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KVM: VMX: Always reflect SGX EPCM #PFs back into the guest
When handling intercepted #PFs, reflect EPCM (Enclave Page Cache Map)
violations, i.e. #PFs with the SGX flag set, back into the guest. KVM
doesn't shadow EPCM entries (the EPCM deals only with virtual/linear
addresses), and so EPCM violation cannot be due to KVM interference,
and more importantly can't be resolved by KVM.
On pre-SGX2 hardware, EPCM violations are delivered as #GP(0) faults, but
on SGX2+ hardware, they are delivered as #PF(SGX). Failure to account for
the SGX2 behavior could put a vCPU into an infinite loop due to KVM not
realizing the #PF is the guest's responsibility.
Take care to deliver the EPCM violation as a #GP(0) if the _guest_ CPU
model is only SGX1.
Fixes: 72add915fb ("KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC")
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Lyu <richard.lyu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251121222018.348987-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
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@ -5303,12 +5303,53 @@ static bool is_xfd_nm_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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!kvm_is_cr0_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR0_TS);
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}
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static int vmx_handle_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 error_code)
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{
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unsigned long cr2 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
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if (vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags)
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goto handle_pf;
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/* When using EPT, KVM intercepts #PF only to detect illegal GPAs. */
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WARN_ON_ONCE(enable_ept && !allow_smaller_maxphyaddr);
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/*
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* On SGX2 hardware, EPCM violations are delivered as #PF with the SGX
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* flag set in the error code (SGX1 hardware generates #GP(0)). EPCM
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* violations have nothing to do with shadow paging and can never be
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* resolved by KVM; always reflect them into the guest.
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*/
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if (error_code & PFERR_SGX_MASK) {
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WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) ||
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!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2));
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if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX2))
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kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error(vcpu, cr2, error_code);
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else
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kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* If EPT is enabled, fixup and inject the #PF. KVM intercepts #PFs
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* only to set PFERR_RSVD as appropriate (hardware won't set RSVD due
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* to the GPA being legal with respect to host.MAXPHYADDR).
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*/
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if (enable_ept) {
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kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error(vcpu, cr2, error_code);
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return 1;
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}
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handle_pf:
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return kvm_handle_page_fault(vcpu, error_code, cr2, NULL, 0);
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}
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static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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{
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struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
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struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
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u32 intr_info, ex_no, error_code;
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unsigned long cr2, dr6;
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unsigned long dr6;
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u32 vect_info;
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vect_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
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@ -5383,19 +5424,8 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
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return 0;
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}
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if (is_page_fault(intr_info)) {
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cr2 = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
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if (enable_ept && !vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_flags) {
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/*
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* EPT will cause page fault only if we need to
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* detect illegal GPAs.
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*/
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WARN_ON_ONCE(!allow_smaller_maxphyaddr);
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kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error(vcpu, cr2, error_code);
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return 1;
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} else
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return kvm_handle_page_fault(vcpu, error_code, cr2, NULL, 0);
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}
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if (is_page_fault(intr_info))
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return vmx_handle_page_fault(vcpu, error_code);
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ex_no = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
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