KVM: VMX: Refresh GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS on all injected #DBs

Move KVM's stuffing of GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS when RFLAGS.TF=1 and
MOV/POP SS or STI blocking is active into the exception injection code so
that KVM fixes up the VMCS for all injected #DBs, not only those that are
reflected back into the guest after #DB interception.  E.g. if KVM queues
a #DB in the emulator, or more importantly if userspace does save/restore
exactly on the #DB+shadow boundary, then KVM needs to massage the VMCS to
avoid the VM-Entry consistency check.

Opportunistically update the wording of the comment to describe the
behavior as a workaround of flawed CPU behavior/architecture, to make it
clear that the *only* thing KVM is doing is fudging around a consistency
check.  Per the SDM:

  There are no pending debug exceptions after VM entry if any of the
  following are true:

    * The VM entry is vectoring with one of the following interruption
      types: external interrupt, non-maskable interrupt (NMI), hardware
      exception, or privileged software exception.

I.e. forcing GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS does *not* impact guest-
visible behavior.

Fixes: b9bed78e2f ("KVM: VMX: Set vmcs.PENDING_DBG.BS on #DB in STI/MOVSS blocking shadow")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/b1a294bc9ed4dae532474a5dc6c8cb6e5962de7c.1757416809.git.houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com
Reviewed-by: Hou Wenlong <houwenlong.hwl@antgroup.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515222638.1949982-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
Sean Christopherson 2026-05-15 15:26:29 -07:00
parent 7e985021ef
commit c5bad4fa2d

View File

@ -1909,6 +1909,24 @@ void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
u32 intr_info = ex->vector | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
/*
* When injecting a #DB, single-stepping is enabled in RFLAGS, and STI
* or MOV-SS blocking is active, set vmcs.PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS to
* prevent a false positive from VM-Entry consistency check. VM-Entry
* asserts that a single-step #DB _must_ be pending in this scenario,
* as the previous instruction cannot have toggled RFLAGS.TF 0=>1
* (because STI and POP/MOV don't modify RFLAGS), therefore the one
* instruction delay when activating single-step breakpoints must have
* already expired. However, the CPU isn't smart enough to peek at
* vmcs.VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD and so doesn't realize that yes, there
* is indeed a #DB pending/imminent.
*/
if (ex->vector == DB_VECTOR &&
(vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_TF) &&
vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(vcpu))
vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS,
vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS) | DR6_BS);
kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex);
if (ex->has_error_code) {
@ -5485,26 +5503,9 @@ static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* avoid single-step #DB and MTF updates, as ICEBP is
* higher priority. Note, skipping ICEBP still clears
* STI and MOVSS blocking.
*
* For all other #DBs, set vmcs.PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS.BS
* if single-step is enabled in RFLAGS and STI or MOVSS
* blocking is active, as the CPU doesn't set the bit
* on VM-Exit due to #DB interception. VM-Entry has a
* consistency check that a single-step #DB is pending
* in this scenario as the previous instruction cannot
* have toggled RFLAGS.TF 0=>1 (because STI and POP/MOV
* don't modify RFLAGS), therefore the one instruction
* delay when activating single-step breakpoints must
* have already expired. Note, the CPU sets/clears BS
* as appropriate for all other VM-Exits types.
*/
if (is_icebp(intr_info))
WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu));
else if ((vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_TF) &&
(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS)))
vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS,
vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS) | DR6_BS);
kvm_queue_exception_p(vcpu, DB_VECTOR, dr6);
return 1;