github-mirror/linux
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/torvalds/linux.git synced 2026-05-27 16:44:58 +02:00
Code Issues Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity Graph
1,446,276 Commits 1 Branch 932 Tags 20 GiB
master
Commit Graph

29 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Rick Edgecombe
9874b2917b x86/shstk: Prevent deadlock during shstk sigreturn 
During sigreturn the shadow stack signal frame is popped. The kernel does
this by reading the shadow stack using normal read accesses. When it can't
assume the memory is shadow stack, it takes extra steps to makes sure it is
reading actual shadow stack memory and not other normal readable memory. It
does this by holding the mmap read lock while doing the access and checking
the flags of the VMA.

Unfortunately that is not safe. If the read of the shadow stack sigframe
hits a page fault, the fault handler will try to recursively grab another
mmap read lock. This normally works ok, but if a writer on another CPU is
also waiting, the second read lock could fail and cause a deadlock.

Fix this by not holding mmap lock during the read access to userspace.

Instead use mmap_lock_speculate_...() to watch for changes between dropping
mmap lock and the userspace access. Retry if anything grabbed an mmap write
lock in between and could have changed the VMA.

These mmap_lock_speculate_...() helpers use mm::mm_lock_seq, which is only
available when PER_VMA_LOCK is configured. So make X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
depend on it. On x86, PER_VMA_LOCK is a default configuration for SMP
kernels. So drop support for the other configs under the assumption that
the !SMP shadow stack user base does not exist.

Currently there is a check that skips the lookup work when the SSP can be
assumed to be on a shadow stack. While reorganizing the function, remove
the optimization to make the tricky code flows more common, such that
issues like this cannot escape detection for so long.

Fixes: 7fad2a432c ("x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem")
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
 2026-04-20 22:54:24 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
334fbe734e mm.git review status for linus..mm-stable 
Everything:
 
 Total patches:       368
 Reviews/patch:       1.56
 Reviewed rate:       74%
 
 Excluding DAMON:
 
 Total patches:       316
 Reviews/patch:       1.77
 Reviewed rate:       81%
 
 Excluding DAMON and zram:
 
 Total patches:       306
 Reviews/patch:       1.81
 Reviewed rate:       82%
 
 Excluding DAMON, zram and maple_tree:
 
 Total patches:       276
 Reviews/patch:       2.01
 Reviewed rate:       91%
 
 Significant patch series in this merge:
 
 - The 30 patch series "maple_tree: Replace big node with maple copy"
   from Liam Howlett is mainly prepararatory work for ongoing development
   but it does reduce stack usage and is an improvement.
 
 - The 12 patch series "mm, swap: swap table phase III: remove swap_map"
   from Kairui Song offers memory savings by removing the static swap_map.
   It also yields some CPU savings and implements several cleanups.
 
 - The 2 patch series "mm: memfd_luo: preserve file seals" from Pratyush
   Yadav adds file seal preservation to LUO's memfd code.
 
 - The 2 patch series "mm: zswap: add per-memcg stat for incompressible
   pages" from Jiayuan Chen adds additional userspace stats reportng to
   zswap.
 
 - The 4 patch series "arch, mm: consolidate empty_zero_page" from Mike
   Rapoport implements some cleanups for our handling of ZERO_PAGE() and
   zero_pfn.
 
 - The 2 patch series "mm/kmemleak: Improve scan_should_stop()
   implementation" from Zhongqiu Han provides an robustness improvement and
   some cleanups in the kmemleak code.
 
 - The 4 patch series "Improve khugepaged scan logic" from Vernon Yang
   "improves the khugepaged scan logic and reduces CPU consumption by
   prioritizing scanning tasks that access memory frequently".
 
 - The 2 patch series "Make KHO Stateless" from Jason Miu simplifies
   Kexec Handover by "transitioning KHO from an xarray-based metadata
   tracking system with serialization to a radix tree data structure that
   can be passed directly to the next kernel"
 
 - The 3 patch series "mm: vmscan: add PID and cgroup ID to vmscan
   tracepoints" from Thomas Ballasi and Steven Rostedt enhances vmscan's
   tracepointing.
 
 - The 5 patch series "mm: arch/shstk: Common shadow stack mapping helper
   and VM_NOHUGEPAGE" from Catalin Marinas is a cleanup for the shadow
   stack code: remove per-arch code in favour of a generic implementation.
 
 - The 2 patch series "Fix KASAN support for KHO restored vmalloc
   regions" from Pasha Tatashin fixes a WARN() which can be emitted the KHO
   restores a vmalloc area.
 
 - The 4 patch series "mm: Remove stray references to pagevec" from Tal
   Zussman provides several cleanups, mainly udpating references to "struct
   pagevec", which became folio_batch three years ago.
 
 - The 17 patch series "mm: Eliminate fake head pages from vmemmap
   optimization" from Kiryl Shutsemau simplifies the HugeTLB vmemmap
   optimization (HVO) by changing how tail pages encode their relationship
   to the head page.
 
 - The 2 patch series "mm/damon/core: improve DAMOS quota efficiency for
   core layer filters" from SeongJae Park improves two problematic
   behaviors of DAMOS that makes it less efficient when core layer filters
   are used.
 
 - The 3 patch series "mm/damon: strictly respect min_nr_regions" from
   SeongJae Park improves DAMON usability by extending the treatment of the
   min_nr_regions user-settable parameter.
 
 - The 3 patch series "mm/page_alloc: pcp locking cleanup" from Vlastimil
   Babka is a proper fix for a previously hotfixed SMP=n issue.  Code
   simplifications and cleanups ennsed.
 
 - The 16 patch series "mm: cleanups around unmapping / zapping" from
   David Hildenbrand implements "a bunch of cleanups around unmapping and
   zapping.  Mostly simplifications, code movements, documentation and
   renaming of zapping functions".
 
 - The 6 patch series "support batched checking of the young flag for
   MGLRU" from Baolin Wang supports batched checking of the young flag for
   MGLRU.  It's part cleanups; one benchmark shows large performance
   benefits for arm64.
 
 - The 5 patch series "memcg: obj stock and slab stat caching cleanups"
   from Johannes Weiner provides memcg cleanup and robustness improvements.
 
 - The 5 patch series "Allow order zero pages in page reporting" from
   Yuvraj Sakshith enhances page_reporting's free page reporting - it is
   presently and undesirably order-0 pages when reporting free memory.
 
 - The 6 patch series "mm: vma flag tweaks" from Lorenzo Stoakes is
   cleanup work following from the recent conversion of the VMA flags to a
   bitmap.
 
 - The 10 patch series "mm/damon: add optional debugging-purpose sanity
   checks" from SeongJae Park adds some more developer-facing debug checks
   into DAMON core.
 
 - The 2 patch series "mm/damon: test and document power-of-2
   min_region_sz requirement" from SeongJae Park adds an additional DAMON
   kunit test and makes some adjustments to the addr_unit parameter
   handling.
 
 - The 3 patch series "mm/damon/core: make passed_sample_intervals
   comparisons overflow-safe" from SeongJae Park fixes a hard-to-hit time
   overflow issue in DAMON core.
 
 - The 7 patch series "mm/damon: improve/fixup/update ratio calculation,
   test and documentation" from SeongJae Park is a "batch of misc/minor
   improvements and fixups" for DAMON.
 
 - The 4 patch series "mm: move vma_(kernel|mmu)_pagesize() out of
   hugetlb.c" from David Hildenbrand fixes a possible issue with dax-device
   when CONFIG_HUGETLB=n.  Some code movement was required.
 
 - The 6 patch series "zram: recompression cleanups and tweaks" from
   Sergey Senozhatsky provides "a somewhat random mix of fixups,
   recompression cleanups and improvements" in the zram code.
 
 - The 11 patch series "mm/damon: support multiple goal-based quota
   tuning algorithms" from SeongJae Park extend DAMOS quotas goal
   auto-tuning to support multiple tuning algorithms that users can select.
 
 - The 4 patch series "mm: thp: reduce unnecessary
   start_stop_khugepaged()" from Breno Leitao fixes the khugpaged sysfs
   handling so we no longer spam the logs with reams of junk when
   starting/stopping khugepaged.
 
 - The 3 patch series "mm: improve map count checks" from Lorenzo Stoakes
   provides some cleanups and slight fixes in the mremap, mmap and vma
   code.
 
 - The 5 patch series "mm/damon: support addr_unit on default monitoring
   targets for modules" from SeongJae Park extends the use of DAMON core's
   addr_unit tunable.
 
 - The 5 patch series "mm: khugepaged cleanups and mTHP prerequisites"
   from Nico Pache provides cleanups in the khugepaged and is a base for
   Nico's planned khugepaged mTHP support.
 
 - The 15 patch series "mm: memory hot(un)plug and SPARSEMEM cleanups"
   from David Hildenbrand implements code movement and cleanups in the
   memhotplug and sparsemem code.
 
 - The 2 patch series "mm: remove CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE and
   cleanup CONFIG_MIGRATION" from David Hildenbrand rationalizes some
   memhotplug Kconfig support.
 
 - The 6 patch series "change young flag check functions to return bool"
   from Baolin Wang is "a cleanup patchset to change all young flag check
   functions to return bool".
 
 - The 3 patch series "mm/damon/sysfs: fix memory leak and NULL
   dereference issues" from Josh Law and SeongJae Park fixes a few
   potential DAMON bugs.
 
 - The 25 patch series "mm/vma: convert vm_flags_t to vma_flags_t in vma
   code" from "converts a lot of the existing use of the legacy vm_flags_t
   data type to the new vma_flags_t type which replaces it".  Mainly in the
   vma code.
 
 - The 21 patch series "mm: expand mmap_prepare functionality and usage"
   from Lorenzo Stoakes "expands the mmap_prepare functionality, which is
   intended to replace the deprecated f_op->mmap hook which has been the
   source of bugs and security issues for some time".  Cleanups,
   documentation, extension of mmap_prepare into filesystem drivers.
 
 - The 13 patch series "mm/huge_memory: refactor zap_huge_pmd()" from
   Lorenzo Stoakes simplifies and cleans up zap_huge_pmd().  Additional
   cleanups around vm_normal_folio_pmd() and the softleaf functionality are
   performed.
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iHUEABYIAB0WIQTTMBEPP41GrTpTJgfdBJ7gKXxAjgUCad3HDQAKCRDdBJ7gKXxA
 jrUQAPwNhPk5nPSxnyxjAeQtOBHqgCdnICeEismLajPKd9aYRgEA0s2XAu3tSUYi
 GrBnWImHG3s4ePQxVcPCegWTsOUrXgQ=
 =1Q7o
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'mm-stable-2026-04-13-21-45' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

Pull MM updates from Andrew Morton:

 - "maple_tree: Replace big node with maple copy" (Liam Howlett)

   Mainly prepararatory work for ongoing development but it does reduce
   stack usage and is an improvement.

 - "mm, swap: swap table phase III: remove swap_map" (Kairui Song)

   Offers memory savings by removing the static swap_map. It also yields
   some CPU savings and implements several cleanups.

 - "mm: memfd_luo: preserve file seals" (Pratyush Yadav)

   File seal preservation to LUO's memfd code

 - "mm: zswap: add per-memcg stat for incompressible pages" (Jiayuan
   Chen)

   Additional userspace stats reportng to zswap

 - "arch, mm: consolidate empty_zero_page" (Mike Rapoport)

   Some cleanups for our handling of ZERO_PAGE() and zero_pfn

 - "mm/kmemleak: Improve scan_should_stop() implementation" (Zhongqiu
   Han)

   A robustness improvement and some cleanups in the kmemleak code

 - "Improve khugepaged scan logic" (Vernon Yang)

   Improve khugepaged scan logic and reduce CPU consumption by
   prioritizing scanning tasks that access memory frequently

 - "Make KHO Stateless" (Jason Miu)

   Simplify Kexec Handover by transitioning KHO from an xarray-based
   metadata tracking system with serialization to a radix tree data
   structure that can be passed directly to the next kernel

 - "mm: vmscan: add PID and cgroup ID to vmscan tracepoints" (Thomas
   Ballasi and Steven Rostedt)

   Enhance vmscan's tracepointing

 - "mm: arch/shstk: Common shadow stack mapping helper and
   VM_NOHUGEPAGE" (Catalin Marinas)

   Cleanup for the shadow stack code: remove per-arch code in favour of
   a generic implementation

 - "Fix KASAN support for KHO restored vmalloc regions" (Pasha Tatashin)

   Fix a WARN() which can be emitted the KHO restores a vmalloc area

 - "mm: Remove stray references to pagevec" (Tal Zussman)

   Several cleanups, mainly udpating references to "struct pagevec",
   which became folio_batch three years ago

 - "mm: Eliminate fake head pages from vmemmap optimization" (Kiryl
   Shutsemau)

   Simplify the HugeTLB vmemmap optimization (HVO) by changing how tail
   pages encode their relationship to the head page

 - "mm/damon/core: improve DAMOS quota efficiency for core layer
   filters" (SeongJae Park)

   Improve two problematic behaviors of DAMOS that makes it less
   efficient when core layer filters are used

 - "mm/damon: strictly respect min_nr_regions" (SeongJae Park)

   Improve DAMON usability by extending the treatment of the
   min_nr_regions user-settable parameter

 - "mm/page_alloc: pcp locking cleanup" (Vlastimil Babka)

   The proper fix for a previously hotfixed SMP=n issue. Code
   simplifications and cleanups ensued

 - "mm: cleanups around unmapping / zapping" (David Hildenbrand)

   A bunch of cleanups around unmapping and zapping. Mostly
   simplifications, code movements, documentation and renaming of
   zapping functions

 - "support batched checking of the young flag for MGLRU" (Baolin Wang)

   Batched checking of the young flag for MGLRU. It's part cleanups; one
   benchmark shows large performance benefits for arm64

 - "memcg: obj stock and slab stat caching cleanups" (Johannes Weiner)

   memcg cleanup and robustness improvements

 - "Allow order zero pages in page reporting" (Yuvraj Sakshith)

   Enhance free page reporting - it is presently and undesirably order-0
   pages when reporting free memory.

 - "mm: vma flag tweaks" (Lorenzo Stoakes)

   Cleanup work following from the recent conversion of the VMA flags to
   a bitmap

 - "mm/damon: add optional debugging-purpose sanity checks" (SeongJae
   Park)

   Add some more developer-facing debug checks into DAMON core

 - "mm/damon: test and document power-of-2 min_region_sz requirement"
   (SeongJae Park)

   An additional DAMON kunit test and makes some adjustments to the
   addr_unit parameter handling

 - "mm/damon/core: make passed_sample_intervals comparisons
   overflow-safe" (SeongJae Park)

   Fix a hard-to-hit time overflow issue in DAMON core

 - "mm/damon: improve/fixup/update ratio calculation, test and
   documentation" (SeongJae Park)

   A batch of misc/minor improvements and fixups for DAMON

 - "mm: move vma_(kernel|mmu)_pagesize() out of hugetlb.c" (David
   Hildenbrand)

   Fix a possible issue with dax-device when CONFIG_HUGETLB=n. Some code
   movement was required.

 - "zram: recompression cleanups and tweaks" (Sergey Senozhatsky)

   A somewhat random mix of fixups, recompression cleanups and
   improvements in the zram code

 - "mm/damon: support multiple goal-based quota tuning algorithms"
   (SeongJae Park)

   Extend DAMOS quotas goal auto-tuning to support multiple tuning
   algorithms that users can select

 - "mm: thp: reduce unnecessary start_stop_khugepaged()" (Breno Leitao)

   Fix the khugpaged sysfs handling so we no longer spam the logs with
   reams of junk when starting/stopping khugepaged

 - "mm: improve map count checks" (Lorenzo Stoakes)

   Provide some cleanups and slight fixes in the mremap, mmap and vma
   code

 - "mm/damon: support addr_unit on default monitoring targets for
   modules" (SeongJae Park)

   Extend the use of DAMON core's addr_unit tunable

 - "mm: khugepaged cleanups and mTHP prerequisites" (Nico Pache)

   Cleanups to khugepaged and is a base for Nico's planned khugepaged
   mTHP support

 - "mm: memory hot(un)plug and SPARSEMEM cleanups" (David Hildenbrand)

   Code movement and cleanups in the memhotplug and sparsemem code

 - "mm: remove CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE and cleanup
   CONFIG_MIGRATION" (David Hildenbrand)

   Rationalize some memhotplug Kconfig support

 - "change young flag check functions to return bool" (Baolin Wang)

   Cleanups to change all young flag check functions to return bool

 - "mm/damon/sysfs: fix memory leak and NULL dereference issues" (Josh
   Law and SeongJae Park)

   Fix a few potential DAMON bugs

 - "mm/vma: convert vm_flags_t to vma_flags_t in vma code" (Lorenzo
   Stoakes)

   Convert a lot of the existing use of the legacy vm_flags_t data type
   to the new vma_flags_t type which replaces it. Mainly in the vma
   code.

 - "mm: expand mmap_prepare functionality and usage" (Lorenzo Stoakes)

   Expand the mmap_prepare functionality, which is intended to replace
   the deprecated f_op->mmap hook which has been the source of bugs and
   security issues for some time. Cleanups, documentation, extension of
   mmap_prepare into filesystem drivers

 - "mm/huge_memory: refactor zap_huge_pmd()" (Lorenzo Stoakes)

   Simplify and clean up zap_huge_pmd(). Additional cleanups around
   vm_normal_folio_pmd() and the softleaf functionality are performed.

* tag 'mm-stable-2026-04-13-21-45' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (369 commits)
  mm: fix deferred split queue races during migration
  mm/khugepaged: fix issue with tracking lock
  mm/huge_memory: add and use has_deposited_pgtable()
  mm/huge_memory: add and use normal_or_softleaf_folio_pmd()
  mm: add softleaf_is_valid_pmd_entry(), pmd_to_softleaf_folio()
  mm/huge_memory: separate out the folio part of zap_huge_pmd()
  mm/huge_memory: use mm instead of tlb->mm
  mm/huge_memory: remove unnecessary sanity checks
  mm/huge_memory: deduplicate zap deposited table call
  mm/huge_memory: remove unnecessary VM_BUG_ON_PAGE()
  mm/huge_memory: add a common exit path to zap_huge_pmd()
  mm/huge_memory: handle buggy PMD entry in zap_huge_pmd()
  mm/huge_memory: have zap_huge_pmd return a boolean, add kdoc
  mm/huge: avoid big else branch in zap_huge_pmd()
  mm/huge_memory: simplify vma_is_specal_huge()
  mm: on remap assert that input range within the proposed VMA
  mm: add mmap_action_map_kernel_pages[_full]()
  uio: replace deprecated mmap hook with mmap_prepare in uio_info
  drivers: hv: vmbus: replace deprecated mmap hook with mmap_prepare
  mm: allow handling of stacked mmap_prepare hooks in more drivers
  ...
 2026-04-15 12:59:16 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
52f657e34d x86: shadow stacks: proper error handling for mmap lock 
김영민 reports that shstk_pop_sigframe() doesn't check for errors from
mmap_read_lock_killable(), which is a silly oversight, and also shows
that we haven't marked those functions with "__must_check", which would
have immediately caught it.

So let's fix both issues.

Reported-by: 김영민 <osori@hspace.io>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2026-04-08 13:18:57 -07:00
Catalin Marinas
a515ffc9de x86: shstk: use the new common vm_mmap_shadow_stack() helper 
Replace part of the x86 alloc_shstk() content with a call to
vm_mmap_shadow_stack(). There is no functional change.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260225161404.3157851-5-catalin.marinas@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>
Cc: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Cc: "Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
 2026-04-05 13:53:06 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
e4dcbdff11 Performance events updates for v6.18: 
Core perf code updates:
 
  - Convert mmap() related reference counts to refcount_t. This
    is in reaction to the recently fixed refcount bugs, which
    could have been detected earlier and could have mitigated
    the bug somewhat. (Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra)
 
  - Clean up and simplify the callchain code, in preparation
    for sframes. (Steven Rostedt, Josh Poimboeuf)
 
 Uprobes updates:
 
  - Add support to optimize usdt probes on x86-64, which
    gives a substantial speedup. (Jiri Olsa)
 
  - Cleanups and fixes on x86 (Peter Zijlstra)
 
 PMU driver updates:
 
  - Various optimizations and fixes to the Intel PMU driver
    (Dapeng Mi)
 
 Misc cleanups and fixes:
 
  - Remove redundant __GFP_NOWARN (Qianfeng Rong)
 
 Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
 
 iQJFBAABCgAvFiEEBpT5eoXrXCwVQwEKEnMQ0APhK1gFAmjWpGIRHG1pbmdvQGtl
 cm5lbC5vcmcACgkQEnMQ0APhK1iHvxAAvO8qWbbhUdF3EZaFU0Wx6oh5KBhImU49
 VZ107xe9llA0Szy3hIl1YpdOQA2NAHtma6We/ebonrPVTTkcSCGq8absc+GahA3I
 CHIomx2hjD0OQ01aHvTqgHJUdFUQQ0yzE3+FY6Tsn05JsNZvDmqpAMIoMQT0LuuG
 7VvVRLBuDXtuMtNmGaGCvfDGKTZkGGxD6iZS1iWHuixvVAz4IECK0vYqSyh31UGA
 w9Jwa0thwjKm2EZTmcSKaHSM2zw3N8QXJ3SNPPThuMrtO6QDz2+3Da9kO+vhGcRP
 Jls9KnWC2wxNxqIs3dr80Mzn4qMplc67Ekx2tUqX4tYEGGtJQxW6tm3JOKKIgFMI
 g/KF9/WJPXp0rVI9mtoQkgndzyswR/ZJBAwfEQu+nAqlp3gmmQR9+MeYPCyNnyhB
 2g22PTMbXkihJmRPAVeH+WhwFy1YY3nsRhh61ha3/N0ULXTHUh0E+hWwUVMifYSV
 SwXqQx4srlo6RJJNTji1d6R3muNjXCQNEsJ0lCOX6ajVoxWZsPH2x7/W1A8LKmY+
 FLYQUi6X9ogQbOO3WxCjUhzp5nMTNA2vvo87MUzDlZOCLPqYZmqcjntHuXwdjPyO
 lPcfTzc2nK1Ud26bG3+p2Bk3fjqkX9XcTMFniOvjKfffEfwpAq4xRPBQ3uRlzn0V
 pf9067JYF+c=
 =sVXH
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Merge tag 'perf-core-2025-09-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull performance events updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "Core perf code updates:

   - Convert mmap() related reference counts to refcount_t. This is in
     reaction to the recently fixed refcount bugs, which could have been
     detected earlier and could have mitigated the bug somewhat (Thomas
     Gleixner, Peter Zijlstra)

   - Clean up and simplify the callchain code, in preparation for
     sframes (Steven Rostedt, Josh Poimboeuf)

  Uprobes updates:

   - Add support to optimize usdt probes on x86-64, which gives a
     substantial speedup (Jiri Olsa)

   - Cleanups and fixes on x86 (Peter Zijlstra)

  PMU driver updates:

   - Various optimizations and fixes to the Intel PMU driver (Dapeng Mi)

  Misc cleanups and fixes:

   - Remove redundant __GFP_NOWARN (Qianfeng Rong)"

* tag 'perf-core-2025-09-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (57 commits)
  selftests/bpf: Fix uprobe_sigill test for uprobe syscall error value
  uprobes/x86: Return error from uprobe syscall when not called from trampoline
  perf: Skip user unwind if the task is a kernel thread
  perf: Simplify get_perf_callchain() user logic
  perf: Use current->flags & PF_KTHREAD|PF_USER_WORKER instead of current->mm == NULL
  perf: Have get_perf_callchain() return NULL if crosstask and user are set
  perf: Remove get_perf_callchain() init_nr argument
  perf/x86: Print PMU counters bitmap in x86_pmu_show_pmu_cap()
  perf/x86/intel: Add ICL_FIXED_0_ADAPTIVE bit into INTEL_FIXED_BITS_MASK
  perf/x86/intel: Change macro GLOBAL_CTRL_EN_PERF_METRICS to BIT_ULL(48)
  perf/x86: Add PERF_CAP_PEBS_TIMING_INFO flag
  perf/x86/intel: Fix IA32_PMC_x_CFG_B MSRs access error
  perf/x86/intel: Use early_initcall() to hook bts_init()
  uprobes: Remove redundant __GFP_NOWARN
  selftests/seccomp: validate uprobe syscall passes through seccomp
  seccomp: passthrough uprobe systemcall without filtering
  selftests/bpf: Fix uprobe syscall shadow stack test
  selftests/bpf: Change test_uretprobe_regs_change for uprobe and uretprobe
  selftests/bpf: Add uprobe_regs_equal test
  selftests/bpf: Add optimized usdt variant for basic usdt test
  ...
 2025-09-30 11:11:21 -07:00
Simon Schuster
bbc46b23af arch: copy_thread: pass clone_flags as u64 
With the introduction of clone3 in commit 7f192e3cd3 ("fork: add
clone3") the effective bit width of clone_flags on all architectures was
increased from 32-bit to 64-bit, with a new type of u64 for the flags.
However, for most consumers of clone_flags the interface was not
changed from the previous type of unsigned long.

While this works fine as long as none of the new 64-bit flag bits
(CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND and CLONE_INTO_CGROUP) are evaluated, this is still
undesirable in terms of the principle of least surprise.

Thus, this commit fixes all relevant interfaces of the copy_thread
function that is called from copy_process to consistently pass
clone_flags as u64, so that no truncation to 32-bit integers occurs on
32-bit architectures.

Signed-off-by: Simon Schuster <schuster.simon@siemens-energy.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250901-nios2-implement-clone3-v2-3-53fcf5577d57@siemens-energy.com
Fixes: c5febea095 ("fork: Pass struct kernel_clone_args into copy_thread")
Acked-by: Guo Ren (Alibaba Damo Academy) <guoren@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andreas Larsson <andreas@gaisler.com> # sparc
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
 2025-09-01 15:31:34 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra
f349ec8086 uprobes/x86: Fix uprobe syscall vs shadow stack 
The uprobe syscall stores and strips the trampoline stack frame from
the user context, to make it appear similar to an exception at the
original instruction. It then restores the trampoline stack when it
can exit using sysexit.

Make sure to match the regular stack manipulation with shadow stack
operations such that regular and shadow stack don't get out of sync
and causes trouble.

This enables using the optimization when shadow stack is in use.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250821123657.055790090@infradead.org
 2025-08-21 20:09:22 +02:00
Ingo Molnar
78255eb239 x86/msr: Rename 'wrmsrl()' to 'wrmsrq()' 
Suggested-by: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2025-04-10 11:58:33 +02:00
Ingo Molnar
c435e608cf x86/msr: Rename 'rdmsrl()' to 'rdmsrq()' 
Suggested-by: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Xin Li <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
 2025-04-10 11:58:27 +02:00
Jiri Olsa
ff474a78ce uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe 
Adding uretprobe syscall instead of trap to speed up return probe.

At the moment the uretprobe setup/path is:

  - install entry uprobe

  - when the uprobe is hit, it overwrites probed function's return address
    on stack with address of the trampoline that contains breakpoint
    instruction

  - the breakpoint trap code handles the uretprobe consumers execution and
    jumps back to original return address

This patch replaces the above trampoline's breakpoint instruction with new
ureprobe syscall call. This syscall does exactly the same job as the trap
with some more extra work:

  - syscall trampoline must save original value for rax/r11/rcx registers
    on stack - rax is set to syscall number and r11/rcx are changed and
    used by syscall instruction

  - the syscall code reads the original values of those registers and
    restore those values in task's pt_regs area

  - only caller from trampoline exposed in '[uprobes]' is allowed,
    the process will receive SIGILL signal otherwise

Even with some extra work, using the uretprobes syscall shows speed
improvement (compared to using standard breakpoint):

  On Intel (11th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-1165G7 @ 2.80GHz)

  current:
    uretprobe-nop  :    1.498 ± 0.000M/s
    uretprobe-push :    1.448 ± 0.001M/s
    uretprobe-ret  :    0.816 ± 0.001M/s

  with the fix:
    uretprobe-nop  :    1.969 ± 0.002M/s  < 31% speed up
    uretprobe-push :    1.910 ± 0.000M/s  < 31% speed up
    uretprobe-ret  :    0.934 ± 0.000M/s  < 14% speed up

  On Amd (AMD Ryzen 7 5700U)

  current:
    uretprobe-nop  :    0.778 ± 0.001M/s
    uretprobe-push :    0.744 ± 0.001M/s
    uretprobe-ret  :    0.540 ± 0.001M/s

  with the fix:
    uretprobe-nop  :    0.860 ± 0.001M/s  < 10% speed up
    uretprobe-push :    0.818 ± 0.001M/s  < 10% speed up
    uretprobe-ret  :    0.578 ± 0.000M/s  <  7% speed up

The performance test spawns a thread that runs loop which triggers
uprobe with attached bpf program that increments the counter that
gets printed in results above.

The uprobe (and uretprobe) kind is determined by which instruction
is being patched with breakpoint instruction. That's also important
for uretprobes, because uprobe is installed for each uretprobe.

The performance test is part of bpf selftests:
  tools/testing/selftests/bpf/run_bench_uprobes.sh

Note at the moment uretprobe syscall is supported only for native
64-bit process, compat process still uses standard breakpoint.

Note that when shadow stack is enabled the uretprobe syscall returns
via iret, which is slower than return via sysret, but won't cause the
shadow stack violation.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240611112158.40795-4-jolsa@kernel.org/

Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
 2024-06-12 08:44:28 +09:00
Jiri Olsa
1713b63a07 x86/shstk: Make return uprobe work with shadow stack 
Currently the application with enabled shadow stack will crash
if it sets up return uprobe. The reason is the uretprobe kernel
code changes the user space task's stack, but does not update
shadow stack accordingly.

Adding new functions to update values on shadow stack and using
them in uprobe code to keep shadow stack in sync with uretprobe
changes to user stack.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240611112158.40795-2-jolsa@kernel.org/

Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Fixes: 488af8ea71 ("x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
 2024-06-12 08:44:27 +09:00
H.J. Lu
2883f01ec3 x86/shstk: Enable shadow stacks for x32 
1. Add shadow stack support to x32 signal.
2. Use the 64-bit map_shadow_stack syscall for x32.
3. Set up shadow stack for x32.

Tested with shadow stack enabled x32 glibc on Intel Tiger Lake:

I configured x32 glibc with --enable-cet, build glibc and
run all glibc tests with shadow stack enabled.  There are
no regressions.  I verified that shadow stack is enabled
via /proc/pid/status.

Signed-off-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tested-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240315140433.1966543-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com
 2024-03-22 10:17:11 +01:00
Rick Edgecombe
509ff51ee6 x86/shstk: Add warning for shadow stack double unmap 
There are several ways a thread's shadow stacks can get unmapped. This
can happen on exit or exec, as well as error handling in exec or clone.
The task struct already keeps track of the thread's shadow stack. Use the
size variable to keep track of if the shadow stack has already been freed.

When an attempt to double unmap the thread shadow stack is caught, warn
about it and abort the operation.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230908203655.543765-4-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-09-19 09:18:34 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
331955600d x86/shstk: Handle vfork clone failure correctly 
Shadow stacks are allocated automatically and freed on exit, depending
on the clone flags. The two cases where new shadow stacks are not
allocated are !CLONE_VM (fork()) and CLONE_VFORK (vfork()). For
!CLONE_VM, although a new stack is not allocated, it can be freed normally
because it will happen in the child's copy of the VM.

However, for CLONE_VFORK the parent and the child are actually using the
same shadow stack. So the kernel doesn't need to allocate *or* free a
shadow stack for a CLONE_VFORK child. CLONE_VFORK children already need
special tracking to avoid returning to userspace until the child exits or
execs. Shadow stack uses this same tracking to avoid freeing CLONE_VFORK
shadow stacks.

However, the tracking is not setup until the clone has succeeded
(internally). Which means, if a CLONE_VFORK fails, the existing logic will
not know it is a CLONE_VFORK and proceed to unmap the parents shadow stack.
This error handling cleanup logic runs via exit_thread() in the
bad_fork_cleanup_thread label in copy_process(). The issue was seen in
the glibc test "posix/tst-spawn3-pidfd" while running with shadow stack
using currently out-of-tree glibc patches.

Fix it by not unmapping the vfork shadow stack in the error case as well.
Since clone is implemented in core code, it is not ideal to pass the clone
flags along the error path in order to have shadow stack code have
symmetric logic in the freeing half of the thread shadow stack handling.

Instead use the existing state for thread shadow stacks to track whether
the thread is managing its own shadow stack. For CLONE_VFORK, simply set
shstk->base and shstk->size to 0, and have it mean the thread is not
managing a shadow stack and so should skip cleanup work. Implement this
by breaking up the CLONE_VFORK and !CLONE_VM cases in
shstk_alloc_thread_stack() to separate conditionals since, the logic is
now different between them. In the case of CLONE_VFORK && !CLONE_VM, the
existing behavior is to not clean up the shadow stack in the child (which
should go away quickly with either be exit or exec), so maintain that
behavior by handling the CLONE_VFORK case first in the allocation path.

This new logioc cleanly handles the case of normal, successful
CLONE_VFORK's skipping cleaning up their shadow stack's on exit as well.
So remove the existing, vfork shadow stack freeing logic. This is in
deactivate_mm() where vfork_done is used to tell if it is a vfork child
that can skip cleaning up the thread shadow stack.

Fixes: b2926a36b9 ("x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack")
Reported-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230908203655.543765-2-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-09-19 09:18:34 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
1fe428d369 x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type 
0day reports a sparse warning:
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c:295:55: sparse: sparse: cast removes address space
'__user' of expression

The __user is in the wrong spot. Move it to right spot and make sparse
happy.

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202308222312.Jt4Tog5T-lkp@intel.com/
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230825014554.1769194-1-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-30 10:35:53 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
c6b53dcec0 x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR 
The existing comment around handling vm_munmap() failure when freeing a
shadow stack is wrong. It asserts that vm_munmap() returns -EINTR when
the mmap lock is only being held for a short time, and so the caller
should retry. Based on this wrong understanding, unmap_shadow_stack() will
loop retrying vm_munmap().

What -EINTR actually means in this case is that the process is going
away (see ae79878), and the whole MM will be torn down soon. In order
to facilitate this, the task should not linger in the kernel, but
actually do the opposite. So don't loop in this scenario, just abandon
the operation and let exit_mmap() clean it up. Also, update the comment
to reflect the actual meaning of the error code.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230706233858.446232-1-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:51 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
87f0df7828 x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm 
The comment around VM_SHADOW_STACK in mm.h refers to a lot of x86
specific details that don't belong in a cross arch file. Remove these
out of core mm, and just leave the non-arch details.

Since the comment includes some useful details that would be good to
retain in the source somewhere, put the arch specifics parts in
arch/x86/shstk.c near alloc_shstk(), where memory of this type is
allocated. Include a reference to the existence of the x86 details near
the VM_SHADOW_STACK definition mm.h.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230706233248.445713-1-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:51 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
67840ad0fa x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS 
CRIU and GDB need to get the current shadow stack and WRSS enablement
status. This information is already available via /proc/pid/status, but
this is inconvenient for CRIU because it involves parsing the text output
in an area of the code where this is difficult. Provide a status
arch_prctl(), ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS for retrieving the status. Have arg2 be a
userspace address, and make the new arch_prctl simply copy the features
out to userspace.

Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-43-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:51 -07:00
Mike Rapoport
680ed2f15e x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK 
Userspace loaders may lock features before a CRIU restore operation has
the chance to set them to whatever state is required by the process
being restored. Allow a way for CRIU to unlock features. Add it as an
arch_prctl() like the other shadow stack operations, but restrict it being
called by the ptrace arch_pctl() interface.

[Merged into recent API changes, added commit log and docs]

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-42-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:51 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
488af8ea71 x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface 
The kernel now has the main shadow stack functionality to support
applications. Wire in the WRSS and shadow stack enable/disable functions
into the existing shadow stack API skeleton.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-38-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:51 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
1d62c65372 x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace 
For the current shadow stack implementation, shadow stacks contents can't
easily be provisioned with arbitrary data. This property helps apps
protect themselves better, but also restricts any potential apps that may
want to do exotic things at the expense of a little security.

The x86 shadow stack feature introduces a new instruction, WRSS, which
can be enabled to write directly to shadow stack memory from userspace.
Allow it to get enabled via the prctl interface.

Only enable the userspace WRSS instruction, which allows writes to
userspace shadow stacks from userspace. Do not allow it to be enabled
independently of shadow stack, as HW does not support using WRSS when
shadow stack is disabled.

>From a fault handler perspective, WRSS will behave very similar to WRUSS,
which is treated like a user access from a #PF err code perspective.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-36-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:51 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
c35559f94e x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall 
When operating with shadow stacks enabled, the kernel will automatically
allocate shadow stacks for new threads, however in some cases userspace
will need additional shadow stacks. The main example of this is the
ucontext family of functions, which require userspace allocating and
pivoting to userspace managed stacks.

Unlike most other user memory permissions, shadow stacks need to be
provisioned with special data in order to be useful. They need to be setup
with a restore token so that userspace can pivot to them via the RSTORSSP
instruction. But, the security design of shadow stacks is that they
should not be written to except in limited circumstances. This presents a
problem for userspace, as to how userspace can provision this special
data, without allowing for the shadow stack to be generally writable.

Previously, a new PROT_SHADOW_STACK was attempted, which could be
mprotect()ed from RW permissions after the data was provisioned. This was
found to not be secure enough, as other threads could write to the
shadow stack during the writable window.

The kernel can use a special instruction, WRUSS, to write directly to
userspace shadow stacks. So the solution can be that memory can be mapped
as shadow stack permissions from the beginning (never generally writable
in userspace), and the kernel itself can write the restore token.

First, a new madvise() flag was explored, which could operate on the
PROT_SHADOW_STACK memory. This had a couple of downsides:
1. Extra checks were needed in mprotect() to prevent writable memory from
   ever becoming PROT_SHADOW_STACK.
2. Extra checks/vma state were needed in the new madvise() to prevent
   restore tokens being written into the middle of pre-used shadow stacks.
   It is ideal to prevent restore tokens being added at arbitrary
   locations, so the check was to make sure the shadow stack had never been
   written to.
3. It stood out from the rest of the madvise flags, as more of direct
   action than a hint at future desired behavior.

So rather than repurpose two existing syscalls (mmap, madvise) that don't
quite fit, just implement a new map_shadow_stack syscall to allow
userspace to map and setup new shadow stacks in one step. While ucontext
is the primary motivator, userspace may have other unforeseen reasons to
setup its own shadow stacks using the WRSS instruction. Towards this
provide a flag so that stacks can be optionally setup securely for the
common case of ucontext without enabling WRSS. Or potentially have the
kernel set up the shadow stack in some new way.

The following example demonstrates how to create a new shadow stack with
map_shadow_stack:
void *shstk = map_shadow_stack(addr, stack_size, SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN);

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-35-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:51 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
7fad2a432c x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem 
The shadow stack signal frame is read by the kernel on sigreturn. It
relies on shadow stack memory protections to prevent forgeries of this
signal frame (which included the pre-signal SSP). This behavior helps
userspace protect itself. However, using the INCSSP instruction userspace
can adjust the SSP to 8 bytes beyond the end of a shadow stack. INCSSP
performs shadow stack reads to make sure it doesn’t increment off of the
shadow stack, but on the end position it actually reads 8 bytes below the
new SSP.

For the shadow stack HW operations, this situation (INCSSP off the end
of a shadow stack by 8 bytes) would be fine. If the a RET is executed, the
push to the shadow stack would fail to write to the shadow stack. If a
CALL is executed, the SSP will be incremented back onto the stack and the
return address will be written successfully to the very end. That is
expected behavior around shadow stack underflow.

However, the kernel doesn’t have a way to read shadow stack memory using
shadow stack accesses. WRUSS can write to shadow stack memory with a
shadow stack access which ensures the access is to shadow stack memory.
But unfortunately for this case, there is no equivalent instruction for
shadow stack reads. So when reading the shadow stack signal frames, the
kernel currently assumes the SSP is pointing to the shadow stack and uses
a normal read.

The SSP pointing to shadow stack memory will be true in most cases, but as
described above, in can be untrue by 8 bytes. So lookup the VMA of the
shadow stack sigframe being read to verify it is shadow stack.

Since the SSP can only be beyond the shadow stack by 8 bytes, and
shadow stack memory is page aligned, this check only needs to be done
when this type of relative position to a page boundary is encountered.
So skip the extra work otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-34-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:50 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
b93d6c7882 x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn 
The shadow stack signal frame is read by the kernel on sigreturn. It
relies on shadow stack memory protections to prevent forgeries of this
signal frame (which included the pre-signal SSP). It also relies on the
shadow stack signal frame to have bit 63 set. Since this bit would not be
set via typical shadow stack operations, so the kernel can assume it was a
value it placed there.

However, in order to support 32 bit shadow stack, the INCSSPD instruction
can increment the shadow stack by 4 bytes. In this case SSP might be
pointing to a region spanning two 8 byte shadow stack frames. It could
confuse the checks described above.

Since the kernel only supports shadow stack in 64 bit, just check that
the SSP is 8 byte aligned in the sigreturn path.

Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-33-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:50 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
05e36022c0 x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack 
When a signal is handled, the context is pushed to the stack before
handling it. For shadow stacks, since the shadow stack only tracks return
addresses, there isn't any state that needs to be pushed. However, there
are still a few things that need to be done. These things are visible to
userspace and which will be kernel ABI for shadow stacks.

One is to make sure the restorer address is written to shadow stack, since
the signal handler (if not changing ucontext) returns to the restorer, and
the restorer calls sigreturn. So add the restorer on the shadow stack
before handling the signal, so there is not a conflict when the signal
handler returns to the restorer.

The other thing to do is to place some type of checkable token on the
thread's shadow stack before handling the signal and check it during
sigreturn. This is an extra layer of protection to hamper attackers
calling sigreturn manually as in SROP-like attacks.

For this token the shadow stack data format defined earlier can be used.
Have the data pushed be the previous SSP. In the future the sigreturn
might want to return back to a different stack. Storing the SSP (instead
of a restore offset or something) allows for future functionality that
may want to restore to a different stack.

So, when handling a signal push
 - the SSP pointing in the shadow stack data format
 - the restorer address below the restore token.

In sigreturn, verify SSP is stored in the data format and pop the shadow
stack.

Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-32-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:50 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
928054769d x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk 
Shadow stacks are normally written to via CALL/RET or specific CET
instructions like RSTORSSP/SAVEPREVSSP. However, sometimes the kernel will
need to write to the shadow stack directly using the ring-0 only WRUSS
instruction.

A shadow stack restore token marks a restore point of the shadow stack, and
the address in a token must point directly above the token, which is within
the same shadow stack. This is distinctively different from other pointers
on the shadow stack, since those pointers point to executable code area.

Introduce token setup and verify routines. Also introduce WRUSS, which is
a kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to user shadow stack.

In future patches that enable shadow stack to work with signals, the kernel
will need something to denote the point in the stack where sigreturn may be
called. This will prevent attackers calling sigreturn at arbitrary places
in the stack, in order to help prevent SROP attacks.

To do this, something that can only be written by the kernel needs to be
placed on the shadow stack. This can be accomplished by setting bit 63 in
the frame written to the shadow stack. Userspace return addresses can't
have this bit set as it is in the kernel range. It also can't be a valid
restore token.

Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-31-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:50 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
b2926a36b9 x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack 
When a process is duplicated, but the child shares the address space with
the parent, there is potential for the threads sharing a single stack to
cause conflicts for each other. In the normal non-CET case this is handled
in two ways.

With regular CLONE_VM a new stack is provided by userspace such that the
parent and child have different stacks.

For vfork, the parent is suspended until the child exits. So as long as
the child doesn't return from the vfork()/CLONE_VFORK calling function and
sticks to a limited set of operations, the parent and child can share the
same stack.

For shadow stack, these scenarios present similar sharing problems. For the
CLONE_VM case, the child and the parent must have separate shadow stacks.
Instead of changing clone to take a shadow stack, have the kernel just
allocate one and switch to it.

Use stack_size passed from clone3() syscall for thread shadow stack size. A
compat-mode thread shadow stack size is further reduced to 1/4. This
allows more threads to run in a 32-bit address space. The clone() does not
pass stack_size, which was added to clone3(). In that case, use
RLIMIT_STACK size and cap to 4 GB.

For shadow stack enabled vfork(), the parent and child can share the same
shadow stack, like they can share a normal stack. Since the parent is
suspended until the child terminates, the child will not interfere with
the parent while executing as long as it doesn't return from the vfork()
and overwrite up the shadow stack. The child can safely overwrite down
the shadow stack, as the parent can just overwrite this later. So CET does
not add any additional limitations for vfork().

Free the shadow stack on thread exit by doing it in mm_release(). Skip
this when exiting a vfork() child since the stack is shared in the
parent.

During this operation, the shadow stack pointer of the new thread needs
to be updated to point to the newly allocated shadow stack. Since the
ability to do this is confined to the FPU subsystem, change
fpu_clone() to take the new shadow stack pointer, and update it
internally inside the FPU subsystem. This part was suggested by Thomas
Gleixner.

Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-30-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:50 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
2d39a6add4 x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support 
Introduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines.
A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHADOW_STACK flag
and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).

Keep the task's shadow stack address and size in thread_struct. This will
be copied when cloning new threads, but needs to be cleared during exec,
so add a function to do this.

32 bit shadow stack is not expected to have many users and it will
complicate the signal implementation. So do not support IA32 emulation
or x32.

Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-29-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:50 -07:00
Rick Edgecombe
98cfa46309 x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack 
Add three new arch_prctl() handles:

 - ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE/DISABLE enables or disables the specified
   feature. Returns 0 on success or a negative value on error.

 - ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK prevents future disabling or enabling of the
   specified feature. Returns 0 on success or a negative value
   on error.

The features are handled per-thread and inherited over fork(2)/clone(2),
but reset on exec().

Co-developed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-27-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
 2023-08-02 15:01:50 -07:00