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selftests/landlock: Check that coredump sockets stay unrestricted
Even when a process is restricted with the new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX right, the kernel can continue writing its coredump to the configured coredump socket. In the test, we create a local server and rewire the system to write coredumps into it. We then create a child process within a Landlock domain where LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX is restricted and make the process crash. The test uses SO_PEERCRED to check that the connecting client process is the expected one. Includes a fix by Mickaël Salaün for setting the EUID to 0 (see [1]). Link[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260218.ohth8theu8Yi@digikod.net/ Suggested-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Signed-off-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260327164838.38231-11-gnoack3000@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
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#include <sys/ioctl.h>
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#include <sys/mount.h>
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#include <sys/prctl.h>
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#include <sys/resource.h>
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#include <sys/sendfile.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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@ -4928,6 +4929,148 @@ TEST_F(scoped_domains, unix_seqpacket_connect_to_child_full)
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#undef USE_SENDTO
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#undef ENFORCE_ALL
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static void read_core_pattern(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
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char *buf, size_t buf_size)
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{
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int fd;
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ssize_t ret;
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fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
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ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
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ret = read(fd, buf, buf_size - 1);
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ASSERT_LE(0, ret);
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EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
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buf[ret] = '\0';
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}
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static void set_core_pattern(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
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const char *pattern)
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{
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int fd;
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size_t len = strlen(pattern);
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/*
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* Writing to /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern requires EUID 0 because
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* sysctl_perm() checks that, ignoring capabilities like
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* CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.
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*
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* Switching EUID clears the dumpable flag, which must be restored
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* afterwards to allow coredumps.
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*/
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set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
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ASSERT_EQ(0, seteuid(0));
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clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
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fd = open("/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern", O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
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ASSERT_LE(0, fd)
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{
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TH_LOG("Failed to open core_pattern for writing: %s",
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strerror(errno));
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}
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ASSERT_EQ(len, write(fd, pattern, len));
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EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
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set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
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ASSERT_EQ(0, seteuid(getuid()));
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clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETUID);
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/* Restore dumpable flag cleared by seteuid(). */
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ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1, 0, 0, 0));
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}
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FIXTURE(coredump)
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{
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char original_core_pattern[256];
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};
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FIXTURE_SETUP(coredump)
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{
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disable_caps(_metadata);
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read_core_pattern(_metadata, self->original_core_pattern,
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sizeof(self->original_core_pattern));
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}
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FIXTURE_TEARDOWN_PARENT(coredump)
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{
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set_core_pattern(_metadata, self->original_core_pattern);
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}
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/*
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* Test that even when a process is restricted with
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* LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX, the kernel can still initiate a connection
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* to the coredump socket on the processes' behalf.
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*/
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TEST_F_FORK(coredump, socket_not_restricted)
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{
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static const char core_pattern[] = "@/tmp/landlock_coredump_test.sock";
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const char *const sock_path = core_pattern + 1;
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int srv_fd, conn_fd, status;
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pid_t child_pid;
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struct ucred cred;
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socklen_t cred_len = sizeof(cred);
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char buf[4096];
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/* Set up the coredump server socket. */
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unlink(sock_path);
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srv_fd = set_up_named_unix_server(_metadata, SOCK_STREAM, sock_path);
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/* Point coredumps at our socket. */
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set_core_pattern(_metadata, core_pattern);
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/* Restrict LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX. */
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drop_access_rights(_metadata,
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&(struct landlock_ruleset_attr){
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.handled_access_fs =
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LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_RESOLVE_UNIX,
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});
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/* Fork a child that crashes. */
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child_pid = fork();
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ASSERT_LE(0, child_pid);
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if (child_pid == 0) {
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struct rlimit rl = {
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.rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY,
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.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY,
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};
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ASSERT_EQ(0, setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rl));
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/* Crash on purpose. */
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kill(getpid(), SIGSEGV);
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_exit(1);
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}
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/*
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* Accept the coredump connection. If Landlock incorrectly denies the
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* kernel's coredump connect, accept() will block forever, so the test
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* would time out.
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*/
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conn_fd = accept(srv_fd, NULL, NULL);
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ASSERT_LE(0, conn_fd);
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/* Check that the connection came from the crashing child. */
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ASSERT_EQ(0, getsockopt(conn_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred,
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&cred_len));
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EXPECT_EQ(child_pid, cred.pid);
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/* Drain the coredump data so the kernel can finish. */
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while (read(conn_fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) > 0)
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;
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EXPECT_EQ(0, close(conn_fd));
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/* Wait for the child and verify it coredumped. */
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ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
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ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSIGNALED(status));
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ASSERT_TRUE(WCOREDUMP(status));
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EXPECT_EQ(0, close(srv_fd));
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EXPECT_EQ(0, unlink(sock_path));
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}
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/* clang-format off */
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FIXTURE(layout1_bind) {};
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/* clang-format on */
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