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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop
The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each
iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an
AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame
(the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length
from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer.
Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length
itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a
truncated IE to the handler functions.
Add two guards at the top of the loop body:
1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header).
2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past pkt_len.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu <hossu.alexandru@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Luka Gejak <luka.gejak@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004531.1038924-6-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -1371,7 +1371,11 @@ unsigned int OnAssocRsp(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame)
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/* to handle HT, WMM, rate adaptive, update MAC reg */
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/* for not to handle the synchronous IO in the tasklet */
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for (i = (6 + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN); i < pkt_len;) {
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if (i + sizeof(*pIE) > pkt_len)
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break;
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pIE = (struct ndis_80211_var_ie *)(pframe + i);
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if (i + sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length > pkt_len)
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break;
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switch (pIE->element_id) {
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case WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC:
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