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tools/testing/cxl: Add "passphrase secure erase" opcode support
Add support to emulate a CXL mem device support the "passphrase secure erase" operation. Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166983615879.2734609.5177049043677443736.stgit@djiang5-desk3.ch.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
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@ -373,6 +373,105 @@ static int mock_unlock_security(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd
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return 0;
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}
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static int mock_passphrase_secure_erase(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds,
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struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd)
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{
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struct cxl_mock_mem_pdata *mdata = dev_get_platdata(cxlds->dev);
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struct cxl_pass_erase *erase;
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if (cmd->size_in != sizeof(*erase))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (cmd->size_out != 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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erase = cmd->payload_in;
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if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_FROZEN) {
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cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY;
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return -ENXIO;
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}
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if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PLIMIT &&
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erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER) {
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cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY;
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return -ENXIO;
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}
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if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PLIMIT &&
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erase->type == CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER) {
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cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_SECURITY;
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return -ENXIO;
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}
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switch (erase->type) {
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case CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER:
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/*
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* The spec does not clearly define the behavior of the scenario
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* where a master passphrase is passed in while the master
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* passphrase is not set and user passphrase is not set. The
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* code will take the assumption that it will behave the same
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* as a CXL secure erase command without passphrase (0x4401).
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*/
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if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_MASTER_PASS_SET) {
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if (memcmp(mdata->master_pass, erase->pass,
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NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) {
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master_plimit_check(mdata);
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cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE;
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return -ENXIO;
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}
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mdata->master_limit = 0;
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mdata->user_limit = 0;
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mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET;
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memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
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mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_LOCKED;
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} else {
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/*
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* CXL rev3 8.2.9.8.6.3 Disable Passphrase
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* When master passphrase is disabled, the device shall
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* return Invalid Input for the Passphrase Secure Erase
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* command with master passphrase.
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*/
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/* Scramble encryption keys so that data is effectively erased */
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break;
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case CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER:
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/*
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* The spec does not clearly define the behavior of the scenario
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* where a user passphrase is passed in while the user
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* passphrase is not set. The code will take the assumption that
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* it will behave the same as a CXL secure erase command without
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* passphrase (0x4401).
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*/
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if (mdata->security_state & CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET) {
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if (memcmp(mdata->user_pass, erase->pass,
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NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN)) {
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user_plimit_check(mdata);
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cmd->return_code = CXL_MBOX_CMD_RC_PASSPHRASE;
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return -ENXIO;
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}
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mdata->user_limit = 0;
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mdata->security_state &= ~CXL_PMEM_SEC_STATE_USER_PASS_SET;
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memset(mdata->user_pass, 0, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
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}
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/*
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* CXL rev3 Table 8-118
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* If user passphrase is not set or supported by device, current
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* passphrase value is ignored. Will make the assumption that
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* the operation will proceed as secure erase w/o passphrase
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* since spec is not explicit.
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*/
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/* Scramble encryption keys so that data is effectively erased */
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break;
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default:
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int mock_get_lsa(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd *cmd)
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{
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struct cxl_mbox_get_lsa *get_lsa = cmd->payload_in;
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@ -483,6 +582,9 @@ static int cxl_mock_mbox_send(struct cxl_dev_state *cxlds, struct cxl_mbox_cmd *
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case CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK:
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rc = mock_unlock_security(cxlds, cmd);
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break;
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case CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE:
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rc = mock_passphrase_secure_erase(cxlds, cmd);
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break;
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default:
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break;
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}
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