selinux/stable-7.2 PR 20260805

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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20260805' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:

 - Continue to improve the validation of SELinux policies during load

 - Fix a SELinux regression caused by bpffs changes in v7.2-rc1

 - Fix a SELinux preformance regression caused by SELinux changes in
   v7.2-rc1

* tag 'selinux-pr-20260805' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: check level category sets once at load time
  selinux: require every boolean value to be defined
  selinux: reject an unclaimed class value in security_get_classes()
  selinux: require a class's permission values to cover its permission count
  selinux: do not cancel a policy conversion that never started
  selinux: bpf: check SBLABEL_MNT before isec init
  selinux: reject a class permission count below its inherited common
  selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count

security/selinux/hooks.c

@@ -2974,6 +2974,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 
 	sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
 
+	if (!selinux_initialized() ||
+	    !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	newsid = crsec->create_sid;
 	newsclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
 	rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(crsec, dir, qstr, newsclass, &newsid);
@@ -2988,10 +2992,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
 	}
 
-	if (!selinux_initialized() ||
-	    !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
 	xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
 	if (xattr) {
 		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,

security/selinux/ss/mls.c

@@ -160,9 +160,6 @@ bool mls_level_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, const struct mls_level *l)
 {
 	const char *name;
 	const struct level_datum *levdatum;
-	struct ebitmap_node *node;
-	u32 bit;
-	int rc;
 
 	if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
 		return false;
@@ -176,21 +173,14 @@ bool mls_level_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, const struct mls_level *l)
 		return false;
 
 	/*
-	 * Validate that all bits set in l->cat are also be set in
-	 * levdatum->level->cat and no bit in l->cat is larger than
-	 * p->p_cats.nprim.
+	 * l is valid iff every bit in l->cat is set in levdatum->level.cat
+	 * and no bit in l->cat is larger than p->p_cats.nprim.
+	 * policydb_index() has already verified that every bit set in
+	 * levdatum->level.cat names a defined category, so containment is
+	 * sufficient here.
 	 */
-	rc = ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level.cat, &l->cat,
-			      p->p_cats.nprim);
-	if (!rc)
-		return false;
-
-	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&levdatum->level.cat, node, bit) {
-		if (!sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, bit))
-			return false;
-	}
-
-	return true;
+	return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level.cat, &l->cat,
+				p->p_cats.nprim);
 }
 
 bool mls_range_isvalid(const struct policydb *p, const struct mls_range *r)

security/selinux/ss/policydb.c

@@ -665,6 +665,23 @@ static int cat_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int sens_cat_index_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+	struct policydb *p = datap;
+	struct level_datum *levdatum = datum;
+	struct ebitmap_node *node;
+	u32 bit;
+
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&levdatum->level.cat, node, bit) {
+		if (bit >= p->p_cats.nprim || !sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, bit)) {
+			pr_err("SELinux: sensitivity %s allows undefined category %u\n",
+				(const char *)key, bit + 1);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* clang-format off */
 static int (*const index_f[SYM_NUM])(void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
 	common_index,
@@ -719,6 +736,7 @@ static inline void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
 static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
 {
 	int i, rc;
+	u32 v;
 
 	if (p->mls_enabled)
 		pr_debug(
@@ -769,6 +787,30 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * A sparse class value is absorbed by policydb_class_isvalid() and
+	 * its siblings, but no such predicate exists for booleans: every
+	 * user of bool_val_to_struct[] walks it by index and dereferences
+	 * each entry -- cond_evaluate_expr(), the two getters and
+	 * security_set_bools() -- so an unclaimed one has no consumer that
+	 * can tolerate it.
+	 */
+	for (v = 0; v < p->p_bools.nprim; v++) {
+		if (!p->bool_val_to_struct[v]) {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  boolean %u is declared but not defined\n",
+			       v + 1);
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (p->mls_enabled) {
+		rc = hashtab_map(&p->p_levels.table, sens_cat_index_check, p);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
 	rc = 0;
 out:
 	return rc;
@@ -1154,7 +1196,18 @@ int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
+/*
+ * Bitmap of the permission values a symtab has claimed.  Values are 1-based
+ * and bounded by SEL_VEC_MAX, the width of an access vector, so the whole set
+ * fits in a u32 and the callers reject an nprim past that width.
+ */
+static u32 perm_claimed_mask(u32 nprim)
+{
+	return nprim ? U32_MAX >> (SEL_VEC_MAX - nprim) : 0;
+}
+
+static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s,
+		     struct policy_file *fp, u32 *claimed)
 {
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct perm_datum *perdatum;
@@ -1175,6 +1228,13 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
 	rc = -EINVAL;
 	if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX)
 		goto bad;
+	/* indexes an nprim-sized array in security_get_permissions() */
+	if (perdatum->value > s->nprim)
+		goto bad;
+	/* two permissions cannot share one slot of that array */
+	if (*claimed & (1U << (perdatum->value - 1)))
+		goto bad;
+	*claimed |= 1U << (perdatum->value - 1);
 
 	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1195,7 +1255,7 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct common_datum *comdatum;
 	__le32 buf[4];
-	u32 i, len, nel;
+	u32 i, len, nel, claimed = 0;
 	int rc;
 
 	comdatum = kzalloc_obj(*comdatum);
@@ -1222,17 +1282,28 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 	comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+	/* no permission value can reach a slot past SEL_VEC_MAX */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (comdatum->permissions.nprim > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
 
 	rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
-		rc = perm_read(p, &comdatum->permissions, fp);
+		rc = perm_read(p, &comdatum->permissions, fp, &claimed);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 	}
 
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (claimed != perm_claimed_mask(comdatum->permissions.nprim)) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  common %s does not define every permission it declares\n",
+		       key);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
 	hash_eval(&comdatum->permissions.table, "common_permissions", key);
 
 	rc = symtab_insert(s, key, comdatum);
@@ -1366,7 +1437,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
 	char *key = NULL;
 	struct class_datum *cladatum;
 	__le32 buf[6];
-	u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val;
+	u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val, claimed = 0, inherited = 0;
 	int rc;
 
 	cladatum = kzalloc_obj(*cladatum);
@@ -1399,6 +1470,10 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
 	if (rc)
 		goto bad;
 	cladatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+	/* no permission value can reach a slot past SEL_VEC_MAX */
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (cladatum->permissions.nprim > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+		goto bad;
 
 	ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
 
@@ -1419,13 +1494,36 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
 			       cladatum->comkey);
 			goto bad;
 		}
+
+		/*
+		 * security_get_permissions() maps the common's permissions
+		 * into an array sized by this class's nprim, so a class must
+		 * declare at least as many as the common it inherits.
+		 */
+		if (cladatum->permissions.nprim <
+		    cladatum->comdatum->permissions.nprim) {
+			pr_err("SELinux:  class %s has fewer permissions than common %s\n",
+			       key, cladatum->comkey);
+			goto bad;
+		}
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
-		rc = perm_read(p, &cladatum->permissions, fp);
+		rc = perm_read(p, &cladatum->permissions, fp, &claimed);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 	}
 
+	/* the class's own permissions must claim the slots the common leaves */
+	if (cladatum->comdatum)
+		inherited = cladatum->comdatum->permissions.nprim;
+	rc = -EINVAL;
+	if (claimed != (perm_claimed_mask(cladatum->permissions.nprim) &
+			~perm_claimed_mask(inherited))) {
+		pr_err("SELinux:  class %s does not define every permission it declares\n",
+		       key);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+
 	hash_eval(&cladatum->permissions.table, "class_permissions", key);
 
 	rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);

security/selinux/ss/services.c

@@ -2221,7 +2221,9 @@ void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
 	oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
 					lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
 
-	sidtab_cancel_convert(oldpolicy->sidtab);
+	/* a first load has no outgoing policy and converted nothing */
+	if (oldpolicy)
+		sidtab_cancel_convert(oldpolicy->sidtab);
 	selinux_policy_free(load_state->policy);
 	kfree(load_state->convert_data);
 }
@@ -3302,6 +3304,7 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
 			 char ***classes, u32 *nclasses)
 {
 	struct policydb *policydb;
+	u32 i;
 	int rc;
 
 	policydb = &policy->policydb;
@@ -3314,16 +3317,29 @@ int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
 
 	rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
 			 *classes);
-	if (rc) {
-		u32 i;
+	if (rc)
+		goto err;
 
-		for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
-			kfree((*classes)[i]);
-		kfree(*classes);
+	/*
+	 * The class symtab may be sparse, which policydb_class_isvalid() exists
+	 * to absorb; the callback fills this array by value, so an unclaimed
+	 * one leaves a NULL that sel_make_classes() hands to sel_make_dir().
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++) {
+		if (!(*classes)[i]) {
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+			goto err;
+		}
 	}
 
 out:
 	return rc;
+
+err:
+	for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
+		kfree((*classes)[i]);
+	kfree(*classes);
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)