diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/binfmt-misc.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/binfmt-misc.rst index 85bbf4845f99..27391fcb43fa 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/binfmt-misc.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/binfmt-misc.rst @@ -90,6 +90,23 @@ Here is what the fields mean: emulation is installed and uses the opened image to spawn the emulator, meaning it is always available once installed, regardless of how the environment changes. + ``T`` - transparent + Run the interpreter transparently. The binary is handed to + the interpreter through ``AT_EXECFD`` (``T`` implies ``O``), + the argument vector is left exactly as the caller built it + and the kernel labels ``/proc/pid/exe`` with the binary + instead of the interpreter. The interpreter has to load the + binary from ``AT_EXECFD`` and follow the + ``AT_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP`` contract. Combining ``T`` + with ``P`` is rejected: transparency preserves the whole + argument vector, argv[0] included. + ``L`` - loader substitution + Do not run the interpreter on the binary at all: load the + binary itself as a fully native exec and substitute the + interpreter for the loader named in the binary's + ``PT_INTERP``. See the "Loader substitution" section + below. ``L`` rejects ``T``, ``P``, ``O`` and ``C``; + ``F`` composes. There are some restrictions: @@ -98,66 +115,12 @@ There are some restrictions: - the magic must reside in the first 128 bytes of the file, i.e. offset+size(magic) has to be less than 128 - the interpreter string may not exceed 127 characters + - an interpreter used with ``C`` or ``L`` but without ``F`` has to be + named by an absolute path. It is opened when the binary is executed, so + a relative one would be resolved against the working directory of + whoever runs the binary -bpf-backed handlers -------------------- - -With ``CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_BPF`` both the matching and the interpreter -selection can be delegated to bpf programs. A handler is an instance of the -``binfmt_misc_ops`` struct_ops with a ``match`` and a ``load`` program and a -``name``. Once the struct_ops map is registered the handler can be activated -with a ``B`` entry that references it by name in the ``interpreter`` field -and carries neither offset, magic, nor mask:: - - echo ':qemu:B::::my_handler:' > register - -Both programs receive the ``linux_binprm`` of the binary and both can -sleep. The ``match`` program decides whether the handler applies: it is -consulted during the entry walk exactly like magic and extension matching, -in the same registration order with the same first-match-wins semantics. -Unlike static matching it is not limited to the prefetched first bytes of -the file in ``bprm->buf``: it can read the file, e.g. to parse ELF program -headers whose data sits at arbitrary offsets. It only decides, though: the -selection kfuncs below are rejected in it. The ``load`` program of the -matched handler then selects the interpreter: it can equally read the file -and derive the interpreter from the binary's location. It selects the -interpreter by calling the ``bpf_binprm_set_interp()`` kfunc with an -absolute path and returning ``0``. A match is committed: a failing -``load`` fails the exec with its error instead of falling through to later -entries; ``-ENOEXEC`` lets the remaining binary formats have a go. The -interpreter is opened with the credentials of the task doing the exec, -exactly as a statically registered interpreter would be. - -The ``load`` program can also pass a single argument to the interpreter with -the ``bpf_binprm_set_interp_arg()`` kfunc. It is inserted between the -interpreter and the binary, exactly like the optional argument of a ``#!`` -interpreter line, e.g. for a handler that resolves ``$ORIGIN`` in a script's -``#!`` path and needs to preserve the argument that followed it. - -The invocation flags a static entry fixes at registration - ``P``, ``C`` -and ``O`` - are per-exec choices for a bpf handler, made by the ``load`` -program with the ``bpf_binprm_set_flags()`` kfunc, so a single handler can -decide them differently for each binary it handles: - -- ``BPF_BINPRM_PRESERVE_ARGV0`` keeps the caller's ``argv[0]`` (the ``P`` - flag). -- ``BPF_BINPRM_CREDENTIALS`` computes credentials from the binary (the ``C`` - flag), bounded to user namespaces that map the binary's owner just like - any other setuid exec. -- ``BPF_BINPRM_EXECFD`` opens the binary on the interpreter's behalf and - passes it through the ``AT_EXECFD`` aux vector entry (the ``O`` flag), so - the interpreter can run binaries it could not open by path. - -Because these are program choices, a ``B`` entry carries no flags in the -register string; ``F`` (pre-open a fixed interpreter) has no meaning for it. - -A handler is looked up only in the user namespace the struct_ops map was -registered in. Handlers are not inherited, so an entry can only reference a -handler registered in the same user namespace as its binfmt_misc instance. -The entry keeps the handler alive; deleting the struct_ops map only prevents -new activations. - To use binfmt_misc you have to mount it first. You can mount it with ``mount -t binfmt_misc none /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc`` command, or you can add a line ``none /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc binfmt_misc defaults 0 0`` to your @@ -198,6 +161,152 @@ or ``/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/status``. A single entry can also be removed by simply unlinking (``rm``) ``/proc/.../the_name``. +bpf-backed handlers +------------------- + +With ``CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_BPF`` both the matching and the interpreter +selection can be delegated to bpf programs. A handler is an instance of the +``binfmt_misc_ops`` struct_ops with a ``match`` and a ``load`` program and a +``name``. Once the struct_ops map is registered the handler can be activated +with a ``B`` entry that references it by name in the ``interpreter`` field +and carries neither offset, magic, nor mask:: + + echo ':qemu:B::::my_handler:' > register + +Both programs receive the ``linux_binprm`` of the binary and both can +sleep. The ``match`` program decides whether the handler applies: it is +consulted during the entry walk exactly like magic and extension matching, +in the same registration order with the same first-match-wins semantics. +Unlike static matching it is not limited to the prefetched first bytes of +the file in ``bprm->buf``: it can read the file, e.g. to parse ELF program +headers whose data sits at arbitrary offsets. It only decides, though: the +selection kfuncs below are rejected in it. The ``load`` program of the +matched handler then selects the interpreter: it can equally read the file +and derive the interpreter from the binary's location. It selects the +interpreter by calling the ``bpf_binprm_set_interp()`` kfunc with an +absolute path and returning ``0``. A match is committed: a failing +``load`` fails the exec with its error instead of falling through to later +entries; ``-ENOEXEC`` lets the remaining binary formats have a go. The +interpreter is opened with the credentials of the task doing the exec, +exactly as a statically registered interpreter would be. + +The ``load`` program can also pass a single argument to the interpreter with +the ``bpf_binprm_set_interp_arg()`` kfunc. It is inserted between the +interpreter and the binary, exactly like the optional argument of a ``#!`` +interpreter line, e.g. for a handler that resolves ``$ORIGIN`` in a script's +``#!`` path and needs to preserve the argument that followed it. + +The invocation flags a static entry fixes at registration - ``P``, ``C``, +``O``, ``T`` and ``L`` - are per-exec choices for a bpf handler, made by the +``load`` program with the ``bpf_binprm_set_flags()`` kfunc, so a single +handler can decide them differently for each binary it handles: + +- ``BPF_BINPRM_PRESERVE_ARGV0`` keeps the caller's ``argv[0]`` (the ``P`` + flag). +- ``BPF_BINPRM_CREDENTIALS`` computes credentials from the binary (the ``C`` + flag), bounded to user namespaces that map the binary's owner just like + any other setuid exec. +- ``BPF_BINPRM_EXECFD`` opens the binary on the interpreter's behalf and + passes it through the ``AT_EXECFD`` aux vector entry (the ``O`` flag), so + the interpreter can run binaries it could not open by path. +- ``BPF_BINPRM_TRANSPARENT`` runs the interpreter transparently (the ``T`` + flag): the binary is handed over through ``AT_EXECFD`` as + with ``BPF_BINPRM_EXECFD``, but the argument vector is also left as the + caller passed it. An interpreter that loads the binary from ``AT_EXECFD`` + then appears in ``argv[0]`` and ``/proc/pid/cmdline`` as a direct + execution of the binary. ``BPF_BINPRM_PRESERVE_ARGV0`` and a staged + interpreter argument are rejected in combination with it, just as ``P`` + is with ``T``. It also lets a handler + run a binary passed as an inaccessible ``O_CLOEXEC`` file descriptor to + ``execveat()``, which a path-splicing dispatch cannot: the interpreter + has no path by which to open it. +- ``BPF_BINPRM_LOADER`` substitutes the interpreter for the binary's + ``PT_INTERP`` and runs the binary as a fully native exec (the ``L`` + flag). It excludes the other flags and a staged interpreter argument. + +Because these are program choices, a ``B`` entry carries no flags in the +register string; ``F`` (pre-open a fixed interpreter) has no meaning for it. + +A handler is looked up only in the user namespace the struct_ops map was +registered in. Handlers are not inherited, so an entry can only reference a +handler registered in the same user namespace as its binfmt_misc instance. +The entry keeps the handler alive; deleting the struct_ops map only prevents +new activations. + + +Transparent interpreters +------------------------ + +With the ``T`` flag or ``BPF_BINPRM_TRANSPARENT`` the dispatch is invisible +to the resulting process. The argument vector is left exactly as the caller +built it. The binary is passed through ``AT_EXECFD``. The kernel also labels +``/proc/pid/exe`` correctly. The binary's file is write-denied while the +process runs and the interpreter's is not, exactly as if the binary had been +executed directly. A transparent entry does not change how credentials are +derived. As +with any other entry, set*id bits of the binary are only honored with ``C`` (or +``BPF_BINPRM_CREDENTIALS``). + +The interpreter has to be built for this contract. The kernel announces it +with ``AT_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP`` in the ``AT_FLAGS`` aux vector entry +next to ``AT_EXECFD``. The argument vector belongs entirely to the program, +nothing was spliced in, so the interpreter doesn't consume arguments and +simply loads the program from the descriptor. The bit is also the loader's +license to finish the identity. After mapping the program it may retarget the +``AT_PHDR``/``AT_ENTRY``/``AT_BASE`` entries of ``/proc/pid/auxv`` and the +code/data statistics markers via one ``PR_SET_MM_MAP`` which completes +what attaching debuggers observe. What remains visibly different from a +direct execution is the address space layout. The interpreter occupies +the main-image position and the program lives in the mmap region. + + +Loader substitution +------------------- + +The ``L`` flag turns the execution model around. Instead of running the +registered interpreter with the binary as its payload the kernel loads +the matched binary itself as the main image and substitutes the registered +interpreter for the loader named in the binary's ``PT_INTERP``. + +Because the exec is native, there is no dispatch identity to +reconstruct and no contract the substitute has to implement. A stock +dynamic loader works unchanged. The argument vector is untouched, +credentials and ``AT_SECURE`` derive from the binary, there is no +``AT_EXECFD`` and no marker in the aux vector, the binary sits in the +main-image slot with the native brk placement so ``/proc/pid/maps``, +core dumps and perf mmap records have the native shape, and the +identity is already complete when ``PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC`` stops the +tracee. So launching under a debugger works, not just attaching. ``L`` +entries are for ELF binaries of a native architecture. Foreign-arch +emulation and non-ELF payloads remain the domain of the classic and +transparent modes. + +The override applies when the format that finally claims the file is +ELF with a ``PT_INTERP``. A matched binary without one or an +interpreter-less ``ET_DYN`` drops the override and runs natively. A file +claimed by another format - a ``#!`` script, say - is handled by that +format as if the entry had not matched. ``L`` is therefore not an +enforcement mechanism: it decides how a binary that asks for a loader is +run, it does not guarantee that everything matching the entry runs under +the substitute. A format that cannot consume the override at all instead +refuses the exec with ``ENOEXEC`` before the point of no return. + +A wrong-architecture ELF fails the whole exec with ``ENOEXEC`` exactly +as if no entry had matched. A substitute that is not ELF of the right +architecture fails with ``ELIBBAD``. The usual ``PT_INTERP`` sanity +checks on the binary still apply. But the segment's content is otherwise +irrelevant. + +``L`` rejects the classic-dispatch flags ``T``, ``P``, ``O`` and ``C`` +at registration. ``F`` composes and is valuable: with it the substitute +is opened at registration time, so later mount namespace or path changes +cannot redirect it. Without it the substitute is opened when the binary +is executed, and the path is resolved in the mount namespace and root of +whoever runs the binary, which is why it has to be absolute. As with +``C``, register only trusted interpreters. The substituted loader runs +with credentials derived from the binary. + + Hints ----- diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf.c b/fs/binfmt_elf.c index 16a56b6b3f6c..00ff35cad441 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c @@ -179,7 +179,6 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct elfhdr *exec, unsigned char k_rand_bytes[16]; int items; elf_addr_t *elf_info; - elf_addr_t flags = 0; int ei_index; const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct vm_area_struct *vma; @@ -254,9 +253,7 @@ create_elf_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const struct elfhdr *exec, NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PHENT, sizeof(struct elf_phdr)); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PHNUM, exec->e_phnum); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_BASE, interp_load_addr); - if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0) - flags |= AT_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0; - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_FLAGS, flags); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_FLAGS, bprm_at_flags(bprm)); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_ENTRY, e_entry); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_UID, from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid)); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid)); @@ -904,7 +901,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (elf_interpreter[elf_ppnt->p_filesz - 1] != '\0') goto out_free_interp; - interpreter = open_exec(elf_interpreter); + interpreter = bprm_open_interpreter(bprm, elf_interpreter); kfree(elf_interpreter); retval = PTR_ERR(interpreter); if (IS_ERR(interpreter)) @@ -935,6 +932,9 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) goto out_free_ph; } + /* No PT_INTERP to substitute for: the override does not apply. */ + bprm_drop_loader(bprm); + elf_ppnt = elf_phdata; for (i = 0; i < elf_ex->e_phnum; i++, elf_ppnt++) switch (elf_ppnt->p_type) { diff --git a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c index fe0b5c5ed2bc..068c46875c74 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_elf_fdpic.c @@ -263,7 +263,8 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) kdebug("Using ELF interpreter %s", interpreter_name); /* replace the program with the interpreter */ - interpreter = open_exec(interpreter_name); + interpreter = bprm_open_interpreter(bprm, + interpreter_name); retval = PTR_ERR(interpreter); if (IS_ERR(interpreter)) { interpreter = NULL; @@ -299,6 +300,9 @@ static int load_elf_fdpic_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) } + /* No PT_INTERP to substitute for: the override does not apply. */ + bprm_drop_loader(bprm); + if (is_constdisp(&exec_params.hdr)) exec_params.flags |= ELF_FDPIC_FLAG_CONSTDISP; @@ -509,7 +513,6 @@ static int create_elf_fdpic_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, char *k_platform, *k_base_platform; char __user *u_platform, *u_base_platform, *p; int loop; - unsigned long flags = 0; int ei_index; elf_addr_t *elf_info; @@ -649,9 +652,7 @@ static int create_elf_fdpic_tables(struct linux_binprm *bprm, NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PHENT, sizeof(struct elf_phdr)); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_PHNUM, exec_params->hdr.e_phnum); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_BASE, interp_params->elfhdr_addr); - if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0) - flags |= AT_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0; - NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_FLAGS, flags); + NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_FLAGS, bprm_at_flags(bprm)); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_ENTRY, exec_params->entry_addr); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_UID, (elf_addr_t) from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid)); NEW_AUX_ENT(AT_EUID, (elf_addr_t) from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid)); diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c index c3064f2557ca..707f8a14f8a6 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt +#include #include #include #include @@ -49,8 +50,42 @@ enum binfmt_misc_entry_flags { MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY = (1U << 30), MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS = (1U << 29), MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE = (1U << 28), + MISC_FMT_TRANSPARENT = (1U << 27), + MISC_FMT_LOADER = (1U << 26), }; +/** + * struct binfmt_misc_flag - a flag character of the register string + * @c: the character userspace writes and reads back + * @flag: the entry flag it sets + * @implies: entry flags it turns on in addition + * @desc: what it does, for the registration debug output + */ +struct binfmt_misc_flag { + char c; + unsigned long flag; + unsigned long implies; + const char *desc; +}; + +static const struct binfmt_misc_flag misc_flags[] = { + { 'P', MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0, 0, "preserve argv0" }, + { 'O', MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY, 0, "open binary" }, + { 'C', MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS, MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY, "credentials from the binary" }, + { 'F', MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE, 0, "open interpreter file now" }, + { 'T', MISC_FMT_TRANSPARENT, MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY, "transparent" }, + { 'L', MISC_FMT_LOADER, 0, "loader substitution" }, +}; + +/* Look up a flag character, NULL if @c is not one. */ +static const struct binfmt_misc_flag *misc_flag_by_char(const char c) +{ + for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(misc_flags); i++) + if (misc_flags[i].c == c) + return &misc_flags[i]; + return NULL; +} + struct binfmt_misc_entry { struct hlist_node node; unsigned long flags; /* type, status, etc. */ @@ -288,56 +323,97 @@ static const char *entry_select_interpreter(const struct binfmt_misc_entry *e, return ERR_PTR(retval); } -/* - * the loader itself +/** + * entry_invocation_flags - the invocation flags in effect for this exec + * @e: matched binary type handler + * @bprm: binary that is being executed + * + * A static entry fixes its flags at registration, a 'B' entry's load program + * picks them per exec with bpf_binprm_set_flags(). Translate the latter into + * the former, implications included, so the dispatch has one set to act on. + * + * Return: the invocation flags for this exec */ -static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static unsigned long entry_invocation_flags(const struct binfmt_misc_entry *e, + struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - struct binfmt_misc_entry *fmt __free(put_binfmt_handler) = NULL; - const char *interpreter; - struct file *interp_file; - struct binfmt_misc *misc; - bool preserve_argv0, want_execfd, want_creds; + unsigned long flags = 0; + u64 bpf_flags; + + if (!test_bit(MISC_FMT_BPF_BIT, &e->flags)) + return e->flags; + + bpf_flags = bprm->bpf_flags; + /* Clear so they can't accumulate into a nested interpreter level. */ + bprm->bpf_flags = 0; + + if (bpf_flags & BPF_BINPRM_PRESERVE_ARGV0) + flags |= MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0; + if (bpf_flags & BPF_BINPRM_EXECFD) + flags |= MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY; + if (bpf_flags & BPF_BINPRM_CREDENTIALS) + flags |= MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS | MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY; + if (bpf_flags & BPF_BINPRM_TRANSPARENT) + flags |= MISC_FMT_TRANSPARENT | MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY; + if (bpf_flags & BPF_BINPRM_LOADER) + flags |= MISC_FMT_LOADER; + + return flags; +} + +/** + * entry_open_interpreter - open the entry's interpreter for execution + * @e: matched binary type handler + * @interpreter: the interpreter selected for this exec + * + * An 'F' entry hands out a clone of the file it pre-opened at registration, + * any other entry opens the selected path. + * + * Return: the opened interpreter on success, an ERR_PTR on failure + */ +static struct file *entry_open_interpreter(const struct binfmt_misc_entry *e, + const char *interpreter) +{ + struct file *interp_file __free(fput) = NULL; int retval; - misc = current_binfmt_misc(); - if (!READ_ONCE(misc->enabled)) - return -ENOEXEC; + if (!(e->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE)) + return open_exec(interpreter); - fmt = get_binfmt_handler(misc, bprm); - if (!fmt) - return -ENOEXEC; + interp_file = file_clone_open(e->interp_file); + if (IS_ERR(interp_file)) + return interp_file; - /* Need to be able to load the file after exec */ + retval = exe_file_deny_write_access(interp_file); + if (retval) + return ERR_PTR(retval); + + return no_free_ptr(interp_file); +} + +/** + * build_interp_argv - splice the interpreter invocation into the argv + * @bprm: binary that is being executed + * @interpreter: the interpreter selected for this exec + * @flags: invocation flags in effect for this exec + * + * The interpreter becomes argv[0] and the binary its last argument, with an + * optional staged argument in between. The caller's argv[0] is dropped + * unless 'P' keeps it. + * + * Return: 0 on success, a negative error code on failure + */ +static int build_interp_argv(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const char *interpreter, + unsigned long flags) +{ + int retval; + + /* The interpreter has to be able to load the binary by path. */ if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_PATH_INACCESSIBLE) return -ENOENT; - interpreter = entry_select_interpreter(fmt, bprm); - if (IS_ERR(interpreter)) - return PTR_ERR(interpreter); - - /* - * The invocation flags are fixed at registration for a static handler - * and chosen per exec by the load program, via bpf_binprm_set_flags(), - * for a bpf one. - */ - if (test_bit(MISC_FMT_BPF_BIT, &fmt->flags)) { - u64 f = bprm->bpf_flags; - - /* Clear so it can't accumulate into a nested interpreter level. */ - bprm->bpf_flags = 0; - - preserve_argv0 = f & BPF_BINPRM_PRESERVE_ARGV0; - want_creds = f & BPF_BINPRM_CREDENTIALS; - want_execfd = f & (BPF_BINPRM_CREDENTIALS | BPF_BINPRM_EXECFD); - } else { - preserve_argv0 = fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0; - want_creds = fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS; - want_execfd = fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY; - } - /* The entry's own choice - not one accumulated from an earlier level. */ - if (preserve_argv0) { + if (flags & MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0) { bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0; } else { retval = remove_arg_zero(bprm); @@ -371,31 +447,83 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return retval; bprm->argc++; - /* Update interp in case binfmt_script needs it. */ + return 0; +} + +/* + * the loader itself + */ +static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + struct binfmt_misc_entry *fmt __free(put_binfmt_handler) = NULL; + const char *interpreter; + struct file *interp_file; + struct binfmt_misc *misc; + unsigned long flags; + int retval; + + /* Only binfmt_misc stages one and exec_binprm() clears it per round. */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(bprm->loader); + + misc = current_binfmt_misc(); + if (!READ_ONCE(misc->enabled)) + return -ENOEXEC; + + fmt = get_binfmt_handler(misc, bprm); + if (!fmt) + return -ENOEXEC; + + interpreter = entry_select_interpreter(fmt, bprm); + if (IS_ERR(interpreter)) + return PTR_ERR(interpreter); + + flags = entry_invocation_flags(fmt, bprm); + + /* No argv is built for a staged argument to land in. */ + if ((flags & (MISC_FMT_LOADER | MISC_FMT_TRANSPARENT)) && + bprm->bpf_interp_arg) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Stash the interpreter for binfmt_elf to consume in place of the + * binary's PT_INTERP and decline the match, so the search continues + * to the real format in the same round. + */ + if (flags & MISC_FMT_LOADER) { + interp_file = entry_open_interpreter(fmt, interpreter); + if (IS_ERR(interp_file)) { + retval = PTR_ERR(interp_file); + /* Declining here would run the binary's own PT_INTERP. */ + return retval == -ENOEXEC ? -EACCES : retval; + } + + bprm->loader = interp_file; + return -ENOEXEC; + } + + if (!(flags & MISC_FMT_TRANSPARENT)) { + retval = build_interp_argv(bprm, interpreter, flags); + if (retval) + return retval; + } + + /* Update interp for the next round; sched_prepare_exec reports it. */ retval = bprm_change_interp(interpreter, bprm); if (retval < 0) return retval; - if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE) { - interp_file = file_clone_open(fmt->interp_file); - if (!IS_ERR(interp_file)) { - int err = exe_file_deny_write_access(interp_file); - - if (err) { - fput(interp_file); - interp_file = ERR_PTR(err); - } - } - } else { - interp_file = open_exec(interpreter); - } + interp_file = entry_open_interpreter(fmt, interpreter); if (IS_ERR(interp_file)) return PTR_ERR(interp_file); + /* Raise only past the last failure, or an -ENOEXEC decline leaks it. */ + if (flags & MISC_FMT_TRANSPARENT) + bprm->interp_flags |= BINPRM_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP; + bprm->interpreter = interp_file; - if (want_execfd) + if (flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY) bprm->have_execfd = 1; - if (want_creds) + if (flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS) bprm->execfd_creds = 1; return 0; } @@ -424,30 +552,16 @@ static char *scanarg(char *s, char del) return s; } +/* Parse the 'flags' field, stopping at the first character that is not one. */ static char *check_special_flags(char *p, struct binfmt_misc_entry *e) { for (;; p++) { - switch (*p) { - case 'P': - pr_debug("register: flag: P (preserve argv0)\n"); - e->flags |= MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0; - break; - case 'O': - pr_debug("register: flag: O (open binary)\n"); - e->flags |= MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY; - break; - case 'C': - pr_debug("register: flag: C (preserve creds)\n"); - /* C implies O */ - e->flags |= MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS | MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY; - break; - case 'F': - pr_debug("register: flag: F: open interpreter file now\n"); - e->flags |= MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE; - break; - default: + const struct binfmt_misc_flag *f = misc_flag_by_char(*p); + + if (!f) return p; - } + pr_debug("register: flag: %c (%s)\n", f->c, f->desc); + e->flags |= f->flag | f->implies; } } @@ -570,7 +684,7 @@ static struct binfmt_misc_entry *create_entry(const char __user *buffer, size_t count) { struct binfmt_misc_entry *e __free(kfree) = NULL; - char *buf, *p; + char *buf, *p, *flags; char del; pr_debug("register: received %zu bytes\n", count); @@ -595,7 +709,7 @@ static struct binfmt_misc_entry *create_entry(const char __user *buffer, pr_debug("register: delim: %#x {%c}\n", del, del); /* A flag-char delimiter runs the flag scan off the buffer. */ - if (del == 'P' || del == 'O' || del == 'C' || del == 'F') + if (misc_flag_by_char(del)) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); /* Pad the buffer with the delim to simplify parsing below. */ @@ -666,21 +780,38 @@ static struct binfmt_misc_entry *create_entry(const char __user *buffer, } /* Parse the 'flags' field. */ + flags = p; p = check_special_flags(p, e); + + /* + * A bpf handler decides the invocation flags per exec with + * bpf_binprm_set_flags() rather than fixing them at registration, and + * 'F' (pre-open a fixed interpreter) is meaningless for it, so a 'B' + * entry's flags field has to be empty. + */ + if (test_bit(MISC_FMT_BPF_BIT, &e->flags) && p != flags) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* Transparency preserves the whole argv, argv[0] included. */ + if ((e->flags & MISC_FMT_TRANSPARENT) && + (e->flags & MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0)) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + + /* A native exec splices no argv, passes no execfd and needs no creds. */ + if ((e->flags & MISC_FMT_LOADER) && + (e->flags & (MISC_FMT_TRANSPARENT | MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0 | + MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS | MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY))) + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + if (*p == '\n') p++; if (p != buf + count) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - /* - * A bpf handler decides the invocation flags per exec with - * bpf_binprm_set_flags() rather than fixing them at registration, so a - * 'B' entry carries no flags: 'P', 'C' and 'O' become per-exec choices - * and 'F' (pre-open a fixed interpreter) is meaningless for it. - */ - if (test_bit(MISC_FMT_BPF_BIT, &e->flags) && - (e->flags & (MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0 | MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY | - MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS | MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE))) + /* Non-F opens the interp at exec against the caller's cwd; require absolute. */ + if ((e->flags & (MISC_FMT_LOADER | MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS)) && + !(e->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE) && + e->interpreter[0] != '/') return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); return no_free_ptr(e); @@ -743,14 +874,9 @@ static int bm_entry_show(struct seq_file *m, void *unused) /* print the special flags */ seq_puts(m, "flags: "); - if (e->flags & MISC_FMT_PRESERVE_ARGV0) - seq_putc(m, 'P'); - if (e->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_BINARY) - seq_putc(m, 'O'); - if (e->flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS) - seq_putc(m, 'C'); - if (e->flags & MISC_FMT_OPEN_FILE) - seq_putc(m, 'F'); + for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(misc_flags); i++) + if (e->flags & misc_flags[i].flag) + seq_putc(m, misc_flags[i].c); seq_putc(m, '\n'); if (test_bit(MISC_FMT_BPF_BIT, &e->flags)) { diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc_bpf.c b/fs/binfmt_misc_bpf.c index e3dcf8330df0..5bf0e46b867c 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_misc_bpf.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_misc_bpf.c @@ -171,19 +171,33 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_binprm_set_interp_arg(struct linux_binprm *bprm, * @flags: an OR of enum bpf_binprm_flags values * * To be called from the load program of a struct binfmt_misc_ops handler. It - * decides per exec what a static entry fixes at registration with the P, C and - * O flags: BPF_BINPRM_PRESERVE_ARGV0 keeps the caller's argv[0], + * decides per exec what a static entry fixes at registration with the P, C, + * O, T and L flags: BPF_BINPRM_PRESERVE_ARGV0 keeps the caller's argv[0], * BPF_BINPRM_CREDENTIALS computes credentials from the binary, and * BPF_BINPRM_EXECFD hands the binary to the interpreter through AT_EXECFD. + * BPF_BINPRM_TRANSPARENT additionally leaves the argument vector untouched, + * making the exec look like a direct execution of the binary. + * BPF_BINPRM_LOADER substitutes the interpreter for the binary's PT_INTERP + * and runs the binary as a native exec; it excludes every other flag. * Calling it again replaces the flags, passing zero clears them again. * - * Return: 0 on success, -EINVAL if @flags contains an unknown bit + * Return: 0 on success, -EINVAL if @flags contains an unknown bit or an + * invalid combination */ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_binprm_set_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm, enum bpf_binprm_flags flags) { if (flags & ~(BPF_BINPRM_PRESERVE_ARGV0 | BPF_BINPRM_CREDENTIALS | - BPF_BINPRM_EXECFD)) + BPF_BINPRM_EXECFD | BPF_BINPRM_TRANSPARENT | + BPF_BINPRM_LOADER)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Loader substitution is a native exec: no splice, execfd or creds work. */ + if ((flags & BPF_BINPRM_LOADER) && (flags & ~BPF_BINPRM_LOADER)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Transparency preserves the whole argv, argv[0] included. */ + if ((flags & BPF_BINPRM_TRANSPARENT) && (flags & BPF_BINPRM_PRESERVE_ARGV0)) return -EINVAL; bprm->bpf_flags = flags; diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 41e1684d999c..856731f78d05 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1101,6 +1101,17 @@ void __set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, const char *buf, bool exec) perf_event_comm(tsk, exec); } +/* + * The file the process presents as: its exe link and comm. A transparent + * dispatch presents as the binary, which is bprm->executable. + */ +static struct file *bprm_identity_file(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP) + return bprm->executable; + return bprm->file; +} + /* * Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be * seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal @@ -1112,6 +1123,10 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) struct task_struct *me = current; int retval; + /* A pending PT_INTERP substitution this format cannot consume. */ + if (bprm->loader) + return -ENOEXEC; + /* Once we are committed compute the creds */ retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm); if (retval) @@ -1151,7 +1166,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) * not visible until then. Doing it here also ensures * we don't race against replace_mm_exe_file(). */ - retval = set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file); + retval = set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm_identity_file(bprm)); if (retval) goto out; @@ -1241,6 +1256,8 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) * Let's fix it up to be something reasonable. */ if (bprm->comm_from_dentry) { + struct file *comm_file = bprm_identity_file(bprm); + /* * Hold RCU lock to keep the name from being freed behind our back. * Use acquire semantics to make sure the terminating NUL from @@ -1250,7 +1267,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) * detecting a concurrent rename and just want a terminated name. */ rcu_read_lock(); - __set_task_comm(me, smp_load_acquire(&bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name), + __set_task_comm(me, smp_load_acquire(&comm_file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name), true); rcu_read_unlock(); } else { @@ -1291,10 +1308,17 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) /* Pass the opened binary to the interpreter. */ if (bprm->have_execfd) { - retval = FD_ADD(0, bprm->executable); - if (retval < 0) - goto out_unlock; + struct file *executable = bprm->executable; + + /* mm->exe_file carries its own write denial now so drop it. */ + exe_file_allow_write_access(executable); bprm->executable = NULL; + retval = FD_ADD(0, executable); + if (retval < 0) { + /* The reference was not consumed. */ + fput(executable); + goto out_unlock; + } bprm->execfd = retval; } return 0; @@ -1394,6 +1418,39 @@ static void do_close_execat(struct file *file) fput(file); } +/** + * bprm_open_interpreter - open the interpreter the binary asks for + * @bprm: binary that is being executed + * @path: the interpreter path named in the binary's PT_INTERP + * + * A binfmt_misc loader entry substitutes for the interpreter the binary + * names. Hand out the stashed substitute if there is one and open @path + * if there is not. The caller owns the reference either way and releases + * it like any other open_exec() one. + * + * Return: the interpreter on success, an ERR_PTR on failure + */ +struct file *bprm_open_interpreter(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const char *path) +{ + if (bprm->loader) + return no_free_ptr(bprm->loader); + return open_exec(path); +} + +/** + * bprm_drop_loader - discard a PT_INTERP substitute that does not apply + * @bprm: binary that is being executed + * + * A binary without PT_INTERP has nothing to substitute for, so drop the + * override and let the binary load natively rather than have + * begin_new_exec() refuse it. A no-op once bprm_open_interpreter() took + * the substitute. + */ +void bprm_drop_loader(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + do_close_execat(no_free_ptr(bprm->loader)); +} + static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { if (bprm->mm) { @@ -1413,8 +1470,9 @@ static void free_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (bprm->old_mm) exec_mm_put_old(bprm->old_mm); do_close_execat(bprm->file); - if (bprm->executable) - fput(bprm->executable); + /* An unconsumed PT_INTERP substitute from a binfmt_misc loader entry. */ + bprm_drop_loader(bprm); + do_close_execat(bprm->executable); /* If a binfmt changed the interp, free it. */ if (bprm->interp != bprm->filename) kfree(bprm->interp); @@ -1731,19 +1789,23 @@ static int exec_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (!bprm->interpreter) break; + /* A stashed PT_INTERP substitute belonged to the replaced file. */ + bprm_drop_loader(bprm); + exec = bprm->file; bprm->file = bprm->interpreter; bprm->interpreter = NULL; - exe_file_allow_write_access(exec); if (unlikely(bprm->have_execfd)) { if (bprm->executable) { - fput(exec); + do_close_execat(exec); return -ENOEXEC; } + /* Kept for AT_EXECFD; the write denial rides along until hand-over. */ bprm->executable = exec; - } else - fput(exec); + } else { + do_close_execat(exec); + } } audit_bprm(bprm); diff --git a/include/linux/binfmt_misc.h b/include/linux/binfmt_misc.h index d3112a00cc19..4abdfd36b3fa 100644 --- a/include/linux/binfmt_misc.h +++ b/include/linux/binfmt_misc.h @@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ struct user_namespace; * @BPF_BINPRM_CREDENTIALS: compute credentials from the binary; implies execfd * (like the 'C' flag) * @BPF_BINPRM_EXECFD: pass the binary via AT_EXECFD (like the 'O' flag) + * @BPF_BINPRM_TRANSPARENT: leave argv untouched, the interpreter takes the + * binary from AT_EXECFD (like the 'T' flag); implies + * execfd, excludes preserve-argv0 + * @BPF_BINPRM_LOADER: substitute the interpreter for the binary's PT_INTERP + * and run the binary as a native exec (like the 'L' + * flag); excludes every other flag * * Set from a load program with bpf_binprm_set_flags(). Unlike a static entry, * a bpf handler chooses these per exec rather than once at registration. @@ -24,6 +30,8 @@ enum bpf_binprm_flags { BPF_BINPRM_PRESERVE_ARGV0 = (1ULL << 0), BPF_BINPRM_CREDENTIALS = (1ULL << 1), BPF_BINPRM_EXECFD = (1ULL << 2), + BPF_BINPRM_TRANSPARENT = (1ULL << 3), + BPF_BINPRM_LOADER = (1ULL << 4), }; /** diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h index 03e1794b5cbb..a2daecbb01d6 100644 --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h +++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct linux_binprm { is_check:1; struct file *executable; /* Executable to pass to the interpreter */ struct file *interpreter; + struct file *loader; struct file *file; struct cred *cred; /* new credentials */ int unsafe; /* how unsafe this exec is (mask of LSM_UNSAFE_*) */ @@ -93,6 +94,28 @@ struct linux_binprm { #define BINPRM_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0_BIT 3 #define BINPRM_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0 (1 << BINPRM_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0_BIT) +/* binfmt_misc dispatched to the interpreter transparently */ +#define BINPRM_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP_BIT 4 +#define BINPRM_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP (1 << BINPRM_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP_BIT) + +/** + * bprm_at_flags - the AT_FLAGS this invocation implies + * @bprm: binary that is being executed + * + * Tell the program on the receiving end which dispatch contract it got. + * + * Return: the AT_FLAGS value for this exec + */ +static inline unsigned long bprm_at_flags(const struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + /* Transparency preserves the whole argv, argv[0] included. */ + if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP) + return AT_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP; + if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0) + return AT_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0; + return 0; +} + /* * This structure defines the functions that are used to load the binary formats that * linux accepts. @@ -137,6 +160,8 @@ extern int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm); extern void setup_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm); extern void finalize_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern void would_dump(struct linux_binprm *, struct file *); +struct file *bprm_open_interpreter(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const char *path); +void bprm_drop_loader(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int suid_dumpable; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/binfmts.h b/include/uapi/linux/binfmts.h index c6f9450efc12..aafc07d78b80 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/binfmts.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/binfmts.h @@ -22,4 +22,11 @@ struct pt_regs; #define AT_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0_BIT 0 #define AT_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0 (1 << AT_FLAGS_PRESERVE_ARGV0_BIT) +/* + * The interpreter runs transparently: the argument vector and the exe + * link belong to the binary passed in AT_EXECFD. + */ +#define AT_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP_BIT 1 +#define AT_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP (1 << AT_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP_BIT) + #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_BINFMTS_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore index 8b93b405c424..fbbb1600ddb9 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/.gitignore @@ -22,5 +22,10 @@ S_I*.test binfmt_misc_bpf binfmt_bpf_interp binfmt_bpf_app +binfmt_misc_transparent +binfmt_transparent_interp +binfmt_misc_loader +binfmt_loader_payload +binfmt_loader_payload_static *.bpf.o vmlinux.h diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile index ec66c1fecfc0..67d4d54f6286 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/Makefile @@ -21,6 +21,18 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS += recursion-depth TEST_GEN_PROGS += null-argv TEST_GEN_PROGS += check-exec +# Static ('T' flag) transparent binfmt_misc test; the asserting interpreter +# is shared with the bpf harness's transparent case. No bpf toolchain needed. +TEST_GEN_PROGS += binfmt_misc_transparent +TEST_GEN_FILES += binfmt_transparent_interp + +# 'L' (loader substitution) binfmt_misc test: the payload runs as the main +# image with a copy of the system loader substituted for its PT_INTERP and +# asserts the native identity from inside; the static build proves the +# override is dropped for a binary without PT_INTERP. +TEST_GEN_PROGS += binfmt_misc_loader +TEST_GEN_FILES += binfmt_loader_payload binfmt_loader_payload_static + # binfmt_misc bpf-backed ('B') handler test: a libbpf harness plus its # struct_ops objects and the test interpreter/app it routes between. Only # built when clang, bpftool, the vmlinux BTF and libbpf are all present @@ -35,7 +47,8 @@ HAVE_BPF_TOOLCHAIN ?= $(shell command -v $(CLANG) >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ pkg-config --exists libbpf 2>/dev/null && echo y) ifeq ($(HAVE_BPF_TOOLCHAIN),y) TEST_GEN_PROGS += binfmt_misc_bpf -TEST_GEN_FILES += bpf_interp.bpf.o nix_origin.bpf.o +TEST_GEN_FILES += bpf_interp.bpf.o nix_origin.bpf.o transparent.bpf.o +TEST_GEN_FILES += loader.bpf.o TEST_GEN_FILES += binfmt_bpf_interp binfmt_bpf_app else $(info exec selftests: skipping binfmt_misc_bpf, needs clang, bpftool, vmlinux BTF and libbpf) @@ -44,6 +57,8 @@ endif EXTRA_CLEAN := $(OUTPUT)/subdir.moved $(OUTPUT)/execveat.moved $(OUTPUT)/xxxxx* \ $(OUTPUT)/S_I*.test +LOCAL_HDRS += binfmt_misc_common.h + include ../lib.mk CHECK_EXEC_SAMPLES := $(top_srcdir)/samples/check-exec @@ -86,20 +101,27 @@ LIBBPF_LDLIBS ?= -lbpf -lelf -lz $(OUTPUT)/vmlinux.h: $(BPFTOOL) btf dump file $(VMLINUX_BTF) format c > $@ - sed -i '/__ksym;$$/d' $@ +# BPF_NO_KFUNC_PROTOTYPES: the programs declare the kfuncs they use themselves. $(OUTPUT)/%.bpf.o: %.bpf.c $(OUTPUT)/vmlinux.h - $(CLANG) -g -O2 -target bpf -mcpu=v3 $(BPF_CFLAGS) $(LIBBPF_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ + $(CLANG) -g -O2 -target bpf -mcpu=v3 -DBPF_NO_KFUNC_PROTOTYPES \ + $(BPF_CFLAGS) $(LIBBPF_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ -$(OUTPUT)/binfmt_misc_bpf: binfmt_misc_bpf.c +$(OUTPUT)/binfmt_misc_bpf: binfmt_misc_bpf.c binfmt_misc_common.h $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LIBBPF_CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $< $(LIBBPF_LDLIBS) -o $@ $(OUTPUT)/binfmt_bpf_interp: binfmt_bpf_interp.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $< -o $@ +$(OUTPUT)/binfmt_loader_payload: binfmt_loader_payload.c binfmt_misc_common.h + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -fPIE -pie $< -o $@ + +$(OUTPUT)/binfmt_loader_payload_static: binfmt_loader_payload.c binfmt_misc_common.h + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -static $< -o $@ + # PT_INTERP is set to the literal "$ORIGIN/binfmt_bpf_interp"; the nix_origin # handler resolves it relative to the binary at run time. $(OUTPUT)/binfmt_bpf_app: binfmt_bpf_app.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -Wl,--dynamic-linker,'$$ORIGIN/binfmt_bpf_interp' $< -o $@ -EXTRA_CLEAN += $(OUTPUT)/vmlinux.h $(OUTPUT)/bpf_interp.bpf.o $(OUTPUT)/nix_origin.bpf.o +EXTRA_CLEAN += $(OUTPUT)/vmlinux.h $(OUTPUT)/*.bpf.o diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_loader_payload.c b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_loader_payload.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..272db8efb4b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_loader_payload.c @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Payload for the binfmt_misc 'L' (loader substitution) selftest. It is + * executed as the MAIN image - a fully native exec - with the registered + * interpreter substituted for its PT_INTERP, and asserts the native + * identity from the inside. Exits 0 when every surface checks out. + * + * Modes, selected by the orchestrator via the environment: + * - default: full assertions, path-based ones included + * - BINFMT_TEST_MEMFD=1: executed from an inaccessible memfd, skip + * the path-based assertions + * - BINFMT_TEST_STATIC=1: static build; the override was dropped, so + * expect no interpreter at all + */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "binfmt_misc_common.h" + +/* Start of our own mapped image, courtesy of the linker. */ +extern const char __ehdr_start[]; + +/* An image is never this large; used to bracket "within our image". */ +#define IMAGE_SPAN (16UL << 20) + +static int failed; + +static void check(int cond, const char *what) +{ + if (cond) + return; + fprintf(stderr, "[payload] FAILED: %s (errno %d)\n", what, errno); + failed = 1; +} + +/* Return whether /proc/self/maps names a path starting with @prefix. */ +static int maps_has_prefix(const char *prefix) +{ + char *line = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + int found = 0; + FILE *f; + + f = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r"); + if (!f) + return -1; + while (getline(&line, &len, f) > 0) { + char *path = strchr(line, '/'); + + if (path && !strncmp(path, prefix, strlen(prefix))) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + free(line); + fclose(f); + return found; +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + const char *binary = getenv("BINFMT_TEST_BINARY"); + const char *interp = getenv("BINFMT_TEST_INTERP"); + int memfd_mode = getenv("BINFMT_TEST_MEMFD") != NULL; + int static_mode = getenv("BINFMT_TEST_STATIC") != NULL; + unsigned long self = (unsigned long)__ehdr_start; + unsigned long base = getauxval(AT_BASE); + unsigned long phdr = getauxval(AT_PHDR); + unsigned long entry = getauxval(AT_ENTRY); + unsigned long start_code, end_code; + + /* The argument vector is exactly what the caller built. */ + check(argc == 3 && !strcmp(argv[0], PAYLOAD_ARGV0) && + !strcmp(argv[1], PAYLOAD_ARG1) && !strcmp(argv[2], PAYLOAD_ARG2), + "argv was rewritten"); + + /* Native from birth: no execfd, no dispatch marker. */ + check(getauxval(AT_EXECFD) == 0, "AT_EXECFD present"); + check(getauxval(AT_FLAGS) == 0, "AT_FLAGS not native"); + + if (static_mode) { + /* The override was dropped: no interpreter was loaded. */ + check(base == 0, "AT_BASE set for a static payload"); + } else { + /* A loader is mapped in the interpreter slot, not our image. */ + check(base != 0, "AT_BASE missing"); + check(base < self || base >= self + IMAGE_SPAN, + "AT_BASE inside our own image"); + } + + /* We occupy the main-image slot. */ + check(phdr >= self && phdr < self + IMAGE_SPAN, + "AT_PHDR outside our image"); + check(entry >= self && entry < self + IMAGE_SPAN, + "AT_ENTRY outside our image"); + + /* The code statistics markers describe our image, natively placed. */ + if (stat_codes(getpid(), &start_code, &end_code) == 0) { + check(start_code >= self && start_code < end_code && + end_code < self + IMAGE_SPAN, + "stat start_code/end_code not our image"); + check(entry >= start_code && entry < end_code, + "AT_ENTRY outside [start_code, end_code)"); + } else { + check(0, "cannot parse /proc/self/stat"); + } + + if (!memfd_mode && binary) { + const char *execfn = (const char *)getauxval(AT_EXECFN); + const char *base_name = strrchr(binary, '/'); + + base_name = base_name ? base_name + 1 : binary; + + /* exe link, AT_EXECFN and comm all follow the binary. */ + check(exe_is(binary), "/proc/self/exe"); + check(execfn && !strcmp(execfn, binary), "AT_EXECFN"); + check(comm_is(base_name), "comm"); + + /* The running binary is write-denied, natively. */ + check(write_denied(binary), "no ETXTBSY on the binary"); + } + + if (interp) { + int found = maps_has_prefix(interp); + + if (static_mode) + /* Nothing was substituted, nothing may be mapped. */ + check(found == 0, "loader mapped for a static payload"); + else + /* The substituted loader shows under its real path. */ + check(found == 1, "loader path not in /proc/self/maps"); + } + + if (failed) + return 1; + printf("[payload] native identity checks out\n"); + return 0; +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_bpf.c index cb89d2766fe2..069768a66ba0 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_bpf.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_bpf.c @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ * * echo ':name:B:::::' > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register * - * Two self-contained cases are exercised: + * Three self-contained cases are exercised: * * 1. bpf_interp: the match program matches a synthetic aarch64 ELF header * from the prefetched bprm->buf and the load program routes it to a @@ -18,73 +18,60 @@ * commit only to a "$ORIGIN/..."-relative PT_INTERP and the load program * resolves it to an interpreter co-located with the binary (the * relocatable-loader case the kernel ELF loader cannot express). + * 3. transparent: the load program sets BPF_BINPRM_TRANSPARENT; the + * asserting interpreter (binfmt_transparent_interp) verifies the + * identity the kernel constructed (exe link, argv, cmdline, comm, + * AT_EXECFD, write denial) from inside the process. + * 4. loader: the load program sets BPF_BINPRM_LOADER; the payload + * (binfmt_loader_payload) runs as the main image with the selected + * interpreter substituted for its PT_INTERP and asserts the native + * identity from inside. * - * Both route to a test interpreter that prints BPF_INTERP_RAN, proving the - * program's chosen interpreter actually ran. + * The first two route to a test interpreter that prints BPF_INTERP_RAN, + * proving the program's chosen interpreter actually ran. */ #define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include #include #include #include #include #include -#include -#include -#include #include #include +#include "binfmt_misc_common.h" +#include "kselftest_harness.h" + #define INTERP_PATH "/tmp/binfmt_bpf_interp" #define AARCH64_PATH "/tmp/binfmt_bpf_aarch64" -#define RELOC_DIR "/tmp/binfmt_reloc" -#define BINFMT_REG "/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register" +#define RELOC_TEMPLATE "/tmp/binfmt_relocXXXXXX" +#define TRANS_INTERP "/tmp/binfmt_transparent_interp" +#define TRANS_PATH "/tmp/binfmt_bpf_riscv" #define EXPECT "BPF_INTERP_RAN" +#define TRANS_EXPECT "TRANSPARENT_OK" +#define LOADER_INTERP "/tmp/binfmt_loader_interp" +#define LOADER_PATH "/tmp/binfmt_bpf_loader.ldrtest" -static char testdir[512]; /* directory holding this test's built artifacts */ - -static int copy_file(const char *src, const char *dst) -{ - char buf[4096]; - int in, out; - ssize_t n; - - in = open(src, O_RDONLY); - if (in < 0) - return -1; - out = open(dst, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0755); - if (out < 0) { - close(in); - return -1; - } - while ((n = read(in, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) { - if (write(out, buf, n) != n) { - close(in); - close(out); - return -1; - } - } - close(in); - close(out); - return n < 0 ? -1 : 0; -} - -/* A minimal 64-bit little-endian aarch64 ELF header, padded to the read size. */ -static int create_fake_aarch64(const char *path) +/* A minimal 64-bit little-endian ELF header, padded to the read size. */ +static int create_fake_elf(const char *path, unsigned short machine) { unsigned char hdr[256] = {0}; int fd; hdr[0] = 0x7f; hdr[1] = 'E'; hdr[2] = 'L'; hdr[3] = 'F'; - hdr[4] = 2; /* ELFCLASS64 */ - hdr[5] = 1; /* ELFDATA2LSB */ - hdr[6] = 1; /* EV_CURRENT */ - hdr[16] = 2; /* e_type = ET_EXEC */ - hdr[18] = 183 & 0xff; /* e_machine = EM_AARCH64 */ - hdr[19] = (183 >> 8) & 0xff; - hdr[20] = 1; /* e_version */ + hdr[4] = ELFCLASS64; + hdr[5] = ELFDATA2LSB; + hdr[6] = EV_CURRENT; + hdr[16] = ET_EXEC; + hdr[18] = machine & 0xff; /* e_machine, little-endian */ + hdr[19] = machine >> 8; + hdr[20] = EV_CURRENT; - fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0755); + unlink(path); + fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0755); if (fd < 0) return -1; if (write(fd, hdr, sizeof(hdr)) != (ssize_t)sizeof(hdr)) { @@ -97,31 +84,10 @@ static int create_fake_aarch64(const char *path) static int register_entry(const char *name, const char *handler) { - char rule[128]; - int fd; - ssize_t n; + char rule[PATH_MAX]; snprintf(rule, sizeof(rule), ":%s:B::::%s:", name, handler); - fd = open(BINFMT_REG, O_WRONLY); - if (fd < 0) - return -1; - n = write(fd, rule, strlen(rule)); - close(fd); - return n < 0 ? -1 : 0; -} - -static void unregister_entry(const char *name) -{ - char path[128]; - int fd; - - snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/%s", name); - fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); - if (fd >= 0) { - if (write(fd, "-1", 2) < 0) - ; /* best effort */ - close(fd); - } + return write_reg(rule); } static int check_output(const char *cmd, const char *expected) @@ -140,138 +106,205 @@ static int check_output(const char *cmd, const char *expected) return strncmp(buf, expected, strlen(expected)) ? -1 : 0; } +/* An attached handler with its 'B' entry activated. */ +struct bpf_case { + struct bpf_object *obj; + struct bpf_link *link; + const char *entry; +}; + /* * Load @objfile, attach its struct_ops map @handler (which publishes the - * handler), activate a 'B' entry named @entry that references it, run @target - * and check it produced @expect. + * handler) and activate a 'B' entry named @entry that references it. */ -static int run_case(const char *objfile, const char *handler, - const char *entry, const char *target, const char *expect) +static int bpf_case_start(struct bpf_case *c, const char *objfile, + const char *handler, const char *entry) { - struct bpf_object *obj; struct bpf_map *map; - struct bpf_link *link; - int ret = -1; - obj = bpf_object__open_file(objfile, NULL); - if (!obj || libbpf_get_error(obj)) { + c->obj = NULL; + c->link = NULL; + c->entry = entry; + + c->obj = bpf_object__open_file(objfile, NULL); + if (!c->obj || libbpf_get_error(c->obj)) { fprintf(stderr, "open %s failed\n", objfile); + c->obj = NULL; return -1; } - if (bpf_object__load(obj)) { + if (bpf_object__load(c->obj)) { fprintf(stderr, "load %s failed (check dmesg for the verifier log)\n", objfile); - goto close; + goto fail; } - map = bpf_object__find_map_by_name(obj, handler); + map = bpf_object__find_map_by_name(c->obj, handler); if (!map) { fprintf(stderr, "no struct_ops map '%s' in %s\n", handler, objfile); - goto close; + goto fail; } - link = bpf_map__attach_struct_ops(map); - if (!link || libbpf_get_error(link)) { + c->link = bpf_map__attach_struct_ops(map); + if (!c->link || libbpf_get_error(c->link)) { fprintf(stderr, "attach struct_ops '%s' failed\n", handler); - goto close; + c->link = NULL; + goto fail; } if (register_entry(entry, handler)) { fprintf(stderr, "register 'B' entry '%s' failed\n", entry); - goto detach; + goto fail; } + return 0; + +fail: + bpf_link__destroy(c->link); + bpf_object__close(c->obj); + c->obj = NULL; + c->link = NULL; + return -1; +} + +static void bpf_case_stop(struct bpf_case *c) +{ + unregister(c->entry); + bpf_link__destroy(c->link); + bpf_object__close(c->obj); +} + +/* Activate @handler, run @target and check it produced @expect. */ +static int run_case(const char *objfile, const char *handler, + const char *entry, const char *target, const char *expect) +{ + struct bpf_case c; + int ret; + + if (bpf_case_start(&c, objfile, handler, entry)) + return -1; ret = check_output(target, expect); - unregister_entry(entry); -detach: - bpf_link__destroy(link); -close: - bpf_object__close(obj); + bpf_case_stop(&c); return ret; } -int main(void) +FIXTURE(bpf_handler) { + char obj[PATH_MAX]; /* struct_ops object of the case under test */ +}; + +FIXTURE_SETUP(bpf_handler) { - char src[600], obj[600], appdst[600], interpdst[600]; - char exe[512]; - ssize_t n; - int fail = 0; - struct stat st; + char src[PATH_MAX]; struct btf *btf; - if (getuid() != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "Skipping: test must be run as root\n"); - return 4; /* KSFT_SKIP */ - } + if (getuid() != 0) + SKIP(return, "test must be run as root"); /* The kernel must know struct binfmt_misc_ops (CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_BPF). */ btf = btf__load_vmlinux_btf(); if (!btf || btf__find_by_name_kind(btf, "binfmt_misc_ops", BTF_KIND_STRUCT) < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, - "Skipping: no struct binfmt_misc_ops in the kernel BTF (CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_BPF)\n"); btf__free(btf); - return 4; /* KSFT_SKIP */ + SKIP(return, + "no struct binfmt_misc_ops in the kernel BTF (CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_BPF)"); } btf__free(btf); - n = readlink("/proc/self/exe", exe, sizeof(exe) - 1); - if (n < 0) { - perror("readlink"); - return 1; - } - exe[n] = '\0'; - snprintf(testdir, sizeof(testdir), "%s", dirname(exe)); - - if (stat("/sys/fs/bpf", &st) < 0) - mkdir("/sys/fs/bpf", 0755); - mount("bpf", "/sys/fs/bpf", "bpf", 0, NULL); - if (access(BINFMT_REG, F_OK) < 0) - mount("binfmt_misc", "/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc", "binfmt_misc", 0, NULL); + if (!binfmt_misc_available()) + SKIP(return, "no binfmt_misc"); /* Shared test interpreter. */ - snprintf(src, sizeof(src), "%s/binfmt_bpf_interp", testdir); - if (copy_file(src, INTERP_PATH)) { - fprintf(stderr, "cannot install %s\n", INTERP_PATH); - return 1; - } - - /* Case 1: match a synthetic aarch64 header -> fixed interpreter. */ - printf("[*] case 1: match aarch64 header -> program-chosen interpreter\n"); - if (create_fake_aarch64(AARCH64_PATH)) { - fprintf(stderr, "cannot create %s\n", AARCH64_PATH); - return 1; - } - snprintf(obj, sizeof(obj), "%s/bpf_interp.bpf.o", testdir); - if (run_case(obj, "bpf_interp", "test_bpf_interp", AARCH64_PATH, EXPECT) == 0) - printf("[+] case 1 passed\n"); - else { - printf("[-] case 1 FAILED\n"); - fail = 1; - } - unlink(AARCH64_PATH); - - /* Case 2: $ORIGIN-relative PT_INTERP -> co-located interpreter. */ - printf("[*] case 2: $ORIGIN interpreter resolved relative to the binary\n"); - mkdir(RELOC_DIR, 0755); - snprintf(appdst, sizeof(appdst), "%s/app", RELOC_DIR); - snprintf(interpdst, sizeof(interpdst), "%s/binfmt_bpf_interp", RELOC_DIR); - snprintf(src, sizeof(src), "%s/binfmt_bpf_app", testdir); - if (copy_file(src, appdst) || - copy_file(INTERP_PATH, interpdst)) { - fprintf(stderr, "cannot set up %s\n", RELOC_DIR); - fail = 1; - } else { - snprintf(obj, sizeof(obj), "%s/nix_origin.bpf.o", testdir); - if (run_case(obj, "nix_origin", "test_bpf_origin", appdst, EXPECT) == 0) - printf("[+] case 2 passed\n"); - else { - printf("[-] case 2 FAILED\n"); - fail = 1; - } - } - unlink(appdst); - unlink(interpdst); - rmdir(RELOC_DIR); - unlink(INTERP_PATH); - - if (!fail) - printf("[*] all binfmt_misc bpf cases passed\n"); - return fail; + ASSERT_EQ(artifact_path(src, sizeof(src), "binfmt_bpf_interp"), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(copy_file(src, INTERP_PATH), 0); } + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(bpf_handler) +{ + unlink(INTERP_PATH); +} + +/* The match program matches a synthetic header, the load program routes it. */ +TEST_F(bpf_handler, fixed_interpreter) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(create_fake_elf(AARCH64_PATH, EM_AARCH64), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(artifact_path(self->obj, sizeof(self->obj), + "bpf_interp.bpf.o"), 0); + EXPECT_EQ(run_case(self->obj, "bpf_interp", "test_bpf_interp", + AARCH64_PATH, EXPECT), 0); + unlink(AARCH64_PATH); +} + +/* A "$ORIGIN/..." PT_INTERP resolved to an interpreter next to the binary. */ +TEST_F(bpf_handler, origin_relative_interpreter) +{ + char src[PATH_MAX], app[PATH_MAX], interp[PATH_MAX]; + char dir[] = RELOC_TEMPLATE; + + ASSERT_NE(mkdtemp(dir), NULL); + snprintf(app, sizeof(app), "%s/app", dir); + snprintf(interp, sizeof(interp), "%s/binfmt_bpf_interp", dir); + ASSERT_EQ(artifact_path(src, sizeof(src), "binfmt_bpf_app"), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(copy_file(src, app), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(copy_file(INTERP_PATH, interp), 0); + + ASSERT_EQ(artifact_path(self->obj, sizeof(self->obj), + "nix_origin.bpf.o"), 0); + EXPECT_EQ(run_case(self->obj, "nix_origin", "test_bpf_origin", + app, EXPECT), 0); + + unlink(app); + unlink(interp); + rmdir(dir); +} + +/* A transparent dispatch: the process presents as the binary, not the interp. */ +TEST_F(bpf_handler, transparent_dispatch) +{ + char src[PATH_MAX], cmd[PATH_MAX + 16]; + + /* Probe for transparent-mode support via its static counterpart. */ + if (binfmt_flag_supported('T')) + SKIP(return, "kernel without transparent mode"); + + ASSERT_EQ(artifact_path(src, sizeof(src), "binfmt_transparent_interp"), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(copy_file(src, TRANS_INTERP), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(create_fake_elf(TRANS_PATH, EM_RISCV), 0); + + setenv("BINFMT_TEST_BINARY", TRANS_PATH, 1); + snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "%s argone argtwo", TRANS_PATH); + ASSERT_EQ(artifact_path(self->obj, sizeof(self->obj), + "transparent.bpf.o"), 0); + EXPECT_EQ(run_case(self->obj, "transparent", "test_bpf_transparent", + cmd, TRANS_EXPECT), 0); + + unlink(TRANS_PATH); + unlink(TRANS_INTERP); +} + +/* A per-exec loader substitution: the payload runs as a native exec. */ +TEST_F(bpf_handler, loader_substitution) +{ + char src[PATH_MAX], loader[PATH_MAX]; + struct bpf_case c; + int status; + + if (find_loader(loader, sizeof(loader))) + SKIP(return, "cannot determine own PT_INTERP"); + + ASSERT_EQ(copy_file(loader, LOADER_INTERP), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(artifact_path(src, sizeof(src), "binfmt_loader_payload"), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(copy_file(src, LOADER_PATH), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(patch_file(LOADER_PATH, EI_PAD, LOADER_MARKER, + strlen(LOADER_MARKER)), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(artifact_path(self->obj, sizeof(self->obj), + "loader.bpf.o"), 0); + + setenv("BINFMT_TEST_BINARY", LOADER_PATH, 1); + setenv("BINFMT_TEST_INTERP", LOADER_INTERP, 1); + + ASSERT_EQ(bpf_case_start(&c, self->obj, "loader", "test_bpf_loader"), 0); + status = run_payload(LOADER_PATH); + bpf_case_stop(&c); + EXPECT_EQ(status, 0); + + unsetenv("BINFMT_TEST_INTERP"); + unlink(LOADER_PATH); + unlink(LOADER_INTERP); +} + +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_common.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c6900ded019f --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_common.h @@ -0,0 +1,276 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* Helpers shared by the binfmt_misc selftests. */ +#ifndef __SELFTESTS_EXEC_BINFMT_MISC_COMMON_H +#define __SELFTESTS_EXEC_BINFMT_MISC_COMMON_H + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define BINFMT_DIR "/proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc" +#define BINFMT_REG BINFMT_DIR "/register" + +/* comm holds 15 usable chars; a read of /proc/self/comm appends a newline. */ +#define TASK_COMM_LEN 16 + +/* The canonical payload argv: run_payload() passes it, the payloads assert it. */ +#define PAYLOAD_ARGV0 "payload-argv0" +#define PAYLOAD_ARG1 "argone" +#define PAYLOAD_ARG2 "argtwo" + +/* Marker the loader tests poke into the payload's e_ident padding. */ +#define LOADER_MARKER "LDRTST" + +/* Exit status run_payload() reports when the exec was refused as unhandled. */ +#define RUN_ENOEXEC 42 + +static inline int copy_file(const char *src, const char *dst) +{ + char buf[4096]; + int in, out; + ssize_t n; + + in = open(src, O_RDONLY); + if (in < 0) + return -1; + /* The tests share /tmp, so never write through a name they don't own. */ + unlink(dst); + out = open(dst, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0755); + if (out < 0) { + close(in); + return -1; + } + while ((n = read(in, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) { + if (write(out, buf, n) != n) { + close(in); + close(out); + return -1; + } + } + close(in); + close(out); + return n < 0 ? -1 : 0; +} + +/* Write @rule to the register file, preserving the write's errno. */ +static inline int write_reg(const char *rule) +{ + int fd, saved; + ssize_t n; + + fd = open(BINFMT_REG, O_WRONLY); + if (fd < 0) + return -1; + n = write(fd, rule, strlen(rule)); + saved = errno; + close(fd); + errno = saved; + return n < 0 ? -1 : 0; +} + +static inline void unregister(const char *name) +{ + char path[PATH_MAX]; + int fd; + + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), BINFMT_DIR "/%s", name); + fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); + if (fd >= 0) { + if (write(fd, "-1", 2) < 0) + ; /* best effort */ + close(fd); + } +} + +/* Mount binfmt_misc unless it already is, and report whether it is usable. */ +static inline bool binfmt_misc_available(void) +{ + if (access(BINFMT_REG, F_OK) < 0) + mount("binfmt_misc", BINFMT_DIR, "binfmt_misc", 0, NULL); + return access(BINFMT_REG, F_OK) == 0; +} + +/* Absolute path of @name in the directory this test was built into. */ +static inline int artifact_path(char *out, size_t sz, const char *name) +{ + char exe[PATH_MAX]; + ssize_t n; + + n = readlink("/proc/self/exe", exe, sizeof(exe) - 1); + if (n < 0) + return -1; + exe[n] = '\0'; + if ((size_t)snprintf(out, sz, "%s/%s", dirname(exe), name) >= sz) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +/* Probe kernel support for a registration flag with a throwaway entry. */ +static inline int binfmt_flag_supported(char flag) +{ + char rule[64]; + + snprintf(rule, sizeof(rule), ":bm_flag_probe:E::bmprobe::/bin/true:%c", + flag); + if (write_reg(rule)) + return -1; + unregister("bm_flag_probe"); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Run @path with the canonical payload argv and return its exit status, or + * RUN_ENOEXEC when the exec itself was refused as unhandled. + */ +static inline int run_payload(const char *path) +{ + int status; + pid_t pid; + + pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + execl(path, PAYLOAD_ARGV0, PAYLOAD_ARG1, PAYLOAD_ARG2, + (char *)NULL); + _exit(errno == ENOEXEC ? RUN_ENOEXEC : 126); + } + if (pid < 0 || waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid || !WIFEXITED(status)) + return -1; + return WEXITSTATUS(status); +} + +/* Does the exe link name @path? */ +static inline bool exe_is(const char *path) +{ + char exe[PATH_MAX], real[PATH_MAX]; + ssize_t n; + + n = readlink("/proc/self/exe", exe, sizeof(exe) - 1); + if (n <= 0 || !realpath(path, real)) + return false; + exe[n] = '\0'; + return !strcmp(exe, real); +} + +/* Is comm @name truncated to what a comm can hold? */ +static inline bool comm_is(const char *name) +{ + char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN + 2], expect[TASK_COMM_LEN]; + ssize_t n; + int fd; + + fd = open("/proc/self/comm", O_RDONLY); + if (fd < 0) + return false; + n = read(fd, comm, sizeof(comm) - 1); + close(fd); + if (n <= 0) + return false; + if (comm[n - 1] == '\n') + n--; + comm[n] = '\0'; + snprintf(expect, sizeof(expect), "%s", name); + return !strcmp(comm, expect); +} + +/* Opening @path for writing has to fail with ETXTBSY. */ +static inline bool write_denied(const char *path) +{ + int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); + + if (fd >= 0) { + close(fd); + return false; + } + return errno == ETXTBSY; +} + +static inline int patch_file(const char *path, off_t off, const void *data, size_t len) +{ + ssize_t n; + int fd; + + fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); + if (fd < 0) + return -1; + n = pwrite(fd, data, len, off); + close(fd); + return n == (ssize_t)len ? 0 : -1; +} + +/* start_code and end_code are the 26th and 27th fields of /proc/pid/stat. */ +static inline int stat_codes(pid_t pid, unsigned long *start_code, + unsigned long *end_code) +{ + char buf[4096], path[64], *p; + ssize_t n; + int fd, i; + + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/stat", pid); + fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); + if (fd < 0) + return -1; + n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); + close(fd); + if (n <= 0) + return -1; + buf[n] = '\0'; + + /* Skip "pid (comm)", then start_code is the 24th field after it. */ + p = strrchr(buf, ')'); + if (!p) + return -1; + p++; + for (i = 0; i < 23; i++) { + p = strchr(p + 1, ' '); + if (!p) + return -1; + } + if (sscanf(p, " %lu %lu", start_code, end_code) != 2) + return -1; + return 0; +} + +/* Find the system loader through our own PT_INTERP. */ +static inline int find_loader(char *out, size_t sz) +{ + ElfW(Ehdr) eh; + ElfW(Phdr) ph; + int fd, i, ret = -1; + + fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY); + if (fd < 0) + return -1; + if (pread(fd, &eh, sizeof(eh), 0) != sizeof(eh)) + goto out; + for (i = 0; i < eh.e_phnum; i++) { + if (pread(fd, &ph, sizeof(ph), + eh.e_phoff + i * eh.e_phentsize) != sizeof(ph)) + goto out; + if (ph.p_type != PT_INTERP) + continue; + if (!ph.p_filesz || ph.p_filesz > sz) + goto out; + if (pread(fd, out, ph.p_filesz, ph.p_offset) != + (ssize_t)ph.p_filesz) + goto out; + out[ph.p_filesz - 1] = '\0'; + ret = 0; + break; + } +out: + close(fd); + return ret; +} + +#endif /* __SELFTESTS_EXEC_BINFMT_MISC_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_loader.c b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_loader.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1e14dcd274af --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_loader.c @@ -0,0 +1,372 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Test the 'L' (loader substitution) flag of binfmt_misc. A matched + * binary runs as the MAIN image - a fully native exec - with the + * registered interpreter substituted for its PT_INTERP. The payload + * (binfmt_loader_payload) asserts the native identity from inside. + * + * The substitute is a copy of the system loader found via our own + * PT_INTERP; magic matching pokes a marker into the ELF header's + * e_ident padding, which kernel and loader ignore. + * + * Needs root for the registration; no bpf toolchain involved. + */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "binfmt_misc_common.h" +#include "kselftest_harness.h" + +#define ENTRY "test_loader" +#define INTERP_PATH "/tmp/binfmt_loader_interp" +#define MOVED_PATH INTERP_PATH ".moved" +#define TARGET_PATH "/tmp/binfmt_loader_target.ldrtest" +#define STATIC_PATH "/tmp/binfmt_loader_static.ldrtest" +#define FOREIGN_PATH "/tmp/binfmt_loader_foreign.ldrtest" +#define SCRIPT_PATH "/tmp/binfmt_loader_script.ldrtest" +#define M_RULE ":" ENTRY ":M:9:" LOADER_MARKER "::" INTERP_PATH ":L" +#define E_RULE ":" ENTRY ":E::ldrtest::" INTERP_PATH ":L" +#define FL_RULE ":" ENTRY ":E::ldrtest::" INTERP_PATH ":FL" + +/* Execute the binary from an inaccessible O_CLOEXEC memfd. */ +static int run_memfd(const char *path) +{ + int status; + pid_t pid; + + pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + char *argv[] = { PAYLOAD_ARGV0, PAYLOAD_ARG1, PAYLOAD_ARG2, NULL }; + char buf[4096]; + int in, mfd; + ssize_t n; + + mfd = memfd_create("loader-test", MFD_CLOEXEC); + in = open(path, O_RDONLY); + if (mfd < 0 || in < 0) + _exit(125); + while ((n = read(in, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) + if (write(mfd, buf, n) != n) + _exit(125); + close(in); + setenv("BINFMT_TEST_MEMFD", "1", 1); + unsetenv("BINFMT_TEST_BINARY"); + syscall(SYS_execveat, mfd, "", argv, environ, AT_EMPTY_PATH); + _exit(126); + } + if (pid < 0 || waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid || !WIFEXITED(status)) + return -1; + return WEXITSTATUS(status); +} + +/* + * The differentiator against the transparent mode: at PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC + * the identity is already complete - exe, auxv and the stat code markers + * are mutually consistent with no window a debugger could observe. + */ +static int ptrace_probe(const char *target) +{ + unsigned long auxv[2 * 64], base = 0, entry = 0, at_flags = 0; + unsigned long start_code = 0, end_code = 0; + int status, fd, execfd_seen = 0, failed = 0; + char path[64], buf[PATH_MAX]; + ssize_t n; + pid_t pid; + int i; + + pid = fork(); + if (pid == 0) { + ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, NULL, NULL); + raise(SIGSTOP); + execl(target, PAYLOAD_ARGV0, PAYLOAD_ARG1, PAYLOAD_ARG2, (char *)NULL); + _exit(126); + } + if (pid < 0) + return -1; + if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid || !WIFSTOPPED(status)) + goto fail_kill; + if (ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, pid, NULL, (void *)PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC)) + goto fail_kill; + if (ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, NULL, NULL)) + goto fail_kill; + if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid || !WIFSTOPPED(status) || + status >> 8 != (SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC << 8))) { + fprintf(stderr, "no exec stop (status %#x)\n", status); + goto fail_kill; + } + + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/exe", pid); + n = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); + if (n <= 0) { + failed = 1; + } else { + buf[n] = '\0'; + if (strcmp(buf, target)) { + fprintf(stderr, "exe at exec stop: %s\n", buf); + failed = 1; + } + } + + snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/auxv", pid); + fd = open(path, O_RDONLY); + if (fd < 0) { + n = -1; + } else { + n = read(fd, auxv, sizeof(auxv)); + close(fd); + } + if (n <= 0) { + failed = 1; + n = 0; + } + for (i = 0; i + 1 < (int)(n / sizeof(unsigned long)); i += 2) { + switch (auxv[i]) { + case AT_BASE: + base = auxv[i + 1]; + break; + case AT_ENTRY: + entry = auxv[i + 1]; + break; + case AT_FLAGS: + at_flags = auxv[i + 1]; + break; + case AT_EXECFD: + execfd_seen = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (stat_codes(pid, &start_code, &end_code)) + failed = 1; + + if (!base || execfd_seen || at_flags) { + fprintf(stderr, "auxv at exec stop not native\n"); + failed = 1; + } + if (!start_code || entry < start_code || entry >= end_code) { + fprintf(stderr, "auxv/stat inconsistent at exec stop\n"); + failed = 1; + } + + if (ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, NULL, NULL)) + goto fail_kill; + if (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) != pid || !WIFEXITED(status) || + WEXITSTATUS(status)) + failed = 1; + return failed ? -1 : 0; + +fail_kill: + kill(pid, SIGKILL); + waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + return -1; +} + +FIXTURE(loader) { + bool have_static; +}; + +FIXTURE_SETUP(loader) +{ + unsigned short foreign_machine = 0xdead; + char src[PATH_MAX], loader[PATH_MAX]; + + if (getuid() != 0) + SKIP(return, "test must be run as root"); + if (!binfmt_misc_available()) + SKIP(return, "no binfmt_misc"); + if (find_loader(loader, sizeof(loader))) + SKIP(return, "cannot determine own PT_INTERP"); + + ASSERT_EQ(copy_file(loader, INTERP_PATH), 0); + + ASSERT_EQ(artifact_path(src, sizeof(src), "binfmt_loader_payload"), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(copy_file(src, TARGET_PATH), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(patch_file(TARGET_PATH, EI_PAD, LOADER_MARKER, + strlen(LOADER_MARKER)), 0); + + /* The same payload with a machine type this kernel cannot load. */ + ASSERT_EQ(copy_file(src, FOREIGN_PATH), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(patch_file(FOREIGN_PATH, EI_PAD, LOADER_MARKER, + strlen(LOADER_MARKER)), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(patch_file(FOREIGN_PATH, offsetof(ElfW(Ehdr), e_machine), + &foreign_machine, sizeof(foreign_machine)), 0); + + self->have_static = + artifact_path(src, sizeof(src), "binfmt_loader_payload_static") == 0 && + copy_file(src, STATIC_PATH) == 0; + + setenv("BINFMT_TEST_BINARY", TARGET_PATH, 1); + setenv("BINFMT_TEST_INTERP", INTERP_PATH, 1); + + /* Everything below needs the flag; find out once. */ + if (write_reg(E_RULE)) { + ASSERT_EQ(errno, EINVAL); + SKIP(return, "kernel without the 'L' flag"); + } + unregister(ENTRY); +} + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(loader) +{ + unregister(ENTRY); + if (access(MOVED_PATH, F_OK) == 0) + rename(MOVED_PATH, INTERP_PATH); + unlink(TARGET_PATH); + unlink(STATIC_PATH); + unlink(FOREIGN_PATH); + unlink(SCRIPT_PATH); + unlink(INTERP_PATH); +} + +/* Grammar sanity check: the same entry without 'L' has to register. */ +TEST_F(loader, plain_entry_registers) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(write_reg(":" ENTRY ":E::ldrtest::" INTERP_PATH ":"), 0); +} + +/* 'L' is a native exec: every classic-dispatch flag is rejected. */ +TEST_F(loader, rejects_classic_flags) +{ + static const char * const combos[] = { "LT", "LP", "LC", "LO" }; + char rule[PATH_MAX]; + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(combos); i++) { + int rc; + + snprintf(rule, sizeof(rule), + ":" ENTRY ":E::ldrtest::" INTERP_PATH ":%s", combos[i]); + rc = write_reg(rule); + EXPECT_EQ(rc, -1) + TH_LOG("'%s' was not rejected", combos[i]); + if (rc == 0) { + unregister(ENTRY); + continue; + } + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL); + } +} + +/* + * Without 'F' the interpreter is opened when the binary is executed, so a + * relative path would be resolved against the caller's working directory. + */ +TEST_F(loader, rejects_relative_interpreter) +{ + static const char * const flags[] = { "L", "C" }; + char rule[PATH_MAX]; + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(flags); i++) { + int rc; + + snprintf(rule, sizeof(rule), + ":" ENTRY ":E::ldrtest::binfmt_loader_interp:%s", + flags[i]); + rc = write_reg(rule); + EXPECT_EQ(rc, -1) + TH_LOG("'%s' accepted a relative interpreter", flags[i]); + if (rc == 0) { + unregister(ENTRY); + continue; + } + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL); + } +} + +TEST_F(loader, extension_matched) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(write_reg(E_RULE), 0); + EXPECT_EQ(run_payload(TARGET_PATH), 0); +} + +TEST_F(loader, magic_matched) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(write_reg(M_RULE), 0); + EXPECT_EQ(run_payload(TARGET_PATH), 0); +} + +/* + * The differentiator against the transparent mode: at PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC the + * identity is already complete, with no window a debugger could observe. + */ +TEST_F(loader, exec_stop_consistency) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(write_reg(E_RULE), 0); + EXPECT_EQ(ptrace_probe(TARGET_PATH), 0); +} + +/* A binary without PT_INTERP drops the override and runs natively. */ +TEST_F(loader, static_binary_runs_natively) +{ + if (!self->have_static) + SKIP(return, "no static payload built"); + + ASSERT_EQ(write_reg(E_RULE), 0); + setenv("BINFMT_TEST_BINARY", STATIC_PATH, 1); + setenv("BINFMT_TEST_STATIC", "1", 1); + EXPECT_EQ(run_payload(STATIC_PATH), 0); + unsetenv("BINFMT_TEST_STATIC"); + setenv("BINFMT_TEST_BINARY", TARGET_PATH, 1); +} + +/* + * A '#!' file that matched an 'L' entry is claimed by binfmt_script, which + * sits ahead of binfmt_elf. The substitute the entry staged has to be + * released when the interpreter replaces the file, not leaked. + */ +TEST_F(loader, script_claims_the_file) +{ + static const char script[] = "#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n"; + int fd; + + unlink(SCRIPT_PATH); + fd = open(SCRIPT_PATH, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0755); + ASSERT_GE(fd, 0); + ASSERT_EQ(write(fd, script, sizeof(script) - 1), + (ssize_t)sizeof(script) - 1); + ASSERT_EQ(close(fd), 0); + + ASSERT_EQ(write_reg(E_RULE), 0); + EXPECT_EQ(run_payload(SCRIPT_PATH), 0); + + /* A leaked substitute keeps its write denial on the loader. */ + fd = open(INTERP_PATH, O_WRONLY); + EXPECT_GE(fd, 0) + TH_LOG("loader still write denied (errno %d)", errno); + if (fd >= 0) + close(fd); +} + +/* Nothing needs the binary's path, so an inaccessible fd works. */ +TEST_F(loader, inaccessible_memfd) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(write_reg(M_RULE), 0); + EXPECT_EQ(run_memfd(TARGET_PATH), 0); +} + +/* The whole exec of a wrong-arch binary fails as if unhandled. */ +TEST_F(loader, foreign_arch_enoexec) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(write_reg(M_RULE), 0); + EXPECT_EQ(run_payload(FOREIGN_PATH), RUN_ENOEXEC); +} + +/* 'F' pre-opens the substitute, so it survives losing its path. */ +TEST_F(loader, fixed_interpreter_survives_rename) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(write_reg(FL_RULE), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(rename(INTERP_PATH, MOVED_PATH), 0); + EXPECT_EQ(run_payload(TARGET_PATH), 0); +} + +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_transparent.c b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_transparent.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d0cb845df1d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_misc_transparent.c @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Test the static transparent flag 'T' of binfmt_misc. A magic-matched + * binary is dispatched to an interpreter with the argument vector left + * untouched, the binary passed through AT_EXECFD and mm->exe_file labeled + * with the binary. The asserting interpreter (binfmt_transparent_interp) + * verifies the constructed identity from inside the process and exits 0. + * + * Needs root for the registration; no bpf toolchain involved. + */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include + +#include "binfmt_misc_common.h" +#include "kselftest_harness.h" + +#define MAGIC "#TRANSPARENT-SELFTEST#" +#define TARGET_PATH "/tmp/binfmt_transparent_target" +#define INTERP_PATH "/tmp/binfmt_transparent_interp" +#define ENTRY "test_transparent" +#define RULE(flags) ":" ENTRY ":M:0:" MAGIC "::" INTERP_PATH ":" flags + +/* The target only has to carry the magic; it is never actually loaded. */ +static int create_target(void) +{ + char buf[128] = MAGIC "\n"; + int fd; + + unlink(TARGET_PATH); + fd = open(TARGET_PATH, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0755); + if (fd < 0) + return -1; + if (write(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != (ssize_t)sizeof(buf)) { + close(fd); + return -1; + } + close(fd); + return 0; +} + +FIXTURE(transparent) { +}; + +FIXTURE_SETUP(transparent) +{ + char src[PATH_MAX]; + + if (getuid() != 0) + SKIP(return, "test must be run as root"); + if (!binfmt_misc_available()) + SKIP(return, "no binfmt_misc"); + + ASSERT_EQ(artifact_path(src, sizeof(src), "binfmt_transparent_interp"), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(copy_file(src, INTERP_PATH), 0); + ASSERT_EQ(create_target(), 0); + + /* Skip the whole suite on a kernel that does not know 'T'. */ + if (binfmt_flag_supported('T')) { + ASSERT_EQ(errno, EINVAL); + SKIP(return, "kernel without the 'T' flag"); + } +} + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(transparent) +{ + unregister(ENTRY); + unlink(TARGET_PATH); + unlink(INTERP_PATH); +} + +/* Grammar sanity check: the same entry without 'T' has to register. */ +TEST_F(transparent, plain_entry_registers) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(write_reg(RULE("")), 0); +} + +/* 'T' preserves the whole argv, so combining it with 'P' is rejected. */ +TEST_F(transparent, rejects_preserve_argv0) +{ + ASSERT_NE(write_reg(RULE("TP")), 0); + EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL); +} + +/* The interpreter asserts the identity the kernel built for it. */ +TEST_F(transparent, dispatch) +{ + ASSERT_EQ(write_reg(RULE("T")), 0); + + setenv("BINFMT_TEST_BINARY", TARGET_PATH, 1); + setenv("BINFMT_TEST_ARGV0", PAYLOAD_ARGV0, 1); + EXPECT_EQ(run_payload(TARGET_PATH), 0); +} + +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_transparent_interp.c b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_transparent_interp.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d4c4a538c9aa --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/binfmt_transparent_interp.c @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Asserting interpreter for the transparent binfmt_misc mode. It runs in + * place of the dispatched binary and verifies the identity the kernel + * constructed: the aux vector contract, the exe link, argv, cmdline, comm + * and the write denial on the binary. BINFMT_TEST_BINARY names the binary; + * the harness execs it with the arguments "argone argtwo". Prints + * TRANSPARENT_OK and exits 0 when every check holds. + */ +#define _GNU_SOURCE +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "binfmt_misc_common.h" +#include "kselftest.h" + +#ifndef AT_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP +#define AT_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP (1 << 1) +#endif + +static int fail; + +static void ok(int cond, const char *what) +{ + if (!cond) { + fprintf(stderr, "TRANSPARENT_FAIL: %s (errno %d)\n", what, errno); + fail = 1; + } +} + +int main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + const char *binary = getenv("BINFMT_TEST_BINARY"); + const char *argv0 = getenv("BINFMT_TEST_ARGV0"); + char expect[PATH_MAX + 32], buf[PATH_MAX]; + unsigned long execfd; + struct stat stb, stfd; + const char *want[3]; + const char *base; + size_t expect_len, i; + int fd, have_stb, have_stfd; + ssize_t n; + + if (!binary) { + fprintf(stderr, "TRANSPARENT_FAIL: BINFMT_TEST_BINARY unset\n"); + return 1; + } + /* Distinct from the binary path, so a classic argv splice is caught. */ + want[0] = argv0 ? argv0 : binary; + want[1] = PAYLOAD_ARG1; + want[2] = PAYLOAD_ARG2; + + /* The aux vector announces the transparent contract. */ + ok(getauxval(AT_FLAGS) & AT_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP, + "AT_FLAGS lacks AT_FLAGS_TRANSPARENT_INTERP"); + + /* AT_EXECFD refers to the very file that was executed. */ + execfd = getauxval(AT_EXECFD); + ok(execfd > 2, "no AT_EXECFD"); + have_stb = !stat(binary, &stb); + ok(have_stb, "cannot stat the binary"); + have_stfd = !fstat((int)execfd, &stfd); + ok(have_stfd, "cannot fstat AT_EXECFD"); + ok(have_stb && have_stfd && stb.st_dev == stfd.st_dev && + stb.st_ino == stfd.st_ino, "AT_EXECFD is not the binary"); + + /* The exe link names the binary, not this interpreter. */ + ok(exe_is(binary), "/proc/self/exe is not the binary"); + + /* argv arrived unspliced. */ + ok(argc == (int)ARRAY_SIZE(want), "argv was rewritten"); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(want) && i < (size_t)argc; i++) + ok(!strcmp(argv[i], want[i]), "argv was rewritten"); + + /* And so did the kernel's copy of it: the same strings, NUL separated. */ + for (i = 0, expect_len = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(want); i++) { + size_t len = strlen(want[i]) + 1; + + if (expect_len + len > sizeof(expect)) { + ok(0, "argv does not fit the expectation buffer"); + break; + } + memcpy(expect + expect_len, want[i], len); + expect_len += len; + } + fd = open("/proc/self/cmdline", O_RDONLY); + n = fd >= 0 ? read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) : -1; + if (fd >= 0) + close(fd); + ok(n == (ssize_t)expect_len && !memcmp(buf, expect, expect_len), + "/proc/self/cmdline was rewritten"); + + /* comm is the binary's basename. */ + base = strrchr(binary, '/'); + base = base ? base + 1 : binary; + ok(comm_is(base), "comm is not the binary's basename"); + + /* The binary is write-denied while it runs, like a direct exec. */ + ok(write_denied(binary), "binary is writable while running"); + ok(write_denied("/proc/self/exe"), "exe link is writable while running"); + + if (!fail) + printf("TRANSPARENT_OK\n"); + return fail; +} diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/config b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/config index c308079867b3..2b1973e14291 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/config +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/config @@ -1,2 +1,9 @@ CONFIG_BLK_DEV=y CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP=y +CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC=y +CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_BPF=y +CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y +CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF4=y diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/loader.bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/loader.bpf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..108e51dd4961 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/loader.bpf.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * binfmt_misc_ops handler for the loader-substitution case: match the + * marker the harness poked into the payload's e_ident padding and ask for + * the selected interpreter to be substituted for the binary's PT_INTERP, + * so the binary itself runs as a fully native exec. + */ +#include "vmlinux.h" +#include +#include + +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; + +#define EI_CLASS 4 +#define EI_PAD 9 +#define ELFCLASS64 2 + +extern int bpf_binprm_set_interp(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const char *path, + size_t path__sz) __ksym; +extern int bpf_binprm_set_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm, + enum bpf_binprm_flags flags) __ksym; + +SEC("struct_ops.s/match") +bool BPF_PROG(loader_match, struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + if (bprm->buf[0] != 0x7f || bprm->buf[1] != 'E' || + bprm->buf[2] != 'L' || bprm->buf[3] != 'F' || + bprm->buf[EI_CLASS] != ELFCLASS64) + return false; + + /* The harness marks the payload with "LDRTST" at EI_PAD. */ + return bprm->buf[EI_PAD + 0] == 'L' && bprm->buf[EI_PAD + 1] == 'D' && + bprm->buf[EI_PAD + 2] == 'R' && bprm->buf[EI_PAD + 3] == 'T' && + bprm->buf[EI_PAD + 4] == 'S' && bprm->buf[EI_PAD + 5] == 'T'; +} + +SEC("struct_ops.s/load") +int BPF_PROG(loader_load, struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + char interp[] = "/tmp/binfmt_loader_interp"; + int err; + + err = bpf_binprm_set_flags(bprm, BPF_BINPRM_LOADER); + if (err) + return err; + + /* @path__sz includes the terminating NUL; 0 commits the selection. */ + return bpf_binprm_set_interp(bprm, interp, sizeof(interp)); +} + +SEC(".struct_ops.link") +struct binfmt_misc_ops loader = { + .match = (void *)loader_match, + .load = (void *)loader_load, + .name = "loader", +}; diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/exec/transparent.bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/transparent.bpf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7632019ebe69 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/exec/transparent.bpf.c @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * binfmt_misc_ops handler for the transparent-mode case: match a synthetic + * riscv ELF header and run the asserting interpreter transparently - the + * argument vector untouched, the binary in AT_EXECFD and mm->exe_file + * labeled with the binary. + */ +#include "vmlinux.h" +#include +#include + +char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL"; + +#define EI_CLASS 4 +#define ELFCLASS64 2 +#define EM_RISCV 243 + +extern int bpf_binprm_set_interp(struct linux_binprm *bprm, const char *path, + size_t path__sz) __ksym; +extern int bpf_binprm_set_flags(struct linux_binprm *bprm, + enum bpf_binprm_flags flags) __ksym; + +SEC("struct_ops.s/match") +bool BPF_PROG(transparent_match, struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + __u16 machine; + + if (bprm->buf[0] != 0x7f || bprm->buf[1] != 'E' || + bprm->buf[2] != 'L' || bprm->buf[3] != 'F' || + bprm->buf[EI_CLASS] != ELFCLASS64) + return false; + + /* e_machine is a 16-bit little-endian field at offset 18. */ + machine = (__u8)bprm->buf[18] | ((__u16)(__u8)bprm->buf[19] << 8); + return machine == EM_RISCV; +} + +SEC("struct_ops.s/load") +int BPF_PROG(transparent_load, struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + char interp[] = "/tmp/binfmt_transparent_interp"; + int err; + + err = bpf_binprm_set_flags(bprm, BPF_BINPRM_TRANSPARENT); + if (err) + return err; + + /* @path__sz includes the terminating NUL; 0 commits the selection. */ + return bpf_binprm_set_interp(bprm, interp, sizeof(interp)); +} + +SEC(".struct_ops.link") +struct binfmt_misc_ops transparent = { + .match = (void *)transparent_match, + .load = (void *)transparent_load, + .name = "transparent", +};