Please consider pulling these changes from the signed vfs-7.4-rc1.idmap tag.
Thanks!
Christian
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Merge tag 'vfs-7.4-rc1.idmap' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs idmap constification from Christian Brauner:
"This makes struct mnt_idmap const throughout the tree.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing modified after
alloc_mnt_idmap() is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only reads from
it. That is the same model struct cred uses and the idmapping is
sensitive enough to deserve it.
The conversion goes bottom up through the vfs{g,u}id and fs{g,u}id
helpers, the privilege checks, acl, xattr and quota and then every
inode operation that takes an idmap, so ->permission(), ->getattr(),
->setattr(), ->create(), ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), ->symlink(),
->rename(), ->tmpfile(), ->get_acl(), ->set_acl() and ->fileattr_set()
with their implementations in every filesystem, plus the LSM hooks.
struct vfsmount, struct mount_kattr and struct kstatmount store a
const pointer and nop_mnt_idmap and invalid_mnt_idmap live in rodata,
so anything that tries to modify them faults instead of silently
corrupting the initial idmapping"
* tag 'vfs-7.4-rc1.idmap' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (27 commits)
fs: make nop_mnt_idmap and invalid_mnt_idmap const
fs: port mnt_idmap() and file_mnt_idmap() to const mnt_idmap
fs: port vfs_*() helpers to const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->setattr() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->getattr() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->create() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->symlink() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->mkdir() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->rename() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->mknod() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->tmpfile() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->get_acl() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->set_acl() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->fileattr_set() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port xattr to const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->permission() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port acl to const mnt_idmap
fs: port inode_init_owner() to const mnt_idmap
fs: port inode_owner_or_capable() to const mnt_idmap
fs: port privilege checking helpers to const mnt_idmap
...
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Merge tag 'landlock-7.3-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull Landlock fix from Mickaël Salaün:
"This fixes a Clang bug by removing an annotation, which was introduced
mostly for documentation"
* tag 'landlock-7.3-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Drop __counted_by from landlock_domain.handled_masks
With clang 22 and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, the second
landlock_restrict_self() call hits a bogus fortify report in
inherit_ruleset():
memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0
Call Trace:
__fortify_panic
landlock_merge_ruleset
__se_sys_landlock_restrict_self
handled_masks[] lives in an anonymous struct inside the anonymous union
that overlays work_free. For such a flexible array, clang computes the
address of the __counted_by counter as the start of the array instead of
&num_layers. The bound is then read from handled_masks[0], i.e. from
the first layer's access masks, which is not a count. The same layout
crashes clang itself in a standalone test.
The annotation was added as documentation, so drop it rather than
restructure the union. Keep the information in the member comment.
Reported-by: syzbot+a0eecb22de4d821a9e5d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a0eecb22de4d821a9e5d
Fixes: bd3a19800d ("landlock: Add counted_by in landlock_domain")
Signed-off-by: Nguyen Ngoc Thang <ngocthang2710.1999@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261010164450.194439-1-ngocthang2710.1999@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reported-by: Mike Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261009115108.17819-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
[mic: Rebased on master, where the array is handled_masks[], updated the
fortify report, added the clang bug link and the other reports]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
This pull request contains two critical bug fixes, which can be briefly
descibed as follows:
1. key_get_persistent() creates a new persisten keyring for UID if it does
not exist yet, and creates a link from it to the nominated keyring.
Function did not set timeout when linking failed, therefore preventing
GC. The bug was addressed by calling key_set_timeout() regardless of
key_link() result when the persistent keyring gets created by
key_get_persistent().
2. __key_create_or_update() made a copy of keyring->restrict_link before
holding keyring->sem, which can cause add_key() to be executed against
stale keyring restrictions. The bug was fixed by copying the value only
after keyring->sem was taken.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'keys-v7.3-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull keys fixes from Jarkko Sakkinen:
- key_get_persistent() created a new persistent keyring if one did not
exist, but failed to set a timeout on it in an error path, preventing
GC.
Call key_set_timeout() regardless of key_link() result if a
persistent keyring was created.
- __key_create_or_update() made a copy of keyring->restrict_link before
holding keyring->sem, which could cause add_key() to be executed
against stale keyring restrictions. Fix it by copying the value only
after taking keyring->sem
* tag 'keys-v7.3-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: Fix add_key() race with keyring restriction
keys: finalize persistent keyring timeout after link attempt
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20261005' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
- Preserve SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS when reusing superblocks
Similar to a previous fix (see the commit description of Stephen's
fix) we need to check to see if we have already mounted/setup the
superblock passed into the security_sb_set_mnt_opts() LSM hook so we
don't mistakenly unset SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS.
- Fix a potential AVC sequence number data race
* tag 'selinux-pr-20261005' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: preserve NATIVE_LABELS on already-initialized sb in set_mnt_opts
selinux: fix data race on AVC latest_notif
__key_create_or_update() snapshots keyring->restrict_link before taking
the destination keyring's semaphore. keyring_restrict() installs a
restriction while holding that semaphore.
This allows a writer to observe no restriction, wait for the keyring
owner to install a reject-all restriction and return successfully, and
then link a key using the stale NULL snapshot. The writer only needs
write permission on the destination keyring.
Move the restrict_link read after __key_link_lock() and
__key_link_begin(). The read and the subsequent restriction check are
then serialized with restriction installation by keyring->sem.
The race was reproduced on v7.2.8 in 19 executions where restriction
installation returned before the link completed. All 19 linked the key
despite the reject-all restriction. With this change, 312 executions
reached the same ordering and every add_key() call failed with -EPERM.
The issue was found by manual concurrency analysis assisted by AI-based
analysis and independently verified with a QEMU reproducer and kernel
instrumentation.
Fixes: 5ac7eace2d ("KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: 성병찬 <tjdqudcks0424@naver.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260930041802.6114-1-tjdqudcks0424@naver.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
When no keyring exists for the requested UID, KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT
creates and registers one before linking it to the requested destination.
The configured timeout is set only after the destination link succeeds.
A destination restricted with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING makes that link fail
with -EPERM. With persistent_keyring_expiry set to 60 seconds, /proc/keys
still reports the registered keyring's expiry as "perm".
The failed call therefore leaves a quota-exempt keyring in the namespace's
hidden register, where it may remain until namespace teardown.
Rename the write-locked helper to key_get_or_create_persistent() and return
the key reference through a result parameter. Return 0 when it creates a
keyring and 1 when the retry finds an existing one. Return a negative error
on failure. Another caller may create the keyring between the initial
read-locked lookup and the retry under the write lock.
Set the timeout after permission checking and linking. Do this on success,
or on failure if the call allocated the keyring. This leaves a new keyring
collectible after failure without starting its timeout while linking is
still in progress.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Fixes: f36f8c75ae ("KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260912095440.79864-1-kmehltretter@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
When an NFSv4 filesystem exported with security_label is mounted a
second time, sget_fc() returns the existing superblock and
nfs_get_root() calls security_sb_set_mnt_opts() again on it. Since the
superblock is already SB_INITIALIZED, selinux_set_mnt_opts() takes an
early exit without setting SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in
*set_kern_flags. nfs_get_root() then sees kflags without
SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS set and clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL on
the shared nfs_server, silently disabling per-file labeling for both
the new and the original mount.
Commit 3815a245b5 ("security/selinux: fix SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
on reused superblock") fixed the same problem in
selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(). The reused-superblock path for a plain
second mount now goes through sb_set_mnt_opts rather than
sb_clone_mnt_opts, so it needs the same treatment: on both
SE_SBINITIALIZED early exits, set SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in
*set_kern_flags when the superblock was already using
SECURITY_FS_USE_NATVE.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/69
Closes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/70
Closes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/issues/91
Closes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/issues/92
Fixes: eb9ae68650 ("SELinux: Add new labeling type native labels")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'ipe-pr-20260925' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe
Pull IPE fixes from Fan Wu:
"Two fixes for use-after-free issues found by recent LLM-assisted code
analysis.
- move successful policy load auditing under the new policy
directory's inode lock, preventing a concurrent policy deletion
from freeing the policy while it is still being audited
- protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU, preventing policy
evaluation from racing with root hash replacement during preresume"
* tag 'ipe-pr-20260925' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe:
ipe: protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU
ipe: fix use-after-free when auditing a newly loaded policy
ipe_bdev_setintegrity() frees the old root hash when dm-verity publishes
a new one on ->preresume, while policy evaluation can still be
dereferencing it.
Protect the root hash with RCU. The evaluation path already runs under
rcu_read_lock().
Fixes: e155858dd9 ("ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
[FW: remove model name according to latest guideline]
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
new_policy() audits the policy after ipe_new_policyfs_node() publishes it
and drops the new directory's inode lock. A concurrent delete can free
the policy while ipe_audit_policy_load() is still using it.
Audit the successful load under that lock.
Fixes: f44554b506 ("audit,ipe: add IPE auditing support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
[FW: remove model name according to latest guideline]
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
avc_policy_seqno() reads latest_notif without holding notif_lock, while
avc_latest_notif_update() can update it under that lock. KCSAN reports
these concurrent accesses during policy boolean updates and permission
checks.
Use READ_ONCE() for the lockless read and WRITE_ONCE() for the update.
The spinlock continues to serialize the comparison and update against
other writers. Reads made while holding notif_lock cannot race with a
writer and can remain plain accesses.
This marks both sides of the intentional concurrent access and constrains
compiler transformations, without suppressing checking with data_race().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 788e7dd4c2 ("SELinux: Improve read/write performance")
Reported-by: syzbot+a7f7cb0737bd91aa698c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a7f7cb0737bd91aa698c
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'landlock-7.3-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull Landlock fixes from Mickaël Salaün:
"This mainly fixes the Landlock tracepoint support merged this cycle so
that denial and rule events report the intended policy context,
whether through tracefs or BTF-visible callbacks.
The size of this all is mainly from propagating the corrected contract
through event definitions and producers, adding new tests for the
reported context, and updating the documentation.
Also improve annotation and fix a GCC 16 build warning"
* tag 'landlock-7.3-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Widen ruleset versions to 64 bits
landlock: Add counted_by in landlock_domain
landlock: Fix tracepoint contract documentation
selftests/landlock: Test network denial context
selftests/landlock: Test filesystem denial blockers
landlock: Report the effective signal number
landlock: Report the actual ptrace tracer
landlock: Fix network denial trace context
landlock: Fix rule tracepoint context
landlock: Fix filesystem denial blocker reporting
landlock: Fix tracepoint fixed-width type names
landlock: Work around gcc-16 -Wuninitialized warning
Now that everything takes a mnt_idmap as const store a const pointer in
struct vfsmount, struct mount_kattr and struct kstatmount and return one
from mnt_idmap(), file_mnt_idmap() and ovl_upper_mnt_idmap(). Finally,
also make mnt_idmap_get() return a const pointer. Also convert the
remaining local variables that are initialized from the accessors.
alloc_mnt_idmap() keeps returning a non-const pointer. It is the only
place where an idmapping is actually written to.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-26-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-24-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-20-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-18-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-17-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-13-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-12-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-11-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-8-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-6-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-5-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-3-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Tracepoint consumers use a ruleset ID and version to identify the
successful landlock_add_rule(2) call prefix used to create a domain.
LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES bounds distinct stored rules, not successful
calls: re-adding already-present rights for an object or port succeeds
without increasing num_rules. Because every successful call increments
the version, these calls can wrap the 32-bit counter and give different
prefixes the same trace identity.
Widen the counter and its trace fields to 64 bits so the counter cannot
wrap in practice, while preserving the successful-call semantics.
Saturating would alias all subsequent histories, while rejecting a call
at the limit would change otherwise valid syscall behavior solely for
trace metadata.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 63747c9477 ("landlock: Add landlock_add_rule_fs and landlock_add_rule_net tracepoints")
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260922132615.1025945-1-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
For a domain, this array stores the access masks for each layer (of
which there are num_layers of them). This annotation serves as useful
documentation.
Signed-off-by: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260208235449.1124354-1-m@maowtm.org
[mic: Rebase on the ruleset/domain split, and update commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20260919' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
- Ensure that the cached SELinux access decisions are correct
- Fix the SELinux overlayfs code to properly track the top-level/user
information on multiple stacked overlayfs filesystems
- Fix the SELinux overlayfs code to properly enforce mprotect() access
control policy on all of the different layers in multiple stacked
overlayfs filesystems
* tag 'selinux-pr-20260919' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: recheck intermediate backing files on mprotect()
selinux: preserve user SID across nested backing files
selinux: always fill AVC decision in avc_has_perm_noaudit()
The signal-scope denial callback identifies its target but not the
effective signal. This loses permission-probe signal zero and makes the
file-owner hook's zero sentinel ambiguous.
Append an int signal argument to the typed-BPF callback. Preserve sig,
including zero, in hook_task_kill(). In hook_file_send_sigiotask(),
translate signum zero to SIGIO at the producer, where its meaning is
known.
Carry the effective signal and target domain ID in a private,
stack-backed context consumed synchronously. This requires no allocation
or task reference in the interrupt-capable file-owner path. Gate this
context and the remaining scope-only domain IDs with CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS.
Keep the tracefs record and audit output unchanged.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: bb91730f16 ("landlock: Add tracepoints for ptrace and scope denials")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260918185036.608651-7-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
The ptrace denial callback identifies only the tracee. Current is the
tracer during hook_ptrace_access_check(), but it is the tracee during
PTRACE_TRACEME, where the parent is the actual tracer. A consumer
therefore cannot infer both parties from the existing arguments.
Append the actual tracer task to the typed-BPF callback: current for
hook_ptrace_access_check() and parent for hook_ptrace_traceme(). Carry
it with the tracee domain ID in a private ptrace context. Both hooks
keep the selected tasks alive through synchronous dispatch, so no extra
task reference is needed.
Keep the tracefs record unchanged. The new context is available only to
typed BPF, while same_exec continues to describe the tracer that owns
the denying policy.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: bb91730f16 ("landlock: Add tracepoints for ptrace and scope denials")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260918185036.608651-6-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Network denial events report source and destination ports reconstructed
from audit data. Their zero values are ambiguous, and neither identifies
the complete endpoint that Landlock checked.
Carry the checked sockaddr and its signed length in a private trace-only
context. For an enabled event, validate the length and copy only the
initialized prefix into zeroed local storage. This prevents a typed BPF
program from reading uninitialized bytes while exposing the socket
family, socket, address, and length.
Replace the source and destination trace-record fields with one signed
port derived from the checked address. A value of -1 means that no port
was checked, zero is a valid port, and positive values use host
endianness. Bind blockers select the bind address; connect and send
blockers select the destination.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 01ce260f5c ("landlock: Add landlock_deny_access_fs and landlock_deny_access_net")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260918185036.608651-5-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Name each event after the identity it reports. Add-rule events describe
UAPI rule insertion, so rename them after LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH and
LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT. Check-rule events describe matches in internal
rule trees, so rename them after LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE and
LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT. This remains accurate if multiple UAPI rule types
share one lookup and stored rule. Keep denial event names based on
filesystem and network families because they describe final access
decisions.
Use u64 for growable access masks passed by value to add-rule and
check-rule typed BTF callbacks. CO-RE can relocate pointer-reached
fields, but it cannot widen a scalar callback slot declared by a BPF
program. Keep native access_mask_t for internal state and trace records.
For add-rule callbacks, report the normalized per-call contribution
passed to landlock_insert_rule() and expose the complete validated flags
value. Put the ruleset and flags first as a common invocation prefix.
This distinguishes duplicate and effective-zero additions without
recovering arguments from saved syscall registers.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 63747c9477 ("landlock: Add landlock_add_rule_fs and landlock_add_rule_net tracepoints")
Fixes: 3f1f106e4c ("landlock: Add tracepoints for rule checking")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260918185036.608651-4-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Filesystem topology denials are rendered with an empty blockers value
because their blocker is identified by the request type instead of an
access mask.
Introduce the private struct landlock_blockers to carry the request type
and final missing access mask to filesystem and network denial
tracepoints. Copy both members into named trace-record fields, then use
the type to print change_topology for topology denials while preserving
symbolic access masks for ordinary denials.
The request type lets typed BPF consumers distinguish topology denials
from access denials. Keeping the native access mask in a pointer-reached
field also lets CO-RE adjust existing programs' load width if
access_mask_t grows.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Fixes: 01ce260f5c ("landlock: Add landlock_deny_access_fs and landlock_deny_access_net")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260918185036.608651-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
gcc has a bug with -ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern that produces a
warning for correct code that uses sparse bitfields:
security/landlock/fs.c: In function 'is_access_to_paths_allowed.isra':
security/landlock/fs.c:767:28: error: '_layer_masks_child1' is used uninitialized [-Werror=uninitialized]
767 | struct layer_masks _layer_masks_child1, _layer_masks_child2;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/landlock/fs.c:767:28: note: '_layer_masks_child1' declared here
767 | struct layer_masks _layer_masks_child1, _layer_masks_child2;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/landlock/fs.c: In function 'hook_unix_find':
security/landlock/fs.c:1649:28: error: 'layer_masks' is used uninitialized [-Werror=uninitialized]
1649 | struct layer_masks layer_masks;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
security/landlock/fs.c:1649:28: note: 'layer_masks' declared here
1649 | struct layer_masks layer_masks;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
To work around this, change the definition of struct layer_mask to
use an explictit padding field.
Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=110743
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260619082133.3504146-1-arnd@kernel.org/
Fixes: a260c00556 ("landlock: Add a place for flags to layer rules")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260915201036.3527935-1-arnd@kernel.org
[mic: Use BITS_PER_TYPE(), fix kdoc warnings, fix commit message
according to v2 changes]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
mprotect() can be used to bypass the SELinux checks that mmap() performs
against the intermediate layers of a stacked filesystem.
mmap() checks every backing layer as the request descends through the
stack. mprotect() only has the lowest backing file in vma->vm_file, so it
rechecks the top-level user and the lowest mounter, but skips the mounters
of every layer in between. With two nested overlayfs mounts and a policy
denying mounter_t -> middle_file_t:file { execute }, a direct
mmap(PROT_EXEC) is denied:
avc: denied { execute } for pid=71 comm="nested_exec"
path="/payload" dev="overlay" ino=9
scontext=user_u:base_r:mounter_t
tcontext=user_u:object_r:middle_file_t tclass=file permissive=0
while mmap(PROT_NONE) followed by mprotect(PROT_EXEC) succeeds.
Preserve each intermediate path, mounter SID and file-description SID in
the backing-file security blob, copying the saved entries when another
backing layer is opened. Allocate the array only for nested backing files,
and release it and the path references in the backing_file_free hook.
During mprotect(), recheck fd { use } and the requested inode permissions
for every saved mounter, and include the intermediate layers in the execmod
checks. Policy for nested stacking may then need to grant intermediate
mounters what a direct mmap() already requires, and execmod on intermediate
labels for binaries using text relocations.
Tested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built
SELinux policy, on a mainline tree containing
commit f2381b546e ("fs: fix user path of nested backing files").
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82544d36b1 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux saves the user file SID in a backing-file security blob so it
remains available after mmap() replaces vma->vm_file with a backing file.
For nested backing files (overlayfs over overlayfs, or FUSE passthrough
backed by overlayfs), user_file may itself be a backing file. Its
fsec->sid is the SID of the mounter that opened it, rather than the user
that opened the top-level file. mprotect() then checks fd { use } against
the mounter SID. This can incorrectly deny access without a domain
transition, or check the wrong target SID after one.
Copy the saved user SID when user_file is a backing file. Keep using the
regular file SID for the first backing layer.
With two nested overlayfs mounts and SELinux enforcing,
mprotect(PROT_READ) returns EACCES with an fd { use } denial against the
mounter SID. With this change, mprotect() succeeds.
Tested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built
SELinux policy. The original test was also repeated with Fedora Cloud
Base 44 userspace and gave the same result.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82544d36b1 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
avc_has_perm_noaudit() is documented to return a copy of the access
decision in @avd, but its early return for an empty requested permission
set leaves the buffer untouched. All callers pass an uninitialized
stack variable and afterwards feed it to avc_audit(), and the inode hook
even stores it in the per-task decision cache.
Fill in a deny-all, audit-all decision, similar to avd_init(), so every
caller receives a defined value at no cost on the hot path.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e6f2f381e4 ("selinux: replace BUG_ONs with WARN_ONs in avc.c")
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
encrypted_key_alloc() stores datablob_len in a u16. It is computed from
multiple string and payload lengths. If the result exceeds U16_MAX, the
assignment truncates the allocation size. KASAN reports a 32760-byte
slab-out-of-bounds write when __ekey_init() copies the master key
description into the undersized buffer.
The total payload length stored in key->datalen is also a u16. Use
check_add_overflow() to reject values that do not fit either destination,
and use kzalloc_flex() for the flexible-array allocation.
Fixes: 7e70cb4978 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Francis Perron <francis@akrites.dev>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260909153433.83117-1-cenzhang@linux.microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
request_key_auth_describe() prints rka->pid into /proc/keys as a raw
pid_t in the initial pid namespace. A reader can open /proc/keys through
a mount in another pid namespace. That reader sees a number with no
meaning there. The number can even name an unrelated task. The line
needs VIEW on the key. So the reader either shares the key owner's uid
or possesses the key.
The fix keeps a struct pid. Commit 4f82f45730 ("net ip6 flowlabel:
Make owner a union of struct pid * and kuid_t") gave
/proc/net/ip6_flowlabel the same storage. The print goes through
pid_nr_ns(). It renders against the pid namespace of the procfs instance
the line is read through. Commit ad08978ab4 ("ipv6/flowlabel: simplify
pid namespace lookup") moved that print to the same anchor. Output
through an initial namespace /proc does not change. The line shows 0 for
a requestor with no number in that namespace.
Translating at read time was the alternative. find_pid_ns() can resolve
a recycled number. The line would then name a live task with no
connection to the key. A stored struct pid gives 0 instead when the
requestor has no number there.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20260809110202.2180410-1-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com/
Fixes: 78b7280cce ("KEYS: Improve /proc/keys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 codeql
Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie <maoyixie.tju@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260821095935.1864998-1-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
clear_bit() is atomic with respect to the word it modifies, but it is
an unordered operation: it implies no memory barrier on either side
(Documentation/atomic_bitops.txt).
key_garbage_collector() clears KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE with clear_bit()
and calls wake_up_bit() after reaping a dead key type. wake_up_bit()
uses a lockless waitqueue check and requires a full barrier after the
clear.
The existing smp_mb() is before clear_bit(), so nothing orders the clear
against that check. The GC can see an empty waitqueue while
unregister_key_type() still sees the bit set. The final wakeup is then
lost, leaving module unload stuck in wait_on_bit().
Use clear_and_wake_up_bit(). Its clear_bit_unlock() has RELEASE
semantics, so the completed GC work stays ordered before the clear, and
its smp_mb__after_atomic() orders the clear before the waitqueue check.
Fixes: 0c061b5707 ("KEYS: Correctly destroy key payloads when their keytype is removed")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260821025327.61488-1-kmehltretter@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Use focused KUnit tests to exercise the renderer's internal boundary and
composition contracts with synthetic scratch states, including both
sibling-helper evaluation orders. Check the exact output and
reservation boundaries, including a four-byte octal escape accepted at
exact capacity and rejected one byte short. Also verify an unchanged
cursor on failure, that bracketed process names and embedded NUL bytes
remain data, and that input ellipsis bytes are escaped rather than
mistaken for the raw truncation marker.
The composition test requires generic trace output helpers. Enable
CONFIG_FTRACE and CONFIG_SCHED_TRACER because the latter selects the
otherwise-hidden CONFIG_TRACING support required by
trace_print_flags_seq().
Use kselftests to exercise the complete tracefs path for both affected
filesystem events. A valid path containing 2640 spaces exceeds the
scratch output budget. Require its escaped prefix to end in the raw
UTF-8 ellipsis while access_rights and blockers remain intact.
This division keeps the exact safety contract compiler-independent while
proving that real tracepoints preserve their surrounding symbolic
fields. The end-to-end assertions fail after a full fix revert with
both GCC and Clang, while the composition KUnit test fails if the
scratch reserve is removed.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260907154401.124362-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
landlock_merge_ruleset() checks for a NULL ruleset after dereferencing
it in lockdep_assert_held(). Move the assertion after the check so the
defensive path remains effective.
The mask-validation comment originated in landlock_add_fs_access_mask()
to explain that its WARN_ON_ONCE() checked a caller invariant. It
became self-referential when this helper and its network and scope
counterparts were inlined into landlock_create_ruleset(). Restate the
invariant without naming the caller.
Keep both as defensive callee checks. Moving the assertion preserves
the NULL check's ability to warn and return -EINVAL, while invalid masks
remain warned about and masked.
Reported-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Closes: https://patch.msgid.link/aobYhIt3vcs2xN0b@google.com
Closes: https://patch.msgid.link/aobasxUDQ8b7GYXl@google.com
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260907103609.113325-1-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
current_check_refer_path() reads old_dentry->d_parent without holding a
reference nor a lock on it, and then dereferences it in
collect_domain_accesses() and in the audit record.
A reference on a child does not pin its parent: __d_move() reassigns
dentry->d_parent and drops the reference the child held on its former
parent. hook_path_rename() is not affected because the rename path
calls lock_rename() before the hook, so the source cannot be reparented
under it. hook_path_link() has no such protection: filename_linkat()
holds a reference on the source dentry but neither locks nor references
its parent, so a concurrent rename(2) can reparent the source while
security_path_link() runs, and the former parent can then be removed and
freed while the hook walks it.
A process can trigger this after entering a Landlock domain that handles
at least one filesystem access right. The process can then race a
linkat(2) loop against rename(2) and rmdir(2):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in collect_domain_accesses+0x278/0x290
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888160bd53f4 by task llrepro2/549
collect_domain_accesses+0x278/0x290
current_check_refer_path+0x952/0x1120
security_path_link+0x1be/0x320
filename_linkat+0x342/0x6d0
__x64_sys_linkat+0xfa/0x150
Freed by task 562:
kmem_cache_free+0x139/0x4c0
i_callback+0x4b/0x80
rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0
Take a reference on the dentry selected as the source parent, using
dget() for the common-mount-root case and dget_parent() otherwise.
Release it after the hierarchy walk and synchronous audit logging.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b91c3e4ea7 ("landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER")
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/E9CDD9E6-E960-4DE2-B1AC-5667D52ABB3E@doyensec.com
[mic: Clarify the caller, reachability, and reference handling]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
- Run scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci for v7.3
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Merge tag 'kmalloc_obj-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull kmalloc_obj conversions from Kees Cook:
"Another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc()
family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules
in scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci"
* tag 'kmalloc_obj-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
treewide: refresh kmalloc_obj() conversions
drm/amd/display: Fix harmless type mismatch in allocation
This is another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc()
family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules in
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci
This catches both the set of kmalloc() uses added since the first
kmalloc_obj() conversions in v7.0 and adds a large group missed in the
first pass due to Coccinelle not interacting well with the cleanup.h
scoped_...() family of macros[1]. I worked around this with spatch's
"--macro-file" argument to a file with all the scoped_...() macros mapped
to Coccinelle's YACFE_ITERATOR[2] as that was the closest viable control
flow indicator I could find.
Build tested allmodconfig on x86, arm64, arm, loongarch, mips, powerpc,
riscv, and s390 with no new warnings.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202609021314.8A9C0B8@keescook/ [1]
Link: https://github.com/coccinelle/coccinelle/blob/master/standard.h [2]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'integrity-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA fixes from Mimi Zohar:
- Instantiating the ima_file_truncate and ima_path_truncate LSM hooks
resulted in configfs locking issues.
configfs files should not be measured, appraised, or audited in the
first place, so the builtin policies are updated to exclude them.
- IMA audit messages include the filename, which could result in a page
fault when the filename doesn't exist
- Un-hide the IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX Kconfig prompt
* tag 'integrity-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: allow users to specify the pcr index with IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
ima: Check for ERR_PTR from dentry_path() in validate_hash_algo()
ima: don't measure/appraise files on configfs
configfs: move CONFIGFS_MAGIC definition to magic.h
The IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX option is currently not visible in the kconfig
frontend, so it always uses its default, 10. This means that the
'range 8 14' is dead code, and users are unable to specify the pcr index
value.
In a previous discussion, Mimi explained that users should be able to use
this config option to specify the pcr index. [1]
Let's add a prompt for users to specify the pcr index, when EXPERT is
enabled.
This dead range was found by kconfirm, a static analysis tool for Kconfig.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1feff118-4afa-4b9c-86f1-271a7a88208f@gmail.com/T/#mc4efa2491b4937eb7c9e532c29ffba516a70e662 [1]
Signed-off-by: Julian Braha <julianbraha@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20260903' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two SELinux fixes: one to fix how we lookup a BPF token's creator
label to prevent a possible TOCTOU, and one to update Ondrej's email
address"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20260903' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
MAINTAINERS, mailmap: update email address for Ondrej Mosnáček
selinux: fix BPF token permission checks
dentry_path() returns ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG) when the path exceeds the
buffer. validate_hash_algo() passes the result straight to
integrity_audit_msg() without checking. ERR_PTR is not NULL, so
integrity_audit_message() sees a valid pointer and calls strlen() on
it, which faults:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffffffffdc
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x30/0xa0
Call Trace:
audit_log_untrustedstring+0x19/0x30
integrity_audit_message+0x366/0x4f0
ima_inode_setxattr+0x512/0x5f0
Check for IS_ERR() and use NULL instead, which makes the audit message
skip the name= field instead of crashing.
Fixes: 4f2946aa0c ("IMA: introduce a new policy option func=SETXATTR_CHECK")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+5ebeb3089ea6439c37be@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6a8f89e5.1d9ded08.62e62.00bf.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Bradley Morgan <brads@mainlining.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
