x86/bugs: Use VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS in VMX as well

TSA mitigation:

  d8010d4ba4 ("x86/bugs: Add a Transient Scheduler Attacks mitigation")

introduced VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS for guests on AMD CPUs. Currently on Intel
CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS is being used for guests which has a much broader scope
(kernel->user also).

Make mitigations on Intel consistent with TSA. This would help handling the
guest-only mitigations better in future.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
[sean: make CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM mutually exclusive with the MMIO mitigation]
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251113233746.1703361-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
This commit is contained in:
Pawan Gupta 2025-11-13 15:37:39 -08:00 committed by Sean Christopherson
parent 844afc1af3
commit aba7de6088
2 changed files with 10 additions and 5 deletions

View File

@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
/*
* Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before VMenter. This is a subset of
* X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF, and should only be enabled when KVM-only
* X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM, and should only be enabled when KVM-only
* mitigation is required.
*/
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_AUTO : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
/*
* Set if any of MDS/TAA/MMIO/RFDS are going to enable VERW clearing
* through X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF on kernel and guest entry.
* Set if any of MDS/TAA/MMIO/RFDS are going to enable VERW clearing on exit to
* userspace *and* on entry to KVM guests.
*/
static bool verw_clear_cpu_buf_mitigation_selected __ro_after_init;
@ -536,6 +536,7 @@ static void __init mds_apply_mitigation(void)
if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL ||
mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
(mds_nosmt || smt_mitigations == SMT_MITIGATIONS_ON))
cpu_smt_disable(false);
@ -647,6 +648,7 @@ static void __init taa_apply_mitigation(void)
* present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
*/
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
if (taa_nosmt || smt_mitigations == SMT_MITIGATIONS_ON)
cpu_smt_disable(false);
@ -748,6 +750,7 @@ static void __init mmio_apply_mitigation(void)
*/
if (verw_clear_cpu_buf_mitigation_selected) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
static_branch_disable(&cpu_buf_vm_clear);
} else {
static_branch_enable(&cpu_buf_vm_clear);
@ -839,8 +842,10 @@ static void __init rfds_update_mitigation(void)
static void __init rfds_apply_mitigation(void)
{
if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW)
if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM);
}
}
static __init int rfds_parse_cmdline(char *str)

View File

@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX
/* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */
CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
VM_CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS
/* Check @flags to see if VMLAUNCH or VMRESUME is needed. */
testl $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME, WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP)