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Merge tag 'ipsec-2026-09-16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2026-09-16
1) xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()
Add the up-front nr_frags guard iptfs_skb_add_frags() already has,
so an out-of-range offset can't walk past the on-stack frags[] array.
2) xfrm: serialize state GC with device state flush
Serialize xfrm_state destruction against the deferred-device pass
with a dedicated mutex, since the device GC list doesn't hold a state
reference and the two paths could free the same state.
3) xfrm: add missing RCU read lock in xfrm_send_migrate_state()
Hold the RCU read lock around xfrm_nlmsg_multicast() so the
rcu_dereference() of net->xfrm.nlsk doesn't warn.
4) xfrm: iptfs: fix runt reassembly panic from short inner tot_len
Require the runt length to cover at least the minimum IP header,
so a tot_len in [6, 19] (IPv4) can't write past the declared length
and trip skb_over_panic().
5) ipv6: xfrm: use full sockets in local error paths
Use skb_to_full_sk() in xfrm6_local_rxpmtu() and xfrm6_local_error()
and bail out without a full socket, so a TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request_sock
isn't miscast as a full inet/IPv6 socket.
6) xfrm: fix compat ALLOCSPI request use-after-free
Drop the redundant alloc_compat() in xfrm_alloc_userspi() so the
compat translator no longer reads past the payload and publishes a
child a multicast clone can still see after xfrm_user_rcv_msg() frees.
7) xfrm: add missing rcu_read_lock(), skb_dst_force() and dev_hold() for xfrm_trans_reinject()
Force the dst before queuing, hold dev across the workqueue deferral,
and take rcu_read_lock() around the finish() loop, so transport-mode
reinjection doesn't deref non-refcounted dst/dev under workqueue.
8) xfrm: use hlist_del_init_rcu for state_cache and state_cache_input
Switch to hlist_del_init_rcu() so a second __xfrm_state_delete() is
a no-op instead of writing through LIST_POISON2, closing the UAFs.
9) esp: downgrade zerocopy managed frags before mutating skb frags
Call skb_zcopy_downgrade_managed() before ESP rewrites the skb frag
array, so per-frag unrefs in esp_ssg_unref() and skb_release_data()
stay balanced for ubuf-owned managed frags.
10) xfrm: hold net_device reference under RCU in bundle creation
Read dst->dev via dst_dev_rcu() and keep RCU active through
xfrm_fill_dst(), so a concurrent RTM_DELLINK can't free dev
under bundle creation.
11) xfrm: save input state data before secpath resets
Save the state protocol on the stack while it's still valid and
use the saved address family for transport_finish(), so post-reset
dereferences (VTI, XFRM if, MAX_DEPTH error) can't UAF the state.
12) net: xfrm: reject unrepresentable espintcp transport headers
Use the careful transport-header helper and drop the skb through
the XFRM error path when the offset can't be represented, instead
of silently truncating it.
* tag 'ipsec-2026-09-16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec:
net: xfrm: reject unrepresentable espintcp transport headers
xfrm: save input state data before secpath resets
xfrm: hold net_device reference under RCU in bundle creation
esp: downgrade zerocopy managed frags before mutating skb frags
xfrm: use hlist_del_init_rcu for state_cache and state_cache_input
xfrm: add missing rcu_read_lock(), skb_dst_force() and dev_hold() for xfrm_trans_reinject()
xfrm: fix compat ALLOCSPI request use-after-free
ipv6: xfrm: use full sockets in local error paths
xfrm: iptfs: fix runt reassembly panic from short inner tot_len
xfrm: add missing RCU read lock in xfrm_send_migrate_state()
xfrm: serialize state GC with device state flush
xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260916101938.118628-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
ESP-in-TCP can hand xfrm packets whose transport header offset no longer
fits after the stream parser trims the TCP envelope. The plain transport
header reset truncates that offset and triggers the skb warning path.
Use the careful transport-header helper and drop the skb through the
existing XFRM error path when the offset cannot be represented.
Fixes: e27cca96cd ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Wyatt Feng <wf.kernel.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <weir@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
xfrm_input() stores the current xfrm_state in the skb secpath while it
continues receive-side processing. Some input paths can reset that secpath
before xfrm_input() has finished dereferencing the state.
Receive callback users such as VTI and XFRM interfaces can reset the
secpath. The VTI receive path does so before checking whether the packet
crosses network namespaces, while the XFRM interface path does so only for
cross-network-namespace packets. The XFRM_MAX_DEPTH error path can also
reset the secpath before the final drop callback reports the current
state's protocol.
If secpath_reset() drops the last state reference while the state is
concurrently deleted, xfrm_input() can still dereference the freed state
when selecting transport_finish() or reporting the drop callback protocol.
Save the state protocol on the stack while the state is still valid,
and use the already saved address family for transport_finish(). A larval
XFRM_STATE_ACQ state has no type, so retain nexthdr as its protocol. This
preserves the existing drop-path fallback while avoiding the post-reset
state dereferences without adding an extra state reference to every
received packet.
Fixes: df3893c176 ("vti: Update the ipv4 side to use it's own receive hook.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou <zhilinz@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
xfrm_bundle_create() and xfrm_create_dummy_bundle() read dst->dev into
a local pointer without taking a device reference, then pass it to
xfrm_fill_dst(). A concurrent RTM_DELLINK replaces dst->dev via
dst_dev_put() and frees the old net_device, causing a use-after-free
when xfrm6_fill_dst() later dereferences the stale dev pointer.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in xfrm6_fill_dst+0x82c/0x860
(net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:86 netdev_hold())
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880142fe588 by task exploit/153
Call Trace:
xfrm6_fill_dst+0x82c/0x860
xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x21d4/0x2bd0
xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x485/0x1640
ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x19b/0x1e0
udpv6_sendmsg+0x1443/0x2dd0
Fix this by reading dst->dev via dst_dev_rcu() and keeping the RCU
read-side critical section active until xfrm_fill_dst() has taken the
required device references.
Fixes: 25ee3286dc ("[IPSEC]: Merge common code into xfrm_bundle_create")
Fixes: a0073fe18e ("xfrm: Add a state resolution packet queue")
Suggested-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Reported-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260820200245.44312-1-blbllhy@gmail.com/
Cc: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-opus-4.6
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft Security FORGE Labs) <blbllhy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Commit 14acf9652e ("xfrm: defensively unhash xfrm_state lists in
__xfrm_state_delete") converted bydst/bysrc/byseq/byspi from
hlist_del_rcu() to hlist_del_init_rcu() so that a second
__xfrm_state_delete() on the same object becomes a no-op rather than a
write through LIST_POISON pprev. It missed state_cache and
state_cache_input, which kept hlist_del_rcu():
- hlist_del_rcu() leaves pprev = LIST_POISON2 (non-NULL), so
hlist_unhashed() returns false.
- hlist_del_init_rcu() leaves pprev = NULL, so hlist_unhashed()
returns true.
A second __xfrm_state_delete() therefore enters __hlist_del() on the
already-deleted state_cache/state_cache_input nodes and does
WRITE_ONCE(*pprev, next) through LIST_POISON2 — a write use-after-free
once the slab is reused. The corruption can in turn cause a subsequent
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu traversal to follow a dangling next pointer,
producing the read use-after-free reported in xfrm_input_state_lookup().
Switch state_cache and state_cache_input to hlist_del_init_rcu() to
match the other four lists, closing the write use-after-free and, with
it, the read use-after-free it spawns.
Assisted-by: CodeBuddy:GLM-5.2
Fixes: 0045e3d806 ("xfrm: Cache used outbound xfrm states at the policy.")
Fixes: 81a331a0e7 ("xfrm: Add an inbound percpu state cache.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Siwei Zhang <fourdizhang@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Merge tag 'ipsec-2026-08-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2026-08-18
1) xfrm6: fix out-of-bounds write in xfrm6_input_addr() when secpath is full
Tighten the secpath-depth check so a full chain can't write
past xvec[].
2) Add and revert "esp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()"
The patch does not fully fully resolve the issue, a corrected version
will follow.
3) xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close
Synchronize espintcp close with the xfrm_trans_reinject work
queue so the freed socket message isn't dereferenced again.
4) xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device
Drop queued ESP-in-TCP records whose saved ingress device has
gone away, avoiding a NULL device deref in the XFRM input path.
5) xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work
Split the NAT keepalive walk into a reference-collection phase
and a per-state lock phase to break the AB-BA with state removal.
This patch has some issues that are fixed with a followup patch.
6) xfrm: Fix skb double-free in xfrm_dev_direct_output()
Stop freeing the skb unconditionally in xfrm_dev_direct_output(),
letting local_out()'s result indicate when ownership has moved on.
7) xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left
Validate the segments_left/hdrlen invariant before rearranging
the routing-header addresses, avoiding an OOB memmove on
malformed HDRINCL packets.
8) xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak
Detect an already-attached auth-trunc allocation by the pointer
rather than inferring it from the algorithm id, so a prior
attach isn't overwritten and lost.
9) xfrm: bound nat keepalive state collection
Replace the per-state allocation in the NAT keepalive walk
with a fixed-size batch that drains under BH-disabled locking
and resumes from the cursor, bounding the worker's memory.
* tag 'ipsec-2026-08-18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec:
xfrm: bound nat keepalive state collection
Revert "esp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()"
xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak
xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left
xfrm: Fix skb double-free in xfrm_dev_direct_output()
xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work
xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device
xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close
esp: do not unref managed frag pages in esp_ssg_unref()
xfrm6: fix out-of-bounds write in xfrm6_input_addr() when secpath is full
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260818092920.653034-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
syzbot reported a suspicious RCU usage warning in ip6_pkt_drop():
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage in ip6_pkt_drop
include/net/addrconf.h:389 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
Call Trace:
__in6_dev_get_safely include/net/addrconf.h:389 [inline]
ip6_pkt_drop+0x596/0x610 net/ipv6/route.c:4620
ip6_pkt_discard+0x1c/0x30 net/ipv6/route.c:4651
xfrm_trans_reinject+0x324/0x630 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:806
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405
worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3486
When commit 4f4920669d ("xfrm: Reinject transport-mode packets through
workqueue") converted xfrm_trans_reinject from a tasklet to a workqueue,
the reinjection loop ceased running in softirq context. Workqueue workers
run in process context where local_bh_disable() does not enter an RCU
read-side critical section under CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU.
Because finish callbacks (such as ip6_rcv_finish) expect to run under an
RCU read lock (performing route lookups, l3mdev lookups, and accessing
RCU-protected data structures), invoking them in workqueue context without
rcu_read_lock() triggers RCU lockdep warnings.
Furthermore, packets queued to the workqueue via xfrm_trans_queue_net()
may carry non-refcounted (noref) dst entries (e.g. from ip_route_input_noref).
Additionally, on netdevice unregistration, dst_dev_put() replaces dst->dev
with blackhole_netdev, so dst entries do not keep skb->dev alive while
queued in the workqueue.
Fix these issues by:
1. Calling skb_dst_force(skb) in xfrm_trans_queue_net() while still in the
caller's RCU section to ensure dst is reference-counted before queuing.
2. Holding a reference on skb->dev via dev_hold()/dev_put() across workqueue
deferral so skb->dev remains valid during finish() callback processing.
3. Acquiring rcu_read_lock() around the finish callback invocation loop in
xfrm_trans_reinject().
Fixes: 4f4920669d ("xfrm: Reinject transport-mode packets through workqueue")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Liu Jian <liujian56@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
xfrm_state_netlink() builds the ALLOCSPI response with
dump_one_state(), which already calls alloc_compat() with the response
skb and header.
xfrm_alloc_userspi() then calls alloc_compat() again, but passes the
original request skb and its header. For a compat request, the
translator therefore interprets the 228-byte compat xfrm_userspi_info
as the 232-byte native layout and reads four bytes past the declared
payload. It also publishes the translated child through the request's
frag_list.
A multicast clone of the request shares skb_shared_info and can observe
that child. xfrm_user_rcv_msg() frees it after the request handler
returns, racing a compat receiver which may still be copying from it and
resulting in a use-after-free.
Remove the redundant conversion. The response keeps its correct compat
translation from dump_one_state(), and no child is attached to the
inbound request.
Fixes: 5f3eea6b7e ("xfrm/compat: Attach xfrm dumps to 64=>32 bit translator")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Codex:gpt-5.5-cyber
Signed-off-by: Kyle Zeng <kylebot@openai.com>
Co-developed-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lee <david.lee@trailofbits.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
When the start of an inner packet is split across two outer packets
such that fewer than 4 bytes land at the end of the first one,
__input_process_payload() saves those bytes as a runt and skips the
iplen/iphlen validation performed for in-place packets. When the
continuation packet arrives, iptfs_reassem_cont() only requires the
declared inner length to be >= sizeof(ra_runt) (6) before allocating
the reassembly skb with that attacker-controlled length.
However, __iptfs_iphlen() always returns the fixed minimum IP header
size (20 for IPv4, 40 for IPv6), so for an inner IPv4 tot_len in
[6, 19] the header-completion copy writes past the declared packet
length, and the subsequent "ipremain -= copylen" underflows to ~4GB,
leaving the payload copy length bounded only by blkoff (up to 64KB).
At runtime the skb_put() tailroom check turns this into
skb_over_panic(), i.e. an unprivileged kernel panic (DoS), reachable
locally via userns+netns IPTFS SAs and remotely against IPTFS VPN
gateways when the decrypted outer skb is linear (e.g. AF_PACKET taps,
tun/tap delivery).
Align the runt path with the normal path by requiring the declared
inner length to cover at least the IP header size. This also subsumes
the previous >= sizeof(ra_runt) check, since the minimum IP header
is always larger than the runt buffer.
This issue was found by the autokbug dynamic kernel fuzzer at
Tencent Yunding Lab.
Fixes: 0756947654 ("xfrm: iptfs: handle received fragmented inner packets")
Reported-by: Henry Martin <bsdhenrymartin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Henry Martin <bsdhenrymartin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
xfrm_nlmsg_multicast() requires the RCU read lock to be held because it
safely dereferences the net->xfrm.nlsk pointer using rcu_dereference().
When it is called from xfrm_send_migrate_state(), the RCU read lock is not
held, which triggers a suspicious RCU usage warning:
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1630 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
Call Trace:
lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x13f/0x1d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6876
xfrm_nlmsg_multicast+0x1d8/0x1f0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:1630
xfrm_send_migrate_state+0x870/0xae0 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:3340
xfrm_do_migrate_state+0x1749/0x1e90 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:3507
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x7a8/0xf30 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:3907
Fix this by wrapping the xfrm_nlmsg_multicast() call in
xfrm_send_migrate_state() with rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock().
Fixes: a9d155ea9b ("xfrm: add XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE for single SA migration")
Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.5-flash Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview syzbot
Reported-by: syzbot+c0e99a1aa85a286d7a3b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c0e99a1aa85a286d7a3b
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/ai_job?id=8977f559-3a7e-4bb5-b4d6-1196956260b6
Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh <nogikh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
The deferred-device pass in xfrm_dev_state_flush() finds states under
xfrm_state_dev_gc_lock, but drops the lock before calling
xfrm_dev_state_free() because the driver callback may sleep. The device
GC list does not hold an xfrm_state reference, so the state GC worker can
destroy the same state concurrently.
The race can proceed as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
find x on the device GC list
drop xfrm_state_dev_gc_lock
read x->xso.dev
xfrm_state_gc_destroy(x)
xfrm_dev_state_free(x)
xfrm_state_free(x)
continue xfrm_dev_state_free(x)
Both paths can invoke the driver callback and drop the device reference.
CPU 0 can also access the xfrm_state after CPU 1 has freed it.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in xfrm_dev_state_free+0x24c/0x2a0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810bbaa960 by task poc/102
Call Trace:
xfrm_dev_state_free+0x24c/0x2a0
xfrm_dev_state_flush+0x353/0x400
xfrm_dev_event+0x26d/0x3a0
notifier_call_chain+0xc0/0x280
__dev_notify_flags+0x169/0x250
netif_change_flags+0xe7/0x160
dev_change_flags+0x96/0x220
devinet_ioctl+0x7f4/0x1880
Allocated by task 87:
xfrm_state_alloc+0x1e/0x5c0
xfrm_add_sa+0xe7f/0x5820
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x4f3/0x940
Freed by task 57:
kmem_cache_free+0xcb/0x3d0
xfrm_state_gc_task+0x4a8/0x650
process_one_work+0x63a/0x1070
Serialize xfrm_state destruction against the deferred-device pass with a
mutex. Keep xfrm_state_dev_gc_lock limited to list operations and retain
the existing callback and device-reference release ordering.
Fixes: 07b87f9eea ("xfrm: Fix unregister netdevice hang on hardware offload.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() advances to the fragment containing @offset
with an unbounded loop:
while (offset >= walk->past + walk->frags[walk->fragi].len)
walk->past += walk->frags[walk->fragi++].len;
walk->fragi is advanced and walk->frags[walk->fragi] is dereferenced
without ever checking fragi against walk->nr_frags. When the requested
offset is at or beyond the total length spanned by the walk's fragments,
fragi runs past nr_frags and off the end of the fixed-size on-stack
frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1] array, reading out-of-bounds stack memory.
The two callers behave differently: iptfs_skb_add_frags() already guards
against this with
if (!walk->nr_frags ||
offset >= walk->total + walk->initial_offset)
return len;
but iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() has no such guard and calls
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() unconditionally, so it performs the
out-of-range walk. Its own "fragi < walk->nr_frags" bound check runs only
afterwards, too late to prevent the read.
This is reachable from the receive path: a crafted IP-TFS (AGGFRAG)
payload delivered to an IPTFS SA drives iptfs_reassem_cont() ->
iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() with an offset past the fragment total, e.g.:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888008ad7210 by task repro/345
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:392
iptfs_skb_can_add_frags+0x155/0x310 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:420
iptfs_reassem_cont+0xcf8/0x1140 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:902
iptfs_input_ordered+0x552/0x670 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1280
iptfs_input+0x3d6/0xde0 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1741
xfrm_input+0x282f/0x6140 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:700
xfrm4_esp_rcv+0x93/0x120 net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c:104
ip_rcv+0x278/0x2d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612
Give iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() the same up-front guard that
iptfs_skb_add_frags() already has, so the walk is never entered with an
out-of-range offset. When it triggers, the caller falls back to the
existing linearize-and-copy path, which is safe.
Fixes: 5f2b6a9095 ("xfrm: iptfs: add skb-fragment sharing code")
Reported-by: Roshan Kumar <roshaen09@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Roshan Kumar <roshaen09@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
The v1 nat keepalive fix allocates a GFP_ATOMIC object for every state
while collecting references for phase two. This makes the worker's
temporary memory use depend on the number of states and lets -ENOMEM abort
the scan.
Replace the allocated list with a fixed-size batch. When the batch is full,
return a private walk status so xfrm_state_walk() leaves a cursor; drain
the references after the walk releases xfrm_state_lock and resume from
the cursor. This bounds temporary memory use and avoids the allocation
failure path.
The v1 fix also moved nat_keepalive_send() out of the walk callback. Keep
the phase-two drain BH-disabled, as required by local_lock_nested_bh()
used by the keepalive sockets.
Fixes: 763fe700b7 ("xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Const qualify clt_table arrays in the net directory that always pass a
memory duplicate to sysctl register. The template would then be in
.rodata and the kmemdup'ed array would be outside.
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260810-jag-net_const_qualify-v4-2-77e888237c69@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving
x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no
sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes).
xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth
algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites
x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown
only frees the replacement pointer.
Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that
state from x->props.aalgo.
Fixes: 4447bb33f0 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <zihanx@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
A return value other than 1 from local_out() means that the skb has been
consumed or its ownership was transferred. xfrm_dev_direct_output()
nevertheless frees the skb on this path, causing a double-free when
netfilter drops the packet and invalidating any other owner.
Return the local_out() result directly, matching the ownership handling
in xfrm_output_resume().
Fixes: 5eddd76ec2 ("xfrm: fix tunnel mode TX datapath in packet offload mode")
Signed-off-by: Sanghyun Park <sanghyun.park.cnu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
nat_keepalive_work() walks the state table while xfrm_state_walk()
holds net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock. Its callback then acquires x->lock,
which conflicts with the delete path taking the same locks in reverse
order via xfrm_state_delete() and __xfrm_state_delete(). This creates
an AB-BA deadlock that is reported by lockdep when a NAT keepalive
worker races with SA deletion.
Fix this by splitting the keepalive walk into two phases. First,
collect the candidate states while the walk holds xfrm_state_lock and
take a reference on each state. Then, after the walk completes, process
each collected state and acquire x->lock without nesting it under
xfrm_state_lock.
Fixes: f531d13bdf ("xfrm: support sending NAT keepalives in ESP in UDP states")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi <xizh2024@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Alice Mikityanska says:
====================
BIG TCP for UDP tunnels
This series is a follow-up to "BIG TCP without HBH in IPv6", and it adds
support for BIG TCP IPv4/IPv6 workloads in vxlan and geneve. Now that
IPv6 BIG TCP doesn't require stripping the HBH in all various
combinations in tunneled traffic, adding BIG TCP becomes feasible.
Patch 01 adds accessors for the length field in the UDP header, as
suggested by Paolo in review. The usage of udp_set_len is then added in
the following patches that start using length=0 in BIG TCP UDP packets.
Patches 02-04 close the gaps that prevent BIG TCP packets from going
through UDP tunnel code.
Patch 05 validates packets in udp_gro_receive to exclude packets with
length=0 from GRO aggregation.
Patch 06 is for proper formatting in tcpdump (set UDP len to 0 rather
than a trimmed value on overflow).
Patches 07-08 bump up tso_max_size for VXLAN and GENEVE.
Patch 09 adds selftests.
====================$
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710134242.216538-1-alice.kernel@fastmail.im
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Since BIG TCP for UDP tunnels will start using len=0 in the UDP header
as an indicator of a GSO packet bigger than 65535 bytes, this commit
introduces the following getter and setters to use tree-wide, in order
to explicitly mark places where len=0 may be expected, and handle them
properly:
1. udp_set_len() sets uh->len to its real value if it's not bigger than
65535, and to 0 otherwise: to be used in GSO context with aggregated
packets.
2. udp_set_len_short() is to be used when the length is known to fit 16
bits. It WARNs when the caller tries to assign a bigger value if
CONFIG_DEBUG_NET=y.
3. udp_get_len_short() returns len in host byte order: to be used on the
RX side to deal with non-aggregated packets, or to access the raw value
of the len field.
4. udp_get_len() decodes uh->len set by udp_set_len(). It checks whether
the packet is GSO to guard from malformed packets.
At the moment udp_set_len() is not used, a following commit will start
using it after enabling len>65535 for GSO.
Raw uh->len (in network byte order) is still accessed in a few places
for checksum calculation purposes, and to decode len=0 in udpv6_rcv for
jumbograms. udp_rcv and udpv6_rcv will be addressed by the commit that
starts using udp_set_len() to set UDP len=0 for BIG TCP packets in UDP
tunnels.
Signed-off-by: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710134242.216538-2-alice.kernel@fastmail.im
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
ESP-in-TCP receives records through the TCP strparser. handle_esp()
restores skb->dev from the saved skb_iif before passing the packet into
the XFRM input path.
Queued TCP data can be processed after the original ingress device has
been removed, for example during veth or net namespace teardown. In that
case dev_get_by_index_rcu() returns NULL. The XFRM IPv4 and IPv6 input
paths both expect skb->dev to be valid while building the route lookup,
so queued ESP-in-TCP data can dereference a NULL device.
Drop the packet if the saved ingress device can no longer be resolved.
Such a packet can no longer be routed through the normal XFRM receive
path, and this preserves the existing behaviour for packets whose ingress
device still exists.
Fixes: e27cca96cd ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Vega <vega@nebusec.ai>
Signed-off-by: Zhiling Zou <roxy520tt@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4
Reviewed-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
ZDI reported and analyzed a race condition during close for espintcp
sockets:
espintcp_close() frees emsg->skb via kfree_skb() without holding
any socket lock. Concurrently, the xfrm_trans_reinject work queue
invokes esp_output_tcp_finish() -> espintcp_push_skb() ->
espintcp_push_msgs() -> skb_send_sock_locked(), which reads the
same skb as a data source.
Fix this by adding a synchronize_rcu() call after resetting sk_prot,
since esp_output_tcp_finish() runs under RCU and won't use a socket
with sk_prot == &tcp_prot. Simply taking the socket lock in
espintcp_close() could lead to leaks, if esp_output_tcp_finish()
re-adds an skb in the slot we just freed. After this, the existing
barrier() is no longer needed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e27cca96cd ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Reported-by: zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Reviewed-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
xfrm_hash_rebuild()'s first loop preallocates the bins/chains the reinsert
loop needs, so the reinsert (after hlist_del_rcu()) cannot allocate or
fail. But its guard is inverted: it skips policies with prefixlen <
threshold and preallocates for the rest.
prefixlen < threshold is exactly when policy_hash_bysel() returns NULL and
the reinsert takes the allocating xfrm_policy_inexact_insert() path. So the
loop preallocates for the exact policies (which never allocate) and skips
the inexact ones, whose bin/node is then allocated GFP_ATOMIC during
reinsert. On failure the error path only WARN_ONCE()s and continues,
leaving a poisoned bydst node; the next rebuild's hlist_del_rcu()
dereferences LIST_POISON2 and takes a GPF. Reachable under memory pressure,
deterministic via failslab.
Invert the guard so preallocation covers exactly the reinserted policies;
the reinsert then allocates nothing and cannot fail.
Crash:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xfbd59c0000000024: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead...]
...
Workqueue: events xfrm_hash_rebuild
RIP: 0010:xfrm_hash_rebuild+0x5b3/0x1190
RAX: dead000000000122 (LIST_POISON2 + offset)
...
Call Trace:
hlist_del_rcu (include/linux/rculist.h:599)
xfrm_hash_rebuild (net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1365)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
Fixes: 24969facd7 ("xfrm: policy: store inexact policies in an rhashtable")
Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
When iptfs_skb_add_frags() copies frag references from the source
frag walk into a new SKB, it increments the page reference count via
__skb_frag_ref() but does not propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to the
destination SKB's skb_shinfo->flags.
If the source SKB carries shared frags (e.g. from a page-pool backed
receive path), the new inner SKB will appear to ESP as having privately
owned frags. A subsequent esp_input() call for a nested transport-mode
SA then takes the no-COW fast path and decrypts in place, writing over
pages that are still referenced by the outer IPTFS SKB. This causes
kernel-visible memory corruption and can trigger a panic.
All other frag-transfer helpers in the kernel (skb_try_coalesce,
skb_gro_receive, __pskb_copy_fclone, skb_shift, skb_segment) correctly
propagate SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG; align iptfs_skb_add_frags() with this
convention by setting the flag inside the loop immediately after
__skb_frag_ref() and nr_frags++, so every exit path that attaches a frag
unconditionally propagates SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG.
Fixes: 5f2b6a9095 ("xfrm: iptfs: add skb-fragment sharing code")
Signed-off-by: Chen YanJun <moomichen@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
xfrm_state_gc_task can run long after a failed IPTFS state setup. In the
reproduced case, __xfrm_init_state() cached x->mode_cbs, IPTFS setup
returned -ENOMEM before publishing mode_data, and the temporary module
reference from xfrm_get_mode_cbs() was dropped immediately. The dead state
then kept x->mode_cbs until deferred GC ran after xfrm_iptfs had been
unloaded.
Clear x->mode_cbs when mode init or clone fails before publishing
mode_data. Those states never installed mode-specific state or the
long-term IPTFS module pin, so deferred GC has nothing mode-specific to
destroy and must not retain a callback table pointer past the temporary
lookup reference.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
failed setup path:
1. cache x->mode_cbs
2. mode setup fails before mode_data
3. drop the temporary module ref
4. dead state keeps x->mode_cbs cached
GC/unload path:
1. xfrm_state_put() queues GC work
2. xfrm_iptfs unloads later
3. xfrm_state_gc_task runs
4. GC dereferences stale x->mode_cbs
This also covers the failed clone path where clone_state() returns before
publishing mode_data.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_STACKTRACE_FILTER=y
failslab_stacktrace_filter matched xfrm_iptfs frames
ack_error=-12
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure
BUG: unable to handle page fault
Workqueue: events xfrm_state_gc_task
RIP: xfrm_state_gc_task+0x142/0x650
Modules linked in: esp4_offload xfrm_user [last unloaded: xfrm_iptfs]
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Fixes: 4b3faf610c ("xfrm: iptfs: add new iptfs xfrm mode impl")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
copy_to_user_state_extra() only holds a reference to the outer xfrm_state.
That does not pin x->xso.dev. NETDEV_DOWN and NETDEV_UNREGISTER can race
through xfrm_dev_state_flush(), xfrm_state_delete(), and
xfrm_dev_state_free(), which clears xso->dev and drops the netdev
reference before the GETSA dump reaches xso_to_xuo() and reads
xso->dev->ifindex.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
XFRM_MSG_GETSA dump path: NETDEV teardown path:
1. xfrm_get_sa() gets xfrm_state 1. xfrm_dev_state_flush() finds x
2. copy_to_user_state_extra() sees 2. xfrm_state_delete() removes x
x->xso.dev from the SAD
3. copy_user_offload() calls 3. xfrm_dev_state_free() clears
xso_to_xuo() xso->dev
4. xso->dev->ifindex dereferences 4. netdev_put() drops the device
a detached net_device reference
Avoid following the live net_device from the dump paths. Cache the
attached ifindex in xfrm_dev_offload when state or policy offload is bound
to a device, and serialize that snapshot instead. This preserves the
user-visible XFRMA_OFFLOAD_DEV value without depending on the embedded
net_device lifetime.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
Oops: general protection fault
Call Trace:
<TASK>
copy_to_user_state_extra+0xb8d/0x1370 [xfrm_user]
? __pfx_copy_to_user_state_extra+0x10/0x10 [xfrm_user]
? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __alloc_skb+0x342/0x960
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __nlmsg_put+0x147/0x1b0
dump_one_state+0x1c7/0x3e0 [xfrm_user]
xfrm_state_netlink+0xcb/0x130 [xfrm_user]
? __pfx_xfrm_state_netlink+0x10/0x10 [xfrm_user]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? xfrm_user_state_lookup.constprop.0+0x230/0x310 [xfrm_user]
xfrm_get_sa+0x102/0x250 [xfrm_user]
? __pfx_xfrm_get_sa+0x10/0x10 [xfrm_user]
xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x504/0xaa0 [xfrm_user]
? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [xfrm_user]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0
? __pfx_stack_trace_save+0x10/0x10
netlink_rcv_skb+0x11f/0x350
? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [xfrm_user]
? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x65/0x80 [xfrm_user]
netlink_unicast+0x600/0x870
? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __pfx_stack_trace_save+0x10/0x10
netlink_sendmsg+0x75d/0xc10
? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
____sys_sendmsg+0x77a/0x900
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_copy_msghdr_from_user+0x10/0x10
? release_sock+0x1a/0x1d0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? netlink_insert+0x143/0xec0
___sys_sendmsg+0xff/0x180
? __pfx____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x85/0xe0
? do_getsockname+0xf9/0x170
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? fdget+0x53/0x3b0
__sys_sendmsg+0x111/0x1a0
? __pfx___sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __sys_getsockname+0x8c/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x102/0x5a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Fixes: 07b87f9eea ("xfrm: Fix unregister netdevice hang on hardware offload.")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang <zzzccc427@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
xfrm_user_policy() clears the socket dst cache with __sk_dst_reset(),
i.e. the non-atomic __sk_dst_set(sk, NULL): it reads sk_dst_cache with
rcu_dereference_protected(), stores NULL and dst_release()s the old dst.
That is only safe if no other thread modifies sk_dst_cache concurrently.
For a connected UDP socket that does not hold: the transmit fast path
(udp_sendmsg -> sk_dst_check -> sk_dst_reset) resets the cache locklessly
with an atomic xchg(). A per-socket policy change racing a send can make
both sides observe the same old dst and each dst_release() it, dropping
the socket's single reference twice and freeing the xfrm_dst bundle while
it is still referenced:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dst_release
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88801897b6c0 by task exploit/155
Call Trace:
...
dst_release (... ./include/linux/rcuref.h:109)
xfrm_user_policy (./include/net/sock.h:2239 ./include/net/sock.h:2256 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:3053)
do_ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1347)
ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1417)
do_sock_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2368)
__sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393)
__x64_sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2396)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Reachable by an unprivileged user via a user+network namespace.
Use the atomic sk_dst_reset() so the cache is cleared and released with a
single xchg(): whichever side wins releases the dst once, the other sees
NULL and does nothing. Behaviour is otherwise unchanged.
Fixes: 2b06cdf3e6 ("xfrm: Clear sk_dst_cache when applying per-socket policy.")
Fixes: be8f8284cd ("net: xfrm: allow clearing socket xfrm policies.")
Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei (Microsoft) <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
nat_keepalive_send() frees the keepalive skb whenever the IPv4 or IPv6
send helper reports an error.
That cleanup is only correct before the skb is handed to the output
path. Once ip_build_and_send_pkt() or ip6_xmit() takes ownership, the
networking stack may already have consumed the skb before returning an
error, so freeing it again is unsafe.
Handle the pre-handoff failure cases inside nat_keepalive_send_ipv4()
and nat_keepalive_send_ipv6(), where the caller still owns the skb, and
keep nat_keepalive_send() responsible only for family dispatch and the
unsupported-family cleanup path.
Fixes: f531d13bdf ("xfrm: support sending NAT keepalives in ESP in UDP states")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Qianyu Luo <qianyuluo3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
skb_gso_segment() leaves the segment list head with ->prev pointing at
the last segment, an invariant validate_xmit_skb_list() relies on when
it sets its tail pointer (tail = skb->prev).
When validate_xmit_xfrm() walks a GSO list and some segments are stolen
by async crypto (->xmit() returns -EINPROGRESS), those segments are
unlinked from the list but the head ->prev is never updated. If the
last segment is the one stolen, the returned head still has ->prev
pointing at it, even though it is now owned by the crypto engine and may
be freed. validate_xmit_skb_list() later does tail->next = skb, writing
through that stale pointer -- a use-after-free.
Repoint skb->prev at the last retained segment before returning.
Fixes: f53c723902 ("net: Add asynchronous callbacks for xfrm on layer 2.")
Signed-off-by: Petr Wozniak <petr.wozniak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
validate_xmit_xfrm() returns NULL both when a packet is dropped and
when it is stolen by async crypto (-EINPROGRESS from ->xmit()).
Callers cannot distinguish the two cases.
f53c723902 ("net: Add asynchronous callbacks for xfrm on layer 2.")
changed the semantics of a NULL return from "dropped" to "stolen or
dropped", but __dev_queue_xmit() was not updated. On virtual/bridge
interfaces (noqueue qdisc) __dev_queue_xmit() initialises rc=-ENOMEM
and jumps to out: when skb is NULL, returning -ENOMEM to the caller
even though the packet will be delivered correctly via xfrm_dev_resume().
Return ERR_PTR(-EINPROGRESS) from validate_xmit_xfrm() for the async
case so callers can tell it apart from a real drop. Update
__dev_queue_xmit() to handle ERR_PTR(-EINPROGRESS) from
validate_xmit_skb() correctly. Update validate_xmit_skb_list() to
use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() so that ERR_PTR(-EINPROGRESS) is not mistakenly
added to the transmitted list.
Fixes: f53c723902 ("net: Add asynchronous callbacks for xfrm on layer 2.")
Suggested-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Petr Wozniak <petr.wozniak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Merge tag 'ipsec-2026-06-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2026-06-22
1) xfrm: use compat translator only for u64 alignment mismatch
Gate the XFRM_USER_COMPAT translator on COMPAT_FOR_U64_ALIGNMENT
so 32-bit compat tasks on arches whose 32-bit ABI already matches
the native 64-bit layout are no longer rejected with -EOPNOTSUPP.
From Sanman Pradhan.
2) net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states
Initialize the alg_key_len to 0 in the IPComp branch of
pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() so an uninitialized value cannot drive
xfrm_alg_len() into a slab-out-of-bounds kmemdup during
XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE. From Zijing Yin.
3) xfrm: Fix dev use-after-free in xfrm async resumption
Stash the original skb->dev and extend the RCU critical section
across xfrm_rcv_cb() and transport_finish() to prevent a
tunnel-device UAF and original-device refcount leak when a
callback replaces skb->dev. From Dong Chenchen.
4) xfrm: Fix xfrm state cache insertion race
Move the state-validity check inside xfrm_state_lock in the
input state cache insertion path so a state cannot be killed
between the check and the insert. From Herbert Xu.
5) xfrm: annotate data-races around xfrm_policy_count[] and xfrm_policy_default[]
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations on xfrm_policy_count
and xfrm_policy_default to silence the KCSAN data race reported
on net->xfrm.policy_count. From Eric Dumazet.
6) espintcp: use sk_msg_free_partial to fix partial send
Replace the manual skmsg accounting in espintcp with
sk_msg_free_partial() so the skmsg stays consistent on every
iteration and the partial-send accounting bugs go away.
From Sabrina Dubroca.
7) xfrm: validate selector family and prefixlen during match
Reject mismatched address families in xfrm_selector_match() and
bound prefixlen in addr4_match()/addr_match() to prevent the
shift-out-of-bounds syzbot reported when an AF_UNSPEC selector
with a large prefixlen is matched against an IPv4 flow.
From Eric Dumazet.
* tag 'ipsec-2026-06-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec:
xfrm: validate selector family and prefixlen during match
espintcp: use sk_msg_free_partial to fix partial send
xfrm: annotate data-races around xfrm_policy_count[] and xfrm_policy_default[]
xfrm: Fix xfrm state cache insertion race
xfrm: Fix dev use-after-free in xfrm async resumption
net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states
xfrm: use compat translator only for u64 alignment mismatch
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260622075726.29685-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
xfrmi_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the
interface link netns xi->net. They differ once the device is created in
or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl
changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a
caller privileged there but not in xi->net can rewrite an interface that
lives in xi->net.
Gate xfrmi_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,
before any attribute is parsed.
Reported-by: Xiao Liang <shaw.leon@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CABAhCOSzP1vaThGV35_VnsRCb=87_CPjPVsTHbq905k8A+BuUg@mail.gmail.com/
Fixes: f203b76d78 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie <maoyixie.tju@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612085941.3158249-8-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
syzbot reported a shift-out-of-bounds in xfrm_selector_match()
due to AF_UNSPEC selector with large prefixlen (e.g. 128) matched
against IPv4 flow (when XFRM_STATE_AF_UNSPEC is set).
Fix this by:
- Rejecting mismatched families in xfrm_selector_match.
- Returning false in addr4_match if prefixlen > 32.
- Returning false in addr_match if prefixlen > 128 (prevents overflow).
Fixes: 3f0ab59e65 ("xfrm: validate new SA's prefixlen using SA family when sel.family is unset")
Reported-by: syzbot+9383b1ff0df4b29ca5e6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a2fbe35.be3f099c.2836ae.0018.GAE@google.com/T/#u
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
sk_msg_free_partial() ensures consistency of the skmsg at every
iteration, without having to manually handle uncharges and offsets.
This simplifies the code, and fixes some bugs in skmsg accounting when
we don't send the full contents.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e27cca96cd ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Reported-by: Aaron Esau <aaron1esau@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
The xfrm input state cache insertion code checks the validity of
the state before acquiring the global xfrm_state_lock. Thus it's
possible for someone else to kill the state after it passed the
validity check, and then the insertion will add the dead state
to the cache.
Fix this by moving the validity check inside the lock.
This entire function is called on the input path, where BH must
be off (e.g., the caller of this function xfrm_input acquires
its spinlocks without disabling BH).
So there is no need to disable BH here or take the RCU read lock.
Remove both and replace them with an assertion that trips if BH
is accidentally enabled on some future calling path.
Fixes: 81a331a0e7 ("xfrm: Add an inbound percpu state cache.")
Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative <zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
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Merge tag 'ipsec-next-2026-06-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2026-06-12
1) Replace the open-coded manual cleanup in xfrm_add_policy() error
path with xfrm_policy_destroy() for consistency with
xfrm_policy_construct().
From Deepanshu Kartikey.
2) Limit XFRMA_TFCPAD to a sensible maximum (max IP length, 64k) since
u32 is excessive for traffic flow confidentiality padding.
From David Ahern.
3) Add a new netlink message XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE that
allows migrating individual IPsec SAs independently of
their policies. The existing XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE is tightly coupled
to policy+SA migration, lacks SPI for unique SA identification,
and cannot express reqid changes or migrate Transport mode
selectors. The new interface identifies the SA via SPI and mark,
supports reqid changes, address family changes, encap removal,
and uses an atomic create+install flow under x->lock to prevent
SN/IV reuse during AEAD SA migration.
From Antony Antony.
* tag 'ipsec-next-2026-06-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next:
xfrm: add documentation for XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE
xfrm: restrict netlink attributes for XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE
xfrm: add XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE for single SA migration
xfrm: make xfrm_dev_state_add xuo parameter const
xfrm: extract address family and selector validation helpers
xfrm: refactor XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH validation into a helper
xfrm: move encap and xuo into struct xfrm_migrate
xfrm: add error messages to state migration
xfrm: add state synchronization after migration
xfrm: check family before comparing addresses in migrate
xfrm: split xfrm_state_migrate into create and install functions
xfrm: rename reqid in xfrm_migrate
xfrm: fix NAT-related field inheritance in SA migration
xfrm: allow migration from UDP encapsulated to non-encapsulated ESP
xfrm: add extack to xfrm_init_state
xfrm: remove redundant assignments
xfrm: Reject excessive values for XFRMA_TFCPAD
xfrm: cleanup error path in xfrm_add_policy()
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612074725.1760473-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
xfrm async resumption hold skb->dev refcnt until after transport_finish.
However, xfrm_rcv_cb may modify skb->dev to tunnel dev without taking
device reference, such as vti_rcv_cb. The subsequent async resumption
will decrement the tunnel device's reference count, which lead to uaf
of tunnel dev and refcnt leak of orig dev as below:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for vti1 to become free. Usage count = -2
Stash the original skb->dev to fix refcnt imbalance. The new skb->dev set
by xfrm_rcv_cb can race with device teardown. Extend rcu protection over
xfrm_rcv_cb and transport_finish to prevent races.
Fixes: 1c428b0384 ("xfrm: hold dev ref until after transport_finish NF_HOOK")
Reported-by: Xu Chunxiao <xuchunxiao3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
The XFRM compat layer (CONFIG_XFRM_USER_COMPAT) translates 32-bit xfrm
netlink and setsockopt messages into the native 64-bit layout. It is
only needed on architectures where the 32-bit and 64-bit ABIs disagree
on u64 alignment, which the kernel encodes as COMPAT_FOR_U64_ALIGNMENT.
That symbol is defined only by arch/x86. XFRM_USER_COMPAT depends on it,
so the translator can never be built on any other architecture,
including arm64, which still provides a 32-bit compat ABI (CONFIG_COMPAT)
for AArch32 EL0 userspace. On arm64 the AArch32 EABI already aligns u64
to 8 bytes, identical to the AArch64 ABI, so no translation is required
and the native code path is correct for 32-bit tasks.
However, xfrm_user_rcv_msg() and xfrm_user_policy() gate on
in_compat_syscall() alone and then call xfrm_get_translator(), which
returns NULL when no translator is registered. On arm64 that is always
the case, so every xfrm netlink message and the XFRM_POLICY setsockopt
issued by a 32-bit task returns -EOPNOTSUPP. A 32-bit userspace process
on arm64 (and on any other arch with CONFIG_COMPAT but without
COMPAT_FOR_U64_ALIGNMENT) therefore cannot configure XFRM state or
policy through the XFRM_USER netlink API, and cannot use the XFRM_POLICY
setsockopt path, because both fail before reaching the native parser.
The translator series replaced the blanket compat rejection with a
translator lookup. That made the path usable on x86 when the translator
is available, but left architectures that cannot build the translator
permanently rejected even when their compat layout already matches the
native layout. Let those architectures use the native parser instead.
Gate the translator requirement on COMPAT_FOR_U64_ALIGNMENT instead of
on in_compat_syscall() alone. Gating on the ABI property rather than on
CONFIG_XFRM_USER_COMPAT is deliberate: on x86 with IA32_EMULATION=y but
XFRM_USER_COMPAT=n, a 32-bit task must still be rejected rather than
routed through the native parser, which would misread genuinely
4-byte-aligned x86-32 messages. COMPAT_FOR_U64_ALIGNMENT is the ABI
property that makes the XFRM translator mandatory.
Only the receive/input direction needs the guard. The send, dump and
notification paths already call the translator as "if (xtr) { ... }"
with no error on NULL, so on arches without a translator they no-op and
the kernel emits native 64-bit-layout messages, which is what an AArch32
task expects.
Tested on Juniper SRX hardware: with the fix, 32-bit IPsec userspace
netlink and XFRM_POLICY setsockopt operations that previously failed
with -EOPNOTSUPP now succeed; x86 behaviour is unchanged by inspection.
Fixes: 5106f4a8ac ("xfrm/compat: Add 32=>64-bit messages translator")
Fixes: 96392ee5a1 ("xfrm/compat: Translate 32-bit user_policy from sockptr")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sanman Pradhan <psanman@juniper.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
espintcp keeps a single in-flight transmit in ctx->partial.
Before building a new sk_msg, espintcp_sendmsg() first tries to flush
that state through espintcp_push_msgs().
For blocking callers, espintcp_push_msgs() may return success even when
the previous partial send is still pending. espintcp_sendmsg() would
then reinitialize emsg->skmsg and reuse ctx->partial while the old
transfer still owns that state.
Do not rebuild the send message when ctx->partial is still in progress.
If espintcp_push_msgs() returns with emsg->len still set, fail the new
send instead of overwriting the live partial state.
This is a memory-safety fix: reusing the live partial-send state can
leave a stale offset attached to a new sk_msg and lead to an out-of-
bounds read in the send path.
tcp_sendmsg_locked() already handles waiting for send buffer memory, so
the fix here is just to preserve espintcp's one-message-at-a-time
transmit state.
Fixes: e27cca96cd ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhengchuan Liang <zcliangcn@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Assisted-by: Codex:GPT-5.4
Signed-off-by: Wyatt Feng <bronzed_45_vested@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
iptfs_destroy_state() calls hrtimer_cancel() while holding a spinlock
that the timer callback also acquires, leading to an ABBA deadlock on
SMP systems.
For the output timer (iptfs_timer):
- iptfs_destroy_state() holds x->lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
- iptfs_delay_timer() callback takes x->lock
For the drop timer (drop_timer):
- iptfs_destroy_state() holds drop_lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
- iptfs_drop_timer() callback takes drop_lock
Both timers use HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT, so their callbacks run in softirq
context. When hrtimer_cancel() is called for a soft timer that is
currently executing on another CPU, hrtimer_cancel_wait_running() spins
on softirq_expiry_lock -- the same lock held by the softirq running the
callback. If the callback is blocked waiting for the spinlock held by
the caller of hrtimer_cancel(), a circular dependency forms:
CPU 0: holds lock_A -> waits for softirq_expiry_lock
CPU 1: holds softirq_expiry_lock -> waits for lock_A
Fix by calling hrtimer_cancel() before acquiring the respective locks.
hrtimer_cancel() is safe to call without holding any lock and will wait
for any in-progress callback to complete. For the output timer, the
lock is still acquired afterwards to drain the packet queue. For the
drop timer, the lock/unlock pair is removed entirely since it only
existed to serialize with the timer callback, which hrtimer_cancel()
already guarantees.
Found by source code audit.
Fixes: 4b3faf610c ("xfrm: iptfs: add new iptfs xfrm mode impl")
Cc: Christian Hopps <chopps@labn.net>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan@talencesecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Only accept XFRMA used in this method, reject the rest.
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Add a new netlink method to migrate a single xfrm_state.
Unlike the existing migration mechanism (SA + policy), this
supports migrating only the SA and allows changing the reqid.
The SA is looked up via xfrm_usersa_id, which uniquely
identifies it, so old_saddr is not needed. old_daddr is carried in
xfrm_usersa_id.daddr.
The reqid is invariant in the old migration.
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
The xuo pointer is not modified by xfrm_dev_state_add(); make it const.
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Extract verify_xfrm_family() and verify_selector_prefixlen() from
verify_newsa_info() to allow reuse by other netlink handlers.
verify_xfrm_family() validates that a given address family is AF_INET
or AF_INET6 (with CONFIG_IPV6 guard).
verify_selector_prefixlen() validates that the selector prefix lengths
are within the bounds for the given address family.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Extract verify_mtimer_thresh() to consolidate the XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH
validation logic shared between the add_sa and upcoming patch.
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
In preparation for an upcoming patch, move the xfrm_encap_tmpl and
xfrm_user_offload pointers from separate parameters into struct
xfrm_migrate, reducing the parameter count of
xfrm_state_migrate_create(), xfrm_state_migrate_install()
and xfrm_state_migrate()
The fields are placed after the four xfrm_address_t members where
the struct is naturally 8-byte aligned, avoiding padding.
No functional change.
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Add descriptive(extack) error messages for all error paths
in state migration. This improves diagnostics by
providing clear feedback when migration fails.
After xfrm_init_state() use NL_SET_ERR_MSG_WEAK() as fallback for
error paths not yet propagating extack e.g. mode_cbs->init_state()
No functional change.
Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Add xfrm_migrate_sync() to copy curlft and replay state from the old SA
to the new one before installation. The function allocates no memory, so
it can be called under a spinlock. In preparation for a subsequent patch
in this series.
A subsequent patch calls this under x->lock, atomically capturing the
latest lifetime counters and replay state from the original SA and
deleting it in the same critical section to prevent SN/IV reuse
for XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE_STATE method.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
When migrating between different address families, xfrm_addr_equal()
cannot meaningfully compare addresses, different lengths.
Only call xfrm_addr_equal() when families match, and take
the xfrm_state_insert() path when addresses are equal.
Fixes: 80c9abaabf ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
