netfilter: disable payload mangling in userns

Several parts of network stack rely on iph->ihl validation
done by network stack before PRE_ROUTING.

Disable this feature for user namespaces for now.

tcp option handling is likely safe even for LOCAL_IN, so this
this leaves tcp option mangling via nft_exthdr.c as-is.

I don't think these are the only means to alter packets, but these
appear to be relatively prominent.

This could be relaxed later.  Example:
 - allow userns for ingress hook.
 - allow userns if base is transport header.

 Also, we should revalidate or restrict generally:
 - Don't allow linklayer writes to spill into network header
 - restrict ipv4 and ipv6 to 'known safe' writes, e.g.
   saddr/daddr/check/tos

Reported-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Tong Liu <lyutoon@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/20260515100411.3141-1-fw@strlen.de/
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
This commit is contained in:
Florian Westphal 2026-05-16 23:23:21 +08:00
parent c376f07e16
commit 968cc2c963
2 changed files with 7 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -1141,6 +1141,9 @@ nfqnl_mangle(void *data, unsigned int data_len, struct nf_queue_entry *e, int di
{
struct sk_buff *nskb;
if (e->state.net->user_ns != &init_user_ns)
return -EPERM;
if (diff < 0) {
unsigned int min_len = skb_transport_offset(e->skb);
@ -1537,8 +1540,7 @@ static int nfqnl_recv_verdict(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nfnl_info *info,
if (nfqnl_mangle(nla_data(nfqa[NFQA_PAYLOAD]),
payload_len, entry, diff) < 0)
verdict = NF_DROP;
if (ct && diff)
else if (ct && diff)
nfnl_ct->seq_adjust(entry->skb, ct, ctinfo, diff);
}

View File

@ -917,6 +917,9 @@ static int nft_payload_set_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
struct nft_payload_set *priv = nft_expr_priv(expr);
int err;
if (ctx->net->user_ns != &init_user_ns)
return -EPERM;
priv->base = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_BASE]));
priv->len = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_PAYLOAD_LEN]));