This was done entirely with mindless brute force, using
git grep -l '\<k[vmz]*alloc_objs*(.*, GFP_KERNEL)' |
xargs sed -i 's/\(alloc_objs*(.*\), GFP_KERNEL)/\1)/'
to convert the new alloc_obj() users that had a simple GFP_KERNEL
argument to just drop that argument.
Note that due to the extreme simplicity of the scripting, any slightly
more complex cases spread over multiple lines would not be triggered:
they definitely exist, but this covers the vast bulk of the cases, and
the resulting diff is also then easier to check automatically.
For the same reason the 'flex' versions will be done as a separate
conversion.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:
Single allocations: kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)
Array allocations: kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)
Flex array allocations: kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)
(where TYPE may also be *VAR)
The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
* Restrict KVM-specific exports to KVM itself
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=tjcN
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'x86_misc_for_6.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull misc x86 updates from Dave Hansen:
"The most significant are some changes to ensure that symbols exported
for KVM are used only by KVM modules themselves, along with some
related cleanups.
In true x86/misc fashion, the other patch is completely unrelated and
just enhances an existing pr_warn() to make it clear to users how they
have tainted their kernel when something is mucking with MSRs.
Summary:
- Make MSR-induced taint easier for users to track down
- Restrict KVM-specific exports to KVM itself"
* tag 'x86_misc_for_6.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86: Restrict KVM-induced symbol exports to KVM modules where obvious/possible
x86/mm: Drop unnecessary export of "ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs"
x86/mtrr: Drop unnecessary export of "mtrr_state"
x86/bugs: Drop unnecessary export of "x86_spec_ctrl_base"
x86/msr: Add CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC taint name to "unrecognized" pr_warn(msg)
Extend KVM's export macro framework to provide EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(),
and use the helper macro to export symbols for KVM throughout x86 if and
only if KVM will build one or more modules, and only for those modules.
To avoid unnecessary exports when CONFIG_KVM=m but kvm.ko will not be
built (because no vendor modules are selected), let arch code #define
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM to suppress/override the exports.
Note, the set of symbols to restrict to KVM was generated by manual search
and audit; any "misses" are due to human error, not some grand plan.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112173944.1380633-5-seanjc%40google.com
Currently, when SGX is compromised and the microcode update fix is applied,
the machine needs to be rebooted to invalidate old SGX crypto-assets and
make SGX be in an updated safe state. It's not friendly for the cloud.
To avoid having to reboot, a new ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] is introduced to update
SGX environment at runtime. This process needs to be done when there's no
SGX users to make sure no compromised enclaves can survive from the update
and allow the system to regenerate crypto-assets.
For now there's no counter to track the active SGX users of host enclave
and virtual EPC. Introduce such counter mechanism so that the EUPDATESVN
can be done only when there's no SGX users.
Define placeholder functions sgx_inc/dec_usage_count() that are used to
increment and decrement such a counter. Also, wire the call sites for
these functions. Encapsulate the current sgx_(vepc_)open() to
__sgx_(vepc_)open() to make the new sgx_(vepc_)open() easy to read.
The definition of the counter itself and the actual implementation of
sgx_inc/dec_usage_count() functions come next.
Note: The EUPDATESVN, which may fail, will be done in
sgx_inc_usage_count(). Make it return 'int' to make subsequent patches
which implement EUPDATESVN easier to review. For now it always returns
success.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nataliia Bondarevska <bondarn@google.com>
On large enclaves we hit the softlockup warning with following call trace:
xa_erase()
sgx_vepc_release()
__fput()
task_work_run()
do_exit()
The latency issue is similar to the one fixed in:
8795359e35 ("x86/sgx: Silence softlockup detection when releasing large enclaves")
The test system has 64GB of enclave memory, and all is assigned to a single VM.
Release of 'vepc' takes a longer time and causes long latencies, which triggers
the softlockup warning.
Add cond_resched() to give other tasks a chance to run and reduce
latencies, which also avoids the softlockup detector.
[ mingo: Rewrote the changelog. ]
Fixes: 540745ddbc ("x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests")
Reported-by: Yu Zhang <yu.zhang@ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Yu Zhang <yu.zhang@ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Replace direct modifications to vma->vm_flags with calls to modifier
functions to be able to track flag changes and to keep vma locking
correctness.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix drivers/misc/open-dice.c, per Hyeonggon Yoo]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230126193752.297968-5-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@Oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjun Roy <arjunroy@google.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@google.com>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Oskolkov <posk@google.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@bytedance.com>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
For bare-metal SGX on real hardware, the hardware provides guarantees
SGX state at reboot. For instance, all pages start out uninitialized.
The vepc driver provides a similar guarantee today for freshly-opened
vepc instances, but guests such as Windows expect all pages to be in
uninitialized state on startup, including after every guest reboot.
Some userspace implementations of virtual SGX would rather avoid having
to close and reopen the /dev/sgx_vepc file descriptor and re-mmap the
virtual EPC. For example, they could sandbox themselves after the guest
starts and forbid further calls to open(), in order to mitigate exploits
from untrusted guests.
Therefore, add a ioctl that does this with EREMOVE. Userspace can
invoke the ioctl to bring its vEPC pages back to uninitialized state.
There is a possibility that some pages fail to be removed if they are
SECS pages, and the child and SECS pages could be in separate vEPC
regions. Therefore, the ioctl returns the number of EREMOVE failures,
telling userspace to try the ioctl again after it's done with all
vEPC regions. A more verbose description of the correct usage and
the possible error conditions is documented in sgx.rst.
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211021201155.1523989-3-pbonzini@redhat.com
For bare-metal SGX on real hardware, the hardware provides guarantees
SGX state at reboot. For instance, all pages start out uninitialized.
The vepc driver provides a similar guarantee today for freshly-opened
vepc instances, but guests such as Windows expect all pages to be in
uninitialized state on startup, including after every guest reboot.
One way to do this is to simply close and reopen the /dev/sgx_vepc file
descriptor and re-mmap the virtual EPC. However, this is problematic
because it prevents sandboxing the userspace (for example forbidding
open() after the guest starts; this is doable with heavy use of SCM_RIGHTS
file descriptor passing).
In order to implement this, we will need a ioctl that performs
EREMOVE on all pages mapped by a /dev/sgx_vepc file descriptor:
other possibilities, such as closing and reopening the device,
are racy.
Start the implementation by creating a separate function with just
the __eremove wrapper.
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211021201155.1523989-2-pbonzini@redhat.com
xa_destroy() needs to be called to destroy a virtual EPC's page array
before calling kfree() to free the virtual EPC. Currently it is not
called so add the missing xa_destroy().
Fixes: 540745ddbc ("x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests")
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Tested-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210615101639.291929-1-kai.huang@intel.com
Fix the following sparse warning:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c:95:35: warning:
symbol 'sgx_vepc_vm_ops' was not declared. Should it be static?
This symbol is not used outside of virt.c so mark it static.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210412160023.193850-1-weiyongjun1@huawei.com
The host kernel must intercept ECREATE to impose policies on guests, and
intercept EINIT to be able to write guest's virtual SGX_LEPUBKEYHASH MSR
values to hardware before running guest's EINIT so it can run correctly
according to hardware behavior.
Provide wrappers around __ecreate() and __einit() to hide the ugliness
of overloading the ENCLS return value to encode multiple error formats
in a single int. KVM will trap-and-execute ECREATE and EINIT as part
of SGX virtualization, and reflect ENCLS execution result to guest by
setting up guest's GPRs, or on an exception, injecting the correct fault
based on return value of __ecreate() and __einit().
Use host userspace addresses (provided by KVM based on guest physical
address of ENCLS parameters) to execute ENCLS/EINIT when possible.
Accesses to both EPC and memory originating from ENCLS are subject to
segmentation and paging mechanisms. It's also possible to generate
kernel mappings for ENCLS parameters by resolving PFN but using
__uaccess_xx() is simpler.
[ bp: Return early if the __user memory accesses fail, use
cpu_feature_enabled(). ]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20e09daf559aa5e9e680a0b4b5fba940f1bad86e.1616136308.git.kai.huang@intel.com
Add a misc device /dev/sgx_vepc to allow userspace to allocate "raw"
Enclave Page Cache (EPC) without an associated enclave. The intended
and only known use case for raw EPC allocation is to expose EPC to a
KVM guest, hence the 'vepc' moniker, virt.{c,h} files and X86_SGX_KVM
Kconfig.
The SGX driver uses the misc device /dev/sgx_enclave to support
userspace in creating an enclave. Each file descriptor returned from
opening /dev/sgx_enclave represents an enclave. Unlike the SGX driver,
KVM doesn't control how the guest uses the EPC, therefore EPC allocated
to a KVM guest is not associated with an enclave, and /dev/sgx_enclave
is not suitable for allocating EPC for a KVM guest.
Having separate device nodes for the SGX driver and KVM virtual EPC also
allows separate permission control for running host SGX enclaves and KVM
SGX guests.
To use /dev/sgx_vepc to allocate a virtual EPC instance with particular
size, the hypervisor opens /dev/sgx_vepc, and uses mmap() with the
intended size to get an address range of virtual EPC. Then it may use
the address range to create one KVM memory slot as virtual EPC for
a guest.
Implement the "raw" EPC allocation in the x86 core-SGX subsystem via
/dev/sgx_vepc rather than in KVM. Doing so has two major advantages:
- Does not require changes to KVM's uAPI, e.g. EPC gets handled as
just another memory backend for guests.
- EPC management is wholly contained in the SGX subsystem, e.g. SGX
does not have to export any symbols, changes to reclaim flows don't
need to be routed through KVM, SGX's dirty laundry doesn't have to
get aired out for the world to see, and so on and so forth.
The virtual EPC pages allocated to guests are currently not reclaimable.
Reclaiming an EPC page used by enclave requires a special reclaim
mechanism separate from normal page reclaim, and that mechanism is not
supported for virutal EPC pages. Due to the complications of handling
reclaim conflicts between guest and host, reclaiming virtual EPC pages
is significantly more complex than basic support for SGX virtualization.
[ bp:
- Massage commit message and comments
- use cpu_feature_enabled()
- vertically align struct members init
- massage Virtual EPC clarification text
- move Kconfig prompt to Virtualization ]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0c38ced8c8e5a69872db4d6a1c0dabd01e07cad7.1616136308.git.kai.huang@intel.com
