mirror of
https://github.com/torvalds/linux.git
synced 2026-11-07 06:17:02 +01:00
aio: avoid request count overflow in ioctx_alloc()
ioctx_alloc() saves the 32-bit nr_events in max_reqs, then doubles nr_events before checking the ring-size bound. For nr_events=0x80000001, the doubled value wraps to 2, so the ring check passes and aio_setup_ring() builds a one-page/127-slot ring. The original 0x80000001 is still stored in ctx->max_reqs and charged to the global aio_nr quota. If an administrator has raised fs.aio-max-nr to at least 0x80000001, an unprivileged process can create that context and make later normal io_setup() calls fail with -EAGAIN until the wrapped context is destroyed. Check for too large number of requests before multiplying. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261022091748.3653127-1-teel4res@gmail.com Reported-by: Cheng Yongkang <teel4res@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261022112534.3513745-2-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
8457ca071f
commit
b44341e39d
5
fs/aio.c
5
fs/aio.c
|
|
@ -816,13 +816,12 @@ static struct kioctx *ioctx_alloc(unsigned nr_events)
|
|||
* counters at a time, so make sure that isn't 0:
|
||||
*/
|
||||
nr_events = max(nr_events, num_possible_cpus() * 4);
|
||||
nr_events *= 2;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Prevent overflows */
|
||||
if (nr_events > (0x10000000U / sizeof(struct io_event))) {
|
||||
if (nr_events > (0x8000000U / sizeof(struct io_event))) {
|
||||
pr_debug("ENOMEM: nr_events too high\n");
|
||||
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
|
||||
}
|
||||
nr_events *= 2;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!nr_events || (unsigned long)max_reqs > aio_max_nr)
|
||||
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user