ALSA: seq: Fix kernel heap address leak in bounce_error_event()

The comment above bounce_error_event() documents that user clients
should receive SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE with the original event embedded
as variable-length data, while kernel clients should receive
SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR with a quoted kernel pointer.

However, the implementation unconditionally uses
SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR with data.quote.event set to the raw
struct snd_seq_event pointer for all clients.  When a bounce error
event is delivered to a USER_CLIENT via snd_seq_read(), the kernel
heap address in data.quote.event is exposed to userspace through
copy_to_user() in the fixed-length branch.

This is a distinct leak path from the one addressed by commit
705dd6dcbc ("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read"),
which sanitizes data.ext.ptr in the variable-length branch of
snd_seq_read().  The bounce_error_event() leak uses fixed-length
events that take the else branch where no sanitization occurs.

Differentiate the bounce event by client type.  For USER_CLIENT,
send SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE with SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_LENGTH_VARIABLE
and data.ext pointing to the original event.  The variable-length
path in snd_seq_event_dup() copies the event data into chained
cells, and snd_seq_expand_var_event() copies only the content --
never the pointer -- to userspace.  For KERNEL_CLIENT, keep the
existing SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR behavior with the quoted
pointer.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: HanQuan <eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260612103222.2528305-1-eilaimemedsnaimel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
This commit is contained in:
HanQuan 2026-06-12 10:32:22 +00:00 committed by Takashi Iwai
parent e76296d137
commit efc86691e4

View File

@ -538,16 +538,38 @@ static int bounce_error_event(struct snd_seq_client *client,
/* set up quoted error */
memset(&bounce_ev, 0, sizeof(bounce_ev));
bounce_ev.type = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR;
bounce_ev.flags = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_LENGTH_FIXED;
if (client->type == USER_CLIENT) {
/*
* For user clients, send SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE with the
* original event embedded as variable-length data. This
* avoids exposing data.quote.event (a kernel pointer) to
* userspace. The variable-length path in snd_seq_event_dup()
* copies the event data from data.ext.ptr into chained cells,
* and snd_seq_expand_var_event() copies only the data content
* -- never the pointer -- to userspace.
*/
bounce_ev.type = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE;
bounce_ev.flags = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_LENGTH_VARIABLE;
bounce_ev.data.ext.len = sizeof(struct snd_seq_event);
bounce_ev.data.ext.ptr = (char *)event;
} else {
/*
* For kernel clients, quote the event pointer directly.
* Kernel consumers can safely dereference the pointer.
*/
bounce_ev.type = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_KERNEL_ERROR;
bounce_ev.flags = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_LENGTH_FIXED;
bounce_ev.data.quote.origin = event->dest;
bounce_ev.data.quote.event = event;
bounce_ev.data.quote.value = -err; /* use positive value */
}
bounce_ev.queue = SNDRV_SEQ_QUEUE_DIRECT;
bounce_ev.source.client = SNDRV_SEQ_CLIENT_SYSTEM;
bounce_ev.source.port = SNDRV_SEQ_PORT_SYSTEM_ANNOUNCE;
bounce_ev.dest.client = client->number;
bounce_ev.dest.port = event->source.port;
bounce_ev.data.quote.origin = event->dest;
bounce_ev.data.quote.event = event;
bounce_ev.data.quote.value = -err; /* use positive value */
result = snd_seq_deliver_single_event(NULL, &bounce_ev, atomic, hop + 1);
if (result < 0) {
client->event_lost++;