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bpf: Enforce trusted BTF ID argument provenance
A global subprogram parameter tagged __arg_trusted is verified with
PTR_TRUSTED, but the common call-site type check accepts bare PTR_TO_BTF_ID
and MEM_RCU registers. The callee can consequently pass a pointer with
weaker provenance to a kfunc that does not accept RCU-protected pointers.
RCU protection only guarantees that the object remains allocated through a
grace period. It does not guarantee that an object's refcount is nonzero,
so an RCU-protected pointer cannot satisfy the trusted-pointer contract.
For example, an RCU-protected bpf_cpumask loaded from a map may have a
zero refcount. Passing it through __arg_trusted lets the callee pass it
to bpf_cpumask_acquire(), whose plain refcount_inc() can retain an object
that will be freed after the grace period.
Make the existing provenance check contract-driven. Mark generated BTF ID
kfunc argument types with PTR_TRUSTED, and add MEM_RCU only for KF_RCU
kfuncs. Normalize PTR_MAYBE_NULL when the argument contract permits it.
Then use the argument flags to require trusted or referenced provenance
and allow MEM_RCU only when the contract says so.
Split is_trusted_reg() so the normalized type is used for type and modifier
checks while reference lookup still uses the original register. Conversion
of scalar-struct BTF ID arguments to fixed-size memory continues to
construct a new ARG_PTR_TO_MEM type without PTR_TRUSTED.
Fixes: e2b3c4ff5d ("bpf: add __arg_trusted global func arg tag")
Suggested-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yiyang Chen <chenyy23@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20261007-a3-arg-trusted-v4-v4-1-253ef3a1a69a@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
0f9b1e9ef5
commit
c3a0bfddae
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@ -5501,15 +5501,17 @@ static u32 *reg2btf_ids[__BPF_REG_TYPE_MAX] = {
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[CONST_PTR_TO_MAP] = btf_bpf_map_id,
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};
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static bool is_trusted_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
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static bool is_trusted_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
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enum bpf_reg_type type)
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{
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/* A referenced register is always trusted. */
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if (reg_is_referenced(env, reg))
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return true;
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/* Types listed in the reg2btf_ids are always trusted */
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if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)] &&
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!bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type))
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if (reg2btf_ids[base_type(type)] &&
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!bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(type))
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return true;
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/* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the
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@ -5521,8 +5523,14 @@ static bool is_trusted_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_reg_st
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* Eventually, we should make PTR_TRUSTED the single source of truth
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* for whether a register is trusted.
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*/
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return type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS &&
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!bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type);
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return type_flag(type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS &&
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!bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(type);
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}
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static bool is_trusted_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
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const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
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{
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return is_trusted_reg_type(env, reg, reg->type);
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}
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static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
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@ -9798,6 +9806,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, u32 slot, u32 p
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{
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const u32 *arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg];
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const struct btf *arg_btf = is_kfunc(meta) ? meta->btf : btf_vmlinux;
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enum bpf_reg_type reg_type;
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if (!meta->btf) {
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const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible;
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@ -9825,8 +9834,10 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, u32 slot, u32 p
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}
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}
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if (is_kfunc(meta) && (!is_trusted_reg(env, reg) ||
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bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type))) {
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reg_type = reg->type & ~(arg_type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL);
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if ((arg_type & PTR_TRUSTED) &&
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(!is_trusted_reg_type(env, reg, reg_type) ||
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bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg_type))) {
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if (!(arg_type & MEM_RCU)) {
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const char *actual_type, *arg_name, *expected_type;
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@ -14023,6 +14034,8 @@ get_kfunc_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
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else
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proto->arg_btf_id[arg] = ref_id_ptr;
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arg_type |= PTR_TRUSTED;
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/*
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* A KF_RCU kfunc accepts an RCU-protected pointer where it would
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* otherwise demand a referenced or trusted one. Other argument kinds
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