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HID: logitech-dj: Prevent REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT related user initiated OOB write
logi_dj_recv_send_report() assumes that all incoming REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT reports are 14 Bytes (DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 1) long. It uses that assumption to load the associated field's 'value' array with 14 Bytes of data. However, if a malicious user only sends say 1 Byte of data, 'report_count' will be 1 and only 1 Byte of memory will be allocated to the 'value' Byte array. When we come to populate 'value[1-13]' we will experience an OOB write. Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.com>
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@ -1859,6 +1859,7 @@ static int logi_dj_probe(struct hid_device *hdev,
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const struct hid_device_id *id)
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{
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struct hid_report_enum *input_report_enum;
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struct hid_report_enum *output_report_enum;
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struct hid_report *rep;
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struct dj_receiver_dev *djrcv_dev;
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struct usb_interface *intf;
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@ -1903,6 +1904,15 @@ static int logi_dj_probe(struct hid_device *hdev,
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}
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}
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output_report_enum = &hdev->report_enum[HID_OUTPUT_REPORT];
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rep = output_report_enum->report_id_hash[REPORT_ID_DJ_SHORT];
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if (rep->maxfield < 1 || rep->field[0]->report_count != DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 1) {
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hid_err(hdev, "Expected size of DJ short report is %d, but got %d",
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DJREPORT_SHORT_LENGTH - 1, rep->field[0]->report_count);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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input_report_enum = &hdev->report_enum[HID_INPUT_REPORT];
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/* no input reports, bail out */
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