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10856 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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ab9414ed70 |
net: skbuff: don't leave stale bytes in skb_copy_and_csum_bits()
When skb_copy_and_csum_bits() reaches unreadable frags it returns 0
after copying only the linear part, and the rest of the caller's buffer
is left as it was. The callers copy into a buffer that is about to go
out on the wire: an ICMP error quoting the offending packet, or a
driver's TX bounce buffer in skb_copy_and_csum_dev(). Neither buffer
is zeroed beforehand, so whatever was in memory there gets sent.
Zero the part of the buffer we didn't fill. The checksum usually
won't match the data any more, so the receiver will usually drop the
packet, but either way it no longer carries anything it shouldn't.
Only zero for a positive @len, a negative one from a broken caller must
not turn into a huge memset().
Fixes:
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f202578efc |
flow_dissector: avoid u16 truncation of hlen in bpf_flow_dissect()
bpf_flow_dissect() sanitizes the offsets returned by the BPF program with clamp_t(u16, ..., hlen). If hlen is bigger than 65535, the upper bound is truncated before the comparison. For instance, with hlen == 65536, both nhoff and thoff are forced to zero, even if the program returned sane values. This is the same class of bug as the one fixed in commit |
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99bda1ecbd |
flow_dissector: avoid u16 truncation of skb->len when computing thoff
__skb_flow_dissect() computes key_control->thoff using: key_control->thoff = min_t(u16, nhoff, skb ? skb->len : hlen); min_t(u16, ...) casts both arguments to u16 before comparing them. Whenever skb->len (or hlen) modulo 65536 is smaller than nhoff, the truncated length wins and thoff is set to a bogus small value, even when the dissection succeeded. For example, an IPv4/TCP frame with skb->len == 65540 and nhoff == 34 gets thoff == 4, so callers such as skb_probe_transport_header() point the transport header inside the Ethernet header. Such skbs are not exotic: - At the time of commit |
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d333c8bca6 |
net: make dev_xdp_sb_prog_count() see programs attached through a link
ethtool refuses to enable tcp-data-split on a device running
a single-buffer XDP program (which can't deal with the payload
landing in a separate buffer). dev_xdp_sb_prog_count() only looks
at xdp_state[].prog though, ignoring bpf_link integration.
Get the prog pointer from dev_xdp_prog(), which will consult both.
bpf_xdp_link_update() needs a bit of a touch-up, too, since
ethtool calls dev_xdp_sb_prog_count() with just the instance
lock (for ops-locked devices) - we now have to make sure the
link updates happen under that lock.
Spotted by AI while reviewing the XDP propagation series,
verified and tested on netdevsim with a C test along these lines:
link = bpf_program__attach_xdp(prog, ifindex);
system("ethtool -G eth0 tcp-data-split on")
Fixes:
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5f0764cb1c |
net: extend IPv6 exthdr detection of tunneled packets
Commit |
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ea4d4b5ddd |
net: cap skb->queue_mapping when the tx queue is picked
skbedit can set skb->queue_mapping and raise the per-CPU skip_txqueue flag so __dev_queue_xmit() honours the mapping. __dev_queue_xmit() cleared the flag before sch_handle_egress() and only read it afterwards, so the flag was not confined to the xmit that set it: a nested xmit (mirred redirect or mirror, or a drop after skbedit) could set the flag and the outer xmit would consume it for an skb that never went through skbedit. A forwarded packet still carries the ingress NIC's rx_queue + 1 in skb->queue_mapping, so the outer device then indexes its tx queue state with that stale value. Taprio's child array q->qdiscs[] is sized to the device's queue count, so taprio_enqueue() indexes past its allocation and dereferences the result as a struct Qdisc *. We (ab)use the skb->nf_skip_egress which means "skip netfilter egress for this packet" to tag to "am I in tc egress?". Despite the overload I dont see it as a conflict since the marker is set only around the single sch_handle_egress() call and ingress path is guarded by tc_at_ingress. I will send a followup(net-next) patch once this hits net-next to rename the skb->nf_skip_egress bit/flag to skb->skip_egress Arm the flag only from the egress classifier that can use it: raise skip_txqueue from tcf_skbedit_act() only when it runs inside sch_handle_egress(), thanks to skb->nf_skip_egress. An egress qdisc classifier runs in q->enqueue(), after the tx queue has been picked, so a mapping it sets cannot affect the current packet; arming the flag there only pollutes it for a later xmit. Then own the flag for the xmit frame the egress hook runs in: save the incoming value and clear it just before sch_handle_egress(), and restore it after the hook - on the consumed (drop) path, or, in the same call that reads it, on the surviving path. The save and the restores stay inside the egress_needed_key static branch, so a packet pays for them only when egress hooks are active ( |
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febec6a707 |
net: fix checksum offsets in skb_splice_from_iter()
skb_splice_from_iter() appends multiple page fragments before updating
skb->len. However, skb_splice_csum_page() uses that unchanged length as the
offset for every fragment checksum. If bytes already appended during the
call have an odd total length, a later fragment's checksum is combined
with the wrong parity.
For example, prime a UDP socket with sendto(MSG_MORE) and splice two
distinct pipe buffers containing "abc" and "DEFGH". Uncorking reports
success, but the receiver discards the packet for a bad checksum.
This also affects IPv6 and fragments beginning near a page boundary.
Pass the initial skb length plus the bytes already spliced to the checksum
helper. Keep the existing final length update and partial-progress error
handling unchanged. CHECKSUM_PARTIAL does not use this helper and remains
unaffected.
Fixes:
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006c8b834a |
net: gso: limit recursive IP-in-IP segmentation
IP-in-IP GSO can re-enter inet_gso_segment() or ipv6_gso_segment()
for each nested IP header. encap_level tracks header bytes, not callback
depth, so a deep chain can exhaust the kernel stack. Making
inet_gso_segment() stackable introduced unbounded IPv4 nesting; IPIP
GSO/TSO later made the path reachable. The IPv6 stackable path was
introduced separately and uses the same guard.
Count IPv4 and IPv6 GSO handler entries in skb_gso_cb, initialized once
per top-level GSO operation and preserved across GRE/UDP context changes.
Use the existing IP_TUNNEL_RECURSION_LIMIT for both handlers. The first
five entries pass, and the sixth returns -EINVAL before dispatching
another GSO callback.
Fixes:
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37e02c42a0 |
net: restrict SO_RESERVE_MEM to TCP sockets and cap max value
Commit |
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036778a4fa |
net: ethtool: let tsconfig reach a PHY-only timestamp provider
TSCONFIG_GET and TSCONFIG_SET reject a device that implements neither
hwtstamp NDO, even when its PHY can serve the request. The ioctls they
meant to replace handle it, so the two interfaces disagree on the same
hardware and user space has to pick one.
Accept the default timestamping PHY and an already installed provider on
both sides. On the set side the test moves into ethnl_set_tsconfig() as
the validate callback runs without rtnl. On the get side it stays ahead
of ethnl_ops_begin(), so a device that can serve nothing keeps failing
with EOPNOTSUPP and a dump still skips it rather than stopping there.
A netdev provider needs ndo_hwtstamp_set to be programmed at all, so
don't pick that source without it, and test for ndo_hwtstamp_get before
calling it.
Fixes:
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bdea498018 |
net: page_pool: fix use-after-free in page_pool_recycle_ring_bulk()
With CONFIG_PAGE_POOL_STATS=y, page_pool_recycle_ring_bulk() updates the recycle stats after dropping the producer lock. If it just recycled the last inflight netmems of a pool being destroyed, page_pool_release() can pass its producer-lock barrier and free the pool before recycle_stat_add() runs. Commit |
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f2c53ea949 |
Including fixes from Bluetooth, NFC and Netfilter.
Every week in this release is record-setting for number of posted
patches. It doesn't seem like we're creating any regressions with
all these fixes, 3 Fixes tags here point to 7.2 commits but none
are true regression fixes. We're trying to keep the count down,
nonetheless.
Previous releases - regressions:
- net: don't require the hwtstamp NDOs when a PHY provides timestamping
- ipv6: fix dst leak for uncached routes
- vrf: stop corrupting skb->csum when capturing CHECKSUM_COMPLETE
packets
Previous releases - always broken:
- packet: use ubuf_info completion for TX_RING packets
- arp: terminate device name before lookup
- ipv6: do not let ipv6_find_hdr() return an offset past the packet end
- udp: remove a disconnected socket from the 4-tuple hash table
- sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error
- eth: mlx5: Bridge, fix remaining switchdev ownership gaps on merged
eswitch
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'net-7.3-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski:
"Including fixes from Bluetooth, NFC and Netfilter.
Every week in this release is record-setting for number of posted
patches. It doesn't seem like we're creating any regressions with all
these fixes, three 'Fixes' tags here point to 7.2 commits but none are
true regression fixes. We're trying to keep the count down,
nonetheless.
Previous releases - regressions:
- net: don't require the hwtstamp NDOs when a PHY provides
timestamping
- ipv6: fix dst leak for uncached routes
- vrf: stop corrupting skb->csum when capturing CHECKSUM_COMPLETE
packets
Previous releases - always broken:
- packet: use ubuf_info completion for TX_RING packets
- arp: terminate device name before lookup
- ipv6: do not let ipv6_find_hdr() return an offset past the packet
end
- udp: remove a disconnected socket from the 4-tuple hash table
- sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error
- eth: mlx5: Bridge, fix remaining switchdev ownership gaps on merged
eswitch"
[ And lots of other random network driver fixes ]
* tag 'net-7.3-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (189 commits)
tcp: prevent collapsing skbs across boundary in rtx queue
vlan: ensure sufficient headroom in vlan_dev_hard_header()
net/sched: sch_teql: fix shadowed err in __teql_resolve()
bridge: check llc_mac_hdr_init() return value in br_send_bpdu()
llc: fix skb UAF and leaks on llc_mac_hdr_init() failure
llc: reserve device headroom for allocated frames
gve: DQO: reject TSO packets with an out of range MSS
gve: fix TX drop when GSO MSS is too small for hw
gve: DQO: fix header length used by gve_can_send_tso() for UDP GSO
net: flush skb_defer_nodes in dev_cpu_dead()
net: ethernet: stmmac: dwmac-rk: fix bulk clock leak when the PHY clock fails
af_packet: fix integer overflow in prb_calc_retire_blk_tmo()
tipc: Fix a data race on mon->peer_cnt in mon_timeout()
net: phy: intel-xway: workaround 100BASE-TX Link-Up issue
net/smc: fix UAF on lgr list traversal in smcr_port_err()
net/rds: size a connection's path set by the transport it ends up with
nfp: hold IPsec RX state under the XArray lock
net: ena: fix MMIO read buffer leak on probe failure
net: ena: fix PHC cleanup on probe failure
net/sched: act_ct: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc
...
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06e3f54e8b |
net: flush skb_defer_nodes in dev_cpu_dead()
When a CPU goes offline, dev_cpu_dead() drains its softnet queues (completion_queue, output_queue, poll_list, process_queue, and input_pkt_queue), but leaves net_hotdata.skb_defer_nodes untouched. If oldcpu goes offline while holding pending skbs in its skb_defer_nodes lists (e.g. below the sysctl_skb_defer_max >> 1 IPI threshold, or if the IPI races with CPU teardown), those skbs remain stranded until oldcpu is brought back online. If any of these skbs hold page_pool fragments, page_pool_destroy() will stall indefinitely waiting for inflight pages to be returned when a netdev or driver is torn down while oldcpu is offline. Additionally, if smp_call_function_single_async() fails in kick_defer_list_purge() because the target CPU went offline, reset defer_ipi_scheduled to 0 so future IPI kicks are not blocked when the CPU comes back online. Also, if oldcpu was the last online CPU on its NUMA node, drain that node's slot across all CPUs so no skbs deferred from that node remain stranded on idle remote CPUs (or if the node itself is subsequently offlined). Finally, in skb_attempt_defer_free(), re-check cpu_online(cpu) and whether the caller migrated CPUs after llist_add(), flushing the node list if so, to close the preemption TOCTOU race against CPU/node teardown. Fixes: |
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5fc5768c7c |
bpf-fixes
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Merge tag 'bpf-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf
Pull bpf fixes from Alexei Starovoitov:
- Fix bpf_skb_change_tail() to drop the checksum offload instead of
rejecting the trim of CHECKSUM_PARTIAL skbs (Daniel Borkmann)
- Add KF_PERFMON kfunc flag and require CAP_PERFMON for kfuncs that
read arbitrary memory and for untrusted read-only memory reads
(Daniel Borkmann)
- Clear scalar delta on narrowing stack spill (Daniel Borkmann)
- Set up the frame pointer for the exception callback in arm64 JIT, and
zero-fill other CPUs when BPF_F_CPU update creates a per-cpu hash
element (Donggeun Yoo)
- Various fixes (Emil Tsalapatis):
- Fix bounds check underflow for skb-backed dynptrs
- Fix rx_queue_mapping context access code generation in bpf_sock
- Reject packet pointer arguments to subprogs that may mutate the
packet
- Reject ALU instructions that see arena and non-arena operands on
different code paths
- Fix copied_seq double-counting on sockmap self-redirect
(Geliang Tang)
- Fix divide-by-zero in btf_struct_walk() on a flexible array of
zero-sized elements, fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops
(Jiayuan Chen)
- Fix bpf_sock_destroy() out-of-bounds read of sk_protocol on TIME_WAIT
and request socks, and sleeping under RCU when destroying a listener
with pending children (Jiayuan Chen)
- Fix JEQ/JNE with immediate operand in MIPS32 JIT and missing zero
extension of BSWAP 16/32 in MIPS64 JIT (Johan Almbladh)
- Avoid soft lockup in htab lookup[_and_delete] batch operations on
large maps (Jose Fernandez)
- Various fixes (Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi):
- Verify global subprogs in each sleepability context they are
called from
- Make post-verification instruction rewrites killable
- Preserve packet pointer displacement in regsafe()
- Apply CO-RE relocations before subprogram validation, restrict
CO-RE poisoning to relocatable instructions, and reject truncated
ldimm64 CO-RE relocations in libbpf
- Assign lock identity to callback map values
- Compare stack frames in regs_exact()
- Bound ownership depth through local kptrs and graph roots
- Fix u32 overflow in map batch operations when the map size exceeds
4GB (Masoud Aghasi)
- Fix UAF in bpf memalloc due to concurrent consumption of ttrace lists
in alloc_bulk() (Pu Lehui)
- Allow gotox as the terminal instruction of a program or a subprogram
(Siddharth Chintamaneni)
- Disallow bpf_skb_pull_data() for LWT_SEG6LOCAL, skip unsettled links
in link iterator, and reject dev-bound-only programs on other devices
(Weiming Shi)
- Reject non-negative stack offsets in stack_slot_obj_get_spi()
(Xu Yunxiang)
- Check params size before reading reserved fields in
bpf_crypto_ctx_create() (Yuqi Xu)
- Reject max_entries > INT_MAX in sock_map_alloc() (Zhao Gongyi)
- Use a 32-bit compare in xsk_map_gen_lookup() (Zhiling Zou)
- Use kvfree() in xdp_test_run_teardown() (Zhixing Chen)
* tag 'bpf-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf: (58 commits)
selftests/bpf: Test per-cpu initialization of a BPF_F_CPU created element
bpf: Zero-fill other CPUs when BPF_F_CPU creates a per-cpu hash element
bpf: Fix BSWAP 32 and 16 on MIPS64
bpf: Fix immediate JMP JEQ/JNE on MIPS32
bpf: Reject dev-bound-only programs on other devices
bpf, sockmap: Reject max_entries > INT_MAX in sock_map_alloc
selftests/bpf: Test for mixed arena/nonarena code paths
bpf: Prevent variable arena/non-arena register contents
selftests/bpf: Test rejection of pkt args to mutating subprogs
bpf: Reject pkt arguments in mutating subprogs
selftests/bpf: Add selftests for rx_queue_mapping context access
bpf: Fix bpf_sock context code generation
selftests/bpf: Test dynptr slices past end of skb
bpf: Fix bounds check for skb-backed dynptrs
selftests/bpf: Reject iterator destruction through fp+0
bpf: Reject non-negative offsets in stack_slot_obj_get_spi()
bpf: Check params size before reading reserved fields
selftests/bpf: Check local object ownership depth
bpf: Bound ownership depth through local kptrs and graph roots
selftests/bpf: Cover frame changes in bounded loops
...
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4da3b7b8b5 |
net: xps: reject an out of range traffic class
Only the entries below dev->num_tc are valid in dev->tc_to_txq[], and
dev->prio_tc_map[] may only name classes below it. netdev_set_num_tc()
lowers dev->num_tc without touching either array.
netdev_txq_to_tc() walks all TC_MAX_QUEUE slots and
netdev_get_prio_tc_map() returns the entry as it stands, so a leftover
entry is handed out as a traffic class >= dev->num_tc. Taking that
class from netdev_txq_to_tc(), __netif_set_xps_queue() rejects only a
negative one and indexes an XPS map sized for dev->num_tc classes:
tci = j * num_tc + tc;
RCU_INIT_POINTER(new_dev_maps->attr_map[tci], map);
attr_map[] holds nr_ids * num_tc entries and j runs over the ids named
in the mask, so a class that is not below num_tc pushes tci past the end
of the map for the last ids and the store overruns it.
Any caller that lowers num_tc leaves such entries behind, and
mqprio_destroy() tears down with netdev_set_num_tc(dev, 0) rather than
netdev_reset_tc(). After mqprio with 8 classes then 1, tc_to_txq[1..7]
still describe txq 1..7. The splat is from an XPS write to txq 2 on a
veth with 8 rx queues: attr_map[] has 8 * 1 entries, tci = j + 2, and
j == 6 stores one past the end of the 88-byte map:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __netif_set_xps_queue (net/core/dev.c:2954)
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88813016bc58 by task xps_oob/634
__netif_set_xps_queue (net/core/dev.c:2954)
xps_rxqs_store (net/core/net-sysfs.c:1880)
netdev_queue_attr_store (net/core/net-sysfs.c:1390)
Allocated by task 634:
__kmalloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:5439)
__netif_set_xps_queue (net/core/dev.c:2937)
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 88-byte region [ffff88813016bc00, ffff88813016bc58)
Reject a class the map has no room for.
Fixes:
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3b4e0b0c00 |
net: skbuff: fix pull-bound underflow in skb_checksum_setup_ipv6()
skb_maybe_pull_tail() subtracts skb_headlen(skb) from the unsigned max
argument and passes the result to __pskb_pull_tail() as a signed int. The
function does not ensure that max is at least skb_headlen(skb).
This can happen while parsing IPv6 extension headers when an skb already
has a linear area larger than MAX_IPV6_HDR_LEN. Once the parser needs data
beyond the linear area, max - skb_headlen(skb) wraps and is converted to a
negative delta. __pskb_pull_tail() then passes that negative length to
skb_copy_bits(), where it can become a very large copy length.
Pass the requested length itself as the pull bound at the three
extension-header call sites, so the delta can no longer go negative.
Fixes:
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73b3fc67a4 |
net: devmem: document that bind-tx is unprivileged by design
Unlike bind-rx, which configures shared NIC RX queues to steer incoming traffic into the caller's dmabuf and requires CAP_NET_ADMIN (uns-admin-perm), bind-tx only DMA-maps the caller's dmabuf so the caller can transmit from it on their own sockets without affecting other traffic or device configuration. Add a comment in netdev.yaml and above netdev_nl_bind_tx_doit() to make it explicit that NETDEV_CMD_BIND_TX is unprivileged by design. Signed-off-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@fomichev.me> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921195545.493253-1-almasrymina@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> |
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814a81c842
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bpf, sockmap: Reject max_entries > INT_MAX in sock_map_alloc
sock_map_alloc() only rejects max_entries == 0 and otherwise allows any
u32 value. sock_map_free() then walks the sks[] array with a signed int
iterator:
int i;
for (i = 0; i < stab->map.max_entries; i++)
struct sock **psk = &stab->sks[i];
When a SOCKMAP is created with max_entries = 0xffffffff (UINT_MAX), the
allocation of 32 GiB can succeed on large-memory hosts. During free the
counter reaches 0x80000000, wraps to INT_MIN, is sign-extended by movslq
and turned into a ~16 GiB negative offset from stab->sks, pointing far
below the allocation.
The faulting access is an xchg() write in sock_map_free(). Without
KASAN, the same out-of-bounds write can fault on an unmapped vmalloc page
or corrupt an unrelated allocation if that vmalloc address is populated.
On a KASAN kernel with CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC=y, the shadow check for that
address hits an unmapped shadow page and oopses first:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffff521b59c5a00
RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x107/0x190
Call Trace:
sock_map_free+0x93/0x190
map_create+0x68d/0xb30
__sys_bpf+0x21e/0x2e70
Vmcore confirmed stab->map.max_entries == 0xffffffff, stab->sks ==
0xffffc911ace2d000, and the faulting address sks + (s64)INT_MIN * 8
exactly at 0xffffc90dace2d000. The same buggy path is reached on the
normal close()/bpf_map_free_deferred() path whenever such a map is
destroyed.
sock_map_alloc() used to bound its allocation size through
bpf_map_charge_init(), but the bound was dropped when rlimit-based memory
accounting was removed. Reject max_entries > INT_MAX at creation time so
the signed iterator in sock_map_free() never sees a value that would
overflow.
Triggered by syzkaller and reproduced on both a 6.6-based KASAN kernel
and the upstream v7.3-rc2 kernel.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
4a4852376e
|
bpf: Fix bpf_sock context code generation
Currently, the ctx access code reads the rx_queue_mapping
field with either a 4-byte or 2-byte load. The rest of the bits
in the register are marked known zero by the verifier. However,
the emitted ctx access code places in the register on certain
the special value (-1) using BPF_MOV_IMM64, which gets sign-extended
to turn on all the bits in the register. By shifting this value right,
the program ends up with a value at runtime above what the verifier
assumes is possible.
Fix this by ensuring the read value is as wide as the assumed size.
Use MOV32 instructions instead of MOV64 instructions to keep
the upper bits zero as assumed by the verifier. Also properly report
the size of the destination variable (the bpf_sock field, 4 bytes) instead
of the source (the socket field, 2 bytes).
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
3199557121 |
net: don't require the hwtstamp NDOs when a PHY provides timestamping
Removing the legacy ioctl fallback made both hwtstamp NDOs mandatory. A
device that only timestamps in its PHY implements neither, so
SIOCSHWTSTAMP fails with EOPNOTSUPP before anything looks at the PHY and
PTP stops working there.
The check only ever picked the legacy path. That path is gone, so drop it
and test where the NDOs are actually called.
SIOCGHWTSTAMP is new here, not restored. The old path went through
phy_mii_ioctl(), which only handled SIOCSHWTSTAMP.
Such a device now returns -ENODEV while absent instead of -EOPNOTSUPP,
like the ones that do implement the NDOs.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
a5117e1ecc |
net: skbuff: do not leave stale header offsets after pskb_carve()
pskb_carve_inside_header() and pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() remove
the first bytes of a packet and reallocate skb->head.
All the headers that were present before the operation are gone,
but both functions call skb_headers_offset_update(skb, 0), which
is a no-op : skb->mac_header, skb->network_header,
skb->transport_header and skb->csum_start keep their old values and
now describe bytes which are no longer there.
Both helpers size the new head from the old skb_end_offset(), so the
stale offsets still land inside the new allocation. They point past
skb_tail_pointer() though, to bytes that were never initialized.
pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() is the worst case, because it leaves a
zombie skb with an empty linear part (skb->data ==
skb_tail_pointer(skb), skb_headlen(skb) == 0), while
skb_mac_header_was_set() is still true and skb->mac_header is way
ahead of skb->data.
The only user of pskb_extract() is rds_tcp_data_recv(), and the
carved skb is queued on tinc->ti_skb_list. When the RDS incoming
message is released, rds_tcp_inc_free() calls skb_queue_purge(),
which frees the skbs with SKB_DROP_REASON_QUEUE_PURGE. This is
visible from drop_monitor, which then tries to pull back to the
(bogus) mac header :
skbuff: __skb_pull(len=234)
skb len=6968 data_len=6968 headroom=0 headlen=0 tailroom=0
end-tail=384 mac=(234,14) mac_len=14 net=(248,40) trans=288
shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=1 gso(size=1428 type=16 segs=5))
csum(0x100120 start=288 offset=16 ip_summed=3 complete_sw=0 valid=1 level=0)
hash(0x7b446c6c sw=0 l4=1) proto=0x86dd pkttype=0 iif=60
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2847!
Add skb_carve_reset_headers() to mark the mac and transport headers
as not set, reset the network header, clear skb->mac_len, and drop
a now meaningless CHECKSUM_PARTIAL (csum_start no longer describes
anything).
Invalidate the inner offsets as well. Unlike mac_header and
transport_header they have no "unset" sentinel, so a leftover
non-zero value still looks like a real header. Zero
skb->inner_mac_header, skb->inner_network_header,
skb->inner_transport_header, skb->inner_protocol and
skb->encapsulation, so that all the header state is invalidated in
one place.
v2: fixed an inaccurate changelog. The stale offsets stay inside the
new skb->head, which is never smaller than the old one, they
simply point past skb_tail_pointer() to bytes that are gone.
Thanks to Xuanqiang Luo for insisting on this.
Also invalidate the inner header state, as suggested by the
netdev AI review :
https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260911114922.621937-1-edumazet%40google.com
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
a41f24c612 |
net: psp: avoid conflicts with skb->decrypted and sk_validate_xmit_skb()
PSP conflicts with TLS ULP in its usage of both skb->decrypted and
sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb().
Make PSP mutually exclusive with TLS ULP, the only other user of either
of these. As other users of skb->decrypted come along, they can be added
to sk_has_decrypt_user(). It would make sense to also assert that
sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb() is also NULL in both of these setup paths for
similar future proofing, but the PSP listener/sk_clone() path is still
broken and it could be seen as a regression to not allow rx assoc to run
on a child of a listener socket with PSP tx assoc state.
Include all TCP ULPs in the sk_has_decrypt_user() check, even though TLS
is the only one that conflicts with PSP via the decrypted bit. This is
intentional because PSP was not designed to be used with ULPs. It is
best to close off surface area that may make bugs reachable, until
someone wishes to design and test an actual user of PSP with ULPs.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
9ed55f3dbe |
net: lock the socket in sock_gettstamp()
sk->sk_flags must only be changed while holding the socket lock,
because sock_set_flag() and sock_reset_flag() use non atomic
operations (__set_bit() and __clear_bit()).
sock_gettstamp() is one of the last places where a bit of sk->sk_flags
is changed from a syscall without owning the socket lock, through
sock_enable_timestamp(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMP).
sk_set_memalloc() and sk_clear_memalloc() also change sk->sk_flags
without the socket lock, but their callers (nbd, iscsi_tcp, nvme-tcp,
sunrpc, wireguard) need a careful audit, this will be addressed in a
separate patch.
Jungwoo Lee and Wongi Lee reported an UDP socket use-after-free
caused by this bug: a SIOCGSTAMPNS_NEW ioctl racing with bind()
can cancel the SOCK_RCU_FREE bit that udp_lib_get_port() just set,
because both threads perform a read-modify-write on the same word.
CPU 0 (bind) CPU 1 (SIOCGSTAMPNS_NEW)
-------------------------------- ----------------------------
read sk_flags = F read sk_flags = F
compute F | BIT(SOCK_RCU_FREE) compute F | BIT(SOCK_TIMESTAMP)
store F | BIT(SOCK_RCU_FREE)
sk_add_node_rcu(sk, ...)
store F | BIT(SOCK_TIMESTAMP)
After the lost update, SOCK_RCU_FREE is clear while the socket is
visible to lockless UDP receive lookups. sk_destruct() then frees
the socket immediately instead of waiting for a RCU grace period,
while the receive path still holds a reference-less pointer to it:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ipv4_pktinfo_prepare+0x30/0x410
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888008806610 by task exploit/207
CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 207 Comm: exploit Not tainted 6.12.95+ #1
ipv4_pktinfo_prepare+0x30/0x410
udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x51c/0x1180
udp_unicast_rcv_skb+0x109/0x350
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x14b/0x310
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x29d/0x390
ip_local_deliver+0x24d/0x2a0
Only grab the socket lock when SOCK_TIMESTAMP has to be set,
to keep the common case lockless.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
150dba2c69 |
net: remove WARN_ON_ONCE() from the dev_fill_forward_path() loop check
ipip_fill_forward_path() and ip6_tnl_fill_forward_path() look up the route to the tunnel's remote endpoint and set ctx->dev to its device, which is the tunnel itself when that route resolves back to the tunnel. dev_fill_forward_path() then makes no progress and trips WARN_ON_ONCE(last_dev == ctx->dev) as soon as a flowtable tries to offload a flow through the tunnel. That routing loop is a configuration any CAP_NET_ADMIN user can set up, and ip_tunnel_xmit() and ip6_tnl_xmit() already treat it as a tx error, so remove the warning and just fail the walk, as commit |
||
|
|
439f392084 |
drop_monitor: fix out-of-bounds write in reset_per_cpu_data()
In reset_per_cpu_data(), al is computed as:
al = sizeof(struct net_dm_alert_msg);
al += dm_hit_limit * sizeof(struct net_dm_drop_point);
al += sizeof(struct nlattr);
skb = genlmsg_new(al, GFP_KERNEL);
...
nla = nla_reserve(skb, NLA_UNSPEC, sizeof(struct net_dm_alert_msg));
...
msg = nla_data(nla);
memset(msg, 0, al);
Because al includes sizeof(struct nlattr) (the 4-byte attribute header),
genlmsg_new() allocates al bytes of tailroom starting at nla.
However, msg points to nla_data(nla), which is located
sizeof(struct nlattr) bytes past nla. Calling memset(msg, 0, al)
therefore writes al bytes starting from msg, exceeding the allocated
buffer by sizeof(struct nlattr) (4 bytes) and corrupting
skb_shared_info.
Fix this by letting al represent only the payload length, allocating
the skb with genlmsg_new(nla_total_size(al), GFP_KERNEL), and zeroing
al bytes from msg.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
c19b7d3508 |
drop_monitor: use raw_cpu_ptr() in tracepoint probes
syzbot reported a preemption warning in sk_skb_reason_drop(): BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: syz.0.17/5917 caller is net_dm_packet_trace_kfree_skb_hit+0x119/0x350 net/core/drop_monitor.c:519 In net_dm_packet_trace_kfree_skb_hit(), data = this_cpu_ptr(&dm_cpu_data) is evaluated before spin_lock_irqsave(&data->drop_queue.lock, flags). When kfree_skb() is called from preemptible context (e.g. process context during close() on /dev/net/tun), preemption is enabled, triggering the CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT warning in smp_processor_id(). The same pattern exists in net_dm_hw_trap_summary_probe() and net_dm_hw_trap_packet_probe() for dm_hw_cpu_data. This is a false positive because each per-cpu structure is protected by its own spinlock. If the task migrates to another CPU right after reading the per-cpu pointer, the lock still safely synchronizes access to that queue. Use raw_cpu_ptr() instead of this_cpu_ptr() to silence CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT without disturbing interrupt state or breaking PREEMPT_RT locking semantics. Fixes: |
||
|
|
c391a40f71 |
drop_monitor: use timer_shutdown_sync() to prevent timer rearming during teardown
In drop_monitor teardown paths (net_dm_trace_off_set(),
net_dm_hw_monitor_stop(), and error unwind paths in net_dm_trace_on_set()
and net_dm_hw_monitor_start()), per-CPU timers are stopped using
timer_delete_sync() followed by cancel_work_sync().
However, there is a circular dependency between send_timer and
dm_alert_work:
1) sched_send_work() (timer callback) schedules dm_alert_work.
2) send_dm_alert() / net_dm_hw_summary_work() calls reset_per_cpu_data()
or net_dm_hw_reset_per_cpu_data().
3) If memory allocation fails under memory pressure in the reset
function, it re-arms the timer via mod_timer(&data->send_timer, ...).
If dm_alert_work is running concurrently while timer_delete_sync()
executes on another CPU, an allocation failure in the worker will
re-arm the timer after timer_delete_sync() has already returned.
Once cancel_work_sync() completes and module_put() is called, the timer
remains active in the timer wheel. If the module is then unloaded, the
timer will fire and execute sched_send_work() in freed memory,
triggering a kernel panic / use-after-free.
Switch from timer_delete_sync() to timer_shutdown_sync(). This guarantees
that any in-flight timer handler has finished and prevents subsequent
re-arming attempts from running workers from succeeding. When monitoring
is restarted later, timer_setup() is invoked, which cleanly
re-initializes the timer.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
6a038ef2b5 |
drop_monitor: synchronize tracepoint unregistration on error path
If register_trace_napi_poll() fails in net_dm_trace_on_set(),
unregister_trace_kfree_skb() is called to roll back the kfree_skb
tracepoint registration.
However, tracepoint_synchronize_unregister() is omitted before calling
cancel_work_sync() and module_put(). An in-flight probe executing
concurrently on another CPU could call schedule_work() after
cancel_work_sync() has already returned, leaving a pending work item
scheduled after the module reference is dropped. If the module is then
unloaded, executing the work item triggers a kernel panic.
Add tracepoint_synchronize_unregister() after unregister_trace_kfree_skb()
in the error path, matching net_dm_trace_off_set() and
net_dm_hw_probe_unregister().
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
490a83d638 |
bpf, sockmap: Fix self-redirect copied_seq double-counting
When a BPF stream_verdict program redirects an skb back to the same
socket (self-redirect with BPF_F_INGRESS), sk_psock_verdict_apply()
calls tcp_eat_skb() which advances tcp_sk->copied_seq. However, the
skb is then delivered to the socket's psock ingress queue and later
read by tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser(), which also advances copied_seq via
the copied_from_self accounting path. This double-counting causes
copied_seq to advance by 2x the actual data length, triggering:
TCP recvmsg seq # bug 2: copied BF2E806, seq BF2E7FD, \
rcvnxt BF2E806, fl 0
WARNING: net/ipv4/tcp.c:2745 at tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x72b/0x2640
Call Trace:
tcp_recvmsg+0x10a/0x500
sock_recvmsg+0x168/0x1d0
__sys_recvfrom+0x19a/0x2a0
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe4/0x1f0
do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x530
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
cleanup rbuf bug: copied BF2E806 seq BF2E806 rcvnxt BF2E806
WARNING: net/ipv4/tcp.c:1609 at tcp_cleanup_rbuf+0xf2/0x1c0
Call Trace:
tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x8d1/0x2640
tcp_recvmsg+0x10a/0x500
sock_recvmsg+0x168/0x1d0
__sys_recvfrom+0x19a/0x2a0
__x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe4/0x1f0
do_syscall_64+0xf7/0x530
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Fix this by converting self-redirect verdict to __SK_PASS at the
beginning of sk_psock_verdict_apply(). This bypasses the
__SK_REDIRECT case entirely (which calls sk_psock_eat_skb), letting
the __SK_PASS path queue the skb to the psock ingress queue. The
data is then read via tcp_bpf_recvmsg_parser(), which advances
copied_seq exactly once through copied_from_self. Cross-socket
redirects continue through __SK_REDIRECT with sk_psock_eat_skb()
unchanged.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
75f8cf2246 |
bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops
A sockops prog reading skops->rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the
tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops->sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the
ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of
the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.
SEC("sockops")
int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)
{
switch (skops->op) {
case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:
leak = skops->rtt_min; /* reads the request_sock OOB */
...
}
}
For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a
leaked kernel pointer.
Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks
is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops->sk is not a locked full
socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is
the only one open-coded, so it skips the check.
Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special:
it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass
rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset
offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)
(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get()
returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is
added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset
are no longer needed.
Before patch:
0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk
1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; ((tcp_sock *)sk)->rtt_min.s[0].v
After patch:
0: *(u64 *)(r1 +56) = r9
1: r9 = *(u8 *)(r1 +50) ; is_locked_tcp_sock
2: if r9 == 0 goto pc+4 ; not a locked full sock -> 0
3: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)
4: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk
5: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; rtt_min.s[0].v
6: goto pc+2
7: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)
8: r1 = 0
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
979aabdad8 |
neighbour: Skip default parms when resumed in neightbl_dump_info().
neightbl_dump_info() calls neightbl_fill_info() in each loop
to render the default parms.
If there are many devices and neightbl_fill_param_info() failed,
neightbl_fill_info() is called again when the dump resumes:
# ynl --family rt-neigh --dump getneightbl --output-json |
jq '.[] | {name: .name, ifindex: .parms.ifindex}'
...
{
"name": "ndisc_cache",
"ifindex": null
}
...
{
"name": "ndisc_cache",
"ifindex": 6
}
{
"name": "ndisc_cache",
"ifindex": null
}
{
"name": "ndisc_cache",
"ifindex": 5
}
Let's skip neightbl_fill_info() if it is already called in
neightbl_dump_info().
Note that we cannot use !neigh_skip instead of !default_skip
because default_skip == 1 && neigh_skip == 0 could be true
if the first neightbl_fill_param_info() fails.
Also, nidx must be cleared at the end of each table loop;
otherwise, if neightbl_fill_info() for a subsequent table
fails, the leftover nidx from the previous table would be
saved in cb->args[1], resulting in erroneously skipping parms
of the subsequent table in the next dump.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
7b430fcfc9 |
neighbour: Don't render blackhole_netdev via RTM_GETNEIGHTBL.
The cited commits started to initialise blackhole_netdev with
neigh_parms_alloc().
This is visible in init_net as the ifindex==0 entries via
RTM_GETNEIGHTBL:
# ynl --family rt-neigh --dump getneightbl --output-json \
| jq '.[] | select(.parms.ifindex == 0)
| {name: .name, ifindex: .parms.ifindex}'
{
"name": "arp_cache",
"ifindex": 0
}
{
"name": "ndisc_cache",
"ifindex": 0
}
For RTM_SETNEIGHTBL, ifindex being 0 means wildcard.
Let's skip blackhole_netdev's parms in neightbl_dump_info().
Note that lookup_neigh_parms() does not need the same change
because the default parms is always the first entry and matches
with ifindex == 0.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
6d79b223ec |
neighbour: Enforce min/max to NDTPA_INTERVAL_PROBE_TIME_MS.
NDTPA_INTERVAL_PROBE_TIME_MS sets .type and .min but misses
.validation_type, so no validation is applied:
# ynl --family rt-neigh --do setneightbl \
--json '{"name": "arp_cache", "parms": {"interval-probe-time-ms": 0}}'
# ynl --family rt-neigh --dump getneightbl --output-json | \
jq '.[] | select(.name == "arp_cache" and has("config"))
| .parms["interval-probe-time-ms"]'
0
Moreover, nla_get_msecs() uses msecs_to_jiffies(), and u64 is
silently cast to u32, so a larger value can bypass the min check:
e.g. 4294967296 == 0x100000000
# ynl --family rt-neigh --do setneightbl \
--json '{"name": "arp_cache", "parms": {"interval-probe-time-ms": 4294967296}}'
# ynl --family rt-neigh --dump getneightbl --output-json | \
jq '.[] | select(.name == "arp_cache" and has("config"))
| .parms["interval-probe-time-ms"]'
0
msecs_to_jiffies() returns MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET if the value is
larger than INT_MAX. Also, INT_MAX ms overflows int NEIGH_VAR()
when HZ > 1000 (Alpha, MIPS), and passing a negative integer to
queue_delayed_work(unsigned long delay) causes sign extension,
which wraps around the expiry time to the past, resulting in it
being handled as 0 delay in the timer wheel.
Let's use NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE() and limit the max to 1 day.
The same max check is applied to sysctl as well.
Note that this controls the probe interval for NTF_MANAGED
entries, so the max of 1 day is unlikely to break any
deployments.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
764dcebb03 |
neighbour: Add missing RCU annotation for neightbl_dump_info().
neightbl_dump_info() fetches the first non-default neigh_parms
with list_next_entry(&tbl->parms, ...) and iterates through the
list with list_for_each_entry_from_rcu().
However, list_next_entry() does not use RCU helper.
Let's use list_for_each_entry_rcu() and skip the default parms.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
01b245ba01 |
bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of sk_protocol in bpf_sock_destroy()
sk_protocol lives in struct sock, not in struct sock_common. A timewait
or request sock handed to bpf_sock_destroy() by the tcp iterator is
neither, so reading sk->sk_protocol runs past the object:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_sock_destroy+0xc7/0xe0
Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881047d11b4 by task test_progs/428
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0
print_report+0xd1/0x630
kasan_report+0xf3/0x130
__asan_report_load2_noabort+0x14/0x30
bpf_sock_destroy+0xc7/0xe0
bpf_prog_c3dd61f9d9cd9f37_iter_tcp6_timewait+0x9f/0xb7
bpf_iter_run_prog+0x538/0xde0
bpf_iter_tcp_seq_show+0x26b/0x4b0
bpf_seq_read+0x424/0x1210
vfs_read+0x197/0xe40
ksys_read+0x119/0x240
__x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0
x64_sys_call+0x647/0x27e0
do_syscall_64+0xe5/0x610
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Only check sk_protocol on full socks. tcp_abort() already knows how to
deal with TIME_WAIT and NEW_SYN_RECV socks. Also fix the comment, it
never matched the code.
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
e4a62833ad |
bpf: Disallow bpf_skb_pull_data() for LWT_SEG6LOCAL
An LWT_SEG6LOCAL program can invalidate its cached SRH with
bpf_lwt_seg6_adjust_srh() and then call bpf_skb_pull_data(). The latter
may reallocate skb->head, leaving the per-CPU SRH pointer dangling.
Post-program SRH validation then writes through that pointer.
Disallow bpf_skb_pull_data() for LWT_SEG6LOCAL programs so the verifier
rejects this unsafe helper combination. Other LWT program types continue
to expose the helper through lwt_out_func_proto().
Fixes:
|
||
|
|
3b55f350c6 |
bpf: Fix bpf_skb_change_tail wrt csum partial skbs
Cilium generates ICMP "frag needed" replies from BPF when a LB DSR
packet exceeds the egress MTU. The reply is built by first trimming the
packet down to target size via bpf_skb_change_tail(), and then pushing
the ICMP error headers in front of it.
The trim is rejected for skbs which carry a checksum offload, e.g. TCP
packets aggregated by GRO on ingress where tcp_gro_complete() leaves
the skb as CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. __bpf_skb_min_len() raises the minimum
length to the end of the L4 checksum field, so a trim to 42 bytes bails
out with -EINVAL given a min_len of 52 in this case, and due to that
the ICMP generator fails. This is not the case if GRO is turned off.
Fix this bpf_skb_change_tail() restriction and drop the checksum offload
when the new length no longer covers the checksum field. The BPF program
rewrites the skb into an ICMP error and computes the checksum itself
anyway.
Fixes:
|
||
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1aa9e143bf |
net: reject oversized tx_queue_len at netlink parse time
rtnl_create_link() assigns IFLA_TXQLEN directly to dev->tx_queue_len
without going through netif_change_tx_queue_len(), so a device created
with "ip link add ... txqueuelen 500000" bypasses the S16_MAX cap and
still triggers the oversized ring allocations in pfifo_fast, tun and
tap. The veth peer nest (rtnl_nla_parse_ifinfomsg()) and the
RTM_NEWLINK-on-existing-device path reach the same sinks.
Enforce the cap in ifla_policy instead: IFLA_TXQLEN becomes
NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE(NLA_U32, &txqlen_range) with
txqlen_range = { .min = 0, .max = S16_MAX }. All netlink consumers
parse against this policy - rtnl_setlink(), rtnl_newlink() (create
and change), and the veth peer nest - so every netlink path is capped
at parse time and rejects the attribute with -ERANGE plus a proper
"integer out of range" extack message before any device state is
modified (the RTM_SETLINK half-application wart is gone with it).
Document the bound in the rt-link.yaml netlink spec.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_VETH=y, CONFIG_USER_NS=y, CONFIG_NET_NS=y.
- Unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn):
ip link add v0 txqueuelen 500000 type veth peer name v1
-> on the fixed kernel this is rejected with -ERANGE ("integer out
of range" extack) instead of installing an oversized tx_queue_len
that later inflates pfifo_fast/tun/tap ring allocations.
- ip link set v0 txqueuelen 500000 is likewise rejected at parse time.
Fixes:
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66ab4c59b7 |
net: cap tx_queue_len at S16_MAX to prevent oversized ring allocations
Several subsystems allocate ring buffers sized by dev->tx_queue_len
with no upper bound. An unprivileged user (via unshare -Urn) can set a
huge tx_queue_len and exhaust global memory with ring allocations:
- pfifo_fast: pfifo_fast_init() and pfifo_fast_change_tx_queue_len()
allocate 3 skb_array rings of tx_queue_len entries each.
- tun: tun_queue_resize() and the queue-attach path resize ptr_rings
to tx_queue_len on the NETDEV_CHANGE_TX_QUEUE_LEN notifier.
- tap (macvtap/ipvtap): tap_queue_resize() and tap_init() resize/init
ptr_rings to tx_queue_len on the same notifier.
netif_change_tx_queue_len() is the single entry point for IFLA_TXQLEN,
sysfs, and the SIOCSIFTXQLEN ioctl. Cap new_len at S16_MAX (32767)
there so the oversized value is rejected at set time. This takes
effect whether the device is up or down, before dev->tx_queue_len is
written, before any notifier fires, and before any ring is allocated.
The "> S16_MAX" check also subsumes the previous unsigned-long
truncation test, and a negative ifr_qlen from the ioctl lands far
above the cap after conversion, so both old failure modes are covered
by the one comparison.
tx_queue_len is ambigious: both a per-ring sizing multiplier and a
default queue-length/limit knob for consumers that allocate
nothing at set time (pfifo/bfifo/gred/plug/sfb limits, htb
direct_qlen, qfq max_classes, teql). 32767 is chosen as the largest
value NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE can express for the u32 IFLA_TXQLEN
policy in patch 2/3 while staying a legitimate queue length on
high-BDP paths; the ring-memory trade-off of a shared knob is
disclosed below.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_VETH=y, CONFIG_USER_NS=y, CONFIG_NET_NS=y.
- Unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn).
- pfifo_fast: create veth pairs, set tx_queue_len to 500000, attach
mq+pfifo_fast. ~28 iterations OOMs a 2GB guest.
- tun: create 50 tun devices with IFF_MULTI_QUEUE, set tx_queue_len to
500000, open 8 queues each. ~1.6GB of ptr_ring allocations OOMs a
512MB guest.
- tap: same as tun with IFF_TAP. ~960MB OOMs a 512MB guest.
- On the fixed kernel the oversized tx_queue_len is rejected with
-ERANGE at set time (all four paths: RTM_SETLINK, RTM_NEWLINK
create, sysfs, ioctl - the latter two via this check, the former
two via this check and the 2/3 parse policy respectively).
Fixes:
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78a86d75a7 |
net: mpls: clear inner_protocol when the last label is popped
skb_mpls_push() records the pre-encapsulation network header once, gated on !skb->inner_protocol. skb_mpls_pop() never clears that record, so it outlives the encapsulation it describes. Open vSwitch can then re-push MPLS onto a packet whose inner_network_header still points at the older, deeper offset: push a label, pop every label, recirculate (ovs_flow_key_update() re-derives key->eth.type and resets network_header, but leaves inner_*), then push again. ovs_fragment() trusts the record: skb->network_header = skb->inner_network_header; so skb_network_offset() goes negative. The bound check is signed: if (skb_network_offset(skb) > MAX_L2_LEN) a negative offset passes it, and prepare_frag() widens the value: unsigned int hlen = skb_network_offset(skb); memcpy(&data->l2_data, skb->data, hlen); which is a ~4GiB memcpy out of a 30-byte per-CPU buffer. Reproduced on v7.3-rc1. RDX is the truncated length, (unsigned int)(-8): BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe8ffffc16000 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:memcpy+0x8/0x20 RDX: 00000000fffffff8 RSI: ffff888105d732db RDI: ffffe8ffffc16000 prepare_frag+0x3df/0x4e0 ovs_fragment+0x589/0x7e0 do_output+0x4ce/0x5e0 do_execute_actions+0x55d2/0x7b30 ovs_execute_actions+0xea/0x450 Same root-cause shape as commit |
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debac3a20d |
net: Remove conflicting altnames for dying netns in __dev_change_net_namespace().
syzbot reported the warning in cfg80211_pernet_exit(). [0] The repro does the following: 1. create two device in root netns and non-root netns 2. assign the same altname for the two devices 3. remove the non-root netns Since commit |
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1d2929d085 |
net: psp: do not inherit the Rx association on clone
sk->psp_assoc sits past sk_dontcopy_end, so sock_copy() copies it into
every socket accepted from a listener without taking a reference, while
inet_sock_destruct() puts for every inet socket. psp_twsk_init() does
refcount_inc() for the timewait socket, so a child closing through
TIME_WAIT cancels its own put and leaves the association with one
reference and N timewait sockets holding the same pointer. Closing the
listener frees it, and the timewait timers then put freed memory.
Rejecting the association on a listening socket is not sufficient: a socket
can acquire one while established and then be turned back into a listener,
because tcp_disconnect() leaves sk->psp_assoc in place.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in psp_twsk_assoc_free+0x6f/0xf0
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888110f9255c by task swapper/7/0
psp_twsk_assoc_free+0x6f/0xf0
inet_twsk_put+0xda/0x1b0
call_timer_fn+0x53/0x2e0
__run_timers+0x764/0xa80
Freed by task 99:
kfree+0x1a7/0x500
process_one_work+0x7ec/0x1100
An association carries a per-connection SPI and key, so a child must not
inherit the parent's. Clear it on clone.
Fixes:
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dc0df5a0c6 |
page_pool: keep frag_offset aligned for odd-sized requests
page_pool_alloc_frag_netmem() rounds the requested fragment size with
size = ALIGN(size, dma_get_cache_alignment());
dma_get_cache_alignment() returns 1 unless the architecture defines
ARCH_DMA_MINALIGN, which DMA-coherent architectures such as x86 do not.
There the ALIGN() is a no-op and pool->frag_offset advances by the raw,
unrounded size.
A single caller asking for an odd size then leaves frag_offset misaligned
for every fragment carved out of that page afterwards. The pool is shared,
so the damage is not confined to the caller that caused it.
The per-cpu system_page_pool used by generic XDP hits this.
skb_pp_cow_data() allocates its fragments with the raw packet length:
size = min_t(u32, len, PAGE_SIZE);
truesize = size;
page = page_pool_dev_alloc(pool, &page_off, &truesize);
leaving frag_offset odd for whatever is carved out of that page next. Its
own head allocation is already aligned -- SKB_HEAD_ALIGN(size) plus the
XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM its callers pass -- so it is a later user of the shared
pool that pays: page_pool_dev_alloc_va() returns a misaligned buffer,
napi_build_skb() installs it as skb->head, and skb_shinfo(skb) ==
skb->head + skb->end is misaligned with it.
skb_shinfo()->dataref is a 4-byte atomic_t at offset 0x20, so the
atomic_inc() in __skb_clone() straddles a cache line. On x86 with split
lock detection -- fatal for kernel split locks by default -- this panics
the machine:
Oops: Split lock detected
RIP: 0010:skb_clone+0x154/0x1e0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
raw_local_deliver+0x1ed/0x2c0
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x54/0x1c0
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x85/0x100
ip_local_deliver+0x67/0x100
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x85/0xa0
process_backlog+0x87/0x130
Reproduced by attaching any generic-mode XDP program to loopback and
opening a RAW IPPROTO_UDP socket, which makes raw_local_deliver() clone
every locally delivered UDP packet; ordinary DNS traffic then triggers it,
roughly once per 2500 clones. Observed on 6.12.101 and 7.1.8.
Tracing page_pool_alloc_frag_netmem() over one such run shows the
amplification -- two odd-sized requests, nine misaligned offsets:
requested size & 7: 0: 17035 5: 1 7: 1
frag_offset & 7: 0: 17028 3: 1 4: 1 5: 1 6: 1 7: 5
and skb_pp_cow_data() returning heads that were aligned on entry:
head 0xffff8f4c86aeac00 -> 0xffff8f4c53a9a9c4 (&7=4)
head 0xffff8f4d6a8a42c0 -> 0xffff8f4c4f7b7a45 (&7=5)
Round the fragment size up to at least the alignment struct skb_shared_info
requires, so fragments are always suitably aligned for the objects callers
build on them. Architectures needing a larger DMA alignment keep it.
This also makes the remainder computed in page_pool_alloc_netmem(),
*size = max_size - *offset;
aligned, since max_size is a power of two -- which fixes the matching
misalignment of skb->end.
Verified with a controlled A/B under QEMU/KVM: same tree, same config,
same compiler, same rootfs and identical traffic, differing only by this
patch. A SEC("xdp.frags") XDP_PASS program on lo plus UDP datagrams
larger than max_head_size drives skb_pp_cow_data()'s fragment loop, which
passes raw packet lengths to the pool. Measured at the return of
skb_pp_cow_data():
unpatched patched
skb_pp_cow_data calls 40800 40800
misaligned skb->head 1120 0
dataref at line offset >60 80 0
The last row counts the accesses that actually fault:
skb_shinfo()->dataref sits at head+end+0x20 and is a 4-byte atomic, so
`lock incl` splits a 64-byte cache line only when that address lands at
offset 61..63. All 80 occurrences were at offset 61; the panic reported
above was at offset 62. Eliminating the misalignment removes every one
of them.
Same class of bug as commit
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28a57fb2c5 |
net: iptunnel: fix stale transport header during tunnel decapsulation
Syzbot reported a crash in qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init() caused by a stale transport_header offset after tunnel decapsulation. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed102091a42e Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 340 Comm: qdisc_uaf_repro Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-00061-g248951ddc14d #256 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__asan_load2 <IRQ> qdisc_pkt_len_segs_init (net/core/dev.c:4145) __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4787) br_dev_queue_push_xmit (net/bridge/br_forward.c:53) br_handle_frame_finish (net/bridge/br_input.c:229) br_handle_frame (net/bridge/br_input.c:315) __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6099) __netif_receive_skb_list_core (net/core/dev.c:6287) netif_receive_skb_list_internal (net/core/dev.c:6445) napi_complete_done (net/core/dev.c:6813) gro_cell_poll (net/core/gro_cells.c:74) __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:7735) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7798 net/core/dev.c:7955) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:523 kernel/softirq.c:510 ) __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:450) tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1986 (discriminator 1)) tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2032) The issue is completely latent until qdisc read transport header in commit |
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0b13256ce3 |
net: Guard for gso_segs overflow in skb_segment
skb_segment calculates 32-bit partial_segs as len / gso_size, and then assigns it to the 16-bit gso_segs field. The division might overflow in some edge cases where the SKB is BIG TCP (65536 <= len <= 8*65535), and gso_size < TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. While normally this can't happen due to TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE, an AF_PACKET PACKET_VNET_HDR socket could generate such a malformed packet until the previous patch. Blocking malformed virtio_net packets was implemented in the previous patch, but this patch clamps partial_segs in skb_segment itself for more generic robustness. Should len / gso_size happen to be bigger than 65535 in partial GSO, skb_segment will now just produce more than two output SKBs, all of which will be valid with gso_segs <= 65535. In order to catch possible other cases of too many partial_segs, add a DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE when len / gso_size happens to be too big. Signed-off-by: Alice Mikityanska <alice@isovalent.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260822120117.1163423-3-alice.kernel@fastmail.im Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> |
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3220b62fbb |
net: fix a resource leak in copy_net_ns() error handling path
Currently, preinit_net() does two things:
(1) call ns_common_init() which might fail
(2) initialize resources which does not fail
However, preinit_net() is returning early when (1) fails, and copy_net_ns()
is jumping to the dec_ucounts: label. As a result, resources allocated by
net_alloc() are leaking. We need to call key_remove_domain() and
net_passive_dec() in order to release resources allocated by net_alloc().
We cannot simply jump to the put_userns: label when preinit_net() failed,
for (2) is not yet done. But we can reorder (1) and (2), for there is no
dependency between (1) and (2). Therefore, this patch decouples (1) from
preinit_net() and changes preinit_net() back to a void function, and calls
ns_common_init() after preinit_net() succeeded. Then, we can jump to
immediately after ns_common_free() of the put_userns: label.
Reported-by: sashiko (no mail address)
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/af7dabf3-d0d7-46dc-a878-e1715b3c9ac6%40I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Fixes:
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97148bcb75 |
net: core: fix head-page leak in skb_zerocopy
When skb_orphan_frags() throws -ENOMEM, skb_copy_ubufs() may have
already reallocated and replaced 'from->head'. Accessing from->head to
drop the old refcount leaks the original head page, and erroneously
puts an unrelated new buffer. Use the local 'page' tracker variable
instead to drop the reference properly.
Fixes:
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00e11ee983 |
net: core: check skb_frags_readable before uncloning in skb_copy_ubufs
skb_copy_ubufs drops clones and modifies the SKB via pskb_expand_head()
before checking for !skb_frags_readable(skb). This alters the SKB
geometry prior to throwing an -EFAULT on an invalid SKB. Check
readability first.
Fixes:
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f66bdb1cc0 |
net: skbuff: don't touch shared zerocopy state in skb_tx_error()
skb_tx_error() completes the zerocopy uarg and clears
SKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY, and skb_zcopy_downgrade_managed() clears
SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS. Both live in skb_shinfo(), which every clone
shares, while the caller only owns the reference it is about to drop.
Through a clone it tells the producer its pages are free and drops
SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG for an skb that is still in flight.
Open vSwitch reaches this with a non-last OVS_ACTION_ATTR_RECIRC:
clone_execute() sends a skb_clone() into ovs_dp_process_packet() while
do_execute_actions() keeps forwarding the original, and skb_clone()
does not privatise the frags here -- skb_orphan_frags() returns early
on SKBFL_DONT_ORPHAN. A flow miss on the clone then strips the marker
from the packet still being forwarded, and a later local ESP delivery
decrypts in place over frags it does not own privately.
Skip it for a cloned skb. Nothing is lost: skb_release_data() clears
the zerocopy state once the last reference to the shared data goes.
Fixes:
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8ece906150 |
net: skbuff: don't skb_tx_error() the source skb in skb_zerocopy()
skb_zerocopy() copies frags from @from into @to. On an
skb_orphan_frags() failure it calls skb_tx_error(@from), a destructive
operation on the source skb the copy helper does not own. That completes
@from's zerocopy uarg and clears SKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY, including the
SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG page-ownership marker.
Both callers already report the failure on their own drop path.
nfnetlink_queue does it at nla_put_failure, and Open vSwitch does it in
the flow-miss drop arm of ovs_dp_process_packet(), so nothing is lost by
dropping it here.
On Open vSwitch's OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE path the skb is not freed on
this error: do_execute_actions() ignores output_userspace()'s return
value and, unless the upcall was the last action, keeps forwarding the
same skb through the flow's remaining actions. The uarg is completed
while that skb is still in flight, telling the producer its buffers are
free, and SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG is cleared on an skb the rest of the stack
still handles. That flag is what makes esp_input() call skb_cow_data()
instead of decrypting in place, so a later local ESP delivery can
decrypt over frags the skb does not own privately.
Leave error reporting to the callers.
Fixes:
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