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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
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@ -1153,6 +1153,9 @@ int rtw_action_frame_parse(const u8 *frame, u32 frame_len, u8 *category, u8 *act
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u8 c;
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u8 a = ACT_PUBLIC_MAX;
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if (frame_len < sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr) + 2)
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return false;
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fc = le16_to_cpu(((struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr *)frame)->frame_control);
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if ((fc & (IEEE80211_FCTL_FTYPE | IEEE80211_FCTL_STYPE)) !=
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