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netfilter: Validate the sequence number of dataless ACK packets as well
commit 4a70bbfaef upstream.
We spare nothing by not validating the sequence number of dataless
ACK packets and enabling it makes harder off-path attacks.
See: "Reflection scan: an Off-Path Attack on TCP" by Jan Wrobel,
http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2074
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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parent
1b10e0be50
commit
c581c7c77d
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@ -627,15 +627,9 @@ static bool tcp_in_window(const struct nf_conn *ct,
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ack = sack = receiver->td_end;
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}
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if (seq == end
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&& (!tcph->rst
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|| (seq == 0 && state->state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT)))
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if (tcph->rst && seq == 0 && state->state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT)
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/*
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* Packets contains no data: we assume it is valid
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* and check the ack value only.
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* However RST segments are always validated by their
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* SEQ number, except when seq == 0 (reset sent answering
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* SYN.
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* RST sent answering SYN.
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*/
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seq = end = sender->td_end;
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