From 69697e6a61c77c8d3d7aefa1109f9bbe011eb180 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugh Dickins Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:10:13 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 001/140] mm/huge_memory: rename freeze_page() to unmap_page() commit 906f9cdfc2a0800f13683f9e4ebdfd08c12ee81b upstream. The term "freeze" is used in several ways in the kernel, and in mm it has the particular meaning of forcing page refcount temporarily to 0. freeze_page() is just too confusing a name for a function that unmaps a page: rename it unmap_page(), and rename unfreeze_page() remap_page(). Went to change the mention of freeze_page() added later in mm/rmap.c, but found it to be incorrect: ordinary page reclaim reaches there too; but the substance of the comment still seems correct, so edit it down. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261514080.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: e9b61f19858a5 ("thp: reintroduce split_huge_page()") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/huge_memory.c | 12 ++++++------ mm/rmap.c | 13 +++---------- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c index deed97fba979..ef573d719eb4 100644 --- a/mm/huge_memory.c +++ b/mm/huge_memory.c @@ -2322,7 +2322,7 @@ void vma_adjust_trans_huge(struct vm_area_struct *vma, } } -static void freeze_page(struct page *page) +static void unmap_page(struct page *page) { enum ttu_flags ttu_flags = TTU_IGNORE_MLOCK | TTU_IGNORE_ACCESS | TTU_RMAP_LOCKED | TTU_SPLIT_HUGE_PMD; @@ -2337,7 +2337,7 @@ static void freeze_page(struct page *page) VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!unmap_success, page); } -static void unfreeze_page(struct page *page) +static void remap_page(struct page *page) { int i; if (PageTransHuge(page)) { @@ -2454,7 +2454,7 @@ static void __split_huge_page(struct page *page, struct list_head *list, spin_unlock_irqrestore(zone_lru_lock(page_zone(head)), flags); - unfreeze_page(head); + remap_page(head); for (i = 0; i < HPAGE_PMD_NR; i++) { struct page *subpage = head + i; @@ -2635,7 +2635,7 @@ int split_huge_page_to_list(struct page *page, struct list_head *list) } /* - * Racy check if we can split the page, before freeze_page() will + * Racy check if we can split the page, before unmap_page() will * split PMDs */ if (!can_split_huge_page(head, &extra_pins)) { @@ -2644,7 +2644,7 @@ int split_huge_page_to_list(struct page *page, struct list_head *list) } mlocked = PageMlocked(page); - freeze_page(head); + unmap_page(head); VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_mapcount(head), head); /* Make sure the page is not on per-CPU pagevec as it takes pin */ @@ -2701,7 +2701,7 @@ int split_huge_page_to_list(struct page *page, struct list_head *list) fail: if (mapping) xa_unlock(&mapping->i_pages); spin_unlock_irqrestore(zone_lru_lock(page_zone(head)), flags); - unfreeze_page(head); + remap_page(head); ret = -EBUSY; } diff --git a/mm/rmap.c b/mm/rmap.c index 1e79fac3186b..85b7f9423352 100644 --- a/mm/rmap.c +++ b/mm/rmap.c @@ -1627,16 +1627,9 @@ static bool try_to_unmap_one(struct page *page, struct vm_area_struct *vma, address + PAGE_SIZE); } else { /* - * We should not need to notify here as we reach this - * case only from freeze_page() itself only call from - * split_huge_page_to_list() so everything below must - * be true: - * - page is not anonymous - * - page is locked - * - * So as it is a locked file back page thus it can not - * be remove from the page cache and replace by a new - * page before mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end so no + * This is a locked file-backed page, thus it cannot + * be removed from the page cache and replaced by a new + * page before mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end, so no * concurrent thread might update its page table to * point at new page while a device still is using this * page. From 7e18656c9a2c642ac8abb7b7934367fdd26f8a3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugh Dickins Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:10:16 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 002/140] mm/huge_memory: splitting set mapping+index before unfreeze commit 173d9d9fd3ddae84c110fea8aedf1f26af6be9ec upstream. Huge tmpfs stress testing has occasionally hit shmem_undo_range()'s VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_to_pgoff(page) != index, page). Move the setting of mapping and index up before the page_ref_unfreeze() in __split_huge_page_tail() to fix this: so that a page cache lookup cannot get a reference while the tail's mapping and index are unstable. In fact, might as well move them up before the smp_wmb(): I don't see an actual need for that, but if I'm missing something, this way round is safer than the other, and no less efficient. You might argue that VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_to_pgoff(page) != index, page) is misplaced, and should be left until after the trylock_page(); but left as is has not crashed since, and gives more stringent assurance. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261516380.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: e9b61f19858a5 ("thp: reintroduce split_huge_page()") Requires: 605ca5ede764 ("mm/huge_memory.c: reorder operations in __split_huge_page_tail()") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/huge_memory.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c index ef573d719eb4..c12b441a99f9 100644 --- a/mm/huge_memory.c +++ b/mm/huge_memory.c @@ -2373,6 +2373,12 @@ static void __split_huge_page_tail(struct page *head, int tail, (1L << PG_unevictable) | (1L << PG_dirty))); + /* ->mapping in first tail page is compound_mapcount */ + VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(tail > 2 && page_tail->mapping != TAIL_MAPPING, + page_tail); + page_tail->mapping = head->mapping; + page_tail->index = head->index + tail; + /* Page flags must be visible before we make the page non-compound. */ smp_wmb(); @@ -2393,12 +2399,6 @@ static void __split_huge_page_tail(struct page *head, int tail, if (page_is_idle(head)) set_page_idle(page_tail); - /* ->mapping in first tail page is compound_mapcount */ - VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(tail > 2 && page_tail->mapping != TAIL_MAPPING, - page_tail); - page_tail->mapping = head->mapping; - - page_tail->index = head->index + tail; page_cpupid_xchg_last(page_tail, page_cpupid_last(head)); /* From d31ff4722f45560a6daf3df9d15a6b88da0e5080 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugh Dickins Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:10:21 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 003/140] mm/huge_memory: fix lockdep complaint on 32-bit i_size_read() commit 006d3ff27e884f80bd7d306b041afc415f63598f upstream. Huge tmpfs testing, on 32-bit kernel with lockdep enabled, showed that __split_huge_page() was using i_size_read() while holding the irq-safe lru_lock and page tree lock, but the 32-bit i_size_read() uses an irq-unsafe seqlock which should not be nested inside them. Instead, read the i_size earlier in split_huge_page_to_list(), and pass the end offset down to __split_huge_page(): all while holding head page lock, which is enough to prevent truncation of that extent before the page tree lock has been taken. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261520070.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: baa355fd33142 ("thp: file pages support for split_huge_page()") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/huge_memory.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c index c12b441a99f9..15310f14c25e 100644 --- a/mm/huge_memory.c +++ b/mm/huge_memory.c @@ -2410,12 +2410,11 @@ static void __split_huge_page_tail(struct page *head, int tail, } static void __split_huge_page(struct page *page, struct list_head *list, - unsigned long flags) + pgoff_t end, unsigned long flags) { struct page *head = compound_head(page); struct zone *zone = page_zone(head); struct lruvec *lruvec; - pgoff_t end = -1; int i; lruvec = mem_cgroup_page_lruvec(head, zone->zone_pgdat); @@ -2423,9 +2422,6 @@ static void __split_huge_page(struct page *page, struct list_head *list, /* complete memcg works before add pages to LRU */ mem_cgroup_split_huge_fixup(head); - if (!PageAnon(page)) - end = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(head->mapping->host), PAGE_SIZE); - for (i = HPAGE_PMD_NR - 1; i >= 1; i--) { __split_huge_page_tail(head, i, lruvec, list); /* Some pages can be beyond i_size: drop them from page cache */ @@ -2597,6 +2593,7 @@ int split_huge_page_to_list(struct page *page, struct list_head *list) int count, mapcount, extra_pins, ret; bool mlocked; unsigned long flags; + pgoff_t end; VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(is_huge_zero_page(page), page); VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(page), page); @@ -2619,6 +2616,7 @@ int split_huge_page_to_list(struct page *page, struct list_head *list) ret = -EBUSY; goto out; } + end = -1; mapping = NULL; anon_vma_lock_write(anon_vma); } else { @@ -2632,6 +2630,15 @@ int split_huge_page_to_list(struct page *page, struct list_head *list) anon_vma = NULL; i_mmap_lock_read(mapping); + + /* + *__split_huge_page() may need to trim off pages beyond EOF: + * but on 32-bit, i_size_read() takes an irq-unsafe seqlock, + * which cannot be nested inside the page tree lock. So note + * end now: i_size itself may be changed at any moment, but + * head page lock is good enough to serialize the trimming. + */ + end = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(mapping->host), PAGE_SIZE); } /* @@ -2681,7 +2688,7 @@ int split_huge_page_to_list(struct page *page, struct list_head *list) if (mapping) __dec_node_page_state(page, NR_SHMEM_THPS); spin_unlock(&pgdata->split_queue_lock); - __split_huge_page(page, list, flags); + __split_huge_page(page, list, end, flags); if (PageSwapCache(head)) { swp_entry_t entry = { .val = page_private(head) }; From 8797f2f4fe0d555d0869b7c2704da146363bd350 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugh Dickins Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:10:25 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 004/140] mm/khugepaged: collapse_shmem() stop if punched or truncated commit 701270fa193aadf00bdcf607738f64997275d4c7 upstream. Huge tmpfs testing showed that although collapse_shmem() recognizes a concurrently truncated or hole-punched page correctly, its handling of holes was liable to refill an emptied extent. Add check to stop that. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261522040.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: f3f0e1d2150b2 ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/khugepaged.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/khugepaged.c b/mm/khugepaged.c index a31d740e6cd1..0378f758b065 100644 --- a/mm/khugepaged.c +++ b/mm/khugepaged.c @@ -1349,6 +1349,16 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, radix_tree_for_each_slot(slot, &mapping->i_pages, &iter, start) { int n = min(iter.index, end) - index; + /* + * Stop if extent has been hole-punched, and is now completely + * empty (the more obvious i_size_read() check would take an + * irq-unsafe seqlock on 32-bit). + */ + if (n >= HPAGE_PMD_NR) { + result = SCAN_TRUNCATED; + goto tree_locked; + } + /* * Handle holes in the radix tree: charge it from shmem and * insert relevant subpage of new_page into the radix-tree. @@ -1459,6 +1469,11 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, if (result == SCAN_SUCCEED && index < end) { int n = end - index; + /* Stop if extent has been truncated, and is now empty */ + if (n >= HPAGE_PMD_NR) { + result = SCAN_TRUNCATED; + goto tree_locked; + } if (!shmem_charge(mapping->host, n)) { result = SCAN_FAIL; goto tree_locked; From 78141aabfbb9560c4efcf7599ad0f01575bf0cf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugh Dickins Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:10:29 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 005/140] mm/khugepaged: fix crashes due to misaccounted holes commit aaa52e340073b7f4593b3c4ddafcafa70cf838b5 upstream. Huge tmpfs testing on a shortish file mapped into a pmd-rounded extent hit shmem_evict_inode()'s WARN_ON(inode->i_blocks) followed by clear_inode()'s BUG_ON(inode->i_data.nrpages) when the file was later closed and unlinked. khugepaged's collapse_shmem() was forgetting to update mapping->nrpages on the rollback path, after it had added but then needs to undo some holes. There is indeed an irritating asymmetry between shmem_charge(), whose callers want it to increment nrpages after successfully accounting blocks, and shmem_uncharge(), when __delete_from_page_cache() already decremented nrpages itself: oh well, just add a comment on that to them both. And shmem_recalc_inode() is supposed to be called when the accounting is expected to be in balance (so it can deduce from imbalance that reclaim discarded some pages): so change shmem_charge() to update nrpages earlier (though it's rare for the difference to matter at all). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261523450.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: 800d8c63b2e98 ("shmem: add huge pages support") Fixes: f3f0e1d2150b2 ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/khugepaged.c | 4 +++- mm/shmem.c | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/khugepaged.c b/mm/khugepaged.c index 0378f758b065..87dbb0fcfa1a 100644 --- a/mm/khugepaged.c +++ b/mm/khugepaged.c @@ -1537,8 +1537,10 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, khugepaged_pages_collapsed++; } else { /* Something went wrong: rollback changes to the radix-tree */ - shmem_uncharge(mapping->host, nr_none); xa_lock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); + mapping->nrpages -= nr_none; + shmem_uncharge(mapping->host, nr_none); + radix_tree_for_each_slot(slot, &mapping->i_pages, &iter, start) { if (iter.index >= end) break; diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index 38d228a30fdc..cd6b4bc221eb 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -297,12 +297,14 @@ bool shmem_charge(struct inode *inode, long pages) if (!shmem_inode_acct_block(inode, pages)) return false; + /* nrpages adjustment first, then shmem_recalc_inode() when balanced */ + inode->i_mapping->nrpages += pages; + spin_lock_irqsave(&info->lock, flags); info->alloced += pages; inode->i_blocks += pages * BLOCKS_PER_PAGE; shmem_recalc_inode(inode); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&info->lock, flags); - inode->i_mapping->nrpages += pages; return true; } @@ -312,6 +314,8 @@ void shmem_uncharge(struct inode *inode, long pages) struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(inode); unsigned long flags; + /* nrpages adjustment done by __delete_from_page_cache() or caller */ + spin_lock_irqsave(&info->lock, flags); info->alloced -= pages; inode->i_blocks -= pages * BLOCKS_PER_PAGE; From ee13d69bc1e8a55bbdfd588190628c54a90b9782 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugh Dickins Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:10:35 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 006/140] mm/khugepaged: collapse_shmem() remember to clear holes commit 2af8ff291848cc4b1cce24b6c943394eb2c761e8 upstream. Huge tmpfs testing reminds us that there is no __GFP_ZERO in the gfp flags khugepaged uses to allocate a huge page - in all common cases it would just be a waste of effort - so collapse_shmem() must remember to clear out any holes that it instantiates. The obvious place to do so, where they are put into the page cache tree, is not a good choice: because interrupts are disabled there. Leave it until further down, once success is assured, where the other pages are copied (before setting PageUptodate). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261525080.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: f3f0e1d2150b2 ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/khugepaged.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/khugepaged.c b/mm/khugepaged.c index 87dbb0fcfa1a..068868763b78 100644 --- a/mm/khugepaged.c +++ b/mm/khugepaged.c @@ -1498,7 +1498,12 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, * Replacing old pages with new one has succeed, now we need to * copy the content and free old pages. */ + index = start; list_for_each_entry_safe(page, tmp, &pagelist, lru) { + while (index < page->index) { + clear_highpage(new_page + (index % HPAGE_PMD_NR)); + index++; + } copy_highpage(new_page + (page->index % HPAGE_PMD_NR), page); list_del(&page->lru); @@ -1508,6 +1513,11 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, ClearPageActive(page); ClearPageUnevictable(page); put_page(page); + index++; + } + while (index < end) { + clear_highpage(new_page + (index % HPAGE_PMD_NR)); + index++; } local_irq_save(flags); From 3e9646c76cb91d68f1ceaf51f6110e05af5a9f85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugh Dickins Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:10:39 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 007/140] mm/khugepaged: minor reorderings in collapse_shmem() commit 042a30824871fa3149b0127009074b75cc25863c upstream. Several cleanups in collapse_shmem(): most of which probably do not really matter, beyond doing things in a more familiar and reassuring order. Simplify the failure gotos in the main loop, and on success update stats while interrupts still disabled from the last iteration. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261526400.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: f3f0e1d2150b2 ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/khugepaged.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/khugepaged.c b/mm/khugepaged.c index 068868763b78..d0a347e6fd08 100644 --- a/mm/khugepaged.c +++ b/mm/khugepaged.c @@ -1330,13 +1330,12 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, goto out; } + __SetPageLocked(new_page); + __SetPageSwapBacked(new_page); new_page->index = start; new_page->mapping = mapping; - __SetPageSwapBacked(new_page); - __SetPageLocked(new_page); BUG_ON(!page_ref_freeze(new_page, 1)); - /* * At this point the new_page is 'frozen' (page_count() is zero), locked * and not up-to-date. It's safe to insert it into radix tree, because @@ -1365,13 +1364,13 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, */ if (n && !shmem_charge(mapping->host, n)) { result = SCAN_FAIL; - break; + goto tree_locked; } - nr_none += n; for (; index < min(iter.index, end); index++) { radix_tree_insert(&mapping->i_pages, index, new_page + (index % HPAGE_PMD_NR)); } + nr_none += n; /* We are done. */ if (index >= end) @@ -1387,12 +1386,12 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, result = SCAN_FAIL; goto tree_unlocked; } - xa_lock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); } else if (trylock_page(page)) { get_page(page); + xa_unlock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); } else { result = SCAN_PAGE_LOCK; - break; + goto tree_locked; } /* @@ -1407,11 +1406,10 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, result = SCAN_TRUNCATED; goto out_unlock; } - xa_unlock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); if (isolate_lru_page(page)) { result = SCAN_DEL_PAGE_LRU; - goto out_isolate_failed; + goto out_unlock; } if (page_mapped(page)) @@ -1432,7 +1430,9 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, */ if (!page_ref_freeze(page, 3)) { result = SCAN_PAGE_COUNT; - goto out_lru; + xa_unlock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); + putback_lru_page(page); + goto out_unlock; } /* @@ -1448,17 +1448,10 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, slot = radix_tree_iter_resume(slot, &iter); index++; continue; -out_lru: - xa_unlock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); - putback_lru_page(page); -out_isolate_failed: - unlock_page(page); - put_page(page); - goto tree_unlocked; out_unlock: unlock_page(page); put_page(page); - break; + goto tree_unlocked; } /* @@ -1466,7 +1459,7 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, * This code only triggers if there's nothing in radix tree * beyond 'end'. */ - if (result == SCAN_SUCCEED && index < end) { + if (index < end) { int n = end - index; /* Stop if extent has been truncated, and is now empty */ @@ -1478,7 +1471,6 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, result = SCAN_FAIL; goto tree_locked; } - for (; index < end; index++) { radix_tree_insert(&mapping->i_pages, index, new_page + (index % HPAGE_PMD_NR)); @@ -1486,14 +1478,19 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, nr_none += n; } + __inc_node_page_state(new_page, NR_SHMEM_THPS); + if (nr_none) { + struct zone *zone = page_zone(new_page); + + __mod_node_page_state(zone->zone_pgdat, NR_FILE_PAGES, nr_none); + __mod_node_page_state(zone->zone_pgdat, NR_SHMEM, nr_none); + } + tree_locked: xa_unlock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); tree_unlocked: if (result == SCAN_SUCCEED) { - unsigned long flags; - struct zone *zone = page_zone(new_page); - /* * Replacing old pages with new one has succeed, now we need to * copy the content and free old pages. @@ -1507,11 +1504,11 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, copy_highpage(new_page + (page->index % HPAGE_PMD_NR), page); list_del(&page->lru); - unlock_page(page); - page_ref_unfreeze(page, 1); page->mapping = NULL; + page_ref_unfreeze(page, 1); ClearPageActive(page); ClearPageUnevictable(page); + unlock_page(page); put_page(page); index++; } @@ -1520,28 +1517,17 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, index++; } - local_irq_save(flags); - __inc_node_page_state(new_page, NR_SHMEM_THPS); - if (nr_none) { - __mod_node_page_state(zone->zone_pgdat, NR_FILE_PAGES, nr_none); - __mod_node_page_state(zone->zone_pgdat, NR_SHMEM, nr_none); - } - local_irq_restore(flags); - - /* - * Remove pte page tables, so we can re-faulti - * the page as huge. - */ - retract_page_tables(mapping, start); - /* Everything is ready, let's unfreeze the new_page */ - set_page_dirty(new_page); SetPageUptodate(new_page); page_ref_unfreeze(new_page, HPAGE_PMD_NR); + set_page_dirty(new_page); mem_cgroup_commit_charge(new_page, memcg, false, true); lru_cache_add_anon(new_page); - unlock_page(new_page); + /* + * Remove pte page tables, so we can re-fault the page as huge. + */ + retract_page_tables(mapping, start); *hpage = NULL; khugepaged_pages_collapsed++; @@ -1573,8 +1559,8 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, radix_tree_replace_slot(&mapping->i_pages, slot, page); slot = radix_tree_iter_resume(slot, &iter); xa_unlock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); - putback_lru_page(page); unlock_page(page); + putback_lru_page(page); xa_lock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); } VM_BUG_ON(nr_none); @@ -1583,9 +1569,10 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, /* Unfreeze new_page, caller would take care about freeing it */ page_ref_unfreeze(new_page, 1); mem_cgroup_cancel_charge(new_page, memcg, true); - unlock_page(new_page); new_page->mapping = NULL; } + + unlock_page(new_page); out: VM_BUG_ON(!list_empty(&pagelist)); /* TODO: tracepoints */ From af24c01831e4e215473762dd52b6e0003bd5a800 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugh Dickins Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:10:43 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 008/140] mm/khugepaged: collapse_shmem() without freezing new_page commit 87c460a0bded56195b5eb497d44709777ef7b415 upstream. khugepaged's collapse_shmem() does almost all of its work, to assemble the huge new_page from 512 scattered old pages, with the new_page's refcount frozen to 0 (and refcounts of all old pages so far also frozen to 0). Including shmem_getpage() to read in any which were out on swap, memory reclaim if necessary to allocate their intermediate pages, and copying over all the data from old to new. Imagine the frozen refcount as a spinlock held, but without any lock debugging to highlight the abuse: it's not good, and under serious load heads into lockups - speculative getters of the page are not expecting to spin while khugepaged is rescheduled. One can get a little further under load by hacking around elsewhere; but fortunately, freezing the new_page turns out to have been entirely unnecessary, with no hacks needed elsewhere. The huge new_page lock is already held throughout, and guards all its subpages as they are brought one by one into the page cache tree; and anything reading the data in that page, without the lock, before it has been marked PageUptodate, would already be in the wrong. So simply eliminate the freezing of the new_page. Each of the old pages remains frozen with refcount 0 after it has been replaced by a new_page subpage in the page cache tree, until they are all unfrozen on success or failure: just as before. They could be unfrozen sooner, but cause no problem once no longer visible to find_get_entry(), filemap_map_pages() and other speculative lookups. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261527570.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: f3f0e1d2150b2 ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/khugepaged.c | 19 +++++++------------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/khugepaged.c b/mm/khugepaged.c index d0a347e6fd08..e2b13c04626e 100644 --- a/mm/khugepaged.c +++ b/mm/khugepaged.c @@ -1287,7 +1287,7 @@ static void retract_page_tables(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t pgoff) * collapse_shmem - collapse small tmpfs/shmem pages into huge one. * * Basic scheme is simple, details are more complex: - * - allocate and freeze a new huge page; + * - allocate and lock a new huge page; * - scan over radix tree replacing old pages the new one * + swap in pages if necessary; * + fill in gaps; @@ -1295,11 +1295,11 @@ static void retract_page_tables(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t pgoff) * - if replacing succeed: * + copy data over; * + free old pages; - * + unfreeze huge page; + * + unlock huge page; * - if replacing failed; * + put all pages back and unfreeze them; * + restore gaps in the radix-tree; - * + free huge page; + * + unlock and free huge page; */ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t start, @@ -1334,13 +1334,11 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, __SetPageSwapBacked(new_page); new_page->index = start; new_page->mapping = mapping; - BUG_ON(!page_ref_freeze(new_page, 1)); /* - * At this point the new_page is 'frozen' (page_count() is zero), locked - * and not up-to-date. It's safe to insert it into radix tree, because - * nobody would be able to map it or use it in other way until we - * unfreeze it. + * At this point the new_page is locked and not up-to-date. + * It's safe to insert it into the page cache, because nobody would + * be able to map it or use it in another way until we unlock it. */ index = start; @@ -1517,9 +1515,8 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, index++; } - /* Everything is ready, let's unfreeze the new_page */ SetPageUptodate(new_page); - page_ref_unfreeze(new_page, HPAGE_PMD_NR); + page_ref_add(new_page, HPAGE_PMD_NR - 1); set_page_dirty(new_page); mem_cgroup_commit_charge(new_page, memcg, false, true); lru_cache_add_anon(new_page); @@ -1566,8 +1563,6 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, VM_BUG_ON(nr_none); xa_unlock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); - /* Unfreeze new_page, caller would take care about freeing it */ - page_ref_unfreeze(new_page, 1); mem_cgroup_cancel_charge(new_page, memcg, true); new_page->mapping = NULL; } From 8b37c40503eadc6fdbc4619455dc831d041eea15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hugh Dickins Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:10:47 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 009/140] mm/khugepaged: collapse_shmem() do not crash on Compound commit 06a5e1268a5fb9c2b346a3da6b97e85f2eba0f07 upstream. collapse_shmem()'s VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageTransCompound) was unsafe: before it holds page lock of the first page, racing truncation then extension might conceivably have inserted a hugepage there already. Fail with the SCAN_PAGE_COMPOUND result, instead of crashing (CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y) or otherwise mishandling the unexpected hugepage - though later we might code up a more constructive way of handling it, with SCAN_SUCCESS. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1811261529310.2275@eggly.anvils Fixes: f3f0e1d2150b2 ("khugepaged: add support of collapse for tmpfs/shmem pages") Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov Cc: Jerome Glisse Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: [4.8+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- mm/khugepaged.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/khugepaged.c b/mm/khugepaged.c index e2b13c04626e..fde5820be24d 100644 --- a/mm/khugepaged.c +++ b/mm/khugepaged.c @@ -1398,7 +1398,15 @@ static void collapse_shmem(struct mm_struct *mm, */ VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(page), page); VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageUptodate(page), page); - VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(PageTransCompound(page), page); + + /* + * If file was truncated then extended, or hole-punched, before + * we locked the first page, then a THP might be there already. + */ + if (PageTransCompound(page)) { + result = SCAN_PAGE_COMPOUND; + goto out_unlock; + } if (page_mapping(page) != mapping) { result = SCAN_TRUNCATED; From 767d890331ea90a4776bd80669b5b849c21c43ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryan Whitehead Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 12:27:10 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 010/140] lan743x: Enable driver to work with LAN7431 [ Upstream commit 4df5ce9bc03e47d05f400e64aa32a82ec4cef419 ] This driver was designed to work with both LAN7430 and LAN7431. The only difference between the two is the LAN7431 has support for external phy. This change adds LAN7431 to the list of recognized devices supported by this driver. Updates for v2: changed 'fixes' tag to match defined format fixes: 23f0703c125b ("lan743x: Add main source files for new lan743x driver") Signed-off-by: Bryan Whitehead Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c index 001b5f714c1b..a151544a7fa9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c @@ -3020,6 +3020,7 @@ static const struct dev_pm_ops lan743x_pm_ops = { static const struct pci_device_id lan743x_pcidev_tbl[] = { { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SMSC, PCI_DEVICE_ID_SMSC_LAN7430) }, + { PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_SMSC, PCI_DEVICE_ID_SMSC_LAN7431) }, { 0, } }; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h index 0e82b6368798..2d6eea18973e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h @@ -548,6 +548,7 @@ struct lan743x_adapter; /* SMSC acquired EFAR late 1990's, MCHP acquired SMSC 2012 */ #define PCI_VENDOR_ID_SMSC PCI_VENDOR_ID_EFAR #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_SMSC_LAN7430 (0x7430) +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_SMSC_LAN7431 (0x7431) #define PCI_CONFIG_LENGTH (0x1000) From 18dd9bf513258d888409e7292efb42b3500d37e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bryan Whitehead Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 12:04:57 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 011/140] lan743x: fix return value for lan743x_tx_napi_poll [ Upstream commit cc5922054131f9abefdc0622ae64fc55e6b2671d ] The lan743x driver, when under heavy traffic load, has been noticed to sometimes hang, or cause a kernel panic. Debugging reveals that the TX napi poll routine was returning the wrong value, 'weight'. Most other drivers return 0. And call napi_complete, instead of napi_complete_done. Additionally when creating the tx napi poll routine. Changed netif_napi_add, to netif_tx_napi_add. Updates for v3: changed 'fixes' tag to match defined format Updates for v2: use napi_complete, instead of napi_complete_done in lan743x_tx_napi_poll use netif_tx_napi_add, instead of netif_napi_add for registration of tx napi poll routine fixes: 23f0703c125b ("lan743x: Add main source files for new lan743x driver") Signed-off-by: Bryan Whitehead Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c index a151544a7fa9..aaedf1072460 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c @@ -1675,7 +1675,7 @@ static int lan743x_tx_napi_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int weight) netif_wake_queue(adapter->netdev); } - if (!napi_complete_done(napi, weight)) + if (!napi_complete(napi)) goto done; /* enable isr */ @@ -1684,7 +1684,7 @@ static int lan743x_tx_napi_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int weight) lan743x_csr_read(adapter, INT_STS); done: - return weight; + return 0; } static void lan743x_tx_ring_cleanup(struct lan743x_tx *tx) @@ -1873,9 +1873,9 @@ static int lan743x_tx_open(struct lan743x_tx *tx) tx->vector_flags = lan743x_intr_get_vector_flags(adapter, INT_BIT_DMA_TX_ (tx->channel_number)); - netif_napi_add(adapter->netdev, - &tx->napi, lan743x_tx_napi_poll, - tx->ring_size - 1); + netif_tx_napi_add(adapter->netdev, + &tx->napi, lan743x_tx_napi_poll, + tx->ring_size - 1); napi_enable(&tx->napi); data = 0; From b24a813e792de507982b97a3dfdbe450ec2d50b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paolo Abeni Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 18:21:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 012/140] net: don't keep lonely packets forever in the gro hash [ Upstream commit 605108acfe6233b72e2f803aa1cb59a2af3001ca ] Eric noted that with UDP GRO and NAPI timeout, we could keep a single UDP packet inside the GRO hash forever, if the related NAPI instance calls napi_gro_complete() at an higher frequency than the NAPI timeout. Willem noted that even TCP packets could be trapped there, till the next retransmission. This patch tries to address the issue, flushing the old packets - those with a NAPI_GRO_CB age before the current jiffy - before scheduling the NAPI timeout. The rationale is that such a timeout should be well below a jiffy and we are not flushing packets eligible for sane GRO. v1 -> v2: - clarified the commit message and comment RFC -> v1: - added 'Fixes tags', cleaned-up the wording. Reported-by: Eric Dumazet Fixes: 3b47d30396ba ("net: gro: add a per device gro flush timer") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn Acked-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/core/dev.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 097c02101450..22af88c47756 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -5945,11 +5945,14 @@ bool napi_complete_done(struct napi_struct *n, int work_done) if (work_done) timeout = n->dev->gro_flush_timeout; + /* When the NAPI instance uses a timeout and keeps postponing + * it, we need to bound somehow the time packets are kept in + * the GRO layer + */ + napi_gro_flush(n, !!timeout); if (timeout) hrtimer_start(&n->timer, ns_to_ktime(timeout), HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED); - else - napi_gro_flush(n, false); } if (unlikely(!list_empty(&n->poll_list))) { /* If n->poll_list is not empty, we need to mask irqs */ From cfbee9e96d7916d3e228da3bd3340b7267c9eb8c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Fiedler Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2018 00:16:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 013/140] net: gemini: Fix copy/paste error [ Upstream commit 07093b76476903f820d83d56c3040e656fb4d9e3 ] The TX stats should be started with the tx_stats_syncp, there seems to be a copy/paste error in the driver. Signed-off-by: Andreas Fiedler Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c index 1c9ad3630c77..dfd1ad0b1cb9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cortina/gemini.c @@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static void gmac_clean_txq(struct net_device *netdev, struct gmac_txq *txq, u64_stats_update_begin(&port->tx_stats_syncp); port->tx_frag_stats[nfrags]++; - u64_stats_update_end(&port->ir_stats_syncp); + u64_stats_update_end(&port->tx_stats_syncp); } } From abc963e459fd499c83b6e1af2987be1038e12d29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lorenzo Bianconi Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2018 18:28:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 014/140] net: thunderx: set tso_hdrs pointer to NULL in nicvf_free_snd_queue [ Upstream commit ef2a7cf1d8831535b8991459567b385661eb4a36 ] Reset snd_queue tso_hdrs pointer to NULL in nicvf_free_snd_queue routine since it is used to check if tso dma descriptor queue has been previously allocated. The issue can be triggered with the following reproducer: $ip link set dev enP2p1s0v0 xdpdrv obj xdp_dummy.o $ip link set dev enP2p1s0v0 xdpdrv off [ 341.467649] WARNING: CPU: 74 PID: 2158 at mm/vmalloc.c:1511 __vunmap+0x98/0xe0 [ 341.515010] Hardware name: GIGABYTE H270-T70/MT70-HD0, BIOS T49 02/02/2018 [ 341.521874] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [ 341.526654] pc : __vunmap+0x98/0xe0 [ 341.530132] lr : __vunmap+0x98/0xe0 [ 341.533609] sp : ffff00001c5db860 [ 341.536913] x29: ffff00001c5db860 x28: 0000000000020000 [ 341.542214] x27: ffff810feb5090b0 x26: ffff000017e57000 [ 341.547515] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000fbd00000 [ 341.552816] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff810feb5090b0 [ 341.558117] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000 [ 341.563418] x19: ffff000017e57000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 341.568719] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 341.574020] x15: 0000000000000010 x14: ffffffffffffffff [ 341.579321] x13: ffff00008985eb27 x12: ffff00000985eb2f [ 341.584622] x11: ffff0000096b3000 x10: ffff00001c5db510 [ 341.589923] x9 : 00000000ffffffd0 x8 : ffff0000086868e8 [ 341.595224] x7 : 3430303030303030 x6 : 00000000000006ef [ 341.600525] x5 : 00000000003fffff x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 341.605825] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffffffffffffffff [ 341.611126] x1 : ffff0000096b3728 x0 : 0000000000000038 [ 341.616428] Call trace: [ 341.618866] __vunmap+0x98/0xe0 [ 341.621997] vunmap+0x3c/0x50 [ 341.624961] arch_dma_free+0x68/0xa0 [ 341.628534] dma_direct_free+0x50/0x80 [ 341.632285] nicvf_free_resources+0x160/0x2d8 [nicvf] [ 341.637327] nicvf_config_data_transfer+0x174/0x5e8 [nicvf] [ 341.642890] nicvf_stop+0x298/0x340 [nicvf] [ 341.647066] __dev_close_many+0x9c/0x108 [ 341.650977] dev_close_many+0xa4/0x158 [ 341.654720] rollback_registered_many+0x140/0x530 [ 341.659414] rollback_registered+0x54/0x80 [ 341.663499] unregister_netdevice_queue+0x9c/0xe8 [ 341.668192] unregister_netdev+0x28/0x38 [ 341.672106] nicvf_remove+0xa4/0xa8 [nicvf] [ 341.676280] nicvf_shutdown+0x20/0x30 [nicvf] [ 341.680630] pci_device_shutdown+0x44/0x88 [ 341.684720] device_shutdown+0x144/0x250 [ 341.688640] kernel_restart_prepare+0x44/0x50 [ 341.692986] kernel_restart+0x20/0x68 [ 341.696638] __se_sys_reboot+0x210/0x238 [ 341.700550] __arm64_sys_reboot+0x24/0x30 [ 341.704555] el0_svc_handler+0x94/0x110 [ 341.708382] el0_svc+0x8/0xc [ 341.711252] ---[ end trace 3f4019c8439959c9 ]--- [ 341.715874] page:ffff7e0003ef4000 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x4 [ 341.723872] flags: 0x1fffe000000000() [ 341.727527] raw: 001fffe000000000 ffff7e0003f1a008 ffff7e0003ef4048 0000000000000000 [ 341.735263] raw: 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 341.742994] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page_ref_count(page) == 0) where xdp_dummy.c is a simple bpf program that forwards the incoming frames to the network stack (available here: https://github.com/altoor/xdp_walkthrough_examples/blob/master/sample_1/xdp_dummy.c) Fixes: 05c773f52b96 ("net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support") Fixes: 4863dea3fab0 ("net: Adding support for Cavium ThunderX network controller") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_queues.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_queues.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_queues.c index 187a249ff2d1..fcaf18fa3904 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_queues.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_queues.c @@ -585,10 +585,12 @@ static void nicvf_free_snd_queue(struct nicvf *nic, struct snd_queue *sq) if (!sq->dmem.base) return; - if (sq->tso_hdrs) + if (sq->tso_hdrs) { dma_free_coherent(&nic->pdev->dev, sq->dmem.q_len * TSO_HEADER_SIZE, sq->tso_hdrs, sq->tso_hdrs_phys); + sq->tso_hdrs = NULL; + } /* Free pending skbs in the queue */ smp_rmb(); From f2a67e68dbaeae7c88e5522873d7b908911f9f77 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willem de Bruijn Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 13:00:18 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 015/140] packet: copy user buffers before orphan or clone [ Upstream commit 5cd8d46ea1562be80063f53c7c6a5f40224de623 ] tpacket_snd sends packets with user pages linked into skb frags. It notifies that pages can be reused when the skb is released by setting skb->destructor to tpacket_destruct_skb. This can cause data corruption if the skb is orphaned (e.g., on transmit through veth) or cloned (e.g., on mirror to another psock). Create a kernel-private copy of data in these cases, same as tun/tap zerocopy transmission. Reuse that infrastructure: mark the skb as SKBTX_ZEROCOPY_FRAG, which will trigger copy in skb_orphan_frags(_rx). Unlike other zerocopy packets, do not set shinfo destructor_arg to struct ubuf_info. tpacket_destruct_skb already uses that ptr to notify when the original skb is released and a timestamp is recorded. Do not change this timestamp behavior. The ubuf_info->callback is not needed anyway, as no zerocopy notification is expected. Mark destructor_arg as not-a-uarg by setting the lower bit to 1. The resulting value is not a valid ubuf_info pointer, nor a valid tpacket_snd frame address. Add skb_zcopy_.._nouarg helpers for this. The fix relies on features introduced in commit 52267790ef52 ("sock: add MSG_ZEROCOPY"), so can be backported as is only to 4.14. Tested with from `./in_netns.sh ./txring_overwrite` from http://github.com/wdebruij/kerneltools/tests Fixes: 69e3c75f4d54 ("net: TX_RING and packet mmap") Reported-by: Anand H. Krishnan Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/skbuff.h | 18 +++++++++++++++++- net/packet/af_packet.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h index 17a13e4785fc..e6ef9cc05e60 100644 --- a/include/linux/skbuff.h +++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h @@ -1311,6 +1311,22 @@ static inline void skb_zcopy_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ubuf_info *uarg) } } +static inline void skb_zcopy_set_nouarg(struct sk_buff *skb, void *val) +{ + skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg = (void *)((uintptr_t) val | 0x1UL); + skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags |= SKBTX_ZEROCOPY_FRAG; +} + +static inline bool skb_zcopy_is_nouarg(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return (uintptr_t) skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg & 0x1UL; +} + +static inline void *skb_zcopy_get_nouarg(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + return (void *)((uintptr_t) skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg & ~0x1UL); +} + /* Release a reference on a zerocopy structure */ static inline void skb_zcopy_clear(struct sk_buff *skb, bool zerocopy) { @@ -1320,7 +1336,7 @@ static inline void skb_zcopy_clear(struct sk_buff *skb, bool zerocopy) if (uarg->callback == sock_zerocopy_callback) { uarg->zerocopy = uarg->zerocopy && zerocopy; sock_zerocopy_put(uarg); - } else { + } else if (!skb_zcopy_is_nouarg(skb)) { uarg->callback(uarg, zerocopy); } diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c index d6e94dc7e290..6477b131e809 100644 --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -2394,7 +2394,7 @@ static void tpacket_destruct_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) void *ph; __u32 ts; - ph = skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg; + ph = skb_zcopy_get_nouarg(skb); packet_dec_pending(&po->tx_ring); ts = __packet_set_timestamp(po, ph, skb); @@ -2461,7 +2461,7 @@ static int tpacket_fill_skb(struct packet_sock *po, struct sk_buff *skb, skb->mark = po->sk.sk_mark; skb->tstamp = sockc->transmit_time; sock_tx_timestamp(&po->sk, sockc->tsflags, &skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags); - skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg = ph.raw; + skb_zcopy_set_nouarg(skb, ph.raw); skb_reserve(skb, hlen); skb_reset_network_header(skb); From 720e0d05af0f85715026f2344b22f418b4d03bbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pan Bian Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2018 14:53:19 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 016/140] rapidio/rionet: do not free skb before reading its length [ Upstream commit cfc435198f53a6fa1f656d98466b24967ff457d0 ] skb is freed via dev_kfree_skb_any, however, skb->len is read then. This may result in a use-after-free bug. Fixes: e6161d64263 ("rapidio/rionet: rework driver initialization and removal") Signed-off-by: Pan Bian Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/rionet.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/rionet.c b/drivers/net/rionet.c index e9f101c9bae2..bfbb39f93554 100644 --- a/drivers/net/rionet.c +++ b/drivers/net/rionet.c @@ -216,9 +216,9 @@ static int rionet_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *ndev) * it just report sending a packet to the target * (without actual packet transfer). */ - dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); ndev->stats.tx_packets++; ndev->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len; + dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); } } From 711e3d37275c40bb07f538c40048a2ee34f34f70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Julian Wiedmann Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2018 16:20:50 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 017/140] s390/qeth: fix length check in SNMP processing [ Upstream commit 9a764c1e59684c0358e16ccaafd870629f2cfe67 ] The response for a SNMP request can consist of multiple parts, which the cmd callback stages into a kernel buffer until all parts have been received. If the callback detects that the staging buffer provides insufficient space, it bails out with error. This processing is buggy for the first part of the response - while it initially checks for a length of 'data_len', it later copies an additional amount of 'offsetof(struct qeth_snmp_cmd, data)' bytes. Fix the calculation of 'data_len' for the first part of the response. This also nicely cleans up the memcpy code. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann Reviewed-by: Ursula Braun Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c | 27 ++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c index ffce6f39828a..b03515d43745 100644 --- a/drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c +++ b/drivers/s390/net/qeth_core_main.c @@ -4524,8 +4524,8 @@ static int qeth_snmp_command_cb(struct qeth_card *card, { struct qeth_ipa_cmd *cmd; struct qeth_arp_query_info *qinfo; - struct qeth_snmp_cmd *snmp; unsigned char *data; + void *snmp_data; __u16 data_len; QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 3, "snpcmdcb"); @@ -4533,7 +4533,6 @@ static int qeth_snmp_command_cb(struct qeth_card *card, cmd = (struct qeth_ipa_cmd *) sdata; data = (unsigned char *)((char *)cmd - reply->offset); qinfo = (struct qeth_arp_query_info *) reply->param; - snmp = &cmd->data.setadapterparms.data.snmp; if (cmd->hdr.return_code) { QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 4, "scer1%x", cmd->hdr.return_code); @@ -4546,10 +4545,15 @@ static int qeth_snmp_command_cb(struct qeth_card *card, return 0; } data_len = *((__u16 *)QETH_IPA_PDU_LEN_PDU1(data)); - if (cmd->data.setadapterparms.hdr.seq_no == 1) - data_len -= (__u16)((char *)&snmp->data - (char *)cmd); - else - data_len -= (__u16)((char *)&snmp->request - (char *)cmd); + if (cmd->data.setadapterparms.hdr.seq_no == 1) { + snmp_data = &cmd->data.setadapterparms.data.snmp; + data_len -= offsetof(struct qeth_ipa_cmd, + data.setadapterparms.data.snmp); + } else { + snmp_data = &cmd->data.setadapterparms.data.snmp.request; + data_len -= offsetof(struct qeth_ipa_cmd, + data.setadapterparms.data.snmp.request); + } /* check if there is enough room in userspace */ if ((qinfo->udata_len - qinfo->udata_offset) < data_len) { @@ -4562,16 +4566,9 @@ static int qeth_snmp_command_cb(struct qeth_card *card, QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 4, "sseqn%i", cmd->data.setadapterparms.hdr.seq_no); /*copy entries to user buffer*/ - if (cmd->data.setadapterparms.hdr.seq_no == 1) { - memcpy(qinfo->udata + qinfo->udata_offset, - (char *)snmp, - data_len + offsetof(struct qeth_snmp_cmd, data)); - qinfo->udata_offset += offsetof(struct qeth_snmp_cmd, data); - } else { - memcpy(qinfo->udata + qinfo->udata_offset, - (char *)&snmp->request, data_len); - } + memcpy(qinfo->udata + qinfo->udata_offset, snmp_data, data_len); qinfo->udata_offset += data_len; + /* check if all replies received ... */ QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 4, "srtot%i", cmd->data.setadapterparms.hdr.used_total); From 535b494a4fa570895dc49f5b7e6ab05f4a713a82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bernd Eckstein <3erndeckstein@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2018 13:51:26 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 018/140] usbnet: ipheth: fix potential recvmsg bug and recvmsg bug 2 [ Upstream commit 45611c61dd503454b2edae00aabe1e429ec49ebe ] The bug is not easily reproducable, as it may occur very infrequently (we had machines with 20minutes heavy downloading before it occurred) However, on a virual machine (VMWare on Windows 10 host) it occurred pretty frequently (1-2 seconds after a speedtest was started) dev->tx_skb mab be freed via dev_kfree_skb_irq on a callback before it is set. This causes the following problems: - double free of the skb or potential memory leak - in dmesg: 'recvmsg bug' and 'recvmsg bug 2' and eventually general protection fault Example dmesg output: [ 134.841986] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 134.841987] recvmsg bug: copied 9C24A555 seq 9C24B557 rcvnxt 9C25A6B3 fl 0 [ 134.841993] WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 2629 at /build/linux-hwe-On9fm7/linux-hwe-4.15.0/net/ipv4/tcp.c:1865 tcp_recvmsg+0x44d/0xab0 [ 134.841994] Modules linked in: ipheth(OE) kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf joydev input_leds serio_raw vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock shpchp i2c_piix4 mac_hid binfmt_misc vmw_vmci parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 vmw_pvscsi vmxnet3 hid_generic usbhid hid vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mptspi mptscsih sysimgblt ahci psmouse fb_sys_fops pata_acpi mptbase libahci e1000 drm scsi_transport_spi [ 134.842046] CPU: 7 PID: 2629 Comm: python Tainted: G W OE 4.15.0-34-generic #37~16.04.1-Ubuntu [ 134.842046] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017 [ 134.842048] RIP: 0010:tcp_recvmsg+0x44d/0xab0 [ 134.842048] RSP: 0018:ffffa6630422bcc8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 134.842049] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff997616f4f200 RCX: 0000000000000006 [ 134.842049] RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: 0000000000000082 RDI: ffff9976257d6490 [ 134.842050] RBP: ffffa6630422bd98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 000000000004bba4 [ 134.842050] R10: 0000000001e00c6f R11: 000000000004bba4 R12: ffff99760dee3000 [ 134.842051] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff99760dee3514 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 134.842051] FS: 00007fe332347700(0000) GS:ffff9976257c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 134.842052] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 134.842053] CR2: 0000000001e41000 CR3: 000000020e9b4006 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 134.842055] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 134.842055] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 134.842057] Call Trace: [ 134.842060] ? aa_sk_perm+0x53/0x1a0 [ 134.842064] inet_recvmsg+0x51/0xc0 [ 134.842066] sock_recvmsg+0x43/0x50 [ 134.842070] SYSC_recvfrom+0xe4/0x160 [ 134.842072] ? __schedule+0x3de/0x8b0 [ 134.842075] ? ktime_get_ts64+0x4c/0xf0 [ 134.842079] SyS_recvfrom+0xe/0x10 [ 134.842082] do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130 [ 134.842086] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 [ 134.842086] RIP: 0033:0x7fe331f5a81d [ 134.842088] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8da98398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d [ 134.842090] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: 00007fe331f5a81d [ 134.842094] RDX: 00000000000003fb RSI: 0000000001e00874 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 134.842095] RBP: 00007fe32f642c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 134.842097] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe332347698 [ 134.842099] R13: 0000000001b7e0a0 R14: 0000000001e00874 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 134.842103] Code: 24 fd ff ff e9 cc fe ff ff 48 89 d8 41 8b 8c 24 10 05 00 00 44 8b 45 80 48 c7 c7 08 bd 59 8b 48 89 85 68 ff ff ff e8 b3 c4 7d ff <0f> 0b 48 8b 85 68 ff ff ff e9 e9 fe ff ff 41 8b 8c 24 10 05 00 [ 134.842126] ---[ end trace b7138fc08c83147f ]--- [ 134.842144] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 134.842145] Modules linked in: ipheth(OE) kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd vmw_balloon intel_rapl_perf joydev input_leds serio_raw vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock shpchp i2c_piix4 mac_hid binfmt_misc vmw_vmci parport_pc ppdev lp parport autofs4 vmw_pvscsi vmxnet3 hid_generic usbhid hid vmwgfx ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect mptspi mptscsih sysimgblt ahci psmouse fb_sys_fops pata_acpi mptbase libahci e1000 drm scsi_transport_spi [ 134.842161] CPU: 7 PID: 2629 Comm: python Tainted: G W OE 4.15.0-34-generic #37~16.04.1-Ubuntu [ 134.842162] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017 [ 134.842164] RIP: 0010:tcp_close+0x2c6/0x440 [ 134.842165] RSP: 0018:ffffa6630422bde8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 134.842167] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff99760dee3000 RCX: 0000000180400034 [ 134.842168] RDX: 5c4afd407207a6c4 RSI: ffffe868495bd300 RDI: ffff997616f4f200 [ 134.842169] RBP: ffffa6630422be08 R08: 0000000016f4d401 R09: 0000000180400034 [ 134.842169] R10: ffffa6630422bd98 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000600c [ 134.842170] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff99760dee30c8 R15: ffff9975bd44fe00 [ 134.842171] FS: 00007fe332347700(0000) GS:ffff9976257c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 134.842173] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 134.842174] CR2: 0000000001e41000 CR3: 000000020e9b4006 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 134.842177] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 134.842178] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 134.842179] Call Trace: [ 134.842181] inet_release+0x42/0x70 [ 134.842183] __sock_release+0x42/0xb0 [ 134.842184] sock_close+0x15/0x20 [ 134.842187] __fput+0xea/0x220 [ 134.842189] ____fput+0xe/0x10 [ 134.842191] task_work_run+0x8a/0xb0 [ 134.842193] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xc4/0xd0 [ 134.842195] do_syscall_64+0xf4/0x130 [ 134.842197] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2 [ 134.842197] RIP: 0033:0x7fe331f5a560 [ 134.842198] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8da982e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000003 [ 134.842200] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00007fe32f642c70 RCX: 00007fe331f5a560 [ 134.842201] RDX: 00000000008f5320 RSI: 0000000001cd4b50 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 134.842202] RBP: 00007fe32f6500f8 R08: 000000000000003c R09: 00000000009343c0 [ 134.842203] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe32f6500d0 [ 134.842204] R13: 00000000008f5320 R14: 00000000008f5320 R15: 0000000001cd4770 [ 134.842205] Code: c8 00 00 00 45 31 e4 49 39 fe 75 4d eb 50 83 ab d8 00 00 00 01 48 8b 17 48 8b 47 08 48 c7 07 00 00 00 00 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 <48> 89 42 08 48 89 10 0f b6 57 34 8b 47 2c 2b 47 28 83 e2 01 80 [ 134.842226] RIP: tcp_close+0x2c6/0x440 RSP: ffffa6630422bde8 [ 134.842227] ---[ end trace b7138fc08c831480 ]--- The proposed patch eliminates a potential racing condition. Before, usb_submit_urb was called and _after_ that, the skb was attached (dev->tx_skb). So, on a callback it was possible, however unlikely that the skb was freed before it was set. That way (because dev->tx_skb was not set to NULL after it was freed), it could happen that a skb from a earlier transmission was freed a second time (and the skb we should have freed did not get freed at all) Now we free the skb directly in ipheth_tx(). It is not passed to the callback anymore, eliminating the posibility of a double free of the same skb. Depending on the retval of usb_submit_urb() we use dev_kfree_skb_any() respectively dev_consume_skb_any() to free the skb. Signed-off-by: Oliver Zweigle Signed-off-by: Bernd Eckstein <3ernd.Eckstein@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/ipheth.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/ipheth.c b/drivers/net/usb/ipheth.c index 7275761a1177..3d8a70d3ea9b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/ipheth.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/ipheth.c @@ -140,7 +140,6 @@ struct ipheth_device { struct usb_device *udev; struct usb_interface *intf; struct net_device *net; - struct sk_buff *tx_skb; struct urb *tx_urb; struct urb *rx_urb; unsigned char *tx_buf; @@ -230,6 +229,7 @@ static void ipheth_rcvbulk_callback(struct urb *urb) case -ENOENT: case -ECONNRESET: case -ESHUTDOWN: + case -EPROTO: return; case 0: break; @@ -281,7 +281,6 @@ static void ipheth_sndbulk_callback(struct urb *urb) dev_err(&dev->intf->dev, "%s: urb status: %d\n", __func__, status); - dev_kfree_skb_irq(dev->tx_skb); if (status == 0) netif_wake_queue(dev->net); else @@ -423,7 +422,7 @@ static int ipheth_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *net) if (skb->len > IPHETH_BUF_SIZE) { WARN(1, "%s: skb too large: %d bytes\n", __func__, skb->len); dev->net->stats.tx_dropped++; - dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb); + dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); return NETDEV_TX_OK; } @@ -443,12 +442,11 @@ static int ipheth_tx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *net) dev_err(&dev->intf->dev, "%s: usb_submit_urb: %d\n", __func__, retval); dev->net->stats.tx_errors++; - dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb); + dev_kfree_skb_any(skb); } else { - dev->tx_skb = skb; - dev->net->stats.tx_packets++; dev->net->stats.tx_bytes += skb->len; + dev_consume_skb_any(skb); netif_stop_queue(net); } From 2f6cfb8e9f5c69657ded5c5bea9dab1c727de66a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lorenzo Bianconi Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 16:32:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 019/140] net: thunderx: set xdp_prog to NULL if bpf_prog_add fails [ Upstream commit 6d0f60b0f8588fd4380ea5df9601e12fddd55ce2 ] Set xdp_prog pointer to NULL if bpf_prog_add fails since that routine reports the error code instead of NULL in case of failure and xdp_prog pointer value is used in the driver to verify if XDP is currently enabled. Moreover report the error code to userspace if nicvf_xdp_setup fails Fixes: 05c773f52b96 ("net: thunderx: Add basic XDP support") Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c index 768f584f8392..88f8a8fa93cd 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c @@ -1784,6 +1784,7 @@ static int nicvf_xdp_setup(struct nicvf *nic, struct bpf_prog *prog) bool if_up = netif_running(nic->netdev); struct bpf_prog *old_prog; bool bpf_attached = false; + int ret = 0; /* For now just support only the usual MTU sized frames */ if (prog && (dev->mtu > 1500)) { @@ -1817,8 +1818,12 @@ static int nicvf_xdp_setup(struct nicvf *nic, struct bpf_prog *prog) if (nic->xdp_prog) { /* Attach BPF program */ nic->xdp_prog = bpf_prog_add(nic->xdp_prog, nic->rx_queues - 1); - if (!IS_ERR(nic->xdp_prog)) + if (!IS_ERR(nic->xdp_prog)) { bpf_attached = true; + } else { + ret = PTR_ERR(nic->xdp_prog); + nic->xdp_prog = NULL; + } } /* Calculate Tx queues needed for XDP and network stack */ @@ -1830,7 +1835,7 @@ static int nicvf_xdp_setup(struct nicvf *nic, struct bpf_prog *prog) netif_trans_update(nic->netdev); } - return 0; + return ret; } static int nicvf_xdp(struct net_device *netdev, struct netdev_bpf *xdp) From 4aaa233c79f69b6ec0ec5ce50e29ab144901838f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Petr Machata Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 11:39:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 020/140] net: skb_scrub_packet(): Scrub offload_fwd_mark [ Upstream commit b5dd186d10ba59e6b5ba60e42b3b083df56df6f3 ] When a packet is trapped and the corresponding SKB marked as already-forwarded, it retains this marking even after it is forwarded across veth links into another bridge. There, since it ingresses the bridge over veth, which doesn't have offload_fwd_mark, it triggers a warning in nbp_switchdev_frame_mark(). Then nbp_switchdev_allowed_egress() decides not to allow egress from this bridge through another veth, because the SKB is already marked, and the mark (of 0) of course matches. Thus the packet is incorrectly blocked. Solve by resetting offload_fwd_mark() in skb_scrub_packet(). That function is called from tunnels and also from veth, and thus catches the cases where traffic is forwarded between bridges and transformed in a way that invalidates the marking. Fixes: 6bc506b4fb06 ("bridge: switchdev: Add forward mark support for stacked devices") Fixes: abf4bb6b63d0 ("skbuff: Add the offload_mr_fwd_mark field") Signed-off-by: Petr Machata Suggested-by: Ido Schimmel Acked-by: Jiri Pirko Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/core/skbuff.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index f817f336595d..abbbd7fd17fe 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -4912,6 +4912,11 @@ void skb_scrub_packet(struct sk_buff *skb, bool xnet) nf_reset(skb); nf_reset_trace(skb); +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_SWITCHDEV + skb->offload_fwd_mark = 0; + skb->offload_mr_fwd_mark = 0; +#endif + if (!xnet) return; From 1af400beef4a51136809a596f454d416065ae9e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Wang Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2018 14:36:30 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 021/140] virtio-net: disable guest csum during XDP set [ Upstream commit e59ff2c49ae16e1d179de679aca81405829aee6c ] We don't disable VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM if XDP was set. This means we can receive partial csumed packets with metadata kept in the vnet_hdr. This may have several side effects: - It could be overridden by header adjustment, thus is might be not correct after XDP processing. - There's no way to pass such metadata information through XDP_REDIRECT to another driver. - XDP does not support checksum offload right now. So simply disable guest csum if possible in this the case of XDP. Fixes: 3f93522ffab2d ("virtio-net: switch off offloads on demand if possible on XDP set") Reported-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer Cc: Pavel Popa Cc: David Ahern Signed-off-by: Jason Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index ddfa3f24204c..9cc51517e16f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static const unsigned long guest_offloads[] = { VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO4, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO6, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_ECN, - VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_UFO + VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_UFO, + VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM }; struct virtnet_stat_desc { @@ -2285,9 +2286,6 @@ static int virtnet_clear_guest_offloads(struct virtnet_info *vi) if (!vi->guest_offloads) return 0; - if (virtio_has_feature(vi->vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM)) - offloads = 1ULL << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM; - return virtnet_set_guest_offloads(vi, offloads); } @@ -2297,8 +2295,6 @@ static int virtnet_restore_guest_offloads(struct virtnet_info *vi) if (!vi->guest_offloads) return 0; - if (virtio_has_feature(vi->vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM)) - offloads |= 1ULL << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM; return virtnet_set_guest_offloads(vi, offloads); } From b06510bf095b11aeb9ec8d54e1150c610e71c8f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jason Wang Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2018 14:36:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 022/140] virtio-net: fail XDP set if guest csum is negotiated [ Upstream commit 18ba58e1c234ea1a2d9835ac8c1735d965ce4640 ] We don't support partial csumed packet since its metadata will be lost or incorrect during XDP processing. So fail the XDP set if guest_csum feature is negotiated. Fixes: f600b6905015 ("virtio_net: Add XDP support") Reported-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer Cc: Pavel Popa Cc: David Ahern Signed-off-by: Jason Wang Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c index 9cc51517e16f..c2ca6cd3fbe0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c +++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c @@ -2312,8 +2312,9 @@ static int virtnet_xdp_set(struct net_device *dev, struct bpf_prog *prog, && (virtio_has_feature(vi->vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO4) || virtio_has_feature(vi->vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO6) || virtio_has_feature(vi->vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_ECN) || - virtio_has_feature(vi->vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_UFO))) { - NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Can't set XDP while host is implementing LRO, disable LRO first"); + virtio_has_feature(vi->vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_UFO) || + virtio_has_feature(vi->vdev, VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM))) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Can't set XDP while host is implementing LRO/CSUM, disable LRO/CSUM first"); return -EOPNOTSUPP; } From b8e076958a0909a9cc4aada9194c7991f12b9f6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tal Gilboa Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 16:28:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 023/140] net/dim: Update DIM start sample after each DIM iteration [ Upstream commit 0211dda68a4f6531923a2f72d8e8959207f59fba ] On every iteration of net_dim, the algorithm may choose to check for the system state by comparing current data sample with previous data sample. After each of these comparison, regardless of the action taken, the sample used as baseline is needed to be updated. This patch fixes a bug that causes DIM to take wrong decisions, due to never updating the baseline sample for comparison between iterations. This way, DIM always compares current sample with zeros. Although this is a functional fix, it also improves and stabilizes performance as the algorithm works properly now. Performance: Tested single UDP TX stream with pktgen: samples/pktgen/pktgen_sample03_burst_single_flow.sh -i p4p2 -d 1.1.1.1 -m 24:8a:07:88:26:8b -f 3 -b 128 ConnectX-5 100GbE packet rate improved from 15-19Mpps to 19-20Mpps. Also, toggling between profiles is less frequent with the fix. Fixes: 8115b750dbcb ("net/dim: use struct net_dim_sample as arg to net_dim") Signed-off-by: Tal Gilboa Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/net_dim.h | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/net_dim.h b/include/linux/net_dim.h index c79e859408e6..fd458389f7d1 100644 --- a/include/linux/net_dim.h +++ b/include/linux/net_dim.h @@ -406,6 +406,8 @@ static inline void net_dim(struct net_dim *dim, } /* fall through */ case NET_DIM_START_MEASURE: + net_dim_sample(end_sample.event_ctr, end_sample.pkt_ctr, end_sample.byte_ctr, + &dim->start_sample); dim->state = NET_DIM_MEASURE_IN_PROGRESS; break; case NET_DIM_APPLY_NEW_PROFILE: From aaa7e45c00d63984aa27250a94b26302983faed0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 05:53:59 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 024/140] tcp: defer SACK compression after DupThresh [ Upstream commit 86de5921a3d5dd246df661e09bdd0a6131b39ae3 ] Jean-Louis reported a TCP regression and bisected to recent SACK compression. After a loss episode (receiver not able to keep up and dropping packets because its backlog is full), linux TCP stack is sending a single SACK (DUPACK). Sender waits a full RTO timer before recovering losses. While RFC 6675 says in section 5, "Algorithm Details", (2) If DupAcks < DupThresh but IsLost (HighACK + 1) returns true -- indicating at least three segments have arrived above the current cumulative acknowledgment point, which is taken to indicate loss -- go to step (4). ... (4) Invoke fast retransmit and enter loss recovery as follows: there are old TCP stacks not implementing this strategy, and still counting the dupacks before starting fast retransmit. While these stacks probably perform poorly when receivers implement LRO/GRO, we should be a little more gentle to them. This patch makes sure we do not enable SACK compression unless 3 dupacks have been sent since last rcv_nxt update. Ideally we should even rearm the timer to send one or two more DUPACK if no more packets are coming, but that will be work aiming for linux-4.21. Many thanks to Jean-Louis for bisecting the issue, providing packet captures and testing this patch. Fixes: 5d9f4262b7ea ("tcp: add SACK compression") Reported-by: Jean-Louis Dupond Tested-by: Jean-Louis Dupond Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Acked-by: Neal Cardwell Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/tcp.h | 1 + net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 6 +++--- net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h index 263e37271afd..d2c8f280e48f 100644 --- a/include/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/linux/tcp.h @@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ struct tcp_sock { u32 rcv_tstamp; /* timestamp of last received ACK (for keepalives) */ u32 lsndtime; /* timestamp of last sent data packet (for restart window) */ u32 last_oow_ack_time; /* timestamp of last out-of-window ACK */ + u32 compressed_ack_rcv_nxt; u32 tsoffset; /* timestamp offset */ diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 72898cbef43d..664fa7d8f7d9 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -4276,7 +4276,7 @@ static void tcp_sack_new_ofo_skb(struct sock *sk, u32 seq, u32 end_seq) * If the sack array is full, forget about the last one. */ if (this_sack >= TCP_NUM_SACKS) { - if (tp->compressed_ack) + if (tp->compressed_ack > TCP_FASTRETRANS_THRESH) tcp_send_ack(sk); this_sack--; tp->rx_opt.num_sacks--; @@ -5196,7 +5196,17 @@ static void __tcp_ack_snd_check(struct sock *sk, int ofo_possible) if (!tcp_is_sack(tp) || tp->compressed_ack >= sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr) goto send_now; - tp->compressed_ack++; + + if (tp->compressed_ack_rcv_nxt != tp->rcv_nxt) { + tp->compressed_ack_rcv_nxt = tp->rcv_nxt; + if (tp->compressed_ack > TCP_FASTRETRANS_THRESH) + NET_ADD_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPACKCOMPRESSED, + tp->compressed_ack - TCP_FASTRETRANS_THRESH); + tp->compressed_ack = 0; + } + + if (++tp->compressed_ack <= TCP_FASTRETRANS_THRESH) + goto send_now; if (hrtimer_is_queued(&tp->compressed_ack_timer)) return; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 597dbd749f05..68f65ddf9e3c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -165,10 +165,10 @@ static inline void tcp_event_ack_sent(struct sock *sk, unsigned int pkts, { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); - if (unlikely(tp->compressed_ack)) { + if (unlikely(tp->compressed_ack > TCP_FASTRETRANS_THRESH)) { NET_ADD_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPACKCOMPRESSED, - tp->compressed_ack); - tp->compressed_ack = 0; + tp->compressed_ack - TCP_FASTRETRANS_THRESH); + tp->compressed_ack = TCP_FASTRETRANS_THRESH; if (hrtimer_try_to_cancel(&tp->compressed_ack_timer) == 1) __sock_put(sk); } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c index 7fdf222a0bdf..57eae8d70ba1 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c @@ -740,7 +740,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart tcp_compressed_ack_kick(struct hrtimer *timer) bh_lock_sock(sk); if (!sock_owned_by_user(sk)) { - if (tp->compressed_ack) + if (tp->compressed_ack > TCP_FASTRETRANS_THRESH) tcp_send_ack(sk); } else { if (!test_and_set_bit(TCP_DELACK_TIMER_DEFERRED, From 38af4b903210b6ed14b09e1f2c33108696a060fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heiner Kallweit Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2018 19:41:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 025/140] net: phy: add workaround for issue where PHY driver doesn't bind to the device [ Upstream commit c85ddecae6e5e82ca3ae6f20c63f1d865e2ff5ea ] After switching the r8169 driver to use phylib some user reported that their network is broken. This was caused by the genphy PHY driver being used instead of the dedicated PHY driver for the RTL8211B. Users reported that loading the Realtek PHY driver module upfront fixes the issue. See also this mail thread: https://marc.info/?t=154279781800003&r=1&w=2 The issue is quite weird and the root cause seems to be somewhere in the base driver core. The patch works around the issue and may be removed once the actual issue is fixed. The Fixes tag refers to the first reported occurrence of the issue. The issue itself may have been existing much longer and it may affect users of other network chips as well. Users typically will recognize this issue only if their PHY stops working when being used with the genphy driver. Fixes: f1e911d5d0df ("r8169: add basic phylib support") Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c b/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c index 19ab8a7d1e48..733e35b7c4bb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c @@ -1930,6 +1930,14 @@ int phy_driver_register(struct phy_driver *new_driver, struct module *owner) new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.remove = phy_remove; new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.owner = owner; + /* The following works around an issue where the PHY driver doesn't bind + * to the device, resulting in the genphy driver being used instead of + * the dedicated driver. The root cause of the issue isn't known yet + * and seems to be in the base driver core. Once this is fixed we may + * remove this workaround. + */ + new_driver->mdiodrv.driver.probe_type = PROBE_FORCE_SYNCHRONOUS; + retval = driver_register(&new_driver->mdiodrv.driver); if (retval) { pr_err("%s: Error %d in registering driver\n", From 4e3fbd7433d7bbeca4db70ae9ecae9bfa688e2a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jon Maloy Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 12:26:14 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 026/140] tipc: fix lockdep warning during node delete [ Upstream commit ec835f891232d7763dea9da0358f31e24ca6dfb7 ] We see the following lockdep warning: [ 2284.078521] ====================================================== [ 2284.078604] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 2284.078604] 4.19.0+ #42 Tainted: G E [ 2284.078604] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 2284.078604] rmmod/254 is trying to acquire lock: [ 2284.078604] 00000000acd94e28 ((&n->timer)#2){+.-.}, at: del_timer_sync+0x5/0xa0 [ 2284.078604] [ 2284.078604] but task is already holding lock: [ 2284.078604] 00000000f997afc0 (&(&tn->node_list_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: tipc_node_stop+0xac/0x190 [tipc] [ 2284.078604] [ 2284.078604] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 2284.078604] [ 2284.078604] [ 2284.078604] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 2284.078604] [ 2284.078604] -> #1 (&(&tn->node_list_lock)->rlock){+.-.}: [ 2284.078604] tipc_node_timeout+0x20a/0x330 [tipc] [ 2284.078604] call_timer_fn+0xa1/0x280 [ 2284.078604] run_timer_softirq+0x1f2/0x4d0 [ 2284.078604] __do_softirq+0xfc/0x413 [ 2284.078604] irq_exit+0xb5/0xc0 [ 2284.078604] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0xac/0x210 [ 2284.078604] apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 [ 2284.078604] default_idle+0x1c/0x140 [ 2284.078604] do_idle+0x1bc/0x280 [ 2284.078604] cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20 [ 2284.078604] start_secondary+0x187/0x1c0 [ 2284.078604] secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 [ 2284.078604] [ 2284.078604] -> #0 ((&n->timer)#2){+.-.}: [ 2284.078604] del_timer_sync+0x34/0xa0 [ 2284.078604] tipc_node_delete+0x1a/0x40 [tipc] [ 2284.078604] tipc_node_stop+0xcb/0x190 [tipc] [ 2284.078604] tipc_net_stop+0x154/0x170 [tipc] [ 2284.078604] tipc_exit_net+0x16/0x30 [tipc] [ 2284.078604] ops_exit_list.isra.8+0x36/0x70 [ 2284.078604] unregister_pernet_operations+0x87/0xd0 [ 2284.078604] unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1d/0x30 [ 2284.078604] tipc_exit+0x11/0x6f2 [tipc] [ 2284.078604] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x1df/0x240 [ 2284.078604] do_syscall_64+0x66/0x460 [ 2284.078604] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 2284.078604] [ 2284.078604] other info that might help us debug this: [ 2284.078604] [ 2284.078604] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 2284.078604] [ 2284.078604] CPU0 CPU1 [ 2284.078604] ---- ---- [ 2284.078604] lock(&(&tn->node_list_lock)->rlock); [ 2284.078604] lock((&n->timer)#2); [ 2284.078604] lock(&(&tn->node_list_lock)->rlock); [ 2284.078604] lock((&n->timer)#2); [ 2284.078604] [ 2284.078604] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 2284.078604] [ 2284.078604] 3 locks held by rmmod/254: [ 2284.078604] #0: 000000003368be9b (pernet_ops_rwsem){+.+.}, at: unregister_pernet_subsys+0x15/0x30 [ 2284.078604] #1: 0000000046ed9c86 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: tipc_net_stop+0x144/0x170 [tipc] [ 2284.078604] #2: 00000000f997afc0 (&(&tn->node_list_lock)->rlock){+.-.}, at: tipc_node_stop+0xac/0x19 [...} The reason is that the node timer handler sometimes needs to delete a node which has been disconnected for too long. To do this, it grabs the lock 'node_list_lock', which may at the same time be held by the generic node cleanup function, tipc_node_stop(), during module removal. Since the latter is calling del_timer_sync() inside the same lock, we have a potential deadlock. We fix this letting the timer cleanup function use spin_trylock() instead of just spin_lock(), and when it fails to grab the lock it just returns so that the timer handler can terminate its execution. This is safe to do, since tipc_node_stop() anyway is about to delete both the timer and the node instance. Fixes: 6a939f365bdb ("tipc: Auto removal of peer down node instance") Acked-by: Ying Xue Signed-off-by: Jon Maloy Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/tipc/node.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c index 2afc4f8c37a7..488019766433 100644 --- a/net/tipc/node.c +++ b/net/tipc/node.c @@ -584,12 +584,15 @@ static void tipc_node_clear_links(struct tipc_node *node) /* tipc_node_cleanup - delete nodes that does not * have active links for NODE_CLEANUP_AFTER time */ -static int tipc_node_cleanup(struct tipc_node *peer) +static bool tipc_node_cleanup(struct tipc_node *peer) { struct tipc_net *tn = tipc_net(peer->net); bool deleted = false; - spin_lock_bh(&tn->node_list_lock); + /* If lock held by tipc_node_stop() the node will be deleted anyway */ + if (!spin_trylock_bh(&tn->node_list_lock)) + return false; + tipc_node_write_lock(peer); if (!node_is_up(peer) && time_after(jiffies, peer->delete_at)) { From b07fc04c94e3ac96437d7b0ae16f70a0ef574b91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Kosina Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2018 14:38:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 027/140] x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation commit 53c613fe6349994f023245519265999eed75957f upstream STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature (once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by indirect branch predictors. Enable this feature if - the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2 - the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online - spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default) After some previous discussion, this leaves STIBP on all the time, as wrmsr on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later be a bit more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with disabling it in idle, etc) if needed. Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a little bit more future-proof. Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Tim Chen Cc: "SchauflerCasey" Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438240.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- kernel/cpu.c | 11 +++++++- 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 40bdaea97fe7..53eb14a65610 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -35,12 +35,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); -/* - * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any - * writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set. - */ -u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base; +/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */ +u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base); +static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex); /* * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in @@ -325,6 +323,46 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return cmd; } +static bool stibp_needed(void) +{ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE) + return false; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static void update_stibp_msr(void *info) +{ + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); +} + +void arch_smt_update(void) +{ + u64 mask; + + if (!stibp_needed()) + return; + + mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); + mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base; + if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED) + mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; + else + mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; + + if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) { + pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n", + cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? + "Enabling" : "Disabling"); + x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask; + on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1); + } + mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); +} + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -424,6 +462,9 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } + + /* Enable STIBP if appropriate */ + arch_smt_update(); } #undef pr_fmt @@ -814,6 +855,8 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { + int ret; + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); @@ -831,10 +874,12 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2: - return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", + (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "", spectre_v2_module_string()); + return ret; case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]); diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c index 0097acec1c71..3adecda21444 100644 --- a/kernel/cpu.c +++ b/kernel/cpu.c @@ -2026,6 +2026,12 @@ static void cpuhp_online_cpu_device(unsigned int cpu) kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_ONLINE); } +/* + * Architectures that need SMT-specific errata handling during SMT hotplug + * should override this. + */ +void __weak arch_smt_update(void) { }; + static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval) { int cpu, ret = 0; @@ -2052,8 +2058,10 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval) */ cpuhp_offline_cpu_device(cpu); } - if (!ret) + if (!ret) { cpu_smt_control = ctrlval; + arch_smt_update(); + } cpu_maps_update_done(); return ret; } @@ -2064,6 +2072,7 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_enable(void) cpu_maps_update_begin(); cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_ENABLED; + arch_smt_update(); for_each_present_cpu(cpu) { /* Skip online CPUs and CPUs on offline nodes */ if (cpu_online(cpu) || !node_online(cpu_to_node(cpu))) From cacd9385b78dca803be8106b6f7f0bfe51fdeec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Kosina Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2018 14:38:18 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 028/140] x86/speculation: Apply IBPB more strictly to avoid cross-process data leak commit dbfe2953f63c640463c630746cd5d9de8b2f63ae upstream Currently, IBPB is only issued in cases when switching into a non-dumpable process, the rationale being to protect such 'important and security sensitive' processess (such as GPG) from data leaking into a different userspace process via spectre v2. This is however completely insufficient to provide proper userspace-to-userpace spectrev2 protection, as any process can poison branch buffers before being scheduled out, and the newly scheduled process immediately becomes spectrev2 victim. In order to minimize the performance impact (for usecases that do require spectrev2 protection), issue the barrier only in cases when switching between processess where the victim can't be ptraced by the potential attacker (as in such cases, the attacker doesn't have to bother with branch buffers at all). [ tglx: Split up PTRACE_MODE_NOACCESS_CHK into PTRACE_MODE_SCHED and PTRACE_MODE_IBPB to be able to do ptrace() context tracking reasonably fine-grained ] Fixes: 18bf3c3ea8 ("x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch") Originally-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: "SchauflerCasey" Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251437340.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++----------- include/linux/ptrace.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/ptrace.c | 10 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index e96b99eb800c..073b8df349a0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -180,6 +181,19 @@ static void sync_current_stack_to_mm(struct mm_struct *mm) } } +static bool ibpb_needed(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 last_ctx_id) +{ + /* + * Check if the current (previous) task has access to the memory + * of the @tsk (next) task. If access is denied, make sure to + * issue a IBPB to stop user->user Spectre-v2 attacks. + * + * Note: __ptrace_may_access() returns 0 or -ERRNO. + */ + return (tsk && tsk->mm && tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id && + ptrace_may_access_sched(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_SPEC_IBPB)); +} + void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, struct task_struct *tsk) { @@ -262,18 +276,13 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, * one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another. * * As an optimization, flush indirect branches only when - * switching into processes that disable dumping. This - * protects high value processes like gpg, without having - * too high performance overhead. IBPB is *expensive*! - * - * This will not flush branches when switching into kernel - * threads. It will also not flush if we switch to idle - * thread and back to the same process. It will flush if we - * switch to a different non-dumpable process. + * switching into a processes that can't be ptrace by the + * current one (as in such case, attacker has much more + * convenient way how to tamper with the next process than + * branch buffer poisoning). */ - if (tsk && tsk->mm && - tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id && - get_dumpable(tsk->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) && + ibpb_needed(tsk, last_ctx_id)) indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) { diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h index 4f36431c380b..e5e5ef513df3 100644 --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h @@ -62,14 +62,17 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead); #define PTRACE_MODE_READ 0x01 #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH 0x02 #define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT 0x04 -#define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS 0x08 -#define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS 0x10 +#define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS 0x08 +#define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS 0x10 +#define PTRACE_MODE_SCHED 0x20 +#define PTRACE_MODE_IBPB 0x40 /* shorthands for READ/ATTACH and FSCREDS/REALCREDS combinations */ #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS) +#define PTRACE_MODE_SPEC_IBPB (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS | PTRACE_MODE_IBPB) /** * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access @@ -87,6 +90,20 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead); */ extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode); +/** + * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access + * a target task. + * @task: target task + * @mode: selects type of access and caller credentials + * + * Returns true on success, false on denial. + * + * Similar to ptrace_may_access(). Only to be called from context switch + * code. Does not call into audit and the regular LSM hooks due to locking + * constraints. + */ +extern bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode); + static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child) { return !same_thread_group(child->real_parent, child->parent); diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 21fec73d45d4..99cfddde6a55 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -261,6 +261,9 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state) static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode) { + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) + return false; + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); else @@ -328,9 +331,16 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode))) return -EPERM; + if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) + return 0; return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode); } +bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) +{ + return __ptrace_may_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_SCHED); +} + bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) { int err; From 44a076100a7b9b84de319ab05ca2cffd498178ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Kosina Date: Tue, 25 Sep 2018 14:39:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 029/140] x86/speculation: Propagate information about RSB filling mitigation to sysfs commit bb4b3b7762735cdaba5a40fd94c9303d9ffa147a upstream If spectrev2 mitigation has been enabled, RSB is filled on context switch in order to protect from various classes of spectrev2 attacks. If this mitigation is enabled, say so in sysfs for spectrev2. Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: "WoodhouseDavid" Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Tim Chen Cc: "SchauflerCasey" Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/nycvar.YFH.7.76.1809251438580.15880@cbobk.fhfr.pm Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 53eb14a65610..fe32103fcdc7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -874,10 +874,11 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2: - ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "", spectre_v2_module_string()); return ret; From cbc93677ef082f1eb1569f65146fd1f6e963ef13 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhenzhong Duan Date: Tue, 18 Sep 2018 07:45:00 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 030/140] x86/speculation: Add RETPOLINE_AMD support to the inline asm CALL_NOSPEC variant commit 0cbb76d6285794f30953bfa3ab831714b59dd700 upstream ..so that they match their asm counterpart. Add the missing ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE in CALL_NOSPEC, while at it. Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Wang YanQing Cc: dhaval.giani@oracle.com Cc: srinivas.eeda@oracle.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/c3975665-173e-4d70-8dee-06c926ac26ee@default Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index fd2a8c1b88bc..80dc14422495 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -170,11 +170,15 @@ */ # define CALL_NOSPEC \ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \ - ALTERNATIVE( \ + ALTERNATIVE_2( \ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n", \ - X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ + "lfence;\n" \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ + "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD) # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr) #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) @@ -184,7 +188,8 @@ * here, anyway. */ # define CALL_NOSPEC \ - ALTERNATIVE( \ + ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \ + ALTERNATIVE_2( \ ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ " jmp 904f;\n" \ @@ -199,7 +204,11 @@ " ret;\n" \ " .align 16\n" \ "904: call 901b;\n", \ - X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \ + "lfence;\n" \ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ + "call *%[thunk_target]\n", \ + X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD) # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */ From 8c4ad5d39144776c2987e81609204e1766ed4190 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhenzhong Duan Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2018 01:45:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 031/140] x86/retpoline: Make CONFIG_RETPOLINE depend on compiler support commit 4cd24de3a0980bf3100c9dcb08ef65ca7c31af48 upstream Since retpoline capable compilers are widely available, make CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depend on the compiler capability. Break the build when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled and the compiler does not support it. Emit an error message in that case: "arch/x86/Makefile:226: *** You are building kernel with non-retpoline compiler, please update your compiler.. Stop." [dwmw: Fail the build with non-retpoline compiler] Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: Daniel Borkmann Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Masahiro Yamada Cc: Michal Marek Cc: Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cca0cb20-f9e2-4094-840b-fb0f8810cd34@default Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ---- arch/x86/Makefile | 5 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++++++---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- scripts/Makefile.build | 2 -- 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 1a0be022f91d..3a8d2347717a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -441,10 +441,6 @@ config RETPOLINE branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern support for full protection. The kernel may run slower. - Without compiler support, at least indirect branches in assembler - code are eliminated. Since this includes the syscall entry path, - it is not entirely pointless. - config INTEL_RDT bool "Intel Resource Director Technology support" default n diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index 8f6e7eb8ae9f..9298f0f3817a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -223,9 +223,10 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables # Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE -ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),) - KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) -DRETPOLINE +ifeq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),) + $(error You are building kernel with non-retpoline compiler, please update your compiler.) endif + KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS) endif archscripts: scripts_basic diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 80dc14422495..8b09cbb2d52c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -162,11 +162,12 @@ _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t" \ ".popsection\n\t" -#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE) +#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* - * Since the inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC, - * the 64-bit one is dependent on RETPOLINE not CONFIG_RETPOLINE. + * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC + * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined. */ # define CALL_NOSPEC \ ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE \ @@ -181,7 +182,7 @@ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD) # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr) -#elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) +#else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */ /* * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET @@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD) # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) +#endif #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */ # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n" # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index fe32103fcdc7..75bbeda784ac 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason) static inline bool retp_compiler(void) { - return __is_defined(RETPOLINE); + return __is_defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE); } static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt) diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.build b/scripts/Makefile.build index 54da4b070db3..64fac0ad32d6 100644 --- a/scripts/Makefile.build +++ b/scripts/Makefile.build @@ -248,10 +248,8 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL objtool_args += --no-unreachable endif ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE -ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),) objtool_args += --retpoline endif -endif ifdef CONFIG_MODVERSIONS From 90d2c53fa196735c5bc9b5b64c515c79d904ed7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Zhenzhong Duan Date: Fri, 2 Nov 2018 01:45:41 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 032/140] x86/retpoline: Remove minimal retpoline support commit ef014aae8f1cd2793e4e014bbb102bed53f852b7 upstream Now that CONFIG_RETPOLINE hard depends on compiler support, there is no reason to keep the minimal retpoline support around which only provided basic protection in the assembly files. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: H. Peter Anvin Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Cc: Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f06f0a89-5587-45db-8ed2-0a9d6638d5c0@default Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 -- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 ++----------- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 8b09cbb2d52c..c202a64edd95 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -221,8 +221,6 @@ /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_NONE, - SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL, - SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD, SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD, SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 75bbeda784ac..f6e73ec811f8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -135,8 +135,6 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", - [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL] = "Vulnerable: Minimal generic ASM retpoline", - [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline", [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", @@ -250,11 +248,6 @@ static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason) pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } -static inline bool retp_compiler(void) -{ - return __is_defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE); -} - static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt) { int len = strlen(opt); @@ -415,14 +408,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n"); goto retpoline_generic; } - mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD : - SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD; + mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD; setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); } else { retpoline_generic: - mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC : - SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL; + mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC; setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE); } From e8494e5df78e817f06d27c3442a400d6d940fc6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tim Chen Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 033/140] x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment commit 8eb729b77faf83ac4c1f363a9ad68d042415f24c upstream "Reduced Data Speculation" is an obsolete term. The correct new name is "Speculative store bypass disable" - which is abbreviated into SSBD. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.593893901@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h index 2ff2a30a264f..523c69efc38a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ struct thread_info { #define TIF_SIGPENDING 2 /* signal pending */ #define TIF_NEED_RESCHED 3 /* rescheduling necessary */ #define TIF_SINGLESTEP 4 /* reenable singlestep on user return*/ -#define TIF_SSBD 5 /* Reduced data speculation */ +#define TIF_SSBD 5 /* Speculative store bypass disable */ #define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU 6 /* syscall emulation active */ #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */ #define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* secure computing */ From 2ee44e2d761a294f89806ddbbadb64e9aeab98c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tim Chen Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 034/140] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() commit 24848509aa55eac39d524b587b051f4e86df3c12 upstream Remove the unnecessary 'else' statement in spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() to save an indentation level. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.688010903@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 27 +++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index f6e73ec811f8..877111b0f686 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -276,22 +276,21 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; - else { - ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg)); - if (ret < 0) - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) { - if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option)) - continue; - cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd; - break; - } + ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg)); + if (ret < 0) + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; - if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) { - pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg); - return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; - } + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) { + if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option)) + continue; + cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd; + break; + } + + if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) { + pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg); + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE || From 30a8e214606dcf9e053d219ccf801d9af98238f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tim Chen Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 035/140] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() commit b86bda0426853bfe8a3506c7d2a5b332760ae46b upstream Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.783903657@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 877111b0f686..c4367556bce6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -845,8 +845,6 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { - int ret; - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); @@ -864,13 +862,12 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2: - ret = sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "", boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "", spectre_v2_module_string()); - return ret; case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]); From f37b55ab8d843b089ead12c2d14dc58689a195df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tim Chen Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 036/140] x86/speculation: Move STIPB/IBPB string conditionals out of cpu_show_common() commit a8f76ae41cd633ac00be1b3019b1eb4741be3828 upstream The Spectre V2 printout in cpu_show_common() handles conditionals for the various mitigation methods directly in the sprintf() argument list. That's hard to read and will become unreadable if more complex decisions need to be made for a particular method. Move the conditionals for STIBP and IBPB string selection into helper functions, so they can be extended later on. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.874479208@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index c4367556bce6..9433a20c29de 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -842,6 +842,22 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf) } #endif +static char *stibp_state(void) +{ + if (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) + return ", STIBP"; + else + return ""; +} + +static char *ibpb_state(void) +{ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB)) + return ", IBPB"; + else + return ""; +} + static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf, unsigned int bug) { @@ -863,9 +879,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2: return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", + ibpb_state(), boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", - (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) ? ", STIBP" : "", + stibp_state(), boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "", spectre_v2_module_string()); From ca41d792a230828ae5b890fd0cacb26dc19e12d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tim Chen Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 037/140] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use commit 34bce7c9690b1d897686aac89604ba7adc365556 upstream If enhanced IBRS is active, STIBP is redundant for mitigating Spectre v2 user space exploits from hyperthread sibling. Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is used. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185003.966801480@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 9433a20c29de..e3c4a91aec25 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -320,6 +320,10 @@ static bool stibp_needed(void) if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE) return false; + /* Enhanced IBRS makes using STIBP unnecessary. */ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) + return false; + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) return false; @@ -844,6 +848,9 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf) static char *stibp_state(void) { + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) + return ""; + if (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) return ", STIBP"; else From 39402a5e5a297f38b02dcbf24b22199312465d78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 038/140] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions commit 26c4d75b234040c11728a8acb796b3a85ba7507c upstream During context switch, the SSBD bit in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated according to changes of the TIF_SSBD flag in the current and next running task. Currently, only the bit controlling speculative store bypass disable in SPEC_CTRL MSR is updated and the related update functions all have "speculative_store" or "ssb" in their names. For enhanced mitigation control other bits in SPEC_CTRL MSR need to be updated as well, which makes the SSB names inadequate. Rename the "speculative_store*" functions to a more generic name. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.058866968@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 12 ++++++------ 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h index ae7c2c5cd7f0..8e2f8411c7a7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h @@ -70,11 +70,11 @@ extern void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void); static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { } #endif -extern void speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tif); +extern void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif); -static inline void speculative_store_bypass_update_current(void) +static inline void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void) { - speculative_store_bypass_update(current_thread_info()->flags); + speculation_ctrl_update(current_thread_info()->flags); } #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index e3c4a91aec25..93c4dfeb3a8f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) tif = setguest ? ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(guestval) : ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(hostval); - speculative_store_bypass_update(tif); + speculation_ctrl_update(tif); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl); @@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) * mitigation until it is next scheduled. */ if (task == current && update) - speculative_store_bypass_update_current(); + speculation_ctrl_update_current(); return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index c93fcfdf1673..8aa49604f9ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -395,27 +395,27 @@ static __always_inline void amd_set_ssb_virt_state(unsigned long tifn) wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn)); } -static __always_inline void intel_set_ssb_state(unsigned long tifn) +static __always_inline void spec_ctrl_update_msr(unsigned long tifn) { u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn); wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr); } -static __always_inline void __speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tifn) +static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifn) { if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn); else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn); else - intel_set_ssb_state(tifn); + spec_ctrl_update_msr(tifn); } -void speculative_store_bypass_update(unsigned long tif) +void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif) { preempt_disable(); - __speculative_store_bypass_update(tif); + __speculation_ctrl_update(tif); preempt_enable(); } @@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p, set_cpuid_faulting(!!(tifn & _TIF_NOCPUID)); if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD) - __speculative_store_bypass_update(tifn); + __speculation_ctrl_update(tifn); } /* From 6308dde50fcc2e2f5dc473a58a0ecc9424aa9b35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tim Chen Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 039/140] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update commit 01daf56875ee0cd50ed496a09b20eb369b45dfa5 upstream The logic to detect whether there's a change in the previous and next task's flag relevant to update speculation control MSRs is spread out across multiple functions. Consolidate all checks needed for updating speculation control MSRs into the new __speculation_ctrl_update() helper function. This makes it easy to pick the right speculation control MSR and the bits in MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL that need updating based on TIF flags changes. Originally-by: Thomas Lendacky Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.151077005@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 8aa49604f9ae..70e9832379e1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -395,27 +395,40 @@ static __always_inline void amd_set_ssb_virt_state(unsigned long tifn) wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn)); } -static __always_inline void spec_ctrl_update_msr(unsigned long tifn) +/* + * Update the MSRs managing speculation control, during context switch. + * + * tifp: Previous task's thread flags + * tifn: Next task's thread flags + */ +static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, + unsigned long tifn) { - u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base | ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn); + u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base; + bool updmsr = false; - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr); -} + /* If TIF_SSBD is different, select the proper mitigation method */ + if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD) { + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) { + amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn); + } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) { + amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn); + } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || + static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { + msr |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn); + updmsr = true; + } + } -static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifn) -{ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) - amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn); - else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) - amd_set_core_ssb_state(tifn); - else - spec_ctrl_update_msr(tifn); + if (updmsr) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr); } void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif) { + /* Forced update. Make sure all relevant TIF flags are different */ preempt_disable(); - __speculation_ctrl_update(tif); + __speculation_ctrl_update(~tif, tif); preempt_enable(); } @@ -451,8 +464,7 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p, if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOCPUID) set_cpuid_faulting(!!(tifn & _TIF_NOCPUID)); - if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD) - __speculation_ctrl_update(tifn); + __speculation_ctrl_update(tifp, tifn); } /* From a2c094816f894b7a265851fad858e994fa0f78b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:36 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 040/140] sched/smt: Make sched_smt_present track topology commit c5511d03ec090980732e929c318a7a6374b5550e upstream Currently the 'sched_smt_present' static key is enabled when at CPU bringup SMT topology is observed, but it is never disabled. However there is demand to also disable the key when the topology changes such that there is no SMT present anymore. Implement this by making the key count the number of cores that have SMT enabled. In particular, the SMT topology bits are set before interrrupts are enabled and similarly, are cleared after interrupts are disabled for the last time and the CPU dies. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.246110444@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/sched/core.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index 35551110d277..2beda4b726e2 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -5741,15 +5741,10 @@ int sched_cpu_activate(unsigned int cpu) #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT /* - * The sched_smt_present static key needs to be evaluated on every - * hotplug event because at boot time SMT might be disabled when - * the number of booted CPUs is limited. - * - * If then later a sibling gets hotplugged, then the key would stay - * off and SMT scheduling would never be functional. + * When going up, increment the number of cores with SMT present. */ - if (cpumask_weight(cpu_smt_mask(cpu)) > 1) - static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(&sched_smt_present); + if (cpumask_weight(cpu_smt_mask(cpu)) == 2) + static_branch_inc_cpuslocked(&sched_smt_present); #endif set_cpu_active(cpu, true); @@ -5793,6 +5788,14 @@ int sched_cpu_deactivate(unsigned int cpu) */ synchronize_rcu_mult(call_rcu, call_rcu_sched); +#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT + /* + * When going down, decrement the number of cores with SMT present. + */ + if (cpumask_weight(cpu_smt_mask(cpu)) == 2) + static_branch_dec_cpuslocked(&sched_smt_present); +#endif + if (!sched_smp_initialized) return 0; From f98bf1640e06730f27b00becbd5d778af82768b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 041/140] x86/Kconfig: Select SCHED_SMT if SMP enabled commit dbe733642e01dd108f71436aaea7b328cb28fd87 upstream CONFIG_SCHED_SMT is enabled by all distros, so there is not a real point to have it configurable. The runtime overhead in the core scheduler code is minimal because the actual SMT scheduling parts are conditional on a static key. This allows to expose the scheduler's SMT state static key to the speculation control code. Alternatively the scheduler's static key could be made always available when CONFIG_SMP is enabled, but that's just adding an unused static key to every other architecture for nothing. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.337452245@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 8 +------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 3a8d2347717a..44c6a82b7ce5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1001,13 +1001,7 @@ config NR_CPUS to the kernel image. config SCHED_SMT - bool "SMT (Hyperthreading) scheduler support" - depends on SMP - ---help--- - SMT scheduler support improves the CPU scheduler's decision making - when dealing with Intel Pentium 4 chips with HyperThreading at a - cost of slightly increased overhead in some places. If unsure say - N here. + def_bool y if SMP config SCHED_MC def_bool y From 340693ee912e29f51769ae4af3b11486ad921170 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:38 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 042/140] sched/smt: Expose sched_smt_present static key commit 321a874a7ef85655e93b3206d0f36b4a6097f948 upstream Make the scheduler's 'sched_smt_present' static key globaly available, so it can be used in the x86 speculation control code. Provide a query function and a stub for the CONFIG_SMP=n case. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.430168326@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/sched/smt.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ kernel/sched/sched.h | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/sched/smt.h diff --git a/include/linux/sched/smt.h b/include/linux/sched/smt.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c9e0be514110 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/sched/smt.h @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _LINUX_SCHED_SMT_H +#define _LINUX_SCHED_SMT_H + +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT +extern struct static_key_false sched_smt_present; + +static __always_inline bool sched_smt_active(void) +{ + return static_branch_likely(&sched_smt_present); +} +#else +static inline bool sched_smt_active(void) { return false; } +#endif + +#endif diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h index 9683f458aec7..6c25bbe87bd3 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/sched.h +++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -930,9 +931,6 @@ static inline int cpu_of(struct rq *rq) #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT - -extern struct static_key_false sched_smt_present; - extern void __update_idle_core(struct rq *rq); static inline void update_idle_core(struct rq *rq) From f55e301ec4d5a1e53dfc821205362b6438c0fc6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 043/140] x86/speculation: Rework SMT state change commit a74cfffb03b73d41e08f84c2e5c87dec0ce3db9f upstream arch_smt_update() is only called when the sysfs SMT control knob is changed. This means that when SMT is enabled in the sysfs control knob the system is considered to have SMT active even if all siblings are offline. To allow finegrained control of the speculation mitigations, the actual SMT state is more interesting than the fact that siblings could be enabled. Rework the code, so arch_smt_update() is invoked from each individual CPU hotplug function, and simplify the update function while at it. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.521974984@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 +++++------ include/linux/sched/smt.h | 2 ++ kernel/cpu.c | 15 +++++++++------ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 93c4dfeb3a8f..a026b1606c99 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -343,16 +344,14 @@ void arch_smt_update(void) return; mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); - mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base; - if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED) + + mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; + if (sched_smt_active()) mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; - else - mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) { pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n", - cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? - "Enabling" : "Disabling"); + mask & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ? "Enabling" : "Disabling"); x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask; on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1); } diff --git a/include/linux/sched/smt.h b/include/linux/sched/smt.h index c9e0be514110..59d3736c454c 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched/smt.h +++ b/include/linux/sched/smt.h @@ -15,4 +15,6 @@ static __always_inline bool sched_smt_active(void) static inline bool sched_smt_active(void) { return false; } #endif +void arch_smt_update(void); + #endif diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c index 3adecda21444..1699ff68c412 100644 --- a/kernel/cpu.c +++ b/kernel/cpu.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -346,6 +347,12 @@ void cpu_hotplug_enable(void) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_hotplug_enable); #endif /* CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */ +/* + * Architectures that need SMT-specific errata handling during SMT hotplug + * should override this. + */ +void __weak arch_smt_update(void) { } + #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_smt_control); @@ -982,6 +989,7 @@ static int __ref _cpu_down(unsigned int cpu, int tasks_frozen, * concurrent CPU hotplug via cpu_add_remove_lock. */ lockup_detector_cleanup(); + arch_smt_update(); return ret; } @@ -1110,6 +1118,7 @@ static int _cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, int tasks_frozen, enum cpuhp_state target) ret = cpuhp_up_callbacks(cpu, st, target); out: cpus_write_unlock(); + arch_smt_update(); return ret; } @@ -2026,12 +2035,6 @@ static void cpuhp_online_cpu_device(unsigned int cpu) kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_ONLINE); } -/* - * Architectures that need SMT-specific errata handling during SMT hotplug - * should override this. - */ -void __weak arch_smt_update(void) { }; - static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval) { int cpu, ret = 0; From 1572793b498d7818515adc305d84ee2a92566050 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 044/140] x86/l1tf: Show actual SMT state commit 130d6f946f6f2a972ee3ec8540b7243ab99abe97 upstream Use the now exposed real SMT state, not the SMT sysfs control knob state. This reflects the state of the system when the mitigation status is queried. This does not change the warning in the VMX launch code. There the dependency on the control knob makes sense because siblings could be brought online anytime after launching the VM. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.613357354@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index a026b1606c99..80adce5c1c61 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -830,13 +830,14 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf) if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED || (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER && - cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)) + sched_smt_active())) { return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG, l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]); + } return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG, l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation], - cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled"); + sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled"); } #else static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf) From 10c24dc62a3a5a9a26791cd7502de7b5df6e1cec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 045/140] x86/speculation: Reorder the spec_v2 code commit 15d6b7aab0793b2de8a05d8a828777dd24db424e upstream Reorder the code so it is better grouped. No functional change. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.707122879@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 172 ++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 86 insertions(+), 86 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 80adce5c1c61..d101d896d077 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -124,29 +124,6 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) #endif } -/* The kernel command line selection */ -enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { - SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, - SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, - SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, - SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, - SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, - SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, -}; - -static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { - [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", - [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", - [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline", - [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", -}; - -#undef pr_fmt -#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt - -static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = - SPECTRE_V2_NONE; - void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { @@ -216,6 +193,12 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void) wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval); } +#undef pr_fmt +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt + +static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = + SPECTRE_V2_NONE; + #ifdef RETPOLINE static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; @@ -237,6 +220,43 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; } #endif +static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt) +{ + int len = strlen(opt); + + return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len); +} + +/* The kernel command line selection for spectre v2 */ +enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, +}; + +static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { + [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", + [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline", + [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", +}; + +static const struct { + const char *option; + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd; + bool secure; +} mitigation_options[] = { + { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false }, + { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true }, + { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false }, + { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false }, + { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false }, + { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, +}; + static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) { if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) @@ -249,31 +269,11 @@ static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason) pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } -static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt) -{ - int len = strlen(opt); - - return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len); -} - -static const struct { - const char *option; - enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd; - bool secure; -} mitigation_options[] = { - { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false }, - { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true }, - { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false }, - { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, false }, - { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false }, - { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, -}; - static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) { + enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; char arg[20]; int ret, i; - enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2")) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE; @@ -316,48 +316,6 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return cmd; } -static bool stibp_needed(void) -{ - if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE) - return false; - - /* Enhanced IBRS makes using STIBP unnecessary. */ - if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) - return false; - - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) - return false; - - return true; -} - -static void update_stibp_msr(void *info) -{ - wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); -} - -void arch_smt_update(void) -{ - u64 mask; - - if (!stibp_needed()) - return; - - mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); - - mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; - if (sched_smt_active()) - mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; - - if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) { - pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n", - mask & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ? "Enabling" : "Disabling"); - x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask; - on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1); - } - mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); -} - static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) { enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(); @@ -460,6 +418,48 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) arch_smt_update(); } +static bool stibp_needed(void) +{ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE) + return false; + + /* Enhanced IBRS makes using STIBP unnecessary. */ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) + return false; + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static void update_stibp_msr(void *info) +{ + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); +} + +void arch_smt_update(void) +{ + u64 mask; + + if (!stibp_needed()) + return; + + mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); + + mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; + if (sched_smt_active()) + mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; + + if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) { + pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n", + mask & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ? "Enabling" : "Disabling"); + x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask; + on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1); + } + mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); +} + #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt From 275d90f0fa5df77894e711b379d14b31a6232302 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 046/140] x86/speculation: Mark string arrays const correctly commit 8770709f411763884535662744a3786a1806afd3 upstream checkpatch.pl muttered when reshuffling the code: WARNING: static const char * array should probably be static const char * const Fix up all the string arrays. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.800018931@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index d101d896d077..b57084edc25c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, }; -static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = { +static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline", @@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd { SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP, }; -static const char *ssb_strings[] = { +static const char * const ssb_strings[] = { [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE] = "Vulnerable", [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled", [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl", @@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline); #define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion" #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) -static const char *l1tf_vmx_states[] = { +static const char * const l1tf_vmx_states[] = { [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO] = "auto", [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER] = "vulnerable", [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND] = "conditional cache flushes", From 507ac84e159b1e70066b8528599fe8a83043faee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:43 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 047/140] x86/speculataion: Mark command line parser data __initdata commit 30ba72a990f5096ae08f284de17986461efcc408 upstream No point to keep that around. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.893886356@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index b57084edc25c..d18adb5e056c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ static const struct { const char *option; enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd; bool secure; -} mitigation_options[] = { +} mitigation_options[] __initdata = { { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false }, { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true }, { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false }, @@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static const char * const ssb_strings[] = { static const struct { const char *option; enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd; -} ssb_mitigation_options[] = { +} ssb_mitigation_options[] __initdata = { { "auto", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO }, /* Platform decides */ { "on", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */ { "off", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE }, /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */ From 8a34c70686e0ca64dea512476d8584a3bfeff5d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 048/140] x86/speculation: Unify conditional spectre v2 print functions commit 495d470e9828500e0155027f230449ac5e29c025 upstream There is no point in having two functions and a conditional at the call site. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185004.986890749@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 ++++------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index d18adb5e056c..8e86ab9269cd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -257,15 +257,9 @@ static const struct { { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false }, }; -static void __init spec2_print_if_insecure(const char *reason) +static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) { - if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) - pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); -} - -static void __init spec2_print_if_secure(const char *reason) -{ - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure) pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason); } @@ -308,11 +302,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO; } - if (mitigation_options[i].secure) - spec2_print_if_secure(mitigation_options[i].option); - else - spec2_print_if_insecure(mitigation_options[i].option); - + spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option, + mitigation_options[i].secure); return cmd; } From 711875432218e9e819bfde90cb99c61569c8fa90 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 049/140] x86/speculation: Add command line control for indirect branch speculation commit fa1202ef224391b6f5b26cdd44cc50495e8fab54 upstream Add command line control for user space indirect branch speculation mitigations. The new option is: spectre_v2_user= The initial options are: - on: Unconditionally enabled - off: Unconditionally disabled -auto: Kernel selects mitigation (default off for now) When the spectre_v2= command line argument is either 'on' or 'off' this implies that the application to application control follows that state even if a contradicting spectre_v2_user= argument is supplied. Originally-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.082720373@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 32 ++++- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 133 +++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index fa4eec22816d..ccef87bd1d65 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4169,9 +4169,13 @@ spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability. + The default operation protects the kernel from + user space attacks. - on - unconditionally enable - off - unconditionally disable + on - unconditionally enable, implies + spectre_v2_user=on + off - unconditionally disable, implies + spectre_v2_user=off auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is vulnerable @@ -4181,6 +4185,12 @@ CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the compiler with which the kernel was built. + Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation + against user space to user space task attacks. + + Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and + the user space protections. + Specific mitigations can also be selected manually: retpoline - replace indirect branches @@ -4190,6 +4200,24 @@ Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2=auto. + spectre_v2_user= + [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2 + (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between + user space tasks + + on - Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is + enforced by spectre_v2=on + + off - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is + enforced by spectre_v2=off + + auto - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on + the available CPU features and vulnerability. + Default is off. + + Not specifying this option is equivalent to + spectre_v2_user=auto. + spec_store_bypass_disable= [HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation (Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index c202a64edd95..be0b0aa780e2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ +#include + #include #include #include @@ -226,6 +228,12 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED, }; +/* The indirect branch speculation control variants */ +enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation { + SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE, + SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT, +}; + /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */ enum ssb_mitigation { SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE, @@ -303,6 +311,8 @@ do { \ preempt_enable(); \ } while (0) +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp); + #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 8e86ab9269cd..de53f7806355 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base; u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask; +/* Control conditional STIPB in switch_to() */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp); + void __init check_bugs(void) { identify_boot_cpu(); @@ -199,6 +202,9 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void) static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init = SPECTRE_V2_NONE; +static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user __ro_after_init = + SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; + #ifdef RETPOLINE static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; @@ -237,6 +243,104 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd { SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD, }; +enum spectre_v2_user_cmd { + SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, + SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, + SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, +}; + +static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = { + [SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE] = "User space: Vulnerable", + [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection", +}; + +static const struct { + const char *option; + enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd; + bool secure; +} v2_user_options[] __initdata = { + { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, false }, + { "off", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, false }, + { "on", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, true }, +}; + +static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) +{ + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure) + pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason); +} + +static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init +spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) +{ + char arg[20]; + int ret, i; + + switch (v2_cmd) { + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE: + return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE; + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE: + return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE; + default: + break; + } + + ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user", + arg, sizeof(arg)); + if (ret < 0) + return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) { + if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) { + spec_v2_user_print_cond(v2_user_options[i].option, + v2_user_options[i].secure); + return v2_user_options[i].cmd; + } + } + + pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg); + return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; +} + +static void __init +spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) +{ + enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; + bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP); + + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) + return; + + if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED || + cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED) + smt_possible = false; + + switch (spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd)) { + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE: + goto set_mode; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE: + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT; + break; + } + + /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); + pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); + } + + /* If enhanced IBRS is enabled no STIPB required */ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) + return; + +set_mode: + spectre_v2_user = mode; + /* Only print the STIBP mode when SMT possible */ + if (smt_possible) + pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[mode]); +} + static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline", @@ -383,12 +487,6 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW); pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n"); - /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); - pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); - } - /* * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect * branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted @@ -405,23 +503,21 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); } + /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */ + spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd); + /* Enable STIBP if appropriate */ arch_smt_update(); } static bool stibp_needed(void) { - if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE) - return false; - /* Enhanced IBRS makes using STIBP unnecessary. */ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) return false; - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) - return false; - - return true; + /* Check for strict user mitigation mode */ + return spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT; } static void update_stibp_msr(void *info) @@ -842,10 +938,13 @@ static char *stibp_state(void) if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) return ""; - if (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) - return ", STIBP"; - else - return ""; + switch (spectre_v2_user) { + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: + return ", STIBP: disabled"; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: + return ", STIBP: forced"; + } + return ""; } static char *ibpb_state(void) From 69985a2cae82ebca281da7e7275bba7ef2b3dca8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tim Chen Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 050/140] x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control commit 5bfbe3ad5840d941b89bcac54b821ba14f50a0ba upstream To avoid the overhead of STIBP always on, it's necessary to allow per task control of STIBP. Add a new task flag TIF_SPEC_IB and evaluate it during context switch if SMT is active and flag evaluation is enabled by the speculation control code. Add the conditional evaluation to x86_virt_spec_ctrl() as well so the guest/host switch works properly. This has no effect because TIF_SPEC_IB cannot be set yet and the static key which controls evaluation is off. Preparatory patch for adding the control code. [ tglx: Simplify the context switch logic and make the TIF evaluation depend on SMP=y and on the static key controlling the conditional update. Rename it to TIF_SPEC_IB because it controls both STIBP and IBPB ] Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.176917199@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 5 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 5 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 4731f0cf97c5..b3486c8b570a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -41,9 +41,10 @@ #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */ #define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ -#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << 1) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT 1 /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictor (STIBP) bit */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP (1 << SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */ #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */ -#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ +#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */ #define PRED_CMD_IBPB (1 << 0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h index 8e2f8411c7a7..27b0bce3933b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h @@ -53,12 +53,24 @@ static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn) return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) >> (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT); } +static inline u64 stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(u64 tifn) +{ + BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_IB < SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT); + return (tifn & _TIF_SPEC_IB) >> (TIF_SPEC_IB - SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT); +} + static inline unsigned long ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(u64 spec_ctrl) { BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SSBD < SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT); return (spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) << (TIF_SSBD - SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT); } +static inline unsigned long stibp_spec_ctrl_to_tif(u64 spec_ctrl) +{ + BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_IB < SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT); + return (spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP) << (TIF_SPEC_IB - SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT); +} + static inline u64 ssbd_tif_to_amd_ls_cfg(u64 tifn) { return (tifn & _TIF_SSBD) ? x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask : 0ULL; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h index 523c69efc38a..fa583ec99e3e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct thread_info { #define TIF_SYSCALL_EMU 6 /* syscall emulation active */ #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */ #define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* secure computing */ +#define TIF_SPEC_IB 9 /* Indirect branch speculation mitigation */ #define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY 11 /* notify kernel of userspace return */ #define TIF_UPROBE 12 /* breakpointed or singlestepping */ #define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 13 /* pending live patching update */ @@ -110,6 +111,7 @@ struct thread_info { #define _TIF_SYSCALL_EMU (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_EMU) #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT) #define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP) +#define _TIF_SPEC_IB (1 << TIF_SPEC_IB) #define _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY (1 << TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY) #define _TIF_UPROBE (1 << TIF_UPROBE) #define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING (1 << TIF_PATCH_PENDING) @@ -146,7 +148,8 @@ struct thread_info { /* flags to check in __switch_to() */ #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW \ - (_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOCPUID|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP|_TIF_SSBD) + (_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOCPUID|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP| \ + _TIF_SSBD|_TIF_SPEC_IB) #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY) #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index de53f7806355..3bbd512638ac 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -148,6 +148,10 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags); + /* Conditional STIBP enabled? */ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) + hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags); + if (hostval != guestval) { msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 70e9832379e1..574b144d2b53 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -404,11 +404,17 @@ static __always_inline void amd_set_ssb_virt_state(unsigned long tifn) static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, unsigned long tifn) { + unsigned long tif_diff = tifp ^ tifn; u64 msr = x86_spec_ctrl_base; bool updmsr = false; - /* If TIF_SSBD is different, select the proper mitigation method */ - if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_SSBD) { + /* + * If TIF_SSBD is different, select the proper mitigation + * method. Note that if SSBD mitigation is disabled or permanentely + * enabled this branch can't be taken because nothing can set + * TIF_SSBD. + */ + if (tif_diff & _TIF_SSBD) { if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) { amd_set_ssb_virt_state(tifn); } else if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD)) { @@ -420,6 +426,16 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, } } + /* + * Only evaluate TIF_SPEC_IB if conditional STIBP is enabled, + * otherwise avoid the MSR write. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && + static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) { + updmsr |= !!(tif_diff & _TIF_SPEC_IB); + msr |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(tifn); + } + if (updmsr) wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr); } From a87c81f0de3dd61290f0e5216961e349be32af87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 051/140] x86/process: Consolidate and simplify switch_to_xtra() code commit ff16701a29cba3aafa0bd1656d766813b2d0a811 upstream Move the conditional invocation of __switch_to_xtra() into an inline function so the logic can be shared between 32 and 64 bit. Remove the handthrough of the TSS pointer and retrieve the pointer directly in the bitmap handling function. Use this_cpu_ptr() instead of the per_cpu() indirection. This is a preparatory change so integration of conditional indirect branch speculation optimization happens only in one place. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.280855518@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 3 --- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 12 +++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/process.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c | 10 +++------- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 10 +++------- 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/process.h diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h index 36bd243843d6..7cf1a270d891 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h @@ -11,9 +11,6 @@ struct task_struct *__switch_to_asm(struct task_struct *prev, __visible struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next); -struct tss_struct; -void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p, - struct tss_struct *tss); /* This runs runs on the previous thread's stack. */ static inline void prepare_switch_to(struct task_struct *next) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index 574b144d2b53..cdf8e6694f71 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ #include #include +#include "process.h" + /* * per-CPU TSS segments. Threads are completely 'soft' on Linux, * no more per-task TSS's. The TSS size is kept cacheline-aligned @@ -252,11 +254,12 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void) enable_cpuid(); } -static inline void switch_to_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss, - struct thread_struct *prev, +static inline void switch_to_bitmap(struct thread_struct *prev, struct thread_struct *next, unsigned long tifp, unsigned long tifn) { + struct tss_struct *tss = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss_rw); + if (tifn & _TIF_IO_BITMAP) { /* * Copy the relevant range of the IO bitmap. @@ -448,8 +451,7 @@ void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif) preempt_enable(); } -void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p, - struct tss_struct *tss) +void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p) { struct thread_struct *prev, *next; unsigned long tifp, tifn; @@ -459,7 +461,7 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p, tifn = READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(next_p)->flags); tifp = READ_ONCE(task_thread_info(prev_p)->flags); - switch_to_bitmap(tss, prev, next, tifp, tifn); + switch_to_bitmap(prev, next, tifp, tifn); propagate_user_return_notify(prev_p, next_p); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.h b/arch/x86/kernel/process.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..020fbfac3a27 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.h @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +// +// Code shared between 32 and 64 bit + +void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p); + +/* + * This needs to be inline to optimize for the common case where no extra + * work needs to be done. + */ +static inline void switch_to_extra(struct task_struct *prev, + struct task_struct *next) +{ + unsigned long next_tif = task_thread_info(next)->flags; + unsigned long prev_tif = task_thread_info(prev)->flags; + + /* + * __switch_to_xtra() handles debug registers, i/o bitmaps, + * speculation mitigations etc. + */ + if (unlikely(next_tif & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT || + prev_tif & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV)) + __switch_to_xtra(prev, next); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c index 5046a3c9dec2..d3e593eb189f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_32.c @@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ #include #include +#include "process.h" + void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, enum show_regs_mode mode) { unsigned long cr0 = 0L, cr2 = 0L, cr3 = 0L, cr4 = 0L; @@ -232,7 +234,6 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p) struct fpu *prev_fpu = &prev->fpu; struct fpu *next_fpu = &next->fpu; int cpu = smp_processor_id(); - struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu); /* never put a printk in __switch_to... printk() calls wake_up*() indirectly */ @@ -264,12 +265,7 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p) if (get_kernel_rpl() && unlikely(prev->iopl != next->iopl)) set_iopl_mask(next->iopl); - /* - * Now maybe handle debug registers and/or IO bitmaps - */ - if (unlikely(task_thread_info(prev_p)->flags & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV || - task_thread_info(next_p)->flags & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT)) - __switch_to_xtra(prev_p, next_p, tss); + switch_to_extra(prev_p, next_p); /* * Leave lazy mode, flushing any hypercalls made here. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c index ea5ea850348d..a0854f283efd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c @@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ #include #endif +#include "process.h" + __visible DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, rsp_scratch); /* Prints also some state that isn't saved in the pt_regs */ @@ -422,7 +424,6 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p) struct fpu *prev_fpu = &prev->fpu; struct fpu *next_fpu = &next->fpu; int cpu = smp_processor_id(); - struct tss_struct *tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu); WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY) && this_cpu_read(irq_count) != -1); @@ -489,12 +490,7 @@ __switch_to(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p) /* Reload sp0. */ update_task_stack(next_p); - /* - * Now maybe reload the debug registers and handle I/O bitmaps - */ - if (unlikely(task_thread_info(next_p)->flags & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT || - task_thread_info(prev_p)->flags & _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV)) - __switch_to_xtra(prev_p, next_p, tss); + switch_to_extra(prev_p, next_p); #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV /* From dd73e15ea21307f54d253bb0f914096115db868e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 052/140] x86/speculation: Avoid __switch_to_xtra() calls commit 5635d99953f04b550738f6f4c1c532667c3fd872 upstream The TIF_SPEC_IB bit does not need to be evaluated in the decision to invoke __switch_to_xtra() when: - CONFIG_SMP is disabled - The conditional STIPB mode is disabled The TIF_SPEC_IB bit still controls IBPB in both cases so the TIF work mask checks might invoke __switch_to_xtra() for nothing if TIF_SPEC_IB is the only set bit in the work masks. Optimize it out by masking the bit at compile time for CONFIG_SMP=n and at run time when the static key controlling the conditional STIBP mode is disabled. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.374062201@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 13 +++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/process.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h index fa583ec99e3e..6d201699c651 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -147,9 +147,18 @@ struct thread_info { _TIF_FSCHECK) /* flags to check in __switch_to() */ -#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW \ +#define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_BASE \ (_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOCPUID|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP| \ - _TIF_SSBD|_TIF_SPEC_IB) + _TIF_SSBD) + +/* + * Avoid calls to __switch_to_xtra() on UP as STIBP is not evaluated. + */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP +# define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW_BASE | _TIF_SPEC_IB) +#else +# define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW_BASE) +#endif #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_PREV (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW|_TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY) #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_NEXT (_TIF_WORK_CTXSW) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.h b/arch/x86/kernel/process.h index 020fbfac3a27..898e97cf6629 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.h +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.h @@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ // // Code shared between 32 and 64 bit +#include + void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p); /* @@ -14,6 +16,19 @@ static inline void switch_to_extra(struct task_struct *prev, unsigned long next_tif = task_thread_info(next)->flags; unsigned long prev_tif = task_thread_info(prev)->flags; + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) { + /* + * Avoid __switch_to_xtra() invocation when conditional + * STIPB is disabled and the only different bit is + * TIF_SPEC_IB. For CONFIG_SMP=n TIF_SPEC_IB is not + * in the TIF_WORK_CTXSW masks. + */ + if (!static_branch_likely(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) { + prev_tif &= ~_TIF_SPEC_IB; + next_tif &= ~_TIF_SPEC_IB; + } + } + /* * __switch_to_xtra() handles debug registers, i/o bitmaps, * speculation mitigations etc. From a17888154cf202ccf05d2efb71ed0f632f2d8897 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 053/140] x86/speculation: Prepare for conditional IBPB in switch_mm() commit 4c71a2b6fd7e42814aa68a6dec88abf3b42ea573 upstream The IBPB speculation barrier is issued from switch_mm() when the kernel switches to a user space task with a different mm than the user space task which ran last on the same CPU. An additional optimization is to avoid IBPB when the incoming task can be ptraced by the outgoing task. This optimization only works when switching directly between two user space tasks. When switching from a kernel task to a user space task the optimization fails because the previous task cannot be accessed anymore. So for quite some scenarios the optimization is just adding overhead. The upcoming conditional IBPB support will issue IBPB only for user space tasks which have the TIF_SPEC_IB bit set. This requires to handle the following cases: 1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set. 2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set. This needs to be optimized for the case where the IBPB can be avoided when only kernel threads ran in between user space tasks which belong to the same process. The current check whether two tasks belong to the same context is using the tasks context id. While correct, it's simpler to use the mm pointer because it allows to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into it. The context id based mechanism requires extra storage, which creates worse code. When a task is scheduled out its TIF_SPEC_IB bit is mangled as bit 0 into the per CPU storage which is used to track the last user space mm which was running on a CPU. This bit can be used together with the TIF_SPEC_IB bit of the incoming task to make the decision whether IBPB needs to be issued or not to cover the two cases above. As conditional IBPB is going to be the default, remove the dubious ptrace check for the IBPB always case and simply issue IBPB always when the process changes. Move the storage to a different place in the struct as the original one created a hole. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.466447057@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 8 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 29 +++++-- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++------- 4 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index be0b0aa780e2..d4d35baf0430 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -312,6 +312,8 @@ do { \ } while (0) DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp); +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb); +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb); #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h index 0e2130d8d6b1..79ec7add5f98 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h @@ -185,10 +185,14 @@ struct tlb_state { #define LOADED_MM_SWITCHING ((struct mm_struct *)1) + /* Last user mm for optimizing IBPB */ + union { + struct mm_struct *last_user_mm; + unsigned long last_user_mm_ibpb; + }; + u16 loaded_mm_asid; u16 next_asid; - /* last user mm's ctx id */ - u64 last_ctx_id; /* * We can be in one of several states: diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 3bbd512638ac..de96a63114a8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -56,6 +56,10 @@ u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask; /* Control conditional STIPB in switch_to() */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp); +/* Control conditional IBPB in switch_mm() */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb); +/* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb); void __init check_bugs(void) { @@ -331,7 +335,17 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); - pr_info("Spectre v2 mitigation: Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); + + switch (mode) { + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: + static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb); + break; + default: + break; + } + + pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n", + mode == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ? "always-on" : "conditional"); } /* If enhanced IBRS is enabled no STIPB required */ @@ -953,10 +967,15 @@ static char *stibp_state(void) static char *ibpb_state(void) { - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB)) - return ", IBPB"; - else - return ""; + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { + switch (spectre_v2_user) { + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: + return ", IBPB: disabled"; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: + return ", IBPB: always-on"; + } + } + return ""; } static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c index 073b8df349a0..a6d1b0241aea 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ #include #include #include -#include #include #include @@ -30,6 +29,12 @@ * Implement flush IPI by CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR, Alex Shi */ +/* + * Use bit 0 to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB state into the mm pointer which is + * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_ibpb. + */ +#define LAST_USER_MM_IBPB 0x1UL + /* * We get here when we do something requiring a TLB invalidation * but could not go invalidate all of the contexts. We do the @@ -181,17 +186,87 @@ static void sync_current_stack_to_mm(struct mm_struct *mm) } } -static bool ibpb_needed(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 last_ctx_id) +static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(struct task_struct *next) { + unsigned long next_tif = task_thread_info(next)->flags; + unsigned long ibpb = (next_tif >> TIF_SPEC_IB) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB; + + return (unsigned long)next->mm | ibpb; +} + +static void cond_ibpb(struct task_struct *next) +{ + if (!next || !next->mm) + return; + /* - * Check if the current (previous) task has access to the memory - * of the @tsk (next) task. If access is denied, make sure to - * issue a IBPB to stop user->user Spectre-v2 attacks. - * - * Note: __ptrace_may_access() returns 0 or -ERRNO. + * Both, the conditional and the always IBPB mode use the mm + * pointer to avoid the IBPB when switching between tasks of the + * same process. Using the mm pointer instead of mm->context.ctx_id + * opens a hypothetical hole vs. mm_struct reuse, which is more or + * less impossible to control by an attacker. Aside of that it + * would only affect the first schedule so the theoretically + * exposed data is not really interesting. */ - return (tsk && tsk->mm && tsk->mm->context.ctx_id != last_ctx_id && - ptrace_may_access_sched(tsk, PTRACE_MODE_SPEC_IBPB)); + if (static_branch_likely(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb)) { + unsigned long prev_mm, next_mm; + + /* + * This is a bit more complex than the always mode because + * it has to handle two cases: + * + * 1) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) + * which has TIF_SPEC_IB set to a user space task + * (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set. + * + * 2) Switch from a user space task (potential attacker) + * which has TIF_SPEC_IB not set to a user space task + * (potential victim) which has TIF_SPEC_IB set. + * + * This could be done by unconditionally issuing IBPB when + * a task which has TIF_SPEC_IB set is either scheduled in + * or out. Though that results in two flushes when: + * + * - the same user space task is scheduled out and later + * scheduled in again and only a kernel thread ran in + * between. + * + * - a user space task belonging to the same process is + * scheduled in after a kernel thread ran in between + * + * - a user space task belonging to the same process is + * scheduled in immediately. + * + * Optimize this with reasonably small overhead for the + * above cases. Mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB bit into the mm + * pointer of the incoming task which is stored in + * cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb for comparison. + */ + next_mm = mm_mangle_tif_spec_ib(next); + prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb); + + /* + * Issue IBPB only if the mm's are different and one or + * both have the IBPB bit set. + */ + if (next_mm != prev_mm && + (next_mm | prev_mm) & LAST_USER_MM_IBPB) + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); + + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, next_mm); + } + + if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_always_ibpb)) { + /* + * Only flush when switching to a user space task with a + * different context than the user space task which ran + * last on this CPU. + */ + if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm) != next->mm) { + indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm, next->mm); + } + } } void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, @@ -268,22 +343,13 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, } else { u16 new_asid; bool need_flush; - u64 last_ctx_id = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id); /* * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch * predictor when switching between processes. This stops * one process from doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another. - * - * As an optimization, flush indirect branches only when - * switching into a processes that can't be ptrace by the - * current one (as in such case, attacker has much more - * convenient way how to tamper with the next process than - * branch buffer poisoning). */ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) && - ibpb_needed(tsk, last_ctx_id)) - indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); + cond_ibpb(tsk); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) { /* @@ -340,14 +406,6 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, trace_tlb_flush_rcuidle(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, 0); } - /* - * Record last user mm's context id, so we can avoid - * flushing branch buffer with IBPB if we switch back - * to the same user. - */ - if (next != &init_mm) - this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id, next->context.ctx_id); - /* Make sure we write CR3 before loaded_mm. */ barrier(); @@ -428,7 +486,7 @@ void initialize_tlbstate_and_flush(void) write_cr3(build_cr3(mm->pgd, 0)); /* Reinitialize tlbstate. */ - this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id); + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_ibpb, LAST_USER_MM_IBPB); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, 0); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1); this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[0].ctx_id, mm->context.ctx_id); From aecb99692a4dceaa7802de383da44e3f50df8d68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:50 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 054/140] ptrace: Remove unused ptrace_may_access_sched() and MODE_IBRS commit 46f7ecb1e7359f183f5bbd1e08b90e10e52164f9 upstream The IBPB control code in x86 removed the usage. Remove the functionality which was introduced for this. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.559149393@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/ptrace.h | 17 ----------------- kernel/ptrace.c | 10 ---------- 2 files changed, 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h index e5e5ef513df3..561feb560619 100644 --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h @@ -64,15 +64,12 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead); #define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT 0x04 #define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS 0x08 #define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS 0x10 -#define PTRACE_MODE_SCHED 0x20 -#define PTRACE_MODE_IBPB 0x40 /* shorthands for READ/ATTACH and FSCREDS/REALCREDS combinations */ #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS) -#define PTRACE_MODE_SPEC_IBPB (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS | PTRACE_MODE_IBPB) /** * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access @@ -90,20 +87,6 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead); */ extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode); -/** - * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access - * a target task. - * @task: target task - * @mode: selects type of access and caller credentials - * - * Returns true on success, false on denial. - * - * Similar to ptrace_may_access(). Only to be called from context switch - * code. Does not call into audit and the regular LSM hooks due to locking - * constraints. - */ -extern bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode); - static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child) { return !same_thread_group(child->real_parent, child->parent); diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c index 99cfddde6a55..21fec73d45d4 100644 --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -261,9 +261,6 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state) static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode) { - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) - return false; - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); else @@ -331,16 +328,9 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode))) return -EPERM; - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) - return 0; return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode); } -bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) -{ - return __ptrace_may_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_SCHED); -} - bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) { int err; From 59028be133859d7973910b5cf6f2a5934329319e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 055/140] x86/speculation: Split out TIF update commit e6da8bb6f9abb2628381904b24163c770e630bac upstream The update of the TIF_SSBD flag and the conditional speculation control MSR update is done in the ssb_prctl_set() function directly. The upcoming prctl support for controlling indirect branch speculation via STIBP needs the same mechanism. Split the code out and make it reusable. Reword the comment about updates for other tasks. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.652305076@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index de96a63114a8..8359a5e382fe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -700,10 +700,29 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation(void) #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculation prctl: " fmt -static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) +static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk, int tifbit, bool on) { bool update; + if (on) + update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, tifbit); + else + update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, tifbit); + + /* + * Immediately update the speculation control MSRs for the current + * task, but for a non-current task delay setting the CPU + * mitigation until it is scheduled next. + * + * This can only happen for SECCOMP mitigation. For PRCTL it's + * always the current task. + */ + if (tsk == current && update) + speculation_ctrl_update_current(); +} + +static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) +{ if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL && ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP) return -ENXIO; @@ -714,28 +733,20 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task)) return -EPERM; task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task); - update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); + task_update_spec_tif(task, TIF_SSBD, false); break; case PR_SPEC_DISABLE: task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task); - update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); + task_update_spec_tif(task, TIF_SSBD, true); break; case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE: task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task); task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task); - update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SSBD); + task_update_spec_tif(task, TIF_SSBD, true); break; default: return -ERANGE; } - - /* - * If being set on non-current task, delay setting the CPU - * mitigation until it is next scheduled. - */ - if (task == current && update) - speculation_ctrl_update_current(); - return 0; } From e841240174501cd7a1b61d02850591d00a02dc7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Wed, 28 Nov 2018 10:56:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 056/140] x86/speculation: Prevent stale SPEC_CTRL msr content commit 6d991ba509ebcfcc908e009d1db51972a4f7a064 upstream The seccomp speculation control operates on all tasks of a process, but only the current task of a process can update the MSR immediately. For the other threads the update is deferred to the next context switch. This creates the following situation with Process A and B: Process A task 2 and Process B task 1 are pinned on CPU1. Process A task 2 does not have the speculation control TIF bit set. Process B task 1 has the speculation control TIF bit set. CPU0 CPU1 MSR bit is set ProcB.T1 schedules out ProcA.T2 schedules in MSR bit is cleared ProcA.T1 seccomp_update() set TIF bit on ProcA.T2 ProcB.T1 schedules in MSR is not updated <-- FAIL This happens because the context switch code tries to avoid the MSR update if the speculation control TIF bits of the incoming and the outgoing task are the same. In the worst case ProcB.T1 and ProcA.T2 are the only tasks scheduling back and forth on CPU1, which keeps the MSR stale forever. In theory this could be remedied by IPIs, but chasing the remote task which could be migrated is complex and full of races. The straight forward solution is to avoid the asychronous update of the TIF bit and defer it to the next context switch. The speculation control state is stored in task_struct::atomic_flags by the prctl and seccomp updates already. Add a new TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE bit and set this after updating the atomic_flags. Check the bit on context switch and force a synchronous update of the speculation control if set. Use the same mechanism for updating the current task. Reported-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1811272247140.1875@nanos.tec.linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h | 6 +----- arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 +++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 +++++++----------- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h index 27b0bce3933b..5393babc0598 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h @@ -83,10 +83,6 @@ static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { } #endif extern void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif); - -static inline void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void) -{ - speculation_ctrl_update(current_thread_info()->flags); -} +extern void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h index 6d201699c651..82b73b75d67c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct thread_info { #define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7 /* syscall auditing active */ #define TIF_SECCOMP 8 /* secure computing */ #define TIF_SPEC_IB 9 /* Indirect branch speculation mitigation */ +#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE 10 /* Force speculation MSR update in context switch */ #define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY 11 /* notify kernel of userspace return */ #define TIF_UPROBE 12 /* breakpointed or singlestepping */ #define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 13 /* pending live patching update */ @@ -112,6 +113,7 @@ struct thread_info { #define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT) #define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP) #define _TIF_SPEC_IB (1 << TIF_SPEC_IB) +#define _TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE (1 << TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE) #define _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY (1 << TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY) #define _TIF_UPROBE (1 << TIF_UPROBE) #define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING (1 << TIF_PATCH_PENDING) @@ -149,7 +151,7 @@ struct thread_info { /* flags to check in __switch_to() */ #define _TIF_WORK_CTXSW_BASE \ (_TIF_IO_BITMAP|_TIF_NOCPUID|_TIF_NOTSC|_TIF_BLOCKSTEP| \ - _TIF_SSBD) + _TIF_SSBD | _TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE) /* * Avoid calls to __switch_to_xtra() on UP as STIBP is not evaluated. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 8359a5e382fe..642201af98be 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -700,14 +700,10 @@ static void ssb_select_mitigation(void) #undef pr_fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculation prctl: " fmt -static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk, int tifbit, bool on) +static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk) { - bool update; - - if (on) - update = !test_and_set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, tifbit); - else - update = test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, tifbit); + /* Force the update of the real TIF bits */ + set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE); /* * Immediately update the speculation control MSRs for the current @@ -717,7 +713,7 @@ static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk, int tifbit, bool on) * This can only happen for SECCOMP mitigation. For PRCTL it's * always the current task. */ - if (tsk == current && update) + if (tsk == current) speculation_ctrl_update_current(); } @@ -733,16 +729,16 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task)) return -EPERM; task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task); - task_update_spec_tif(task, TIF_SSBD, false); + task_update_spec_tif(task); break; case PR_SPEC_DISABLE: task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task); - task_update_spec_tif(task, TIF_SSBD, true); + task_update_spec_tif(task); break; case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE: task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task); task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task); - task_update_spec_tif(task, TIF_SSBD, true); + task_update_spec_tif(task); break; default: return -ERANGE; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index cdf8e6694f71..afbe2eb4a1c6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -443,6 +443,18 @@ static __always_inline void __speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tifp, wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr); } +static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + if (test_and_clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE)) { + if (task_spec_ssb_disable(tsk)) + set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SSBD); + else + clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SSBD); + } + /* Return the updated threadinfo flags*/ + return task_thread_info(tsk)->flags; +} + void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif) { /* Forced update. Make sure all relevant TIF flags are different */ @@ -451,6 +463,14 @@ void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif) preempt_enable(); } +/* Called from seccomp/prctl update */ +void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + speculation_ctrl_update(speculation_ctrl_update_tif(current)); + preempt_enable(); +} + void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p) { struct thread_struct *prev, *next; @@ -482,7 +502,15 @@ void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p) if ((tifp ^ tifn) & _TIF_NOCPUID) set_cpuid_faulting(!!(tifn & _TIF_NOCPUID)); - __speculation_ctrl_update(tifp, tifn); + if (likely(!((tifp | tifn) & _TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE))) { + __speculation_ctrl_update(tifp, tifn); + } else { + speculation_ctrl_update_tif(prev_p); + tifn = speculation_ctrl_update_tif(next_p); + + /* Enforce MSR update to ensure consistent state */ + __speculation_ctrl_update(~tifn, tifn); + } } /* From f67fafb88c466427a4cc0d637786f466b7e32c8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 057/140] x86/speculation: Prepare arch_smt_update() for PRCTL mode commit 6893a959d7fdebbab5f5aa112c277d5a44435ba1 upstream The upcoming fine grained per task STIBP control needs to be updated on CPU hotplug as well. Split out the code which controls the strict mode so the prctl control code can be added later. Mark the SMP function call argument __unused while at it. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.759457117@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 642201af98be..9f87a7c964a2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -528,40 +528,44 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) arch_smt_update(); } -static bool stibp_needed(void) -{ - /* Enhanced IBRS makes using STIBP unnecessary. */ - if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) - return false; - - /* Check for strict user mitigation mode */ - return spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT; -} - -static void update_stibp_msr(void *info) +static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) { wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); } +/* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */ +static void update_stibp_strict(void) +{ + u64 mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; + + if (sched_smt_active()) + mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; + + if (mask == x86_spec_ctrl_base) + return; + + pr_info("Update user space SMT mitigation: STIBP %s\n", + mask & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ? "always-on" : "off"); + x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask; + on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1); +} + void arch_smt_update(void) { - u64 mask; - - if (!stibp_needed()) + /* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */ + if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) return; mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); - mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; - if (sched_smt_active()) - mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; - - if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) { - pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n", - mask & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ? "Enabling" : "Disabling"); - x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask; - on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1); + switch (spectre_v2_user) { + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: + break; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: + update_stibp_strict(); + break; } + mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); } From 238ba6e75855c48b4175a5a6590a716e4563e578 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 058/140] x86/speculation: Add prctl() control for indirect branch speculation commit 9137bb27e60e554dab694eafa4cca241fa3a694f upstream Add the PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH option for the PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL and PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL prctls to allow fine grained per task control of indirect branch speculation via STIBP and IBPB. Invocations: Check indirect branch speculation status with - prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0); Enable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); Disable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); Force disable indirect branch speculation with - prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0); See Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst. Signed-off-by: Tim Chen Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.866780996@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 9 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 5 ++ include/linux/sched.h | 9 +++ include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 + tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 93 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst index 32f3d55c54b7..c4dbe6f7cdae 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst @@ -92,3 +92,12 @@ Speculation misfeature controls * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0); + +- PR_SPEC_INDIR_BRANCH: Indirect Branch Speculation in User Processes + (Mitigate Spectre V2 style attacks against user processes) + + Invocations: + * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, 0, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0); diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index d4d35baf0430..2adbe7b047fa 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -232,6 +232,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE, SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT, + SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL, }; /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 9f87a7c964a2..9afac5792a88 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -564,6 +564,8 @@ void arch_smt_update(void) case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: update_stibp_strict(); break; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: + break; } mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex); @@ -750,12 +752,50 @@ static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) return 0; } +static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl) +{ + switch (ctrl) { + case PR_SPEC_ENABLE: + if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE) + return 0; + /* + * Indirect branch speculation is always disabled in strict + * mode. + */ + if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT) + return -EPERM; + task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task); + task_update_spec_tif(task); + break; + case PR_SPEC_DISABLE: + case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE: + /* + * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when + * mitigation is force disabled. + */ + if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE) + return -EPERM; + if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT) + return 0; + task_set_spec_ib_disable(task); + if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE) + task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task); + task_update_spec_tif(task); + break; + default: + return -ERANGE; + } + return 0; +} + int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which, unsigned long ctrl) { switch (which) { case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl); + case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH: + return ib_prctl_set(task, ctrl); default: return -ENODEV; } @@ -788,11 +828,34 @@ static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task) } } +static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) + return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; + + switch (spectre_v2_user) { + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: + return PR_SPEC_ENABLE; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: + if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task)) + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE; + if (task_spec_ib_disable(task)) + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE; + return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: + return PR_SPEC_DISABLE; + default: + return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED; + } +} + int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which) { switch (which) { case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS: return ssb_prctl_get(task); + case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH: + return ib_prctl_get(task); default: return -ENODEV; } @@ -972,6 +1035,8 @@ static char *stibp_state(void) return ", STIBP: disabled"; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: return ", STIBP: forced"; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: + return ""; } return ""; } @@ -984,6 +1049,8 @@ static char *ibpb_state(void) return ", IBPB: disabled"; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: return ", IBPB: always-on"; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: + return ""; } } return ""; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c index afbe2eb4a1c6..7d31192296a8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c @@ -450,6 +450,11 @@ static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk) set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SSBD); else clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SSBD); + + if (task_spec_ib_disable(tsk)) + set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_IB); + else + clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_IB); } /* Return the updated threadinfo flags*/ return task_thread_info(tsk)->flags; diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h index 977cb57d7bc9..52a717d23f05 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -1439,6 +1439,8 @@ static inline bool is_percpu_thread(void) #define PFA_SPREAD_SLAB 2 /* Spread some slab caches over cpuset */ #define PFA_SPEC_SSB_DISABLE 3 /* Speculative Store Bypass disabled */ #define PFA_SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE 4 /* Speculative Store Bypass force disabled*/ +#define PFA_SPEC_IB_DISABLE 5 /* Indirect branch speculation restricted */ +#define PFA_SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE 6 /* Indirect branch speculation permanently restricted */ #define TASK_PFA_TEST(name, func) \ static inline bool task_##func(struct task_struct *p) \ @@ -1470,6 +1472,13 @@ TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_SSB_DISABLE, spec_ssb_disable) TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable) TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_SSB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ssb_force_disable) +TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_IB_DISABLE, spec_ib_disable) +TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_IB_DISABLE, spec_ib_disable) +TASK_PFA_CLEAR(SPEC_IB_DISABLE, spec_ib_disable) + +TASK_PFA_TEST(SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ib_force_disable) +TASK_PFA_SET(SPEC_IB_FORCE_DISABLE, spec_ib_force_disable) + static inline void current_restore_flags(unsigned long orig_flags, unsigned long flags) { diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index c0d7ea0bf5b6..b17201edfa09 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { #define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53 /* Speculation control variants */ # define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0 +# define PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH 1 /* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */ # define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0 # define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0) diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index c0d7ea0bf5b6..b17201edfa09 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { #define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53 /* Speculation control variants */ # define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0 +# define PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH 1 /* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */ # define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0 # define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0) From 7b62ef142c11d5c120105e3409a2a03245c4c1ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 059/140] x86/speculation: Enable prctl mode for spectre_v2_user commit 7cc765a67d8e04ef7d772425ca5a2a1e2b894c15 upstream Now that all prerequisites are in place: - Add the prctl command line option - Default the 'auto' mode to 'prctl' - When SMT state changes, update the static key which controls the conditional STIBP evaluation on context switch. - At init update the static key which controls the conditional IBPB evaluation on context switch. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.958421388@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 +++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 41 +++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index ccef87bd1d65..f1e0c8ab6e9c 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4211,9 +4211,14 @@ off - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is enforced by spectre_v2=off + prctl - Indirect branch speculation is enabled, + but mitigation can be enabled via prctl + per thread. The mitigation control state + is inherited on fork. + auto - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on the available CPU features and vulnerability. - Default is off. + Default is prctl. Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2_user=auto. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 9afac5792a88..20c0e8c9e47f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -255,11 +255,13 @@ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd { SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, + SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, }; static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE] = "User space: Vulnerable", [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection", + [SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl", }; static const struct { @@ -270,6 +272,7 @@ static const struct { { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, false }, { "off", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, false }, { "on", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, true }, + { "prctl", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, false }, }; static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) @@ -324,12 +327,15 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) smt_possible = false; switch (spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd)) { - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO: case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE: goto set_mode; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE: mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT; break; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL: + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL; + break; } /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -340,6 +346,9 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb); break; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: + static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb); + break; default: break; } @@ -352,6 +361,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) return; + /* + * If SMT is not possible or STIBP is not available clear the STIPB + * mode. + */ + if (!smt_possible || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; set_mode: spectre_v2_user = mode; /* Only print the STIBP mode when SMT possible */ @@ -550,6 +565,15 @@ static void update_stibp_strict(void) on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1); } +/* Update the static key controlling the evaluation of TIF_SPEC_IB */ +static void update_indir_branch_cond(void) +{ + if (sched_smt_active()) + static_branch_enable(&switch_to_cond_stibp); + else + static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp); +} + void arch_smt_update(void) { /* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */ @@ -565,6 +589,7 @@ void arch_smt_update(void) update_stibp_strict(); break; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: + update_indir_branch_cond(); break; } @@ -1036,7 +1061,8 @@ static char *stibp_state(void) case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: return ", STIBP: forced"; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: - return ""; + if (static_key_enabled(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) + return ", STIBP: conditional"; } return ""; } @@ -1044,14 +1070,11 @@ static char *stibp_state(void) static char *ibpb_state(void) { if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { - switch (spectre_v2_user) { - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: - return ", IBPB: disabled"; - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: + if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb)) return ", IBPB: always-on"; - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: - return ""; - } + if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb)) + return ", IBPB: conditional"; + return ", IBPB: disabled"; } return ""; } From d1ec2354787a948a2a2670181e461278edce40e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 060/140] x86/speculation: Add seccomp Spectre v2 user space protection mode commit 6b3e64c237c072797a9ec918654a60e3a46488e2 upstream If 'prctl' mode of user space protection from spectre v2 is selected on the kernel command-line, STIBP and IBPB are applied on tasks which restrict their indirect branch speculation via prctl. SECCOMP enables the SSBD mitigation for sandboxed tasks already, so it makes sense to prevent spectre v2 user space to user space attacks as well. The Intel mitigation guide documents how STIPB works: Setting bit 1 (STIBP) of the IA32_SPEC_CTRL MSR on a logical processor prevents the predicted targets of indirect branches on any logical processor of that core from being controlled by software that executes (or executed previously) on another logical processor of the same core. Ergo setting STIBP protects the task itself from being attacked from a task running on a different hyper-thread and protects the tasks running on different hyper-threads from being attacked. While the document suggests that the branch predictors are shielded between the logical processors, the observed performance regressions suggest that STIBP simply disables the branch predictor more or less completely. Of course the document wording is vague, but the fact that there is also no requirement for issuing IBPB when STIBP is used points clearly in that direction. The kernel still issues IBPB even when STIBP is used until Intel clarifies the whole mechanism. IBPB is issued when the task switches out, so malicious sandbox code cannot mistrain the branch predictor for the next user space task on the same logical processor. Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.051663132@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 ++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index f1e0c8ab6e9c..f628cd8d0e9f 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4216,9 +4216,16 @@ per thread. The mitigation control state is inherited on fork. + seccomp + - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp + threads will enable the mitigation unless + they explicitly opt out. + auto - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on the available CPU features and vulnerability. - Default is prctl. + + Default mitigation: + If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl" Not specifying this option is equivalent to spectre_v2_user=auto. diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 2adbe7b047fa..032b6009baab 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation { SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE, SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT, SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL, + SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP, }; /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 20c0e8c9e47f..9b5c42d33f1e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -256,12 +256,14 @@ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd { SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, + SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP, }; static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE] = "User space: Vulnerable", [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection", [SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl", + [SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via seccomp and prctl", }; static const struct { @@ -273,6 +275,7 @@ static const struct { { "off", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, false }, { "on", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, true }, { "prctl", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, false }, + { "seccomp", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP, false }, }; static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) @@ -332,10 +335,16 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE: mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT; break; - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO: case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL: mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL; break; + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP: + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP)) + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP; + else + mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL; + break; } /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ @@ -347,6 +356,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb); break; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP: static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb); break; default: @@ -589,6 +599,7 @@ void arch_smt_update(void) update_stibp_strict(); break; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP: update_indir_branch_cond(); break; } @@ -831,6 +842,8 @@ void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task) { if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP) ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE); + if (spectre_v2_user == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP) + ib_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE); } #endif @@ -862,6 +875,7 @@ static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task) case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE: return PR_SPEC_ENABLE; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP: if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task)) return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE; if (task_spec_ib_disable(task)) @@ -1061,6 +1075,7 @@ static char *stibp_state(void) case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: return ", STIBP: forced"; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP: if (static_key_enabled(&switch_to_cond_stibp)) return ", STIBP: conditional"; } From 9f3baacee183853cfb5b9d5f62ae3ece1305494e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thomas Gleixner Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 19:33:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 061/140] x86/speculation: Provide IBPB always command line options commit 55a974021ec952ee460dc31ca08722158639de72 upstream Provide the possibility to enable IBPB always in combination with 'prctl' and 'seccomp'. Add the extra command line options and rework the IBPB selection to evaluate the command instead of the mode selected by the STIPB switch case. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Jiri Kosina Cc: Tom Lendacky Cc: Josh Poimboeuf Cc: Andrea Arcangeli Cc: David Woodhouse Cc: Tim Chen Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Asit Mallick Cc: Arjan van de Ven Cc: Jon Masters Cc: Waiman Long Cc: Greg KH Cc: Dave Stewart Cc: Kees Cook Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185006.144047038@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 34 +++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index f628cd8d0e9f..0c404cda531a 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -4216,11 +4216,23 @@ per thread. The mitigation control state is inherited on fork. + prctl,ibpb + - Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is + controlled per thread. IBPB is issued + always when switching between different user + space processes. + seccomp - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp threads will enable the mitigation unless they explicitly opt out. + seccomp,ibpb + - Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is + controlled per thread. IBPB is issued + always when switching between different + user space processes. + auto - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on the available CPU features and vulnerability. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 9b5c42d33f1e..78928f56cf72 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -256,7 +256,9 @@ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd { SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, + SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB, SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP, + SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB, }; static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = { @@ -271,11 +273,13 @@ static const struct { enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd; bool secure; } v2_user_options[] __initdata = { - { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, false }, - { "off", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, false }, - { "on", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, true }, - { "prctl", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, false }, - { "seccomp", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP, false }, + { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, false }, + { "off", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, false }, + { "on", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, true }, + { "prctl", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, false }, + { "prctl,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB, false }, + { "seccomp", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP, false }, + { "seccomp,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB, false }, }; static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) @@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) { enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE; bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP); + enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd; if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) return; @@ -329,17 +334,20 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED) smt_possible = false; - switch (spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd)) { + cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd); + switch (cmd) { case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE: goto set_mode; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE: mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT; break; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB: mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL; break; case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO: case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB: if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP)) mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP; else @@ -351,12 +359,15 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); - switch (mode) { - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT: + switch (cmd) { + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB: static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb); break; - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL: - case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO: + case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP: static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb); break; default: @@ -364,7 +375,8 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd) } pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n", - mode == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ? "always-on" : "conditional"); + static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ? + "always-on" : "conditional"); } /* If enhanced IBRS is enabled no STIPB required */ From 34b7a7cc5321a1b5e13320443557ba1cb11b42e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrea Arcangeli Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:09:32 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 062/140] userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas commit 29ec90660d68bbdd69507c1c8b4e33aa299278b1 upstream. After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY. The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless it's a MAP_PRIVATE. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing") Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins Reported-by: Jann Horn Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support") Cc: Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Cc: Mike Kravetz Cc: Peter Xu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/userfaultfd.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ mm/userfaultfd.c | 15 ++++++--------- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c index 356d2b8568c1..cd58939dc977 100644 --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c @@ -1361,6 +1361,19 @@ static int userfaultfd_register(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, ret = -EINVAL; if (!vma_can_userfault(cur)) goto out_unlock; + + /* + * UFFDIO_COPY will fill file holes even without + * PROT_WRITE. This check enforces that if this is a + * MAP_SHARED, the process has write permission to the backing + * file. If VM_MAYWRITE is set it also enforces that on a + * MAP_SHARED vma: there is no F_WRITE_SEAL and no further + * F_WRITE_SEAL can be taken until the vma is destroyed. + */ + ret = -EPERM; + if (unlikely(!(cur->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE))) + goto out_unlock; + /* * If this vma contains ending address, and huge pages * check alignment. @@ -1406,6 +1419,7 @@ static int userfaultfd_register(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, BUG_ON(!vma_can_userfault(vma)); BUG_ON(vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx && vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx != ctx); + WARN_ON(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE)); /* * Nothing to do: this vma is already registered into this @@ -1552,6 +1566,7 @@ static int userfaultfd_unregister(struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx, cond_resched(); BUG_ON(!vma_can_userfault(vma)); + WARN_ON(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYWRITE)); /* * Nothing to do: this vma is already registered into this diff --git a/mm/userfaultfd.c b/mm/userfaultfd.c index 5029f241908f..f0af11b1cdf3 100644 --- a/mm/userfaultfd.c +++ b/mm/userfaultfd.c @@ -205,8 +205,9 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t __mcopy_atomic_hugetlb(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, if (!dst_vma || !is_vm_hugetlb_page(dst_vma)) goto out_unlock; /* - * Only allow __mcopy_atomic_hugetlb on userfaultfd - * registered ranges. + * Check the vma is registered in uffd, this is + * required to enforce the VM_MAYWRITE check done at + * uffd registration time. */ if (!dst_vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx) goto out_unlock; @@ -449,13 +450,9 @@ static __always_inline ssize_t __mcopy_atomic(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, if (!dst_vma) goto out_unlock; /* - * Be strict and only allow __mcopy_atomic on userfaultfd - * registered ranges to prevent userland errors going - * unnoticed. As far as the VM consistency is concerned, it - * would be perfectly safe to remove this check, but there's - * no useful usage for __mcopy_atomic ouside of userfaultfd - * registered ranges. This is after all why these are ioctls - * belonging to the userfaultfd and not syscalls. + * Check the vma is registered in uffd, this is required to + * enforce the VM_MAYWRITE check done at uffd registration + * time. */ if (!dst_vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx) goto out_unlock; From 471aca5725299ef1af55c98ff7f5b49b32c3e7ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Junaid Shahid Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 14:53:57 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 063/140] kvm: mmu: Fix race in emulated page table writes commit 0e0fee5c539b61fdd098332e0e2cc375d9073706 upstream. When a guest page table is updated via an emulated write, kvm_mmu_pte_write() is called to update the shadow PTE using the just written guest PTE value. But if two emulated guest PTE writes happened concurrently, it is possible that the guest PTE and the shadow PTE end up being out of sync. Emulated writes do not mark the shadow page as unsync-ed, so this inconsistency will not be resolved even by a guest TLB flush (unless the page was marked as unsync-ed at some other point). This is fixed by re-reading the current value of the guest PTE after the MMU lock has been acquired instead of just using the value that was written prior to calling kvm_mmu_pte_write(). Signed-off-by: Junaid Shahid Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 27 +++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c index 51b953ad9d4e..1b82bc7c3cca 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c @@ -5013,9 +5013,9 @@ static bool need_remote_flush(u64 old, u64 new) } static u64 mmu_pte_write_fetch_gpte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t *gpa, - const u8 *new, int *bytes) + int *bytes) { - u64 gentry; + u64 gentry = 0; int r; /* @@ -5027,22 +5027,12 @@ static u64 mmu_pte_write_fetch_gpte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t *gpa, /* Handle a 32-bit guest writing two halves of a 64-bit gpte */ *gpa &= ~(gpa_t)7; *bytes = 8; - r = kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, *gpa, &gentry, 8); - if (r) - gentry = 0; - new = (const u8 *)&gentry; } - switch (*bytes) { - case 4: - gentry = *(const u32 *)new; - break; - case 8: - gentry = *(const u64 *)new; - break; - default: - gentry = 0; - break; + if (*bytes == 4 || *bytes == 8) { + r = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic(vcpu, *gpa, &gentry, *bytes); + if (r) + gentry = 0; } return gentry; @@ -5146,8 +5136,6 @@ static void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, pgprintk("%s: gpa %llx bytes %d\n", __func__, gpa, bytes); - gentry = mmu_pte_write_fetch_gpte(vcpu, &gpa, new, &bytes); - /* * No need to care whether allocation memory is successful * or not since pte prefetch is skiped if it does not have @@ -5156,6 +5144,9 @@ static void kvm_mmu_pte_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu); spin_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); + + gentry = mmu_pte_write_fetch_gpte(vcpu, &gpa, &bytes); + ++vcpu->kvm->stat.mmu_pte_write; kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_PRE_PTE_WRITE); From b8b0c871640f3330fd1bf00a0da9f7ea178fa727 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jim Mattson Date: Tue, 22 May 2018 09:54:20 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 064/140] kvm: svm: Ensure an IBPB on all affected CPUs when freeing a vmcb commit fd65d3142f734bc4376053c8d75670041903134d upstream. Previously, we only called indirect_branch_prediction_barrier on the logical CPU that freed a vmcb. This function should be called on all logical CPUs that last loaded the vmcb in question. Fixes: 15d45071523d ("KVM/x86: Add IBPB support") Reported-by: Neel Natu Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 61ccfb13899e..8df16166ef4d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -2187,21 +2187,31 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *svm_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id) return ERR_PTR(err); } +static void svm_clear_current_vmcb(struct vmcb *vmcb) +{ + int i; + + for_each_online_cpu(i) + cmpxchg(&per_cpu(svm_data, i)->current_vmcb, vmcb, NULL); +} + static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); + /* + * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in + * svm_vcpu_load(). So, ensure that no logical CPU has this + * vmcb page recorded as its current vmcb. + */ + svm_clear_current_vmcb(svm->vmcb); + __free_page(pfn_to_page(__sme_clr(svm->vmcb_pa) >> PAGE_SHIFT)); __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER); __free_page(virt_to_page(svm->nested.hsave)); __free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER); kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu); kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm); - /* - * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in - * svm_vcpu_load(). So do a full IBPB now. - */ - indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(); } static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu) From 76c8476cc7204a4854a24e1cf47b1476d428b5fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Leonid Shatz Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 12:14:25 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 065/140] KVM: nVMX/nSVM: Fix bug which sets vcpu->arch.tsc_offset to L1 tsc_offset commit 326e742533bf0a23f0127d8ea62fb558ba665f08 upstream. Since commit e79f245ddec1 ("X86/KVM: Properly update 'tsc_offset' to represent the running guest"), vcpu->arch.tsc_offset meaning was changed to always reflect the tsc_offset value set on active VMCS. Regardless if vCPU is currently running L1 or L2. However, above mentioned commit failed to also change kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset() to set vcpu->arch.tsc_offset correctly. This is because vmx_write_tsc_offset() could set the tsc_offset value in active VMCS to given offset parameter *plus vmcs12->tsc_offset*. However, kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset() just sets vcpu->arch.tsc_offset to given offset parameter. Without taking into account the possible addition of vmcs12->tsc_offset. (Same is true for SVM case). Fix this issue by changing kvm_x86_ops->write_tsc_offset() to return actually set tsc_offset in active VMCS and modify kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset() to set returned value in vcpu->arch.tsc_offset. In addition, rename write_tsc_offset() callback to write_l1_tsc_offset() to make it clear that it is meant to set L1 TSC offset. Fixes: e79f245ddec1 ("X86/KVM: Properly update 'tsc_offset' to represent the running guest") Reviewed-by: Liran Alon Reviewed-by: Mihai Carabas Reviewed-by: Krish Sadhukhan Signed-off-by: Leonid Shatz Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 5 +++-- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 21 +++++++++------------ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 1c09a0d1771f..022845ee0c88 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1046,7 +1046,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops { bool (*has_wbinvd_exit)(void); u64 (*read_l1_tsc_offset)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); - void (*write_tsc_offset)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset); + /* Returns actual tsc_offset set in active VMCS */ + u64 (*write_l1_tsc_offset)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset); void (*get_exit_info)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *info1, u64 *info2); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 8df16166ef4d..4397fa0c448f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -1444,7 +1444,7 @@ static u64 svm_read_l1_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return vcpu->arch.tsc_offset; } -static void svm_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset) +static u64 svm_write_l1_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); u64 g_tsc_offset = 0; @@ -1462,6 +1462,7 @@ static void svm_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset) svm->vmcb->control.tsc_offset = offset + g_tsc_offset; mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_INTERCEPTS); + return svm->vmcb->control.tsc_offset; } static void avic_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) @@ -7155,7 +7156,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = { .has_wbinvd_exit = svm_has_wbinvd_exit, .read_l1_tsc_offset = svm_read_l1_tsc_offset, - .write_tsc_offset = svm_write_tsc_offset, + .write_l1_tsc_offset = svm_write_l1_tsc_offset, .set_tdp_cr3 = set_tdp_cr3, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index 9f3def7baa6d..b25cc81e039e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -3433,11 +3433,9 @@ static u64 vmx_read_l1_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) return vcpu->arch.tsc_offset; } -/* - * writes 'offset' into guest's timestamp counter offset register - */ -static void vmx_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset) +static u64 vmx_write_l1_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset) { + u64 active_offset = offset; if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) { /* * We're here if L1 chose not to trap WRMSR to TSC. According @@ -3445,17 +3443,16 @@ static void vmx_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset) * set for L2 remains unchanged, and still needs to be added * to the newly set TSC to get L2's TSC. */ - struct vmcs12 *vmcs12; - /* recalculate vmcs02.TSC_OFFSET: */ - vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); - vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, offset + - (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETING) ? - vmcs12->tsc_offset : 0)); + struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu); + if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETING)) + active_offset += vmcs12->tsc_offset; } else { trace_kvm_write_tsc_offset(vcpu->vcpu_id, vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET), offset); - vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, offset); } + + vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, active_offset); + return active_offset; } /* @@ -14203,7 +14200,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = { .has_wbinvd_exit = cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit, .read_l1_tsc_offset = vmx_read_l1_tsc_offset, - .write_tsc_offset = vmx_write_tsc_offset, + .write_l1_tsc_offset = vmx_write_l1_tsc_offset, .set_tdp_cr3 = vmx_set_cr3, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index ca717737347e..0f9d7fa27894 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1582,8 +1582,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_read_l1_tsc); static void kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset) { - kvm_x86_ops->write_tsc_offset(vcpu, offset); - vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = offset; + vcpu->arch.tsc_offset = kvm_x86_ops->write_l1_tsc_offset(vcpu, offset); } static inline bool kvm_check_tsc_unstable(void) @@ -1711,7 +1710,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_write_tsc); static inline void adjust_tsc_offset_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, s64 adjustment) { - kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset(vcpu, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset + adjustment); + u64 tsc_offset = kvm_x86_ops->read_l1_tsc_offset(vcpu); + kvm_vcpu_write_tsc_offset(vcpu, tsc_offset + adjustment); } static inline void adjust_tsc_offset_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, s64 adjustment) From 6d772df4038e9eb45043a062381130870a439e0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Liran Alon Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 00:43:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 066/140] KVM: x86: Fix kernel info-leak in KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING hypercall commit bcbfbd8ec21096027f1ee13ce6c185e8175166f6 upstream. kvm_pv_clock_pairing() allocates local var "struct kvm_clock_pairing clock_pairing" on stack and initializes all it's fields besides padding (clock_pairing.pad[]). Because clock_pairing var is written completely (including padding) to guest memory, failure to init struct padding results in kernel info-leak. Fix the issue by making sure to also init the padding with zeroes. Fixes: 55dd00a73a51 ("KVM: x86: add KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING hypercall") Reported-by: syzbot+a8ef68d71211ba264f56@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda Signed-off-by: Liran Alon Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 0f9d7fa27894..e3eba64419c7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -6788,6 +6788,7 @@ static int kvm_pv_clock_pairing(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t paddr, clock_pairing.nsec = ts.tv_nsec; clock_pairing.tsc = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, cycle); clock_pairing.flags = 0; + memset(&clock_pairing.pad, 0, sizeof(clock_pairing.pad)); ret = 0; if (kvm_write_guest(vcpu->kvm, paddr, &clock_pairing, From ffb01e73737b4d3e66734c901ee666ae8a23a857 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wanpeng Li Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 09:39:30 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 067/140] KVM: LAPIC: Fix pv ipis use-before-initialization MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 38ab012f109caf10f471db1adf284e620dd8d701 upstream. Reported by syzkaller: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000014 PGD 800000040410c067 P4D 800000040410c067 PUD 40410d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 2567 Comm: poc Tainted: G OE 4.19.0-rc5 #16 RIP: 0010:kvm_pv_send_ipi+0x94/0x350 [kvm] Call Trace: kvm_emulate_hypercall+0x3cc/0x700 [kvm] handle_vmcall+0xe/0x10 [kvm_intel] vmx_handle_exit+0xc1/0x11b0 [kvm_intel] vcpu_enter_guest+0x9fb/0x1910 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x35c/0x610 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3e9/0x6d0 [kvm] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa5/0x690 ksys_ioctl+0x6d/0x80 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x6e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The reason is that the apic map has not yet been initialized, the testcase triggers pv_send_ipi interface by vmcall which results in kvm->arch.apic_map is dereferenced. This patch fixes it by checking whether or not apic map is NULL and bailing out immediately if that is the case. Fixes: 4180bf1b65 (KVM: X86: Implement "send IPI" hypercall) Reported-by: Wei Wu Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Radim Krčmář Cc: Wei Wu Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c index fbb0e6df121b..2216d21e955d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c @@ -571,6 +571,11 @@ int kvm_pv_send_ipi(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long ipi_bitmap_low, rcu_read_lock(); map = rcu_dereference(kvm->arch.apic_map); + if (unlikely(!map)) { + count = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto out; + } + if (min > map->max_apic_id) goto out; /* Bits above cluster_size are masked in the caller. */ From 61c42d657c859ccc95e53afdac64f73a0053b8ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Wanpeng Li Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 16:34:18 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 068/140] KVM: X86: Fix scan ioapic use-before-initialization MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit e97f852fd4561e77721bb9a4e0ea9d98305b1e93 upstream. Reported by syzkaller: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8 PGD 80000003ec4da067 P4D 80000003ec4da067 PUD 3f7bfa067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 7 PID: 5059 Comm: debug Tainted: G OE 4.19.0-rc5 #16 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x1a6/0x1990 Call Trace: lock_acquire+0xdb/0x210 _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x70 kvm_ioapic_scan_entry+0x3e/0x110 [kvm] vcpu_enter_guest+0x167e/0x1910 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x35c/0x610 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3e9/0x6d0 [kvm] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa5/0x690 ksys_ioctl+0x6d/0x80 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x83/0x6e0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe The reason is that the testcase writes hyperv synic HV_X64_MSR_SINT6 msr and triggers scan ioapic logic to load synic vectors into EOI exit bitmap. However, irqchip is not initialized by this simple testcase, ioapic/apic objects should not be accessed. This can be triggered by the following program: #define _GNU_SOURCE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include uint64_t r[3] = {0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff}; int main(void) { syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000, 0x1000000, 3, 0x32, -1, 0); long res = 0; memcpy((void*)0x20000040, "/dev/kvm", 9); res = syscall(__NR_openat, 0xffffffffffffff9c, 0x20000040, 0, 0); if (res != -1) r[0] = res; res = syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[0], 0xae01, 0); if (res != -1) r[1] = res; res = syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[1], 0xae41, 0); if (res != -1) r[2] = res; memcpy( (void*)0x20000080, "\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x5b\x61\xbb\x96\x00\x00\x40\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00" "\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0b\x77\xd1\x78\x4d\xd8\x3a\xed\xb1\x5c\x2e\x43" "\xaa\x43\x39\xd6\xff\xf5\xf0\xa8\x98\xf2\x3e\x37\x29\x89\xde\x88\xc6\x33" "\xfc\x2a\xdb\xb7\xe1\x4c\xac\x28\x61\x7b\x9c\xa9\xbc\x0d\xa0\x63\xfe\xfe" "\xe8\x75\xde\xdd\x19\x38\xdc\x34\xf5\xec\x05\xfd\xeb\x5d\xed\x2e\xaf\x22" "\xfa\xab\xb7\xe4\x42\x67\xd0\xaf\x06\x1c\x6a\x35\x67\x10\x55\xcb", 106); syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[2], 0x4008ae89, 0x20000080); syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[2], 0xae80, 0); return 0; } This patch fixes it by bailing out scan ioapic if ioapic is not initialized in kernel. Reported-by: Wei Wu Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Radim Krčmář Cc: Wei Wu Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index e3eba64419c7..68b53f05a420 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -7314,7 +7314,8 @@ static void vcpu_scan_ioapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) else { if (vcpu->arch.apicv_active) kvm_x86_ops->sync_pir_to_irr(vcpu); - kvm_ioapic_scan_entry(vcpu, vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors); + if (ioapic_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm)) + kvm_ioapic_scan_entry(vcpu, vcpu->arch.ioapic_handled_vectors); } if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) From bbe23c4b948f4e52fde6922a5924ff25f53f1847 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Capitulino Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2018 12:02:14 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 069/140] KVM: VMX: re-add ple_gap module parameter commit a87c99e61236ba8ca962ce97a19fab5ebd588d35 upstream. Apparently, the ple_gap parameter was accidentally removed by commit c8e88717cfc6b36bedea22368d97667446318291. Add it back. Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c8e88717cfc6b36bedea22368d97667446318291 Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c index b25cc81e039e..e55f7a90d4b2 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool, S_IRUGO); * refer SDM volume 3b section 21.6.13 & 22.1.3. */ static unsigned int ple_gap = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP; +module_param(ple_gap, uint, 0444); static unsigned int ple_window = KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW; module_param(ple_window, uint, 0444); From 4ec1039f474b3b8070c6de8dcd44d3958224d250 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Max Filippov Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 13:29:41 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 070/140] xtensa: enable coprocessors that are being flushed commit 2958b66694e018c552be0b60521fec27e8d12988 upstream. coprocessor_flush_all may be called from a context of a thread that is different from the thread being flushed. In that case contents of the cpenable special register may not match ti->cpenable of the target thread, resulting in unhandled coprocessor exception in the kernel context. Set cpenable special register to the ti->cpenable of the target register for the duration of the flush and restore it afterwards. This fixes the following crash caused by coprocessor register inspection in native gdb: (gdb) p/x $w0 Illegal instruction in kernel: sig: 9 [#1] PREEMPT Call Trace: ___might_sleep+0x184/0x1a4 __might_sleep+0x41/0xac exit_signals+0x14/0x218 do_exit+0xc9/0x8b8 die+0x99/0xa0 do_illegal_instruction+0x18/0x6c common_exception+0x77/0x77 coprocessor_flush+0x16/0x3c arch_ptrace+0x46c/0x674 sys_ptrace+0x2ce/0x3b4 system_call+0x54/0x80 common_exception+0x77/0x77 note: gdb[100] exited with preempt_count 1 Killed Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Max Filippov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/xtensa/kernel/process.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/process.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/process.c index 483dcfb6e681..4bb68133a72a 100644 --- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/process.c @@ -94,18 +94,21 @@ void coprocessor_release_all(struct thread_info *ti) void coprocessor_flush_all(struct thread_info *ti) { - unsigned long cpenable; + unsigned long cpenable, old_cpenable; int i; preempt_disable(); + RSR_CPENABLE(old_cpenable); cpenable = ti->cpenable; + WSR_CPENABLE(cpenable); for (i = 0; i < XCHAL_CP_MAX; i++) { if ((cpenable & 1) != 0 && coprocessor_owner[i] == ti) coprocessor_flush(ti, i); cpenable >>= 1; } + WSR_CPENABLE(old_cpenable); preempt_enable(); } From 5f84a996a0cbcc3ceb85adff5d5755590ad00e18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Max Filippov Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 15:18:26 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 071/140] xtensa: fix coprocessor context offset definitions commit 03bc996af0cc71c7f30c384d8ce7260172423b34 upstream. Coprocessor context offsets are used by the assembly code that moves coprocessor context between the individual fields of the thread_info::xtregs_cp structure and coprocessor registers. This fixes coprocessor context clobbering on flushing and reloading during normal user code execution and user process debugging in the presence of more than one coprocessor in the core configuration. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Max Filippov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/xtensa/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/asm-offsets.c index 67904f55f188..120dd746a147 100644 --- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -94,14 +94,14 @@ int main(void) DEFINE(THREAD_SP, offsetof (struct task_struct, thread.sp)); DEFINE(THREAD_CPENABLE, offsetof (struct thread_info, cpenable)); #if XTENSA_HAVE_COPROCESSORS - DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP0, offsetof (struct thread_info, xtregs_cp)); - DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP1, offsetof (struct thread_info, xtregs_cp)); - DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP2, offsetof (struct thread_info, xtregs_cp)); - DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP3, offsetof (struct thread_info, xtregs_cp)); - DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP4, offsetof (struct thread_info, xtregs_cp)); - DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP5, offsetof (struct thread_info, xtregs_cp)); - DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP6, offsetof (struct thread_info, xtregs_cp)); - DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP7, offsetof (struct thread_info, xtregs_cp)); + DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP0, offsetof(struct thread_info, xtregs_cp.cp0)); + DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP1, offsetof(struct thread_info, xtregs_cp.cp1)); + DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP2, offsetof(struct thread_info, xtregs_cp.cp2)); + DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP3, offsetof(struct thread_info, xtregs_cp.cp3)); + DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP4, offsetof(struct thread_info, xtregs_cp.cp4)); + DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP5, offsetof(struct thread_info, xtregs_cp.cp5)); + DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP6, offsetof(struct thread_info, xtregs_cp.cp6)); + DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_CP7, offsetof(struct thread_info, xtregs_cp.cp7)); #endif DEFINE(THREAD_XTREGS_USER, offsetof (struct thread_info, xtregs_user)); DEFINE(XTREGS_USER_SIZE, sizeof(xtregs_user_t)); From 01fb21bf2424786fa0632768ba8fd879c0feee87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Max Filippov Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 18:06:01 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 072/140] xtensa: fix coprocessor part of ptrace_{get,set}xregs commit 38a35a78c5e270cbe53c4fef6b0d3c2da90dd849 upstream. Layout of coprocessor registers in the elf_xtregs_t and xtregs_coprocessor_t may be different due to alignment. Thus it is not always possible to copy data between the xtregs_coprocessor_t structure and the elf_xtregs_t and get correct values for all registers. Use a table of offsets and sizes of individual coprocessor register groups to do coprocessor context copying in the ptrace_getxregs and ptrace_setxregs. This fixes incorrect coprocessor register values reading from the user process by the native gdb on an xtensa core with multiple coprocessors and registers with high alignment requirements. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Max Filippov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c index c0845cb1cbb9..d9541be0605a 100644 --- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -127,12 +127,37 @@ static int ptrace_setregs(struct task_struct *child, void __user *uregs) } +#if XTENSA_HAVE_COPROCESSORS +#define CP_OFFSETS(cp) \ + { \ + .elf_xtregs_offset = offsetof(elf_xtregs_t, cp), \ + .ti_offset = offsetof(struct thread_info, xtregs_cp.cp), \ + .sz = sizeof(xtregs_ ## cp ## _t), \ + } + +static const struct { + size_t elf_xtregs_offset; + size_t ti_offset; + size_t sz; +} cp_offsets[] = { + CP_OFFSETS(cp0), + CP_OFFSETS(cp1), + CP_OFFSETS(cp2), + CP_OFFSETS(cp3), + CP_OFFSETS(cp4), + CP_OFFSETS(cp5), + CP_OFFSETS(cp6), + CP_OFFSETS(cp7), +}; +#endif + static int ptrace_getxregs(struct task_struct *child, void __user *uregs) { struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child); struct thread_info *ti = task_thread_info(child); elf_xtregs_t __user *xtregs = uregs; int ret = 0; + int i __maybe_unused; if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uregs, sizeof(elf_xtregs_t))) return -EIO; @@ -140,8 +165,13 @@ static int ptrace_getxregs(struct task_struct *child, void __user *uregs) #if XTENSA_HAVE_COPROCESSORS /* Flush all coprocessor registers to memory. */ coprocessor_flush_all(ti); - ret |= __copy_to_user(&xtregs->cp0, &ti->xtregs_cp, - sizeof(xtregs_coprocessor_t)); + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cp_offsets); ++i) + ret |= __copy_to_user((char __user *)xtregs + + cp_offsets[i].elf_xtregs_offset, + (const char *)ti + + cp_offsets[i].ti_offset, + cp_offsets[i].sz); #endif ret |= __copy_to_user(&xtregs->opt, ®s->xtregs_opt, sizeof(xtregs->opt)); @@ -157,6 +187,7 @@ static int ptrace_setxregs(struct task_struct *child, void __user *uregs) struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child); elf_xtregs_t *xtregs = uregs; int ret = 0; + int i __maybe_unused; if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uregs, sizeof(elf_xtregs_t))) return -EFAULT; @@ -166,8 +197,11 @@ static int ptrace_setxregs(struct task_struct *child, void __user *uregs) coprocessor_flush_all(ti); coprocessor_release_all(ti); - ret |= __copy_from_user(&ti->xtregs_cp, &xtregs->cp0, - sizeof(xtregs_coprocessor_t)); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cp_offsets); ++i) + ret |= __copy_from_user((char *)ti + cp_offsets[i].ti_offset, + (const char __user *)xtregs + + cp_offsets[i].elf_xtregs_offset, + cp_offsets[i].sz); #endif ret |= __copy_from_user(®s->xtregs_opt, &xtregs->opt, sizeof(xtregs->opt)); From 949ddf8039bffb29a791061ab40175b592d0b57c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Kara Date: Fri, 16 Nov 2018 13:43:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 073/140] udf: Allow mounting volumes with incorrect identification strings commit b54e41f5efcb4316b2f30b30c2535cc194270373 upstream. Commit c26f6c615788 ("udf: Fix conversion of 'dstring' fields to UTF8") started to be more strict when checking whether converted strings are properly formatted. Sudip reports that there are DVDs where the volume identification string is actually too long - UDF reports: [ 632.309320] UDF-fs: incorrect dstring lengths (32/32) during mount and fails the mount. This is mostly harmless failure as we don't need volume identification (and even less volume set identification) for anything. So just truncate the volume identification string if it is too long and replace it with 'Invalid' if we just cannot convert it for other reasons. This keeps slightly incorrect media still mountable. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c26f6c615788 ("udf: Fix conversion of 'dstring' fields to UTF8") Reported-and-tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/udf/super.c | 16 ++++++++++------ fs/udf/unicode.c | 14 +++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/udf/super.c b/fs/udf/super.c index b997e3116e37..c495db7165ae 100644 --- a/fs/udf/super.c +++ b/fs/udf/super.c @@ -831,16 +831,20 @@ static int udf_load_pvoldesc(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block) ret = udf_dstrCS0toChar(sb, outstr, 31, pvoldesc->volIdent, 32); - if (ret < 0) - goto out_bh; - - strncpy(UDF_SB(sb)->s_volume_ident, outstr, ret); + if (ret < 0) { + strcpy(UDF_SB(sb)->s_volume_ident, "InvalidName"); + pr_warn("incorrect volume identification, setting to " + "'InvalidName'\n"); + } else { + strncpy(UDF_SB(sb)->s_volume_ident, outstr, ret); + } udf_debug("volIdent[] = '%s'\n", UDF_SB(sb)->s_volume_ident); ret = udf_dstrCS0toChar(sb, outstr, 127, pvoldesc->volSetIdent, 128); - if (ret < 0) + if (ret < 0) { + ret = 0; goto out_bh; - + } outstr[ret] = 0; udf_debug("volSetIdent[] = '%s'\n", outstr); diff --git a/fs/udf/unicode.c b/fs/udf/unicode.c index 45234791fec2..5fcfa96463eb 100644 --- a/fs/udf/unicode.c +++ b/fs/udf/unicode.c @@ -351,6 +351,11 @@ static int udf_name_to_CS0(struct super_block *sb, return u_len; } +/* + * Convert CS0 dstring to output charset. Warning: This function may truncate + * input string if it is too long as it is used for informational strings only + * and it is better to truncate the string than to refuse mounting a media. + */ int udf_dstrCS0toChar(struct super_block *sb, uint8_t *utf_o, int o_len, const uint8_t *ocu_i, int i_len) { @@ -359,9 +364,12 @@ int udf_dstrCS0toChar(struct super_block *sb, uint8_t *utf_o, int o_len, if (i_len > 0) { s_len = ocu_i[i_len - 1]; if (s_len >= i_len) { - pr_err("incorrect dstring lengths (%d/%d)\n", - s_len, i_len); - return -EINVAL; + pr_warn("incorrect dstring lengths (%d/%d)," + " truncating\n", s_len, i_len); + s_len = i_len - 1; + /* 2-byte encoding? Need to round properly... */ + if (ocu_i[0] == 16) + s_len -= (s_len - 1) & 2; } } From aaf249e36785c49043a6072a555bad32b5fba1b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nikolay Borisov Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 16:40:20 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 074/140] btrfs: Always try all copies when reading extent buffers commit f8397d69daef06d358430d3054662fb597e37c00 upstream. When a metadata read is served the endio routine btree_readpage_end_io_hook is called which eventually runs the tree-checker. If tree-checker fails to validate the read eb then it sets EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT flag. This leads to btree_read_extent_buffer_pages wrongly assuming that all available copies of this extent buffer are wrong and failing prematurely. Fix this modify btree_read_extent_buffer_pages to read all copies of the data. This failure was exhibitted in xfstests btrfs/124 which would spuriously fail its balance operations. The reason was that when balance was run following re-introduction of the missing raid1 disk __btrfs_map_block would map the read request to stripe 0, which corresponded to devid 2 (the disk which is being removed in the test): item 2 key (FIRST_CHUNK_TREE CHUNK_ITEM 3553624064) itemoff 15975 itemsize 112 length 1073741824 owner 2 stripe_len 65536 type DATA|RAID1 io_align 65536 io_width 65536 sector_size 4096 num_stripes 2 sub_stripes 1 stripe 0 devid 2 offset 2156920832 dev_uuid 8466c350-ed0c-4c3b-b17d-6379b445d5c8 stripe 1 devid 1 offset 3553624064 dev_uuid 1265d8db-5596-477e-af03-df08eb38d2ca This caused read requests for a checksum item that to be routed to the stale disk which triggered the aforementioned logic involving EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT flag. This then triggered cascading failures of the balance operation. Fixes: a826d6dcb32d ("Btrfs: check items for correctness as we search") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Suggested-by: Qu Wenruo Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov Signed-off-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 11 +---------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c index dc52ce5e495f..834a3f5ef642 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c @@ -477,9 +477,9 @@ static int btree_read_extent_buffer_pages(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, int mirror_num = 0; int failed_mirror = 0; - clear_bit(EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT, &eb->bflags); io_tree = &BTRFS_I(fs_info->btree_inode)->io_tree; while (1) { + clear_bit(EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT, &eb->bflags); ret = read_extent_buffer_pages(io_tree, eb, WAIT_COMPLETE, mirror_num); if (!ret) { @@ -493,15 +493,6 @@ static int btree_read_extent_buffer_pages(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, break; } - /* - * This buffer's crc is fine, but its contents are corrupted, so - * there is no reason to read the other copies, they won't be - * any less wrong. - */ - if (test_bit(EXTENT_BUFFER_CORRUPT, &eb->bflags) || - ret == -EUCLEAN) - break; - num_copies = btrfs_num_copies(fs_info, eb->start, eb->len); if (num_copies == 1) From 78a2890fcda1c48ce44c06313984310e1c3b96d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 11:35:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 075/140] Btrfs: ensure path name is null terminated at btrfs_control_ioctl commit f505754fd6599230371cb01b9332754ddc104be1 upstream. We were using the path name received from user space without checking that it is null terminated. While btrfs-progs is well behaved and does proper validation and null termination, someone could call the ioctl and pass a non-null terminated patch, leading to buffer overrun problems in the kernel. The ioctl is protected by CAP_SYS_ADMIN. So just set the last byte of the path to a null character, similar to what we do in other ioctls (add/remove/resize device, snapshot creation, etc). CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/btrfs/super.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/super.c b/fs/btrfs/super.c index 6601c9aa5e35..8ad145820ea8 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/super.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c @@ -2235,6 +2235,7 @@ static long btrfs_control_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, vol = memdup_user((void __user *)arg, sizeof(*vol)); if (IS_ERR(vol)) return PTR_ERR(vol); + vol->name[BTRFS_PATH_NAME_MAX] = '\0'; switch (cmd) { case BTRFS_IOC_SCAN_DEV: From 715608dbf7563650563838923742213ea342988f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 10:23:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 076/140] Btrfs: fix rare chances for data loss when doing a fast fsync commit aab15e8ec25765cf7968c72cbec7583acf99d8a4 upstream. After the simplification of the fast fsync patch done recently by commit b5e6c3e170b7 ("btrfs: always wait on ordered extents at fsync time") and commit e7175a692765 ("btrfs: remove the wait ordered logic in the log_one_extent path"), we got a very short time window where we can get extents logged without writeback completing first or extents logged without logging the respective data checksums. Both issues can only happen when doing a non-full (fast) fsync. As soon as we enter btrfs_sync_file() we trigger writeback, then lock the inode and then wait for the writeback to complete before starting to log the inode. However before we acquire the inode's lock and after we started writeback, it's possible that more writes happened and dirtied more pages. If that happened and those pages get writeback triggered while we are logging the inode (for example, the VM subsystem triggering it due to memory pressure, or another concurrent fsync), we end up seeing the respective extent maps in the inode's list of modified extents and will log matching file extent items without waiting for the respective ordered extents to complete, meaning that either of the following will happen: 1) We log an extent after its writeback finishes but before its checksums are added to the csum tree, leading to -EIO errors when attempting to read the extent after a log replay. 2) We log an extent before its writeback finishes. Therefore after the log replay we will have a file extent item pointing to an unwritten extent (and without the respective data checksums as well). This could not happen before the fast fsync patch simplification, because for any extent we found in the list of modified extents, we would wait for its respective ordered extent to finish writeback or collect its checksums for logging if it did not complete yet. Fix this by triggering writeback again after acquiring the inode's lock and before waiting for ordered extents to complete. Fixes: e7175a692765 ("btrfs: remove the wait ordered logic in the log_one_extent path") Fixes: b5e6c3e170b7 ("btrfs: always wait on ordered extents at fsync time") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Signed-off-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/btrfs/file.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/file.c b/fs/btrfs/file.c index 7d81cc415264..ca4902c66dc4 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/file.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/file.c @@ -2088,6 +2088,30 @@ int btrfs_sync_file(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) atomic_inc(&root->log_batch); + /* + * Before we acquired the inode's lock, someone may have dirtied more + * pages in the target range. We need to make sure that writeback for + * any such pages does not start while we are logging the inode, because + * if it does, any of the following might happen when we are not doing a + * full inode sync: + * + * 1) We log an extent after its writeback finishes but before its + * checksums are added to the csum tree, leading to -EIO errors + * when attempting to read the extent after a log replay. + * + * 2) We can end up logging an extent before its writeback finishes. + * Therefore after the log replay we will have a file extent item + * pointing to an unwritten extent (and no data checksums as well). + * + * So trigger writeback for any eventual new dirty pages and then we + * wait for all ordered extents to complete below. + */ + ret = start_ordered_ops(inode, start, end); + if (ret) { + inode_unlock(inode); + goto out; + } + /* * We have to do this here to avoid the priority inversion of waiting on * IO of a lower priority task while holding a transaciton open. From 172a94eb2df2006a795af44cb1ffa330ad85572a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Filipe Manana Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 16:20:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 077/140] Btrfs: fix race between enabling quotas and subvolume creation commit 552f0329c75b3e1d7f9bb8c9e421d37403f192cd upstream. We have a race between enabling quotas end subvolume creation that cause subvolume creation to fail with -EINVAL, and the following diagram shows how it happens: CPU 0 CPU 1 btrfs_ioctl() btrfs_ioctl_quota_ctl() btrfs_quota_enable() mutex_lock(fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock) btrfs_ioctl() create_subvol() btrfs_qgroup_inherit() -> save fs_info->quota_root into quota_root -> stores a NULL value -> tries to lock the mutex qgroup_ioctl_lock -> blocks waiting for the task at CPU0 -> sets BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED in fs_info -> sets quota_root in fs_info->quota_root (non-NULL value) mutex_unlock(fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock) -> checks quota enabled flag is set -> returns -EINVAL because fs_info->quota_root was NULL before it acquired the mutex qgroup_ioctl_lock -> ioctl returns -EINVAL Returning -EINVAL to user space will be confusing if all the arguments passed to the subvolume creation ioctl were valid. Fix it by grabbing the value from fs_info->quota_root after acquiring the mutex. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/btrfs/qgroup.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c b/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c index b070401406be..ff434663d65b 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c @@ -2244,7 +2244,7 @@ int btrfs_qgroup_inherit(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, u64 srcid, int i; u64 *i_qgroups; struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = trans->fs_info; - struct btrfs_root *quota_root = fs_info->quota_root; + struct btrfs_root *quota_root; struct btrfs_qgroup *srcgroup; struct btrfs_qgroup *dstgroup; u32 level_size = 0; @@ -2254,6 +2254,7 @@ int btrfs_qgroup_inherit(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, u64 srcid, if (!test_bit(BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED, &fs_info->flags)) goto out; + quota_root = fs_info->quota_root; if (!quota_root) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; From 590657656bdcf682fa3667dd7c768b3541558619 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pan Bian Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2018 18:10:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 078/140] btrfs: relocation: set trans to be NULL after ending transaction commit 42a657f57628402c73237547f0134e083e2f6764 upstream. The function relocate_block_group calls btrfs_end_transaction to release trans when update_backref_cache returns 1, and then continues the loop body. If btrfs_block_rsv_refill fails this time, it will jump out the loop and the freed trans will be accessed. This may result in a use-after-free bug. The patch assigns NULL to trans after trans is released so that it will not be accessed. Fixes: 0647bf564f1 ("Btrfs: improve forever loop when doing balance relocation") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo Signed-off-by: Pan Bian Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/btrfs/relocation.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/relocation.c b/fs/btrfs/relocation.c index 60bf8dfe7df4..0526b6c473c7 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/relocation.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/relocation.c @@ -3963,6 +3963,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack int relocate_block_group(struct reloc_control *rc) restart: if (update_backref_cache(trans, &rc->backref_cache)) { btrfs_end_transaction(trans); + trans = NULL; continue; } From b391ed731b393a857067de658d826b059652ca02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hou Zhiqiang Date: Wed, 7 Nov 2018 05:16:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 079/140] PCI: layerscape: Fix wrong invocation of outbound window disable accessor commit c6fd6fe9dea44732cdcd970f1130b8cc50ad685a upstream. The order of parameters is not correct when invoking the outbound window disable routine. Fix it. Fixes: 4a2745d760fa ("PCI: layerscape: Disable outbound windows configured by bootloader") Signed-off-by: Hou Zhiqiang [lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com: commit log] Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-layerscape.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-layerscape.c b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-layerscape.c index 3724d3ef7008..7aa9a82b7ebd 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-layerscape.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-layerscape.c @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static void ls_pcie_disable_outbound_atus(struct ls_pcie *pcie) int i; for (i = 0; i < PCIE_IATU_NUM; i++) - dw_pcie_disable_atu(pcie->pci, DW_PCIE_REGION_OUTBOUND, i); + dw_pcie_disable_atu(pcie->pci, i, DW_PCIE_REGION_OUTBOUND); } static int ls1021_pcie_link_up(struct dw_pcie *pci) From 1ce69ec307fd540d13355f3a3c6c83dcd87e6f9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gustavo Pimentel Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2018 18:00:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 080/140] PCI: dwc: Fix MSI-X EP framework address calculation bug commit 15cb127e3c8f6232096d5dba6a5b4046bc292d70 upstream. Fix an error caused by 3-bit right rotation on offset address calculation of MSI-X table in dw_pcie_ep_raise_msix_irq(). The initial testing code was setting by default the offset address of MSI-X table to zero, so that even with a 3-bit right rotation the computed result would still be zero and valid, therefore this bug went unnoticed. Fixes: beb4641a787d ("PCI: dwc: Add MSI-X callbacks handler") Signed-off-by: Gustavo Pimentel [lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com: updated commit log] Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware-ep.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware-ep.c b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware-ep.c index 1e7b02221eac..de8635af4cde 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware-ep.c +++ b/drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pcie-designware-ep.c @@ -440,7 +440,6 @@ int dw_pcie_ep_raise_msix_irq(struct dw_pcie_ep *ep, u8 func_no, tbl_offset = dw_pcie_readl_dbi(pci, reg); bir = (tbl_offset & PCI_MSIX_TABLE_BIR); tbl_offset &= PCI_MSIX_TABLE_OFFSET; - tbl_offset >>= 3; reg = PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_0 + (4 * bir); bar_addr_upper = 0; From ab7702162bbce1d9c3878e07e2369f89355166b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mikulas Patocka Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 10:37:13 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 081/140] PCI: Fix incorrect value returned from pcie_get_speed_cap() commit f1f90e254e46e0a14220e4090041f68256fbe297 upstream. The macros PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS_*GB are values, not bit masks. We must mask the register and compare it against them. This fixes errors like this: amdgpu: [powerplay] failed to send message 261 ret is 0 when a PCIe-v3 card is plugged into a PCIe-v1 slot, because the slot is being incorrectly reported as PCIe-v3 capable. 6cf57be0f78e, which appeared in v4.17, added pcie_get_speed_cap() with the incorrect test of PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS as a bitmask. 5d9a63304032, which appeared in v4.19, changed amdgpu to use pcie_get_speed_cap(), so the amdgpu bug reports below are regressions in v4.19. Fixes: 6cf57be0f78e ("PCI: Add pcie_get_speed_cap() to find max supported link speed") Fixes: 5d9a63304032 ("drm/amdgpu: use pcie functions for link width and speed") Link: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=108704 Link: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=108778 Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka [bhelgaas: update comment, remove use of PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS_8_0GB and PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS_16_0GB since those should be covered by PCI_EXP_LNKCAP2, remove test of PCI_EXP_LNKCAP for zero, since that register is required] Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas Acked-by: Alex Deucher Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/pci/pci.c | 24 +++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci.c b/drivers/pci/pci.c index 51b6c81671c1..afc4680c584f 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci.c @@ -5473,9 +5473,13 @@ enum pci_bus_speed pcie_get_speed_cap(struct pci_dev *dev) u32 lnkcap2, lnkcap; /* - * PCIe r4.0 sec 7.5.3.18 recommends using the Supported Link - * Speeds Vector in Link Capabilities 2 when supported, falling - * back to Max Link Speed in Link Capabilities otherwise. + * Link Capabilities 2 was added in PCIe r3.0, sec 7.8.18. The + * implementation note there recommends using the Supported Link + * Speeds Vector in Link Capabilities 2 when supported. + * + * Without Link Capabilities 2, i.e., prior to PCIe r3.0, software + * should use the Supported Link Speeds field in Link Capabilities, + * where only 2.5 GT/s and 5.0 GT/s speeds were defined. */ pcie_capability_read_dword(dev, PCI_EXP_LNKCAP2, &lnkcap2); if (lnkcap2) { /* PCIe r3.0-compliant */ @@ -5491,16 +5495,10 @@ enum pci_bus_speed pcie_get_speed_cap(struct pci_dev *dev) } pcie_capability_read_dword(dev, PCI_EXP_LNKCAP, &lnkcap); - if (lnkcap) { - if (lnkcap & PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS_16_0GB) - return PCIE_SPEED_16_0GT; - else if (lnkcap & PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS_8_0GB) - return PCIE_SPEED_8_0GT; - else if (lnkcap & PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS_5_0GB) - return PCIE_SPEED_5_0GT; - else if (lnkcap & PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS_2_5GB) - return PCIE_SPEED_2_5GT; - } + if ((lnkcap & PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS) == PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS_5_0GB) + return PCIE_SPEED_5_0GT; + else if ((lnkcap & PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS) == PCI_EXP_LNKCAP_SLS_2_5GB) + return PCIE_SPEED_2_5GT; return PCI_SPEED_UNKNOWN; } From 8af02415638efe288ec8f73b61d087d86dbf0719 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christoph Muellner Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 11:25:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 082/140] arm64: dts: rockchip: Fix PCIe reset polarity for rk3399-puma-haikou. commit c1d91f86a1b4c9c05854d59c6a0abd5d0f75b849 upstream. This patch fixes the wrong polarity setting for the PCIe host driver's pre-reset pin for rk3399-puma-haikou. Without this patch link training will most likely fail. Fixes: 60fd9f72ce8a ("arm64: dts: rockchip: add Haikou baseboard with RK3399-Q7 SoM") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christoph Muellner Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts index e0d64f862322..8ce4a79d9360 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts +++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ &pcie_phy { }; &pcie0 { - ep-gpios = <&gpio4 RK_PC6 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>; + ep-gpios = <&gpio4 RK_PC6 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>; num-lanes = <4>; pinctrl-names = "default"; pinctrl-0 = <&pcie_clkreqn_cpm>; From 00f91adf52afbd7d69fd1860860a12abef652994 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Borislav Petkov Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2018 14:41:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 083/140] x86/MCE/AMD: Fix the thresholding machinery initialization order MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 60c8144afc287ef09ce8c1230c6aa972659ba1bb upstream. Currently, the code sets up the thresholding interrupt vector and only then goes about initializing the thresholding banks. Which is wrong, because an early thresholding interrupt would cause a NULL pointer dereference when accessing those banks and prevent the machine from booting. Therefore, set the thresholding interrupt vector only *after* having initialized the banks successfully. Fixes: 18807ddb7f88 ("x86/mce/AMD: Reset Threshold Limit after logging error") Reported-by: Rafał Miłecki Reported-by: John Clemens Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Tested-by: Rafał Miłecki Tested-by: John Clemens Cc: Aravind Gopalakrishnan Cc: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Tony Luck Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: Yazen Ghannam Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181127101700.2964-1-zajec5@gmail.com Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201291 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c | 19 ++++++------------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c index dd33c357548f..e12454e21b8a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ /* Threshold LVT offset is at MSR0xC0000410[15:12] */ #define SMCA_THR_LVT_OFF 0xF000 -static bool thresholding_en; +static bool thresholding_irq_en; static const char * const th_names[] = { "load_store", @@ -534,9 +534,8 @@ prepare_threshold_block(unsigned int bank, unsigned int block, u32 addr, set_offset: offset = setup_APIC_mce_threshold(offset, new); - - if ((offset == new) && (mce_threshold_vector != amd_threshold_interrupt)) - mce_threshold_vector = amd_threshold_interrupt; + if (offset == new) + thresholding_irq_en = true; done: mce_threshold_block_init(&b, offset); @@ -1357,9 +1356,6 @@ int mce_threshold_remove_device(unsigned int cpu) { unsigned int bank; - if (!thresholding_en) - return 0; - for (bank = 0; bank < mca_cfg.banks; ++bank) { if (!(per_cpu(bank_map, cpu) & (1 << bank))) continue; @@ -1377,9 +1373,6 @@ int mce_threshold_create_device(unsigned int cpu) struct threshold_bank **bp; int err = 0; - if (!thresholding_en) - return 0; - bp = per_cpu(threshold_banks, cpu); if (bp) return 0; @@ -1408,9 +1401,6 @@ static __init int threshold_init_device(void) { unsigned lcpu = 0; - if (mce_threshold_vector == amd_threshold_interrupt) - thresholding_en = true; - /* to hit CPUs online before the notifier is up */ for_each_online_cpu(lcpu) { int err = mce_threshold_create_device(lcpu); @@ -1419,6 +1409,9 @@ static __init int threshold_init_device(void) return err; } + if (thresholding_irq_en) + mce_threshold_vector = amd_threshold_interrupt; + return 0; } /* From 33448a8b577d2649a6daac7cd83abb7d9fb4a404 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 11:26:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 084/140] x86/fpu: Disable bottom halves while loading FPU registers MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 68239654acafe6aad5a3c1dc7237e60accfebc03 upstream. The sequence fpu->initialized = 1; /* step A */ preempt_disable(); /* step B */ fpu__restore(fpu); preempt_enable(); in __fpu__restore_sig() is racy in regard to a context switch. For 32bit frames, __fpu__restore_sig() prepares the FPU state within fpu->state. To ensure that a context switch (switch_fpu_prepare() in particular) does not modify fpu->state it uses fpu__drop() which sets fpu->initialized to 0. After fpu->initialized is cleared, the CPU's FPU state is not saved to fpu->state during a context switch. The new state is loaded via fpu__restore(). It gets loaded into fpu->state from userland and ensured it is sane. fpu->initialized is then set to 1 in order to avoid fpu__initialize() doing anything (overwrite the new state) which is part of fpu__restore(). A context switch between step A and B above would save CPU's current FPU registers to fpu->state and overwrite the newly prepared state. This looks like a tiny race window but the Kernel Test Robot reported this back in 2016 while we had lazy FPU support. Borislav Petkov made the link between that report and another patch that has been posted. Since the removal of the lazy FPU support, this race goes unnoticed because the warning has been removed. Disable bottom halves around the restore sequence to avoid the race. BH need to be disabled because BH is allowed to run (even with preemption disabled) and might invoke kernel_fpu_begin() by doing IPsec. [ bp: massage commit message a bit. ] Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Ingo Molnar Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Dave Hansen Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Cc: kvm ML Cc: Paolo Bonzini Cc: Radim Krčmář Cc: Rik van Riel Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86-ml Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181120102635.ddv3fvavxajjlfqk@linutronix.de Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160226074940.GA28911@pd.tnic Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c index 61a949d84dfa..d99a8ee9e185 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c @@ -344,10 +344,10 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size) sanitize_restored_xstate(tsk, &env, xfeatures, fx_only); } + local_bh_disable(); fpu->initialized = 1; - preempt_disable(); fpu__restore(fpu); - preempt_enable(); + local_bh_enable(); return err; } else { From ad65b548409c521ee74a125f5705ecaf413519c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Olsa Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 11:16:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 085/140] perf/x86/intel: Move branch tracing setup to the Intel-specific source file commit ed6101bbf6266ee83e620b19faa7c6ad56bb41ab upstream. Moving branch tracing setup to Intel core object into separate intel_pmu_bts_config function, because it's Intel specific. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vince Weaver Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121101612.16272-1-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/events/core.c | 20 ------------------ arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/core.c b/arch/x86/events/core.c index dfb2f7c0d019..c8d08da5b308 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c @@ -438,26 +438,6 @@ int x86_setup_perfctr(struct perf_event *event) if (config == -1LL) return -EINVAL; - /* - * Branch tracing: - */ - if (attr->config == PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS && - !attr->freq && hwc->sample_period == 1) { - /* BTS is not supported by this architecture. */ - if (!x86_pmu.bts_active) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - - /* BTS is currently only allowed for user-mode. */ - if (!attr->exclude_kernel) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - - /* disallow bts if conflicting events are present */ - if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_lbr)) - return -EBUSY; - - event->destroy = hw_perf_lbr_event_destroy; - } - hwc->config |= config; return 0; diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c index 035c37481f57..66ce52110a44 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c @@ -2986,10 +2986,49 @@ static unsigned long intel_pmu_large_pebs_flags(struct perf_event *event) return flags; } +static int intel_pmu_bts_config(struct perf_event *event) +{ + struct perf_event_attr *attr = &event->attr; + struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; + + if (attr->config == PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS && + !attr->freq && hwc->sample_period == 1) { + /* BTS is not supported by this architecture. */ + if (!x86_pmu.bts_active) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + /* BTS is currently only allowed for user-mode. */ + if (!attr->exclude_kernel) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + /* disallow bts if conflicting events are present */ + if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_lbr)) + return -EBUSY; + + event->destroy = hw_perf_lbr_event_destroy; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int core_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event) +{ + int ret = x86_pmu_hw_config(event); + + if (ret) + return ret; + + return intel_pmu_bts_config(event); +} + static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event) { int ret = x86_pmu_hw_config(event); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = intel_pmu_bts_config(event); if (ret) return ret; @@ -3478,7 +3517,7 @@ static __initconst const struct x86_pmu core_pmu = { .enable_all = core_pmu_enable_all, .enable = core_pmu_enable_event, .disable = x86_pmu_disable_event, - .hw_config = x86_pmu_hw_config, + .hw_config = core_pmu_hw_config, .schedule_events = x86_schedule_events, .eventsel = MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0, .perfctr = MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0, From be0e2e2436cccf0507547fab44881d0f69075ae0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Olsa Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 11:16:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 086/140] perf/x86/intel: Add generic branch tracing check to intel_pmu_has_bts() commit 67266c1080ad56c31af72b9c18355fde8ccc124a upstream. Currently we check the branch tracing only by checking for the PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS event of PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE type. But we can define the same event with the PERF_TYPE_RAW type. Changing the intel_pmu_has_bts() code to check on event's final hw config value, so both HW types are covered. Adding unlikely to intel_pmu_has_bts() condition calls, because it was used in the original code in intel_bts_constraints. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vince Weaver Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121101612.16272-2-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 17 +++-------------- arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 13 +++++++++---- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c index 66ce52110a44..3e8b2a440883 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c @@ -2358,16 +2358,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_handle_irq(struct pt_regs *regs) static struct event_constraint * intel_bts_constraints(struct perf_event *event) { - struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; - unsigned int hw_event, bts_event; - - if (event->attr.freq) - return NULL; - - hw_event = hwc->config & INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK; - bts_event = x86_pmu.event_map(PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS); - - if (unlikely(hw_event == bts_event && hwc->sample_period == 1)) + if (unlikely(intel_pmu_has_bts(event))) return &bts_constraint; return NULL; @@ -2989,10 +2980,8 @@ static unsigned long intel_pmu_large_pebs_flags(struct perf_event *event) static int intel_pmu_bts_config(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_attr *attr = &event->attr; - struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; - if (attr->config == PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS && - !attr->freq && hwc->sample_period == 1) { + if (unlikely(intel_pmu_has_bts(event))) { /* BTS is not supported by this architecture. */ if (!x86_pmu.bts_active) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -3054,7 +3043,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event) /* * BTS is set up earlier in this path, so don't account twice */ - if (!intel_pmu_has_bts(event)) { + if (!unlikely(intel_pmu_has_bts(event))) { /* disallow lbr if conflicting events are present */ if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_lbr)) return -EBUSY; diff --git a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h index 156286335351..c5ad9cc61f4b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h +++ b/arch/x86/events/perf_event.h @@ -857,11 +857,16 @@ static inline int amd_pmu_init(void) static inline bool intel_pmu_has_bts(struct perf_event *event) { - if (event->attr.config == PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS && - !event->attr.freq && event->hw.sample_period == 1) - return true; + struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw; + unsigned int hw_event, bts_event; - return false; + if (event->attr.freq) + return false; + + hw_event = hwc->config & INTEL_ARCH_EVENT_MASK; + bts_event = x86_pmu.event_map(PERF_COUNT_HW_BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS); + + return hw_event == bts_event && hwc->sample_period == 1; } int intel_pmu_save_and_restart(struct perf_event *event); From 205af59e7011a3ea683cf1178c889ca3a9bbc640 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Olsa Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 11:16:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 087/140] perf/x86/intel: Disallow precise_ip on BTS events commit 472de49fdc53365c880ab81ae2b5cfdd83db0b06 upstream. Vince reported a crash in the BTS flush code when touching the callchain data, which was supposed to be initialized as an 'early' callchain, but intel_pmu_drain_bts_buffer() does not do that: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 ... Call Trace: intel_pmu_drain_bts_buffer+0x151/0x220 ? intel_get_event_constraints+0x219/0x360 ? perf_assign_events+0xe2/0x2a0 ? select_idle_sibling+0x22/0x3a0 ? __update_load_avg_se+0x1ec/0x270 ? enqueue_task_fair+0x377/0xdd0 ? cpumask_next_and+0x19/0x20 ? load_balance+0x134/0x950 ? check_preempt_curr+0x7a/0x90 ? ttwu_do_wakeup+0x19/0x140 x86_pmu_stop+0x3b/0x90 x86_pmu_del+0x57/0x160 event_sched_out.isra.106+0x81/0x170 group_sched_out.part.108+0x51/0xc0 __perf_event_disable+0x7f/0x160 event_function+0x8c/0xd0 remote_function+0x3c/0x50 flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x35/0xe0 smp_call_function_single_interrupt+0x3a/0xd0 call_function_single_interrupt+0xf/0x20 It was triggered by fuzzer but can be easily reproduced by: # perf record -e cpu/branch-instructions/pu -g -c 1 Peter suggested not to allow branch tracing for precise events: > Now arguably, this is really stupid behaviour. Who in his right mind > wants callchain output on BTS entries. And even if they do, BTS + > precise_ip is nonsensical. > > So in my mind disallowing precise_ip on BTS would be the simplest fix. Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra Reported-by: Vince Weaver Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Cc: Alexander Shishkin Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo Cc: Jiri Olsa Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: Stephane Eranian Cc: Thomas Gleixner Fixes: 6cbc304f2f36 ("perf/x86/intel: Fix unwind errors from PEBS entries (mk-II)") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121101612.16272-3-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c index 3e8b2a440883..155fa4b53c56 100644 --- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c @@ -2990,6 +2990,10 @@ static int intel_pmu_bts_config(struct perf_event *event) if (!attr->exclude_kernel) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + /* BTS is not allowed for precise events. */ + if (attr->precise_ip) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + /* disallow bts if conflicting events are present */ if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_lbr)) return -EBUSY; From adcd35a38cdec76f40f9ed4d3a3fe07eea04e0d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maximilian Heyne Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 08:35:14 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 088/140] fs: fix lost error code in dio_complete commit 41e817bca3acd3980efe5dd7d28af0e6f4ab9247 upstream. commit e259221763a40403d5bb232209998e8c45804ab8 ("fs: simplify the generic_write_sync prototype") reworked callers of generic_write_sync(), and ended up dropping the error return for the directio path. Prior to that commit, in dio_complete(), an error would be bubbled up the stack, but after that commit, errors passed on to dio_complete were eaten up. This was reported on the list earlier, and a fix was proposed in https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20160921141539.GA17898@infradead.org/, but never followed up with. We recently hit this bug in our testing where fencing io errors, which were previously erroring out with EIO, were being returned as success operations after this commit. The fix proposed on the list earlier was a little short -- it would have still called generic_write_sync() in case `ret` already contained an error. This fix ensures generic_write_sync() is only called when there's no pending error in the write. Additionally, transferred is replaced with ret to bring this code in line with other callers. Fixes: e259221763a4 ("fs: simplify the generic_write_sync prototype") Reported-by: Ravi Nankani Signed-off-by: Maximilian Heyne Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig CC: Torsten Mehlan CC: Uwe Dannowski CC: Amit Shah CC: David Woodhouse CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/direct-io.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/direct-io.c b/fs/direct-io.c index 093fb54cd316..199146036093 100644 --- a/fs/direct-io.c +++ b/fs/direct-io.c @@ -325,8 +325,8 @@ static ssize_t dio_complete(struct dio *dio, ssize_t ret, unsigned int flags) */ dio->iocb->ki_pos += transferred; - if (dio->op == REQ_OP_WRITE) - ret = generic_write_sync(dio->iocb, transferred); + if (ret > 0 && dio->op == REQ_OP_WRITE) + ret = generic_write_sync(dio->iocb, ret); dio->iocb->ki_complete(dio->iocb, ret, 0); } From e83c4405ebf02151daea8ce6da3bb74b34efcd6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2018 18:16:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 089/140] ALSA: wss: Fix invalid snd_free_pages() at error path commit 7b69154171b407844c273ab4c10b5f0ddcd6aa29 upstream. Some spurious calls of snd_free_pages() have been overlooked and remain in the error paths of wss driver code. Since runtime->dma_area is managed by the PCM core helper, we shouldn't release manually. Drop the superfluous calls. Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/isa/wss/wss_lib.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/isa/wss/wss_lib.c b/sound/isa/wss/wss_lib.c index 32453f81b95a..3a5008837576 100644 --- a/sound/isa/wss/wss_lib.c +++ b/sound/isa/wss/wss_lib.c @@ -1531,7 +1531,6 @@ static int snd_wss_playback_open(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) if (err < 0) { if (chip->release_dma) chip->release_dma(chip, chip->dma_private_data, chip->dma1); - snd_free_pages(runtime->dma_area, runtime->dma_bytes); return err; } chip->playback_substream = substream; @@ -1572,7 +1571,6 @@ static int snd_wss_capture_open(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) if (err < 0) { if (chip->release_dma) chip->release_dma(chip, chip->dma_private_data, chip->dma2); - snd_free_pages(runtime->dma_area, runtime->dma_bytes); return err; } chip->capture_substream = substream; From b77c35ef8e38d9c4027f00a333ca139c583f2a18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2018 15:44:00 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 090/140] ALSA: ac97: Fix incorrect bit shift at AC97-SPSA control write commit 7194eda1ba0872d917faf3b322540b4f57f11ba5 upstream. The function snd_ac97_put_spsa() gets the bit shift value from the associated private_value, but it extracts too much; the current code extracts 8 bit values in bits 8-15, but this is a combination of two nibbles (bits 8-11 and bits 12-15) for left and right shifts. Due to the incorrect bits extraction, the actual shift may go beyond the 32bit value, as spotted recently by UBSAN check: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c:836:7 shift exponent 68 is too large for 32-bit type 'int' This patch fixes the shift value extraction by masking the properly with 0x0f instead of 0xff. Reported-and-tested-by: Meelis Roos Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c b/sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c index f4459d1a9d67..27b468f057dd 100644 --- a/sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c +++ b/sound/pci/ac97/ac97_codec.c @@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static int snd_ac97_put_spsa(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, struct snd_ctl_elem_ { struct snd_ac97 *ac97 = snd_kcontrol_chip(kcontrol); int reg = kcontrol->private_value & 0xff; - int shift = (kcontrol->private_value >> 8) & 0xff; + int shift = (kcontrol->private_value >> 8) & 0x0f; int mask = (kcontrol->private_value >> 16) & 0xff; // int invert = (kcontrol->private_value >> 24) & 0xff; unsigned short value, old, new; From d8a2dca04064b323e80af1b93b465d64e5befed1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2018 14:36:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 091/140] ALSA: control: Fix race between adding and removing a user element commit e1a7bfe3807974e66f971f2589d4e0197ec0fced upstream. The procedure for adding a user control element has some window opened for race against the concurrent removal of a user element. This was caught by syzkaller, hitting a KASAN use-after-free error. This patch addresses the bug by wrapping the whole procedure to add a user control element with the card->controls_rwsem, instead of only around the increment of card->user_ctl_count. This required a slight code refactoring, too. The function snd_ctl_add() is split to two parts: a core function to add the control element and a part calling it. The former is called from the function for adding a user control element inside the controls_rwsem. One change to be noted is that snd_ctl_notify() for adding a control element gets called inside the controls_rwsem as well while it was called outside the rwsem. But this should be OK, as snd_ctl_notify() takes another (finer) rwlock instead of rwsem, and the call of snd_ctl_notify() inside rwsem is already done in another code path. Reported-by: syzbot+dc09047bce3820621ba2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/core/control.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/control.c b/sound/core/control.c index 9aa15bfc7936..649d3217590e 100644 --- a/sound/core/control.c +++ b/sound/core/control.c @@ -348,6 +348,40 @@ static int snd_ctl_find_hole(struct snd_card *card, unsigned int count) return 0; } +/* add a new kcontrol object; call with card->controls_rwsem locked */ +static int __snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol) +{ + struct snd_ctl_elem_id id; + unsigned int idx; + unsigned int count; + + id = kcontrol->id; + if (id.index > UINT_MAX - kcontrol->count) + return -EINVAL; + + if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) { + dev_err(card->dev, + "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n", + id.iface, id.device, id.subdevice, id.name, id.index); + return -EBUSY; + } + + if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls); + card->controls_count += kcontrol->count; + kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1; + card->last_numid += kcontrol->count; + + id = kcontrol->id; + count = kcontrol->count; + for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++) + snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id); + + return 0; +} + /** * snd_ctl_add - add the control instance to the card * @card: the card instance @@ -364,45 +398,18 @@ static int snd_ctl_find_hole(struct snd_card *card, unsigned int count) */ int snd_ctl_add(struct snd_card *card, struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol) { - struct snd_ctl_elem_id id; - unsigned int idx; - unsigned int count; int err = -EINVAL; if (! kcontrol) return err; if (snd_BUG_ON(!card || !kcontrol->info)) goto error; - id = kcontrol->id; - if (id.index > UINT_MAX - kcontrol->count) - goto error; down_write(&card->controls_rwsem); - if (snd_ctl_find_id(card, &id)) { - up_write(&card->controls_rwsem); - dev_err(card->dev, "control %i:%i:%i:%s:%i is already present\n", - id.iface, - id.device, - id.subdevice, - id.name, - id.index); - err = -EBUSY; - goto error; - } - if (snd_ctl_find_hole(card, kcontrol->count) < 0) { - up_write(&card->controls_rwsem); - err = -ENOMEM; - goto error; - } - list_add_tail(&kcontrol->list, &card->controls); - card->controls_count += kcontrol->count; - kcontrol->id.numid = card->last_numid + 1; - card->last_numid += kcontrol->count; - id = kcontrol->id; - count = kcontrol->count; + err = __snd_ctl_add(card, kcontrol); up_write(&card->controls_rwsem); - for (idx = 0; idx < count; idx++, id.index++, id.numid++) - snd_ctl_notify(card, SNDRV_CTL_EVENT_MASK_ADD, &id); + if (err < 0) + goto error; return 0; error: @@ -1361,9 +1368,12 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file, kctl->tlv.c = snd_ctl_elem_user_tlv; /* This function manage to free the instance on failure. */ - err = snd_ctl_add(card, kctl); - if (err < 0) - return err; + down_write(&card->controls_rwsem); + err = __snd_ctl_add(card, kctl); + if (err < 0) { + snd_ctl_free_one(kctl); + goto unlock; + } offset = snd_ctl_get_ioff(kctl, &info->id); snd_ctl_build_ioff(&info->id, kctl, offset); /* @@ -1374,10 +1384,10 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_add(struct snd_ctl_file *file, * which locks the element. */ - down_write(&card->controls_rwsem); card->user_ctl_count++; - up_write(&card->controls_rwsem); + unlock: + up_write(&card->controls_rwsem); return 0; } From 15c5fb33cda9f1f0e89b85e9769e334ba05c1ce5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Takashi Iwai Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2018 18:18:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 092/140] ALSA: sparc: Fix invalid snd_free_pages() at error path commit 9a20332ab373b1f8f947e0a9c923652b32dab031 upstream. Some spurious calls of snd_free_pages() have been overlooked and remain in the error paths of sparc cs4231 driver code. Since runtime->dma_area is managed by the PCM core helper, we shouldn't release manually. Drop the superfluous calls. Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/sparc/cs4231.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/sparc/cs4231.c b/sound/sparc/cs4231.c index e73c962590eb..079063d8038d 100644 --- a/sound/sparc/cs4231.c +++ b/sound/sparc/cs4231.c @@ -1146,10 +1146,8 @@ static int snd_cs4231_playback_open(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) runtime->hw = snd_cs4231_playback; err = snd_cs4231_open(chip, CS4231_MODE_PLAY); - if (err < 0) { - snd_free_pages(runtime->dma_area, runtime->dma_bytes); + if (err < 0) return err; - } chip->playback_substream = substream; chip->p_periods_sent = 0; snd_pcm_set_sync(substream); @@ -1167,10 +1165,8 @@ static int snd_cs4231_capture_open(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) runtime->hw = snd_cs4231_capture; err = snd_cs4231_open(chip, CS4231_MODE_RECORD); - if (err < 0) { - snd_free_pages(runtime->dma_area, runtime->dma_bytes); + if (err < 0) return err; - } chip->capture_substream = substream; chip->c_periods_sent = 0; snd_pcm_set_sync(substream); From bb951d8d965c9f0f21719f3e3a35a9917d2b330c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans de Goede Date: Thu, 22 Nov 2018 12:38:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 093/140] ALSA: hda: Add ASRock N68C-S UCC the power_save blacklist commit 39070a98d668db8fbaa2a6a6752f732cbcbb14b1 upstream. Power-saving is causing plops on audio start/stop on the built-in audio of the nForce 430 based ASRock N68C-S UCC motherboard, add this model to the power_save blacklist. BugLink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1525104 Cc: Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c index 625cb6c7b7d6..5810be2c6c34 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c @@ -2256,6 +2256,8 @@ static struct snd_pci_quirk power_save_blacklist[] = { /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1525104 */ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1849, 0xc892, "Asrock B85M-ITX", 0), /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1525104 */ + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1849, 0x0397, "Asrock N68C-S UCC", 0), + /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1525104 */ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1849, 0x7662, "Asrock H81M-HDS", 0), /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1525104 */ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1043, 0x8733, "Asus Prime X370-Pro", 0), From 094c00891be81d9ce51b81ad808d2e5fedad5e24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kailang Yang Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 16:36:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 094/140] ALSA: hda/realtek - Support ALC300 commit 1078bef0cd9291355a20369b21cd823026ab8eaa upstream. This patch will enable ALC300. [ It's almost equivalent with other ALC269-compatible ones, and apparently has no loopback mixer -- tiwai ] Signed-off-by: Kailang Yang Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index e58537e13ad3..08537660ecb5 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -388,6 +388,7 @@ static void alc_fill_eapd_coef(struct hda_codec *codec) case 0x10ec0285: case 0x10ec0298: case 0x10ec0289: + case 0x10ec0300: alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x10, 1<<9, 0); break; case 0x10ec0275: @@ -2830,6 +2831,7 @@ enum { ALC269_TYPE_ALC215, ALC269_TYPE_ALC225, ALC269_TYPE_ALC294, + ALC269_TYPE_ALC300, ALC269_TYPE_ALC700, }; @@ -2864,6 +2866,7 @@ static int alc269_parse_auto_config(struct hda_codec *codec) case ALC269_TYPE_ALC215: case ALC269_TYPE_ALC225: case ALC269_TYPE_ALC294: + case ALC269_TYPE_ALC300: case ALC269_TYPE_ALC700: ssids = alc269_ssids; break; @@ -7295,6 +7298,10 @@ static int patch_alc269(struct hda_codec *codec) spec->gen.mixer_nid = 0; /* ALC2x4 does not have any loopback mixer path */ alc_update_coef_idx(codec, 0x6b, 0x0018, (1<<4) | (1<<3)); /* UAJ MIC Vref control by verb */ break; + case 0x10ec0300: + spec->codec_variant = ALC269_TYPE_ALC300; + spec->gen.mixer_nid = 0; /* no loopback on ALC300 */ + break; case 0x10ec0700: case 0x10ec0701: case 0x10ec0703: @@ -8404,6 +8411,7 @@ static const struct hda_device_id snd_hda_id_realtek[] = { HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0295, "ALC295", patch_alc269), HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0298, "ALC298", patch_alc269), HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0299, "ALC299", patch_alc269), + HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0300, "ALC300", patch_alc269), HDA_CODEC_REV_ENTRY(0x10ec0861, 0x100340, "ALC660", patch_alc861), HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0660, "ALC660-VD", patch_alc861vd), HDA_CODEC_ENTRY(0x10ec0861, "ALC861", patch_alc861), From 524841156bbe27435c95bc1090a8517008899229 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Anisse Astier Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2018 17:59:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 095/140] ALSA: hda/realtek - fix headset mic detection for MSI MS-B171 commit 8cd65271f8e545ddeed10ecc2e417936bdff168e upstream. MSI Cubi N 8GL (MS-B171) needs the same fixup as its older model, the MS-B120, in order for the headset mic to be properly detected. They both use a single 3-way jack for both mic and headset with an ALC283 codec, with the same pins used. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Anisse Astier Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 08537660ecb5..a2f9ebd34bd6 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -6535,6 +6535,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x144d, 0xc740, "Samsung Ativ book 8 (NP870Z5G)", ALC269_FIXUP_ATIV_BOOK_8), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1458, 0xfa53, "Gigabyte BXBT-2807", ALC283_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0xb120, "MSI Cubi MS-B120", ALC283_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC), + SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1462, 0xb171, "Cubi N 8GL (MS-B171)", ALC283_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x1036, "Lenovo P520", ALC233_FIXUP_LENOVO_MULTI_CODECS), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x20f2, "Thinkpad SL410/510", ALC269_FIXUP_SKU_IGNORE), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x215e, "Thinkpad L512", ALC269_FIXUP_SKU_IGNORE), From dcd51305cd41e77bf775992e6d6cee52f83426b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hui Wang Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 14:17:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 096/140] ALSA: hda/realtek - fix the pop noise on headphone for lenovo laptops commit c4cfcf6f4297c9256b53790bacbbbd6901fef468 upstream. We have several Lenovo laptops with the codec alc285, when playing sound via headphone, we can hear click/pop noise in the headphone, if we let the headphone share the DAC of NID 0x2 with the speaker, the noise disappears. The Lenovo laptops here include P52, P72, X1 yoda2 and X1 carbon. I have tried to set preferred_dacs and override_conn, but neither of them worked. Thanks for Kailang, he told me to invalidate the NID 0x3 through override_wcaps. BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1805079 Cc: Signed-off-by: Kailang Yang Signed-off-by: Hui Wang Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index a2f9ebd34bd6..45ef1adeff72 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -5361,6 +5361,16 @@ static void alc274_fixup_bind_dacs(struct hda_codec *codec, spec->gen.preferred_dacs = preferred_pairs; } +/* The DAC of NID 0x3 will introduce click/pop noise on headphones, so invalidate it */ +static void alc285_fixup_invalidate_dacs(struct hda_codec *codec, + const struct hda_fixup *fix, int action) +{ + if (action != HDA_FIXUP_ACT_PRE_PROBE) + return; + + snd_hda_override_wcaps(codec, 0x03, 0); +} + /* for hda_fixup_thinkpad_acpi() */ #include "thinkpad_helper.c" @@ -5498,6 +5508,7 @@ enum { ALC255_FIXUP_DELL_HEADSET_MIC, ALC295_FIXUP_HP_X360, ALC221_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC, + ALC285_FIXUP_LENOVO_HEADPHONE_NOISE, }; static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { @@ -6365,6 +6376,10 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { .chained = true, .chain_id = ALC269_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC }, + [ALC285_FIXUP_LENOVO_HEADPHONE_NOISE] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC, + .v.func = alc285_fixup_invalidate_dacs, + }, }; static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { @@ -7038,6 +7053,11 @@ static const struct snd_hda_pin_quirk alc269_pin_fixup_tbl[] = { {0x12, 0x90a60130}, {0x19, 0x03a11020}, {0x21, 0x0321101f}), + SND_HDA_PIN_QUIRK(0x10ec0285, 0x17aa, "Lenovo", ALC285_FIXUP_LENOVO_HEADPHONE_NOISE, + {0x12, 0x90a60130}, + {0x14, 0x90170110}, + {0x19, 0x04a11040}, + {0x21, 0x04211020}), SND_HDA_PIN_QUIRK(0x10ec0288, 0x1028, "Dell", ALC288_FIXUP_DELL1_MIC_NO_PRESENCE, {0x12, 0x90a60120}, {0x14, 0x90170110}, From b72fc1c3cce457d3e9753abf52fe7f1627dd1bf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Girija Kumar Kasinadhuni Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 13:40:46 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 097/140] ALSA: hda/realtek - Add auto-mute quirk for HP Spectre x360 laptop commit e8ed64b08eddc05043e556832616a478bbe4bb00 upstream. This device makes a loud buzzing sound when a headphone is inserted while playing audio at full volume through the speaker. Fixes: bbf8ff6b1d2a ("ALSA: hda/realtek - Fixup for HP x360 laptops with B&O speakers") Signed-off-by: Girija Kumar Kasinadhuni Cc: Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c index 45ef1adeff72..cf5d26642bcd 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c @@ -5509,6 +5509,7 @@ enum { ALC295_FIXUP_HP_X360, ALC221_FIXUP_HP_HEADSET_MIC, ALC285_FIXUP_LENOVO_HEADPHONE_NOISE, + ALC295_FIXUP_HP_AUTO_MUTE, }; static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { @@ -5673,6 +5674,8 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { [ALC269_FIXUP_HP_MUTE_LED_MIC3] = { .type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC, .v.func = alc269_fixup_hp_mute_led_mic3, + .chained = true, + .chain_id = ALC295_FIXUP_HP_AUTO_MUTE }, [ALC269_FIXUP_HP_GPIO_LED] = { .type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC, @@ -6380,6 +6383,10 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fixups[] = { .type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC, .v.func = alc285_fixup_invalidate_dacs, }, + [ALC295_FIXUP_HP_AUTO_MUTE] = { + .type = HDA_FIXUP_FUNC, + .v.func = alc_fixup_auto_mute_via_amp, + }, }; static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269_fixup_tbl[] = { From 67d7bec3fc6c129807b22d39cb12edab2420baab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:10:15 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 098/140] function_graph: Create function_graph_enter() to consolidate architecture code commit 8114865ff82e200b383e46821c25cb0625b842b5 upstream. Currently all the architectures do basically the same thing in preparing the function graph tracer on entry to a function. This code can be pulled into a generic location and then this will allow the function graph tracer to be fixed, as well as extended. Create a new function graph helper function_graph_enter() that will call the hook function (ftrace_graph_entry) and the shadow stack operation (ftrace_push_return_trace), and remove the need of the architecture code to manage the shadow stack. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/ftrace.h | 3 +++ kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/ftrace.h b/include/linux/ftrace.h index a397907e8d72..5717e8f81c59 100644 --- a/include/linux/ftrace.h +++ b/include/linux/ftrace.h @@ -779,6 +779,9 @@ extern void return_to_handler(void); extern int ftrace_push_return_trace(unsigned long ret, unsigned long func, int *depth, unsigned long frame_pointer, unsigned long *retp); +extern int +function_graph_enter(unsigned long ret, unsigned long func, + unsigned long frame_pointer, unsigned long *retp); unsigned long ftrace_graph_ret_addr(struct task_struct *task, int *idx, unsigned long ret, unsigned long *retp); diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c index 169b3c44ee97..28f2602435d0 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c @@ -182,6 +182,22 @@ ftrace_push_return_trace(unsigned long ret, unsigned long func, int *depth, return 0; } +int function_graph_enter(unsigned long ret, unsigned long func, + unsigned long frame_pointer, unsigned long *retp) +{ + struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; + + trace.func = func; + trace.depth = current->curr_ret_stack + 1; + + /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ + if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) + return -EBUSY; + + return ftrace_push_return_trace(ret, func, &trace.depth, + frame_pointer, retp); +} + /* Retrieve a function return address to the trace stack on thread info.*/ static void ftrace_pop_return_trace(struct ftrace_graph_ret *trace, unsigned long *ret, From fbbee0cfba5fb0985a6d22cc5ab246bcd7bd5888 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:19:26 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 099/140] ARM: function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter() commit f1f5b14afd7cce39e6a9b25c685e1ea34c231096 upstream. The function_graph_enter() function does the work of calling the function graph hook function and the management of the shadow stack, simplifying the work done in the architecture dependent prepare_ftrace_return(). Have ARM use the new code, and remove the shadow stack management as well as having to set up the trace structure. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: Russell King Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c | 17 +---------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c index 5617932a83df..ee673c09aa6c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -227,9 +227,7 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, unsigned long self_addr, unsigned long frame_pointer) { unsigned long return_hooker = (unsigned long) &return_to_handler; - struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; unsigned long old; - int err; if (unlikely(atomic_read(¤t->tracing_graph_pause))) return; @@ -237,21 +235,8 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, unsigned long self_addr, old = *parent; *parent = return_hooker; - trace.func = self_addr; - trace.depth = current->curr_ret_stack + 1; - - /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) { + if (function_graph_enter(old, self_addr, frame_pointer, NULL)) *parent = old; - return; - } - - err = ftrace_push_return_trace(old, self_addr, &trace.depth, - frame_pointer, NULL); - if (err == -EBUSY) { - *parent = old; - return; - } } #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE From e7deeabe9aa314493596a530371b218ad1020e9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:23:30 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 100/140] microblaze: function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter() commit 556763e5a500d71879d632867b75826551acd49c upstream. The function_graph_enter() function does the work of calling the function graph hook function and the management of the shadow stack, simplifying the work done in the architecture dependent prepare_ftrace_return(). Have microblaze use the new code, and remove the shadow stack management as well as having to set up the trace structure. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: Michal Simek Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/microblaze/kernel/ftrace.c | 15 ++------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/microblaze/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/microblaze/kernel/ftrace.c index d57563c58a26..224eea40e1ee 100644 --- a/arch/microblaze/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/microblaze/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, unsigned long self_addr) { unsigned long old; - int faulted, err; - struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; + int faulted; unsigned long return_hooker = (unsigned long) &return_to_handler; @@ -63,18 +62,8 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, unsigned long self_addr) return; } - err = ftrace_push_return_trace(old, self_addr, &trace.depth, 0, NULL); - if (err == -EBUSY) { + if (function_graph_enter(old, self_addr, 0, NULL)) *parent = old; - return; - } - - trace.func = self_addr; - /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) { - current->curr_ret_stack--; - *parent = old; - } } #endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER */ From 217614993aceeea89fce52b66f8b8afb7019ba23 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:14:10 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 101/140] x86/function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter() commit 07f7175b43827640d1e69c9eded89aa089a234b4 upstream. The function_graph_enter() function does the work of calling the function graph hook function and the management of the shadow stack, simplifying the work done in the architecture dependent prepare_ftrace_return(). Have x86 use the new code, and remove the shadow stack management as well as having to set up the trace structure. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Borislav Petkov Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 15 +-------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c index 01ebcb6f263e..7ee8067cbf45 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -994,7 +994,6 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long self_addr, unsigned long *parent, { unsigned long old; int faulted; - struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; unsigned long return_hooker = (unsigned long) &return_to_handler; @@ -1046,19 +1045,7 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long self_addr, unsigned long *parent, return; } - trace.func = self_addr; - trace.depth = current->curr_ret_stack + 1; - - /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) { + if (function_graph_enter(old, self_addr, frame_pointer, parent)) *parent = old; - return; - } - - if (ftrace_push_return_trace(old, self_addr, &trace.depth, - frame_pointer, parent) == -EBUSY) { - *parent = old; - return; - } } #endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER */ From 25ac02d0ed5eca9151935006b3c506206ce7533f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:26:35 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 102/140] nds32: function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter() commit d48ebb24866edea2c35be02a878f25bc65529370 upstream. The function_graph_enter() function does the work of calling the function graph hook function and the management of the shadow stack, simplifying the work done in the architecture dependent prepare_ftrace_return(). Have nds32 use the new code, and remove the shadow stack management as well as having to set up the trace structure. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: Greentime Hu Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/nds32/kernel/ftrace.c | 18 ++---------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/nds32/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/nds32/kernel/ftrace.c index a0a9679ad5de..8a41372551ff 100644 --- a/arch/nds32/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/nds32/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -211,29 +211,15 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, unsigned long self_addr, unsigned long frame_pointer) { unsigned long return_hooker = (unsigned long)&return_to_handler; - struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; unsigned long old; - int err; if (unlikely(atomic_read(¤t->tracing_graph_pause))) return; old = *parent; - trace.func = self_addr; - trace.depth = current->curr_ret_stack + 1; - - /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) - return; - - err = ftrace_push_return_trace(old, self_addr, &trace.depth, - frame_pointer, NULL); - - if (err == -EBUSY) - return; - - *parent = return_hooker; + if (!function_graph_enter(old, self_addr, frame_pointer, NULL)) + *parent = return_hooker; } noinline void ftrace_graph_caller(void) From 5478648ee8258ba11fa7ed5471d535f34b80965e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:28:53 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 103/140] powerpc/function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter() commit fe60522ec60082a1dd735691b82c64f65d4ad15e upstream. The function_graph_enter() function does the work of calling the function graph hook function and the management of the shadow stack, simplifying the work done in the architecture dependent prepare_ftrace_return(). Have powerpc use the new code, and remove the shadow stack management as well as having to set up the trace structure. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt Cc: Paul Mackerras Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 15 ++------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace.c index 4bfbb54dee51..19ef4f5866b6 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace.c @@ -697,7 +697,6 @@ int ftrace_disable_ftrace_graph_caller(void) */ unsigned long prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long parent, unsigned long ip) { - struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; unsigned long return_hooker; if (unlikely(ftrace_graph_is_dead())) @@ -708,18 +707,8 @@ unsigned long prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long parent, unsigned long ip) return_hooker = ppc_function_entry(return_to_handler); - trace.func = ip; - trace.depth = current->curr_ret_stack + 1; - - /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) - goto out; - - if (ftrace_push_return_trace(parent, ip, &trace.depth, 0, - NULL) == -EBUSY) - goto out; - - parent = return_hooker; + if (!function_graph_enter(parent, ip, 0, NULL)) + parent = return_hooker; out: return parent; } From 56c1dd92c0fc2cc5bdaf66a9fb2dbe4848c4acf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:35:37 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 104/140] sh/function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter() commit bc715ee4dbc5db462c59b9cfba92d31b3274fe3a upstream. The function_graph_enter() function does the work of calling the function graph hook function and the management of the shadow stack, simplifying the work done in the architecture dependent prepare_ftrace_return(). Have superh use the new code, and remove the shadow stack management as well as having to set up the trace structure. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: Yoshinori Sato Cc: Rich Felker Cc: linux-sh@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/sh/kernel/ftrace.c | 16 ++-------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/sh/kernel/ftrace.c index 96dd9f7da250..1b04270e5460 100644 --- a/arch/sh/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/sh/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -321,8 +321,7 @@ int ftrace_disable_ftrace_graph_caller(void) void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, unsigned long self_addr) { unsigned long old; - int faulted, err; - struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; + int faulted; unsigned long return_hooker = (unsigned long)&return_to_handler; if (unlikely(ftrace_graph_is_dead())) @@ -365,18 +364,7 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, unsigned long self_addr) return; } - err = ftrace_push_return_trace(old, self_addr, &trace.depth, 0, NULL); - if (err == -EBUSY) { + if (function_graph_enter(old, self_addr, 0, NULL)) __raw_writel(old, parent); - return; - } - - trace.func = self_addr; - - /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) { - current->curr_ret_stack--; - __raw_writel(old, parent); - } } #endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER */ From 34773b2f57ae9ef9953c66cfaf34b4cbaf18f981 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:37:40 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 105/140] sparc/function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter() commit 9c4bf5e0db164f330a2d3e128e9832661f69f0e9 upstream. The function_graph_enter() function does the work of calling the function graph hook function and the management of the shadow stack, simplifying the work done in the architecture dependent prepare_ftrace_return(). Have sparc use the new code, and remove the shadow stack management as well as having to set up the trace structure. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: "David S. Miller" Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/sparc/kernel/ftrace.c | 11 +---------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/ftrace.c index 915dda4ae412..684b84ce397f 100644 --- a/arch/sparc/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -126,20 +126,11 @@ unsigned long prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long parent, unsigned long frame_pointer) { unsigned long return_hooker = (unsigned long) &return_to_handler; - struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; if (unlikely(atomic_read(¤t->tracing_graph_pause))) return parent + 8UL; - trace.func = self_addr; - trace.depth = current->curr_ret_stack + 1; - - /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) - return parent + 8UL; - - if (ftrace_push_return_trace(parent, self_addr, &trace.depth, - frame_pointer, NULL) == -EBUSY) + if (function_graph_enter(parent, self_addr, frame_pointer, NULL)) return parent + 8UL; return return_hooker; From 87352d621bd3cc850540740d3451c6d0e9540ce7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:27:43 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 106/140] parisc: function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter() commit a87532c78d291265efadc4b20a8c7a70cd59ea29 upstream. The function_graph_enter() function does the work of calling the function graph hook function and the management of the shadow stack, simplifying the work done in the architecture dependent prepare_ftrace_return(). Have parisc use the new code, and remove the shadow stack management as well as having to set up the trace structure. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" Cc: Helge Deller Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/parisc/kernel/ftrace.c | 17 +++-------------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/ftrace.c index 6fa8535d3cce..e46a4157a894 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ static void __hot prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, unsigned long self_addr) { unsigned long old; - struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; extern int parisc_return_to_handler; if (unlikely(ftrace_graph_is_dead())) @@ -41,19 +40,9 @@ static void __hot prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, old = *parent; - trace.func = self_addr; - trace.depth = current->curr_ret_stack + 1; - - /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) - return; - - if (ftrace_push_return_trace(old, self_addr, &trace.depth, - 0, NULL) == -EBUSY) - return; - - /* activate parisc_return_to_handler() as return point */ - *parent = (unsigned long) &parisc_return_to_handler; + if (!function_graph_enter(old, self_addr, 0, NULL)) + /* activate parisc_return_to_handler() as return point */ + *parent = (unsigned long) &parisc_return_to_handler; } #endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER */ From 84d2023c14ea5a5a8a0f361a1f1aa5d0c225d66e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:31:44 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 107/140] riscv/function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter() commit e949b6db51dc172a35c962bc4414ca148315fe21 upstream. The function_graph_enter() function does the work of calling the function graph hook function and the management of the shadow stack, simplifying the work done in the architecture dependent prepare_ftrace_return(). Have riscv use the new code, and remove the shadow stack management as well as having to set up the trace structure. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: Greentime Hu Cc: Alan Kao Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Palmer Dabbelt Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c | 14 ++------------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c index 1157b6b52d25..c433f6d3dd64 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -132,7 +132,6 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, unsigned long self_addr, { unsigned long return_hooker = (unsigned long)&return_to_handler; unsigned long old; - struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; int err; if (unlikely(atomic_read(¤t->tracing_graph_pause))) @@ -144,17 +143,8 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, unsigned long self_addr, */ old = *parent; - trace.func = self_addr; - trace.depth = current->curr_ret_stack + 1; - - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) - return; - - err = ftrace_push_return_trace(old, self_addr, &trace.depth, - frame_pointer, parent); - if (err == -EBUSY) - return; - *parent = return_hooker; + if (function_graph_enter(old, self_addr, frame_pointer, parent)) + *parent = return_hooker; } #ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE From ef9326a145cd79c867bd84a95b837f8a60499068 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:33:17 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 108/140] s390/function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter() commit 18588e1487b19e45bd90bd55ec8d3a1d44f3257f upstream. The function_graph_enter() function does the work of calling the function graph hook function and the management of the shadow stack, simplifying the work done in the architecture dependent prepare_ftrace_return(). Have s390 use the new code, and remove the shadow stack management as well as having to set up the trace structure. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: Julian Wiedmann Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c | 13 ++----------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c index 84be7f02d0c2..39b13d71a8fe 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -203,22 +203,13 @@ device_initcall(ftrace_plt_init); */ unsigned long prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long parent, unsigned long ip) { - struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; - if (unlikely(ftrace_graph_is_dead())) goto out; if (unlikely(atomic_read(¤t->tracing_graph_pause))) goto out; ip -= MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE; - trace.func = ip; - trace.depth = current->curr_ret_stack + 1; - /* Only trace if the calling function expects to. */ - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) - goto out; - if (ftrace_push_return_trace(parent, ip, &trace.depth, 0, - NULL) == -EBUSY) - goto out; - parent = (unsigned long) return_to_handler; + if (!function_graph_enter(parent, ip, 0, NULL)) + parent = (unsigned long) return_to_handler; out: return parent; } From bdfd01cfd1e7306e9488cf6cbb0766945d202c1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:21:51 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 109/140] arm64: function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter() commit 01e0ab2c4ff12358f15a856fd1a7bbea0670972b upstream. The function_graph_enter() function does the work of calling the function graph hook function and the management of the shadow stack, simplifying the work done in the architecture dependent prepare_ftrace_return(). Have arm64 use the new code, and remove the shadow stack management as well as having to set up the trace structure. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: Catalin Marinas Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Acked-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c | 15 +-------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c index 50986e388d2b..57e962290df3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -216,8 +216,6 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, unsigned long self_addr, { unsigned long return_hooker = (unsigned long)&return_to_handler; unsigned long old; - struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; - int err; if (unlikely(atomic_read(¤t->tracing_graph_pause))) return; @@ -229,18 +227,7 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent, unsigned long self_addr, */ old = *parent; - trace.func = self_addr; - trace.depth = current->curr_ret_stack + 1; - - /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) - return; - - err = ftrace_push_return_trace(old, self_addr, &trace.depth, - frame_pointer, NULL); - if (err == -EBUSY) - return; - else + if (!function_graph_enter(old, self_addr, frame_pointer, NULL)) *parent = return_hooker; } From 35aa93cbb04c33a6a771c47e6c04c401615f0dd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 17:25:18 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 110/140] MIPS: function_graph: Simplify with function_graph_enter() commit 8712b27c5723c26400a2b350faf1d6d9fd7ffaad upstream. The function_graph_enter() function does the work of calling the function graph hook function and the management of the shadow stack, simplifying the work done in the architecture dependent prepare_ftrace_return(). Have MIPS use the new code, and remove the shadow stack management as well as having to set up the trace structure. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: Ralf Baechle Cc: Paul Burton Cc: James Hogan Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/mips/kernel/ftrace.c | 14 ++------------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ftrace.c index 7f3dfdbc3657..b122cbb4aad1 100644 --- a/arch/mips/kernel/ftrace.c +++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ftrace.c @@ -322,7 +322,6 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent_ra_addr, unsigned long self_ra, unsigned long fp) { unsigned long old_parent_ra; - struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; unsigned long return_hooker = (unsigned long) &return_to_handler; int faulted, insns; @@ -369,12 +368,6 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent_ra_addr, unsigned long self_ra, if (unlikely(faulted)) goto out; - if (ftrace_push_return_trace(old_parent_ra, self_ra, &trace.depth, fp, - NULL) == -EBUSY) { - *parent_ra_addr = old_parent_ra; - return; - } - /* * Get the recorded ip of the current mcount calling site in the * __mcount_loc section, which will be used to filter the function @@ -382,13 +375,10 @@ void prepare_ftrace_return(unsigned long *parent_ra_addr, unsigned long self_ra, */ insns = core_kernel_text(self_ra) ? 2 : MCOUNT_OFFSET_INSNS + 1; - trace.func = self_ra - (MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE * insns); + self_ra -= (MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE * insns); - /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) { - current->curr_ret_stack--; + if (function_graph_enter(old_parent_ra, self_ra, fp, NULL)) *parent_ra_addr = old_parent_ra; - } return; out: ftrace_graph_stop(); From 72c33b233f051e9e58d7e6b9213e985747530ec1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 07:40:39 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 111/140] function_graph: Make ftrace_push_return_trace() static commit d125f3f866df88da5a85df00291f88f0baa89f7c upstream. As all architectures now call function_graph_enter() to do the entry work, no architecture should ever call ftrace_push_return_trace(). Make it static. This is needed to prepare for a fix of a design bug on how the curr_ret_stack is used. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/ftrace.h | 3 --- kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ftrace.h b/include/linux/ftrace.h index 5717e8f81c59..dd16e8218db3 100644 --- a/include/linux/ftrace.h +++ b/include/linux/ftrace.h @@ -776,9 +776,6 @@ struct ftrace_ret_stack { */ extern void return_to_handler(void); -extern int -ftrace_push_return_trace(unsigned long ret, unsigned long func, int *depth, - unsigned long frame_pointer, unsigned long *retp); extern int function_graph_enter(unsigned long ret, unsigned long func, unsigned long frame_pointer, unsigned long *retp); diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c index 28f2602435d0..88ca787a1cdc 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ print_graph_duration(struct trace_array *tr, unsigned long long duration, struct trace_seq *s, u32 flags); /* Add a function return address to the trace stack on thread info.*/ -int +static int ftrace_push_return_trace(unsigned long ret, unsigned long func, int *depth, unsigned long frame_pointer, unsigned long *retp) { From 392374326d2905e1c617fae703237be84ba09e4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 08:07:12 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 112/140] function_graph: Use new curr_ret_depth to manage depth instead of curr_ret_stack commit 39eb456dacb543de90d3bc6a8e0ac5cf51ac475e upstream. Currently, the depth of the ret_stack is determined by curr_ret_stack index. The issue is that there's a race between setting of the curr_ret_stack and calling of the callback attached to the return of the function. Commit 03274a3ffb44 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") moved the calling of the callback to after the setting of the curr_ret_stack, even stating that it was safe to do so, when in fact, it was the reason there was a barrier() there (yes, I should have commented that barrier()). Not only does the curr_ret_stack keep track of the current call graph depth, it also keeps the ret_stack content from being overwritten by new data. The function profiler, uses the "subtime" variable of ret_stack structure and by moving the curr_ret_stack, it allows for interrupts to use the same structure it was using, corrupting the data, and breaking the profiler. To fix this, there needs to be two variables to handle the call stack depth and the pointer to where the ret_stack is being used, as they need to change at two different locations. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/sched.h | 1 + kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 3 +++ kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h index 52a717d23f05..4abb5bd74b04 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -1108,6 +1108,7 @@ struct task_struct { #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER /* Index of current stored address in ret_stack: */ int curr_ret_stack; + int curr_ret_depth; /* Stack of return addresses for return function tracing: */ struct ftrace_ret_stack *ret_stack; diff --git a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c index f536f601bd46..48513954713c 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c @@ -6814,6 +6814,7 @@ static int alloc_retstack_tasklist(struct ftrace_ret_stack **ret_stack_list) atomic_set(&t->tracing_graph_pause, 0); atomic_set(&t->trace_overrun, 0); t->curr_ret_stack = -1; + t->curr_ret_depth = -1; /* Make sure the tasks see the -1 first: */ smp_wmb(); t->ret_stack = ret_stack_list[start++]; @@ -7038,6 +7039,7 @@ graph_init_task(struct task_struct *t, struct ftrace_ret_stack *ret_stack) void ftrace_graph_init_idle_task(struct task_struct *t, int cpu) { t->curr_ret_stack = -1; + t->curr_ret_depth = -1; /* * The idle task has no parent, it either has its own * stack or no stack at all. @@ -7068,6 +7070,7 @@ void ftrace_graph_init_task(struct task_struct *t) /* Make sure we do not use the parent ret_stack */ t->ret_stack = NULL; t->curr_ret_stack = -1; + t->curr_ret_depth = -1; if (ftrace_graph_active) { struct ftrace_ret_stack *ret_stack; diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c index 88ca787a1cdc..02d4081a7f5a 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ print_graph_duration(struct trace_array *tr, unsigned long long duration, /* Add a function return address to the trace stack on thread info.*/ static int -ftrace_push_return_trace(unsigned long ret, unsigned long func, int *depth, +ftrace_push_return_trace(unsigned long ret, unsigned long func, unsigned long frame_pointer, unsigned long *retp) { unsigned long long calltime; @@ -177,8 +177,6 @@ ftrace_push_return_trace(unsigned long ret, unsigned long func, int *depth, #ifdef HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_RET_ADDR_PTR current->ret_stack[index].retp = retp; #endif - *depth = current->curr_ret_stack; - return 0; } @@ -188,14 +186,20 @@ int function_graph_enter(unsigned long ret, unsigned long func, struct ftrace_graph_ent trace; trace.func = func; - trace.depth = current->curr_ret_stack + 1; + trace.depth = ++current->curr_ret_depth; /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) - return -EBUSY; + goto out; - return ftrace_push_return_trace(ret, func, &trace.depth, - frame_pointer, retp); + if (ftrace_push_return_trace(ret, func, + frame_pointer, retp)) + goto out; + + return 0; + out: + current->curr_ret_depth--; + return -EBUSY; } /* Retrieve a function return address to the trace stack on thread info.*/ @@ -257,7 +261,7 @@ ftrace_pop_return_trace(struct ftrace_graph_ret *trace, unsigned long *ret, trace->func = current->ret_stack[index].func; trace->calltime = current->ret_stack[index].calltime; trace->overrun = atomic_read(¤t->trace_overrun); - trace->depth = index; + trace->depth = current->curr_ret_depth; } /* @@ -273,6 +277,7 @@ unsigned long ftrace_return_to_handler(unsigned long frame_pointer) trace.rettime = trace_clock_local(); barrier(); current->curr_ret_stack--; + current->curr_ret_depth--; /* * The curr_ret_stack can be less than -1 only if it was * filtered out and it's about to return from the function. From aec14c812ba877d94837d78def1832822594598a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 12:51:07 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 113/140] function_graph: Have profiler use curr_ret_stack and not depth commit b1b35f2e218a5b57d03bbc3b0667d5064570dc60 upstream. The profiler uses trace->depth to find its entry on the ret_stack, but the depth may not match the actual location of where its entry is (if an interrupt were to preempt the processing of the profiler for another function, the depth and the curr_ret_stack will be different). Have it use the curr_ret_stack as the index to find its ret_stack entry instead of using the depth variable, as that is no longer guaranteed to be the same. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/trace/ftrace.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c index 48513954713c..77734451cb05 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/ftrace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/ftrace.c @@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ function_profile_call(unsigned long ip, unsigned long parent_ip, #ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER static int profile_graph_entry(struct ftrace_graph_ent *trace) { - int index = trace->depth; + int index = current->curr_ret_stack; function_profile_call(trace->func, 0, NULL, NULL); @@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ static void profile_graph_return(struct ftrace_graph_ret *trace) if (!fgraph_graph_time) { int index; - index = trace->depth; + index = current->curr_ret_stack; /* Append this call time to the parent time to subtract */ if (index) From d2bcf809e838579902b0075f00a57aff2f1e27a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 15:18:40 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 114/140] function_graph: Move return callback before update of curr_ret_stack commit 552701dd0fa7c3d448142e87210590ba424694a0 upstream. In the past, curr_ret_stack had two functions. One was to denote the depth of the call graph, the other is to keep track of where on the ret_stack the data is used. Although they may be slightly related, there are two cases where they need to be used differently. The one case is that it keeps the ret_stack data from being corrupted by an interrupt coming in and overwriting the data still in use. The other is just to know where the depth of the stack currently is. The function profiler uses the ret_stack to save a "subtime" variable that is part of the data on the ret_stack. If curr_ret_stack is modified too early, then this variable can be corrupted. The "max_depth" option, when set to 1, will record the first functions going into the kernel. To see all top functions (when dealing with timings), the depth variable needs to be lowered before calling the return hook. But by lowering the curr_ret_stack, it makes the data on the ret_stack still being used by the return hook susceptible to being overwritten. Now that there's two variables to handle both cases (curr_ret_depth), we can move them to the locations where they can handle both cases. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c | 22 +++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c index 02d4081a7f5a..4f0d72ae6362 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c @@ -261,7 +261,13 @@ ftrace_pop_return_trace(struct ftrace_graph_ret *trace, unsigned long *ret, trace->func = current->ret_stack[index].func; trace->calltime = current->ret_stack[index].calltime; trace->overrun = atomic_read(¤t->trace_overrun); - trace->depth = current->curr_ret_depth; + trace->depth = current->curr_ret_depth--; + /* + * We still want to trace interrupts coming in if + * max_depth is set to 1. Make sure the decrement is + * seen before ftrace_graph_return. + */ + barrier(); } /* @@ -275,9 +281,14 @@ unsigned long ftrace_return_to_handler(unsigned long frame_pointer) ftrace_pop_return_trace(&trace, &ret, frame_pointer); trace.rettime = trace_clock_local(); + ftrace_graph_return(&trace); + /* + * The ftrace_graph_return() may still access the current + * ret_stack structure, we need to make sure the update of + * curr_ret_stack is after that. + */ barrier(); current->curr_ret_stack--; - current->curr_ret_depth--; /* * The curr_ret_stack can be less than -1 only if it was * filtered out and it's about to return from the function. @@ -288,13 +299,6 @@ unsigned long ftrace_return_to_handler(unsigned long frame_pointer) return ret; } - /* - * The trace should run after decrementing the ret counter - * in case an interrupt were to come in. We don't want to - * lose the interrupt if max_depth is set. - */ - ftrace_graph_return(&trace); - if (unlikely(!ret)) { ftrace_graph_stop(); WARN_ON(1); From a22ff9df71aa6433f8e68098cd20ef78bc607397 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 12:40:25 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 115/140] function_graph: Reverse the order of pushing the ret_stack and the callback commit 7c6ea35ef50810aa12ab26f21cb858d980881576 upstream. The function graph profiler uses the ret_stack to store the "subtime" and reuse it by nested functions and also on the return. But the current logic has the profiler callback called before the ret_stack is updated, and it is just modifying the ret_stack that will later be allocated (it's just lucky that the "subtime" is not touched when it is allocated). This could also cause a crash if we are at the end of the ret_stack when this happens. By reversing the order of the allocating the ret_stack and then calling the callbacks attached to a function being traced, the ret_stack entry is no longer used before it is allocated. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 03274a3ffb449 ("tracing/fgraph: Adjust fgraph depth before calling trace return callback") Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c index 4f0d72ae6362..2561460d7baf 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_functions_graph.c @@ -188,15 +188,17 @@ int function_graph_enter(unsigned long ret, unsigned long func, trace.func = func; trace.depth = ++current->curr_ret_depth; - /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ - if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) - goto out; - if (ftrace_push_return_trace(ret, func, frame_pointer, retp)) goto out; + /* Only trace if the calling function expects to */ + if (!ftrace_graph_entry(&trace)) + goto out_ret; + return 0; + out_ret: + current->curr_ret_stack--; out: current->curr_ret_depth--; return -EBUSY; From 553927d6aab993e1297d0c69274cd0c2df5440ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Todd Kjos Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 15:55:32 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 116/140] binder: fix race that allows malicious free of live buffer MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit 7bada55ab50697861eee6bb7d60b41e68a961a9c upstream. Malicious code can attempt to free buffers using the BC_FREE_BUFFER ioctl to binder. There are protections against a user freeing a buffer while in use by the kernel, however there was a window where BC_FREE_BUFFER could be used to free a recently allocated buffer that was not completely initialized. This resulted in a use-after-free detected by KASAN with a malicious test program. This window is closed by setting the buffer's allow_user_free attribute to 0 when the buffer is allocated or when the user has previously freed it instead of waiting for the caller to set it. The problem was that when the struct buffer was recycled, allow_user_free was stale and set to 1 allowing a free to go through. Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos Acked-by: Arve Hjønnevåg Cc: stable # 4.14 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/android/binder.c | 21 ++++++++++++--------- drivers/android/binder_alloc.c | 16 ++++++---------- drivers/android/binder_alloc.h | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index d58763b6b009..ce0e4d317d24 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -2971,7 +2971,6 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->buffer = NULL; goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed; } - t->buffer->allow_user_free = 0; t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id; t->buffer->transaction = t; t->buffer->target_node = target_node; @@ -3465,14 +3464,18 @@ static int binder_thread_write(struct binder_proc *proc, buffer = binder_alloc_prepare_to_free(&proc->alloc, data_ptr); - if (buffer == NULL) { - binder_user_error("%d:%d BC_FREE_BUFFER u%016llx no match\n", - proc->pid, thread->pid, (u64)data_ptr); - break; - } - if (!buffer->allow_user_free) { - binder_user_error("%d:%d BC_FREE_BUFFER u%016llx matched unreturned buffer\n", - proc->pid, thread->pid, (u64)data_ptr); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(buffer)) { + if (PTR_ERR(buffer) == -EPERM) { + binder_user_error( + "%d:%d BC_FREE_BUFFER u%016llx matched unreturned or currently freeing buffer\n", + proc->pid, thread->pid, + (u64)data_ptr); + } else { + binder_user_error( + "%d:%d BC_FREE_BUFFER u%016llx no match\n", + proc->pid, thread->pid, + (u64)data_ptr); + } break; } binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_FREE_BUFFER, diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c index 64fd96eada31..030c98f35cca 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c @@ -151,16 +151,12 @@ static struct binder_buffer *binder_alloc_prepare_to_free_locked( else { /* * Guard against user threads attempting to - * free the buffer twice + * free the buffer when in use by kernel or + * after it's already been freed. */ - if (buffer->free_in_progress) { - binder_alloc_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_USER_ERROR, - "%d:%d FREE_BUFFER u%016llx user freed buffer twice\n", - alloc->pid, current->pid, - (u64)user_ptr); - return NULL; - } - buffer->free_in_progress = 1; + if (!buffer->allow_user_free) + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + buffer->allow_user_free = 0; return buffer; } } @@ -500,7 +496,7 @@ static struct binder_buffer *binder_alloc_new_buf_locked( rb_erase(best_fit, &alloc->free_buffers); buffer->free = 0; - buffer->free_in_progress = 0; + buffer->allow_user_free = 0; binder_insert_allocated_buffer_locked(alloc, buffer); binder_alloc_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_BUFFER_ALLOC, "%d: binder_alloc_buf size %zd got %pK\n", diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h index 9ef64e563856..fb3238c74c8a 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h +++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.h @@ -50,8 +50,7 @@ struct binder_buffer { unsigned free:1; unsigned allow_user_free:1; unsigned async_transaction:1; - unsigned free_in_progress:1; - unsigned debug_id:28; + unsigned debug_id:29; struct binder_transaction *transaction; From 1666cf8c492d7a9b8b83e26eb139961a4c137b80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: xingaopeng Date: Sat, 24 Nov 2018 19:21:59 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 117/140] ext2: initialize opts.s_mount_opt as zero before using it commit e5f5b717983bccfa033282e9886811635602510e upstream. We need to initialize opts.s_mount_opt as zero before using it, else we may get some unexpected mount options. Fixes: 088519572ca8 ("ext2: Parse mount options into a dedicated structure") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: xingaopeng Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext2/super.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/ext2/super.c b/fs/ext2/super.c index 73bd58fa13de..0c38e31ec938 100644 --- a/fs/ext2/super.c +++ b/fs/ext2/super.c @@ -895,6 +895,7 @@ static int ext2_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) if (sb->s_magic != EXT2_SUPER_MAGIC) goto cantfind_ext2; + opts.s_mount_opt = 0; /* Set defaults before we parse the mount options */ def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts); if (def_mount_opts & EXT2_DEFM_DEBUG) From ffaaaf68be1e3c6f3a8ff5285e7b52543c1c2885 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pan Bian Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 08:58:02 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 118/140] ext2: fix potential use after free commit ecebf55d27a11538ea84aee0be643dd953f830d5 upstream. The function ext2_xattr_set calls brelse(bh) to drop the reference count of bh. After that, bh may be freed. However, following brelse(bh), it reads bh->b_data via macro HDR(bh). This may result in a use-after-free bug. This patch moves brelse(bh) after reading field. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pan Bian Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext2/xattr.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext2/xattr.c b/fs/ext2/xattr.c index 62d9a659a8ff..dd8f10db82e9 100644 --- a/fs/ext2/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext2/xattr.c @@ -612,9 +612,9 @@ bad_block: ext2_error(sb, "ext2_xattr_set", } cleanup: - brelse(bh); if (!(bh && header == HDR(bh))) kfree(header); + brelse(bh); up_write(&EXT2_I(inode)->xattr_sem); return error; From f35f68c68ce48a8b70a4c3674663513825b7a1bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans de Goede Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 15:22:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 119/140] ASoC: intel: cht_bsw_max98090_ti: Add quirk for boards using pmc_plt_clk_0 commit a182ecd3809c8d5a2da80c520f3602e301c5317e upstream. Some boards such as the Swanky model Chromebooks use pmc_plt_clk_0 for the mclk instead of pmc_plt_clk_3. This commit adds a DMI based quirk for this. This fixing audio no longer working on these devices after commit 648e921888ad ("clk: x86: Stop marking clocks as CLK_IS_CRITICAL") that commit fixes us unnecessary keeping unused clocks on, but in case of the Swanky that was breaking audio support since we were not using the right clock in the cht_bsw_max98090_ti machine driver. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 648e921888ad ("clk: x86: Stop marking clocks as CLK_IS_CRITICAL") Reported-and-tested-by: Dean Wallace Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/soc/intel/boards/cht_bsw_max98090_ti.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/intel/boards/cht_bsw_max98090_ti.c b/sound/soc/intel/boards/cht_bsw_max98090_ti.c index db6976f4ddaa..9d9f6e41d81c 100644 --- a/sound/soc/intel/boards/cht_bsw_max98090_ti.c +++ b/sound/soc/intel/boards/cht_bsw_max98090_ti.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ */ +#include #include #include #include @@ -35,6 +36,8 @@ #define CHT_PLAT_CLK_3_HZ 19200000 #define CHT_CODEC_DAI "HiFi" +#define QUIRK_PMC_PLT_CLK_0 0x01 + struct cht_mc_private { struct clk *mclk; struct snd_soc_jack jack; @@ -385,11 +388,29 @@ static struct snd_soc_card snd_soc_card_cht = { .num_controls = ARRAY_SIZE(cht_mc_controls), }; +static const struct dmi_system_id cht_max98090_quirk_table[] = { + { + /* Swanky model Chromebook (Toshiba Chromebook 2) */ + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Swanky"), + }, + .driver_data = (void *)QUIRK_PMC_PLT_CLK_0, + }, + {} +}; + static int snd_cht_mc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { + const struct dmi_system_id *dmi_id; struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; int ret_val = 0; struct cht_mc_private *drv; + const char *mclk_name; + int quirks = 0; + + dmi_id = dmi_first_match(cht_max98090_quirk_table); + if (dmi_id) + quirks = (unsigned long)dmi_id->driver_data; drv = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*drv), GFP_KERNEL); if (!drv) @@ -411,11 +432,16 @@ static int snd_cht_mc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) snd_soc_card_cht.dev = &pdev->dev; snd_soc_card_set_drvdata(&snd_soc_card_cht, drv); - drv->mclk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, "pmc_plt_clk_3"); + if (quirks & QUIRK_PMC_PLT_CLK_0) + mclk_name = "pmc_plt_clk_0"; + else + mclk_name = "pmc_plt_clk_3"; + + drv->mclk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, mclk_name); if (IS_ERR(drv->mclk)) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, - "Failed to get MCLK from pmc_plt_clk_3: %ld\n", - PTR_ERR(drv->mclk)); + "Failed to get MCLK from %s: %ld\n", + mclk_name, PTR_ERR(drv->mclk)); return PTR_ERR(drv->mclk); } From b16c2b78f13c26fde9b7460883f0722bb40e133c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andreas Dannenberg Date: Thu, 15 Nov 2018 11:01:31 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 120/140] ASoC: pcm186x: Fix device reset-registers trigger value commit 5277715639ff6f75c729e657690751a831112c4b upstream. According to the current device datasheet (TI Lit # SLAS831D, revised March 2018) the value written to the device's PAGE register to trigger a complete register reset should be 0xfe, not 0xff. So go ahead and update to the correct value. Reported-by: Stephane Le Provost Tested-by: Stephane Le Provost Signed-off-by: Andreas Dannenberg Acked-by: Andrew F. Davis Signed-off-by: Mark Brown Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- sound/soc/codecs/pcm186x.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm186x.h b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm186x.h index 2c6ba55bf394..bb3f0c42a1cd 100644 --- a/sound/soc/codecs/pcm186x.h +++ b/sound/soc/codecs/pcm186x.h @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ enum pcm186x_type { #define PCM186X_MAX_REGISTER PCM186X_CURR_TRIM_CTRL /* PCM186X_PAGE */ -#define PCM186X_RESET 0xff +#define PCM186X_RESET 0xfe /* PCM186X_ADCX_INPUT_SEL_X */ #define PCM186X_ADC_INPUT_SEL_POL BIT(7) From 6e74fc22db9cb76efccdcebe015a8c848c17620b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Heiko Stuebner Date: Sun, 18 Nov 2018 20:03:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 121/140] ARM: dts: rockchip: Remove @0 from the veyron memory node commit 672e60b72bbe7aace88721db55b380b6a51fb8f9 upstream. The Coreboot version on veyron ChromeOS devices seems to ignore memory@0 nodes when updating the available memory and instead inserts another memory node without the address. This leads to 4GB systems only ever be using 2GB as the memory@0 node takes precedence. So remove the @0 for veyron devices. Fixes: 0b639b815f15 ("ARM: dts: rockchip: Add missing unit name to memory nodes in rk3288 boards") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Heikki Lindholm Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron.dtsi | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron.dtsi index 2075120cfc4d..d8bf939a3aff 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron.dtsi @@ -10,7 +10,11 @@ #include "rk3288.dtsi" / { - memory@0 { + /* + * The default coreboot on veyron devices ignores memory@0 nodes + * and would instead create another memory node. + */ + memory { device_type = "memory"; reg = <0x0 0x0 0x0 0x80000000>; }; From 9983a5bba09e5b56b73881ce99b95b0723f72bc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Genoud Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2018 17:06:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 122/140] dmaengine: at_hdmac: fix memory leak in at_dma_xlate() commit 98f5f932254b88ce828bc8e4d1642d14e5854caa upstream. The leak was found when opening/closing a serial port a great number of time, increasing kmalloc-32 in slabinfo. Each time the port was opened, dma_request_slave_channel() was called. Then, in at_dma_xlate(), atslave was allocated with devm_kzalloc() and never freed. (Well, it was free at module unload, but that's not what we want). So, here, kzalloc is more suited for the job since it has to be freed in atc_free_chan_resources(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: bbe89c8e3d59 ("at_hdmac: move to generic DMA binding") Reported-by: Mario Forner Suggested-by: Alexandre Belloni Acked-by: Alexandre Belloni Acked-by: Ludovic Desroches Signed-off-by: Richard Genoud Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c b/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c index 75f38d19fcbe..ba8994e10ed9 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c +++ b/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c @@ -1641,6 +1641,12 @@ static void atc_free_chan_resources(struct dma_chan *chan) atchan->descs_allocated = 0; atchan->status = 0; + /* + * Free atslave allocated in at_dma_xlate() + */ + kfree(chan->private); + chan->private = NULL; + dev_vdbg(chan2dev(chan), "free_chan_resources: done\n"); } @@ -1675,7 +1681,7 @@ static struct dma_chan *at_dma_xlate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, dma_cap_zero(mask); dma_cap_set(DMA_SLAVE, mask); - atslave = devm_kzalloc(&dmac_pdev->dev, sizeof(*atslave), GFP_KERNEL); + atslave = kzalloc(sizeof(*atslave), GFP_KERNEL); if (!atslave) return NULL; From 0d04d450fe0d34bd0173a36d8748226925ba1ade Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Richard Genoud Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2018 17:06:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 123/140] dmaengine: at_hdmac: fix module unloading commit 77e75fda94d2ebb86aa9d35fb1860f6395bf95de upstream. of_dma_controller_free() was not called on module onloading. This lead to a soft lockup: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 23s! Modules linked in: at_hdmac [last unloaded: at_hdmac] when of_dma_request_slave_channel() tried to call ofdma->of_dma_xlate(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: bbe89c8e3d59 ("at_hdmac: move to generic DMA binding") Acked-by: Ludovic Desroches Signed-off-by: Richard Genoud Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c b/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c index ba8994e10ed9..dbc51154f122 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c +++ b/drivers/dma/at_hdmac.c @@ -2006,6 +2006,8 @@ static int at_dma_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) struct resource *io; at_dma_off(atdma); + if (pdev->dev.of_node) + of_dma_controller_free(pdev->dev.of_node); dma_async_device_unregister(&atdma->dma_common); dma_pool_destroy(atdma->memset_pool); From 053b783d3da3fdec641072fac0437bb62a1ce4a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Ian King Date: Fri, 9 Nov 2018 11:56:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 124/140] staging: most: use format specifier "%s" in snprintf commit 13c45007e0a87e912da21223599583fdea677914 upstream. Passing string ch_data_type[i].name as the format specifier is potentially hazardous because it could (although very unlikely to) have a format specifier embedded in it causing issues when parsing the non-existent arguments to these. Follow best practice by using the "%s" format string for the string. Cleans up clang warning: format string is not a string literal (potentially insecure) [-Wformat-security] Fixes: e7f2b70fd3a9 ("staging: most: replace multiple if..else with table lookup") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/most/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/most/core.c b/drivers/staging/most/core.c index f4c464625a67..52ad62722996 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/most/core.c +++ b/drivers/staging/most/core.c @@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static ssize_t set_datatype_show(struct device *dev, for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ch_data_type); i++) { if (c->cfg.data_type & ch_data_type[i].most_ch_data_type) - return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, ch_data_type[i].name); + return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s", ch_data_type[i].name); } return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "unconfigured\n"); } From 6df2b837939a9fba3375c9dd8c5e6e841e0086e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ben Wolsieffer Date: Sat, 3 Nov 2018 19:32:20 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 125/140] staging: vchiq_arm: fix compat VCHIQ_IOC_AWAIT_COMPLETION commit 5a96b2d38dc054c0bbcbcd585b116566cbd877fe upstream. The compatibility ioctl wrapper for VCHIQ_IOC_AWAIT_COMPLETION assumes that the native ioctl always uses a message buffer and decrements msgbufcount. Certain message types do not use a message buffer and in this case msgbufcount is not decremented, and completion->header for the message is NULL. Because the wrapper unconditionally decrements msgbufcount, the calling process may assume that a message buffer has been used even when it has not. This results in a memory leak in the userspace code that interfaces with this driver. When msgbufcount is decremented, the userspace code assumes that the buffer can be freed though the reference in completion->header, which cannot happen when the reference is NULL. This patch causes the wrapper to only decrement msgbufcount when the native ioctl decrements it. Note that we cannot simply copy the native ioctl's value of msgbufcount, because the wrapper only retrieves messages from the native ioctl one at a time, while userspace may request multiple messages. See https://github.com/raspberrypi/linux/pull/2703 for more discussion of this patch. Fixes: 5569a1260933 ("staging: vchiq_arm: Add compatibility wrappers for ioctls") Signed-off-by: Ben Wolsieffer Acked-by: Stefan Wahren Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- .../staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c index bc05c69383b8..fe431302a030 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c +++ b/drivers/staging/vc04_services/interface/vchiq_arm/vchiq_arm.c @@ -1787,6 +1787,7 @@ vchiq_compat_ioctl_await_completion(struct file *file, struct vchiq_await_completion32 args32; struct vchiq_completion_data32 completion32; unsigned int *msgbufcount32; + unsigned int msgbufcount_native; compat_uptr_t msgbuf32; void *msgbuf; void **msgbufptr; @@ -1898,7 +1899,11 @@ vchiq_compat_ioctl_await_completion(struct file *file, sizeof(completion32))) return -EFAULT; - args32.msgbufcount--; + if (get_user(msgbufcount_native, &args->msgbufcount)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (!msgbufcount_native) + args32.msgbufcount--; msgbufcount32 = &((struct vchiq_await_completion32 __user *)arg)->msgbufcount; From bea52e4d1e4278b5852ef20149883536ab5c4d02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sergio Paracuellos Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2018 13:31:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 126/140] staging: mt7621-dma: fix potentially dereferencing uninitialized 'tx_desc' commit 354e379684fcc70ab8d5450b4d57bd92b5294dfd upstream. Function 'mtk_hsdma_start_transfer' uses 'tx_desc' pointer which can be dereferenced before it is initializated. Initializate pointer before avoiding the problem. Fixes: 0853c7a53eb3 ("staging: mt7621-dma: ralink: add rt2880 dma engine") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Sergio Paracuellos Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/mt7621-dma/mtk-hsdma.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/mt7621-dma/mtk-hsdma.c b/drivers/staging/mt7621-dma/mtk-hsdma.c index df6ebf41bdea..5831f816c17b 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/mt7621-dma/mtk-hsdma.c +++ b/drivers/staging/mt7621-dma/mtk-hsdma.c @@ -335,6 +335,8 @@ static int mtk_hsdma_start_transfer(struct mtk_hsdam_engine *hsdma, /* tx desc */ src = sg->src_addr; for (i = 0; i < chan->desc->num_sgs; i++) { + tx_desc = &chan->tx_ring[chan->tx_idx]; + if (len > HSDMA_MAX_PLEN) tlen = HSDMA_MAX_PLEN; else @@ -344,7 +346,6 @@ static int mtk_hsdma_start_transfer(struct mtk_hsdam_engine *hsdma, tx_desc->addr1 = src; tx_desc->flags |= HSDMA_DESC_PLEN1(tlen); } else { - tx_desc = &chan->tx_ring[chan->tx_idx]; tx_desc->addr0 = src; tx_desc->flags = HSDMA_DESC_PLEN0(tlen); From fa299861aeeb7329042ab60be06903f5cb9fba32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Colin Ian King Date: Sat, 10 Nov 2018 23:28:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 127/140] staging: mt7621-pinctrl: fix uninitialized variable ngroups commit cd56a5141331abfe218d744a3d66e1788135d482 upstream. Currently the for_each_node_with_property loop us incrementing variable ngroups however it was not initialized and hence will contain garbage. Fix this by initializing ngroups to zero. Detected with static analysis with cppcheck: drivers/staging/mt7621-pinctrl/pinctrl-rt2880.c:89]: (error) Uninitialized variable: ngroups Fixes: e12a1a6e087b ("staging: mt7621-pinctrl: refactor rt2880_pinctrl_dt_node_to_map function") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King Reviewed-by: Sergio Paracuellos Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/mt7621-pinctrl/pinctrl-rt2880.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/mt7621-pinctrl/pinctrl-rt2880.c b/drivers/staging/mt7621-pinctrl/pinctrl-rt2880.c index b8566ed898f1..aa98fbb17013 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/mt7621-pinctrl/pinctrl-rt2880.c +++ b/drivers/staging/mt7621-pinctrl/pinctrl-rt2880.c @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static int rt2880_pinctrl_dt_node_to_map(struct pinctrl_dev *pctrldev, struct property *prop; const char *function_name, *group_name; int ret; - int ngroups; + int ngroups = 0; unsigned int reserved_maps = 0; for_each_node_with_property(np_config, "group") From 6d956674dfc5ef606ae914446296c261dfeaf03d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Larry Finger Date: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 21:33:14 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 128/140] staging: rtl8723bs: Fix incorrect sense of ether_addr_equal commit c948c6915b620f075496846df8d4487ee0c56121 upstream. In commit b37f9e1c3801 ("staging: rtl8723bs: Fix lines too long in update_recvframe_attrib()."), the refactoring involved replacing two memcmp() calls with ether_addr_equal() calls. What the author missed is that memcmp() returns false when the two strings are equal, whereas ether_addr_equal() returns true when the two addresses are equal. One side effect of this error is that the strength of an unassociated AP was much stronger than the same AP after association. This bug is reported at bko#201611. Fixes: b37f9e1c3801 ("staging: rtl8723bs: Fix lines too long in update_recvframe_attrib().") Cc: Stable Cc: youling257 Cc: u.srikant.patnaik@gmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: youling257 Signed-off-by: Larry Finger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c index 85077947b9b8..85aba8a503cd 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/hal/rtl8723bs_recv.c @@ -109,12 +109,12 @@ static void update_recvframe_phyinfo(union recv_frame *precvframe, rx_bssid = get_hdr_bssid(wlanhdr); pkt_info.bssid_match = ((!IsFrameTypeCtrl(wlanhdr)) && !pattrib->icv_err && !pattrib->crc_err && - !ether_addr_equal(rx_bssid, my_bssid)); + ether_addr_equal(rx_bssid, my_bssid)); rx_ra = get_ra(wlanhdr); my_hwaddr = myid(&padapter->eeprompriv); pkt_info.to_self = pkt_info.bssid_match && - !ether_addr_equal(rx_ra, my_hwaddr); + ether_addr_equal(rx_ra, my_hwaddr); pkt_info.is_beacon = pkt_info.bssid_match && From b73301b7db4a6987c64d1d98a173254d736a3ba2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Larry Finger Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 23:30:09 -0600 Subject: [PATCH 129/140] staging: rtl8723bs: Add missing return for cfg80211_rtw_get_station commit 8561fb31a1f9594e2807681f5c0721894e367f19 upstream. With Androidx86 8.1, wificond returns "failed to get nl80211_sta_info_tx_failed" and wificondControl returns "Invalid signal poll result from wificond". The fix is to OR sinfo->filled with BIT_ULL(NL80211_STA_INFO_TX_FAILED). This missing bit is apparently not needed with NetworkManager, but it does no harm in that case. Reported-and-Tested-by: youling257 Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Cc: youling257 Signed-off-by: Larry Finger Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c index af2234798fa8..db553f2e4c0b 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c @@ -1277,7 +1277,7 @@ static int cfg80211_rtw_get_station(struct wiphy *wiphy, sinfo->filled |= BIT_ULL(NL80211_STA_INFO_TX_PACKETS); sinfo->tx_packets = psta->sta_stats.tx_pkts; - + sinfo->filled |= BIT_ULL(NL80211_STA_INFO_TX_FAILED); } /* for Ad-Hoc/AP mode */ From d4f924e359ad37305f7b42bdb131b3e7dc956991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kai-Heng Feng Date: Fri, 23 Nov 2018 08:42:19 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 130/140] USB: usb-storage: Add new IDs to ums-realtek commit a84a1bcc992f0545a51d2e120b8ca2ef20e2ea97 upstream. There are two new Realtek card readers require ums-realtek to work correctly. Add the new IDs to support them. Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng Acked-by: Alan Stern Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/storage/unusual_realtek.h | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_realtek.h b/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_realtek.h index d17cd95b55bb..6b2140f966ef 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_realtek.h +++ b/drivers/usb/storage/unusual_realtek.h @@ -27,4 +27,14 @@ UNUSUAL_DEV(0x0bda, 0x0159, 0x0000, 0x9999, "USB Card Reader", USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, init_realtek_cr, 0), +UNUSUAL_DEV(0x0bda, 0x0177, 0x0000, 0x9999, + "Realtek", + "USB Card Reader", + USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, init_realtek_cr, 0), + +UNUSUAL_DEV(0x0bda, 0x0184, 0x0000, 0x9999, + "Realtek", + "USB Card Reader", + USB_SC_DEVICE, USB_PR_DEVICE, init_realtek_cr, 0), + #endif /* defined(CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_REALTEK) || ... */ From c7d370712e722fd7205279aa85fb67909db16e59 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Michael=20Niew=C3=B6hner?= Date: Sun, 25 Nov 2018 17:57:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 131/140] usb: core: quirks: add RESET_RESUME quirk for Cherry G230 Stream series MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit commit effd14f66cc1ef6701a19c5a56e39c35f4d395a5 upstream. Cherry G230 Stream 2.0 (G85-231) and 3.0 (G85-232) need this quirk to function correctly. This fixes a but where double pressing numlock locks up the device completely with need to replug the keyboard. Signed-off-by: Michael Niewöhner Tested-by: Michael Niewöhner Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c index f9ff03e6af93..0690fcff0ea2 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c +++ b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c @@ -209,6 +209,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id usb_quirk_list[] = { /* Microsoft LifeCam-VX700 v2.0 */ { USB_DEVICE(0x045e, 0x0770), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_RESET_RESUME }, + /* Cherry Stream G230 2.0 (G85-231) and 3.0 (G85-232) */ + { USB_DEVICE(0x046a, 0x0023), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_RESET_RESUME }, + /* Logitech HD Pro Webcams C920, C920-C, C925e and C930e */ { USB_DEVICE(0x046d, 0x082d), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT }, { USB_DEVICE(0x046d, 0x0841), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_DELAY_INIT }, From 91f1c5c65d733086d1af756e4405b324e87d8bf0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Felipe Balbi Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2018 08:34:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 132/140] Revert "usb: dwc3: gadget: skip Set/Clear Halt when invalid" commit 38317f5c0f2faae5110854f36edad810f841d62f upstream. This reverts commit ffb80fc672c3a7b6afd0cefcb1524fb99917b2f3. Turns out that commit is wrong. Host controllers are allowed to use Clear Feature HALT as means to sync data toggle between host and periperal. Cc: Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c index 2de1a3971a26..558949b826d0 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c @@ -1461,9 +1461,6 @@ int __dwc3_gadget_ep_set_halt(struct dwc3_ep *dep, int value, int protocol) unsigned transfer_in_flight; unsigned started; - if (dep->flags & DWC3_EP_STALL) - return 0; - if (dep->number > 1) trb = dwc3_ep_prev_trb(dep, dep->trb_enqueue); else @@ -1485,8 +1482,6 @@ int __dwc3_gadget_ep_set_halt(struct dwc3_ep *dep, int value, int protocol) else dep->flags |= DWC3_EP_STALL; } else { - if (!(dep->flags & DWC3_EP_STALL)) - return 0; ret = dwc3_send_clear_stall_ep_cmd(dep); if (ret) From ec800c8b028ec5b42dc81421d04a6d4649d44b51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hans de Goede Date: Wed, 31 Oct 2018 15:20:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 133/140] iio/hid-sensors: Fix IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW returning wrong values for signed numbers commit 0145b50566e7de5637e80ecba96c7f0e6fff1aad upstream. Before this commit sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value() failed to take the signedness of 16 and 8 bit values into account, returning e.g. 65436 instead of -100 for the z-axis reading of an accelerometer. This commit adds a new is_signed parameter to the function and makes all callers pass the appropriate value for this. While at it, this commit also fixes up some neighboring lines where statements were needlessly split over 2 lines to improve readability. Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede Acked-by: Srinivas Pandruvada Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-sensor-custom.c | 2 +- drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c | 13 ++++++++++--- drivers/iio/accel/hid-sensor-accel-3d.c | 5 ++++- drivers/iio/gyro/hid-sensor-gyro-3d.c | 5 ++++- drivers/iio/humidity/hid-sensor-humidity.c | 3 ++- drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-als.c | 8 +++++--- drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-prox.c | 8 +++++--- drivers/iio/magnetometer/hid-sensor-magn-3d.c | 8 +++++--- drivers/iio/orientation/hid-sensor-incl-3d.c | 8 +++++--- drivers/iio/pressure/hid-sensor-press.c | 8 +++++--- drivers/iio/temperature/hid-sensor-temperature.c | 3 ++- drivers/rtc/rtc-hid-sensor-time.c | 2 +- include/linux/hid-sensor-hub.h | 4 +++- 13 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-custom.c b/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-custom.c index e8a114157f87..bb012bc032e0 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-custom.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-custom.c @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static ssize_t show_value(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, sensor_inst->hsdev, sensor_inst->hsdev->usage, usage, report_id, - SENSOR_HUB_SYNC); + SENSOR_HUB_SYNC, false); } else if (!strncmp(name, "units", strlen("units"))) value = sensor_inst->fields[field_index].attribute.units; else if (!strncmp(name, "unit-expo", strlen("unit-expo"))) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c b/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c index 2b63487057c2..4256fdc5cd6d 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-sensor-hub.c @@ -299,7 +299,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sensor_hub_get_feature); int sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value(struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev, u32 usage_id, u32 attr_usage_id, u32 report_id, - enum sensor_hub_read_flags flag) + enum sensor_hub_read_flags flag, + bool is_signed) { struct sensor_hub_data *data = hid_get_drvdata(hsdev->hdev); unsigned long flags; @@ -331,10 +332,16 @@ int sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value(struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev, &hsdev->pending.ready, HZ*5); switch (hsdev->pending.raw_size) { case 1: - ret_val = *(u8 *)hsdev->pending.raw_data; + if (is_signed) + ret_val = *(s8 *)hsdev->pending.raw_data; + else + ret_val = *(u8 *)hsdev->pending.raw_data; break; case 2: - ret_val = *(u16 *)hsdev->pending.raw_data; + if (is_signed) + ret_val = *(s16 *)hsdev->pending.raw_data; + else + ret_val = *(u16 *)hsdev->pending.raw_data; break; case 4: ret_val = *(u32 *)hsdev->pending.raw_data; diff --git a/drivers/iio/accel/hid-sensor-accel-3d.c b/drivers/iio/accel/hid-sensor-accel-3d.c index 41d97faf5013..38ff374a3ca4 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/accel/hid-sensor-accel-3d.c +++ b/drivers/iio/accel/hid-sensor-accel-3d.c @@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ static int accel_3d_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int report_id = -1; u32 address; int ret_type; + s32 min; struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev = accel_state->common_attributes.hsdev; @@ -158,12 +159,14 @@ static int accel_3d_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, case IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW: hid_sensor_power_state(&accel_state->common_attributes, true); report_id = accel_state->accel[chan->scan_index].report_id; + min = accel_state->accel[chan->scan_index].logical_minimum; address = accel_3d_addresses[chan->scan_index]; if (report_id >= 0) *val = sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value( accel_state->common_attributes.hsdev, hsdev->usage, address, report_id, - SENSOR_HUB_SYNC); + SENSOR_HUB_SYNC, + min < 0); else { *val = 0; hid_sensor_power_state(&accel_state->common_attributes, diff --git a/drivers/iio/gyro/hid-sensor-gyro-3d.c b/drivers/iio/gyro/hid-sensor-gyro-3d.c index 36941e69f959..88e857c4baf4 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/gyro/hid-sensor-gyro-3d.c +++ b/drivers/iio/gyro/hid-sensor-gyro-3d.c @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ static int gyro_3d_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int report_id = -1; u32 address; int ret_type; + s32 min; *val = 0; *val2 = 0; @@ -118,13 +119,15 @@ static int gyro_3d_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, case IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW: hid_sensor_power_state(&gyro_state->common_attributes, true); report_id = gyro_state->gyro[chan->scan_index].report_id; + min = gyro_state->gyro[chan->scan_index].logical_minimum; address = gyro_3d_addresses[chan->scan_index]; if (report_id >= 0) *val = sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value( gyro_state->common_attributes.hsdev, HID_USAGE_SENSOR_GYRO_3D, address, report_id, - SENSOR_HUB_SYNC); + SENSOR_HUB_SYNC, + min < 0); else { *val = 0; hid_sensor_power_state(&gyro_state->common_attributes, diff --git a/drivers/iio/humidity/hid-sensor-humidity.c b/drivers/iio/humidity/hid-sensor-humidity.c index beab6d6fd6e1..4bc95f31c730 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/humidity/hid-sensor-humidity.c +++ b/drivers/iio/humidity/hid-sensor-humidity.c @@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ static int humidity_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, HID_USAGE_SENSOR_HUMIDITY, HID_USAGE_SENSOR_ATMOSPHERIC_HUMIDITY, humid_st->humidity_attr.report_id, - SENSOR_HUB_SYNC); + SENSOR_HUB_SYNC, + humid_st->humidity_attr.logical_minimum < 0); hid_sensor_power_state(&humid_st->common_attributes, false); return IIO_VAL_INT; diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-als.c b/drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-als.c index 406caaee9a3c..94f33250ba5a 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-als.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-als.c @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static int als_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int report_id = -1; u32 address; int ret_type; + s32 min; *val = 0; *val2 = 0; @@ -102,8 +103,8 @@ static int als_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, case CHANNEL_SCAN_INDEX_INTENSITY: case CHANNEL_SCAN_INDEX_ILLUM: report_id = als_state->als_illum.report_id; - address = - HID_USAGE_SENSOR_LIGHT_ILLUM; + min = als_state->als_illum.logical_minimum; + address = HID_USAGE_SENSOR_LIGHT_ILLUM; break; default: report_id = -1; @@ -116,7 +117,8 @@ static int als_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, als_state->common_attributes.hsdev, HID_USAGE_SENSOR_ALS, address, report_id, - SENSOR_HUB_SYNC); + SENSOR_HUB_SYNC, + min < 0); hid_sensor_power_state(&als_state->common_attributes, false); } else { diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-prox.c b/drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-prox.c index 45107f7537b5..cf5a0c242609 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-prox.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/hid-sensor-prox.c @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ static int prox_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int report_id = -1; u32 address; int ret_type; + s32 min; *val = 0; *val2 = 0; @@ -81,8 +82,8 @@ static int prox_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, switch (chan->scan_index) { case CHANNEL_SCAN_INDEX_PRESENCE: report_id = prox_state->prox_attr.report_id; - address = - HID_USAGE_SENSOR_HUMAN_PRESENCE; + min = prox_state->prox_attr.logical_minimum; + address = HID_USAGE_SENSOR_HUMAN_PRESENCE; break; default: report_id = -1; @@ -95,7 +96,8 @@ static int prox_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, prox_state->common_attributes.hsdev, HID_USAGE_SENSOR_PROX, address, report_id, - SENSOR_HUB_SYNC); + SENSOR_HUB_SYNC, + min < 0); hid_sensor_power_state(&prox_state->common_attributes, false); } else { diff --git a/drivers/iio/magnetometer/hid-sensor-magn-3d.c b/drivers/iio/magnetometer/hid-sensor-magn-3d.c index d55c4885211a..f3c0d41e5a8c 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/magnetometer/hid-sensor-magn-3d.c +++ b/drivers/iio/magnetometer/hid-sensor-magn-3d.c @@ -163,21 +163,23 @@ static int magn_3d_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int report_id = -1; u32 address; int ret_type; + s32 min; *val = 0; *val2 = 0; switch (mask) { case IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW: hid_sensor_power_state(&magn_state->magn_flux_attributes, true); - report_id = - magn_state->magn[chan->address].report_id; + report_id = magn_state->magn[chan->address].report_id; + min = magn_state->magn[chan->address].logical_minimum; address = magn_3d_addresses[chan->address]; if (report_id >= 0) *val = sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value( magn_state->magn_flux_attributes.hsdev, HID_USAGE_SENSOR_COMPASS_3D, address, report_id, - SENSOR_HUB_SYNC); + SENSOR_HUB_SYNC, + min < 0); else { *val = 0; hid_sensor_power_state( diff --git a/drivers/iio/orientation/hid-sensor-incl-3d.c b/drivers/iio/orientation/hid-sensor-incl-3d.c index 1e5451d1ff88..bdc5e4554ee4 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/orientation/hid-sensor-incl-3d.c +++ b/drivers/iio/orientation/hid-sensor-incl-3d.c @@ -111,21 +111,23 @@ static int incl_3d_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int report_id = -1; u32 address; int ret_type; + s32 min; *val = 0; *val2 = 0; switch (mask) { case IIO_CHAN_INFO_RAW: hid_sensor_power_state(&incl_state->common_attributes, true); - report_id = - incl_state->incl[chan->scan_index].report_id; + report_id = incl_state->incl[chan->scan_index].report_id; + min = incl_state->incl[chan->scan_index].logical_minimum; address = incl_3d_addresses[chan->scan_index]; if (report_id >= 0) *val = sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value( incl_state->common_attributes.hsdev, HID_USAGE_SENSOR_INCLINOMETER_3D, address, report_id, - SENSOR_HUB_SYNC); + SENSOR_HUB_SYNC, + min < 0); else { hid_sensor_power_state(&incl_state->common_attributes, false); diff --git a/drivers/iio/pressure/hid-sensor-press.c b/drivers/iio/pressure/hid-sensor-press.c index 4c437918f1d2..d7b1c00ceb4d 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/pressure/hid-sensor-press.c +++ b/drivers/iio/pressure/hid-sensor-press.c @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ static int press_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int report_id = -1; u32 address; int ret_type; + s32 min; *val = 0; *val2 = 0; @@ -85,8 +86,8 @@ static int press_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, switch (chan->scan_index) { case CHANNEL_SCAN_INDEX_PRESSURE: report_id = press_state->press_attr.report_id; - address = - HID_USAGE_SENSOR_ATMOSPHERIC_PRESSURE; + min = press_state->press_attr.logical_minimum; + address = HID_USAGE_SENSOR_ATMOSPHERIC_PRESSURE; break; default: report_id = -1; @@ -99,7 +100,8 @@ static int press_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, press_state->common_attributes.hsdev, HID_USAGE_SENSOR_PRESSURE, address, report_id, - SENSOR_HUB_SYNC); + SENSOR_HUB_SYNC, + min < 0); hid_sensor_power_state(&press_state->common_attributes, false); } else { diff --git a/drivers/iio/temperature/hid-sensor-temperature.c b/drivers/iio/temperature/hid-sensor-temperature.c index beaf6fd3e337..b592fc4f007e 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/temperature/hid-sensor-temperature.c +++ b/drivers/iio/temperature/hid-sensor-temperature.c @@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ static int temperature_read_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, HID_USAGE_SENSOR_TEMPERATURE, HID_USAGE_SENSOR_DATA_ENVIRONMENTAL_TEMPERATURE, temp_st->temperature_attr.report_id, - SENSOR_HUB_SYNC); + SENSOR_HUB_SYNC, + temp_st->temperature_attr.logical_minimum < 0); hid_sensor_power_state( &temp_st->common_attributes, false); diff --git a/drivers/rtc/rtc-hid-sensor-time.c b/drivers/rtc/rtc-hid-sensor-time.c index 2751dba850c6..3e1abb455472 100644 --- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-hid-sensor-time.c +++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-hid-sensor-time.c @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ static int hid_rtc_read_time(struct device *dev, struct rtc_time *tm) /* get a report with all values through requesting one value */ sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value(time_state->common_attributes.hsdev, HID_USAGE_SENSOR_TIME, hid_time_addresses[0], - time_state->info[0].report_id, SENSOR_HUB_SYNC); + time_state->info[0].report_id, SENSOR_HUB_SYNC, false); /* wait for all values (event) */ ret = wait_for_completion_killable_timeout( &time_state->comp_last_time, HZ*6); diff --git a/include/linux/hid-sensor-hub.h b/include/linux/hid-sensor-hub.h index 331dc377c275..dc12f5c4b076 100644 --- a/include/linux/hid-sensor-hub.h +++ b/include/linux/hid-sensor-hub.h @@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ int sensor_hub_input_get_attribute_info(struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev, * @attr_usage_id: Attribute usage id as per spec * @report_id: Report id to look for * @flag: Synchronous or asynchronous read +* @is_signed: If true then fields < 32 bits will be sign-extended * * Issues a synchronous or asynchronous read request for an input attribute. * Returns data upto 32 bits. @@ -190,7 +191,8 @@ enum sensor_hub_read_flags { int sensor_hub_input_attr_get_raw_value(struct hid_sensor_hub_device *hsdev, u32 usage_id, u32 attr_usage_id, u32 report_id, - enum sensor_hub_read_flags flag + enum sensor_hub_read_flags flag, + bool is_signed ); /** From 855f9dc87160f9351291cbe52056fa08529532d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Kelly Date: Sun, 28 Oct 2018 20:18:53 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 134/140] iio:st_magn: Fix enable device after trigger commit fe5192ac81ad0d4dfe1395d11f393f0513c15f7f upstream. Currently, we enable the device before we enable the device trigger. At high frequencies, this can cause interrupts that don't yet have a poll function associated with them and are thus treated as spurious. At high frequencies with level interrupts, this can even cause an interrupt storm of repeated spurious interrupts (~100,000 on my Beagleboard with the LSM9DS1 magnetometer). If these repeat too much, the interrupt will get disabled and the device will stop functioning. To prevent these problems, enable the device prior to enabling the device trigger, and disable the divec prior to disabling the trigger. This means there's no window of time during which the device creates interrupts but we have no trigger to answer them. Fixes: 90efe055629 ("iio: st_sensors: harden interrupt handling") Signed-off-by: Martin Kelly Tested-by: Denis Ciocca Cc: Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/iio/magnetometer/st_magn_buffer.c | 12 +++--------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/magnetometer/st_magn_buffer.c b/drivers/iio/magnetometer/st_magn_buffer.c index 0a9e8fadfa9d..37ab30566464 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/magnetometer/st_magn_buffer.c +++ b/drivers/iio/magnetometer/st_magn_buffer.c @@ -30,11 +30,6 @@ int st_magn_trig_set_state(struct iio_trigger *trig, bool state) return st_sensors_set_dataready_irq(indio_dev, state); } -static int st_magn_buffer_preenable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) -{ - return st_sensors_set_enable(indio_dev, true); -} - static int st_magn_buffer_postenable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) { int err; @@ -50,7 +45,7 @@ static int st_magn_buffer_postenable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) if (err < 0) goto st_magn_buffer_postenable_error; - return err; + return st_sensors_set_enable(indio_dev, true); st_magn_buffer_postenable_error: kfree(mdata->buffer_data); @@ -63,11 +58,11 @@ static int st_magn_buffer_predisable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) int err; struct st_sensor_data *mdata = iio_priv(indio_dev); - err = iio_triggered_buffer_predisable(indio_dev); + err = st_sensors_set_enable(indio_dev, false); if (err < 0) goto st_magn_buffer_predisable_error; - err = st_sensors_set_enable(indio_dev, false); + err = iio_triggered_buffer_predisable(indio_dev); st_magn_buffer_predisable_error: kfree(mdata->buffer_data); @@ -75,7 +70,6 @@ static int st_magn_buffer_predisable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) } static const struct iio_buffer_setup_ops st_magn_buffer_setup_ops = { - .preenable = &st_magn_buffer_preenable, .postenable = &st_magn_buffer_postenable, .predisable = &st_magn_buffer_predisable, }; From 91a51478835664b2b7e8d136474c887c9e52ddb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luis Chamberlain Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:09:21 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 135/140] lib/test_kmod.c: fix rmmod double free commit 5618cf031fecda63847cafd1091e7b8bd626cdb1 upstream. We free the misc device string twice on rmmod; fix this. Without this we cannot remove the module without crashing. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181124050500.5257-1-mcgrof@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain Reported-by: Randy Dunlap Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton Cc: [4.12+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- lib/test_kmod.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/lib/test_kmod.c b/lib/test_kmod.c index e3ddd836491f..d82d022111e0 100644 --- a/lib/test_kmod.c +++ b/lib/test_kmod.c @@ -1214,7 +1214,6 @@ void unregister_test_dev_kmod(struct kmod_test_device *test_dev) dev_info(test_dev->dev, "removing interface\n"); misc_deregister(&test_dev->misc_dev); - kfree(&test_dev->misc_dev.name); mutex_unlock(&test_dev->config_mutex); mutex_unlock(&test_dev->trigger_mutex); From 16a2d602244ff5327cecd210fdd50ad5ad443c9c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavel Tikhomirov Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:09:00 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 136/140] mm: cleancache: fix corruption on missed inode invalidation commit 6ff38bd40230af35e446239396e5fc8ebd6a5248 upstream. If all pages are deleted from the mapping by memory reclaim and also moved to the cleancache: __delete_from_page_cache (no shadow case) unaccount_page_cache_page cleancache_put_page page_cache_delete mapping->nrpages -= nr (nrpages becomes 0) We don't clean the cleancache for an inode after final file truncation (removal). truncate_inode_pages_final check (nrpages || nrexceptional) is false no truncate_inode_pages no cleancache_invalidate_inode(mapping) These way when reading the new file created with same inode we may get these trash leftover pages from cleancache and see wrong data instead of the contents of the new file. Fix it by always doing truncate_inode_pages which is already ready for nrpages == 0 && nrexceptional == 0 case and just invalidates inode. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add comment, per Jan] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181112095734.17979-1-ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com Fixes: commit 91b0abe36a7b ("mm + fs: store shadow entries in page cache") Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov Reviewed-by: Vasily Averin Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Cc: Johannes Weiner Cc: Mel Gorman Cc: Matthew Wilcox Cc: Andi Kleen Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/truncate.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/truncate.c b/mm/truncate.c index 1d2fb2dca96f..71b65aab8077 100644 --- a/mm/truncate.c +++ b/mm/truncate.c @@ -520,9 +520,13 @@ void truncate_inode_pages_final(struct address_space *mapping) */ xa_lock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); xa_unlock_irq(&mapping->i_pages); - - truncate_inode_pages(mapping, 0); } + + /* + * Cleancache needs notification even if there are no pages or shadow + * entries. + */ + truncate_inode_pages(mapping, 0); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(truncate_inode_pages_final); From b66375b599bf8cce4f18c1440a6aac7a6be2175e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yu Zhao Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 14:09:03 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 137/140] mm: use swp_offset as key in shmem_replace_page() commit c1cb20d43728aa9b5393bd8d489bc85c142949b2 upstream. We changed the key of swap cache tree from swp_entry_t.val to swp_offset. We need to do so in shmem_replace_page() as well. Hugh said: "shmem_replace_page() has been wrong since the day I wrote it: good enough to work on swap "type" 0, which is all most people ever use (especially those few who need shmem_replace_page() at all), but broken once there are any non-0 swp_type bits set in the higher order bits" Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181121215442.138545-1-yuzhao@google.com Fixes: f6ab1f7f6b2d ("mm, swap: use offset of swap entry as key of swap cache") Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox Acked-by: Hugh Dickins Cc: [4.9+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/shmem.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c index cd6b4bc221eb..0b02b539072e 100644 --- a/mm/shmem.c +++ b/mm/shmem.c @@ -1551,11 +1551,13 @@ static int shmem_replace_page(struct page **pagep, gfp_t gfp, { struct page *oldpage, *newpage; struct address_space *swap_mapping; + swp_entry_t entry; pgoff_t swap_index; int error; oldpage = *pagep; - swap_index = page_private(oldpage); + entry.val = page_private(oldpage); + swap_index = swp_offset(entry); swap_mapping = page_mapping(oldpage); /* @@ -1574,7 +1576,7 @@ static int shmem_replace_page(struct page **pagep, gfp_t gfp, __SetPageLocked(newpage); __SetPageSwapBacked(newpage); SetPageUptodate(newpage); - set_page_private(newpage, swap_index); + set_page_private(newpage, entry.val); SetPageSwapCache(newpage); /* From 5e4b30d68a02690122f61e589a41a7afc89e32bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dexuan Cui Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2018 02:29:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 138/140] Drivers: hv: vmbus: check the creation_status in vmbus_establish_gpadl() commit eceb05965489784f24bbf4d61ba60e475a983016 upstream. This is a longstanding issue: if the vmbus upper-layer drivers try to consume too many GPADLs, the host may return with an error 0xC0000044 (STATUS_QUOTA_EXCEEDED), but currently we forget to check the creation_status, and hence we can pass an invalid GPADL handle into the OPEN_CHANNEL message, and get an error code 0xc0000225 in open_info->response.open_result.status, and finally we hang in vmbus_open() -> "goto error_free_info" -> vmbus_teardown_gpadl(). With this patch, we can exit gracefully on STATUS_QUOTA_EXCEEDED. Cc: Stephen Hemminger Cc: K. Y. Srinivasan Cc: Haiyang Zhang Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui Signed-off-by: K. Y. Srinivasan Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hv/channel.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel.c b/drivers/hv/channel.c index 741857d80da1..2f164bd74687 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/channel.c +++ b/drivers/hv/channel.c @@ -482,6 +482,14 @@ int vmbus_establish_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel, void *kbuffer, } wait_for_completion(&msginfo->waitevent); + if (msginfo->response.gpadl_created.creation_status != 0) { + pr_err("Failed to establish GPADL: err = 0x%x\n", + msginfo->response.gpadl_created.creation_status); + + ret = -EDQUOT; + goto cleanup; + } + if (channel->rescind) { ret = -ENODEV; goto cleanup; From 842c4c22ea2b39688b868e6fead0b5b06f03f631 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: YueHaibing Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 01:57:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 139/140] misc: mic/scif: fix copy-paste error in scif_create_remote_lookup commit 6484a677294aa5d08c0210f2f387ebb9be646115 upstream. gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning: drivers/misc/mic/scif/scif_rma.c: In function 'scif_create_remote_lookup': drivers/misc/mic/scif/scif_rma.c:373:25: warning: variable 'vmalloc_num_pages' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable] 'vmalloc_num_pages' should be used to determine if the address is within the vmalloc range. Fixes: ba612aa8b487 ("misc: mic: SCIF memory registration and unregistration") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/misc/mic/scif/scif_rma.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/mic/scif/scif_rma.c b/drivers/misc/mic/scif/scif_rma.c index c824329f7012..0e4193cb08cf 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/mic/scif/scif_rma.c +++ b/drivers/misc/mic/scif/scif_rma.c @@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ static int scif_create_remote_lookup(struct scif_dev *remote_dev, if (err) goto error_window; err = scif_map_page(&window->num_pages_lookup.lookup[j], - vmalloc_dma_phys ? + vmalloc_num_pages ? vmalloc_to_page(&window->num_pages[i]) : virt_to_page(&window->num_pages[i]), remote_dev); From 61c68f2a2af0f3dc531053524f980a7875e24e7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2018 19:32:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 140/140] Linux 4.19.7 --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 20cbb8e84650..d2b4efcfb388 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 19 -SUBLEVEL = 6 +SUBLEVEL = 7 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = "People's Front"