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x86/bugs: Remove X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN
Whack this thing because: - the "unknown" handling is done only for this vuln and not for the others - it doesn't do anything besides reporting things differently. It doesn't apply any mitigations - it is simply causing unnecessary complications to the code which don't bring anything besides maintenance overhead to what is already a very nasty spaghetti pile - all the currently unaffected CPUs can also be in "unknown" status so there's no need for special handling here so get rid of it. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250414150951.5345-1-bp@kernel.org
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@ -519,7 +519,7 @@
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#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* "itlb_multihit" CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
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#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* "srbds" CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
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#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* "mmio_stale_data" CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
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#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* "mmio_unknown" CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
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/* unused, was #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) "mmio_unknown" CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
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#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(27) /* "retbleed" CPU is affected by RETBleed */
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#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* "eibrs_pbrsb" EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
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#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB X86_BUG(29) /* "smt_rsb" CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */
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@ -428,7 +428,6 @@ static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
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static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
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{
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if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
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boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN) ||
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cpu_mitigations_off()) {
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mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
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return;
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@ -591,8 +590,6 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
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pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
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if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
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pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
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else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
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pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n");
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if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS))
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pr_info("Register File Data Sampling: %s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]);
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}
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@ -2819,9 +2816,6 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
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static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
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{
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if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
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return sysfs_emit(buf, "Unknown: No mitigations\n");
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if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
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return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
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@ -3006,7 +3000,6 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
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return srbds_show_state(buf);
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case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
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case X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN:
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return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
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case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
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@ -3075,10 +3068,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *
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ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
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{
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if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
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return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
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else
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return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
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return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
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}
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ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
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@ -1402,15 +1402,10 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
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* Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability,
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* but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may
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* not want the guest to enumerate the bug.
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*
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* Set X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN for CPUs that are neither in the blacklist,
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* nor in the whitelist and also don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAP MMIO bits.
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*/
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if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(x86_arch_cap_msr)) {
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if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO))
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setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
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else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO))
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setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
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}
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if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) {
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@ -508,7 +508,7 @@
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#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* "itlb_multihit" CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
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#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* "srbds" CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
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#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* "mmio_stale_data" CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
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#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* "mmio_unknown" CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
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/* unused, was #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) * "mmio_unknown" CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
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#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(27) /* "retbleed" CPU is affected by RETBleed */
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#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* "eibrs_pbrsb" EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
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#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB X86_BUG(29) /* "smt_rsb" CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */
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