x86/bugs: Remove X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN

Whack this thing because:

- the "unknown" handling is done only for this vuln and not for the
  others

- it doesn't do anything besides reporting things differently. It
  doesn't apply any mitigations - it is simply causing unnecessary
  complications to the code which don't bring anything besides
  maintenance overhead to what is already a very nasty spaghetti pile

- all the currently unaffected CPUs can also be in "unknown" status so
  there's no need for special handling here

so get rid of it.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250414150951.5345-1-bp@kernel.org
This commit is contained in:
Borislav Petkov (AMD) 2025-04-14 17:09:51 +02:00 committed by Ingo Molnar
parent 9fb6938d55
commit dd86a1d013
4 changed files with 3 additions and 18 deletions

View File

@ -519,7 +519,7 @@
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* "itlb_multihit" CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* "srbds" CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* "mmio_stale_data" CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* "mmio_unknown" CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
/* unused, was #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) "mmio_unknown" CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(27) /* "retbleed" CPU is affected by RETBleed */
#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* "eibrs_pbrsb" EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB X86_BUG(29) /* "smt_rsb" CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */

View File

@ -428,7 +428,6 @@ static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN) ||
cpu_mitigations_off()) {
mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
return;
@ -591,8 +590,6 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n");
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS))
pr_info("Register File Data Sampling: %s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]);
}
@ -2819,9 +2816,6 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
{
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
return sysfs_emit(buf, "Unknown: No mitigations\n");
if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
@ -3006,7 +3000,6 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
return srbds_show_state(buf);
case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
case X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN:
return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
@ -3075,10 +3068,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *
ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
else
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
}
ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)

View File

@ -1402,15 +1402,10 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability,
* but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may
* not want the guest to enumerate the bug.
*
* Set X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN for CPUs that are neither in the blacklist,
* nor in the whitelist and also don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAP MMIO bits.
*/
if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(x86_arch_cap_msr)) {
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
}
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) {

View File

@ -508,7 +508,7 @@
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* "itlb_multihit" CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* "srbds" CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* "mmio_stale_data" CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* "mmio_unknown" CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
/* unused, was #define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) * "mmio_unknown" CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(27) /* "retbleed" CPU is affected by RETBleed */
#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* "eibrs_pbrsb" EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
#define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB X86_BUG(29) /* "smt_rsb" CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */