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ceph: fix integer overflow in the snap trace bounds check
ceph_update_snap_trace() bounds the two encoded snapid arrays that follow a
struct ceph_mds_snap_realm with sizeof(u64) * (num_snaps +
num_prior_parent_snaps). Both counts come straight off the wire as __le32,
so the addition is evaluated in unsigned int and wraps before sizeof(u64)
promotes it to size_t: an MDS sending num_snaps = 1 and
num_prior_parent_snaps = 0xffffffff makes the sum zero and the check
degenerates to ceph_decode_need(&p, e, 0, bad), which always passes.
dup_array() then reads num_snaps * 8 bytes past the end of the message
front, which ceph_msg_new2() allocates at exactly front_len bytes. An
unsolicited CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_SNAP reaches this from a malicious or
compromised MDS with no client-side action, as do the snaptraces carried in
an MDS reply and in a cap import.
Compute the length with size_add()/size_mul() so it saturates at SIZE_MAX
instead of wrapping, in the style fs/ceph/mdsmap.c already uses for
num_export_targets.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dup_array (include/linux/unaligned.h:28 fs/ceph/snap.c:500)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880102a16c8 by task kworker/1:2/129
Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
dup_array (include/linux/unaligned.h:28 fs/ceph/snap.c:500)
ceph_update_snap_trace (fs/ceph/snap.c:836)
ceph_handle_snap (fs/ceph/snap.c:1155)
mds_dispatch (fs/ceph/mds_client.c:7234)
ceph_con_process_message (net/ceph/messenger.c:1424)
ceph_con_v1_try_read (net/ceph/messenger_v1.c:1430)
ceph_con_workfn (net/ceph/messenger.c:1576)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
...
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 72-byte region [ffff8880102a1680, ffff8880102a16c8)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 963b61eb04 ("ceph: snapshot management")
Reported-by: co+ecaada42f806f629@bugs.sh
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
62b41a16d8
commit
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@ -788,6 +788,7 @@ int ceph_update_snap_trace(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,
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struct ceph_snap_realm *first_realm = NULL;
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struct ceph_snap_realm *realm_to_rebuild = NULL;
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struct ceph_client *client = mdsc->fsc->client;
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size_t snaps_len;
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int rebuild_snapcs;
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int err = -ENOMEM;
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int ret;
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@ -802,8 +803,10 @@ int ceph_update_snap_trace(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,
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ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad);
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ri = p;
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p += sizeof(*ri);
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ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(u64)*(le32_to_cpu(ri->num_snaps) +
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le32_to_cpu(ri->num_prior_parent_snaps)), bad);
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snaps_len = size_mul(size_add(le32_to_cpu(ri->num_snaps),
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le32_to_cpu(ri->num_prior_parent_snaps)),
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sizeof(u64));
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ceph_decode_need(&p, e, snaps_len, bad);
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snaps = p;
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p += sizeof(u64) * le32_to_cpu(ri->num_snaps);
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prior_parent_snaps = p;
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