aio: avoid request count overflow in ioctx_alloc()

ioctx_alloc() saves the 32-bit nr_events in max_reqs, then doubles
nr_events before checking the ring-size bound.  For
nr_events=0x80000001, the doubled value wraps to 2, so the ring check
passes and aio_setup_ring() builds a one-page/127-slot ring.  The
original 0x80000001 is still stored in ctx->max_reqs and charged to the
global aio_nr quota.

If an administrator has raised fs.aio-max-nr to at least 0x80000001,
an unprivileged process can create that context and make later normal
io_setup() calls fail with -EAGAIN until the wrapped context is
destroyed.

Check for too large number of requests before multiplying.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261022091748.3653127-1-teel4res@gmail.com
Reported-by: Cheng Yongkang <teel4res@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261022112534.3513745-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Jan Kara 2026-10-22 13:25:35 +02:00 committed by Christian Brauner
parent 8457ca071f
commit b44341e39d
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@ -816,13 +816,12 @@ static struct kioctx *ioctx_alloc(unsigned nr_events)
* counters at a time, so make sure that isn't 0:
*/
nr_events = max(nr_events, num_possible_cpus() * 4);
nr_events *= 2;
/* Prevent overflows */
if (nr_events > (0x10000000U / sizeof(struct io_event))) {
if (nr_events > (0x8000000U / sizeof(struct io_event))) {
pr_debug("ENOMEM: nr_events too high\n");
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
nr_events *= 2;
if (!nr_events || (unsigned long)max_reqs > aio_max_nr)
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);