcount in the garbage collector.
Fixes: 9578e327b2 ("keys: update key quotas in key_put()")
Reported-by: syzbot+6105ffc1ded71d194d6d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/673b6aec.050a0220.87769.004a.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: syzbot+6105ffc1ded71d194d6d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Potentially include errata for Landlock ABI v5 (Linux 6.10) and v6
(Linux 6.12). That will be useful for the following signal scoping
erratum.
As explained in errata.h, this commit should be backportable without
conflict down to ABI v5. It must then not include the errata/abi-6.h
file.
Fixes: 54a6e6bbf3 ("landlock: Add signal scoping")
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318161443.279194-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Some fixes may require user space to check if they are applied on the
running kernel before using a specific feature. For instance, this
applies when a restriction was previously too restrictive and is now
getting relaxed (e.g. for compatibility reasons). However, non-visible
changes for legitimate use (e.g. security fixes) do not require an
erratum.
Because fixes are backported down to a specific Landlock ABI, we need a
way to avoid cherry-pick conflicts. The solution is to only update a
file related to the lower ABI impacted by this issue. All the ABI files
are then used to create a bitmask of fixes.
The new errata interface is similar to the one used to get the supported
Landlock ABI version, but it returns a bitmask instead because the order
of fixes may not match the order of versions, and not all fixes may
apply to all versions.
The actual errata will come with dedicated commits. The description is
not actually used in the code but serves as documentation.
Create the landlock_abi_version symbol and use its value to check errata
consistency.
Update test_base's create_ruleset_checks_ordering tests and add errata
tests.
This commit is backportable down to the first version of Landlock.
Fixes: 3532b0b435 ("landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features")
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318161443.279194-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
To ease backports in setup.c, let's group changes from
__lsm_ro_after_init to __ro_after_init with commit f22f9aaf6c
("selinux: remove the runtime disable functionality"), and the
landlock_lsmid addition with commit f3b8788cde ("LSM: Identify modules
by more than name").
That will help to backport the following errata.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250318161443.279194-2-mic@digikod.net
Fixes: f3b8788cde ("LSM: Identify modules by more than name")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Any driver that needs these library functions should already be selecting
the corresponding Kconfig symbols, so there is no real point in making
these visible.
The original patch that made these user selectable described problems
with drivers failing to select the code they use, but for consistency
it's better to always use 'select' on a symbol than to mix it with
'depends on'.
Fixes: e56e189855 ("lib/crypto: add prompts back to crypto libraries")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Retrieve the netif_wildcard policy capability in security_netif_sid()
from the locked active policy instead of the cached value in
selinux_state.
Fixes: 8af43b61c1 ("selinux: support wildcard network interface names")
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: /netlabel/netif/ due to a typo in the description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Certain bpf syscall subcommands are available for usage from both
userspace and the kernel. LSM modules or eBPF gatekeeper programs may
need to take a different course of action depending on whether or not
a BPF syscall originated from the kernel or userspace.
Additionally, some of the bpf_attr struct fields contain pointers to
arbitrary memory. Currently the functionality to determine whether or
not a pointer refers to kernel memory or userspace memory is exposed
to the bpf verifier, but that information is missing from various LSM
hooks.
Here we augment the LSM hooks to provide this data, by simply passing
a boolean flag indicating whether or not the call originated in the
kernel, in any hook that contains a bpf_attr struct that corresponds
to a subcommand that may be called from the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250310221737.821889-2-bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Remove my old, no longer functioning, email address from comments.
Could alternatively replace with my current email but seems
redundant with MAINTAINERS and prone to being out of date.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge 6.14-rc6 into driver-core-next
We need the driver core fix in here as well.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The function can be replaced by evict_inodes. The only difference is
that evict_inodes() skips the inodes with positive refcount without
touching ->i_lock, but they are equivalent as evict_inodes() repeats the
refcount check after having grabbed ->i_lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250307144318.28120-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
The vanilla has_capability() function has been unused since 2018's
commit dcb569cf6a ("Smack: ptrace capability use fixes")
Remove it.
Fixup a comment in security/commoncap.c that referenced it.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <linux@treblig.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>
current->group_leader is stable, no need to take rcu_read_lock() and do
get/put_task_struct().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250219161417.GA20851@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Add support for wildcard matching of network interface names. This is
useful for auto-generated interfaces, for example podman creates network
interfaces for containers with the naming scheme podman0, podman1,
podman2, ...
To maintain backward compatibility guard this feature with a new policy
capability 'netif_wildcard'.
Netifcon definitions are compared against in the order given by the
policy, so userspace tools should sort them in a reasonable order.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Updated the MODULE_COMPRESS_NONE with MODULE_COMPRESS as it was no longer
available from kernel modules. As MODULE_COMPRESS and MODULE_DECOMPRESS
depends on MODULES removing MODULES as well.
Fixes: c7ff693fa2 ("module: Split modules_install compression and in-kernel decompression")
Signed-off-by: Arulpandiyan Vadivel <arulpandiyan.vadivel@siemens.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250302103831.285381-1-arulpandiyan.vadivel@siemens.com
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
FORTIFY_SOURCE is a hardening option both at build and runtime. Move
it under 'Kernel hardening options'.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250123221115.19722-5-mgorman@techsingularity.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
HARDENED_USERCOPY defaults to on if enabled at compile time. Allow
hardened_usercopy= default to be set at compile time similar to
init_on_alloc= and init_on_free=. The intent is that hardening
options that can be disabled at runtime can set their default at
build time.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250123221115.19722-3-mgorman@techsingularity.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
There is a submenu for 'Kernel hardening options' under "Security".
Move HARDENED_USERCOPY under the hardening options as it is clearly
related.
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250123221115.19722-2-mgorman@techsingularity.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Some filesystems, such as NFS, cifs, ceph, and fuse, do not have
complete control of sequencing on the actual filesystem (e.g. on a
different server) and may find that the inode created for a mkdir
request already exists in the icache and dcache by the time the mkdir
request returns. For example, if the filesystem is mounted twice the
directory could be visible on the other mount before it is on the
original mount, and a pair of name_to_handle_at(), open_by_handle_at()
calls could instantiate the directory inode with an IS_ROOT() dentry
before the first mkdir returns.
This means that the dentry passed to ->mkdir() may not be the one that
is associated with the inode after the ->mkdir() completes. Some
callers need to interact with the inode after the ->mkdir completes and
they currently need to perform a lookup in the (rare) case that the
dentry is no longer hashed.
This lookup-after-mkdir requires that the directory remains locked to
avoid races. Planned future patches to lock the dentry rather than the
directory will mean that this lookup cannot be performed atomically with
the mkdir.
To remove this barrier, this patch changes ->mkdir to return the
resulting dentry if it is different from the one passed in.
Possible returns are:
NULL - the directory was created and no other dentry was used
ERR_PTR() - an error occurred
non-NULL - this other dentry was spliced in
This patch only changes file-systems to return "ERR_PTR(err)" instead of
"err" or equivalent transformations. Subsequent patches will make
further changes to some file-systems to return a correct dentry.
Not all filesystems reliably result in a positive hashed dentry:
- NFS, cifs, hostfs will sometimes need to perform a lookup of
the name to get inode information. Races could result in this
returning something different. Note that this lookup is
non-atomic which is what we are trying to avoid. Placing the
lookup in filesystem code means it only happens when the filesystem
has no other option.
- kernfs and tracefs leave the dentry negative and the ->revalidate
operation ensures that lookup will be called to correctly populate
the dentry. This could be fixed but I don't think it is important
to any of the users of vfs_mkdir() which look at the dentry.
The recommendation to use
d_drop();d_splice_alias()
is ugly but fits with current practice. A planned future patch will
change this.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250227013949.536172-2-neilb@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Although the LSM hooks for loading kernel modules were later generalized
to cover loading other kinds of files, SELinux didn't implement
corresponding permission checks, leaving only the module case covered.
Define and add new permission checks for these other cases.
Signed-off-by: Cameron K. Williams <ckwilliams.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kipp N. Davis <kippndavis.work@gmx.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, line length, and spacing fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'landlock-6.14-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull landlock fixes from Mickaël Salaün:
"Fixes to TCP socket identification, documentation, and tests"
* tag 'landlock-6.14-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
selftests/landlock: Add binaries to .gitignore
selftests/landlock: Test that MPTCP actions are not restricted
selftests/landlock: Test TCP accesses with protocol=IPPROTO_TCP
landlock: Fix non-TCP sockets restriction
landlock: Minor typo and grammar fixes in IPC scoping documentation
landlock: Fix grammar error
selftests/landlock: Enable the new CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB
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Merge tag 'integrity-v6.14-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity fixes from Mimi Zohar:
"One bugfix and one spelling cleanup. The bug fix restores a
performance improvement"
* tag 'integrity-v6.14-fix' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Reset IMA_NONACTION_RULE_FLAGS after post_setattr
integrity: fix typos and spelling errors
It seems that the attr parameter was never been used in security
checks since it was first introduced by:
commit da97e18458 ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks")
so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun@huaweicloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
If SMACK label has CIPSO representation w/o categories, e.g.:
| # cat /smack/cipso2
| foo 10
| @ 250/2
| ...
then SMACK does not recognize such CIPSO in input ipv4 packets
and substitues '*' label instead. Audit records may look like
| lsm=SMACK fn=smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb action=denied
| subject="*" object="_" requested=w pid=0 comm="swapper/1" ...
This happens in two steps:
1) security/smack/smackfs.c`smk_set_cipso
does not clear NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT
from (struct smack_known *)skp->smk_netlabel.flags
on assigning CIPSO w/o categories:
| rcu_assign_pointer(skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat, ncats.attr.mls.cat);
| skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = ncats.attr.mls.lvl;
2) security/smack/smack_lsm.c`smack_from_secattr
can not match skp->smk_netlabel with input packet's
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap
because sap->flags have not NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT (what is correct)
but skp->smk_netlabel.flags have (what is incorrect):
| if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
| if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
| NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
| found = 1;
| break;
| }
This commit sets/clears NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT in
skp->smk_netlabel.flags according to the presense of CIPSO categories.
The update of smk_netlabel is not atomic, so input packets processing
still may be incorrect during short time while update proceeds.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This reverts commit ccfd889acb
The indicated commit
* does not describe the problem that change tries to solve
* has programming issues
* introduces a bug: forever clears NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT
in (struct smack_known *)skp->smk_netlabel.flags
Reverting the commit to reapproach original problem
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Using RCU lifetime rules to access kernfs_node::name can avoid the
trouble with kernfs_rename_lock in kernfs_name() and kernfs_path_from_node()
if the fs was created with KERNFS_ROOT_INVARIANT_PARENT. This is usefull
as it allows to implement kernfs_path_from_node() only with RCU
protection and avoiding kernfs_rename_lock. The lock is only required if
the __parent node can be changed and the function requires an unchanged
hierarchy while it iterates from the node to its parent.
The change is needed to allow the lookup of the node's path
(kernfs_path_from_node()) from context which runs always with disabled
preemption and or interrutps even on PREEMPT_RT. The problem is that
kernfs_rename_lock becomes a sleeping lock on PREEMPT_RT.
I went through all ::name users and added the required access for the lookup
with a few extensions:
- rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_create() drops all locks and then uses the name
later on. resctrl supports rename with different parents. Here I made
a temporal copy of the name while it is used outside of the lock.
- kernfs_rename_ns() accepts NULL as new_parent. This simplifies
sysfs_move_dir_ns() where it can set NULL in order to reuse the current
name.
- kernfs_rename_ns() is only using kernfs_rename_lock if the parents are
different. All users use either kernfs_rwsem (for stable path view) or
just RCU for the lookup. The ::name uses always RCU free.
Use RCU lifetime guarantees to access kernfs_node::name.
Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+6ea37e2e6ffccf41a7e6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/67251dc6.050a0220.529b6.015e.GAE@google.com/
Reported-by: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/20241102001224.2789-1-hdanton@sina.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250213145023.2820193-7-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Use sk_is_tcp() to check if socket is TCP in bind(2) and connect(2)
hooks.
SMC, MPTCP, SCTP protocols are currently restricted by TCP access
rights. The purpose of TCP access rights is to provide control over
ports that can be used by userland to establish a TCP connection.
Therefore, it is incorrect to deny bind(2) and connect(2) requests for a
socket of another protocol.
However, SMC, MPTCP and RDS implementations use TCP internal sockets to
establish communication or even to exchange packets over a TCP
connection [1]. Landlock rules that configure bind(2) and connect(2)
usage for TCP sockets should not cover requests for sockets of such
protocols. These protocols have different set of security issues and
security properties, therefore, it is necessary to provide the userland
with the ability to distinguish between them (eg. [2]).
Control over TCP connection used by other protocols can be achieved with
upcoming support of socket creation control [3].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/62336067-18c2-3493-d0ec-6dd6a6d3a1b5@huawei-partners.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241204.fahVio7eicim@digikod.net/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240904104824.1844082-1-ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com/
Closes: https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/40
Fixes: fff69fb03d ("landlock: Support network rules with TCP bind and connect")
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250205093651.1424339-2-ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com
[mic: Format commit message to 72 columns]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
If CONFIG_AUDIT is not set then
SMACK does not generate audit messages,
however, keeps audit control file, /smack/logging,
while there is no entity to control.
This change removes audit control file /smack/logging
when audit is not configured in the kernel
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Since inception [1], SMACK initializes ipv* child socket security
for connection-oriented communications (tcp/sctp/dccp)
during accept() syscall, in the security_sock_graft() hook:
| void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, ...)
| {
| // only ipv4 and ipv6 are eligible here
| // ...
| ssp = sk->sk_security; // socket security
| ssp->smk_in = skp; // process label: smk_of_current()
| ssp->smk_out = skp; // process label: smk_of_current()
| }
This approach is incorrect for two reasons:
A) initialization occurs too late for child socket security:
The child socket is created by the kernel once the handshake
completes (e.g., for tcp: after receiving ack for syn+ack).
Data can legitimately start arriving to the child socket
immediately, long before the application calls accept()
on the socket.
Those data are (currently — were) processed by SMACK using
incorrect child socket security attributes.
B) Incoming connection requests are handled using the listening
socket's security, hence, the child socket must inherit the
listening socket's security attributes.
smack_sock_graft() initilizes the child socket's security with
a process label, as is done for a new socket()
But ... the process label is not necessarily the same as the
listening socket label. A privileged application may legitimately
set other in/out labels for a listening socket.
When this happens, SMACK processes incoming packets using
incorrect socket security attributes.
In [2] Michael Lontke noticed (A) and fixed it in [3] by adding
socket initialization into security_sk_clone_security() hook like
| void smack_sk_clone_security(struct sock *oldsk, struct sock *newsk)
| {
| *(struct socket_smack *)newsk->sk_security =
| *(struct socket_smack *)oldsk->sk_security;
| }
This initializes the child socket security with the parent (listening)
socket security at the appropriate time.
I was forced to revisit this old story because
smack_sock_graft() was left in place by [3] and continues overwriting
the child socket's labels with the process label,
and there might be a reason for this, so I undertook a study.
If the process label differs from the listening socket's labels,
the following occurs for ipv4:
assigning the smk_out is not accompanied by netlbl_sock_setattr,
so the outgoing packet's cipso label does not change.
So, the only effect of this assignment for interhost communications
is a divergence between the program-visible “out” socket label and
the cipso network label. For intrahost communications this label,
however, becomes visible via secmark netfilter marking, and is
checked for access rights by the client, receiving side.
Assigning the smk_in affects both interhost and intrahost
communications: the server begins to check access rights against
an wrong label.
Access check against wrong label (smk_in or smk_out),
unsurprisingly fails, breaking the connection.
The above affects protocols that calls security_sock_graft()
during accept(), namely: {tcp,dccp,sctp}/{ipv4,ipv6}
One extra security_sock_graft() caller, crypto/af_alg.c`af_alg_accept
is not affected, because smack_sock_graft() does nothing for PF_ALG.
To reproduce, assign non-default in/out labels to a listening socket,
setup rules between these labels and client label, attempt to connect
and send some data.
Ipv6 specific: ipv6 packets do not convey SMACK labels. To reproduce
the issue in interhost communications set opposite labels in
/smack/ipv6host on both hosts.
Ipv6 intrahost communications do not require tricking, because SMACK
labels are conveyed via secmark netfilter marking.
So, currently smack_sock_graft() is not useful, but harmful,
therefore, I have removed it.
This fixes the issue for {tcp,dccp}/{ipv4,ipv6},
but not sctp/{ipv4,ipv6}.
Although this change is necessary for sctp+smack to function
correctly, it is not sufficient because:
sctp/ipv4 does not call security_sk_clone() and
sctp/ipv6 ignores SMACK completely.
These are separate issues, belong to other subsystem,
and should be addressed separately.
[1] 2008-02-04,
Fixes: e114e47377 ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
[2] Michael Lontke, 2022-08-31, SMACK LSM checks wrong object label
during ingress network traffic
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/6324997ce4fc092c5020a4add075257f9c5f6442.camel@elektrobit.com/
[3] 2022-08-31, michael.lontke,
commit 4ca165fc6c ("SMACK: Add sk_clone_security LSM hook")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
I want to be sure that ipv6-specific code
is not compiled in kernel binaries
if ipv6 is not configured.
[1] was getting rid of "unused variable" warning, but,
with that, it also mandated compilation of a handful ipv6-
specific functions in ipv4-only kernel configurations:
smk_ipv6_localhost, smack_ipv6host_label, smk_ipv6_check.
Their compiled bodies are likely to be removed by compiler
from the resulting binary, but, to be on the safe side,
I remove them from the compiler view.
[1]
Fixes: 00720f0e7f ("smack: avoid unused 'sip' variable warning")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fix typos and spelling errors in security/smack module comments that
were identified using the codespell tool.
No functional changes - documentation only.
Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
When CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_ASSERTS is disabled, there is a
warning that sock is unused:
security/apparmor/file.c: In function '__file_sock_perm':
security/apparmor/file.c:544:24: warning: unused variable 'sock' [-Wunused-variable]
544 | struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
| ^~~~
sock was moved into aa_sock_file_perm(), where the same check is
present, so remove sock and the assertion from __file_sock_perm() to fix
the warning.
Fixes: c05e705812 ("apparmor: add fine grained af_unix mediation")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202501190757.myuLxLyL-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This follows the established practice and fixes a build failure for me:
security/apparmor/file.c: In function ‘__file_sock_perm’:
security/apparmor/file.c:544:24: error: unused variable ‘sock’ [-Werror=unused-variable]
544 | struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
| ^~~~
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Fix typos and spelling errors in apparmor module comments that were
identified using the codespell tool.
No functional changes - documentation only.
Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
clang warns:
security/apparmor/label.c:206:15: error: address of array 'new->vec' will always evaluate to 'true' [-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion]
206 | AA_BUG(!new->vec);
| ~~~~~~^~~
The address of this array can never be NULL because it is not at the
beginning of a structure. Convert the assertion to check that the new
pointer is not NULL.
Fixes: de4754c801 ("apparmor: carry mediation check on label")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202501191802.bDp2voTJ-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring
because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So,
add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[PM: merge fuzz due to changes in preceding patches, subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 2039bda1fa ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook")
added a new flag to the security_kernel_read_file() LSM hook, "contents",
which was set if a file was being read in its entirety or if it was the
first chunk read in a multi-step process. The SELinux LSM callback was
updated to only check against the file label if this "contents" flag was
set, meaning that in multi-step reads the file label was not considered
in the access control decision after the initial chunk.
Thankfully the only in-tree user that performs a multi-step read is the
"bcm-vk" driver and it is loading firmware, not a kernel module, so there
are no security regressions to worry about. However, we still want to
ensure that the SELinux code does the right thing, and *always* checks
the file label, especially as there is a chance the file could change
between chunk reads.
Fixes: 2039bda1fa ("LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The dac_mmap_min_addr belongs to min_addr.c, move it to
min_addr.c from /kernel/sysctl.c. In the previous Linux kernel
boot process, sysctl_init_bases needs to be executed before
init_mmap_min_addr, So, register_sysctl_init should be executed
before update_mmap_min_addr in init_mmap_min_addr. And according
to the compilation condition in security/Makefile:
obj-$(CONFIG_MMU) += min_addr.o
if CONFIG_MMU is not defined, min_addr.c would not be included in the
compilation process. So, drop the CONFIG_MMU check.
Signed-off-by: Kaixiong Yu <yukaixiong@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>
Commit 0d73a55208 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock")
mistakenly reverted the performance improvement introduced in commit
42a4c60319 ("ima: fix ima_inode_post_setattr"). The unused bit mask was
subsequently removed by commit 11c60f23ed ("integrity: Remove unused
macro IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS").
Restore the performance improvement by introducing the new mask
IMA_NONACTION_RULE_FLAGS, equal to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS without
IMA_NEW_FILE, which is not a rule-specific flag.
Finally, reset IMA_NONACTION_RULE_FLAGS instead of IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS in
process_measurement(), if the IMA_CHANGE_ATTR atomic flag is set (after
file metadata modification).
With this patch, new files for which metadata were modified while they are
still open, can be reopened before the last file close (when security.ima
is written), since the IMA_NEW_FILE flag is not cleared anymore. Otherwise,
appraisal fails because security.ima is missing (files with IMA_NEW_FILE
set are an exception).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.16.x
Fixes: 0d73a55208 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Fix typos and spelling errors in integrity module comments that were
identified using the codespell tool.
No functional changes - documentation only.
Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Fix spelling error in selinux module comments that were identified
using the codespell tool.
No functional changes - documentation only.
Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 08ae2487b2 ("tomoyo: automatically use patterns for several
situations in learning mode") replaced only $PID part of procfs pathname
with \$ pattern. But it turned out that we need to also replace $TID part
and $FD part to make this functionality useful for e.g. /bin/lsof .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Add the const qualifier to all the ctl_tables in the tree except for
watchdog_hardlockup_sysctl, memory_allocation_profiling_sysctls,
loadpin_sysctl_table and the ones calling register_net_sysctl (./net,
drivers/inifiniband dirs). These are special cases as they use a
registration function with a non-const qualified ctl_table argument or
modify the arrays before passing them on to the registration function.
Constifying ctl_table structs will prevent the modification of
proc_handler function pointers as the arrays would reside in .rodata.
This is made possible after commit 78eb4ea25c ("sysctl: treewide:
constify the ctl_table argument of proc_handlers") constified all the
proc_handlers.
Created this by running an spatch followed by a sed command:
Spatch:
virtual patch
@
depends on !(file in "net")
disable optional_qualifier
@
identifier table_name != {
watchdog_hardlockup_sysctl,
iwcm_ctl_table,
ucma_ctl_table,
memory_allocation_profiling_sysctls,
loadpin_sysctl_table
};
@@
+ const
struct ctl_table table_name [] = { ... };
sed:
sed --in-place \
-e "s/struct ctl_table .table = &uts_kern/const struct ctl_table *table = \&uts_kern/" \
kernel/utsname_sysctl.c
Reviewed-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> # for kernel/trace/
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> # SCSI
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> # xfs
Acked-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Acked-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Bill O'Donnell <bodonnel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>
this pull are:
- "lib min_heap: Improve min_heap safety, testing, and documentation"
from Kuan-Wei Chiu provides various tightenings to the min_heap library
code.
- "xarray: extract __xa_cmpxchg_raw" from Tamir Duberstein preforms some
cleanup and Rust preparation in the xarray library code.
- "Update reference to include/asm-<arch>" from Geert Uytterhoeven fixes
pathnames in some code comments.
- "Converge on using secs_to_jiffies()" from Easwar Hariharan uses the
new secs_to_jiffies() in various places where that is appropriate.
- "ocfs2, dlmfs: convert to the new mount API" from Eric Sandeen
switches two filesystems to the new mount API.
- "Convert ocfs2 to use folios" from Matthew Wilcox does that.
- "Remove get_task_comm() and print task comm directly" from Yafang Shao
removes now-unneeded calls to get_task_comm() in various places.
- "squashfs: reduce memory usage and update docs" from Phillip Lougher
implements some memory savings in squashfs and performs some
maintainability work.
- "lib: clarify comparison function requirements" from Kuan-Wei Chiu
tightens the sort code's behaviour and adds some maintenance work.
- "nilfs2: protect busy buffer heads from being force-cleared" from
Ryusuke Konishi fixes an issues in nlifs when the fs is presented with a
corrupted image.
- "nilfs2: fix kernel-doc comments for function return values" from
Ryusuke Konishi fixes some nilfs kerneldoc.
- "nilfs2: fix issues with rename operations" from Ryusuke Konishi
addresses some nilfs BUG_ONs which syzbot was able to trigger.
- "minmax.h: Cleanups and minor optimisations" from David Laight
does some maintenance work on the min/max library code.
- "Fixes and cleanups to xarray" from Kemeng Shi does maintenance work
on the xarray library code.
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Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2025-01-24-23-16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
"Mainly individually changelogged singleton patches. The patch series
in this pull are:
- "lib min_heap: Improve min_heap safety, testing, and documentation"
from Kuan-Wei Chiu provides various tightenings to the min_heap
library code
- "xarray: extract __xa_cmpxchg_raw" from Tamir Duberstein preforms
some cleanup and Rust preparation in the xarray library code
- "Update reference to include/asm-<arch>" from Geert Uytterhoeven
fixes pathnames in some code comments
- "Converge on using secs_to_jiffies()" from Easwar Hariharan uses
the new secs_to_jiffies() in various places where that is
appropriate
- "ocfs2, dlmfs: convert to the new mount API" from Eric Sandeen
switches two filesystems to the new mount API
- "Convert ocfs2 to use folios" from Matthew Wilcox does that
- "Remove get_task_comm() and print task comm directly" from Yafang
Shao removes now-unneeded calls to get_task_comm() in various
places
- "squashfs: reduce memory usage and update docs" from Phillip
Lougher implements some memory savings in squashfs and performs
some maintainability work
- "lib: clarify comparison function requirements" from Kuan-Wei Chiu
tightens the sort code's behaviour and adds some maintenance work
- "nilfs2: protect busy buffer heads from being force-cleared" from
Ryusuke Konishi fixes an issues in nlifs when the fs is presented
with a corrupted image
- "nilfs2: fix kernel-doc comments for function return values" from
Ryusuke Konishi fixes some nilfs kerneldoc
- "nilfs2: fix issues with rename operations" from Ryusuke Konishi
addresses some nilfs BUG_ONs which syzbot was able to trigger
- "minmax.h: Cleanups and minor optimisations" from David Laight does
some maintenance work on the min/max library code
- "Fixes and cleanups to xarray" from Kemeng Shi does maintenance
work on the xarray library code"
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2025-01-24-23-16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (131 commits)
ocfs2: use str_yes_no() and str_no_yes() helper functions
include/linux/lz4.h: add some missing macros
Xarray: use xa_mark_t in xas_squash_marks() to keep code consistent
Xarray: remove repeat check in xas_squash_marks()
Xarray: distinguish large entries correctly in xas_split_alloc()
Xarray: move forward index correctly in xas_pause()
Xarray: do not return sibling entries from xas_find_marked()
ipc/util.c: complete the kernel-doc function descriptions
gcov: clang: use correct function param names
latencytop: use correct kernel-doc format for func params
minmax.h: remove some #defines that are only expanded once
minmax.h: simplify the variants of clamp()
minmax.h: move all the clamp() definitions after the min/max() ones
minmax.h: use BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG() for the lo < hi test in clamp()
minmax.h: reduce the #define expansion of min(), max() and clamp()
minmax.h: update some comments
minmax.h: add whitespace around operators and after commas
nilfs2: do not update mtime of renamed directory that is not moved
nilfs2: handle errors that nilfs_prepare_chunk() may return
CREDITS: fix spelling mistake
...
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Merge tag 'fsnotify_hsm_for_v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs
Pull fsnotify pre-content notification support from Jan Kara:
"This introduces a new fsnotify event (FS_PRE_ACCESS) that gets
generated before a file contents is accessed.
The event is synchronous so if there is listener for this event, the
kernel waits for reply. On success the execution continues as usual,
on failure we propagate the error to userspace. This allows userspace
to fill in file content on demand from slow storage. The context in
which the events are generated has been picked so that we don't hold
any locks and thus there's no risk of a deadlock for the userspace
handler.
The new pre-content event is available only for users with global
CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability (similarly to other parts of fanotify
functionality) and it is an administrator responsibility to make sure
the userspace event handler doesn't do stupid stuff that can DoS the
system.
Based on your feedback from the last submission, fsnotify code has
been improved and now file->f_mode encodes whether pre-content event
needs to be generated for the file so the fast path when nobody wants
pre-content event for the file just grows the additional file->f_mode
check. As a bonus this also removes the checks whether the old
FS_ACCESS event needs to be generated from the fast path. Also the
place where the event is generated during page fault has been moved so
now filemap_fault() generates the event if and only if there is no
uptodate folio in the page cache.
Also we have dropped FS_PRE_MODIFY event as current real-world users
of the pre-content functionality don't really use it so let's start
with the minimal useful feature set"
* tag 'fsnotify_hsm_for_v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs: (21 commits)
fanotify: Fix crash in fanotify_init(2)
fs: don't block write during exec on pre-content watched files
fs: enable pre-content events on supported file systems
ext4: add pre-content fsnotify hook for DAX faults
btrfs: disable defrag on pre-content watched files
xfs: add pre-content fsnotify hook for DAX faults
fsnotify: generate pre-content permission event on page fault
mm: don't allow huge faults for files with pre content watches
fanotify: disable readahead if we have pre-content watches
fanotify: allow to set errno in FAN_DENY permission response
fanotify: report file range info with pre-content events
fanotify: introduce FAN_PRE_ACCESS permission event
fsnotify: generate pre-content permission event on truncate
fsnotify: pass optional file access range in pre-content event
fsnotify: introduce pre-content permission events
fanotify: reserve event bit of deprecated FAN_DIR_MODIFY
fanotify: rename a misnamed constant
fanotify: don't skip extra event info if no info_mode is set
fsnotify: check if file is actually being watched for pre-content events on open
fsnotify: opt-in for permission events at file open time
...
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Merge tag 'bpf-next-6.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Pull bpf updates from Alexei Starovoitov:
"A smaller than usual release cycle.
The main changes are:
- Prepare selftest to run with GCC-BPF backend (Ihor Solodrai)
In addition to LLVM-BPF runs the BPF CI now runs GCC-BPF in compile
only mode. Half of the tests are failing, since support for
btf_decl_tag is still WIP, but this is a great milestone.
- Convert various samples/bpf to selftests/bpf/test_progs format
(Alexis Lothoré and Bastien Curutchet)
- Teach verifier to recognize that array lookup with constant
in-range index will always succeed (Daniel Xu)
- Cleanup migrate disable scope in BPF maps (Hou Tao)
- Fix bpf_timer destroy path in PREEMPT_RT (Hou Tao)
- Always use bpf_mem_alloc in bpf_local_storage in PREEMPT_RT (Martin
KaFai Lau)
- Refactor verifier lock support (Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi)
This is a prerequisite for upcoming resilient spin lock.
- Remove excessive 'may_goto +0' instructions in the verifier that
LLVM leaves when unrolls the loops (Yonghong Song)
- Remove unhelpful bpf_probe_write_user() warning message (Marco
Elver)
- Add fd_array_cnt attribute for prog_load command (Anton Protopopov)
This is a prerequisite for upcoming support for static_branch"
* tag 'bpf-next-6.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (125 commits)
selftests/bpf: Add some tests related to 'may_goto 0' insns
bpf: Remove 'may_goto 0' instruction in opt_remove_nops()
bpf: Allow 'may_goto 0' instruction in verifier
selftests/bpf: Add test case for the freeing of bpf_timer
bpf: Cancel the running bpf_timer through kworker for PREEMPT_RT
bpf: Free element after unlock in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem()
bpf: Bail out early in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem()
bpf: Free special fields after unlock in htab_lru_map_delete_node()
tools: Sync if_xdp.h uapi tooling header
libbpf: Work around kernel inconsistently stripping '.llvm.' suffix
bpf: selftests: verifier: Add nullness elision tests
bpf: verifier: Support eliding map lookup nullness
bpf: verifier: Refactor helper access type tracking
bpf: tcp: Mark bpf_load_hdr_opt() arg2 as read-write
bpf: verifier: Add missing newline on verbose() call
selftests/bpf: Add distilled BTF test about marking BTF_IS_EMBEDDED
libbpf: Fix incorrect traversal end type ID when marking BTF_IS_EMBEDDED
libbpf: Fix return zero when elf_begin failed
selftests/bpf: Fix btf leak on new btf alloc failure in btf_distill test
veristat: Load struct_ops programs only once
...
This branch contains basically the same two patches as last time:
1. A patch by Paul Moore to remove the cap_mmap_file() hook, as it simply
returned the default return value and so doesn't need to exist.
2. A patch by Jordan Rome to add a trace event for cap_capable(), updated
to address your feedback during the last cycle.
Both patches have been sitting in linux-next since 6.13-rc1 with no
issues.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
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Merge tag 'caps-6.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux
Pull capabilities updates from Serge Hallyn:
- remove the cap_mmap_file() hook, as it simply returned the default
return value and so doesn't need to exist (Paul Moore)
- add a trace event for cap_capable() (Jordan Rome)
* tag 'caps-6.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux:
security: add trace event for cap_capable
capabilities: remove cap_mmap_file()
- Implement AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) (Mickaël Salaün)
- Implement EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
(Mickaël Salaün)
- Add selftests and samples for AT_EXECVE_CHECK (Mickaël Salaün)
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Merge tag 'AT_EXECVE_CHECK-v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull AT_EXECVE_CHECK from Kees Cook:
- Implement AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) (Mickaël Salaün)
- Implement EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
(Mickaël Salaün)
- Add selftests and samples for AT_EXECVE_CHECK (Mickaël Salaün)
* tag 'AT_EXECVE_CHECK-v6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
ima: instantiate the bprm_creds_for_exec() hook
samples/check-exec: Add an enlighten "inc" interpreter and 28 tests
selftests: ktap_helpers: Fix uninitialized variable
samples/check-exec: Add set-exec
selftests/landlock: Add tests for execveat + AT_EXECVE_CHECK
selftests/exec: Add 32 tests for AT_EXECVE_CHECK and exec securebits
security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits
exec: Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2)
Tetsuo Handa (3):
tomoyo: automatically use patterns for several situations in learning mode
tomoyo: use realpath if symlink's pathname refers to procfs
tomoyo: don't emit warning in tomoyo_write_control()
security/tomoyo/common.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/tomoyo/domain.c | 11 +++++++++--
2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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Merge tag 'tomoyo-pr-20250123' of git://git.code.sf.net/p/tomoyo/tomoyo
Pull tomoyo updates from Tetsuo Handa:
"Small changes to improve usability"
* tag 'tomoyo-pr-20250123' of git://git.code.sf.net/p/tomoyo/tomoyo:
tomoyo: automatically use patterns for several situations in learning mode
tomoyo: use realpath if symlink's pathname refers to procfs
tomoyo: don't emit warning in tomoyo_write_control()
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Merge tag 'landlock-6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün:
"This mostly factors out some Landlock code and prepares for upcoming
audit support.
Because files with invalid modes might be visible after filesystem
corruption, Landlock now handles those weird files too.
A few sample and test issues are also fixed"
* tag 'landlock-6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
selftests/landlock: Add layout1.umount_sandboxer tests
selftests/landlock: Add wrappers.h
selftests/landlock: Fix error message
landlock: Optimize file path walks and prepare for audit support
selftests/landlock: Add test to check partial access in a mount tree
landlock: Align partial refer access checks with final ones
landlock: Simplify initially denied access rights
landlock: Move access types
landlock: Factor out check_access_path()
selftests/landlock: Fix build with non-default pthread linking
landlock: Use scoped guards for ruleset in landlock_add_rule()
landlock: Use scoped guards for ruleset
landlock: Constify get_mode_access()
landlock: Handle weird files
samples/landlock: Fix possible NULL dereference in parse_path()
selftests/landlock: Remove unused macros in ptrace_test.c
Here's the keys changes for 6.14-rc1.
BR, Jarkko
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Merge tag 'keys-next-6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull keys updates from Jarkko Sakkinen.
Avoid using stack addresses for sg lists. And a cleanup.
* tag 'keys-next-6.14-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix improper sg use with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y
keys: drop shadowing dead prototype
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20250121' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Extended permissions supported in conditional policy
The SELinux extended permissions, aka "xperms", allow security admins
to target individuals ioctls, and recently netlink messages, with
their SELinux policy. Adding support for conditional policies allows
admins to toggle the granular xperms using SELinux booleans, helping
pave the way for greater use of xperms in general purpose SELinux
policies. This change bumps the maximum SELinux policy version to 34.
- Fix a SCTP/SELinux error return code inconsistency
Depending on the loaded SELinux policy, specifically it's
EXTSOCKCLASS support, the bind(2) LSM/SELinux hook could return
different error codes due to the SELinux code checking the socket's
SELinux object class (which can vary depending on EXTSOCKCLASS) and
not the socket's sk_protocol field. We fix this by doing the obvious,
and looking at the sock->sk_protocol field instead of the object
class.
- Makefile fixes to properly cleanup av_permissions.h
Add av_permissions.h to "targets" so that it is properly cleaned up
using the kbuild infrastructure.
- A number of smaller improvements by Christian Göttsche
A variety of straightforward changes to reduce code duplication,
reduce pointer lookups, migrate void pointers to defined types,
simplify code, constify function parameters, and correct iterator
types.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20250121' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policy
selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datum
selinux: use known type instead of void pointer
selinux: rename comparison functions for clarity
selinux: rework match_ipv6_addrmask()
selinux: constify and reconcile function parameter names
selinux: avoid using types indicating user space interaction
selinux: supply missing field initializers
selinux: add netlink nlmsg_type audit message
selinux: add support for xperms in conditional policies
selinux: Fix SCTP error inconsistency in selinux_socket_bind()
selinux: use native iterator types
selinux: add generated av_permissions.h to targets
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20250121' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Improved handling of LSM "secctx" strings through lsm_context struct
The LSM secctx string interface is from an older time when only one
LSM was supported, migrate over to the lsm_context struct to better
support the different LSMs we now have and make it easier to support
new LSMs in the future.
These changes explain the Rust, VFS, and networking changes in the
diffstat.
- Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are
enabled
Small tweak to be a bit smarter about when we build the LSM's common
audit helpers.
- Check for absurdly large policies from userspace in SafeSetID
SafeSetID policies rules are fairly small, basically just "UID:UID",
it easy to impose a limit of KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE on policy writes which
helps quiet a number of syzbot related issues. While work is being
done to address the syzbot issues through other mechanisms, this is a
trivial and relatively safe fix that we can do now.
- Various minor improvements and cleanups
A collection of improvements to the kernel selftests, constification
of some function parameters, removing redundant assignments, and
local variable renames to improve readability.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20250121' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lockdown: initialize local array before use to quiet static analysis
safesetid: check size of policy writes
net: corrections for security_secid_to_secctx returns
lsm: rename variable to avoid shadowing
lsm: constify function parameters
security: remove redundant assignment to return variable
lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set
selftests: refactor the lsm `flags_overset_lsm_set_self_attr` test
binder: initialize lsm_context structure
rust: replace lsm context+len with lsm_context
lsm: secctx provider check on release
lsm: lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security
lsm: use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx
lsm: replace context+len with lsm_context
lsm: ensure the correct LSM context releaser
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Merge tag 'integrity-v6.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"There's just a couple of changes: two kernel messages addressed, a
measurement policy collision addressed, and one policy cleanup.
Please note that the contents of the IMA measurement list is
potentially affected. The builtin tmpfs IMA policy rule change might
introduce additional measurements, while detecting a reboot might
eliminate some measurements"
* tag 'integrity-v6.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: ignore suffixed policy rule comments
ima: limit the builtin 'tcb' dont_measure tmpfs policy rule
ima: kexec: silence RCU list traversal warning
ima: Suspend PCR extends and log appends when rebooting
With vmalloc stack addresses enabled (CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y) DCP trusted
keys can crash during en- and decryption of the blob encryption key via
the DCP crypto driver. This is caused by improperly using sg_init_one()
with vmalloc'd stack buffers (plain_key_blob).
Fix this by always using kmalloc() for buffers we give to the DCP crypto
driver.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10+
Fixes: 0e28bf61a5 ("KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key")
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'vfs-6.14-rc1.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull misc vfs updates from Christian Brauner:
"Features:
- Support caching symlink lengths in inodes
The size is stored in a new union utilizing the same space as
i_devices, thus avoiding growing the struct or taking up any more
space
When utilized it dodges strlen() in vfs_readlink(), giving about
1.5% speed up when issuing readlink on /initrd.img on ext4
- Add RWF_DONTCACHE iocb and FOP_DONTCACHE file_operations flag
If a file system supports uncached buffered IO, it may set
FOP_DONTCACHE and enable support for RWF_DONTCACHE.
If RWF_DONTCACHE is attempted without the file system supporting
it, it'll get errored with -EOPNOTSUPP
- Enable VBOXGUEST and VBOXSF_FS on ARM64
Now that VirtualBox is able to run as a host on arm64 (e.g. the
Apple M3 processors) we can enable VBOXSF_FS (and in turn
VBOXGUEST) for this architecture.
Tested with various runs of bonnie++ and dbench on an Apple MacBook
Pro with the latest Virtualbox 7.1.4 r165100 installed
Cleanups:
- Delay sysctl_nr_open check in expand_files()
- Use kernel-doc includes in fiemap docbook
- Use page->private instead of page->index in watch_queue
- Use a consume fence in mnt_idmap() as it's heavily used in
link_path_walk()
- Replace magic number 7 with ARRAY_SIZE() in fc_log
- Sort out a stale comment about races between fd alloc and dup2()
- Fix return type of do_mount() from long to int
- Various cosmetic cleanups for the lockref code
Fixes:
- Annotate spinning as unlikely() in __read_seqcount_begin
The annotation already used to be there, but got lost in commit
52ac39e5db ("seqlock: seqcount_t: Implement all read APIs as
statement expressions")
- Fix proc_handler for sysctl_nr_open
- Flush delayed work in delayed fput()
- Fix grammar and spelling in propagate_umount()
- Fix ESP not readable during coredump
In /proc/PID/stat, there is the kstkesp field which is the stack
pointer of a thread. While the thread is active, this field reads
zero. But during a coredump, it should have a valid value
However, at the moment, kstkesp is zero even during coredump
- Don't wake up the writer if the pipe is still full
- Fix unbalanced user_access_end() in select code"
* tag 'vfs-6.14-rc1.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (28 commits)
gfs2: use lockref_init for qd_lockref
erofs: use lockref_init for pcl->lockref
dcache: use lockref_init for d_lockref
lockref: add a lockref_init helper
lockref: drop superfluous externs
lockref: use bool for false/true returns
lockref: improve the lockref_get_not_zero description
lockref: remove lockref_put_not_zero
fs: Fix return type of do_mount() from long to int
select: Fix unbalanced user_access_end()
vbox: Enable VBOXGUEST and VBOXSF_FS on ARM64
pipe_read: don't wake up the writer if the pipe is still full
selftests: coredump: Add stackdump test
fs/proc: do_task_stat: Fix ESP not readable during coredump
fs: add RWF_DONTCACHE iocb and FOP_DONTCACHE file_operations flag
fs: sort out a stale comment about races between fd alloc and dup2
fs: Fix grammar and spelling in propagate_umount()
fs: fc_log replace magic number 7 with ARRAY_SIZE()
fs: use a consume fence in mnt_idmap()
file: flush delayed work in delayed fput()
...
dbus permission queries need to be synced with fine grained unix
mediation to avoid potential policy regressions. To ensure that
dbus queries don't result in a case where fine grained unix mediation
is not being applied but dbus mediation is check the loaded policy
support ABI and abort the query if policy doesn't support the
v9 ABI.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Fine grained unix mediation in Ubuntu used ABI v7, and policy using
this has propogated onto systems where fine grained unix mediation was
not supported. The userspace policy compiler supports downgrading
policy so the policy could be shared without changes.
Unfortunately this had the side effect that policy was not updated for
the none Ubuntu systems and enabling fine grained unix mediation on
those systems means that a new kernel can break a system with existing
policy that worked with the previous kernel. With fine grained af_unix
mediation this regression can easily break the system causing boot to
fail, as it affect unix socket files, non-file based unix sockets, and
dbus communication.
To aoid this regression move fine grained af_unix mediation behind
a new abi. This means that the system's userspace and policy must
be updated to support the new policy before it takes affect and
dropping a new kernel on existing system will not result in a
regression.
The abi bump is done in such a way as existing policy can be activated
on the system by changing the policy abi declaration and existing unix
policy rules will apply. Policy then only needs to be incrementally
updated, can even be backported to existing Ubuntu policy.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Extend af_unix mediation to support fine grained controls based on
the type (abstract, anonymous, fs), the address, and the labeling
on the socket.
This allows for using socket addresses to label and the socket and
control which subjects can communicate.
The unix rule format follows standard apparmor rules except that fs
based unix sockets can be mediated by existing file rules. None fs
unix sockets can be mediated by a unix socket rule. Where The address
of an abstract unix domain socket begins with the @ character, similar
to how they are reported (as paths) by netstat -x. The address then
follows and may contain pattern matching and any characters including
the null character. In apparmor null characters must be specified by
using an escape sequence \000 or \x00. The pattern matching is the
same as is used by file path matching so * will not match / even
though it has no special meaning with in an abstract socket name. Eg.
allow unix addr=@*,
Autobound unix domain sockets have a unix sun_path assigned to them by
the kernel, as such specifying a policy based address is not possible.
The autobinding of sockets can be controlled by specifying the special
auto keyword. Eg.
allow unix addr=auto,
To indicate that the rule only applies to auto binding of unix domain
sockets. It is important to note this only applies to the bind
permission as once the socket is bound to an address it is
indistinguishable from a socket that have an addr bound with a
specified name. When the auto keyword is used with other permissions
or as part of a peer addr it will be replaced with a pattern that can
match an autobound socket. Eg. For some kernels
allow unix rw addr=auto,
It is important to note, this pattern may match abstract sockets that
were not autobound but have an addr that fits what is generated by the
kernel when autobinding a socket.
Anonymous unix domain sockets have no sun_path associated with the
socket address, however it can be specified with the special none
keyword to indicate the rule only applies to anonymous unix domain
sockets. Eg.
allow unix addr=none,
If the address component of a rule is not specified then the rule
applies to autobind, abstract and anonymous sockets.
The label on the socket can be compared using the standard label=
rule conditional. Eg.
allow unix addr=@foo peer=(label=bar),
see man apparmor.d for full syntax description.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Rework match_prot into a common fn that can be shared by all the
networking rules. This will provide compatibility with current socket
mediation, via the early bailout permission encoding.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
There is no need for the kern check to be in the critical section,
it only complicates the code and slows down the case where the
socket is being created by the kernel.
Lifting it out will also allow socket_create to share common template
code, with other socket_permission checks.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The af_select macro just adds a layer of unnecessary abstraction that
makes following what the code is doing harder.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Currently the caps encoding is very limited and can't be used with
conditionals. Allow capabilities to be mediated by the state
machine. This will allow us to add conditionals to capabilities that
aren't possible with the current encoding.
This patch only adds support for using the state machine and retains
the old encoding lookup as part of the runtime mediation code to
support older policy abis. A follow on patch will move backwards
compatibility to a mapping function done at policy load time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
x_table_lookup currently does stacking during label_parse() if the
target specifies a stack but its only caller ensures that it will
never be used with stacking.
Refactor to slightly simplify the code in x_to_label(), this
also fixes a long standing problem where x_to_labels check on stacking
is only on the first element to the table option list, instead of
the element that is found and used.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Previously apparmor has only sent SIGKILL but there are cases where
it can be useful to send a different signal. Allow the profile
to optionally specify a different value.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This is a step towards merging the file and policy state machines.
With the switch to extended permissions the state machine's ACCEPT2
table became unused freeing it up to store state specific flags. The
first flags to be stored are FLAG_OWNER and FLAG other which paves the
way towards merging the file and policydb perms into a single
permission table.
Currently Lookups based on the objects ownership conditional will
still need separate fns, this will be address in a following patch.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
In order to speed up the mediated check, precompute and store the
result as a bit per class type. This will not only allow us to
speed up the mediation check but is also a step to removing the
unconfined special cases as the unconfined check can be replaced
with the generic label_mediates() check.
Note: label check does not currently work for capabilities and resources
which need to have their mediation updated first.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Provide semantics, via fn names, for some checks being done in
file_perm(). This is a preparatory patch for improvements to both
permission caching and delegation, where the check will become more
involved.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
There does not need to be an explicit restriction that unconfined
can't use change_hat. Traditionally unconfined doesn't have hats
so change_hat could not be used. But newer unconfined profiles have
the potential of having hats, and even system unconfined will be
able to be replaced with a profile that allows for hats.
To remain backwards compitible with expected return codes, continue
to return -EPERM if the unconfined profile does not have any hats.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
labels containing more than one entry need to accumulate flag info
from profiles that the label is constructed from. This is done
correctly for labels created by a merge but is not being done for
labels created by an update or directly created via a parse.
This technically is a bug fix, however the effect in current code is
to cause early unconfined bail out to not happen (ie. without the fix
it is slower) on labels that were created via update or a parse.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Currently signal mediation is using a hard coded form of the
RULE_MEDIATES check. This hides the intended semantics, and means this
specific check won't pickup any changes or improvements made in the
RULE_MEDIATES check. Switch to using RULE_MEDIATES().
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
profile_af_perm and profile_af_sk_perm are only ever called after
checking that the profile is not unconfined. So we can drop these
redundant checks.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Remove another case of code duplications. Switch to using the generic
routine instead of the current custom checks.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Make it so apparmor debug output can be controlled by class flags
as well as the debug flag on labels. This provides much finer
control at what is being output so apparmor doesn't flood the
logs with information that is not needed, making it hard to find
what is important.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Remove hard-coded strings by using the str_yes_no() helper function.
Fix a typo in a comment: s/unpritable/unprintable/
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Always synchronize access_masked_parent* with access_request_parent*
according to allowed_parent*. This is required for audit support to be
able to get back to the reason of denial.
In a rename/link action, instead of always checking a rule two times for
the same parent directory of the source and the destination files, only
check it when an action on a child was not already allowed. This also
enables us to keep consistent allowed_parent* status, which is required
to get back to the reason of denial.
For internal mount points, only upgrade allowed_parent* to true but do
not wrongfully set both of them to false otherwise. This is also
required to get back to the reason of denial.
This does not impact the current behavior but slightly optimize code and
prepare for audit support that needs to know the exact reason why an
access was denied.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250108154338.1129069-14-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Fix a logical issue that could have been visible if the source or the
destination of a rename/link action was allowed for either the source or
the destination but not both. However, this logical bug is unreachable
because either:
- the rename/link action is allowed by the access rights tied to the
same mount point (without relying on access rights in a parent mount
point) and the access request is allowed (i.e. allow_parent1 and
allow_parent2 are true in current_check_refer_path),
- or a common rule in a parent mount point updates the access check for
the source and the destination (cf. is_access_to_paths_allowed).
See the following layout1.refer_part_mount_tree_is_allowed test that
work with and without this fix.
This fix does not impact current code but it is required for the audit
support.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250108154338.1129069-12-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Upgrade domain's handled access masks when creating a domain from a
ruleset, instead of converting them at runtime. This is more consistent
and helps with audit support.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250108154338.1129069-7-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Move LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED, access_mask_t, struct
access_mask, and struct access_masks_all to a dedicated access.h file.
Rename LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED to
_LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED to make it clear that it's not part
of UAPI. Add some newlines when appropriate.
This file will be extended with following commits, and it will help to
avoid dependency loops.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250108154338.1129069-6-mic@digikod.net
[mic: Fix rebase conflict because of the new cleanup headers]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Simplify error handling by replacing goto statements with automatic
calls to landlock_put_ruleset() when going out of scope.
This change depends on the TCP support.
Cc: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
Cc: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250113161112.452505-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Simplify error handling by replacing goto statements with automatic
calls to landlock_put_ruleset() when going out of scope.
This change will be easy to backport to v6.6 if needed, only the
kernel.h include line conflicts. As for any other similar changes, we
should be careful when backporting without goto statements.
Add missing include file.
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250113161112.452505-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Since task->comm is guaranteed to be NUL-terminated, we can print it
directly without the need to copy it into a separate buffer. This
simplifies the code and avoids unnecessary operations.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241219023452.69907-5-laoar.shao@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: "André Almeida" <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org>
Cc: Karol Herbst <kherbst@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Cc: Oded Gabbay <ogabbay@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Cc: Simona Vetter <simona@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tvrtko Ursulin <tursulin@ursulin.net>
Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Simplify the call sites, and enable future string validation in a single
place.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Store the owned member of type struct mls_level directly in the parent
struct instead of an extra heap allocation.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Improve type safety and readability by using the known type.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The functions context_cmp(), mls_context_cmp() and ebitmap_cmp() are not
traditional C style compare functions returning -1, 0, and 1 for less
than, equal, and greater than; they only return whether their arguments
are equal.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Constify parameters, add size hints, and simplify control flow.
According to godbolt the same assembly is generated.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Align the parameter names between declarations and definitions, and
constify read-only parameters.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Integer types starting with a double underscore, like __u32, are
intended for usage of variables interacting with user-space.
Just use the plain variant.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Please clang by supplying the missing field initializers in the
secclass_map variable and sel_fill_super() function.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: tweak subj and commit description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20250107' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"A single SELinux patch to address a problem with a single domain using
multiple xperm classes"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20250107' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: match extended permissions to their base permissions
The "file_pattern" keyword was used for automatically recording patternized
pathnames when using the learning mode. This keyword was removed in TOMOYO
2.4 because it is impossible to predefine all possible pathname patterns.
However, since the numeric part of proc:/$PID/ , pipe:[$INO] and
socket:[$INO] has no meaning except $PID == 1, automatically replacing
the numeric part with \$ pattern helps reducing frequency of restarting
the learning mode due to hitting the quota.
Since replacing one digit with \$ pattern requires enlarging string buffer,
and several programs access only $PID == 1, replace only two or more digits
with \$ pattern.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
The static code analysis tool "Coverity Scan" pointed the following
details out for further development considerations:
CID 1486102: Uninitialized scalar variable (UNINIT)
uninit_use_in_call: Using uninitialized value *temp when calling
strlen.
Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
[PM: edit/reformat the description, subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
syzbot attempts to write a buffer with a large size to a sysfs entry
with writes handled by handle_policy_update(), triggering a warning
in kmalloc.
Check the size specified for write buffers before allocating.
Reported-by: syzbot+4eb7a741b3216020043a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4eb7a741b3216020043a
Signed-off-by: Leo Stone <leocstone@gmail.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The function dump_common_audit_data() contains two variables with the
name comm: one declared at the top and one nested one. Rename the
nested variable to improve readability and make future refactorings
of the function less error prone.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: description long line removal, line wrap cleanup, merge fuzz]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The functions print_ipv4_addr() and print_ipv6_addr() are called with
string literals and do not modify these parameters internally.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: cleaned up the description to remove long lines]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In the case where rc is equal to EOPNOTSUPP it is being reassigned a
new value of zero that is never read. The following continue statement
loops back to the next iteration of the lsm_for_each_hook loop and
rc is being re-assigned a new value from the call to getselfattr.
The assignment is redundant and can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[PM: subj tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In commit d1d991efaf ("selinux: Add netlink xperm support") a new
extended permission was added ("nlmsg"). This was the second extended
permission implemented in selinux ("ioctl" being the first one).
Extended permissions are associated with a base permission. It was found
that, in the access vector cache (avc), the extended permission did not
keep track of its base permission. This is an issue for a domain that is
using both extended permissions (i.e., a domain calling ioctl() on a
netlink socket). In this case, the extended permissions were
overlapping.
Keep track of the base permission in the cache. A new field "base_perm"
is added to struct extended_perms_decision to make sure that the
extended permission refers to the correct policy permission. A new field
"base_perms" is added to struct extended_perms to quickly decide if
extended permissions apply.
While it is in theory possible to retrieve the base permission from the
access vector, the same base permission may not be mapped to the same
bit for each class (e.g., "nlmsg" is mapped to a different bit for
"netlink_route_socket" and "netlink_audit_socket"). Instead, use a
constant (AVC_EXT_IOCTL or AVC_EXT_NLMSG) provided by the caller.
Fixes: d1d991efaf ("selinux: Add netlink xperm support")
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When CONFIG_AUDIT is set, its CONFIG_NET dependency is also set, and the
dev_get_by_index and init_net symbols (used by dump_common_audit_data)
are found by the linker. dump_common_audit_data() should then failed to
build when CONFIG_NET is not set. However, because the compiler is
smart, it knows that audit_log_start() always return NULL when
!CONFIG_AUDIT, and it doesn't build the body of common_lsm_audit(). As
a side effect, dump_common_audit_data() is not built and the linker
doesn't error out because of missing symbols.
Let's only build lsm_audit.o when CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are
both set, which is checked with the new CONFIG_HAS_SECURITY_AUDIT.
ipv4_skb_to_auditdata() and ipv6_skb_to_auditdata() are only used by
Smack if CONFIG_AUDIT is set, so they don't need fake implementations.
Because common_lsm_audit() is used in multiple places without
CONFIG_AUDIT checks, add a fake implementation.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241122143353.59367-2-mic@digikod.net
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Lines beginning with '#' in the IMA policy are comments and are ignored.
Instead of placing the rule and comment on separate lines, allow the
comment to be suffixed to the IMA policy rule.
Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
With a custom policy similar to the builtin IMA 'tcb' policy [1], arch
specific policy, and a kexec boot command line measurement policy rule,
the kexec boot command line is not measured due to the dont_measure
tmpfs rule.
Limit the builtin 'tcb' dont_measure tmpfs policy rule to just the
"func=FILE_CHECK" hook. Depending on the end users security threat
model, a custom policy might not even include this dont_measure tmpfs
rule.
Note: as a result of this policy rule change, other measurements might
also be included in the IMA-measurement list that previously weren't
included.
[1] https://ima-doc.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ima-policy.html#ima-tcb
Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The ima_measurements list is append-only and doesn't require
rcu_read_lock() protection. However, lockdep issues a warning when
traversing RCU lists without the read lock:
security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c:40 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
Fix this by using the variant of list_for_each_entry_rcu() with the last
argument set to true. This tells the RCU subsystem that traversing this
append-only list without the read lock is intentional and safe.
This change silences the lockdep warning while maintaining the correct
semantics for the append-only list traversal.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
When utilized it dodges strlen() in vfs_readlink(), giving about 1.5%
speed up when issuing readlink on /initrd.img on ext4.
Filesystems opt in by calling inode_set_cached_link() when creating an
inode.
The size is stored in a new union utilizing the same space as i_devices,
thus avoiding growing the struct or taking up any more space.
Churn-wise the current readlink_copy() helper is patched to accept the
size instead of calculating it.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241120112037.822078-2-mjguzik@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Like direct file execution (e.g. ./script.sh), indirect file execution
(e.g. sh script.sh) needs to be measured and appraised. Instantiate
the new security_bprm_creds_for_exec() hook to measure and verify the
indirect file's integrity. Unlike direct file execution, indirect file
execution is optionally enforced by the interpreter.
Differentiate kernel and userspace enforced integrity audit messages.
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-9-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
The new SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE, and
their *_LOCKED counterparts are designed to be set by processes setting
up an execution environment, such as a user session, a container, or a
security sandbox. Unlike other securebits, these ones can be set by
unprivileged processes. Like seccomp filters or Landlock domains, the
securebits are inherited across processes.
When SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE is set, programs interpreting code should
control executable resources according to execveat(2) + AT_EXECVE_CHECK
(see previous commit).
When SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE is set, a process should deny
execution of user interactive commands (which excludes executable
regular files).
Being able to configure each of these securebits enables system
administrators or owner of image containers to gradually validate the
related changes and to identify potential issues (e.g. with interpreter
or audit logs).
It should be noted that unlike other security bits, the
SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE bits are
dedicated to user space willing to restrict itself. Because of that,
they only make sense in the context of a trusted environment (e.g.
sandbox, container, user session, full system) where the process
changing its behavior (according to these bits) and all its parent
processes are trusted. Otherwise, any parent process could just execute
its own malicious code (interpreting a script or not), or even enforce a
seccomp filter to mask these bits.
Such a secure environment can be achieved with an appropriate access
control (e.g. mount's noexec option, file access rights, LSM policy) and
an enlighten ld.so checking that libraries are allowed for execution
e.g., to protect against illegitimate use of LD_PRELOAD.
Ptrace restrictions according to these securebits would not make sense
because of the processes' trust assumption.
Scripts may need some changes to deal with untrusted data (e.g. stdin,
environment variables), but that is outside the scope of the kernel.
See chromeOS's documentation about script execution control and the
related threat model:
https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/developer-library/guides/security/noexec-shell-scripts/
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Add a new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag to execveat(2) to check if a file would
be allowed for execution. The main use case is for script interpreters
and dynamic linkers to check execution permission according to the
kernel's security policy. Another use case is to add context to access
logs e.g., which script (instead of interpreter) accessed a file. As
any executable code, scripts could also use this check [1].
This is different from faccessat(2) + X_OK which only checks a subset of
access rights (i.e. inode permission and mount options for regular
files), but not the full context (e.g. all LSM access checks). The main
use case for access(2) is for SUID processes to (partially) check access
on behalf of their caller. The main use case for execveat(2) +
AT_EXECVE_CHECK is to check if a script execution would be allowed,
according to all the different restrictions in place. Because the use
of AT_EXECVE_CHECK follows the exact kernel semantic as for a real
execution, user space gets the same error codes.
An interesting point of using execveat(2) instead of openat2(2) is that
it decouples the check from the enforcement. Indeed, the security check
can be logged (e.g. with audit) without blocking an execution
environment not yet ready to enforce a strict security policy.
LSMs can control or log execution requests with
security_bprm_creds_for_exec(). However, to enforce a consistent and
complete access control (e.g. on binary's dependencies) LSMs should
restrict file executability, or measure executed files, with
security_file_open() by checking file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC.
Because AT_EXECVE_CHECK is dedicated to user space interpreters, it
doesn't make sense for the kernel to parse the checked files, look for
interpreters known to the kernel (e.g. ELF, shebang), and return ENOEXEC
if the format is unknown. Because of that, security_bprm_check() is
never called when AT_EXECVE_CHECK is used.
It should be noted that script interpreters cannot directly use
execveat(2) (without this new AT_EXECVE_CHECK flag) because this could
lead to unexpected behaviors e.g., `python script.sh` could lead to Bash
being executed to interpret the script. Unlike the kernel, script
interpreters may just interpret the shebang as a simple comment, which
should not change for backward compatibility reasons.
Because scripts or libraries files might not currently have the
executable permission set, or because we might want specific users to be
allowed to run arbitrary scripts, the following patch provides a dynamic
configuration mechanism with the SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and
SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits.
This is a redesign of the CLIP OS 4's O_MAYEXEC:
f5cb330d6b/1901_open_mayexec.patch
This patch has been used for more than a decade with customized script
interpreters. Some examples can be found here:
https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Link: https://docs.python.org/3/library/io.html#io.open_code [1]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241212174223.389435-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20241217' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux patch to get rid improve our handling of unknown
extended permissions by safely ignoring them.
Not only does this make it easier to support newer SELinux policy
on older kernels in the future, it removes to BUG() calls from the
SELinux code."
* tag 'selinux-pr-20241217' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: ignore unknown extended permissions
Fedora 41 has reached Linux 6.12 kernel with TOMOYO enabled. I observed
that /usr/lib/systemd/systemd executes /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor
by passing dirfd == 9 or dirfd == 16 upon execveat().
Commit ada1986d07 ("tomoyo: fallback to realpath if symlink's pathname
does not exist") used realpath only if symlink's pathname does not exist.
But an out of tree patch suggested that it will be reasonable to always
use realpath if symlink's pathname refers to proc filesystem.
Therefore, this patch changes the pathname used for checking "file execute"
and the domainname used after a successful execve() request.
Before:
<kernel> /usr/lib/systemd/systemd
file execute proc:/self/fd/16 exec.realpath="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor" exec.argv[0]="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor"
file execute proc:/self/fd/9 exec.realpath="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor" exec.argv[0]="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor"
<kernel> /usr/lib/systemd/systemd proc:/self/fd/16
file execute /usr/sbin/auditd exec.realpath="/usr/sbin/auditd" exec.argv[0]="/usr/sbin/auditd"
<kernel> /usr/lib/systemd/systemd proc:/self/fd/16 /usr/sbin/auditd
<kernel> /usr/lib/systemd/systemd proc:/self/fd/9
file execute /usr/bin/systemctl exec.realpath="/usr/bin/systemctl" exec.argv[0]="/usr/bin/systemctl"
<kernel> /usr/lib/systemd/systemd proc:/self/fd/9 /usr/bin/systemctl
After:
<kernel> /usr/lib/systemd/systemd
file execute /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor exec.realpath="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor" exec.argv[0]="/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor"
<kernel> /usr/lib/systemd/systemd /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor
file execute /usr/bin/systemctl exec.realpath="/usr/bin/systemctl" exec.argv[0]="/usr/bin/systemctl"
file execute /usr/sbin/auditd exec.realpath="/usr/sbin/auditd" exec.argv[0]="/usr/sbin/auditd"
<kernel> /usr/lib/systemd/systemd /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor /usr/bin/systemctl
<kernel> /usr/lib/systemd/systemd /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-executor /usr/sbin/auditd
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
free_task() already calls bpf_task_storage_free(). It is not necessary
to call it again on security_task_free(). Remove the hook.
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241212075956.2614894-1-song@kernel.org
syzbot is reporting too large allocation warning at tomoyo_write_control(),
for one can write a very very long line without new line character. To fix
this warning, I use __GFP_NOWARN rather than checking for KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE,
for practically a valid line should be always shorter than 32KB where the
"too small to fail" memory-allocation rule applies.
One might try to write a valid line that is longer than 32KB, but such
request will likely fail with -ENOMEM. Therefore, I feel that separately
returning -EINVAL when a line is longer than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE is redundant.
There is no need to distinguish over-32KB and over-KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE.
Reported-by: syzbot+7536f77535e5210a5c76@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7536f77535e5210a5c76
Reported-by: Leo Stone <leocstone@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241216021459.178759-2-leocstone@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
When evaluating extended permissions, ignore unknown permissions instead
of calling BUG(). This commit ensures that future permissions can be
added without interfering with older kernels.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: fa1aa143ac ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a new audit message type to capture nlmsg-related information. This
is similar to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP which was added for the other
SELinux extended permission (ioctl).
Adding a new type is preferred to adding to the existing
lsm_network_audit structure which contains irrelevant information for
the netlink sockets (i.e., dport, sport).
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
[PM: change "nlnk-msgtype" to "nl-msgtype" as discussed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add support for extended permission rules in conditional policies.
Currently the kernel accepts such rules already, but evaluating a
security decision will hit a BUG() in
services_compute_xperms_decision(). Thus reject extended permission
rules in conditional policies for current policy versions.
Add a new policy version for this feature.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Check sk->sk_protocol instead of security class to recognize SCTP socket.
SCTP socket is initialized with SECCLASS_SOCKET class if policy does not
support EXTSOCKCLASS capability. In this case bind(2) hook wrongfully
return EAFNOSUPPORT instead of EINVAL.
The inconsistency was detected with help of Landlock tests:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/b58680ca-81b2-7222-7287-0ac7f4227c3c@huawei-partners.com/
Fixes: 0f8db8cc73 ("selinux: add AF_UNSPEC and INADDR_ANY checks to selinux_socket_bind()")
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Use types for iterators equal to the type of the to be compared values.
Reported by clang:
../ss/sidtab.c:126:2: warning: comparison of integers of different
signs: 'int' and 'unsigned long'
126 | hash_for_each_rcu(sidtab->context_to_sid, i, entry, list) {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../hashtable.h:139:51: note: expanded from macro 'hash_for_each_rcu'
139 | for (... ; obj == NULL && (bkt) < HASH_SIZE(name);\
| ~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../selinuxfs.c:1520:23: warning: comparison of integers of different
signs: 'int' and 'unsigned int'
1520 | for (cpu = *idx; cpu < nr_cpu_ids; ++cpu) {
| ~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~
../hooks.c:412:16: warning: comparison of integers of different signs:
'int' and 'unsigned long'
412 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
| ~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[PM: munged the clang output due to line length concerns]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
av_permissions.h was not declared as a target and therefore not cleaned
up automatically by kbuild.
Suggested-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAK7LNATUnCPt03BRFSKh1EH=+Sy0Q48wE4ER0BZdJqOb_44L8w@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To avoid the following types of error messages due to a failure by the TPM
driver to use the TPM, suspend TPM PCR extensions and the appending of
entries to the IMA log once IMA's reboot notifier has been called. This
avoids trying to use the TPM after the TPM subsystem has been shut down.
[111707.685315][ T1] ima: Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: -19
[111707.685960][ T1] ima: Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: -19
Synchronization with the ima_extend_list_mutex to set
ima_measurements_suspended ensures that the TPM subsystem is not shut down
when IMA holds the mutex while appending to the log and extending the PCR.
The alternative of reading the system_state variable would not provide this
guarantee.
This error could be observed on a ppc64 machine running SuSE Linux where
processes are still accessing files after devices have been shut down.
Suspending the IMA log and PCR extensions shortly before reboot does not
seem to open a significant measurement gap since neither TPM quoting would
work for attestation nor that new log entries could be written to anywhere
after devices have been shut down. However, there's a time window between
the invocation of the reboot notifier and the shutdown of devices. This
includes all subsequently invoked reboot notifiers as well as
kernel_restart_prepare() where __usermodehelper_disable() waits for all
running_helpers to exit. During this time window IMA could now miss log
entries even though attestation would still work. The reboot of the system
shortly after may make this small gap insignificant.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The new FS_PRE_ACCESS permission event is similar to FS_ACCESS_PERM,
but it meant for a different use case of filling file content before
access to a file range, so it has slightly different semantics.
Generate FS_PRE_ACCESS/FS_ACCESS_PERM as two seperate events, so content
scanners could inspect the content filled by pre-content event handler.
Unlike FS_ACCESS_PERM, FS_PRE_ACCESS is also called before a file is
modified by syscalls as write() and fallocate().
FS_ACCESS_PERM is reported also on blockdev and pipes, but the new
pre-content events are only reported for regular files and dirs.
The pre-content events are meant to be used by hierarchical storage
managers that want to fill the content of files on first access.
There are some specific requirements from filesystems that could
be used with pre-content events, so add a flag for fs to opt-in
for pre-content events explicitly before they can be used.
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/b934c5e3af205abc4e0e4709f6486815937ddfdf.1731684329.git.josef@toxicpanda.com
Current release - regressions:
- rtnetlink: fix double call of rtnl_link_get_net_ifla()
- tcp: populate XPS related fields of timewait sockets
- ethtool: fix access to uninitialized fields in set RXNFC command
- selinux: use sk_to_full_sk() in selinux_ip_output()
Current release - new code bugs:
- net: make napi_hash_lock irq safe
- eth: bnxt_en: support header page pool in queue API
- eth: ice: fix NULL pointer dereference in switchdev
Previous releases - regressions:
- core: fix icmp host relookup triggering ip_rt_bug
- ipv6:
- avoid possible NULL deref in modify_prefix_route()
- release expired exception dst cached in socket
- smc: fix LGR and link use-after-free issue
- hsr: avoid potential out-of-bound access in fill_frame_info()
- can: hi311x: fix potential use-after-free
- eth: ice: fix VLAN pruning in switchdev mode
Previous releases - always broken:
- netfilter:
- ipset: hold module reference while requesting a module
- nft_inner: incorrect percpu area handling under softirq
- can: j1939: fix skb reference counting
- eth: mlxsw: use correct key block on Spectrum-4
- eth: mlx5: fix memory leak in mlx5hws_definer_calc_layout
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'net-6.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Pull networking fixes from Paolo Abeni:
"Including fixes from can and netfilter.
Current release - regressions:
- rtnetlink: fix double call of rtnl_link_get_net_ifla()
- tcp: populate XPS related fields of timewait sockets
- ethtool: fix access to uninitialized fields in set RXNFC command
- selinux: use sk_to_full_sk() in selinux_ip_output()
Current release - new code bugs:
- net: make napi_hash_lock irq safe
- eth:
- bnxt_en: support header page pool in queue API
- ice: fix NULL pointer dereference in switchdev
Previous releases - regressions:
- core: fix icmp host relookup triggering ip_rt_bug
- ipv6:
- avoid possible NULL deref in modify_prefix_route()
- release expired exception dst cached in socket
- smc: fix LGR and link use-after-free issue
- hsr: avoid potential out-of-bound access in fill_frame_info()
- can: hi311x: fix potential use-after-free
- eth: ice: fix VLAN pruning in switchdev mode
Previous releases - always broken:
- netfilter:
- ipset: hold module reference while requesting a module
- nft_inner: incorrect percpu area handling under softirq
- can: j1939: fix skb reference counting
- eth:
- mlxsw: use correct key block on Spectrum-4
- mlx5: fix memory leak in mlx5hws_definer_calc_layout"
* tag 'net-6.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (76 commits)
net :mana :Request a V2 response version for MANA_QUERY_GF_STAT
net: avoid potential UAF in default_operstate()
vsock/test: verify socket options after setting them
vsock/test: fix parameter types in SO_VM_SOCKETS_* calls
vsock/test: fix failures due to wrong SO_RCVLOWAT parameter
net/mlx5e: Remove workaround to avoid syndrome for internal port
net/mlx5e: SD, Use correct mdev to build channel param
net/mlx5: E-Switch, Fix switching to switchdev mode in MPV
net/mlx5: E-Switch, Fix switching to switchdev mode with IB device disabled
net/mlx5: HWS: Properly set bwc queue locks lock classes
net/mlx5: HWS: Fix memory leak in mlx5hws_definer_calc_layout
bnxt_en: handle tpa_info in queue API implementation
bnxt_en: refactor bnxt_alloc_rx_rings() to call bnxt_alloc_rx_agg_bmap()
bnxt_en: refactor tpa_info alloc/free into helpers
geneve: do not assume mac header is set in geneve_xmit_skb()
mlxsw: spectrum_acl_flex_keys: Use correct key block on Spectrum-4
ethtool: Fix wrong mod state in case of verbose and no_mask bitset
ipmr: tune the ipmr_can_free_table() checks.
netfilter: nft_set_hash: skip duplicated elements pending gc run
netfilter: ipset: Hold module reference while requesting a module
...
In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace
cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates)
add a tracepoint that passes:
- The credentials used
- The user namespace of the resource being accessed
- The user namespace in which the credential provides the
capability to access the targeted resource
- The capability to check for
- The return value of the check
Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <linux@jordanrome.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241204155911.1817092-1-linux@jordanrome.com
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>
The cap_mmap_file() LSM callback returns the default value for the
security_mmap_file() LSM hook and can be safely removed.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>
Verify that the LSM releasing the secctx is the LSM that
allocated it. This was not necessary when only one LSM could
create a secctx, but once there can be more than one it is.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single lsm_context
pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier along with the context
and context length. This allows security_release_secctx() to know how
to release the context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Change the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill a lsm_context
structure instead of data and length pointers. This provides
the information about which LSM created the context so that
security_release_secctx() can use the correct hook.
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsm_context pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
security_secid_to_secctx() and security_lsmproc_to_secctx()
will now return the length value on success instead of 0.
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak, kdoc fix, signedness fix from Dan Carpenter]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a new lsm_context data structure to hold all the information about a
"security context", including the string, its size and which LSM allocated
the string. The allocation information is necessary because LSMs have
different policies regarding the lifecycle of these strings. SELinux
allocates and destroys them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer
to an entry in a list that never goes away.
Update security_release_secctx() to use the lsm_context instead of a
(char *, len) pair. Change its callers to do likewise. The LSMs
supporting this hook have had comments added to remind the developer
that there is more work to be done.
The BPF security module provides all LSM hooks. While there has yet to
be a known instance of a BPF configuration that uses security contexts,
the possibility is real. In the existing implementation there is
potential for multiple frees in that case.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20241129' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull ima fix from Paul Moore:
"One small patch to fix a function parameter / local variable naming
snafu that went up to you in the current merge window"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20241129' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
ima: uncover hidden variable in ima_match_rules()
The variable name "prop" is inadvertently used twice in
ima_match_rules(), resulting in incorrect use of the local
variable when the function parameter should have been.
Rename the local variable and correct the use of the parameter.
Suggested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
[PM: subj tweak, Roberto's ACK]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
the kernel test robot reports a C23 extension
warning: label followed by a declaration is a C23 extension
[-Wc23-extensions]
696 | struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
Instead of adding a null statement creating a C99 style inline var
declaration lift the label declaration out of the block so that it no
longer immediatedly follows the label.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202411101808.AI8YG6cs-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: ee650b3820f3 ("apparmor: properly handle cx/px lookup failure for complain")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The wording of 'scrubbing environment' implied that all environment
variables would be removed, when instead secure-execution mode only
removes a small number of environment variables. This patch updates the
wording to describe what actually occurs instead: setting AT_SECURE for
ld.so's secure-execution mode.
Link: https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/merge_requests/1315 is a
merge request that does similar updating for apparmor userspace.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The macros for label combination XXX_comb are no longer used and there
are no plans to use them so remove the dead code.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
In the macro definition of next_comb(), a parameter L1 is accepted,
but it is not used. Hence, it should be removed.
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The previous audit_cap cache deduping was based on the profile that was
being audited. This could cause confusion due to the deduplication then
occurring across multiple processes, which could happen if multiple
instances of binaries matched the same profile attachment (and thus ran
under the same profile) or a profile was attached to a container and its
processes.
Instead, perform audit_cap deduping over ad->subj_cred, which ensures the
deduping only occurs across a single process, instead of across all
processes that match the current one's profile.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
When auditing capabilities, AppArmor uses a per-CPU, per-profile cache
such that the same capability for the same profile doesn't get repeatedly
audited, with the original goal of reducing audit logspam. However, this
cache does not have an expiration time, resulting in confusion when a
profile is shared across binaries (for example) and an expected DENIED
audit entry doesn't appear, despite the cache entry having been populated
much longer ago. This confusion was exacerbated by the per-CPU nature of
the cache resulting in the expected entries sporadically appearing when
the later denial+audit occurred on a different CPU.
To resolve this, record the last time a capability was audited for a
profile and add a timestamp expiration check before doing the audit.
v1 -> v2:
- Hardcode a longer timeout and drop the patches making it a sysctl,
after discussion with John Johansen.
- Cache the expiration time instead of the last-audited time. This value
can never be zero, which lets us drop the kernel_cap_t caps field from
the cache struct.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The profile_capabile function takes a struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
which is documented as possibly being NULL. However, the single place that
calls this function never passes it a NULL ad. If we were ever to call
profile_capable with a NULL ad elsewhere, we would need to rework the
function, as its very first use of ad is to dereference ad->class without
checking if ad is NULL.
Thus, document profile_capable's ad parameter as not accepting NULL.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
