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perf session: Snapshot event->header.size in process_user_event()
On native-endian files, events are read from MAP_SHARED memory. Multiple reads of event->header.size can return different values if the file is concurrently modified, allowing an attacker to bypass bounds checks performed on an earlier read. Snapshot header.size into a local variable at function entry using READ_ONCE() to prevent compiler rematerialization, and use it for all size-dependent arithmetic within the function. This ensures every bounds calculation uses the same value that was validated by the reader. Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org # Running on a local machine Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.6-1m Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
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@ -2230,6 +2230,7 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
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{
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struct ordered_events *oe = &session->ordered_events;
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const struct perf_tool *tool = session->tool;
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const u32 event_size = READ_ONCE(event->header.size);
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struct perf_sample sample;
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int fd = perf_data__fd(session->data);
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s64 err;
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@ -2271,7 +2272,7 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
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break;
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case PERF_RECORD_HEADER_BUILD_ID:
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if (!perf_event__check_nul(event->build_id.filename,
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(void *)event + event->header.size,
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(void *)event + event_size,
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"HEADER_BUILD_ID")) {
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err = 0;
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break;
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@ -2294,7 +2295,7 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
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* place already.
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*/
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if (!perf_data__is_pipe(session->data))
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lseek(fd, file_offset + event->header.size, SEEK_SET);
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lseek(fd, file_offset + event_size, SEEK_SET);
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err = tool->auxtrace(tool, session, event);
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break;
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case PERF_RECORD_AUXTRACE_ERROR:
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@ -2304,14 +2305,14 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
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case PERF_RECORD_THREAD_MAP: {
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u64 max_nr;
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if (event->header.size < sizeof(event->thread_map)) {
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if (event_size < sizeof(event->thread_map)) {
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pr_err("PERF_RECORD_THREAD_MAP: header.size (%u) too small\n",
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event->header.size);
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event_size);
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err = -EINVAL;
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break;
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}
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max_nr = (event->header.size - sizeof(event->thread_map)) /
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max_nr = (event_size - sizeof(event->thread_map)) /
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sizeof(event->thread_map.entries[0]);
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if (event->thread_map.nr > max_nr) {
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pr_err("PERF_RECORD_THREAD_MAP: nr %" PRIu64 " exceeds max %" PRIu64 "\n",
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@ -2325,7 +2326,7 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
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}
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case PERF_RECORD_CPU_MAP: {
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struct perf_record_cpu_map_data *data = &event->cpu_map.data;
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u32 payload = event->header.size - sizeof(event->header);
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u32 payload = event_size - sizeof(event->header);
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/*
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* Native-endian events are mmap'd read-only, so we
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@ -2389,8 +2390,8 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
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break;
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}
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case PERF_RECORD_STAT_CONFIG: {
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/* Cannot underflow: perf_event__min_size[] guarantees header.size >= sizeof */
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u64 max_nr = (event->header.size - sizeof(event->stat_config)) /
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/* Cannot underflow: perf_event__min_size[] guarantees event_size >= sizeof */
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u64 max_nr = (event_size - sizeof(event->stat_config)) /
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sizeof(event->stat_config.data[0]);
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/*
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@ -2421,7 +2422,7 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
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*/
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memset(&session->time_conv, 0, sizeof(session->time_conv));
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memcpy(&session->time_conv, &event->time_conv,
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min((size_t)event->header.size, sizeof(session->time_conv)));
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min((size_t)event_size, sizeof(session->time_conv)));
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err = tool->time_conv(tool, session, event);
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break;
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case PERF_RECORD_HEADER_FEATURE:
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@ -2438,11 +2439,10 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
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break;
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case PERF_RECORD_BPF_METADATA: {
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u64 nr_entries, max_entries;
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u32 hdr_size = READ_ONCE(event->header.size);
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if (hdr_size < sizeof(event->bpf_metadata)) {
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if (event_size < sizeof(event->bpf_metadata)) {
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pr_warning("WARNING: PERF_RECORD_BPF_METADATA: header.size (%u) too small, skipping\n",
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hdr_size);
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event_size);
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err = 0;
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break;
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}
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@ -2458,9 +2458,8 @@ static s64 perf_session__process_user_event(struct perf_session *session,
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break;
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}
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/* Snapshot — event is mmap'd and could change between reads */
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nr_entries = READ_ONCE(event->bpf_metadata.nr_entries);
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max_entries = (hdr_size - sizeof(event->bpf_metadata)) /
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max_entries = (event_size - sizeof(event->bpf_metadata)) /
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sizeof(event->bpf_metadata.entries[0]);
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if (nr_entries > max_entries) {
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pr_warning("WARNING: PERF_RECORD_BPF_METADATA: nr_entries %" PRIu64 " exceeds max %" PRIu64 ", skipping\n",
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