crypto: padlock-aes - clear the crypto_aes_ctx when done

Clear the crypto_aes_ctx structure via __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx)
when we're done with it to avoid that key data could leak on the
stack.

And since __cleanup() (and __free()) should not be mixed with
"gotos" in the same function, turn the goto statement here
into a proper block of the related if-statement.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This commit is contained in:
Thomas Huth 2026-08-10 11:29:58 +02:00 committed by Herbert Xu
parent 26b845b7e1
commit cafba3d678

View File

@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
{
struct aes_ctx *ctx = aes_ctx(tfm);
const __le32 *key = (const __le32 *)in_key;
struct crypto_aes_ctx gen_aes;
struct crypto_aes_ctx gen_aes __cleanup(aes_zeroize_ctx);
int cpu;
if (key_len % 8)
@ -137,20 +137,18 @@ static int aes_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
ctx->cword.decrypt.ksize = ctx->cword.encrypt.ksize;
/* Don't generate extended keys if the hardware can do it. */
if (aes_hw_extkey_available(key_len))
goto ok;
if (!aes_hw_extkey_available(key_len)) {
ctx->D = ctx->d_data;
ctx->cword.encrypt.keygen = 1;
ctx->cword.decrypt.keygen = 1;
ctx->D = ctx->d_data;
ctx->cword.encrypt.keygen = 1;
ctx->cword.decrypt.keygen = 1;
if (aes_expandkey(&gen_aes, in_key, key_len))
return -EINVAL;
if (aes_expandkey(&gen_aes, in_key, key_len))
return -EINVAL;
memcpy(ctx->E, gen_aes.key_enc, AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH);
memcpy(ctx->D, gen_aes.key_dec, AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH);
}
memcpy(ctx->E, gen_aes.key_enc, AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH);
memcpy(ctx->D, gen_aes.key_dec, AES_MAX_KEYLENGTH);
ok:
for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
if (&ctx->cword.encrypt == per_cpu(paes_last_cword, cpu) ||
&ctx->cword.decrypt == per_cpu(paes_last_cword, cpu))